DESIGN OF AN ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SYSTEM FOR A MIXED-OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY

• NCJ Number: 59813
• Journal: NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT Volume: 6 Issue: 3 Dated: (FALL 1977) Pages: 125-138
• Author(s): A E WINBLAD; R P MCKNIGHT; W C FIENNING; B R FENCHEL
• Date Published: 1977
• Length: 15 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: US Energy Research and Development Admin
• Corporate Author: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

SEVERAL ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS CONCEPTS AND DESIGNS ARE DESCRIBED THAT PROVIDE INCREASED PROTECTION FOR MIXED-OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION FACILITIES.

Abstract

IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS THAT CAN COUNTER THE POSTULATED THREATES TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES ARE FEASIBLE THROUGH APPLICATIONS OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY TO PHYSICAL PROTECTION, MATERIALS MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS, AND FACILITY DESIGN. ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND VITAL SYSTEMS FROM ADVERSARY ACTIVITY IS ACCOMPLISHED BY COORDINATING SAFEGUARDS FUNCTIONS WITH PLANT DESIGN AND OPERATIONS TO PRODUCE AN EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM CALLED ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (ESS). THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM FOR A MIXED-OXIDE FUEL FACILITY HAS THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF DETERRING A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY ACTION, DETECTING UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITY, DELAYING UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITY, AND RESPONDING TO SUCH ACTIVITIES IN AN ADEQUATE AND TIMELY MANNER. BOTH A PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND A MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM ARE EMPLOYED TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM CONTROL THE PEOPLE AND OPERATIONS, AND MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM PROVIDES INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION AND STATUS OF MATERIALS IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. DESIGN EVALUATION BEGINS WITH AN ADVERSARY SEQUENCE DIAGRAM WHICH PROVIDES A GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATION OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR THE FACILITY. A SINGLE LOGIC EQUATION WHOSE TERMS REPRESENT THHE DETECTION AND DELAY ELEMENTS IS DERIVED DIRECTLY FROM THE DIAGRAM. THE PROTECTION CAPABILITIES OF THE ONSITE AND OFFSITE RESPONSE FORCES MUST BE EVALUATED AGAINST A SPECTRUM OF THREATS, AND GUARD DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE EXAMINED USING DYNAMIC SIMULATION MODELS. THE CRITERION FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DESIGNS IS THE PROBABILITY OF PREVENTING ADVERSARY THEFT OR SABOTAGE SEQUENCE COMPLETION. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION INCLUDES THE FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS AND ESS CONFIGURATIONS. TABULAR DATA INCLUDE THE SEQUENCE DIAGRAM AND THE CRITICAL PATH DIAGRAM. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK).