NCJ Number
49674
Date Published
1978
Length
270 pages
Annotation
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE AND BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IN THE MIXED CAPITALIST SYSTEM IS SUBJECTED TO CRITICAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.
Abstract
THE OPENING CHAPTERS DEMONSTRATE HOW INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION DEPEND UPON POLITICAL COMPETITION, THE KNOWLEDGE OF VOTERS, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF LEGISLATURES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND BUREAUCRACIES. THE DISCUSSION OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS CONTRASTS OUTRIGHT BRIBERY WITH LEGAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND OTHER FORMS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE. CORRUPTION AND THE MIXED ECONOMY, AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND FUNCTIONAL BRIBERY, AND HIGH AND LOW LEVEL CORRUPTION ARE DISCUSSED AND AN ECONOMIC ARGUMENT IS PRESENTED REGARDING THE TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES OF AN INFORMED CITIZENRY. THE LATTER SECTIONS CRITICALLY DISCUSS LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONING STRATEGIES, AND EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR BUREAUCRATIC REFORM. AN OVERVIEW OF LOW LEVEL BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION IS PROVIDED AND MONOPOLISTIC BUREAUCRACY, CORRUPTION IN REGULATORY AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS, VAGUENESS AND COERCION IN THE MARKET STRUCTURE, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE, AND CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR ARE DISCUSSED. THE ANALYSIS CONCLUDES WITH AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, ON THE ONE HAND, AND MORAL SCRUPLES, IDEOLOGIES, AND PROFESSIONAL NORMS OF INDIVIDUAL AGENTS AND CITIZENS, ON THE OTHER. GRAPHIC AND TABULAR DATA ARE PROVIDED. A BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX ARE PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)