NCJ Number
98485
Date Published
1983
Length
19 pages
Annotation
This analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) examines the Court's interpretation of precedent and its decision to broaden the waiver exception to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule, which will allow the police to extract confessions after the suspect asserts the right to counsel.
Abstract
The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination encompasses the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. The U.S. Supreme Court requires that suspects be informed of these rights upon arrest, because the inherent coerciveness of the custodial setting could prompt involuntary confessions absent these safeguards. Once a suspect asserts the right to counsel, a heavy burden has traditionally rested on the State to prove that the right has been waived. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, however, the Court narrowed the scope of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation by making it easier for the State to prove that the right was waived after it was asserted by the suspect. The Court thus restricted one of the fundamental rights established in Miranda v. Arizona and reasserted in Edwards v. Arizona. 'Bradshaw' is the first Supreme Court case to interpret fully the decision in 'Edwards,' which indicated that once the accused requests an attorney, the accused may not be interrogated until an attorney is present. Instead, the Court confused the issue by making a fact-based decision which confused the issue by making a fact-based decision which failed to provide the lower courts and law enforcement agencies with clear constitutional guidelines for determining when an accused who has asserted the right to counsel subsequently waives that right. A total of 145 footnotes are provided.