NCJ Number
199014
Journal
Nonproliferation Review Volume: 7 Issue: 73 Dated: Fall-Winter 2000 Pages: 92-105
Date Published
2000
Length
14 pages
Annotation
After assessing the threat of a terrorist attack on U.S. agricultural crops and animals ("agroterrorism"), this article speculates on the types of terrorists most likely to resort to such attacks, followed by recommendations designed to prevent and mitigate agroterrorist attacks.
Abstract
A major act of agroterrorism, one that causes over a billion dollars in damage, could be produced by a series of limited infections triggered by pathogens delivered by simple methods. Furthermore, depending on the agent chosen, biological attacks against agriculture could appeal to politically motivated terrorist or criminal groups that are seeking financial gain, as well as to apocalyptic groups who seek to kill as many people as possible. A biological attack that targets agriculture, therefore, should be regarded as a "high-consequences, high-probability" event; it should receive the attention it deserves as a serious national security risk. The current government funding for agricultural disease control and detection is inadequate. More funds must be appropriated to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Additional measures are also required to stop terrorists from obtaining and using anti-crop and livestock weapons. Because prevention may fail, more steps must be taken to recognize and respond quickly to an agricultural disease outbreak. This article offers some recommendations for such steps. 76 notes