NCJ Number
192116
Date Published
2001
Length
6 pages
Annotation
This paper presents testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations and the House Committee on Government Reform on chemical and biological defense. This testimony was based on the GAO report, "Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness."
Abstract
The testimony is based on the Department of Defense’s (DOD's) preparations for medical support for chemical and biological casualties. In its report, the GAO responded to a Congressional request concerning how DOD adapted its medical personnel to emerging chemical and biological threats. Specifically, the GAO looked at how DOD and the military services had addressed chemical and biological threats in the distribution of medical personnel across specialties. The GAO also looked at the extent of training for medical personnel in the treatment of chemical and biological casualties. In the years since Desert Storm, DOD and the services have not fully addressed weaknesses and gaps in planning, training, tracking systems, or testing proficiency for the treatment of chemical and biological casualties. The resulting organization of medical personnel has not been rigorously tested for the capacity to deliver the required support. Despite efforts to plan and train for these threats, there is a wide and longstanding gap between DOD’s appraisal of chemical and biological threats and DOD’s medical preparedness to meet them. The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense address the gap between the stated chemical and biological threat and the current level of medical readiness by first, clarifying DOD’s expectations concerning medical preparation for chemical and biological contingencies and second, as appropriate, incorporating biological medical readiness in Defense Planning Guidance. To the degree that DOD views chemical and biological contingencies as a serious threat and expects medical personnel to prepare for them, the GAO recommends these additional actions: (1) the services and joint staff should conclude an agreement about which medical personnel are qualified to provide specific treatments; (2) the military services should develop medical training requirements for chemical and biological contingencies, assess the effectiveness of the training with rigorous proficiency standards and tests, and track individual training and proficiency; and (3) the joint staff, commanders-in-chief, and the services should increase chemical and biological exercises involving medical personnel to an extent commensurate with current chemical and biological threat assessments. Given the threat of mass casualties, exercises should explore the extent of medical capabilities and the full consequences of scenarios that overwhelm them.