Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations

• NCJ Number: 190869
• Author(s): Gerald L. Dillingham
• Date Published: 2001
• Length: 14 pages
• Corporate Author: US Government Accountability Office
• Sale Source: US Government Accountability Office; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and Its Subcommittee on Oversight of Governmental Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate; downloaded October 10, 2001

Annotation

This report examines weaknesses in airport security and identifies ways they could be improved.

Abstract

The task of providing security to the Nation's airspace and aviation system is daunting, given the size of the country, hundreds of airports, thousands of planes, tens of thousands of daily flights, and the seemingly limitless ways terrorists or criminals can devise to attack the system. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has developed several mechanisms to prevent criminal acts against aircraft, such as adopting technology to detect explosives. Still, significant weaknesses plague the Nation's aviation security. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. Testing of screeners shows that significant, long-standing weaknesses - measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage - continue to exist. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its tests. Too little attention has been given to training screeners. Rapid turnover of screeners is attributed to low pay, which is at or about minimum wage. Beginning in 1972, air carriers were required to provide screening personnel and the airport operators to provide law enforcement support. Four options for assigning screening responsibilities have been identified: continue with air carriers but with new requirements, assign responsibility to airports, or shift responsibility to the Federal government, either through the creation of a new Federal agency or the creation of a Federal corporation. In assessing alternatives, stakeholders respondents identified five important criteria: improving screening performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues. The majority of respondents believed screening performance would improve if screening were placed with the Federal government. In other countries, screening is more rigorous, screeners' qualifications are more extensive, and they are better paid.