Inching up the Learning Curve

• NCJ Number: 200810
• Journal: Homeland Defense Volume: 1 Issue: 2 Dated: May 2003 Pages: 28-32
• Author(s): Michael R. Hathaway
• Editor(s): David Silverberg
• Date Published: May 2003
• Length: 5 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This article reviews the failures in the effectiveness of the Office of National Drug Control Policy and how they can serve as lessons for the Department of Homeland Security to become an organizational paradigm fostering interagency cooperation and engaging operational tasks.

Abstract

To combat the threat of illegal drug use, the United States created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The intent in establishing this office was to unite various elements of the Federal Government responsible for the supply and demand sides of the illegal drug use problem. However, with the establishment of ONDCP, major shortcomings emerged over time and several failures were identified. It is from these shortcomings and failures of ONDCP that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will hopefully learn from. First, the absence of a unified chain of command, no one outside ONDCP reported to the Drug Czar's office this was rectified through the establishment of the DHS. Second, the lack of budget discipline in ONDCP was corrected through departmental structure and complementary realignments of the subcommittee jurisdictions of the Appropriations Committees of the two Houses of Congress. Lastly, separate agency personnel systems rewarding competition instead of cooperation was remedied by the creation of a new DHS personnel system. However, even though DHS represents a significant improvement over ONDCP, DHS adopted the traditional form of organization for civilian agencies of the Federal Government and fails when expected to engage in operational tasks. DHS has laid out plans to correct this problem with the potential for adapting the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which effectively reorganized the Department of Defense through its recognition of the functional division between operational forces and administrative and support functions.