NCJ Number
244243
Date Published
2013
Length
91 pages
Annotation
This work explores an error in policing, specifically a wrongful arrest, in terms of organizational accident theory, which suggests a single unsafe act is facilitated by several underlying latent conditions.
Abstract
This study explores an organizational accident that occurred in American policing, but the context and circumstances have direct implications for all rule-of-law societies that practice democratic law enforcement. While the proximate cause of any accident is usually someone's immediate action or omission, there is often a trail of underlying latent conditions that facilitated the error; the person has, in effect, been unwittingly ''set up'' for failure by the organization. The study is described in terms of organizational accident theory, which suggests a single unsafe act - in this case a wrongful arrest - is facilitated by several underlying latent conditions that triggered the event and failed to stop the harm once it was set in motion. The analyses show the risk of errors committed by omission were significantly more likely to occur than errors committed by acts of commission and among them, procedural omissions posed the greatest risk. The analysis also reveals proof of concept for the organizational accident model. Policy implications and directions for future research are discussed. (Published Abstract)