Objections to S 1382, A Bill To Establish Rational Criteria for the Imposition of Capital Punishment

• NCJ Number: 74966
• Journal: Crime and Delinquency Volume: 26 Issue: 4 Dated: (October 1980) Pages: 441-452
• Author(s): C L Black
• Date Published: 1980
• Length: 12 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

The proposed bill to establish criteria for imposing the death penalty in Federal criminal cases is examined and criticized for failing to provide clear guidelines for fair imposition of the death penalty by Federal judges and juries.

Abstract

In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the death penalty laws in five States under Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases. Most States with capital punishment laws follow Gregg's formula for bifurcated trials with guilt determined at one hearing and sentence imposed at another. The result of these approved statutes has been the continued imposition of the death penalty arbitrarily, with the poor, blacks, and uneducated people predominantly populating death row. S. 1382 is a similar attempt to provide guidelines for judges and juries passing sentence in Federal capital cases. Sections defining mitigating and aggravating factors are vague and ambiguous, providing no real guidance to those who must rely on them in formulating and decision. These sections imply that mitigating factors, which include such concepts as youthfulness of the offender and slightly diminished capacity, can be weighed against such aggravating circumstances as treason, aircraft hijacking, or the murder of top-level Federal officials. Since each mitigating and aggravating circumstance must be found unanimously by the jury, the jurors may be able to agree unanimously on a clear-cut aggravating circumstance (e.g., prior criminal record, the murder of a U.S. Supreme court justice) but find a number of mitigating circumstances by a plurality. No guidance is given in the bill for such a situation. Appellate review of the sentences imposed under S. 1382 will be impossible because of the broad discretion left to the judge and jury. There can be no uniformity of result under such a scheme, just as there has been no uniformity of result or discernible nonarbitrary pattern of imposition under similarly structured State laws. S. 1382 will allow Federal judges and juries to impose the sentence of death arbitrarily, and no discernible deterrent effect or effective societal retributive function will result. Footnotes are included.