Hired Gun Effect: Assessing the Effect of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony

• NCJ Number: 183262
• Journal: Law and Human Behavior Volume: 24 Issue: 2 Dated: April 2000 Pages: 149-171
• Author(s): Joel Cooper; Isaac M. Neuhaus
• Date Published: April 2000
• Length: 23 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

Three experiments addressed the proposition that jurors use short cuts in processing information when confronted with expert scientific testimony.

Abstract

One study orthogonally manipulated two potential heuristic cues: the level of pay an expert received for his/her testimony and the expert's level of credentials. Mock jurors listened to complex scientific testimony in a civil case and were subjected to one level of each variable. The study hypothesized that, after listening to complex scientific testimony, jurors would be affected by level of credentials and by the magnitude of the fee the witness received for testifying. A second study was conducted in order to assess the impact of the frequency of the expert's court appearances. The study systematically varied information the jury had about the number of times the experts had testified in court as well as the magnitude of the expert's pay. The method was similar to the first experiment, except that all subjects were conducted in the high-credential condition. A third experiment was conducted to assess the effects of pay and frequency of testifying in conditions in which the conceptual distinction between peripheral and central processing could be assessed. This was accomplished by having two sets of testimony, one straightforward and easy to understand, the other more complex and difficult to understand. The study hypothesized that the effects found for the joint impact of pay and frequency would occur when the testimony was complex, but would not occur when the testimony was easier to comprehend. The results of the first two studies demonstrated that experts who are highly paid for their testimony and who testify frequently are perceived as "hired guns." They are neither liked nor believed. The results of the third experiment replicated the hired gun effect and showed that it is most likely to occur when the testimony is complex and cannot be easily processed. The results are discussed in terms of the theoretical differences between central and peripheral processing of persuasive messages in a legal context. 3 figures, 4 tables, and 15 references