NCJ Number
56541
Journal
Catholic University Law Review Volume: 27 Issue: 3 Dated: (1978) Pages: 627-641
Date Published
1978
Length
15 pages
Annotation
CRIMINAL CASES IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE PASSAGE OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1975 AND RELATED U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ARE DISCUSSED.
Abstract
JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WITH THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY AND THE VICTIMS OF THE CRIME HAVE TENDED TO WEAKEN THIS RIGHT. CONGRESS PASSED THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1975 TO PROVIDE UNIFORMITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS BY IMPOSING A TIMETABLE FOR CRIMINAL ADJUDICATIONS. IN LOCAL COURTS, HOWEVER, JUDGES MUST RELY ON THE BALANCING TEST ARTICULATED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN BARKER V. WINGO (1972). THE HIGH COURT IDENTIFIED FOUR FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DECIDING WHETHER THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL HAD BEEN VIOLATED: (1) LENGTH OF DELAY, (2) REASONS FOR DELAY, (3) ASSERTION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT BY THE DEFENDANT, AND (4) PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. AN EXAMINATION OF CASES FROM DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS ILLUSTRATES THE WEAKNESS OF THE BARKER APPROACH. FREQUENTLY THE COURTS HAVE ACCEPTED TOO EASILY THE GOVERNMENT'S REASONS FOR THE DELAYS, OR HAVE FOUND IMPLIED WAIVERS OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS. THERE MUST BE A GREATER DEGREE OF PREDICTABILITY IN THE RESOLUTION OF SPEEDY TRIAL CLAIMS, AND CONSISTENT METHODS MUST BE USED TO BALANCE INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)