NCJ Number
133902
Journal
International Journal of Conflict Management Volume: 2 Issue: 4 Dated: (October 1991) Pages: 257-273
Date Published
1991
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This study develops an empirical means of tracking involvement in a relational "double-bind" in hostage negotiations as a means of monitoring the extent to which the hostagetakers develop more cooperative or competitive relational parameters with police negotiators.
Abstract
The study involved an analysis of the audio tapes of nine actual hostage negotiations. According to Kuiken and Hill (1985), a "double-bind" situation occurs when two or more persons are involved in a highly structured relationship, a communication is given that includes two mutually incompatible self-presentations and hence contradictory definitions of appropriate behavior by the recipient, the contradiction is concealed or denied, and the recipient of the message is prevented from commenting on the contradiction or withdrawing from the interaction. In a hostage negotiation, the "double-bind" occurs when disputants are caught in the coercive, crisis-bargaining mode. The parties send paradoxical relational messages. Each party wishes to continue negotiations in order to obtain something from the other party, but each party also wants to maintain distance and protection from the other out of fear that the other party may do harm to him. The findings from the audio analysis of hostage negotiations indicate that the purpose for taking hostages greatly influenced the kinds of paradoxes displayed by the hostagetakers. Mentally ill hostagetakers became cooperative early in the negotiation but then became more coercive as the negotiation proceeded. Hostagetakers caught in the act of committing a crime were competitive early and then became more cooperative over time. The hostagetakers in domestic disputes remained competitive throughout the interaction. The analysis suggests that parties involved in intense conflicts must become more sophisticated in the use of indirect techniques of control and cooperation. 3 tables and 35 references