NCJ Number
150003
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 84 Issue: 4 Dated: (Winter-Spring 1994) Pages: 883-914
Date Published
1994
Length
32 pages
Annotation
This article critiques the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran (1993), in which the Court held that due process does not require a higher competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to an attorney than the standard for competency to stand trial.
Abstract
In this case, the Court addressed an important issue that has divided the Federal circuit courts for years. The Godinez Court correctly held that due process does not require a heightened competency standard to waive constitutional rights above the Dusky competency standard to stand trial. This holding is in accord both with the policy justifications that support the plea bargaining process and with the constitutional right to self-representation. Under Godinez, even if the trial court has already found the defendant competent to stand trial, the defendant's mental condition remains relevant to a judicial determination of competency to waive constitutional rights. A defendant who wishes to collaterally challenge his competency may still do so under the Dusky "rational understanding" standard, unless the State has adopted a higher standard by statute, in which case the defendant may assert his challenge in accord with whatever standard the State legislature has adopted. Additionally, if a defendant is found competent to waive his rights, he may challenge his waiver under the additional requirement that the waiver be voluntary, intelligent, and knowing. 255 footnotes