NCJ Number
178116
Journal
Stanford Law Review Volume: 50 Issue: 4 Dated: April 1998 Pages: 1055-1145
Date Published
1998
Length
91 pages
Annotation
After documenting the detrimental impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona on police clearance rates, the authors conclude that Miranda has "handcuffed" the police and that society should begin to explore ways of loosening these shackles.
Abstract
Part I reviews the limited evidence about Miranda's effects, and Part II then considers the only available long-term measure of Miranda's effects: crime clearance rate data. Contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom, crime clearance rates fell precipitously immediately after Miranda and have remained at lower levels ever since. This suggests that the Supreme Court's decision prevented police from solving a substantial number of crimes. Part III presents a multiple regression time series analysis of crime clearance rates. It proposes a model based on the crime rate, law enforcement expenditures, the percentage of the population in the crime-prone younger years, and other relevant variables. Even controlling for these factors, police ability to solve crimes declined sharply after Miranda. Part IV defends the position that Miranda was an important cause of the 1966-68 drop in clearance rates. Apart from Miranda, other possible causes of the drop in clearance rates offer weak explanations, a conclusion that is consistent with other available data. Part V explains why a Miranda-induced drop in clearance rates should be regarded as a social cost. It first refutes the argument that clearance rates might have fallen because police officers were generally using unconstitutionally coercive questioning techniques before Miranda that disappeared after the decision. Part VI places the findings in the context of the ongoing debate about the wisdom of Miranda. It concludes that Miranda has impeded the police in their law enforcement efforts, such that society should begin to explore other, less costly ways of regulating police interrogation. 10 tables and 446 footnotes