NCJ Number
85436
Journal
Virginia Law Review Volume: 68 Issue: 5 Dated: (May 1982) Pages: 1139-1155
Date Published
1982
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This note analyzes the history and rationale for the single-standard and the dual-standard approaches to competence to plead guilty, and argues that the higher standard poses practical problems as reflected in the case law.
Abstract
The Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit Courts have gone beyond the 'understand and assist' test of competence and imposed a higher standard of competence upon a defendant who wishes to plead guilty. The dual standard is unsupported by logic and by case law, denies certain defendants the opportunity to plea bargain, and adds further confusion to the competency inquiry by adding subtleties to already imprecise expert testimony. It is argued that if the defendant is already represented by counsel at all stages of the criminal proceedings, no justification exists for imposing a higher standard of competence to plead guilty. However, if a defendant foregoes the crucial assistance of counsel, a different standard of competence is required to ensure fairness. If the defendant chooses to proceed to trial, a court will consider the defendant's ability to participate in proceedings in making its competency decision. If the unrepresented defendant chooses to plead guilty, the court should then expand its inquiry into voluntariness and intelligence of the plea. This approach would be consistent with the case law, would eliminate the unfairness created when the defendant is not allowed to plea bargain, and would avoid the necessity of additional psychiatric testimony. The article provides 98 footnotes.