NCJ Number
132607
Journal
Rutgers Law Review Volume: 43 Issue: 1 Dated: (Fall 1990) Pages: 15-52
Date Published
1990
Length
38 pages
Annotation
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Penry v. Lynaugh and Stanford v. Kentucky in 1989, which upheld capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders and minors, do not contribute to the goals of retribution and deterrence and thus needlessly imposed the death penalty on two classes of defendants who would have been adequately punished through lesser sentences of life imprisonment.
Abstract
In the Penry case, the Court rejected the argument that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants violates the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Similarly, the Stanford decision rejected the argument that the eighth amendment prohibited death sentences for the two minors convicted of murder. Thus, these decisions overturned almost 20 years of decisions requiring that the death penalty, because of its severity and finality, be used only when it serves a valid penal purpose that a lesser sentence could not. The court failed to give proper weight to evidence that mentally retarded offenders are unable to engage in the "cold calculus" required to deter criminals and that minors do not engage in the consideration of mortality that is central to the deterrent rationale. Footnotes