NCJ Number
92738
Date Published
1981
Length
32 pages
Annotation
Modernization has stimulated police corruption in Hong Kong by extending government controls and services so that more pecuniary opportunities are available. Behavior patterns have been altered with individuals becoming highly rational and calculative when balancing economic incentives and legal risks.
Abstract
The Hong Kong Police force historically has had certain military characteristics, political functions, and wide jurisdiction. Large-scale police corruption was detected in the 1970's which involved protection rackets targeting minibus operators, fixing traffic tickets for taxicab and truck drivers, warning gambling establishments before a raid, and cooperation with organized syndicates in drug trafficking. This corruption occurred in areas where the legal risk was low or the economic incentive was high. Moreover, it was not so much a family business or patrol-client relationship as a corporate venture involving entrepreneurial initiative. Police corruption results in goal displacement, particularly when incongruence exists between the legal framework and socioeconomic development and the police force cannot give equal weight to all its organizational goals. It also alters the incentive structure regarding promotion and job satisfaction and creates social divisions between corrupt officers and those who refuse to participate. Tightened controls over corruption in the early 1970's posed adjustment problems for corrupt officers in their lifestyles, human relations in the department, and self-images as police officers. The magnitude of police corruption in Hong Kong appears to be decreasing, partly due to increased legal risks, more emphasis on superior officers' accountability, and heightened civic awareness. The paper includes 85 footnotes.