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Understanding Influence Across Justice Agencies:
The Spread of "Community Reforms" from Law Enforcement to Prosecutor Organizations

Final Report

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ABSTRACT

Within the last few decades, police departments and prosecutors' offices innovated with new policies and practices, particularly those stressing the community (i.e., community policing, community prosecution). Although organizational innovation has been empirically researched within the discipline of criminal justice, most of these studies focused on the police in isolation from the other components of the criminal justice system. These valuable studies have identified several factors that are associated with innovation including those both internal and external to organizations, but researchers have rarely considered the influence of the policies and practices of other criminal justice agencies. Police and prosecutors, even though interconnected and part of the same system, are studied individually and the cross-component effects of other agencies within the criminal justice system have not received much attention in the literature. This study explores the innovation of community prosecution using organizational predictors typically associated with innovation while also including measures of community policing within the jurisdiction of the prosecutors' offices. Community policing practices of the agencies within the jurisdiction are potentially powerful influences on community prosecution. Using data from the 2001 and 2005 waves of the National Prosecutors Survey and the 2000 and 2003 waves of the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey, analyses show that community reforms are not connected across system components. Several possible explanations are offered to account for these findings.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Many police and prosecutors' organizations have adopted "community" reforms over the past 30 years. These reforms, falling under the headings of community policing and community prosecution, share many common attributes. Organizations become increasingly responsive to and encourage input from the community, adopt a problem-solving orientation to address community problems, take a broader view of success (e.g., not just about arrests and convictions), and partner with other agencies to improve overall neighborhood quality of life. The fact that these reforms developed almost simultaneously—the attention devoted to community prosecution trailed community policing—led some to examine the relationship between the two reforms. Anecdotal and case study evidence from multiple sites suggest that some prosecutors not only supported the local police department's move to community policing, but were actually compelled to adopt community prosecution as a result. However, the relationship between community policing and prosecution has not been systematically examined using larger samples.

The current study addresses this question using police data from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey (2000 and 2003) and the National Prosecutors Survey (2001 and 2005). Specifically, models are produced to predict community prosecution implementation in 2001 (using community policing implementation in 2000, among other variables) and community prosecution implementation in 2005 (using community policing implementation in 2003, among other variables). In the latter set of analyses, controls are also introduced for prior (2001) levels of community prosecution implementation. Among the key findings:

- Community prosecution can be measured using a model derived from National Prosecutors Survey data. The model includes five elements: using the community to identify crime problems, assigning prosecutors to geographic areas, using tools other than criminal prosecution, establishing relationships with other parties, and holding regular meetings with constituent groups.

- Community policing implementation was unrelated to community prosecution implementation in all models.

- Four variables emerged as predictors in more than two models: organizational size, functional differentiation, formalization, and prosecutors' tenure. Larger, more complex organizations tend to be more innovative (adopt community prosecution). Contrary to the innovative literature, more formalized or rule-bound organizations also tend to implement community prosecution. Finally, implementation is inversely related to the tenure of the chief prosecutor.

The results suggest that prosecutors' offices and police chiefs may respond to their respective institutional environments. While both community policing and community prosecution received attention during the 1990s and 2000s, adoption of either reform was likely to occur if organizational leaders were plugged into institutional networks. Evidence from police organizations supports this contention; additional research is needed to understand whether prosecutors are similarly influenced by broader forces such as conferences, publications, and other organizations.

The key is that local leadership matters and can ultimately mitigate the effects of organizational and environmental factors. An organization that is structurally amendable to innovation may nevertheless abandon reform if prosecutors adhere to traditional practices or view innovations as fads. Likewise, a prosecutor who champions reform may be able to implement changes, even in the face of resistance.

CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION

Considerable innovation has occurred within criminal justice organizations over the past 30 years.

Police departments, prosecutor and public defenders' offices, courts, and correctional institutions have

adopted new and emergent philosophies, technologies, policies, and practices including, but not limited

to, Compstat, focused deterrence strategies, problem-solving courts, and reentry initiatives (see, for

example, Anderson, 1997; Berman & Fox, 2010; Fox & Gold, 2010; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). As

organizations changed, scholars sought to explain these innovations, specifically why reforms were

penetrating some organizations but largely ignored by others.

Although organizational innovation has been empirically researched within the discipline of criminal

justice, most of these studies have concentrated on changes within police agencies (for example,

Chamard, 2004; Giblin, 2006; King, 2000; Morabito, 2010; Skogan & Hartnett, 2005; Weisburd & Lum,

2005). The literature on innovation adoption outside of policing is largely missing two critical elements.

First, although works include discussions about the general causes of innovation (e.g., rising crime rates,

overcrowded prisons, and community demands), factors are addressed in more global terms and rarely

subjected to empirical scrutiny at the jurisdictional or organizational level. For example, the growth of

drug courts is often attributed to the volume of drug offenders within the court system; specialized

courts, including drug courts, are viewed as a way to alleviate the crowding (Finn & Newlyn, 1993).

While true in the general sense, is courtroom crowding a jurisdiction-level explanation that would

account for the adoption of over 1,000 courts nationwide and, conversely, the absence of drug courts in

other jurisdictions? Similarly, sentencing guidelines were designed to reduce disparity in punishments

by curtailing judicial discretion (Spohn, 2002). Did the diffusion of guidelines across the states begin in

jurisdictions with the greatest disparities? These questions deal with the causes of innovation but move

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beyond conjecture and demand research at the jurisdiction level to explain variation in adoption at the local level.

Studies of innovation, including police innovation, are incomplete for a second reason. While scholars have made valuable contributions to the field, identifying internal and external agency factors associated with innovation (e.g., organizational size, structure, external funding), they have rarely considered the influence of changes in other criminal justice agencies. Police, prosecutor, and correctional organizations, even though interconnected and part of the same system, are studied individually and the cross-component effects within the criminal justice system have largely been ignored (for an exception, see Jacoby, Gramckow, & Ratledge, 1995). This omission is noteworthy, especially given the congruence of certain reforms over the past three decades (e.g., broken windows policing and community courts in New York City both focus on quality of life offenses).

Two major police and prosecutorial reforms provide a perfect opportunity to examine the influence of innovation across criminal justice system components. The two innovations—community policing and community prosecution—are remarkably similar in their core characteristics: greater agency responsiveness to citizen input, a focus on problem solving using an expanded range of options (e.g., responses other than arrest or prosecution), broader measures of success (e.g., reduced fear, improved quality of life), and collaborative partnerships with other public and private organizations.

While both innovations received significant attention among researchers, policymakers, and practitioners during the 1990s, they did not emerge concurrently. The seeds of community policing can be traced to community relations units in the 1960s and team policing units in the 1970s. Early experiments with foot patrol, fear reduction, and problem solving in places like Flint (MI), Houston (TX), Newark (NJ), and Newport News (VA) proved to be the first generation of community policing sites during the late 1970s and early 1980s (Oliver, 2000). Widespread adoption and institutionalization would come during the 1990s, facilitated in part by funding from the federal Office of Community

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Oriented Policing Services (Hickman & Reaves, 2001; Oliver, 2000). For example, within a two-year

period at the end of the 1990s, the proportion of law enforcement agencies employing community

policing officers nearly doubled to 64 percent (Hickman & Reaves, 2001).

Although prosecutors' offices were experimenting with community prosecution in the 1980s,

community reforms in prosecution generally trailed those in policing (Boland, 1996; Goldkamp, Irons-

Guynn, & Weiland, 2003; Gray, 2008). The separate, isolated reforms of a few innovative chief

prosecutors would ultimately coalesce into a unified idea, community prosecution, during the 1990s

(Coles, 2000). According to Kuykendall (2004), "as recently as 1995, less than ten jurisdictions

throughout the United States engaged in community prosecution, and then only in urban settings" (p.

1). A decade later, nearly 40 percent of prosecutors' offices self-defined as community prosecution sites

(Perry, 2006) and many others engaged in strategies (e.g., involving the community in problem

identification) consistent with the reform (DeFrances, 2002; Kuykendall, 2004; Perry, 2006). While the

level of implementation of and attention given to community prosecution may never have reached the

level of community policing, it was clearly a significant reform.

There is some limited anecdotal and case study evidence that the spread of community prosecution

was connected to the institutionalization of community policing (Coles, Kelling, & Moore, 1998). Indeed,

former Marion County (IN) prosecution Scott Newman explicitly mentioned community policing in his

rationale for adopting community prosecution in the Indianapolis metropolitan area:

> I felt instinctively that, as community policing was being implemented in Indianapolis…what
> would happen to me if I didn't change the way I did business was the community would draw
> closer to the police department. And the community and the police department, together,
> would come to despise my office…and…tend to blame [failures] on me as the most visible
> proponent of the criminal justice system. (Coles, Kelling, & Moore, 1998, p. 73)

Although police officers were more often in attendance at community meetings in Indianapolis (at least

in the neighborhoods studied), a community prosecutor was quite visible, attending approximately 30

percent of meetings (Duffee, Renauer, Scott, Chermak, & McGarrell, 2001). Prosecutors were well

aware of the attention given to other justice agencies embracing community justice principles through the adoption of community policing and community courts (Coles, 2000; Karp & Clear, 2000).

The spread of community reforms from one component (police) to another (prosecution) is a reasonable assumption but is, at the present, based on limited evidence. It is clear that the reforms overlapped and garnered heightened attention at approximately the same time. The quote by Scott Newman above suggests that he quite possibly had to align with the "community" ideal evident in the Indianapolis Police Department's community policing approach by implementing community prosecution within his own office. The influence of the police on the prosecutor's office is potentially powerful if the potential for cross-component effects is recognized.

The problem is that the link between the various systems of the criminal justice system has largely been neglected empirically when it comes to explaining organizational innovations. We have only anecdotal or small sample evidence that cross-component pollination of ideas is actually occurring (see, for example, Coles, Kelling, & Moore, 1998). Much of the research studying innovation has focused on policing and considered characteristics of the organization itself (e.g., size, organizational budgets) or factors external to the organization (e.g., crime rates, external funding) as facilitators and inhibitors. Similar research examining the determinants of innovation in prosecutors' offices, the judiciary, prisons, jails, and probation/parole is lacking, a surprise given that many of these organizations have been similarly innovative over the past several decades (e.g., community prosecution, reentry programs, electronic monitoring, problem-solving courts, intensive supervised probation/parole). The current study examines the impact of community policing activities in large local police departments on community prosecution activities in prosecutors' offices in 2001 and 2005. In doing so, it addresses two key objectives:

1. It extends the study of organizational innovation beyond the singular focus on police organizations currently dominating the literature by addressing innovation in prosecutors' offices.

2. It assesses the importance of other criminal justice components on innovation adoption. As noted, most research addresses the focal organization in isolation. The proposed study measures the influence of one component (police) on the innovation level of another (prosecution).

The connection between community policing and community prosecution, and police and prosecutors more generally, is largely predicated on how one views the overall criminal justice system. Since the 1950s, scholars have used the system metaphor to describe the administration of justice in the United States (President's Commission, 1968; Walker, 1992). Accordingly, "the various criminal justice agencies were interrelated in such a way that constituted a criminal justice system" (Walker, 1992, p. 59) where the "whole system was more than the sum of its parts" (Bernard, Paoline, & Pare, 2005, p. 204). The system processes cases and the parts significantly affect each other; "output from one agency is input to the next" (Bernard, Paoline, & Pare, 2005, p. 203). For example, a dramatic shift in arrests— the outputs from a local police department—likely shapes the charging decisions of the local prosecutor. Likewise, researchers have shown interest in what has been described as criminal justice thermodynamics or the hydraulic displacement of discretion, asking whether discretion shifts from one organization/actor to another as constraints are imposed (Miethe, 1987; Walker, 1998).

Others have questioned this system (coordinated, interrelated) paradigm. For example, Campbell, Sahid, and Stang (1970) argued that offenders pass through a series of stages but, due to a number of factors, the process may best be described as a "fragmented and often hostile amalgamation of criminal justice agencies" (p. 267). The components of the criminal justice system often blame each other for failures (e.g., police blame prosecutors for dropping charges; community correctional officials blame police for harassing probationers) and they typically compete for a common pool of finite resources. Moreover, communities often lack any type of overall criminal justice system coordination authority; each organization operates largely independent of the others.

In between these two perspectives is John Hagan's (1989) view of the criminal justice system as a loosely coupled system that becomes more tightly connected in certain situations. Loosely coupled

organizations "are responsive to one another, while still maintaining independent identities and some evidence of physical or logical separateness" (Hagan, 1989, p. 119). Under some conditions, however, agencies become more aligned in their activities, or tightly coupled, and dependent upon the other components. For example, proactive drug enforcement efforts may require increased coordination between police and prosecutors when it comes to offering plea bargains to offenders in exchange for useful information resulting in more severe charges for larger-scale distributors (Hagan, 1989).

The spread of ideas is theoretically consistent with the metaphor of the police and prosecutors as loosely connected components becoming tightly coupled. Anecdotal and case study evidence presented below suggests that police departments and prosecutors' offices, even if loosely connected more generally, became tightly aligned as the former implemented community policing reforms. Police departments received attention through innovation, community residents placed demands on criminal justice officials, and the broader community justice movement was taking hold. As a result, it is hypothesized that prosecutors in jurisdictions characterized by deeper community policing implementation were more likely to adopt community prosecution.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Police organizations have adopted a range of innovations over the past 30 years but community policing is "arguably the most important development in policing in the past quarter century," receiving tremendous attention and widely adopted (see Skogan & Frydl, 2004, p. 85; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). The factors contributing to community policing reform are many: community alienation associated with the professional model of policing, Supreme Court decisions restricting police actions, civil unrest in the 1960s, research questioning professional model strategies, innovative strategies in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., team policing, foot patrol, fear reduction), and the publication of influenial articles related to broken windows and problem-oriented policing (see, for example, Oliver, 2000; Pelfrey, 2000). While

the definitions of community policing vary (see Bayley, 1994; Cordner, 2000; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Skogan, 2006; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990), several common themes are evident: greater community input, a broad police function, a problem-solving orientation, and partnerships with outside organizations.

Community policing encourages the police to share power with the community, becoming "co-producers" of public safety (Bayley, 1994, p. 106; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994). In practice, this means providing opportunities for citizen input and being responsive to those needs, what Bayley (1994) described as consultation and adaptation (see, also, Cordner, 2000; Skogan, 2006; Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Police officers take steps to ensure positive interactions with citizens, not just contacts with individuals as victims, witnesses, or suspects (Cordner, 2000). Such contact—through community meetings, walking the beat, substations, and other strategies—helps develop trust and theoretically fosters a strong working relationship between the police and the public, allowing them to address matters of mutual concern (Cordner, 2000; Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994).

Cordner (2000) also argued that community policing requires the police to assume a broader function beyond just law enforcement. While police have always handled order maintenance and service responsibilities, community policing recognizes the value of these functions. As Skogan and Frydl (2004) noted,

> Controlling serious crime remains the first priority of policing, and enforcing the criminal law remains the primary and distinctive method of the police in accomplishing that important objective. But instead of seeing the policing exclusively in these terms and viewing any activities that depart from direct efforts to control serious crime by threatening and making arrests of offenders as a distraction from the fundamental mission of the police and a waste of police resources, those who embrace community policing recognize that the police have other additional functions to perform and other ways than making arrests of controlling crime and enhancing security. (pp. 85-86)

Serious crime is not the only concern. Citizens are concerned about other matters and police can play a role in reducing disorder and fear and improving overall neighborhood quality of life. Thus, the measures of success move beyond counting arrests or tracking crime rates.

Community policing also draws heavily on Goldstein's (1979) problem-solving orientation. Police are supposed to view calls for service in terms of problems and search for solutions to those problems using an expanded toolkit. That is, rather than rely solely upon arrests of lawbreakers to handle calls, police can look at alternative solutions such as civil remedies, third party policing efforts, outside agency assistance, environmental design strategies, or others.

There is also an explicit recognition that the police cannot fight crime, eliminate disorder, reduce fear, and improve community quality of life absent collaborations with other public and private organizations. Eck and Rosenbaum (1994) suggest that the resource base available to police departments is expanded beyond what is included in department budget lines. For example, police can draw upon the sanitation or health department when a blighted property becomes a crime or disorder problem in a community.

Community policing spread throughout the law enforcement industry throughout the 1990s, facilitated in part by funding from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (Oliver, 2000). For example, Worrall and Zhao (2003) found that grant funding, more than any other predictor included in their models (e.g., crime rates, department size, region), was associated with their outcome measure of community policing (an index). By 2000, almost three quarters of police agencies participating in the periodic LEMAS survey reported having at least one full-time sworn officer regularly engaged in community policing activities (e.g., Burruss & Giblin, 2014; Worrall & Zhao, 2003; Zhao, 1996). Although both scholarly and popular media attention devoted to community policing has waned in recent years, perhaps due to a shift toward homeland security policing (see Oliver, 2006), community policing is still prevalent in local police departments. According to a 2007 survey, 47 percent of police departments still use full-time community policing officers and 53 percent included a mission statement with a community policing component (Reaves, 2010).

COMMUNITY PROSECUTION

As community policing was taking shape, innovative state prosecutors were experimenting with new strategies designed to address longstanding problems, particularly those associated with the drug trade. The experimentation was noteworthy given that prosecutors have changed very little over the past century relative to police organizations (Forst, 2002):

> Prosecutors are not more inherently resistant to change than others…Still, as elected officials, district attorneys aim to avoid embarrassment. This is usually accomplished by keeping the bulk of their work below the horizon, staying away from risky ventures and drastic departures from conventional modes of office management and from collaborations with researchers on the assessment of policies, procedures, or performance, assessments that could show up as tomorrow's negative headline. (p. 525)

Gray (2008) indicated that prosecutors were experimenting as early as the mid-1980s and Goldstock (1992) documented some of these "nontraditional" approaches, including greater use of civil remedies and crime prevention measures to address crime and public meetings to garner support.[1] Boland (1996) offered the brief case study of Multnomah County, Oregon as an example of the reforms that were emerging in many prosecutors' offices in the 1990s. In Multnomah County, the prosecutor responded to business leaders in one area of the city, recognizing that citizens were concerned about more immediate problems of disorder rather than serious incidents of crime—akin to the notion of broken windows (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). A neighborhood district attorney (NDA) was assigned to the area to work with neighborhood residents and the business community to solve community crime and disorder problems. As Boland (1996) explained, "an important part of the NDAs' role is to provide answers, feedback, and explanations—especially explanations of legal constraints that prohibit the police from doing what citizens think they ought to do to deal with certain conditions. The NDAs' core activity, however, is devising alternative responses" (p. 37).

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[1] For example, Goldkamp, Irons-Guynn, and Weiland (2003) place the start of community prosecution in Manhattan (NYC) at 1985 (see, also, Boland, 1998).

Projects like the one in Multnomah County would spread across the United States throughout the 1990s—for example, to Philadelphia (Goldkamp, Irons-Guynn, & Weiland, 2003), Washington, D.C. (Boland, 2001), Boston (Coles, Kelling, & Moore, 1998), and elsewhere (Wolf & Worrall, 2004). The ideas would converge into the philosophy or process of community prosecution (Coles, 2000) and would typically be contrasted with traditional prosecution strategies (the felony case processor strategy) (Coles, 2000, 2008; Coles & Kelling, 1999; see, also, Nugent, Fanflik, & Bromirski, 2004). Specifically, community prosecution has been defined, as "a long term, proactive strategy involving a partnership among the prosecutor's office, law enforcement, the community and public and private organizations whereby the authority of the prosecutor's office is used to solve and improve public safety and the quality of life in an identified community" (Stevens, 1994 as cited in Forst, 2002, p. 529). As noted earlier, the elements of community prosecution that emerged through meetings of constituent groups during the 1990s (e.g., American Prosecutors Research Institute, Bureau of Justice Assistance) are remarkably similar to the major dimensions of community policing (see Table 1 for common elements offered by others): partnering with and responsiveness to the public, moving beyond convictions to include a concern for community quality of life, a problem-solving orientation, and collaborations with other agencies (Coles, 2000; Nugent-Borakove & Fanflik, 2008; Rainville & Nugent, 2002; Weinstein, 1998).

Table 1.
Common elements associated with community prosecution

Nugent (2004, p. 3)	Goldkamp, Irons-Guynn, & Weiland (2003, p. xvi)
A proactive approach to crime	Role of the community (e.g., advisory, recipient of prosecutor services)
A defined target area	Target area (e.g., business district)
An emphasis on problem-solving, public safety, and quality of life issues	Target problems (e.g., quality-of-life offenses, drug crime, housing, landlord/tenant issues)
Partnerships between the prosecutor, the community, law enforcement, and others to address crime and disorder	Interagency and collaborative partnerships in community prosecution
Use of varied enforcement methods	Organizational adaptations/emphasis in prosecutor's office
	Content of response to community problems (e.g., facilitating community self-help, crime prevention efforts, prosecution of cases)

The focus on felony cases results in a hierarchically organized prosecutor's office intent on disposing of cases brought to it by the police. Traditionally, outcomes have included, "the number of trials (particularly involving Part I crimes), convictions, and length of sentences [and the] ability to prosecute cases successfully" (Coles, 2008, p. 186). Under a community prosecution philosophy, prosecutors expand their focus to address larger community safety and quality of life concerns: fear, disorder, crime, and other concerns. Like community policing, citizens provide input and participate in strategies to improve their own neighborhoods. While the felony case process relies primarily on the criminal law and prosecution, the community prosecutor uses a more diverse range of options to solve problems: civil law, code enforcement, and community education among them (Boland, 1996; Coles, 2008). Finally, prosecutors work outside of the central office in order to learn about community concerns and interact with neighborhood groups and other agencies to solve neighborhood problems.

By 2001, many prosecutors nationwide had implemented strategies consistent with community prosecution and those persisted into the middle part of the decade (DeFrances, 2002; Perry, 2006). For example, more than half of prosecutors' offices nationwide (55%) involved the community in identifying

problem areas or crimes and two-thirds (69%) had informal or formal relationships with community

organizations. Interestingly, while some of the factors that encouraged the adoption of community

policing are well known (e.g., COPS funding), few researchers have examined the spread of community

prosecution. In general terms, three factors stimulated innovation among prosecutors' offices: rising

crime and disorder, increasing citizen demands, and larger changes within the criminal justice system

(Coles, 2000). Innovative prosecutors began taking problem-oriented approaches to address problem

behavior, particularly drug crimes. Citizens "were becoming increasingly vocal in demanding something

more than arrests, prosecution, and incarceration as a response to and remedy for crime problems"

(Coles, 2000, p. 16). Only one study (Cunningham, Renauer, & Khalifa, 2006) has addressed the

determinants of community prosecution using a large sample. They found that innovation is largely

related to internal organizational characteristics—size, decentralization, functional and occupational

differentiation, and formalization—factors that are commonly associated with innovation more

generally.

CONNECTING COMMUNITY POLICING AND PROSECUTION

Prosecutors were aware of the attention given to other justice agencies embracing community

justice principles through the adoption of community policing and community courts (Coles, 2000; Karp

& Clear, 2000). In Multnomah County, an early community policing site, "the District Attorney formed

not only a partnership with the police department but developed his own community prosecution effort

by assigning Deputy District Attorneys to neighborhoods" (Jacoby, Gramckow, & Ratledge, 1995, p. 12).

Analyses from four other sites (Austin, TX, Boston, MA, Indianapolis, IN, and Kansas City, MO) revealed

considerable congruence between the innovative prosecutorial strategy and community policing (Coles,

Kelling, & Moore, 1998). More importantly for the present study, it is quite possible that community

policing provided the impetus for community prosecution adoption at the jurisdictional level:

Both in the local context, and as a development around the country that had gained significant national attention, community policing provided a model and in some cases put pressure on prosecutors. The example of community policing "wins," the growing use of problem-solving tactics by police, the popularity of community policing with the public, and the increase in the number of police available, all were apparent at the national level if not in every locality. (Coles, Kelling, & Moore, 1998, p. 41)

The former director of the National Institute of Justice further described the importance of community policing by stating, "once police return to communities, they are the magnets that draw prosecutors into the community as well" (Coles & Kelling, 1999, p. 73).

Forst (2002) argued that both community policing and community prosecution are linked by trends emphasizing service delivery (see, for example, Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) and communitarianism (see Crank, 1994, for a discussion of "community" in policing). Others see community prosecution as a complement to community policing efforts; comments from police officials note that "community prosecution is the missing link in community policing and problem solving" and "community prosecution is what makes community policing work" (Coles, 2002, p. 2).

Clearly, the two reforms are similar and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Marion County Prosecutor Scott Newman's quote in the introduction) supports the contention that community policing implementation was at least a partial determinant of community prosecution implementation. Yet, other evidence points to negligible effects of community policing adoption. For example, a chief prosecutor in Pima County, Arizona offered no opinion on the Tucson Police Department's approach to community policing but saw "the present emphasis on community service as counter-productive to effective traditional law enforcement" (Jacoby, Gramckow, & Ratledge, 1995, p. 80). These accounts do not provide enough evidence to know whether cross-component effects matter at the jurisdictional (i.e., county) level. Scholars addressing criminal justice innovation have tended to examine internal organizational characteristics or larger environmental factors (e.g., community characteristics or external funding) but not the influence of upstream or downstream system components. As case study evidence suggests, other system components may be powerful influences on organizational innovation. The focus of the

present research is to begin to fill this gap in the criminal justice innovation literature, to move beyond a

policing focus and to incorporate a multi-component perspective. Specifically, the study addresses the

question: Did community policing implementation influence community prosecution implementation at

the jurisdiction level?

The research will proceed by examining whether community policing implementation in local police departments predicts community prosecution implementation in local prosecutors' offices. Specifically, models will be constructed to explain community prosecution implementation in 2001 and 2005. The key difference between the two is that the 2005 model provides a stronger test, albeit with a smaller sample, by controlling for prior levels of community prosecution activities and assuring the temporal ordering of control variables. This chapter provides an overview of the police and prosecution datasets and a summary of the merging process.

OVERVIEW OF DATASETS

National Prosecutors Survey

Indicators of community prosecution implementation and characteristics of prosecutors' offices (discussed in Chapter IV) were derived from two waves of the *National Prosecutors Survey* (NPS). The survey, a project of the Bureau of Justice Statistics, is designed, "to obtain detailed information on prosecutors' offices, as well as information on their policies and practices" (U.S. DOJ, 2012, p. 4). As such, the NPS is an organization-level survey addressing issues such as personnel, workload, funding, homeland security, and community prosecution-related activities. The dataset lacks information on case-level or person-level variables, with the exception of limited descriptors about the chief prosecutor within each jurisdiction.

At present, seven waves of the NPS are publicly archived with the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD). The survey has been administered at irregular two to five year intervals from 1990 through 2007; the 2001 and 2007 versions were sent to a census of all prosecutors' offices nationwide while the remaining iterations relied upon sampling approaches. Response rates to the survey are consistently high in sample and census years: 99 percent in 2005 (Perry, 2006), 96 percent in 2001

(DeFrances, 2002), 88 percent in 1996 (DeFrances & Steadman, 1998), and 90 percent in 1994

(DeFrances, Smith, & van der Does, 1996).

In spite of the wealth of organizational data collected, the NPS has only been used sporadically

beyond the *Prosecutors in State Courts* series and other similar Bureau of Justice Statistics-produced

descriptive reports (e.g., DeFrances, 2002; Perry, 2006; Perry, Malega, & Banks, 2011). That said, others

have used measures derived from the NPS as predictor or outcome variables in explanatory studies.

Consider the following examples:

- Baumer, Messner, and Felson's (2000) study of murder case outcomes in 33 counties: NPS 1990 measure of dominant case screening mechanism (i.e., grand jury indictment or other) in each prosecutors' office.

- King, Messner, and Baller's (2009) study of hate crime enforcement: NPS 2001 measure of whether office prosecuted a hate crime in prior year.

- Rasmusen, Raghav, and Ramseyer's (2009) study of conviction rates: NPS 2001 measures of conviction rates (dependent variable), budget, dispositions, salaries, prosecutorial selection method, and length of service (dependent variables).

Scholars interested in organizational features of prosecutors' offices across years confront challenges in

working with the NPS. Not only is the survey administered at irregular intervals, some of the content

changes from one wave to the next. Groves and Cork (2009) pointed out, for example, that "BJS scaled

back the level of information requested in the most recent [2007/2008 survey], with the objective of

capping the burden on responding prosecutor offices at 30 minutes" (p. 128). Consequently, some

topics—community prosecution, for example—that had appeared in 2001 and 2005, were omitted in

2007. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the 2001 and 2005 waves provide relevant data for answering

the key research questions.

Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics

Like the NPS, the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey

collects organizational-level data related to the functions, responsibilities, operations, administration,

personnel, policies, expenditures, and, since 1997, community policing. The LEMAS effort predates the

NPS by three years, beginning in 1987, and has been administered at roughly three year intervals since.[2]

The survey is mailed to the chief executive of approximately 3,000 law enforcement agencies—generally

each of the largest agencies (employing 100 or more full-time sworn officers) and a sample of smaller

agencies. The unit of analysis is the law enforcement agency and the sampling frame includes all

publicly funded local and state law enforcement agencies within the United States with at least one full-

time or part-time officer. Sheriffs' departments with a primary law enforcement function are also

included and special jurisdiction agencies (e.g., campus or park police) have been included periodically.

Survey response rates generally exceed 90 percent across LEMAS administrations; the difference in

response rates for large agencies (all surveyed) and smaller agencies (sampled) is negligible (92.5% vs.

91.4%) (Langworthy, 2002; Reaves, 2010).

Although there are weaknesses with the LEMAS program (e.g., missing outcome or process

measures such as calls for service; reliability of certain items), it is by far the best data set available for

cross-agency comparisons of law enforcement departments nationwide (Langworthy, 2002). In contrast

to the NPS, LEMAS data is widely used in law enforcement research. For example:

- Worrall (1998) used departmental training and educational requirements from the 1993 LEMAS to predict the number of civil liability lawsuits (outcome variable from a source merged with the LEMAS).

- Maguire (2009) created a number of structural measures using 1987 LEMAS data including formalization and administrative intensity to explain the proportion of child sexual abuse cases closed by arrest (the outcome variable from a source merged with the LEMAS).

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[2] The time between LEMAS administrations has been as short as a single year (1999 to 2000) and as long as four years (1993 to 1997 and 2003 to 2007).

As these examples show, LEMAS datasets, alone or in combination with other datasets, are well suited for examining research questions addressing features of law enforcement organizations. For the purposes of the present study, the LEMAS dataset is critical for both developing the analysis sample and for producing measures of community policing implementation and organizational size.

MERGING DATASETS

2001 Analysis

The shorthand "2001 analysis" is used to describe the set of models predicting community prosecution implementation in 2001. The 2001 NPS dataset included data on a census of 2,341 prosecutors' offices, a 96 percent response rate (DeFrances, 2002). As discussed in the next two chapters, the 2001 NPS is the source of the community prosecution implementation measures as well as controls such as caseload, organizational size, and tenure of the prosecutor. The community policing implementation measure is derived from the 2000 LEMAS dataset. While the project gathered responses from 2,985 state, county, and local agencies of all sizes, the focus of this project is on large law enforcement agencies (municipal or county) with 100 or more full-time sworn officers. The LEMAS dataset includes a census of these agencies as large departments are included in each wave of the survey and participate with extremely high (90% or higher) response rates. In 2001, 803 agencies met the size/agency type criteria.

The 803 law enforcement agencies were matched to the prosecutor's office in the same county using county-level federal information processing standards (FIPS) codes included in each dataset.[3],[4] This process resulted in successful matches of 792 (98.6%) of the LEMAS agencies with 391 unique

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[3] Each law enforcement agency was assigned a single FIPS codes. Prosecutors' officers were assigned one or more FIPS codes depending upon the extent of their jurisdiction. Some offices served multiple counties.
[4] Connecticut court jurisdictions do not correspond with county boundaries so FIPS code matching would result in errors. Police departments were manually matched to Connecticut courts based on maps available from the Connecticut Judicial Branch. Appendix B identifies the city-judicial district match relevant for both the 2001 and 2005 analyses.

prosecutors' offices. Some offices were matched to multiple law enforcement agencies (m=2.03,

sd=1.62, min=1, max=17), an issue that will be addressed by pooling implementation scores in later

analyses. As shown in Appendix A, 11 police departments could not be matched for the following

reasons:

- The NPS provides statewide data for courts in Alaska, Rhode Island, and Delaware. Such data are not appropriate for examining practices at the county level. This resulted in the elimination of seven cases.

- Jefferson County (AL) is served by two separate prosecutors' offices/courts. The Jefferson County Sheriff and Hoover Police Department may file cases in both courts.[5] Tom Green County (TX) is similarly served by two offices, preventing a match with the San Angelo Police Department. These three law enforcement agencies were not matched.

- Connecticut judicial boundaries do not correspond to counties. Consequently, the New Haven County Sheriff's Department jurisdiction crosses court lines and was not matched to any one prosecutors' office.

For the purposes of the 2001 analysis, the goal is to explain community prosecution adoption in the 391

prosecutors' offices.

2005 Analysis

The 2005 NPS served as the source of data for the 2005 analysis ("2005 analysis" serves as

shorthand for the set of models predicting community prosecution adoption in 2005), including the

community prosecution implementation measure. Unlike the 2001 NPS, the 2005 NPS included a

sample, rather than a census, of 307 offices nationwide, a 99 percent response rate (Perry, 2006). The

population of prosecutors' offices was first divided into five strata based on jurisdiction size and offices

were selected from each strata in order to maximize variation. Prosecutors' offices serving larger

jurisdictions were oversampled relative to their representation in the overall population. The 2003

LEMAS dataset, the next wave in the series, served as the source of data for the community policing

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[5]In contrast, the Bessemer and Birmingham police departments, both in Jefferson County, file exclusively in one court or the other. This was confirmed by a representative with the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts.

implementation measure. The 2003 LEMAS dataset includes data on 2,859 state and local law

enforcement agencies.

As with the 2001 analysis, the dataset was filtered based on two criteria: agencies must be either

municipal police or county (police or sheriff) departments and employ 100 or more full-time sworn

officers. The 822 police departments were merged with the 307 prosecutors' offices in the NPS,

resulting in 481 matched pairs of police departments and prosecutors' offices.[6] Specifically, the 481 law

enforcement agencies matched with 182 separate prosecutors' offices (of the 307 in the dataset).

Recall, some prosecutors' offices serve jurisdictions with more than one large law enforcement

organization (m=2.64, sd=2.17, min=1, max=17).

The final step in the merging process was to add prosecution data from the 2001 NPS. This

strengthens the analysis in two ways.[7] First, it permits controls for prior community prosecution

implementation. That is, it allows for the examination of the influence of community prosecution

implementation in 2001 on the level of implementation in 2005. Second, it allows for the control

variables discussed in the next chapter to be measured in such a way that temporal order is assured

(independent variables are captured in 2001 while the dependent measure is captured in 2005). Since

the 2001 NPS was a census, adding variables did not change the dataset size: 481 law enforcement

agencies matched to 182 separate prosecutors' offices. The models in Chapter V attempt to predict

community prosecution adoption in these 182 prosecutors' offices.

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[6] FIPS codes were again used to match agencies with one another. The same problems occurred matching 2003
LEMAS and 2005 NPS data as occurred when matching 2000 LEMAS with 2001 NPS data: Connecticut courts
needed to be matched manually, Alaska, Rhode Island, and Delaware prosecutors' offices (and, by implication,
associated police agencies) were excluded, and two police agencies (Hoover, AL and Jefferson County, AL Sheriff)
matched to multiple prosecutors' offices and were subsequently excluded. See Appendix A.
[7] Interestingly, even though both the 2001 and 2005 waves of the NPS include an identification variable (su_id) of
similar length, the number is not the same across waves. Using this variable to merge datasets will produce
erroneous matches. It is possible to merge based on FIPS codes though the process is tedious given that some
offices serve multiple counties. Instead, matching was accomplished using the unique (and consistent across
waves) district number (distnum) variable.

In order to examine the influence of community reforms across criminal justice system

components, it is necessary to first adequately measure two key concepts: community policing and

community prosecution. This section provides a review of the literature addressing measurement of

community innovation in policing and prosecution and proceeds to a discussion of measurement in the

current context. Although community prosecution is the dependent variable of interest, the section

commences with an overview of the measurement of community policing. The literature on community

policing, particularly large sample studies, is more fully developed, and the procedures for measuring

community prosecution in the current study are largely informed by this literature. The chapter

concludes with a description of control variables included in later models.

PRIOR MEASURES OF COMMUNITY REFORMS

Community Policing

There is no shortage of research examining community policing, either as a dependent variable or

as a predictor of some other outcome (e.g., crime) (see, for example, Morabito, 2010; Zhao, Lovrich, &

Robinson, 2001). Within these models, community policing is generally captured using some

dichotomous or composite indicator. These measures, drawn from available data or new surveys,

attempt to capture the complexity of community policing (content validity), usually via a checklist of

practices. They are widely used in the law enforcement literature even if the measures omit specific

indicators representative of community policing (for example, do they capture underlying department

philosophies or the depth, rather than the range, of activities?).

Maguire, Kuhns, Uchida, and Cox (1997), for example, used data from applications for Office of

Community Oriented Police Services (COPS) funding to assess implementation; applicants were asked to

identify community policing-related activities currently practiced. Responses from the 31 items (e.g.,

citizens participating in neighborhood watch, agency identifying problems by looking at crime trends,

and presence of citizen advisory groups) were summed (*med.*=13) to create a community policing score

"gauging the extent to which departments were involved in a broad array of community policing

activities" (p. 379).[8] In contrast, King (2000) developed an indicator from two items from the 1993

Police Foundation survey of community policing practices: the department self-reported adopting

community policing *and* implementing or planning to implement a beat integrity policy. The latter

question served as a check on the first by requiring at least some action related to community policing.

MacDonald (2002) and others (Morabito, 2010; Randol, 2012) created measures of community

policing adoption from waves of the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics

survey. A series of community policing-related questions was introduced into the survey beginning with

the fourth wave (1997) and, with slight modifications, has remained through the most recent publicly

archived dataset (2007). In general, the items address the presence of a community policing plan,

training provided to new recruits, in-service officers, and civilian personnel, meetings with various

organized constituents (e.g., neighborhood or business groups), and a number of other community

policing-related items (e.g., encourage problem-solving, permanent assignment of officers to geographic

areas, include problem-solving in officer evaluations). There is some variation in the literature as to the

items included in the indices. For example, MacDonald (2002) included indicators of community policing

training for both in-service personnel and new-recruits, Randol (2012) also includes training for civilians,

and Morabito (2010) omits training altogether. Morabito's index does, however, include technological-

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[8] In subsequent analyses, the scores were broken into six categories (0-5, 6-10, etc.) and three categories (0-10, 11-20, 21-31).

oriented measures related to crime analysis, indicators left out of the other two indices.[9] Regardless of

the precise measure, the LEMAS dataset provides a range of measurement options.

Worrall and Zhao (2003) similarly created an index, this time using data from the 1998 Police Issues

Survey, a study of over 400 large municipal and county agencies (representing a 60 percent response

rate). Unlike the previous measures, however, the authors, recognizing the multi-dimensional nature of

community policing, captured both the internal and external innovations associated with reform. Eleven

dichotomous items represented internally-focused change (management-related reforms such as

incorporating community policing into the mission statement and reducing managerial positions) and 14

measured externally-focused change (changes affecting the organization's connection to the outside

such as new strategies [foot patrol, special units] or police substations).

Wilson (2005, 2006) produced a measurement model of community policing implementation using

1997 and 1999 LEMAS measures (see Figure 1). The model draws upon many of the same indicators as

others who have used LEMAS data (MacDonald, 2002; Morabito, 2010; Randol, 2012) and, like Worrall

and Zhao (2003), views community policing as a multidimensional construct. Nevertheless, there are

some important distinctions. First, the measurement model recognizes that some indicators may reflect

the underlying construct (i.e., community policing) better than others. For example, Wilson (2006)

found that community policing implementation in 1997 was more closely associated with a problem-

solving observed measure and a citizen interaction latent construct than other indicators. In situations

where additive indices are used—for example, summing dichotomously coded items—each item is given

equal weight (e.g., the presence of a police academy is equivalent to beat integrity policies as they relate

to community policing).[10] Second, and more substantively, measurement models incorporate

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[9] Some of the variation in the composition of the indices is related to disagreements as to what indicators
appropriately represent community policing. In addition, data availability also likely played some role as indicators
were included or omitted from LEMAS waves.

[10] Where the index comprises a mix of dichotomous and ordinal indicators, the ordinal indicators actually are given
more weight. For example, MacDonald (2002) included two indicators related to training recruits and in-service

measurement error into analyses. Indices implicitly (or explicitly) assume that the construct is perfectly

measured, a tenable assumption. Measurement models are generally reflective; that is, variation in

some underlying latent construct (e.g., community policing) *and* measurement error is assumed to

produce variation in observed indicators (e.g., presence of a community policing plan) (Edwards &

Bagozzi, 2000). Given these two issues, community policing will be measured using a slightly modified

version of Wilson's (2005, 2006) model.

Figure 1. Wilson's (2005, 2006) measurement model of community policing implementation derived from LEMAS 1997 and LEMAS 1999 data.

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personnel in community policing activities (coded 0=none, 1=less than half, 2=more than half). These two items are treated equally in the overall community policing index. However, the other items within the index (e.g., include problem solving in evaluations) are all dichotomous indicators. Thus, the training indicators are mathematically given more weight when compared to another indicator.

Community Prosecution

Unlike the community policing literature, the community prosecution literature is, with few

exceptions, characterized more by descriptive research than explanatory research.[11] Consequently,

there are plenty of survey items addressing specific community prosecution-related items, but these

have rarely been combined to produce a single community prosecution score. For example, Nugent,

Fanflik, and Bromirski (2004) summarized findings from a survey of 879 prosecutors' offices.

Respondents were asked whether they practiced any of key elements of reform including a focus on

problem solving, partnering with other agencies, an expanded toolkit (e.g., enforcement and

prevention), a clearly defined focus area, and use of both proactive and reactive strategies. Offices were

classified as to how many of the six elements they practiced. Other measures were similarly offered

(e.g., the specific groups partnering with the prosecutor's office). The authors then compared these

measures across traditional and community prosecution (self-reported) offices.

Rainville and Nugent (2002) surveyed prosecutors in Georgia in order to examine the time spent on

community outreach (a community prosecution function) and law enforcement coordination (a

traditional prosecution function). In their study, the measure moved beyond just engaging in the

activity; community outreach activities including time spent on tasks such as meeting with community

groups, making referrals, and performing crime prevention activities. More recently, Cunningham,

Renauer, and Khalifa (2006) used data from the 2001 National Prosecutors Survey to explain the

adoption of community prosecution in a sample of 749 offices. Four dichotomous items were summed

to create a community prosecution index: involved the community in identifying crime/problem areas,

assigned prosecutors to specific geographic areas, used tools other than criminal prosecution to address

community problems, and assigned prosecutors to handle community-related activities. Curiously, and

without explanation, the authors omitted items related to relationships with outside agencies and

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[11] In this context, explanatory research is viewed as research that models a relationship between multiple
independent variables and a dependent variable rather than just an examination of bivariate relationships.

meeting with community groups from the community prosecution index even though these items are both theoretically relevant and available in the 2001 NPS dataset.

What these studies show is that there is indeed some overlap in how community prosecution is conceptually defined, just little agreement in how to operationally measure it. In the current study, the 2001 and 2005 NPS datasets are used and, similar to Wilson's approach with community policing, a measurement model is developed. The model incorporates the multiple dimensions of community prosecution and incorporates measurement error.

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Both community policing and community prosecution are captured using measurement models (i.e., confirmatory factor analysis) as detailed below. Once the model is confirmed, factors scores are saved and used in subsequent analyses. Observed indicators are used to measure latent (or unobserved) constructs such as citizen interaction, training, community policing implementation, and community prosecution implementation. Consequently, it is critical to establish the validity of these models—to ensure that the observed indicators actually measure the latent constructs they are hypothesized to measure (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). This is accomplished using Mplus software, a common structural equation modeling program.[12]

The decision to separate the measurement model from the prediction model is based on the overall purpose of the research. A full structural equation model combining both the measurement and prediction portions is designed to assess model fit. While individual parameters can be examined (i.e., the significance of individual predictors), the stability of the parameter estimates is based on the overall model fit. In cases where a model is improperly specified or incomplete, overall model fit statistics

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[12] Mplus is one of a number of commercially available structural equation modeling software programs on the market. Mplus is capable of assessing models using an appropriate estimator when most of the observed indicators are categorical as they are in the present study.

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might preclude an interpretation of individual parameters. In the present study, based on available data, the primary goal is to examine the influence of community policing on community prosecution. A regression model allows for an assessment of individual parameters while acknowledging that the overall prediction model is likely omitting variables.

The analysis of the measurement models proceeds in two steps. First, the significance levels associated with individual paths (i.e., a latent construct to indicator) are examined to determine whether the indicators appropriately reflect the underlying construct. Second, the overall measurement model is assessed using goodness-of-fit indices and statistics (Marsh & Hau, 1996). As noted elsewhere, "these indices relevant to SEM provide a useful gauge of how well the specified, theoretically-derived model describes the covariation in the sample data" (Hoelter, 1983, p. 328). The measurement models will be assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Gau (2010) has summarized these measures and, more importantly, the cut-off criteria suggestive of a good fit between the hypothesized model and the data. For example, CFI and TLI values above 0.95 are said to represent a good fit, though TLI values of 0.90 are acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). The RMSEA lacks an agreed-upon cut-off though values under 0.06 or 0.08 are said to indicate a good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010).[13]

The remainder of this chapter details the operationalization and analysis of the community policing and community prosecution measurement models used in the current study. These models are then used in predictive analyses in Chapter V.

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[13] It is customary to report a chi-square test statistic when assessing models. The statistic tests whether there is a difference between the hypothesized and observed data covariance matrices; a non-significant value (no difference) indicates a good model fit. However, the chi-square statistic is sensitive to sample size and may suggest significant differences even when the hypothesized model fits the data. Gau (2010) advises, "[the chi-square statistic] should not be given much weight" (p. 144).

MEASURING COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE CURRENT STUDY

Indicators

In the present study, community policing implementation is measured using indicators from the

2000 and 2003 waves of the LEMAS. The 2000 LEMAS survey community policing measure is used to

predict community prosecution in the 2001 analyses while the 2003 community policing measure is

used to predict community prosecution in the 2005 analyses. Wilson's (2005, 2006) measurement

model is used with slight modifications due only to data availability issues. While data access and

website indicators were available in 1997 and 1999, they were not available in more recent LEMAS

waves. Consequently, an alternative indicator is used instead as discussed below.

Wilson measured community policing as a second order unmeasured (or latent) construct captured

by five indicators (see Figure 1): the presence of a community policing plan (observed), encouraging

problem solving (observed), geographic/fixed assignment of officers/detectives (observed), training

(unobserved), and citizen interaction (unobserved). The first indicator measured whether or not the

agency had a formally written community policing plan. Agencies were assigned a score of 1 if a formal

written plan was in place, or a 0 if no plan or no written plan was evident. The second indicator

represented the degree of problem-solving activities within the department. Departments were asked

whether officers were encouraged to use the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) model of

problem-solving and build problem solving partnerships, and whether problem-solving was included in

employee evaluations. These three items were summed into a single problem-solving score (range 0-3).

Only two items were available in the 2003 LEMAS dataset; the building problem-solving partnerships

item was used as an indicator of citizen interaction instead (referred to as "citizen input" in Figure 3).[14]

The final observed indicator of the second-order community policing construct was geographic or fixed

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[14] The wording of the partnerships question changed from 2000 to 2003. In 2000, the wording read, "formed
problem-solving partnerships with community groups, public agencies, or others through specialized contracts or
written agreements." In 2003, the question read, "partnered with citizen groups and included their feedback in
the development of neighborhood or community policing strategies."

assignment. LEMAS respondents were asked to report whether detectives and officers were assigned

geographically. A score of 2 indicates that departments deploy both detectives and officers to largely

fixed geographic assignments (1= detectives or officers; 0= neither detectives nor officers).[15]

 Community policing implementation, as noted, was also measured by two first-order latent

constructs. The training construct was indicated by three variables. Organizations were asked to report

the proportion of new recruits, in-service officers, and non-sworn personnel trained in community

policing. For each of the three indicators, agencies were assigned scores of 3 (all), 2 (more than half), 1

(less than half), or 0 (none) to reflect the level of training provided.

 The citizen interaction construct included three indicators in 2000 and four in 2003.[16] The first two,

both dichotomous, indicated whether the department trained citizens in community policing and

whether it ran a citizen police academy. The third indicator was an additive index representing the

number of different groups (e.g., religious groups, senior citizens' groups, business groups) the

department met with on a regular basis during the previous year. The 2000 LEMAS survey included 10

options while the 2003 LEMAS included 9 groups.[17] While there is minor variation in the composition of

the index and wording, it does not affect the overall measurement of community policing

implementation.[18,19] In the 2003 measurement model, a fourth indicator was included that reflected

citizen input (see footnote 15).

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[15] The question addressing detective assignment was not included in the 2003 LEMAS survey. As such, only the officer indicator is used in the model based on 2003 LEMAS data discussed below.

[16] As noted earlier, the website and data access indicators used in Wilson's original model were not available in later LEMAS waves. These were omitted but a citizen academy indicator was added due to its relationship to overall citizen interaction.

[17] Both waves included items addressing advocacy groups, business groups, neighborhood associations, local public agencies (called local government agencies in 2003), religious groups (called faith based-organizations in 2003), school groups, senior citizen groups, and youth service organizations. The 2000 LEMAS asked about meetings with tenants' associations and domestic violence groups. Neither of those groups were addressed in 2003.

[18] The measurement model accounts for measurement error in both the observed indicators and the latent constructs such as citizen interaction. Interestingly, the variable descriptions in the 2003 LEMAS dataset use the phrasing "met" to describe the variables even though the actual instrument refers to partnerships and written agreements.

The analysis of the two community policing measurement models included *all* law enforcement agencies matched to at least one NPS prosecutor's office (*n*=792 from 2000 LEMAS and *n*=481 from 2003 LEMAS). The analysis was not limited to a single law enforcement agency for each prosecutors' office. Descriptive statistics for all items used in the community policing measurement models are shown in Tables 2 and 3.[20]

Table 2.

Descriptive statistics for indicators used in community policing measurement model, 2000 LEMAS data

	Overall Sample Matched with NPS				Measurement Model Sample			
	n	*m*	*sd*	range	*n*	*m*	*sd*	range
Presence of community policing plan	778	0.515	0.500	0-1	778	0.515	0.500	0-1
Agency problem solving	792	1.347	1.063	0-3	778	1.372	1.057	0-3
Encourages prob. solv. projects	792	0.548	0.498	0-1	778	0.558	0.497	0-1
Formed problem solving groups	792	0.481	0.500	0-1	778	0.490	0.500	0-1
Includes problem solving in evals.	792	0.318	0.466	0-1	778	0.324	0.468	0-1
Geographic assignment	792	1.287	0.702	0-2	778	1.310	0.687	0-2
Detectives assigned geographically	792	0.450	0.498	0-1	778	0.458	0.499	0-1
Officers assigned to specific areas	792	0.837	0.369	0-1	778	0.852	0.355	0-1
Train recruits in CP	778	2.279	1.190	0-3	778	2.279	1.190	0-3
Train sworn officers in CP	778	1.505	1.071	0-3	778	1.505	1.071	0-3
Train civilians in CP	778	0.584	0.890	0-3	778	0.584	0.890	0-3
Citizen training in CP	792	0.514	0.500	0-1	778	0.523	0.500	0-1
Hold citizens academy	792	0.605	0.489	0-1	778	0.616	0.487	0-1
Group meetings	792	6.027	3.060	0-10	778	6.135	2.978	0-10
Advocacy groups	792	0.520	0.500	0-1	778	0.530	0.500	0-1
Business groups	792	0.670	0.470	0-1	778	0.680	0.465	0-1
Domestic violence groups	792	0.610	0.488	0-1	778	0.620	0.485	0-1
Local public agencies	792	0.610	0.488	0-1	778	0.620	0.486	0-1
Neighborhood associations	792	0.860	0.342	0-1	778	0.880	0.325	0-1
Religious groups	792	0.450	0.498	0-1	778	0.460	0.499	0-1
School groups	792	0.770	0.420	0-1	778	0.790	0.411	0-1
Senior citizen groups	792	0.590	0.492	0-1	778	0.600	0.490	0-1
Tenants associations	792	0.430	0.495	0-1	778	0.430	0.496	0-1
Youth service organizations	792	0.520	0.500	0-1	778	0.530	0.500	0-1

[19] The 2003 LEMAS asked respondents about meetings with other law enforcement agencies, an item not addressed in 2000. Moreover, the 2003 question addresses partnerships and agreements more than meetings. Nevertheless, both years suggest interaction between the police and the groups identified.
[20] Correlation matrices are shown in Appendix C.

Table 3.
Descriptive statistics for indicators used in community policing measurement model, 2003 LEMAS data

	Overall Sample Matched with NPS				Measurement Model Sample			
	n	m	sd	range	n	m	sd	range
Presence of community policing plan	479	0.464	0.499	0-1	436	0.477	0.500	0-1
Agency problem solving	479	0.908	0.828	0-2	436	0.950	0.829	0-2
Encourages prob. solv. projects	479	0.560	0.497	0-1	436	0.585	0.493	0-1
Includes problem solving in evals.	479	0.349	0.477	0-1	436	0.365	0.482	0-1
Geographic assignment- officers	479	0.789	0.408	0-1	436	0.810	0.393	0-1
Train recruits in CP	447	2.266	1.216	0-3	436	2.273	1.212	0-3
Train sworn officers in CP	475	1.131	1.051	0-3	436	1.154	1.051	0-3
Train civilians in CP	470	0.445	0.753	0-3	436	0.463	0.759	0-3
Citizen training in CP	479	0.549	0.498	0-1	436	0.567	0.496	0-1
Hold citizens academy	479	0.647	0.478	0-1	436	0.663	0.473	0-1
Partnered with citizens/included feedback	479	0.752	0.433	0-1	436	0.768	0.422	0-1
Partnerships/written agreements	477	4.887	2.970	1-9	436	4.961	2.959	1-9
Advocacy groups	477	0.450	0.498	0-1	436	0.460	0.499	0-1
Business groups	477	0.500	0.501	0-1	436	0.520	0.500	0-1
Faith-based organizations	477	0.380	0.485	0-1	436	0.390	0.488	0-1
Local government agencies	477	0.590	0.493	0-1	436	0.590	0.492	0-1
Other law enforcement	477	0.660	0.475	0-1	436	0.670	0.471	0-1
Neighborhood associations	477	0.660	0.475	0-1	436	0.670	0.469	0-1
Senior citizen groups	477	0.450	0.498	0-1	436	0.460	0.499	0-1
School groups	477	0.610	0.487	0-1	436	0.630	0.483	0-1
Youth service organizations	477	0.470	0.500	0-1	436	0.470	0.500	0-1

Assessing the Validity of the Policing Measurement Model (2000 LEMAS Data)

As shown in Figure 2, the hypothesized model of community policing implementation (based on Wilson's model) fits the 2000 LEMAS data well according to the three major fit indices (CFI=0.989; TLI=0.992; RMSEA=0.031). The two first-order latent constructs, training and citizen interaction, explain between 33.8 and 67.5 percent of the variance in observed indicators. In Wilson's (2006) original analysis, the data access and website indicators had the lowest standardized coefficients (the citizen interaction latent construct did not explain as much variance). While those measures were absent in the 2000 LEMAS, the citizen academy indicator proved to be a viable replacement (β=0.584; R^2=0.341). One of the benefits of structural equation modeling is the ability to assess each indicator's relative relationship to the underlying construct. The second-order community policing implementation

construct was most closely connected to citizen interaction (β=0.897), problem-solving (β=0.798), and

training (β=0.707). This pattern closely approximated Wilson's (2006) findings based on 1997 LEMAS

data.

Figure 2. Standardized factor loadings and fit indices for measurement model of community policing implementation using LEMAS 2000 data

Assessing the Validity of the Policing Measurement Model (2003 LEMAS Data)

The hypothesized model did not fit the 2003 LEMAS data as well (see Figure 3). Goodness-of-fit

indices (CFI=0.939; TLI=0.944; RMSEA=0.070) point to a marginal fit, at best, according to common

thresholds (see Gau, 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). One possible reason for

the change in model fit is the change in measurement of indicators from 2000 to 2003. For example, as

noted above, one of the indicators of citizen interaction shifted from regular meetings with various

groups (2000) to partnerships and agreements with many of those same groups (2003). Likewise, the

geographic assignment indicator was more limited in 2003, addressing only the assignment of officers

rather than both officers and detectives. Nevertheless, given acceptable fit, the factors scores produced

from the model are used in subsequent analyses.

Figure 3. Standardized factor loadings and fit indices for measurement model of community policing implementation using LEMAS 2003 data

MEASURING COMMUNITY PROSECUTION IN THE CURRENT STUDY

Indicators

The conceptual model of community prosecution (see Figure 4) is based on the literature on

community prosecution *and* the availability of data within the NPS dataset. The latent community

prosecution implementation construct is indicated by five observed variables. The first three are simply

dichotomous measures addressing community prosecution-related activities: using the community to

help identify crime problems, assigning prosecutors to geographic areas, and using tools other than

criminal prosecution. The relationships indicator is an ordinal measure combining responses to an NPS

survey item: at any time during the past 12 months, did your office have a formal and/or informal

relationship with any of the following? Options included law enforcement agencies, other government

agencies, private organizations, and community associations. Relationship scores theoretically ranged

from 0 to 4. Finally, respondents were asked to indicate whether staff members regularly met with

various groups during the prior 12-month period. Similar to the community policing meetings index,

possible groups included neighborhood associations, tenants' associations, youth service organizations,

advocacy groups, business groups, religious groups, and school groups. Affirmative responses were

summed into a single meetings index with scores ranging from 0 to 7. Indicators were identical for 2001

and 2005 NPS data. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 4 and 5.[21]

Note: Latent constructs are represented by ovals and observed indicators from NPS data are represented by rectangles. Not shown are error terms for each of the observed variables and the training and interaction latent constructs.

Figure 4. Conceptual model of community prosecution

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[21] Correlation matrices are shown in Appendix D.

Table 4.

Descriptive statistics for indicators used in community prosecution measurement model, 2001 NPS data

|	Overall Sample Matched with LEMAS					Measurement Model Sample			
	n	m	sd	range		n	m	sd	range
Formal and informal relationships with other groups	364	3.539	0.831	1-4		291	3.619	0.763	1-4
With law enforcement agencies	364	1.000	0.000	1-1		291	1.000	0.000	1-1
With other gov't agencies	364	0.900	0.295	0-1		291	0.930	0.259	0-1
With private organizations	364	0.790	0.411	0-1		291	0.810	0.392	0-1
With community associations	364	0.850	0.359	0-1		291	0.880	0.326	0-1
Regular meetings with other groups	351	4.293	2.020	0-7		291	4.395	2.015	0-7
With neighborhood associations	351	0.650	0.478	0-1		291	0.670	0.471	0-1
With tenants associations	351	0.250	0.434	0-1		291	0.270	0.447	0-1
With youth services associations	351	0.610	0.489	0-1		291	0.630	0.485	0-1
With advocacy groups	351	0.830	0.372	0-1		291	0.840	0.369	0-1
With business groups	351	0.680	0.469	0-1		291	0.700	0.460	0-1
With religious groups	351	0.470	0.500	0-1		291	0.480	0.501	0-1
With school groups	351	0.800	0.400	0-1		291	0.800	0.398	0-1
Involve community in problem identification	339	0.750	0.436	0-1		291	0.730	0.447	0-1
Assign prosecutions to geographic areas	320	0.390	0.489	0-1		291	0.390	0.488	0-1
Use non-prosecution tools	348	0.820	0.386	0-1		291	0.800	0.398	0-1

Table 5.

Descriptive statistics for indicators used in community prosecution measurement model, 2005 NPS data

	Overall Sample Matched with LEMAS					Measurement Model Sample			
	n	m	sd	range		n	m	sd	range
Formal and informal relationships with other groups	166	3.476	0.919	1-4		162	3.488	0.907	1-4
With law enforcement agencies	166	1.000	0.000	1-1		162	1.000	0.000	1-1
With other gov't agencies	166	0.900	0.296	0-1		162	0.910	0.291	0-1
With private organizations	166	0.750	0.433	0-1		162	0.760	0.429	0-1
With community associations	166	0.820	0.386	0-1		162	0.820	0.385	0-1
Regular meetings with other groups	165	4.515	2.149	0-7		162	4.537	2.156	0-7
With neighborhood associations	165	0.700	0.458	0-1		162	0.700	0.458	0-1
With tenants associations	165	0.320	0.466	0-1		162	0.310	0.466	0-1
With youth services associations	165	0.680	0.466	0-1		162	0.690	0.463	0-1
With advocacy groups	165	0.800	0.401	0-1		162	0.810	0.395	0-1
With business groups	165	0.680	0.466	0-1		162	0.690	0.466	0-1
With religious groups	165	0.520	0.501	0-1		162	0.520	0.501	0-1
With school groups	165	0.810	0.392	0-1		162	0.810	0.395	0-1
Involve community in problem identification	164	0.800	0.398	0-1		162	0.800	0.399	0-1
Assign prosecutions to geographic areas	165	0.450	0.499	0-1		162	0.460	0.500	0-1
Use non-prosecution tools	165	0.830	0.377	0-1		162	0.830	0.379	0-1

Assessing the Validity of the Prosecution Measurement Model (2001 NPS Data)

The goodness-of-fit indices suggest that the hypothesized model of community prosecution implementation fits the 2001 NPS data well (CFI=0.976; TLI=0.966; RMSEA=0.071). Based on the standardized path coefficients (see Figure 5), community prosecution is most closely associated with using the community in the identification of crime problems (β=0.880) and using tools other than criminal prosecution to solve problems (β=0.842). The model is consistent with the hypothesized model depicted in Figure 4. However, it omits the only remaining community prosecution indicator available in the NPS dataset: assigning prosecutors to handle community prosecution activities. This indicator was included in the composite measure developed by Cunningham, Renauer, and Khalifa (2006); recall, however, that they neither measured community meetings nor relations. A separate measurement model was assessed (not shown) that included the five indicators shown in Figure 4 plus the assigning prosecutors variable. This revised model did not fit the data as well as the original model (CFI=0.955; TLI=0.944; RMSEA=0.093). Thus, the five-indicator model forms the basis for the predictor models in Chapter V.

Chi square: 12.236 (df=5)
p= 0.0317
CFI: 0.976
TLI: 0.966
RMSEA: 0.071

Standardized path coefficients are displayed. Error terms are omitted for ease of presentation.

n=291

***p*<.001

Figure 5. Standardized factor loadings and fit indices for measurement model of community prosecution implementation using NPS 2001 data

Assessing the Validity of the Prosecution Measurement Model (2005 NPS Data)

The hypothesized measurement model also fits the 2005 NPS data well (CFI=0.993; TLI=0.988; RMSEA=0.064). As shown in Figure 6, community prosecution is again most closely associated with using the community to identify crime problems (β=0.911) and using tools other than criminal prosecution (β=0.852). Overall, the community prosecution latent construct explains between 31 percent (assigning prosecutors to geographic areas) and 83 percent (using community to identify problems) of the variation in the observed indicators.

Chi square: 6.622 (df=4)
p= 0.1573
CFI: 0.993
TLI: 0.988
RMSEA: 0.064

Standardized path coefficients are displayed. Error terms are omitted for ease of presentation.

n=162

***p<.001

Used community to ID crime problems

Assigned prosecutors to geographic areas

Used tools other than criminal prosecution

Relationships

Meetings

Community prosecution

0.911***

0.556***

0.852***

0.767***

0.759***

Figure 6. Standardized factor loadings and fit indices for measurement model of community prosecution implementation using NPS 2005 data

SUMMARY OF MEASUREMENT MODEL FINDINGS

The analyses presented above—assessing two community policing and two community prosecution measurement models—suggest that the hypothesized models appropriately fit their respective datasets. Going forward, factor scores derived from these models will be used as indicators of the level of implementation of community policing and prosecution. It is important to note, however, "it is possible that the [latent constructs represent] some other phenomenon (e.g., innovativeness or professionalism)…[they] are best defined by their measures and the theories and research from which they derive" (Wilson, 2005, pp. 65-66).

Not surprisingly, the implementation factors scores produced from these measurement models are highly correlated with indices used in prior research. After all, the indices and measurement models are composed of similar indicators. For example, using 2000 LEMAS data, the implementation factor score

was correlated with MacDonald's (2002) dichotomous formal plan/no formal plan measure of community policing (r=0.530) and the more inclusive index (r=0.894). Similarly, the community prosecution implementation scores are highly correlated with Cunningham, Renauer, and Khalifa's (2006) four-item index (r=0.848).[22]

CONTROL VARIABLES

Several control variables are introduced in the models presented in Chapter V. These variables are derived from the general organizational innovation literature and the limited literature on community prosecution adoption (Cunningham, Renauer, & Khalifa, 2006; Damanpour, 1987, 1991; King, 2000). Unless otherwise noted, the NPS 2001 dataset is the source of all control variables for both the 2001 and 2003 analyses.[23] The fourteen variables are described in Table 6 below.[24] Damanpour (1991), for example, summarized the innovation literature and described the importance of organizational structure in shaping the adoption of innovation. In the present study, four structural characteristics— occupational differentiation, functional differentiation, formalization, and decentralization—are measured. Damanpour (1991) suggested that the division of work—either individually or into special units—promotes specialization; "a greater variety of specialists would provide a broader knowledge base and increase the cross-fertilization of ideas" (p. 558). In contrast, formal, rule-bound organizations with centralized control are likely to stifle innovation. Employees lose flexibility in decision-making both because of the need to adhere to written rules and management authority.

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[22] An additional advantage of the factor score approach is the greater precision in measurement. That is, there is greater variation in the factor score variables compared to the more restricted indices.

[23] In the 2001 analysis, the control variables (independent variables) are measured at the same time as community prosecution making time ordering a concern. In the 2005 analysis, the use of 2001 variables ensures the temporal ordering of relevant variables. Of course, a related concern is that some of the characteristics of prosecutors' offices changed from 2001 to 2005. The analysis assumes some degree of stability in favor of ensuring proper ordering of variables.

[24] Most of the variables are skewed and were log transformed prior to analysis. Table 7 shows non-transformed descriptive statistics.

Table 6.
Control variables used in prediction models

Variable	Definition of control variables[1]	2001 Analysis					2005 Analysis					log[2]
		n	m	sd	min	max	n	m	sd	min	max	
Grants	Percent of office budget coming from state, federal, or other grants	363	7.37	9.95	0.00	59.00	168	6.97	9.30	0.00	53.00	X
Occupational differentiation	Number of special occupational-related budget categories: staff, expert, investigator, interpreter, social services, child support enforcement, DNA testing	317	4.27	1.78	1.00	7.00	151	4.68	1.57	1.00	7.00	
Functional differentiation	Number of different types of specialized felony offenses prosecuted in prior 12 months: hate crime, domestic violence, elder abuse, stalking, child abuse, health care fraud, bank or thrift fraud, telemarketing fraud, illegal sale/possession firearm, police use of excessive force	370	6.53	1.68	2.00	10.00	170	6.92	1.74	2.00	10.00	
Formalization	Does organization have written guidelines about proceeding against juveniles in criminal court?	357	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	163	0.41	0.49	0.00	0.19	
Decentralization	Number of FT supervising attorneys and managers as a proportion of all FT total	377	0.06	0.05	0.00	0.47	174	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.19	X[4]
Size	FT total staff	377	134.26	224.19	1.00	2235.00	174	219.25	302.52	17.00	2235.00	X
Budget	Spending per FT staff member (total budget/FT total staff)	376	59498.6	61177.20	2812.50	1021917.8	174	66648.6	85148.0	3662.24	1021914.8	X
Tenure	Number of years current prosecutor has served	345	0.00	34.00	10.18	7.66	159	10.08	8.19	0.00	34.00	
Felony caseload	Number of felony cases closed per FT staff member	342	44.41	41.63	0.36	282.33	160	37.97	33.45	0.36	282.33	X
Felony success[3]	Number of felony convictions/number of felony cases closed	318	0.78	0.20	0.01	1.00	145	0.80	0.18	0.05	1.00	X
SOVI 2000	Index created by researchers at University of South Carolina (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute, 2012) combining 32 separate county-level socio-economic indicators	389	-0.32	3.33	-13.35	6.93	174	-1.12	3.33	-12.95	4.95	
Misdemeanor caseload	Number of misdemeanor cases closed per FT staff member	294	182.13	309.73	0.00	2083.33	135	163.39	284.59	0.00	2024.79	X
Misdemeanor success	Number of misdemeanor convictions/number of misdemeanor cases closed	251	0.75	0.20	0.01	1.00	111	0.74	0.21	0.08	1.00	X

[1]Measurement of variables was guided, in part, by Cunningham, Renauer, & Khalifa (2006)

[2]Denotes whether variable was logged in analyses due to skewness.

[3]In some cases, the number of

[4]Skewness evident in 2001 dataset only. No transformation is used in 2005 analyses.

Two resource-related variables are also included. The first, budget per staff member, provides a general view of the organizations resource base. In practice, it is likely that slack resources matter more (Damanpour, 1991; King, 1998). Slack resources are an organization's resources that are not committed to salaries and other non-discretionary expenses; presumably, greater slack allows for greater innovation. The NPS datasets do not allow for the measurement of slack resources so overall budget per employee is used as a proxy.[25] The second measure captures the proportion of the overall budget coming from external grant funding. Considerable evidence backed by organizational theory (resource dependence) points to the importance of external resource flows in promoting innovation (see, for example, Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Worrall & Zhao, 2003). While it is impossible to determine the source or purpose of the grant funds, it is hypothesized that external funding is associated with community prosecution implementation.

Several additional variables are used to address workload-related issues. For example, two measures of caseload (felony, misdemeanor) are included under the assumption that prosecutors may innovate to address problematic work demands (e.g., use community prosecution to problem-solve). Similarly, community prosecution may be adopted in agencies with lower conviction rates, perhaps as a means of encouraging community cooperation. Thus, two conviction rate measures are introduced in the analyses.

Three final measures are included. Organization size is a common correlate of innovation; indeed, it is one of the strongest predictors of many police innovations (King, 1998). The tenure (number of years served) of the chief prosecutor is measured in order to examine the possibility that recently elected (or appointed) prosecutors are more likely to introduce new ideas to the office. Finally, the overall community environment is measured using the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI), a county-level measure produced by the Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute at the University of South

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[25] LEMAS datasets, for example, separate budget items by salary, equipment, and other items.

Carolina (2012). The SoVI combines 32 separate 2000 Census variables together into a single score

indicative of a community's vulnerability to natural and intentional (e.g., terrorism) hazards (e.g., older

population more susceptible to harms). It is used here as a measure of a county's demographic and

socioeconomic structure.

COMMUNITY PROSECUTION, 2001 (2001 ANALYSES)

The first step in the analysis is to consider the bivariate relationship between community policing implementation and community prosecution implementation. Two sets of analyses are presented below. The first set examines the relationship between prosecutors' offices and the *single* largest police department in each jurisdiction. That is, these analyses, referred to as the "large agency analyses," assess the influence of the most influential law enforcement agency as indicated by the number of FT sworn officers. Recall from Chapter III that some prosecutors had as many as 17 matched LEMAS agencies operating within their jurisdiction. To address this fact, the second set of analyses, referred to as the "pooled agency analyses," averages the community policing implementation scores for *all* law enforcement agencies within a jurisdiction. Stated differently, these analyses examine the general level of community policing across all law enforcement agencies (100 or more FT sworn officers) within a prosecutor's jurisdiction.

Regardless of the analysis, community policing implementation is only weakly related to community prosecution implementation in 2001 (r=0.056 in large agency analysis; r=0.049 in pooled agency analysis; see Figures 7 and 8). If community policing implementation does not significantly predict community prosecution implementation, what factors do matter? Answering this question is no simple task. Although there are a total of 391 prosecutors' offices in the 2001 datasets (both large agency and pooled), a model using all of the independent variables shown in Table 6 would result in a substantial loss of cases.[26] Specifically, listwise deletion would result in a model sample of 158 cases, approximately 40 percent of the offices in the 2001 NPS that were matched with LEMAS agencies. Table

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[26] As shown in Table 6, missing values occur on most NPS variables.

7 offers three large agency analysis models and Table 8 offers three pooled agency analysis models. The

models address missing values issue in different ways.

Figure 7. Scatterplot, regression fit line, and confidence interval for relationship between community policing and community prosecution (large agency analysis), 2001


Figure 8. Scatterplot, regression fit line, and confidence interval for relationship between community policing and community prosecution (pooled agency analysis), 2001

Table 7 shows the results of the analyses that limit the influence of community policing to the single largest law enforcement agency in each prosecutorial jurisdiction (large agency analysis). The first analysis regresses community prosecution implementation on the community policing implementation and the 13 other independent variables. Listwise deletion resulted in a final *n* of 158 cases. Two variables—tenure (*p*=0.009) and formalization (*p*=0.025)—reached conventional significance levels. Longer-serving prosecutors lead organizations with less developed community prosecution efforts and the innovation is likely to occur in organizations that are considered more rule-bound (at least as evident by written rules for handling juveniles). Although not significant by conventional standards, functional differentiation approaches conventional thresholds. More divided (specialized case types) organizations are more likely to adopt community prosecution.

The second model in Table 7 omits the two misdemeanor-related variables (caseload and success), resulting in an additional 43 cases (still only 51% of the 2001 NPS total). Tenure (*p*=0.009), size (p=0.023), and functional differentiation (*p*=0.017) are all significant. Larger, more differentiated prosecutors' offices with shorter serving chief prosecutors are more likely to adopt community prosecution-related strategies.

The final model boosts the analytical sample to 357 cases, 91 percent of the 2001 NPS total, by using multiple imputation. Multiple imputation is a method of estimating missing data using known data from a dataset (see Rubin, 1987). Unlike other common procedures for addressing missing data (e.g., mean replacement, hot deck replacement), multiple imputation essentially generates multiple estimates (e.g., new, filled-in datasets) that are used in subsequent estimations. In the present study, all dependent and independent variables plus a series of other measures included in the NPS with low missing rates were used to predict missing values. Stata software was used to create 10 imputations and these were then used to estimate regression models; beta coefficients and r-square values

represent the average estimated coefficients across these 10 imputed datasets.[27] With the larger

dataset, variables that were significant or approached significance in the first two models—functional

differentiation, formalization, size, and tenure—were significant at the 0.05 level. In addition, the grants

variable proved relevant here (it approached the 0.05 level in the second model). Community

prosecution implementation was more likely as the proportion of the office's budget from grant funding

increased.[28]

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[27] Stata's chained equation imputation function was used. All variables except formalization were imputed using
an OLS regression function. Formalization, due to its dichotomous nature, was imputed using a logistic regression
function.

[28] It is possible that the relationship between community policing and community prosecution implementation is
conditioned by the nature of the relationship between police and prosecutor organizations. Using the large agency
analysis data, the community policing implementation scores were recoded into four groups based on quartiles (an
equal number of departments fell into each group). A second variable, unit, was included to capture whether the
law enforcement agency had a formal prosecutor relations unit (ordinal variable with categories: special unit,
designated personnel, policies, task not official addressed). The relationship between these two measures and
community prosecution implementation was examined using a factorial ANOVA. Neither the main effects
(community policing implementation, $p=0.118$; prosecutor relations unit, $p=0.176$) nor the interaction ($p<0.645$)
were significant.

Table 7.
Standardized regression coefficients for models predicting the community prosecution scores (2001), original, misdemeanor variables omitted, and imputed datasets (large agency analysis)

	Observed dataset (n=158)			Observed dataset, misd. variables excluded (n=201)			Multiple imputed dataset (n=357)[1]		
	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p
Community policing, 2000	0.071	0.124	0.397	0.070	0.104	0.300	-0.029	0.081	0.588
Grants	0.110	0.105	0.168	0.134	0.092	0.052	0.122	0.075	*0.030*
Occupational diff.	0.059	0.035	0.503	0.023	0.030	0.765	-0.041	0.030	0.610
Functional diff.	0.151	0.034	0.063	0.172	0.028	*0.017*	0.191	0.024	*0.001*
Formalization	0.193	0.123	*0.025*	0.134	0.100	0.059	0.136	0.082	*0.020*
Decentralization	-0.008	2.749	0.919	0.002	2.372	0.973	0.059	1.954	0.313
Size	0.128	0.150	0.186	0.193	0.127	*0.023*	0.160	0.097	*0.013*
Budget	0.065	0.335	0.435	0.031	0.278	0.663	0.035	0.250	0.644
Tenure	-0.196	0.007	*0.009*	-0.169	0.006	*0.009*	-0.199	0.005	*0.001*
Felony case	-0.067	0.147	0.453	-0.077	0.121	0.313	-0.100	0.103	0.102
Felony succ.	0.102	0.984	0.243	0.049	0.774	0.471	0.057	0.727	0.412
SOVI 2000	-0.021	0.020	0.800	0.032	0.017	0.663	-0.016	0.013	0.811
Mis. case	0.037	0.104	0.660				-0.001	0.056	0.987
Mis. Succ.	-0.108	0.928	0.204				-0.098	0.694	0.162
	Adj. r²	0.18		Adj. r²	0.21		Adj. r²	0.21	

[1]The model imputing missing variables included all items shown above as well as dichotomous indicators related to jurisdiction(misdemeanors, misdemeanors with felonies, misdemeanor appeals, felony appeals, traffic violations, juvenile matters, child support enforcement, and civil lawsuits), problems recruiting staff, problems retaining staff, work-related threats, and security (police protection, building guards, electronic surveillance, metal detectors, electronic security system). All of these additional variables were complete in the 2001 NPS dataset so serve as useful additions to improve on the imputation.

The same procedures were used in the 2001 pooled agency analysis (see Table 8).[29] When all variables were entered and listwise deletion allowed, tenure (p=0.007) and formalization (p=0.020) were the only significant predictors of community prosecution implementation. Once the misdemeanor variables were omitted, tenure and formalization remained significant. Size (p=0.015) and functional differentiation (p=0.017) also emerged as significant in the second model. In the imputed model, functional differentiation, formalization, size, tenure, and grants were all significant.

Overall, the models show some volatility in terms of a straight significant/not significant distinction. However, the models are largely consistent if the significant variables (even those where p<0.10) are considered. Larger, more functionally differentiated and formalized organizations, with newer chief

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[29] The social vulnerability index (SOVI) measure was excluded from the pooled analysis. The SOVI is a county-level measure linked to the location of the law enforcement agency. The SOVI was not averaged together across agencies.

Table 8.
Standardized regression coefficients for models predicting the community prosecution scores (2001), original, misdemeanor variables omitted, and imputed datasets (pooled agency analysis)

	Observed dataset (n=159)			Observed dataset, misd. variables excluded (n=202)			Multiple imputed dataset (n=358)[1]		
	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p
Community policing, 2000	0.043	0.135	0.574	0.034	0.116	0.608	-0.008	0.095	0.885
Grants	0.103	0.104	0.188	0.131	0.090	0.054	0.137	0.076	*0.016*
Occupational diff.	0.059	0.035	0.496	0.023	0.030	0.758	-0.033	0.025	0.619
Functional diff.	0.155	0.034	0.058	0.172	0.028	*0.017*	0.191	0.025	*0.002*
Formalization	0.197	0.120	*0.020*	0.144	0.099	*0.040*	0.129	0.086	*0.036*
Decentralization	-0.012	2.732	0.878	0.004	2.360	0.948	0.052	2.002	0.381
Size	0.145	0.146	0.130	0.204	0.126	*0.015*	0.143	0.105	*0.043*
Budget	0.072	0.320	0.362	0.024	0.267	0.718	0.046	0.247	0.535
Tenure	-0.199	0.007	*0.007*	-0.163	0.006	*0.011*	-0.173	0.005	*0.002*
Felony case	-0.074	0.139	0.386	-0.064	0.118	0.379	-0.065	0.105	0.299
Felony succ.	0.103	0.977	0.232	0.043	0.771	0.522	0.046	0.719	0.507
Mis. case	0.037	0.104	0.651				-0.018	0.059	0.785
Mis. succ	-0.120	0.912	0.150				-0.108	0.795	0.196
	Adj. r^2	0.19		Adj. r^2	0.22		Adj. r^2	0.19	

[1]The model imputing missing variables included all items shown above as well as dichotomous indicators related to jurisdiction(misdemeanors, misdemeanors with felonies, misdemeanor appeals, felony appeals, traffic violations, juvenile matters, child support enforcement, and civil lawsuits), problems recruiting staff, problems retaining staff, work-related threats, and security (police protection, building guards, electronic surveillance, metal detectors, electronic security system). All of these additional variables were complete in the 2001 NPS dataset so serve as useful additions to improve on the imputation.

prosecutors are more likely to implement community prosecution. It is also worth pointing out that the grants variable was significant in two of six models and approached the 0.05 level in two others (smallest sample models are the exception).

COMMUNITY PROSECUTION, 2005 (2005 ANALYSES)

The 2005 analysis is very similar in terms of procedures used. The primary differences are threefold: the community policing implementation measure is captured using 2003 LEMAS data instead of 2001 data, all independent variables are derived from the 2001 NPS to ensure temporal ordering (SoVI is the exception, measured in 2000), and 2001 community prosecution implementation scores are included in the analyses. As shown in Figures 9 and 10, community policing implementation in 2003 is

not related to community prosecution implementation in 2005 in bivariate relationships limited to just large agencies (*r*=0.022) or the pooled analysis (*r*=0.029).

Figure 9. Scatterplot, regression fit line, and confidence interval for relationship between community policing and community prosecution (large agency analysis), 2005

Figure 10. Scatterplot, regression fit line, and confidence interval for relationship between community policing and community prosecution (pooled agency analysis), 2005

The 2005 analyses (see Tables 9 and 10) show that community prosecution implementation in 2005 is largely predicted by the level of implementation in 2001. The R^2 values in all six 2005 models are substantially higher than the six 2001 models; community prosecution implementation in 2001 is, as indicated by the standardized regression coefficients, driving the model. Suspecting that multicollinearity might be an issue, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were examined. All VIF factors were below 2.00 except for the size variable in the smallest sample models (VIF=2.13 in large agencies analysis; VIF=2.26 in pooled sample analysis). Thus, although there are modest correlations among independent variables, inertia seems to be driving community policing implementation in 2005 independent of other predictors. Only three other variables reach the 0.05 significance level in any of the six models: decentralization in the large agency (p=0.020) and pooled agency analyses (p=0.033) with misdemeanor variables excluded and budget in the pooled agency analysis (p=0.036) with multiple imputation. These results suggest that decentralized prosecutors' offices with smaller administrative components (proportion of managers and supervisors) are more likely to adopt community prosecution. In addition, offices with larger budgets exhibit a greater degree of community prosecution implementation.

Table 9.

Standardized regression coefficients for models predicting the community prosecution scores (2005), original, misdemeanor variables omitted, and imputed datasets (large agency analysis)

	Observed dataset (n=65)			Observed dataset, misd. variables excluded (n=91)			Multiple imputed dataset (n=160)[1]		
	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p
Comm. Prosecution, 2001	0.520	0.124	**_0.000_**	0.498	0.098	**_0.000_**	0.426	0.095	**_0.000_**
Community policing, 2003	-0.050	0.245	0.682	-0.099	0.187	0.280	-0.003	0.150	0.964
Grants	0.073	0.177	0.534	0.066	0.134	0.450	0.006	0.119	0.937
Occupational diff.	0.065	0.060	0.603	0.090	0.046	0.333	0.112	0.043	0.222
Functional diff.	0.059	0.049	0.650	0.058	0.037	0.545	0.001	0.037	0.999
Formalization	0.117	0.180	0.360	0.138	0.131	0.136	0.146	0.125	0.079
Decentralization	0.140	1.879	0.250	0.197	1.325	**_0.020_**	0.034	1.267	0.633
Size	0.079	0.241	0.600	0.145	0.175	0.181	0.082	0.170	0.393
Budget	0.106	0.555	0.405	0.046	0.395	0.610	0.168	0.312	0.065
Tenure	-0.007	0.010	0.953	-0.010	0.008	0.905	-0.088	0.008	0.286
Felony case	0.055	0.196	0.644	0.070	0.145	0.442	-0.013	0.162	0.901
Felony succ.	0.172	1.577	0.172	0.091	1.155	0.302	0.133	1.089	0.146
SOVI 2000	-0.127	0.027	0.267	-0.166	0.021	0.063	-0.074	0.019	0.366
Mis. case	0.035	0.156	0.765				0.067	0.080	0.420
Mis. succ	-0.115	1.529	0.392				-0.162	0.997	0.139
	Adj. r^2	0.33		Adj. r^2	0.47		Adj. r^2	0.39	

[1]The model imputing missing variables included all items shown above as well as dichotomous indicators related to jurisdiction(misdemeanors, misdemeanors with felonies, misdemeanor appeals, felony appeals, traffic violations, juvenile matters, child support enforcement, and civil lawsuits), problems recruiting staff, problems retaining staff, work-related threats, and security (police protection, building guards, electronic surveillance, metal detectors, electronic security system). All of these additional variables were complete in the 2001 NPS dataset so serve as useful additions to improve on the imputation.

Table 10.
Standardized regression coefficients for models predicting the community prosecution scores (2005), original, misdemeanor variables omitted, and imputed datasets (pooled agency analysis)

	Observed dataset (n=66)			Observed dataset, misd. variables excluded (n=87)			Multiple imputed dataset (n=160)[1]		
	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p	β	Std. Err.	p
Comm. Prosecution, 2001	0.513	0.123	***0.000***	0.487	0.100	***0.000***	0.463	0.098	***0.000***
Community policing, 2003	-0.024	0.303	0.835	-0.015	0.238	0.862	0.024	0.216	0.754
Grants	0.054	0.170	0.634	0.060	0.133	0.500	0.016	0.110	0.822
Occupational diff.	0.073	0.056	0.535	0.130	0.044	0.147	0.097	0.042	0.272
Functional diff.	0.063	0.048	0.624	0.066	0.037	0.496	0.028	0.037	0.736
Formalization	0.093	0.177	0.462	0.106	0.132	0.252	0.130	0.121	0.105
Decentralization	0.126	1.840	0.288	0.182	1.339	***0.033***	0.052	1.318	0.475
Size	0.087	0.238	0.568	0.167	0.175	0.133	0.083	0.157	0.351
Budget	0.131	0.546	0.294	0.067	0.394	0.442	0.177	0.289	***0.036***
Tenure	-0.007	0.010	0.949	-0.020	0.008	0.814	-0.062	0.008	0.464
Felony case	0.019	0.188	0.867	0.021	0.142	0.814	-0.024	0.134	0.756
Felony succ.	0.179	1.564	0.153	0.087	1.180	0.339	0.129	1.068	0.144
Mis. case	0.025	0.155	0.827				0.071	0.079	0.388
Mis. succ	-0.107	1.522	0.425				-0.105	0.952	0.308
	Adj. r^2	0.34		Adj. r^2	0.45		Adj. r^2	0.40	

[1]The model imputing missing variables included all items shown above as well as dichotomous indicators related to jurisdiction(misdemeanors, misdemeanors with felonies, misdemeanor appeals, felony appeals, traffic violations, juvenile matters, child support enforcement, and civil lawsuits), problems recruiting staff, problems retaining staff, work-related threats, and security (police protection, building guards, electronic surveillance, metal detectors, electronic security system). All of these additional variables were complete in the 2001 NPS dataset so serve as useful additions to improve on the imputation.

REVIEW

The project was centered on the question of whether recent community reforms in policing and

prosecution were related at the local level. Specifically, did adoption of community policing by law

enforcement agencies (those with 100 or more FT sworn officers) lead to the adoption of community

prosecution in county prosecutors' offices? Using measurement model-derived implementation scores

from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey (police) and National

Prosecutors Survey (prosecutors), analyses assessed the influence of community policing and other

predictors. In spite of some prior evidence pointing to the similarities and even connections between

the two reforms, the larger sample research presented here found no significant linkages between

community policing and prosecution.

The analyses predicting community prosecution implementation in 2001 revealed a number of

generally consistent factors associated with reform: size, functional differentiation, formalization,

prosecutor tenure, and, to a lesser extent, grants. The findings are largely consistent with the work of

Cunningham, Renauer, and Khalifa (2006), one of the few studies to address community prosecution

implementation. Moreover, the results are generally consistent with broader research on the adoption

of innovation. Larger organizations typically have more resources, can more readily take on new

programs, strategies, and practices, and can more easily absorb failed innovations (Damanpour, 1987).

Prosecutors' offices may be no different. Forst (2002) stressed that prosecutors are risk adverse but

larger organizations can make evolutionary (Burke, 2002) or incremental (Nadler & Tushman, 1995)

changes without dramatically altering day-to-day activities (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Structural characteristics of the organization also work to facilitate or impede innovation. The

employment of specialists, especially within distinct units or departments, encourages innovation as

expert employees offer diverse perspectives to the organization (Damanpour, 1991; King, 1998).

Although the functional differentiation measure does not explicitly capture organizational units, it does suggest the workforce is diverse in its capacity to handle different types of cases. The effect of formalization is a bit curious. The relationship found in the models is positive; written rules regarding juveniles in criminal court is associated with greater community prosecution innovation. The literature points to an inverse relationship between formalization and innovation; rules stifle new ideas (see Damanpour, 1991). Two possibilities are offered here. The first possibility is that the measurement of formalization is weak. It only captures one type of rule which may not be enough to truly gauge the level of formalization in an organization.[30] The second possibility is that organizational leaders promulgate rules to control lower-level workers when authority is decentralized toward the bottom of organizations (Cunningham, Renauer, & Khalifa, 2006). It is difficult explain the anomalous finding absent the ability to examine models with a more robust measure of formalization.

Damanpour and Schneider (2009) argued that individual managerial decisions also affect the adoption of innovations. They suggest that the relationship between managerial tenure and innovation is curvilinear; innovations increase as managers become acquainted with the job but decline as their work becomes more routine and entrenched. The linear relationship observed in the models in Chapter V lend support to the view that newer prosecutors may be more apt to embrace new ideas and, as noted earlier, more likely to move beyond a traditional felony case processor approach.

Interestingly, the effects of all of the independent variables generally disappeared in the 2005 analyses once prior community prosecution implementation was considered. Community prosecution in 2005 is largely predicted by prior levels of implementation. Offices were not likely to substantially implement or significantly abandon community prosecution during the 4 year period between NPS waves. The absence of any other consistent effects is not due to multicollinearity; diagnostics showed

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[30]In contrast, researchers have developed a measure of formalization for police organizations using 10 or more items from the LEMAS survey addressing written rules and procedures.

no problems associated with the inclusion of the community prosecution 2001 variable. These findings

suggest that the primary determinants of community prosecution implementation are factors not

considered or that were primarily influential in the pre-2001 period (see below).

LIMITATIONS

The current study only reaffirms some of the challenges in working with existing datasets, many of

which have already been noted by others (see Groves & Cork, 2009; Langworthy, 2002). For example,

Groves and Cork (2009) recommended efforts designed to "facilitate linkage in existing datasets" (p.

138). While not a limitation per se, merging datasets in the present study was hampered by unique

prosecutors' office identifiers that changed across NPS administrations. The *su_id* variable is included in

NPS datasets as an 8-digit unique identification code.[31] If the *su_id* variable were used to match 2001

and 2005 NPS data, erroneous matches would occur (e.g., Alabama's 16th Judicial Circuit prosecutor

would match the Randall County, TX prosecutor—both have an ID number of 10000170). Yet, the

district number, a unique identification number that does in fact permit matches across waves, is never

mentioned as a unique identifier.

The project is also hampered by changes in measurement from one wave to the next. Although the

LEMAS dataset is more consistent across iterations, the problem is actually most pronounced for the

LEMAS-derived measurement models of community policing implementation where survey items were

added, omitted, or altered between waves. As such, the factors scores derived from 2000 and 2003

LEMAS data are based on slightly different indicators. Wilson (2006) was able to assess the stability of

the policing measurement model, concluding that the model held from 1997 to 1999 (i.e., coefficients

were largely unchanged). Given the slight changes in measurement, model invariance is assumed.

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[31] The 2001 NPS codebook refers to the variable as a "preloaded district su_id."

A more significant challenge was the volume of missing cases in the analyses. The NPS, in spite of

survey response rates in excess of 90 percent each wave, deals with a substantial number of item non-

response issues. For example, 275 of the 307 prosecutors' officers participating in the 2005 NPS noted

responsibility for handling misdemeanor cases. When asked about the number of case closures in the

past year, only 250 answered; 25 respondents should have provided an estimate or entered none but,

instead, left the response missing. Similar challenges are evident elsewhere in the survey. In BJS

reports, the hot deck method is used to fill in these missing values (a process of sorting to find similar

prosecutors' offices and then imputing the value from that similar office). In the present study, multiple

imputation was used to address the missing values issue. The procedure estimates the missing data

using known data; estimates are produced by averaging across multiple imputations. Though useful, it is

important to recognize that data are still imputed rather than directly observed from respondents.

Some of the independent variables were also not ideally measured, a result of dataset limitations.

For example, the formalization measure includes a single indicator of the rule-bound nature of the

prosecutor's office—the presence of guidelines for handling juveniles in criminal court. It says nothing

about other areas of the organization that may or may not be guided by rules (e.g., no drop policies for

intimate partner violence). Similarly, the functional differentiation measure addresses specialized

caseloads but does not directly measure how the organization handles the caseload. In other words, are

special units devoted to handling hate crimes, domestic violence, elder abuse, and other types of

offenses? If so, the organization is structurally differentiated along horizontal (functional) lines. If not,

individual prosecutors are handling the caseloads but, again, the data do not permit an understanding of

whether individual prosecutors are exclusively handling certain types of cases (indicative of

specialization).

Temporal ordering and timing, more generally, is also a concern. The independent and dependent

variables (the SoVI and community policing implementation variables excepted) are measured

contemporaneously in the 2001 analyses. As such, it is impossible to know whether community

prosecution reforms preceded or followed the independent variables. Consider functional

differentiation. Does a differentiated organization encourage innovation? Alternatively, does an

innovative organization that adopts community prosecution create a special unit to handle the task?

Maguire (1997) found that police departments became more functionally differentiated during a period

of heightened community policing implementation. It is possible that organizations added a unit to deal

exclusively with community matters.   The temporal ordering problem was addressed in the 2005

analyses. All independent variables were measured prior to the 2005 community prosecution

implementation measure.

DISCUSSION

The results illustrate very little congruence between police and prosecutors in the adoption of

community reforms. In jurisdictions where police departments embraced community policing,

prosecutors differentially implemented community prosecution? Why are the two organizations

disconnected? It is clear that they are only loosely coupled (Hagan, 1989). Indeed, they both operate in

separate institutional environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Police are highly

visible to outsiders, including citizens. They faced a legitimacy crisis in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of

clashes with the public, rising crime, criticisms from national commissions, and research findings

questioning the efficacy of police tactics (Crank, 1994; Worrall, 2008). Community policing was a way to

restore that legitimacy, to reestablish connections with the public. Prosecutors never faced the same

legitimacy crisis; "they were not compelled to 'change their ways' just to appease the public" (Worrall,

2008, p. 14). Their work is largely invisible to the everyday citizen. Even when prosecutors attend

community meetings as part of a community prosecution philosophy, they likely find themselves

interacting with a very small percentage of a neighborhood's residents (Duffee, et al., 2001; Skogan &

Hartnett, 1997). Consequently, the local forces that compelled change in policing may lack salience for the nearby prosecutor.

Community policing implementation was also promoted by the wider institutional environment (Burruss & Giblin, 2014; see, also, Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010). Community policing achieved a status as the appropriate activity of law enforcement agencies. Conferences promoted the philosophy (COPS conference; Problem-Oriented Policing Conference), funding agencies facilitated adoption, and countless publications and research studies addressed the topic. A police chief, if intent on improving his/her organization, need only look around to see that viability of community policing and the attention it was receiving.

Community prosecution was also promoted by the wider environment but we know every little about how the institutional environment effects organizations outside of policing (e.g., prosecutors' offices, prisons). The key point, however, was the fact that it was not the same institutional environment. For example, the federal government offered funding to support community prosecution via the Byrne program (e.g., juvenile block grants) but the program provided support for much more than just innovative prosecutorial programs (unlike the mission of the COPS office). Similarly, national conferences were held and articles and books were published (albeit, much more limited in scope compared to community policing). It is clear that these institutional networks are relevant to police organizations (see Burruss & Giblin, 2014; Burruss, Giblin, & Schafer, 2010), but research has not addressed whether prosecutors are affected by broader forces in their field. Additionally, there is no reason to believe that a police chief and prosecutor would be simultaneously plugged into their respective institutional networks simply by virtue of their geographic proximity to one another. That is, other factors must matter.

The evidence points to the importance of leadership. Certain chief prosecutors—those in office for fewer years—are more likely to implement community prosecution. In other words, characteristics of

an organization's executive can mitigate the effects of both organizational factors and institutional forces. Forst (2000) illustrates this fact in his discussion of two similar counties in the mid-Atlantic region: Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County, VA. The Montgomery County prosecutor developed an extensive community prosecution program in 1991 (Jacoby, Gramckow, & Ratledge, 1995). In contrast, the prosecutor in Fairfax County, like the chief prosecutor in Pima County, AZ, adhered to a focus on traditional criminal prosecution. According to Forst (2000), "he [saw] community prosecution as largely a fad" (p. 530).   Prosecutors, unlike police, may actually have an easier time ignoring community reforms; after all, as elected officials they are already accountable to the public in ways that the police are not. Why the variation? The present study focused on organization-level attributes but, clearly, leadership matters. The case study research indicates that individual prosecutors may have their own perceptions of community prosecution and it is these perceptions that may affect implementation. Indeed, individual perceptions might interact with connections to the broader institutional environment, as noted above. Does a leader see value—actual (effect on crime/disorder) or perceived (improved community relations/funding)—from its adoption? This is an important empirical question that applies not just in the context of community prosecution innovation but all innovation adoption (e.g., homeland security preparedness, Compstat, etc.).

Based on the evidence presented here, prosecutors are unlikely to innovate based on the practices of local police.[32] How can they be encouraged to adopt new practices, especially given the tendency for routine (Forst, 2000)? Future research should address the salience of the institutional environment for prosecutors. Evidence from policing suggests that conferences, professional networks, and publications matter in shaping police practices, more so than considerations related to crime rates or other work-related demands. Are prosecutors similarly influenced? That is an empirical question. More

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[32] The relationship does not just apply to policing either. As shown in a brief analysis presented in Appendix E, police homeland security preparedness in 2003 is not associated with prosecutorial preparedness activities in 2005.

importantly, reform efforts must start with leadership. Chief prosecutors, as shown here and in prior

literature, make a difference when it comes to innovation. Their resistance is enough to stifle change

efforts. They must see the benefits of innovation and the absence of any risk (Forst, 2000).

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APPENDIX A:
MATCHING NOTES

2001 COMMUNITY PROSECUTION ANALYSIS: LEMAS 2000-NPS 2001 MERGE

LEMAS large municipal, county, sheriff *n* = 803

NPS *n*= 2,341

Matched pairs after merge: 792 LEMAS agencies with corresponding NPS office.

LEMAS AGENCY ID	AGENCY NAME	REASON FOR EXCLUSION
0220020010260100	Anchorage Police Dept.	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for AK.
0110370370270300	Jefferson County (AL) Sheriff	NPS 2001 reports two separate prosecutors' offices for Jefferson County (AL).
0120378010260100	Hoover Police Department	NPS 2001 reports two separate prosecutors' offices for Jefferson County (AL).
0810020020240200	New Castle County (DE) Police Department	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for DE.
0820020090260100	Wilmington Police (DE) Dept.	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for DE.
4020020010260100	Warwick Police Dept.	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for RI.
4020040020260100	Cranston Police Dept.	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for RI.
4020040030260100	Pawtucket Police Dept.	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for RI.
4020040040260100	Providence Police Dept.	NPS 2001 only reports statewide totals for RI.
0700000000201800	New Haven County Sheriff's Department	CT judicial districts do not perfectly correspond to county jurisdictional boundaries.
4422260010250100	San Angelo Police Department	NPS 2001 reports two separate prosecutors' offices for Tom Green County (TX).

LEMAS AGENCY ID	AGENCY NAME	REASON FOR MANUAL (NON-FIPS) MATCH
120370020250100	Bessemer Police Department	Jefferson County (AL) is served by two separate prosecutors' offices. Alabama Administrative Office of Courts states that Bessemer cases are filed in the AL 10th Judicial Circuit-Bessemer Division (NPS 2001 10000110).

120370030250100	Birmingham Police Department	Jefferson County (AL) is served by two separate prosecutors' offices. Alabama Administrative Office of Courts states that Birmingham cases are filed in the AL 10th Judicial Circuit-Birmingham Division (NPS 2001 10000100).
720010010260100	Bridgeport Police Department	Matches to Fairfield Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001800)
720010020260100	Danbury Police Department	Matches to Danbury Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001790)
720010040260100	Norwalk Police Department	Matches to Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001870)
720010060260100	Stamford Police Department	Matches to Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001870)
720020010260100	Bristol Police Department	Matches to New Britain Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001840)
720020020260100	Hartford Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001810)
720020030260100	New Britain Police Department	Matches to New Britain Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001840)
720040020260100	Middletown Police Department	Matches to Middlesex Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001830)
720050040260100	Meriden Police Department	Matches to New Haven Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001850)
720050060260100	New Haven Police Department	Matches to New Haven Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001850)
720050080260100	Waterbury Police Department	Matches to Waterbury Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001890)
720055010260100	Milford Police Department	Matches to Ansonia-Milford Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001780)
720055020260100	West Haven Police Department	Matches to Ansonia-Milford Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001780)

730010060260100	Fairfield Police Department	Matches to Fairfield Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001800)
730010070260100	Greenwich Police Department	Matches to Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001870)
730010150260100	Stratford Police Department	Matches to Fairfield Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001800)
730020070260100	East Hartford Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001810)
730020140260100	Manchester Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001810)
730020230260100	West Hartford Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001810)
730050070260100	Hamden Police Department	Matches to New Haven Judicial District (NPS 2001 10001850)

2005 COMMUNITY PROSECUTION ANALYSIS: NPS 2001-LEMAS 2003-NPS 2005 MERGE

LEMAS 2003 large municipal, county, sheriff *n* = 822

NPS 2005 *n*= 307

NPS 2001 *n*= 2,341

Matched pairs after merge: 481 LEMAS agencies with corresponding NPS office.

LEMAS AGENCY ID	AGENCY NAME	REASON FOR EXCLUSION
0220020010260100	Anchorage Police Dept.	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for AK.
120370020250100	Bessemer Police Department	NPS reports two separate prosecutors' offices for Jefferson County (AL). 10th Judicial Circuit-Bessemer Division was not part of NPS 2005.
0120378010260100	Hoover Police Dept.	NPS reports two separate prosecutors' offices for Jefferson County (AL).
0110370370270300	Jefferson County (AL) Sheriff	NPS reports two separate prosecutors' offices for Jefferson County (AL).
0810020020240200	New Castle County (DE) Police Department	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for DE.
0820020090260100	Wilmington Police (DE) Dept.	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for DE.
4020020010260100	Warwick Police Dept.	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for RI.
4020040020260100	Cranston Police Dept.	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for RI.
4020040030260100	Pawtucket Police Dept.	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for RI.
4020040040260100	Providence Police Dept.	NPS 2005 only reports statewide totals for RI.
0720020010260100	Bristol Police Dept.	FIPS code would match agency to Harford Judicial District. CT judicial district do not correspond to counties. City belongs in New Britain Judicial District (not part of NPS 2005).
0720020030260100	New Britain Police Dept.	FIPS code would match agency to Harford Judicial District. CT judicial district do not correspond to counties. City belongs in New Britain Judicial District.
0720050080260100	Waterbury Police Dept.	FIPS code would match agency to Harford Judicial

		District. CT judicial district do not correspond to counties. City belongs in Waterbury Judicial District.
0720055010260100	Milford Police Dept.	FIPS code would match agency to Harford Judicial District. CT judicial district do not correspond to counties. City belongs in Ansonia-Milford Judicial District.
0720055020260100	West Haven Police Dept.	FIPS code would match agency to Harford Judicial District. CT judicial district do not correspond to counties. City belongs in Ansonia-Milford Judicial District.

LEMAS AGENCY ID	AGENCY NAME	REASON FOR MANUAL (NON-FIPS) MATCH
0720020020260100	Hartford Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2005 10001730)
0720050040260100	Meriden Police Department	Matches to New Haven Judicial District (NPS 2005 10002800)
0720050060260100	New Haven Police Department	Matches to New Haven Judicial District (NPS 2005 10002800)
0730020070260100	East Hartford Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2005 10001730)
0730020140260100	Manchester Police Department	Matches to Hartford Judicial District (NPS 2005 10001730)

APPENDIX B:
CONNECTICUT TOWNS AND JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

CITY/TOWN	JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Middletown	Middlesex
Bridgeport	Fairfield
Stratford	Fairfield
Fairfield	Fairfield
New Haven	New Haven
Meriden	New Haven
Hamden	New Haven
West Hartford	Hartford
Hartford	Hartford
East Hartford	Hartford
Manchester	Hartford
Waterbury	Waterbury
Norwalk	Stamford-Norwalk
Stamford	Stamford-Norwalk
Greenwich	Stamford-Norwalk
New Britain	New Britain
Bristol	New Britain
Danbury	Danbury
Milford	Ansonia-Milford
West Haven	Ansonia-Milford
New Haven County Sheriff	No perfect match (districts do not correspond with counties though close to New Haven and Ansonia-Milford).

Source: http://www.jud.ct.gov/directory/maps/JD/default.htm

Correlation matrix for items in community policing measurement model, 2000 LEMAS data (*n=778*)

Variable	CP plan	Problem solving	Geographic assign.	Train recruits in CP	Train sworn officers in CP	Train civilians in CP	Citizen training in CP	Academy	Meetings
CP plan	1.000								
Problem solving	0.326	1.000							
Geographic assign.	0.265	0.373	1.000						
Train recruits in CP	0.234	0.335	0.244	1.000					
Train sworn officers in CP	0.285	0.367	0.268	0.484	1.000				
Train civilians in CP	0.217	0.356	0.199	0.296	0.471	1.000			
Citizen training in CP	0.228	0.414	0.288	0.241	0.205	0.224	1.000		
Hold citizens academy	0.207	0.288	0.199	0.221	0.156	0.206	0.336	1.000	
Meetings	0.251	0.459	0.304	0.245	0.259	0.195	0.328	0.219	1.000

Correlation matrix for items in community policing measurement model, 2003 LEMAS data (*n*=436)

Variable	CP plan	Problem solving	Geographic assign.	Train recruits in CP	Train sworn officers in CP	Train civilians in CP	Citizen training in CP	Academy	Input	Partnerships /agreements
CP plan	1.000									
Problem solving	0.358	1.000								
Geographic assign.	0.264	0.436	1.000							
Train recruits in CP	0.153	0.183	0.158	1.000						
Train sworn officers in CP	0.214	0.191	0.160	0.337	1.000					
Train civilians in CP	0.113	0.213	0.135	0.212	0.504	1.000				
Citizen training in CP	0.242	0.332	0.189	0.125	0.071	0.107	1.000			
Hold citizens academy	0.118	0.173	0.099	0.109	0.086	0.090	0.306	1.000		
Input	0.274	0.321	0.274	0.146	0.199	0.185	0.386	0.287	1.000	
Partnerships/agreements	0.267	0.316	0.213	0.151	0.091	0.140	0.377	0.158	0.405	1.000

APPENDIX D:
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR PROSECUTION
MEASUREMENT MODELS

Correlation matrix for items in community prosecution measurement model, 2001 NPS data (n=291)

Variable	Relation-ships	Meetings	Involve comm. in problem ID	Assign prosecutors to geo. areas	Use non-prosecution tools
Relationships	1.000				
Meetings	0.305	1.000			
Involve comm. in problem ID	0.248	0.351	1.000		
Assign prosecutors to geo. areas	0.131	0.215	0.254	1.000	
Use non-prosecution tools	0.219	0.282	0.530	0.233	1.000

Correlation matrix for items in community prosecution measurement model, 2005 NPS data (n=162)

Variable	Relation-ships	Meetings	Involve comm. in problem ID	Assign prosecutors to geo. areas	Use non-prosecution tools
Relationships	1.000				
Meetings	0.532	1.000			
Involve comm. in problem ID	0.473	0.499	1.000		
Assign prosecutors to geo. areas	0.177	0.307	0.330	1.000	
Use non-prosecution tools	0.463	0.441	0.552	0.255	1.000

APPENDIX E:
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND PROSECUTOR
HOMELAND SECURITY ACTIVITIES

In an effort to determine whether police practices influence prosecutors' offices in other ways, a preliminary assessment of homeland security practices was conducted using the combined 2003 LEMAS-2005 NPS dataset.[33] The 2005 NPS asked respondents four questions related to homeland security: did anyone in the office attend training on homeland security issues, did anyone from the office participate on a state or local homeland security task force, did the office prosecute any terrorism-related cases, and did the office participate in any terrorism-related investigations (all had a 12-month reference period). These four indicators served as outcome variables. The 2003 LEMAS dataset includes fourteen items related to emergency preparedness: written response plan, mutual aid agreements, shared radio networks, possession of emergency response equipment (6 indicators), partnering with diverse communities, public anti-fear campaigns, dissemination of information to increase preparedness, hold meetings on homeland security, and increase sworn officer presence in critical areas. Following the procedures used by Randol (2012), the 14 dichotomous indicators derived from the LEMAS dataset were summed into a single preparedness index (alpha=0.762).

Using logistic regression, police terrorism preparedness is positively and significantly related to two of the four dichotomous indicators of prosecutor preparedness: training ($p<0.05$) and task force participation ($p<0.05$). Police preparedness was unrelated to actual terrorism-related prosecutions or investigations. That said, both of the significant effects disappear once prosecutor office size is introduced as a control; larger prosecutors' offices are more likely to take preparedness steps (training, task force participation, and investigations, but not actual prosecutions).

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[33] A version of this analysis was presented as follows: Wingler, M., Lee, C., and Giblin, M.J. (2014). *Assessing homeland security preparedness in police and prosecutors' offices in the United States.* Paper presented at the Midwest Public Affairs Conference, Fort Wayne, IN, March 27-29, 2014.

This analysis was offered as a supplement to the main analyses presented in the report. It suggests

that the connection between prosecutors' offices and police departments may be quite loose.