INTRODUCTION TO POLICY OPTIMIZING MODELS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS - DRAFT

• NCJ Number: 36055
• Author(s): S NAGEL; M NEEF
• Date Published: 1975
• Length: 31 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: US Dept of Justice; US Dept of Justice NIJ Pub
• Publication Format: Document
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: PAPER PRESENTED AT ANNUAL MEETING OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 1974, CHICAGO

Annotation

THREE MATHEMATICAL MODELS DEVELOPED BY ECONOMISTS (THE MARKETPLACE, THE FIRM, AND THE CONSUMER) ARE USED TO EXPLAIN HOW THE JUDICIAL PROCESS OPERATES AND HOW IT CAN BE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING GIVEN GOALS.

Abstract

THE MAIN DEFINITIONAL ELEMENT THAT ECONOMIC MODELS HAVE IN COMMON PERTINENT TO JUDICIAL RESEARCH IS THAT THEY EACH INVOLVE TWO OR MORE SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS OR INEQUALITIES THAT INTERSECT WHEN GRAPHED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE POINTS OF INTERSECTION REPRESENT THE POINTS TOWARD WHICH THE BEHAVIOR OF AN INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS TEND TO MOVE OR SHOULD MOVE IF HE WANTS TO MAXIMIZE GIVEN GOALS. THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS IS USED TO ILLUSTRATE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MODEL OF THE MARKET PLACE SINCE PLEA BARGAINING INVOLVES A DEFENDANT-BUYER SEEKING AS LOW A PRICE AS POSSIBLE FROM A PROSECUTOR-SELLER. THE MODEL HAS CAUSAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS ON SETTLEMENT OUTCOMES DUE TO CHANGES IN THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND PARTICULARLY DUE TO CHANGES IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. PRETRIAL RELEASE IS USED TO ILLUSTRATE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MODEL OF A PRODUCER SEEKING TO FIND AN OPTIMUM LEVEL OF GOODS TO PRODUCE, SINCE IF TOO MANY OR TOO FEW DEFENDANTS ARE HELD PENDING TRIAL, THERE WILL BE HIGH HOLDING COSTS. IN ADDITION, THE CAUSAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING WHY THE EMPIRICAL PERCENTAGE DIFFERS FROM THE OPTIMUM PERCENTAGE AND FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO REDUCE TOTAL PRETRIAL RELEASE COSTS ARE CONSIDERED. THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING THE OPTIMUM MIX OF EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD DIFFERENT TYPES OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IS USED TO ILLUSTRATE THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MODEL OF THE CONSUMER SEEKING TO FIND AN OPTIMUM MIX AMONG COMPETING GOODS. PERTINENT DATA IS PRESENTED FROM 32 CITIES TO ILLUSTRATE HOW CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION-MAKERS MIGHT CHOOSE AMONG EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD IMPROVING EQUALITY IN VOTING, SCHOOLS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, EMPLOYMENT, HOUSING, AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS. THE MODEL'S CAUSAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING WHY THE INPUTS RELATE TO THE OUTPUTS THE WAY THEY DO AND FOR RECOMMENDING ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATIONS OF EFFORT ARE ALSO DISCUSSED.