NCJ Number
213375
Journal
Crime, Law & Social Change Volume: 38 Issue: 2 Dated: 2002 Pages: 137-160
Date Published
2002
Length
24 pages
Annotation
This article develops and tests a convergence approach to the analysis of political corruption.
Abstract
Findings indicated strong support for the propositions derived from the convergence theory. Specifically, the analysis revealed that indicators of structural incentives, risky policies, and a lack of institutional guardians accounted for 90 percent of the variation in the corruption index of the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), which produces an annual corruption ranking. The findings underscore the importance of tailoring any anti-corruption strategy to the particular circumstances of a country, taking into account both the nature of corruption in that country and the unique opportunities for addressing it. The convergence approach to the analysis of political corruption that was tested draws from two theoretical perspectives: routine activities theory of crime and the tripartite analysis of corruption. The convergence approach holds that the convergence of structural incentives, risky policies, and the lack of effective institutional guardians in time and space creates the opportunities for widespread and systematic corruption. Hypotheses derived from the convergence theory were evaluated. Data were drawn from TI’s annual corruption ranking on 99 countries, which was based on the perceived level of government corruption reported by people working for local multinational firms and institutions. Other data sources included the World Bank’s World Development Report 1999/2000 and several Freedom House research publications. Information on unemployment rates, male suicide rates, and the rule of law index were drawn from the Central Intelligence Agency, the World Health Organization, and the Fraser Institute. Future research should continue to measure and evaluate aspects and dimensions of the problem of political corruption. Tables, notes, references