NCJ Number
85383
Date Published
1981
Length
13 pages
Annotation
This chapter describes a mathematical model that can be used to determine the mechanism of police cooperation required in the event of crime displacement or spillover from one political jurisdiction to another.
Abstract
The model aims to achieve the welfare criterion attributed to Pareto (1971); this criterion states that an allocation should be chosen whereby any reallocation would not make everyone at least as well off in their own estimations. This implies that the model will make citizens in all the targeted districts satisfied with their police service regardless of crime spillover. The proposed model uses a regional authority to oversee the crime-control activities of the districts, but the regional authority undertakes no activity than dealing with spillovers to maximize aggregate consumer surplus. The generality of the discussion of the model allows the existence of a 'center' at any level of government and 'individuals' with various levels of complex subsystems. The identities of the agents in the system can be generalized from citizens to districts to countries. Twelve references are listed.