NCJ Number
195734
Journal
Journal of Law and Society Volume: 29 Issue: 2 Dated: June 2002 Pages: 227-257
Date Published
June 2002
Length
31 pages
Annotation
Using observational and interview data from the author's study of the investigation and prosecution of crime in France, this paper examines the extent to which three features that are central to inquisitorial procedure -- hierarchy, bureaucracy, and ideology -- affect the official decision-making of the procureur, the judicial officer responsible for supervising the majority of French criminal investigations.
Abstract
As a magistrate who represents the public interest and has almost complete authority over investigation and prosecution, the systematic restriction of the procureur's individual discretion through hierarchical and bureaucratic control is considered necessary to guarantee democratic accountability and to ensure certainty and uniformity in the application of both the law and a centralized penal policy. This paper examines the ways in which these ideals of inquisitorial procedure are embodied within the structures and procedures of the French criminal process and the extent to which they are generally understood or shared by procureurs of various ranks and across different localities. Although observation of and interviews with procureurs indicate that other factors, such as the availability of resources and local levels of crime, influence both the policy and practice of the procureur, the conventional ideals of hierarchy and uniformity retain a continuing force and significance for participants in the process. Despite a wide variety of practices, procureurs consistently describe their role and work in the language of official legal discourse; and when shortcomings are acknowledged, they are framed in terms of their failure to measure up to these ideals of certainty and uniformity. Similarly, the professional ideology of the magistrate as someone who represents the public interest in seeking the truth in a case is also a part of the daily discourse of the procureur. Yet, this ideology does not constrain the crime control disposition of most procureurs, as the "public interest" is that which the individual magistrate declares it to be. In many instances, the professional ideology of the magistrate serves to justify rather than to guide or challenge the practice of judicial supervision. 86 footnotes