NCJ Number
16648
Journal
Brooklyn Law Review Volume: 61 Issue: 2 Dated: (FALL 1974) Pages: 325-348
Date Published
1974
Length
24 pages
Annotation
DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AS TO WHETHER FRUITS OF MIRANDA VIOLATIONS MUST BE EXCLUDED FROM THE PROSECUTION'S CASE IS CONSIDERED THE RESULT OF DIFFERING ASSESSMENTS OF THE FUNCTION OF MIRANDA WARNINGS.
Abstract
IN THE SUPREME COURTS DECISION IN MICHIGAN V. TUCKER, THE MAJORITY REASONED THAT MIRANDA WAS INTENDED TO BE A DETERRENT FOR UNLAWFUL POLICE CONDUCT RATHER THAN AN INVIOLABLE GUARANTEE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. IN THIS REASONING MORE FLEXIBILITY IS ADMITTED IN THE USE OF EVIDENCE DRAWN FROM THE ACCUSED'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE POLICE WHERE MIRANDA HAS NOT BEEN PRECISELY FOLLOWED. IN CASES WHERE MIRANDA IS SEEN AS A CONSITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, A VIOLATION OF THAT RIGHT IS CONSIDERED TO EXCLUDE FROM THE LEGAL EVIDENCE ALL INFORMATION GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED TO THE POLICE. THE AUTHOR CONSIDERS THAT TO ADMIT THE FRUITS OF MIRANDA VIOLATIONS UNDER EITHER A DETERRENCE OR A SUBSTANTIVE-PROTECTION THEORY LEAVES A LARGE LOOPHOLE THROUGH WHICH POLICE MAY BENEFIT FROM THE DEPRIVATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, A RESULT SERVING TO ENCOURAGE FUTURE MIRANDA VIOLATIONS.