ANALYTIC SUPPORT PROGRAM CONTRACT:

Survey of Practitioners to Assess the Local Impact of Transnational Crime, Task Order

Final Report

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Executive Summary

With the recent terrorist attacks on America and high profile cases of international computer crime and illegal trafficking in drugs and other goods, the Nation's law enforcement agencies are acutely aware of the imminent challenge of dealing with transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. In the project described in this report, NIJ sought to develop an exploratory, national survey to obtain data on transnational crime activity, perceptions of the problems these activities pose for local law enforcement and the resources needed to address these problems, and interagency communication and collaboration. Due to resource limitations, this report is restricted to a review of the literature, a description of research method development and data collection, and a descriptive overview of responses to the survey.

Key design features of the survey

- Data were collected from three sub samples of agencies:
    - 152 local law enforcement agencies, randomly sampled from among all those in the U.S. with 50 or more sworn officers.
    - 20 state police departments
    - 12 of the primary police departments from the core cities of the 25 largest U.S. metropolitan areas.

- Across all three sub samples the response rate was 74 percent. The greatest success was with the sub sample for which a good response rate is most critical. We completed 152 interviews out of the random sample of 175 agencies, for a response rate of 87 percent.

- Interviews were completed with at least one agency (either state or local) from 43 of the 50 states. All regions of the country are represented, including all coastal and border areas considered at high risk as points of entry for illicit international trafficking and terrorism.

- Respondents within agencies were upper-level command staff in city, county, and state law enforcement agencies and departments.

- The survey addressed: (1) Perceptions of trends and severity of local transnational crime; (2) level of criminal activity; (3) local resources devoted to such crimes; (4) cooperation among agencies; and (5) perceived resources needs.

- While opportunities were provided to discuss any type of transnational crime, the survey featured examination of four major categories: (1) illicit trafficking in humans and goods; (2) illegal immigration, (3) computer crimes, and (4) terrorism (referred to as crimes related to homeland security for reasons explained in the report).

Key findings:

- Law enforcement considered transnational crime to be a substantial and growing problem in most jurisdictions.

- In most locales, one or two types of transnational crime stand out as causing concern and generating law enforcement activity.

- Local law enforcement considered computer crime to be widespread and rapidly increasing, and keeping up with the technology and training necessary to prevent and investigate such crimes a pressing need.

- There is a significant level of communication and cooperation among law enforcement agencies across different levels of government; cooperation and communication among agencies are driven primarily by local crime issues, and by personal and historic relationships with agencies.
- Most respondents felt their agency was at least adequately prepared to deal with transnational crime.

- The most pressing resource needs are equipment, training, and personnel, while only modest increases in cooperation and collaboration are considered necessary to adequately address transnational crime.

- There was widespread unrest over “unfunded mandates” to do more for homeland security, while resource cuts are affecting essential local law enforcement functions.

- Some large city police departments are frustrated by perceived federal inaction and have started their own antiterrorism units.

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Introduction

With the attack on American soil in 2001, the Nation's law enforcement agencies have been made acutely aware of the imminent challenge of dealing with transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. The dark side of a shrinking globe is the increased interconnections of the activities of organized criminal groups including terrorists and crimes such as money laundering, immigration violations, and trafficking in drugs and arms. Transnational crimes are estimated to reap profits of close to one trillion dollars annually (FBI, 2003) and reach into both the smallest and largest communities in the US. While the nature of the crimes is international, the first appearance of these activities is often at the state and local level of law enforcement.

Unfortunately, little is known about what the nearly 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies across the country are seeing, what they are doing to coordinate efforts, and what resources they have and need to meet the challenge. In response to this critical need for information, the National Institute of Justice commissioned a survey of law enforcement agencies to examine daily demands on "first responders." The goal of the survey was to gather information regarding:

- Perceptions of the extent of local problems with transnational crimes (terrorism, money laundering, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, weapons, identity materials)
- Level of transnational criminal activity
- Local resources devoted to preventing and responding to transnational crimes
- Extent of cooperation among local, state, federal and foreign government agencies
- Perception of resource needs

This report reviews the results of the NIJ survey. The following section provides some background on the variety of transnational crime. Subsequent sections address methods, sampling and data collection activities, and survey findings, and conclusions.

Background

Transnational crimes are defined by the United Nations as "offenses whose inception, prevention, and/or direct or indirect effects involve more than one country" (United Nations, 1995). In the past, drug trafficking made up the bulk of transnational crimes with which U.S. state and local law enforcement came in contact. Over the last decade, however, the world has gotten smaller due to better transportation and the ever-increasing reach of communication technology, and new types of crime that reach across borders have appeared: high tech money laundering; trafficking in weapons, identity papers or cultural artifacts or exotic animals; trafficking in human beings; and terrorism. Just as travel and communications have made borders more fluid, they have made complex criminal enterprises that cross borders more common and more successful. "The enormous resources of transnational organized crime and greater expansion beyond major metropolitan and border areas mean that citizens increasingly are susceptible to their activities" (Shelley 1998).

As many crimes have now taken on "a global dimension" (Finckenauer, 2000), researchers and investigative authorities report that the nature of the criminal operations involved in transnational crimes differ from organized crime enterprises in the past (Godson and Williams, 1998). Many of the current international criminal operations appear to work in "networks" of individuals or groups rather than large, well-differentiated, on-going organizations that specialize in particular criminal areas. Newer groups expand and contract as needed, and while some specialize in particular goods (notably drugs), others are more dynamic, moving different products, making it hard to pin down activities or develop coherent investigations over time (Schlegel, 2000). Nigerian crime groups, for example, have been recognized for their financial criminal activities like credit card fraud, insurance fraud, counterfeiting, passport and visa theft as well as involvement in importation of heroin into the US (Schneider, Beare and Hill, 2002). The United Nations identifies types of persons or groups that traffic in human beings: "amateurs" who transport small numbers of persons sporadically; somewhat larger, organized criminal groups specializing in movements

between one or two countries using well-known routes, and large, well organized, international trafficking networks often trafficking in many commodities. The latter group is characterized by sophisticated counterfeiting of documents, flexibility in the enterprise and complex communication networks (Savona, 1998). The first consists of "Mom and Pop" operations that may come together for a quick profit activity and disband just as quickly.

Researchers have also argued that understanding and developing strategies to address transnational crime requires a market-by-market analysis, as there is a great deal of variation in the issues involved between these crimes and even within them (Beare, 2000). Research investigating the Canadian drug trade found that even in the high levels of involvement in trafficking was characterized by individual entrepreneurs who moved between organizations or networks. Similar findings applied to Canadian credit card fraud organizations – diverse "criminal of participants … in terms of the sophistication, the tightness of the networks and in terms of the local vs. international dimension" (Bear 2000:4). The networks of criminals are the mechanism through which individual offenders and groups travel from the local level to the transnational level, though a clear organized structure and relationships may not always be apparent or known to the local portion of the network and may differ by the type of crime. By contrast, studies of cocaine trafficking from South America into the US reveal well organized, task differentiated groups that are relatively stable over time (Dishman, 2001).

Many of the organizations or networks that are responsible for transnational crime are located in areas of the globe in transition. Criminal groups may use the opportunity afforded by nations in development or chaos, where there are fewer resources and fewer regulations operating to interfere with their activities, such as areas of the former Soviet Union, Asia and Latin America. Colombian and Mexican drug cartels have developed regional and even global holds over aspects of the drug trade involving billions of dollars of business in complex systems of production and distribution. Organized operations in Eastern Europe, Brazil, South Africa and Southeast Asia also maintain a range of enterprises moving goods and people across borders (Godson and William 1998; Dishman, 2001).

As exotic as many transnational crimes appear, "local law enforcement is confronted with much more basic and mundane problems that affect its ability to respond to these offenses" (Schlegel, 2000:365), as all transnational crime has both a local and a global component. While the crime itself may originate in other jurisdictions, its face is a local one: a local prostitution ring, discovery of a local cache of stolen firearms, local theft of identity materials. Researchers have argued that by focusing attention (resources, legislative or regulatory actions) on the transnational component of the problem, policymakers may be ignoring the other major component, the lower level crimes that originate or are the endpoints of the transnational criminal activity (Beare, 2000). The most important issues facing local law enforcement regarding transnational crime are "not so much a function of geography as they are a function of the nature of the offenses themselves" (Schlegel, 2000:365); that is, they are organized, cross regulatory boundaries, often involve high tech skills to uncover and prosecute, and are in their own backyards.

Local law enforcement is not designed to respond to these "technologically and organizationally complex" crimes (Schlegel 2000:366), as they often lack the technological capability or specialized skills and resources needed. Nonetheless, they are often the point where the arrest is made and the investigation begins. The problems in responding can appear in all types and sizes of local law enforcement agencies. Smaller entities may have difficulty committing resources to the development of a group of investigators with the necessary skills to mount technologically challenging investigations. Even larger police agencies may be reluctant to expand their ranks to include persons with very different skill sets needed for these investigations, i.e., accountants, computer experts, and auditors (Schlegel, 2000). In a climate of tight local police budgets, releasing officers for special training or to serve on special units involved with transnational crime investigation is a luxury many departments may not have.

Transnational criminal prosecutions are also complex, time-consuming and highlight the challenges of multiple jurisdictions, multiple crimes in the same investigation, and coordination of often high tech data gathering tools. For example, a drug trafficking case can lead to investigations of money laundering, prostitution or identity fraud. While local law

enforcement may be responding to each element of the case, it may lack the resources and personnel to deal with sophisticated cases that are organizationally complex and rely on persons with expertise across many substantive areas (Schlegel, 2000). This type of case requires local law enforcement to rely on other agencies for assistance, most often-federal authorities or experts in a particular field. For example, police-to-police assistance policies cover work that officers can legally perform in their own countries or areas for other countries' police entities without a court order. The ability to offer or allow this assistance is based on the case involved. Most instances require "dual criminality," that is, the crime involved must be a crime in both countries, and requests for assistance are made through federal agencies or INTERPOL. Evidence can also be obtained through mutual assistance requests to other countries through the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, and Office of International Affairs, but success in obtaining information can depend on whether the US has a bilateral legal assistance treaty with the participating country (Culter, 1999). All of these elements of building a transnational case (or even the local part of that case) involve knowledge about methods of obtaining relevant information for an investigation and knowledge of resources not usually drawn upon by law enforcement: agencies regulating areas like construction, marine ports, financial services; utilization of tax fraud investigation used successfully against organized crime figures; systems involved in tracking financial transactions within nations and across borders. In addition, investigation and prosecution of transnational crimes often requires inter-organizational responses from law enforcement agencies that have no special expertise in solving regulatory conflicts that may exist across boundaries.

In response to the many calls for coordination of expertise and increased collaboration in identifying and prosecuting transnational crimes, many law enforcement agreements and task forces have sprung up, notably those related to terrorism. However, basic organizational barriers remain. For example, police agencies have relied historically on informal communication channels between departments or with other agencies (Benson and Cullen 1998) and may see external agencies as competitors or part of "turf battles" in an investigation. --- attitudes and practices that may be difficult to change. In the case of terrorism, federal and national security agencies have stepped in to take the lead in

antiterrorism investigations (Tully and Willoughby, 2002) and coordination of information sharing. However, the boundaries for crimes not directly linked on the surface to terrorism, like trafficking in persons or automobiles, are more fluid and the mechanism for information sharing still untried.

Transnational crime by its nature requires a multifaceted response involving international, national and local law enforcement efforts. This response is multi-jurisdictional, time intensive and requires familiarity with a variety of new systems and new partners. Surveys of first responders indicate concerns at the local level as to their readiness to meet the challenge. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study (Shenon, 2003) of 190 emergency workers in 40 cities across the nation reports that the majority of emergency responders feel under-prepared for terrorist attached. A similar study funded by the National Association of School Resource Officers found that 75% of school security officials felt that schools were inadequately protected. The Police Executive Research forum (PERF) conducted a survey of 25 police chiefs from large jurisdictions about their needs and capabilities in responding to domestic terrorism. This survey reports that chiefs felt that their greatest needs were for additional funding, information sharing, equipment, technology and access to information from federal partners (PEFF, 2000). Respondents felt that local enforcement had a major contribution to make in the anti terrorism effort by building on communities ties to gather intelligence, but that they needed more training to be prepared.

In a study conducted by The International Association of Chiefs of Police of 17,000 police agencies, of the 4500 responding entities, 90% reported that did not feel ready in the face of terrorist attack. Eighty percent of agencies reported trying to increase readiness by acquiring equipment, training and increasing staff, though the majority felt that they still did not have the appropriate equipment to prevent or respond to attack effectively --- better communications equipment, surveillance and tactical equipment. Other needs cited were for specialized training for line personnel and increased coordination with other entities.

In the sections that follow, we review briefly information regarding the major types of transnational crime. We have selected these crimes for discussion, as they are the most

frequently discussed in the study's survey of local law enforcement agencies. Transnational crime covers a vast territory in the criminal justice and homeland security literature.

Areas of Transnational Crime Addressed in This Survey

Transnational crimes appear in multiple forms, some linked in a common purpose like execution of a terrorist agenda and others operating simply to reap enormous profits. Some types of transnational crime included in the survey with police agencies are discussed below. They are not presented in any priority order.

Trafficking in humans and illegal immigration

In the past ten years trafficking in people has grown from a small business involving movement between regions to a global business estimated at $7 billion a year. The Solicitor General of Canada estimates the money involved in trafficking and smuggling people only into Canada at $120-400 million annually (IOM International Organization for Migration, July 1999). Human trafficking is defined as (Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, P.L.106-386)[1]:

> a) Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or, b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage or slavery

The U.S. government estimates that at least 700,000 persons, often women and children, are trafficked each year across its borders (U.S. Department of State, 2001). Trafficking in persons is not a new phenomenon and has been called "a modern day form of slavery" (U.S.

[1] This definition differentiates the term from smuggling, which implies consent of the individual being moved across national boundaries.

Department of State, 2011:2). The contemporary versions of this problem, however, take on somewhat different forms. Trafficking can consist of persons, who are smuggled willingly across borders with promises of work or marriage, or it can involve coercion, either at the point of transit or after the trafficked individual has reached the destination. While the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is involved in both coerced and voluntary smuggling, local law enforcement becomes involved when victims are involved in other crimes like prostitution, child labor violations or even traffic violations.

Modern day trafficking and smuggling victims fall into three general categories: agricultural migrant workers, women and children forced into prostitution and domestic or sweat shop workers (Webb, 2002). Migrant, sweatshop and domestic workers often appear on the surface as legal workers. However, closer inspection reveals workers who are indentured for long periods of time in repayment of passage or who have simply been forced into work. In other instances, women may apply for domestic positions, pay for illegal transport or enter into a promise of marriage and end up in the sex industry (Webb, 2002). Results of a sting operation in Canada in the late 1990s revealed a large number of Asian women sold into prostitution in the US to pay off a $25-40,000 transport fee. The U.S. government estimates that 50,000 women and children are trafficked each year into the U.S. for purposes of sexual exploitation (Raymond and Hughes, 2001). In the late 1990s the Immigration and Naturalization Service reported that there were over 250 brothels in over 25 cities that were involved in trafficking women for sex work (Richard, 1999).

Smuggling migrants into the US to work in agricultural or garment industry sweatshops continues to be a significant problem as well as an international human rights issue. For example, in 1995 eighty Thai immigrants were found in a guarded compound in California sewing garments for some the US's top manufacturers; these workers had been working 17 hours a day, seven days a week for seven years. A 1999 study found that the source of many sweatshop workers found throughout California were the millions of undocumented immigrants entering the state each year. The report found that there were 120,000 people at work in garment sweatshops in Los Angeles alone (Taylor and Jamieson, 1999). While most

of these workers entered willingly, they were found to be operating under illegal terms of indenture or for absurdly low wages and in unsafe environments.

Trafficking in workers for coerced employment is another large transnational criminal operation. The State Department estimates that as many as 100,000 illegal Chinese immigrants were being smuggled into the U.S in the mid 1990s as well as hundreds of thousand of workers from other countries (U.S. Department of State, 1996). Legitimate work may be promised in exchange for passage into the U.S. or workers can be simply hijacked into servitude (Schloenhardt, 1999). Lack of legitimate documentation for being in the country adds to the control the trafficking organization or the employer holds over the worker and increases the worker's fear of local authorities.

Of the almost one million immigrants into the US each year, approximately one-third enter or remain illegally. Many are "overstays" of visas; others are simply illegal entrants. Smuggling persons across the US borders is a multi-million dollar industry. Eager immigrants often pay thousands of dollars to use the complex and often dangerous routes that attempt to avoid detection by INS or other officials. In addition, there are an estimated 100,000-150,000 mail order advertisements for brides to enter the country from Southeast Asia, the Philippines and the former Soviet Union. While many of these marriages are arranged by legitimate agencies, others are not.

Researchers and policymakers find that the extent of the problem is difficult to identify and the activities and nature of the organizations responsible hard to pinpoint. It does appear that the largest proportion of trafficked individuals is women and girl children and that they come from countries with unstable or transitional economies (United Nations, 1997). While in the past there was a focus on sexual exploitation of women and children in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand and the Philippines, there has been recent interest in areas of Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. European authorities estimates that 90% of trafficking victims in the European Union originated in Central and Eastern European states: Ukraine, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Russian and Albania. Other places

identified as source countries include Thailand, China, Vietnam, Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, Brazil, Columbia and the Dominican Republic (Mameli, 2002:71).

Investigations have found that trafficking in human beings involves both large organized criminal groups as well as smaller less complex "Mom and Pop" operations (Schloenhardt, 1999). Professional smugglers in China known as "snakeheads" have been documented as operating sophisticated international operating (Chin 1998); Caldwell, Galster, Kanics and Steinzor (1997) report the role of larger, organized Russian criminal groups in trafficking women for the sex trade as have other researchers looking at organized activities in the Netherlands and Eastern Europe (Bruinsma and Meershoek (1997).

Penalties for human trafficking are less common than those for drug trafficking so that legal sanctions may not serve as the same deterrent. Sanctions also may apply to the victim making willingness to come forward limited. There are some laws. The comprehensive US Alien Smuggling Control Act (1999) defines the crimes involved in trafficking and details penalties for traffickers including forfeiture of properties. The Victims of Trafficking and violence Protection Act of 2000 provides individuals who have been victimized with the ability to remain in the US temporarily and to receive state assistance and enables law enforcement agencies with the ability to pursue offenders.

There are a number of national and international efforts to combat trafficking in people: The Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons Center US Department of State); Presidents Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons; USAID cross border partnership efforts; and Justice Department training of for federal prosecutors, INS personnel and FBI agents. The US Department of Justice civil Rights Division operates a Trafficking in Person and Worker Exploitation Task Force (TPWETF) that includes representatives from all major law enforcement and labor agencies. The Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division has primary responsibility for the enforcement of all statutes related to involuntary servitude and in this role works with the FBI, INS and US Attorneys Offices to investigate and prosecute cases. The Criminal Section also operates outreach efforts to educate victims

of their rights and provide education and training to local law enforcement officers and prosecutors.

There are a number of barriers local law enforcement faces in investigations of these crimes. Inability to speak the native language of the country to which the victim has been trafficked and threats of deportation or jail used by traffickers often makes local investigations of these crimes difficult. Negative experiences victims may have had in their own country and lead to a general distrust of officials adding to communication problems (Webb, 2002). A 1999 study of international trafficking in women also found that "local police officers tend not to be very interested in investigating brothels, which is where much of the trafficking is occurring" (Richards, 1999:32). Finally, simply identifying individuals, as victims of trafficking can be problematic. Persons smuggled into the country illegally may not want to be found, even if they are in seriously disadvantaged circumstances. Fearful of legal reprisal or deportation, they may remain quiet when approached by police on other matters and stay undetected. Uncovering large numbers of person working in a sweatshop as occurred in the 1995 California case is a rarity. More often, local law enforcement may find prostitutes working in their area and not know whether this is a trafficking victim or a local prostitute. Working to establish her identity while she is in the safety of custody is a tricky business, as it involves initiating an investigation with INS and other federal agencies.

Weapons trafficking

It is estimated that over 60 countries produce illicit small arms and light weapons, i.e., automatic rifles, machine guns, small mortars, and shoulder fired rockets. The result is between 100 and 500 million such weapons in circulation worldwide (U.S. Department of State, 2002). These weapons are part of the trafficking in goods that make up the large illegal trade internationally. They are sold or bartered into the hands of criminals and terrorists and are often part of trafficking in other illegal goods such as drugs, diamonds or timber. Small lightweight weapons are in great demand worldwide as a wide range of customers use them: armed groups, militia, and individuals. They are small and relatively easy to conceal in smuggling. A UN report highlights the link between illegal weapons trafficking and other

illegal trafficking indicating that the same channels used to transfer other illegal goods are used to transfer weapons (UN, 1997).

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is marked, particularly in areas of the world that are politically unstable like Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Colombia (McDonnell, 2001). There has been increasing interest in trafficking in small arms and weapons since the end of the Cold War as these weapons have been implicated in local conflicts around the world. It is estimated that since 1990, more than 4 million people have been killed with these weapons in either regional or intra-state warfare (U.S. Department of State 2001). The Institute for International Studies of South Africa reports that in the last 50 years Africa has suffered almost 6 million deaths attributable to small arms and light weapons (Calhoun, 2001). The primary source of these weapons is not newly made arms, but re-circulated stocks of military weapons and the sales of surplus arms through illegal or semi-legal channels (Peartree, 2001).

The U.S. is currently engaged in a number of activities worldwide to stop the trade in weapons, including numerous inter-country agreements on weapons and sponsorship of cross border initiatives to identify and limit arms trafficking. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) operates a unique program that traces the history of recovered guns, the National Tracing Center (NTC). The NTC tracks recovered crime guns for federal, state, local and international agencies using information about sales of guns, stolen guns and suspect guns. During 2000 the NTC processed more than 200,000 requests to trace suspect firearms including 18,000 from foreign sources (Holmes, 2001). Tracing begins when the center receives a request form from federal, state, local or international law enforcement agencies. The NTC stores data on multiple sales of firearms, stolen firearms and suspect guns and uses this information to determine ownership and source areas of illegal weapons. Based on information about the gun from the manufacturer, the center contacts the wholesaler or retailer to determine the identity of the owner or purchaser. This information can be passed back to the law enforcement agency in as little as 24 hours. The center follows the same processes to trace a gun in a foreign country that is linked to a US citizen. This is

one of the resources available to local law enforcement when weapons are uncovered as part of routine police work or special investigations.

Cyber crime

Cyber crime refers to a number of offenses committed to or with computers or communication systems. Experts point to two categories of offenses that make up cyber crimes (Hale, 2002): breaking into a computer or computer system to cause damage or illegally obtain information (hacking, sabotage); and using a computer in committing a crime, like dissemination of child pornography, identity theft, fraud or embezzlement. With more than 430 million Internet users, 150 million in the United States alone, the potential for crime via cyberspace is vast. Cyber crime costs approximately $50 billion internationally and $5 billion in the US annually (Hale 2002). Computers control the servers that make up critical infrastructure of the nation, including communications, banking and finance, transportation, water and electrical supplies and emergency responses. A study of 500 American businesses found that 98% of them had Internet sites and over half used the Internet for electronic commerce for marketing, advertising, public relations and transactions or information sharing (Hale 2002).

The annual Computer Security Institute/ FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey found that 90% of businesses surveyed had been victims of a computer security breach in the prior year and only 34% reported those breaches to law enforcement (Dick, 2002). The FBI identifies several sources of cyber crime. Inside destruction includes deletion of files, theft of secure information and internal destruction of internal systems. Outside hackers are another common source of cyber crimes. Hackers are computer experts who crack the security code or "hack" into a system for the purpose of stealing files, planting computer viruses, changing information or simply displaying the ability to get in to secure sties. Targets in the past have included private corporations (Yahoo, MCI, and AT&T), political organizations (NATO) and governmental entities (Department of Defense, the Senate Web page (Freeh, 2000).

While many computer crimes are the work of individuals, the FBI reports an increase of criminal groups using the Internet or invading computer systems. These groups may invade private systems such as banking or credit card companies as part of identity theft, selling the lifted data to national or international crime groups. The cyber crime potential for terrorists and foreign intelligence services is high. As early as the 1980s West German hackers invaded military and industry computers in several countries and stole information for resale to buyers from unfriendly nations. The terrorist group known as the Internet Black Tigers "attacked" the government servers of the embassies of the Sri Lankan government and an international crime group transferred over $10 million from Citibank into accounts worldwide in the mid 1990s (Freeh, 2000).

There are a number of activities involved in cyber crime. According to the FBI, one million credit card numbers have been stolen by organized crime groups (Serio, 2002) and hundreds of companies have been targets of account theft or fraud. Phony stock companies or fraudulent offers for investments or products have sprung up throughout the Internet. In addition, "cyber stalking," or using the Internet or e-mail to stalk another person is estimated to involve thousands of stalkers. A growing part of cyber crime involves the use of the Internet for selling or transmitting child pornography. Sex offenders have repeatedly been uncovered through their solicitation of unwitting children in Internet chat rooms. Child advocacy organizations estimate that there are over 40,000 chat rooms where children can meet child predators and one in five children who use the computer chat rooms have been approached over the Internet by pedophiles; in addition many child character websites (Pokemon, My Little Pony) contain links to pornography sites (Anti-Child Porn Organization, 2003). For example, in 2001 state and federal investigation team dismantled a Texas based pornography ring that distributed photos, videotapes and offered children for sex to a subscriber base of 250,000 Internet users (Johnson, 2001). A similar ring was uncovered a year later involving 45 children and 37 adults across the country. In this case four foreign governments were involved in the investigation. (USA Today, 2002).

While the amount of cyber crime is increasing as more people and companies link to the Internet, only a small fraction of the crimes are reported or prosecuted. This is due in part to

reticence of victims to come forward, particularly corporate victims who may feel that they may loose the support and confidence of customers if news of a breach in security is leaked. Experts also feel that it is due to "scarce resources, insufficient training and fear of technology, lack of public outcry and the police culture itself" (Hale, 2002:6). Officers are often not adequately trained in dealing with highly skilled hackers or highly technical systems used to track hackers and other cyber criminals. The FBI assists in this effort throughout National Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion teams located in the FBI field offices as well as through partnerships with state and local law enforcement in other task forces on computer crimes.

Jurisdictional problems raised by cyber crime are significant. Victims and offenders may reside in multiple sites, including international locations, making coordination of investigations difficult. While domestic law enforcement can use search warrants or subpoena to collect evidence, such tools may not be available internationally. Extraditing offenders from other countries can also prove difficult, or even impossible if there are not comparable laws regarding cyber crime in those jurisdictions.

These jurisdictional problems become more complicated in the many cases where the offender is a juvenile, persons sometimes referred to as "computer delinquents" (Bowker, 2000:7) Typically, juvenile offenders are dealt with at the local level either through juvenile justice system resources or, if charged as an adult, adult correctional systems. In the case of cyber crimes, like hacking into companies or government agencies, juveniles can quickly become involved in multiple jurisdictions, even crossing international boundaries, and not fully comprehend the seriousness of their offenses. Juveniles have been involved in hacking into computers at the Pentagon and NASA, stealing passwords for an Internet provider, counterfeiting money on a home computer and shutting down airport runway lighting (Bowker, 2000).

Identity Theft

Identity fraud is another area of crime that often crosses national borders. It is an area of increasing concern to law enforcement for the role it plays in terrorist activities. Identity

theft involves the use of personal identifying information (Social Security number, credit cards, drivers license) to establish new credit lines or to utilize existing lines of credit in the name of the victim (ITRC, 2003). In addition, identity theft can include using a victim's information to avoid detection by the police or to establish a new life to evade law enforcement or creditors. This usage is of greatest concern to law enforcement sources involved with tracking terrorist activities, as changing identities by using legal or legitimate ones can make detection difficult.

Theft of identifying materials and the creation of fake identification using some piece of real identification or information is a burgeoning industry. In a recent survey (ITRC, 2003), 50% of victims had fake drivers license issued using their stolen information. With drivers licenses the primary source of identification by Americans, the existence of numerous fraudulent licenses make movement of criminals and/or terrorists far easier through such things as airport checkpoints.

Identity theft is a high profit, low risk crime. According to recent surveys of identify theft (ITRC, 2003) approximately 7 million people were victims of identify theft in from July 2002-July 2003, an increase of 80% over the prior year. The majority of victims find out about the theft through denial of credit, erroneous billing or collection agency notification. Though the average costs for prosecuting these cases is relatively low (estimates range from $11,000-$20,000), the average arrest rate in these cases is also low --- under 5%. The costs to the consumer and/or the credit companies, however, are high. Fraudulent charges on credit card thefts average more than $90,000 per name used. In addition to running up bills, offenders also open additional credit lines using the stolen materials. Often identified through credit reporting agencies, the fraud then moves to the attention of local law enforcement. Eighty-seven percent of the victims surveyed by ITRC reported their identify theft to their local police agency; 53% reported to multiple agencies, as they were transferred from one to another while giving the police report, as agencies were often confused about jurisdiction.

Law enforcement often finds identify theft crimes frustrating to deal with: even a simple case can take more than 100 hours to investigate and difficult ones as much as 500 hours. (ITRC, 2003). In addition, cases require interaction with other governmental agencies like the IRS and the FBI, and can take several months to resolve. Since the average time between the occurrence of the theft and discovery is 1-6 months, the case may begin as a relatively "cold" one for law enforcement.

Drug Trafficking

It is estimated that American drug users spend $63 billion dollars annually on illicit drugs (ONDCP, 2003). The bulk of the expenditures are for cocaine ($36 billion), heroin ($12 billion) and marijuana ($10 billion). This translates into over 290 metric toms of cocaine brought into the US annually. The enormity of the demand for drugs, particularly those not produced in the US, make drug trafficking perhaps the most consistent and lucrative of all transnational crimes.

Who is involved in drug trafficking varies by which drug is being grown, produced and moved across national boundaries. Experts describe the traffic in heroin and cocaine as controlled by organized criminal networks related to each other through history and geography (Mueller, 2000). Authorities have successfully tracked and prosecuted Colombian cocaine and heroin producers tying their activities with Mexico, the Sicilian and Russian Mafias and other crime organizations in Europe. Similarly, Asian traffickers have been linked to Nigerian criminal groups for distribution into the US and Europe. Other drugs, like methamphetamine, Ecstasy and synthetic opiates operate through different trafficking routes and are either transported from Mexico and Europe or manufactured inside the US (DEA, 2002).

The US borders contain numerous routes of entry for imported illegal drugs. Over 400 million people enter annually on over 650,000 airline flights, in the 90,000 passenger ships docking at US ports and in the 116 million vehicles that cross land borders (DEA, 2002). Each of these venues offers considerable opportunity to traffic drugs into the US. The US/Mexico borders are a primary point of entry for drug shipments and it is estimated that

approximately 65% enter through these borders (DEA, 2002). While the borders, airports and other transshipment areas remain the focus of federal activity, local law enforcement deals daily with identification and seizure of drugs as they make their way to the user on the street.

In the past, drug trafficking organizations have been the most commonly encountered transnational criminal organizations, and systems of identifying and dealing with those offenders is well developed at the local enforcement level. Prior to the recent focus on terrorism, law enforcement has treated drug trafficking and terrorist activities as separate issues. However, ties between drug proceeds and terrorist funding have given rise to a new term, narco-terrorist. The DEA defines a narco-terrorist organization as "an organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug traffickers in order to further or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets with the intention to influence … a government or group pf people" (DEA, 2003:14). Examples of narco-terrorist groups include organized groups in Afghanistan (a source country for opiate production), the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia (FARC), and Hezbollah. (DEA, 2003). The activities of narco-terrorists are somewhat different from the traditional activities associated with drug trafficking in that it is politically motivated and directed toward a larger goal than profit.

Trafficking in drugs has also become a cyber crime. Via the Internet, "rogue pharmacies" (Gaul and Flaherty, 2003) operate side by side with legitimate online pharmacies. In a recent case in Nevada an online distributor of narcotics had shipped five million doses of narcotics to customers, accounting for 10% of all hydrocodone sold in Nevada. In legitimate on line pharmacy procedures, patients submit prescriptions from their doctors and the pharmacy fills those orders at a reduced costs to the consumer. In rogue prescription sites, the customer either orders the drugs with no prescription or is connected briefly with doctors who write script without ever seeing the patient. The DEA has recently set up task forces to track this trade, but the extent of the problem is still unknown. Online efforts also tend to be highly mobile. State and federal agencies prosecuting pharmacy operations in Nevada found that records indicated that when a site closed in San Antonio, business moved to Las Vegas and eventually to Florida. In addition to the sites operating the US, there are a number of sites

selling tranquilizers, narcotics and other illegal prescription drugs offshore in Namibia, Thailand and Sri Lanka.

Illegal tobacco trafficking (avoiding taxes by transporting and reselling cigarettes) generates considerable money for criminal groups and was the subject of the International Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trade in 2002. The conference of 142 countries generated a number of recommendations to stop the trafficking and distribution of illegal tobacco products. The report concluded that, while an international problem, control of illegal tobacco trafficking begins with domestic action: tobacco labeling and production tracing, local monitoring of movement of products, training and technical assistance to local agencies in establishing legitimate demand thresholds, automated customs procedures and joint enforcement operations (Benton and Libertucci, 2002).

For example, a case involving smuggling cigarettes from North Carolina for sale in Michigan highlights the role local law enforcement plays as "first responders" to complex transitional crimes. Large quantities of cigarettes were legally purchased in North Carolina, where they are subjected to low sales tax, and transported to Michigan, where cigarettes carry an additional tax of 70 cents per pack. They were then illegally sold through complicit convenience stores at a substantial profit. While this could have been regarded as a case of domestic smuggling or tax evasion, a state-federal task force working in cooperation with Canadian intelligence traced the operation to Hezbollah, regarded by the State Department as one of the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations. The investigation, "Operation Smokescreen," revealed evidence of hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal revenue generated simply from the tobacco sales. It also uncovered related overseas shipments of night vision devices, surveying equipment, global positioning systems, and other high tech equipment with obvious potential to facilitate terrorism (Damask, 2002).

While intelligence sharing and investigative capabilities in drug trafficking investigations has improved over the last few years through interagency task forces, joint operations and data sharing technology, there are still a need for timely information and unduplication of effort. The General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan commissioned in the late 1990s by federal law

enforcement and the intelligence community to look at coordination of efforts in combating drug trafficking found that investigators at the operational level complained that they did not have adequate information or support from national resources. While drug investigators joined together for task force programs to increase local and regional cooperation, the report found insufficient coordination on a larger scale that increased the chances of jurisdictional dispute and funding competition (GCIP, 2000:8).

Multi-jurisdictional issues are not confined to international cases. For example, in September 2001 an investigation of marijuana trafficking and distribution by Texas based criminal organizations was initiated in two US DEA Field Divisions, El Paso and Chicago. The investigation revealed a large-scale transportation ring based in El Paso, but responsible for sending large shipments of marijuana to Chicago, Atlanta, and Kentucky. In the 11-month investigation authorities in four states seized over 25,000 pound of marijuana and $1.2 million in cash. By the time the operation concluded it involved the local police departments of two small towns in Illinois and Indiana, DEA Chicago and El Paso and DEA's Regional Enforcement Team (DEA News Release, 8/6/2002).

Money Laundering

Laundering currency through international and domestic banking enterprises is closely linked to all transnational crime. Money laundering refers to the movement of cash generated through illegal means into other assets through a financial institution. The purpose in this activity is to conceal the profits generated and to obscure any connection between the criminal activity and the funds. The money launderer deposits illegally gained funds into legal financial systems in multiple deposits and then moves those funds from one institution, company or even country quickly to dissociate them from the source in a complicated web of difficult to follow transactions.

The methods of moving funds to conceal profits are "limited only by the imaginations of the launderers" (Serio, 2002:24). Money laundering is implicated in almost all transnational crimes, though drug trafficking and financial crimes (bank fraud, credit card fraud, embezzlement) are the most frequent sources of laundered funds (FATF, 1996). In addition,

laundered funds may be used in other criminal activities, including terrorism. For the terrorist, success often rests on large sums of cash for purchase of equipment, maintaining participants, and funding travel, supplies and bribery.

While estimating the magnitude of the money laundering problem is difficult, data on the total number of seizures and forfeitures related to money laundering made by law enforcement agencies in 2001 put the value at over $500 million (Department of Treasury, 2001). The International Monetary Fund estimates the extent of the money laundering market in the work is between 2-5% of the world's gross domestic product (FATF, 2003).

An international task force on money laundering cites large organized criminal groups as the source of most money laundering: the Italian Mafia, the Japanese yakuza, Colombian cartels, Eastern European criminal groups, American ethnic gangs (FATF, 1996). The ability to track and effectively prosecute money launderers differs considerably across areas of the world. In Asia, for example, there are a number of underground banks where large cash transactions cannot be traced. In the former Soviet Union, trading or front companies may be established and moneys invested in them (FATF, 1996). In many cases, transactions are small enough not to trigger thresholds that require notification of regulatory agencies or may involve "shell" banks or companies as a camouflage for movements of funds (U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Justice, 2002).

Three stages characterize money laundering: placement (depositing funds into financial institutions); layering (moving deposited funds quickly from one location to another or creating a series of layered transactions) and integration (investment funds into legitimate channels, stock, real estate, contributions) (Serio, 2002). It is in the first phase of the operation that the activity is local and geographically confined.

The money launderer of the last few decades is a highly tech criminal, using the complex banking system to deposit, transfer and "layer" (Serio, 2002) funds to avoid detection. There are international e-systems (notably in the UK and Europe) that are designed to detect large, rapid turnaround transfers of funds used by financial institutions to see if they are

inadvertently being used as a money laundering vehicle. The difficulty for law enforcement in this regard is two fold: the technological sophistication involved in catching the complex process and the willingness of financial institutions to cooperate with investigations into the internal workings of their business. Cases are also long in development, and involve many financial institutions and even differing regulations across national borders.

Consequently, money laundering is a different kind of crime for local enforcement agencies. The "fight against money laundering…is the product of statutes, rules and detection strategies each controlled by different institution and individuals" (Cueller, 2003:314). In detection, the focus may often start with the crime that generates the funds and move through a list of other related crimes like wire transfer fraud or embezzlement. Local enforcement is not well positioned for dealing with money laundering for many reasons (Cueller, 2003). Police operate both in response to direct reporting or observation of a crime, through follow up of secondary crimes uncovered or through surveillance of suspicious activities. In investigating money laundering, this might start with a surveillance of drug activity, lead to development of cases against the persons dealing drugs, and finally lead to investigation of where the illegal proceeds are going. Some local agencies may also have special units that monitor travelers carrying large amount of cash[2], gather tips from banks about large cash deposits, or rely on discovery of cash in the course of other searches.

Local enforcement may also cooperate with federal officials in undercover sting operations or follow up financial institution reporting of suspicious transactions. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the US Department of the Treasury coordinates information sharing among a number of expert systems. While these large expert information systems used by federal law enforcement agencies are available to analyze movement of money, they look primarily at violations of currency reporting. An important part of the work on money laundering, however, involves local police work to detect the underlying crime. This "bottom-up" approach relies on understanding the underlying crimes. As a result cases generated from this approach reflect most heavily those crimes that are

[2] Persons carrying more than $10,000 out of the country are required to report that action to regulators prior to travel.

easily seen or "detectable," i.e. drug dealing, prostitution rings, extortion. Local enforcement also works with federal agencies in a top-down approach; for example, investigations of suspicious transactions or activity reported in federal detection systems are turned over to local police to review to convert the currency reporting violations into a money laundering case with ties to the underlying criminal activities.

Terrorism

The Immigration and Naturalization Act defines terrorist activity as any activity that involves international sabotage or conspiracy, and/or injury to others as part of those activities; planning terrorist activities; providing support to terrorists; and soliciting or managing any funds to support terrorist activities (Office of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism, 2001). Terrorism is different from other types of crimes in its political aim or motive and the degree of organization of the criminals. Terrorist acts are also intended to have a broader psychological effect, one that extends beyond any immediate victims ((Hoffman, 1998).

Dishman (2001) differentiates types of terrorists groups based on the degree to which the organizations see their goal as purely political or as including profit orientation. He argues that while "ordinary" criminal organizations are interested in maintaining the status quo to continue their profitable criminal activities, terrorist groups by contrast are interested in disrupting political or governmental structure. For example, transnational criminal groups who are profit driven may use violence to attack those getting in their way, but terrorist groups may use violence to make a political point or disrupt political power. Terrorist groups may also cooperate with each other to further a political agenda, while transnational criminal organizations are less likely to collaborate, unless it increases market share or profits.

A mentioned earlier, narco-terrorist or narco-guerillas are terrorist groups that may at some point use drug marketing proceeds to fund political activities (Sendero Luminoso, the Basque Homeland and Freedom movement), but may reduce or give up trafficking over time. Other terrorist groups continue to be associated with drug trafficking to fund activities (United Way State Army in Burma, the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the Taliban; Dishman,

2003). Still others (FARC, IRA) completely distance themselves from the profit-oriented drug organizations as not dedicated and interested only in profits.

In March of this year the U.S. Office of Counter terrorism listed thirty-three organizations as designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTO). Many activities of FTOs are uncovered as part of on-going federal investigations and have little impact on local enforcement except through a need to provide local support to federal agents. However, many other activities are uncovered or begin as part of routine police work (traffic stops, weapons violations, execution of search warrants, even domestic disturbances).

Summary

The tools needed to address the threat of transnational crime are more complex than those needed to fight local street crime. Some aspects of organized transnational crime can on the surface look like traditional, domestic criminal activity. For example, international prostitution rings involving trafficked women may operate next to local prostitutes, and be indistinguishable to vice officers not trained to recognize a wider criminal enterprise. Similarly, agencies processing non-U.S. citizens may find themselves investigating a forged visa that could lead to identity fraud, money laundering and schemes involving foreign terrorist organizations.

The events since September 11, 2001 have accelerated the need to look at the information and tools law enforcement has at its disposal to identify and deal with these crimes. The dilemma for law enforcement at all levels rests in the nature of transnational crime and the nature of the relationships between the multiple agencies involved in fighting it. Not surprisingly, agencies may be unclear as to whose jurisdiction transnational crime falls under, as well as what procedures to follow. And while transnational crime by definition involves people and organizations outside local borders, it is manifested “in the backyard” of local law enforcement agencies who have to triage to other agencies. This is not an easy task. Transnational crimes have a high level of offense complexity (Schlegel, 2000); that is, they are organizationally complex (involve multiple local and international formal and informal crime organizations, cover multiple regulatory systems and agencies);

technologically complex (involve Internet based operations, high level financial transfers; elaborate communications structures); and spatially and temporally complex (involve multiple countries and extended planning and execution time frames). All these elements make a comprehensive and coordinated response both essential and hard to achieve.

Method

Development

NIJ sought to develop an exploratory, national survey to obtain data from law enforcement on transnational crime activity, perceptions of the problems these activities pose, and agency responses. An important objective in this survey was to achieve a high response rate, since poor response rates can undermine the validity of results of surveys with even the best instrumentation and sampling. Several alternative methods of data collection were considered: Web based or email surveys, self-administered mailed questionnaires and telephone surveys.

The first two types of surveys can be cost effective and yield good response rates when surveying a population that is easily accessible, highly motivated to engage in the survey's topic, and not over-studied. The target respondents within law enforcement agencies involved in this survey were upper-level command staff in city, county, and state law enforcement. Although we expected them to regard the topic as important and to be inclined to participate, upper level law enforcement managers are busy, mobile, over-studied, and often insulated from survey requests by their support staff. Mailed, self-administered surveys without extensive and costly follow-up procedures usually yield low response rates when surveying high-ranking law enforcement staff. For example, a survey conducted by the International Chiefs of Police Association (IACP) whose data collection targeted similar respondents and occurred just weeks before our survey, achieved a 25 percent response rate.

Another pressing consideration was time; our goal was to conduct all data collection and analysis and produce a final report within six months. This time constraint, coupled with other considerations, led us to opt for a telephone survey as the primary mode of data

collection, with extensive use of mail, email, and phone contacts to contact, schedule, and follow-up the phone survey. While quicker and equally effective, this can be more expensive than a mail survey, so our sample size was reduced to accommodate time and resource limitations.

To develop a nationally representative sample with a high response rate, we engaged in several steps. First, we conducted an extensive literature review to identify key transnational crime problems likely to be of highest current and future concern to local law enforcement. We also examined prior surveys of law enforcement agencies and personnel for guidance on the most effective data collection procedures. Second, as key substantive issues clarified and questions arose, we engaged in informal discussions with law enforcement personnel in police departments of both large and small cities. Third, after we developed a set of key transnational crime and relevant law enforcement issues, a prototype questionnaire, and an outline of data collection procedures, we held a focus group with one Chief of Police, one Deputy Chief, and one Head of Operations. The Chief was from the police department of a city of approximately 100,000, with a diverse population and high poverty and crime rates. The Deputy Chief was from the police department of a largely affluent, relatively homogeneous suburb of 100,000, and the Head of Operations was from a middle-class suburb of 25,000 mostly white residents. Fourth, we conducted a pretest of the data collection instrument and procedure with nine police departments from nine different states (Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington).

Certain types of respondents were targeted within jurisdictions selected for the study: Police Chiefs, Sheriffs (in jurisdictions where sheriffs have primary policing responsibility), Captains, Unit Heads or Commanders, or Lead Investigators. For State Police agencies, Commanders, Colonels, or other administrators responsible for central operations or investigations were targeted. The expected challenges in accessing police chiefs, unit commanders, and other high level law enforcement staff was affirmed in exploratory conversations, the focus group, and the pre-test. Knowing this, we elected to collect primarily through telephone interviews, with extensive use of phone, mail, and email

communications for establishing contact with agencies, selecting individuals within agencies for interviews, and following up each contact until they provided data or explicitly refused to participate. The focus group also suggested numerous changes to the survey instrument, such as using the term "threats to homeland security" rather than "terrorism" in the questionnaire. In the pretest the instrument that incorporated such feedback performed very well.

The questionnaire provided a working definition of transnational crime and contained instructions asking respondents to provide information only about crimes with international connections. These instructions were followed by a list of the types of transnational crimes the survey was intended to address:

- Crimes related to homeland security, e.g., foreign organizations attempting to disrupt or destroy domestic infrastructure; threatening or killing American citizens and residents.

- Illicit international trafficking, including trade in humans (for forced labor or sexual exploitation); weapons (biological weapons, firearms, munitions, or components of weapons); drugs; stolen art or artifacts; endangered animals or animal parts and products; or stolen intellectual property (e.g., pirated CDs, counterfeit clothing, or trademarked materials).

- Illegal immigration

- Computer crimes reaching across international boundaries, such as money laundering; identity and information theft; unauthorized access; sabotage; viruses ("hacking"); internet commerce in child pornography; or theft and illicit transmission of intellectual property (music, books, patented materials).

- Opportunities were also provided for respondent to address any other transnational crimes of local concern that they wished to discuss.

From the collective feedback acquired in the focus group and pretest, we finalized instrumentation and procedure guidelines for interviewers. The instrument used in this survey is presented in Appendix A. Copies of messages used in notification and follow-up procedures are presented in Appendices B and C.

Sampling

Current transportation systems and computer and communication technologies allow some forms of transnational crime to reach virtually anywhere in the United States. Localized studies, anecdotal evidence, and the historical record of major international crimes suggest that kinds of international crime of greatest interest to NIJ are not evenly distributed geographically, but most are more highly concentrated in urban areas. However, there is also evidence that suburbs and smaller communities are targeted for some forms of crime to avoid the hardened targets of larger ports and airports, and as staging areas for illicit trafficking into and out of large cities. In addition, some forms of crime, like many computer crimes, are not at all bound geographically.

Given our objective of a high response rate, the labor intensive procedures required to achieve it, and resources allowing only a small number of responses to be collected, we determined that the best approach for a descriptive, exploratory study was to draw three different sub samples. We wanted state, county, and municipal levels of government represented, since the coordination of effort is vital to effective law enforcement. To maximize the information obtainable with available resources, we devised a sampling plan with three components:

- 175 local law enforcement agencies with 50 or more sworn officers
- 50 state police departments
- 25 main police departments of core cities of the 25 largest U.S. metropolitan areas

The centerpiece of this design was the random sample of 175 law enforcement agencies. Abt Associates staff used data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies as the frame, and drew a random sample of municipal and county law enforcement agencies from the universe of 1967 organizations with 50 or more sworn officers. While this sub sample is too small to support statistical modeling of regional variations, it will support national point estimates.

Given that relatively few truly large cities are likely to be captured in a random sample of 175 or 200 of the nearly 2,000 agencies with 50 or more sworn officers, we used a purposively drawn set of the core cities of the 25 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S (for example, the city of Tampa was selected from the Tampa-St. Petersburg metropolitan area). This ensured that with a relatively small number of responding agencies we would provide representation of large cities. It is assumed that some types of transnational crime are concentrated in larger cities. Large urban areas provide a number of features attractive to those engaged in international crime. For terrorists, large cities provide attractive targets in the form of costly and high profile infrastructure, symbolic targets such as commerce centers and corporate headquarters, and larger concentrations of people to target. Assuming that most of the 25 largest cities/metropolitan areas are also major transportation/shipping centers, we can argue that the majority of crimes like trafficking have some involvement with these cities. Major cities are points of international commerce and transportation, and disguising illicit trafficking in goods is easier when the legitimate flow of commerce and transportation is routine and in large volume. Given the purposive selection and the total coverage of this target group of cities, generalizations cannot be drawn and the results are purely descriptive of the set of interviews conducted.

Finally, we targeted all 50 state police agencies and believed they would be an efficient use of interviews, since a relatively small number of interviews would ensure wide geographic coverage of the United States. In addition, state police often act as a conduit between the local and federal levels. Local law enforcement personnel often call state police when they have issues crossing outside their jurisdiction, and state police will refer cases to federal authorities when it becomes clear that certain crimes cross state or international lines. As with the large cities, the purposive selection and the total coverage of states means that generalizations cannot be drawn and the results are purely descriptive of the set of interviews conducted.

Data Collection

Our approach to data collection, emphasizing persistent follow-up procedures using multiple media, proved to be well suited for the extraordinary conditions under which the survey occurred. On March 17, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Terror Threat Level was raised to orange, indicating a "high risk of terrorist attack," when President Bush declared that Saddam Hussein must leave Iraq within 48 hours. We made our first data collection contacts with agencies on March 18. The U.S. military invasion of Iraq began the following day. The threat level remained at orange until April 18, when it was lowered to yellow ("Elevated," indicating a "significant risk of terrorist attack"). Although the obligations of local and state law enforcement in response to an elevated terrorist threat varied widely across jurisdictions, it is clear that agencies' attempts to address homeland security during a time of war stressed state and local resources during the first four weeks of our data collection. In addition, many jurisdictions at the city, county and state level had recently felt the impact of budget cuts, layoffs, and hiring freezes. Already scarce law enforcement resources were stretched thin trying to address extraordinary security issues while attending to already demanding, routine enforcement duties, making responding to surveys a low priority.

While received few refusals the first few weeks of the survey, we also completed few interviews during this period. Most of the effort of the first three weeks was spent repeatedly contacting or attempting to contact respondents. In most cases, people were unavailable and in some instances they made, and often missed, appointments to do the interview. Near the time that the terror threat level was lowered,

Our first wave of approximately 50 interviews were completed by two individuals with experience working as civilian staff in police departments and other criminal justice agencies, and who were formally educated in a college of criminal justice. These interviewers understood the dense terminology and jargons commonly used in criminal justice, and were familiar with and host of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and their acronyms commonly mentioned by respondents. The initial interviewers developed a list of state and local agencies with which local law enforcement often collaborate, a detailed list of obstacles encountered in these interviews, and developed a guide for subsequent interviewers to follow. Additional staff (one of whom was a retired police officer) were brought aboard for the remaining 100 or so interviews.

Contact information for all of the agencies in the sample, and for targeted individuals within these agencies, was compiled well in advance of fielding the survey. We obtained the main email addresses, phone numbers, and addresses for all agencies in the sample. We then called or emailed these agencies and asked for contact information for the Chief or Deputy Chief (or whatever terminology was appropriate for parallel positions in each kind of law enforcement organization, such as Sheriff, Commander, and Superintendent). If the agency head was unavailable, we asked for the name, title, and contact information of the sworn staff member who would be most knowledgeable about law enforcement regarding international crime and homeland security, such as the head of operations for the agency or the commander of a unit addressing such issues. By the time live data collection began in mid March, we had contacted each agency, identified an appropriate individual respondent within the agency, and obtained contact information for that person.

In some cases, more than one person contributed to completion of the questionnaire since one person was not always equipped with information about all parts of the questionnaire. For example, some agencies had staffs large enough to be highly specialized. In such instances, a Head of Operations may answer questions about staffing levels and the number of arrests and investigations related to transnational crime, while the Chief would provide information about perceived resource needs and a special unit commander would tell us about communication with federal and foreign agencies. In relatively small agencies, it was much

more likely that one person in the central command staff would have sufficient knowledge of all agency activity that they could provide all of the different kinds of information we requested. To streamline the remainder of this presentation, we refer to those providing us with information within an agency as the respondent, acknowledging that anywhere from one to five people may have contributed to completing a single questionnaire.

All respondents received an emailed or mailed notification letter alerting them to our forthcoming survey. For most respondents, a series of phone calls, emails, and repeat mailings of the initial letter soon followed. Many respondents or administrative assistants acting on their behalf requested that a summary of the survey be faxed or emailed to them; others requested the full questionnaire, and still others asked for contact information so that they could confirm our legitimacy. It was rare that an interview would be completed, or a refusal received, with a single phone call. We pursued all respondents until an interview was completed, a refusal received, until we ceased major data collection efforts on May 30, 2003. Several interviews were completed in June, but only when respondents contacted us in response to our prior solicitations.

The response rates and the number of completed interviews in each sub sample are presented in Table 1. Figure presents a U.S. map showing the states from which we obtained responses from at least one agency, whether state, large city, or randomly drawn municipality or county. Figure 2 shows the location of the responding large cities, and Figure 3 shows the responding state police agencies obtained.

[Table 1 About Here]

[Figure 1 About Here]

Our approach to data collection was highly effective, particularly in light of the extraordinarily difficult circumstances during the first month of data collection and given the low response rate of a similar survey completed just as ours was beginning (IACP, 2003). We collected data from at least one agency (either state or local) from 43 of the 50 states.

All regions of the country are represented, including all coastal and border areas considered at high risk of being points of entry for illicit international trafficking and terrorism.

Across all three sub samples we achieved a 74 percent response rate. Fortunately, our greatest success was with the sub sample for which a good response rate is most critical. We completed 152 interviews out of the random sample of 175 agencies, for a response rate of 87 percent. We can only generalize from the sub sample of randomly selected agencies, and the excellent response rate provides strong assurance that the responding agencies are representative of all U.S. local law enforcement agencies of 50 or more sworn officers (minus the 25 largest police departments, which were purposively sampled). We had less success completing interviews with the state police and the largest police departments. However, we are not attempting to generalize beyond the obtained cities and states in these sub samples, so a high response rate is not vital. While significantly lower than the rates we achieved in the random sample, the 40 and 48 percent response rates for the state police and the largest cities (respectively) compare favorably with most other surveys of police command staff.

[Figure 2 About Here]

[Figure 3 About Here]

Results

The vast majority of the resources available for this study were devoted to obtaining the best possible data set, whose quality supports additional analyses. The scope of this report is limited to the presentation of tabulations and simple comparisons of responses to the survey.

Perceived Seriousness Of Local Transnational Crime Problem

Figure 4 presents the extent to which respondents said law enforcement personnel believed crimes related to homeland defense and other transnational crimes (described near the beginning of the questionnaire) to be a problem in their jurisdiction. As can be seen here,

roughly half of respondents form the large city and the random sample of departments considered such crimes to be either a “serious” or “critical” problem, and the other half considered them either “not a problem” or “a minor problem.” More than two-thirds of the state police personnel interviewed said that law enforcement officers in their jurisdiction believed transnational crimes to be problematic.

[Figure 4 About Here]

When asked to indicate the extent to which the citizens in their jurisdictions felt transnational crime to be a problem, roughly half of the respondents across each sub sample said their citizens considered such crimes to be a “serious” or “critical” problem (Figure 5).

[Figure 5 About Here]

We also asked questions designed to elicit information about respondent’s perceptions of trends in transnational crime in their jurisdiction over the previous five years. Figures 6 through 13 present responses to the questions about trends in illicit trafficking in humans, weapons, drugs, art, animal, or intellectual property (Figures 6-9, respectively), as well as illegal immigration (Figure 10), money laundering (Figure 11), computer crime (Figure 12), and threats to homeland security (Figure 13). As can be seen in these figures, there is variation in perceived trends across crime types and across sub samples.

[Figure 6 About Here]

About one-fifth to one-third of respondents believed that human trafficking was increasing in their jurisdiction, with respondents in large city police departments most likely to believe that this form of trafficking had increased.

[Figure 7 About Here]

Law enforcement personnel from large cities were also more likely to say that international weapons' trafficking was increasing. Nearly half (45 percent) of respondents from large cities believed there to be an increase over the previous five years, while just 27 percent of state police and 16 percent of respondents from the random sample of agencies thought weapon trafficking had increased (Figure 7).

[Figure 8 About Here]

Unlike the pattern with human and weapons trafficking, state police and those from the random sample of cities were most likely to say that drug trafficking was increasing over the previous five years (Figure 8). The vast majority of state police respondents thought drug trafficking was on the rise (87 percent), while 60 percent of those from the random sample and 44 percent of the large city respondents thought drug trafficking had increased in their jurisdiction.

[Figure 9 About Here]

As can be seen in Figure 9, just 20 percent of those in large city police departments and 11 percent of the random sample said that illicit trafficking in art, animals and animal products, and intellectual property had increased, and most of the remainder thought the five-year levels stayed roughly the same. All of the representatives of state police agencies said that such trafficking was unchanged in the previous five years.

[Figure 10 About Here]

Perceived trends in illegal immigration were more consistent across sub samples. About two-thirds of large city police and three-quarters of those from state police agencies believed there to be an increase in illegal immigration (Figure 10). Roughly half of respondents from the random sample of local agencies said they thought illegal immigration had increased in recent years.

[Figures 11 and 12 About Here]

From the data presented in Figures 11 and 12, it is clear that law enforcement command staff across all three levels of government addressed in this survey (county, city, and state) believe that money laundering and computer crimes have increased over the past five years. One hundred percent of the state police and the large city respondents, and 83 percent of the respondents form the randomly drawn agencies, said that these crimes had increased in their jurisdiction in recent years.

[Figure 13 About Here]

One third of the respondents representing the random sample of agencies said that international threats to homeland security had increased in their jurisdiction (Figure 13). About two thirds of the respondents form the state police (67 percent) and the large cities (71 percent) perceived an increase in local crimes related to international terrorism.

Level Of Transnational Crime Activity

As can be seen in the survey instrument (Appendix A), we asked a series of questions about transnational crime investigations and arrests. If any were noted, we asked questions about whether foreign nationals were involved (and if so, their country of origin) and whether foreign terrorist or criminal organizations were involved (and if so, their names). Of all the major issues addressed in this survey, the data on the number of arrests, investigations, foreign organized crime, and the country of origin for foreign nationals involved are the weakest. The major obstacles are structural and procedural: Some of the crimes addressed in this survey are not recorded by local law enforcement agencies, but are instead referred to federal agencies. Arrests and other data on these incidents are not always recorded locally. In other cases, criminal codes and data recording systems do not adequately distinguish transnational crimes from local variations of the same activity. For example, police in many locales record cases of human trafficking for sexual exploitation as prostitution, either because they have not established sufficiently that the illegal activity is part of a larger trafficking enterprise or because they are trained only to record the violation of local criminal

codes and to leave the possible international connections to federal agencies. In some locations, prostitution by trafficked persons is referred to federal agencies such as the INS and the FBI and would not appear in local crime records at all. Furthermore, even when arrest data on transnational crime exists, it is not always easily accessible to staff or aggregated in a way helpful for our survey. Finally, many agencies do not compile aggregate statistics on investigations, especially those categorized by crime type.

Given these limitations, we believe the best use of the arrest and investigation data is to collapse them into dichotomous variables, where agencies either do or do not report instances of activity in each crime type. This solution is supported by information provided by our respondents. They would often say with confidence whether there was a presence or absence of arrests or investigations into a particular type of crime, but when pressed to estimate the number would say they could only guess, or would provide a wide range and express doubt about the numbers they just provided.

Figures 14 and 15 present the percent of jurisdictions with arrests and investigations, respectively, for each of the major types of transnational crime addressed in our survey. Across almost all crime types and sub samples, we were struck by the prevalence of transnational crime activity. For example, we expected international drug trafficking to be widespread, but did not expect to see that nearly all state and local agencies were conducting investigations into transnational computer crime.

[Figures 14-15 About Here]

When respondents said their agencies had conducted investigations or made arrests for international crimes, we asked them to report whether the persons arrested or investigated were foreign nationals, and if so, their countries of origin. We are convinced that the data do not support any kind of estimate of prevalence or incidence regarding foreign origins or connections. Some respondents would say the preferred not to comment about investigations, citing due process concerns and not wanting to publicly implicate any people or nations. Other respondents said that they did not know the country of origin; in some of

these instances, and some would then mention a region or continent (e.g., "somewhere in the Mid-East," "South America"). Some would say they had the ability to determine specific countries of origin, but once the international nature of the crime became apparent the cases were referred to federal authorities and their own investigations would cease. Given the extent of missing data and the lack of specificity or confidence in the responses we gathered, we do not report on foreign nationals associated with arrests or investigations for transnational crime.

[Figure 16 About Here]

We asked whether people arrested or investigated for transnational crime were associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization, and if so, the names of the organizations. The data received has weaknesses similar to those regarding the information gathered about foreign nationals and their countries of origin: most respondents did not know, refused to answer, or accompanied their answers with expressions of doubt. Nevertheless, we provide a sampling of some of the responses in Figure 16, primarily to illustrate why we believe the data are suspect. As can be seen here, some respondents said "the Mafia," either unspecified or associated with certain countries (e.g., the "Russian Mafia"). Others said "a drug cartel" or a "crime organization" from a specific country or region, and a few said Al Queda or some other specific organization. While some of these responses appear perfectly legitimate (although in some cases vague), others are more suspect. For example, the Latin Kings is regarded primarily as an American organization (although some would argue they street gangs, even large ones with relatively coherent structures, are too loosely formed to be regarded as organized), originating in Chicago in the 1940s. However, there have been efforts to globalize, and local law enforcement may know that local chapters are engaged in transnational drug trafficking, for example, and thus refer to the Latin Kings as an international organization. The KKK is distinctly American and probably should not be mentioned as an international crime organization (particularly when considering their xenophobia), but one can speculate that respondents meant the Aryan Nation or other white supremacist groups whose activities and organization cross national boundaries.

While the data do not support analyses that would provide a coherent profile of foreign countries and organizations linked to crimes addressed by U.S. state and local law enforcement, we gathered enough anecdotes to suggest that transnational crime can originate virtually anywhere and reach nearly anywhere in the U.S. For example, one Western jurisdiction noted an ongoing problem with poaching to provide bear gall bladders to illicit markets in Asia. In one small, inland Southern city, police identified suspected Russian Mafia operatives engaged in local trafficking in stolen auto parts, with some of the illicit revenue sent abroad.

Local Law Enforcement Resources Devoted To Preventing And Responding To Transnational Crime

To provide a measure of local resources devoted to addressing transnational crime, we asked respondents to report the full-time equivalent (FTE) staff positions devoted to preventing or responding to transnational crime. We used FTEs rather than ask for names of particular positions or individuals since it is common for agencies to staff squads and task forces with portions of people's time. For example, officers may be on a drug task force that consumes about 20 percent of their time, and the remainder of their time is spent in normal patrol. A five-person task force may thus consume one FTE, and the total labor burden of the task force expressed as equivalent to one full-time position accurately depicts the human resources devoted to the task force.

As can be seen in Figure 17, all of the respondents from the sample of the 25 largest cities said their department has at least one FTE devoted to transnational crime, and 55 percent have six or more FTEs so deployed. More than half of the random sample of local agencies has no staff devoted to transnational crime, and about 40 percent have five or fewer FTEs

similarly deployed. Most state police agencies have at least one FTE focused on transnational crime, and 50 percent have six or more.

We also asked whether agencies had special units, squads, or task forces devoted to transnational crime (Figure 18). The vast majority of large cities (83 percent) and state police (95 percent) departments have at least one special in-house units addressing transnational crime. About half of the random sample of agencies reported having such units.

[Figures 17-18 About Here]

Those agencies reporting having special units were asked to name them. The data will support some degree of categorization into groups by crime type, although there are some challenges in doing so. For example, some units cross crime types, such as "special investigations unit," "special ops," and "special tactics and response." Others are more easily identifiable as focusing on a certain range of crimes, but since there are no naming conventions in use by separate law enforcement agencies there is still ambiguity. In further analysis of these data involving crime-specific designations of special units, decision rules must be established in determining what crimes are addressed by units with certain names. At this stage of our analysis, we are limited to providing an illustrative list of units, squads, and task forces (Figure 19).

[Figure 19 About Here]

Collaboration and Communication with Other Law Enforcement Agencies

Case Referral to Federal Agencies and Regional Task Forces

To explore the communication and cooperation occurring among law enforcement agencies at different levels of government, we asked respondents whether their agency had referred cases of each major type of transnational crime addressed in the survey to federal agencies or

regional task forces in the previous year. Those responding affirmatively were asked to identify the agencies or task forces. Figure 20 presents an overview of referral of cases to all federal agencies and regional task forces, broken down by crime type and sub sample.

[Figure 20 About Here]

As can be seen here, referral of cases from local and state law enforcement to federal agencies and task forces is highly prevalent. The proportion of agencies referring cases to the federal and regional levels closely follows the proportion reporting investigations for most types of international crime type (Figure 14), suggesting that local agencies usually refer their international cases to at least one agency outside of the state. In fact, the prevalence of referrals for some types of crime is greater than the prevalence of investigations. For example, while 50 percent of the large cities and 25 percent of state agencies indicated conducting investigations for weapons trafficking, 75 percent of the large cities and 50 percent of the state agencies had referred international weapons cases to federal agencies and regional task forces. This suggests that respondents were defining the term "investigations" rather formally, and that state and local agencies may summarily refer cases to federal agencies that are no more than reported cases or those that have had only preliminary investigation.

[Table 2 About Here]

Table 2 presents the agencies to which state and federal law enforcement organizations refer cases of known or suspected transnational crime. It is important to note here that the referrals to state police were made by local law enforcement only, while referrals to local and regional task forces and all federal agencies include referrals from both state and local agencies. In Table 2, "Local Task Force" refers to task forces and other formal, collaborative groups formed by city and county law enforcement agencies, usually of adjacent jurisdictions.

The major task forces (except the local regional task forces, listed separately) mentioned by respondents include High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), composed of a mixture of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. There are currently 26 designated HIDTA regions in the U.S., such as the Washington/Baltimore HIDTA comprised of over 40 agencies across all levels of government. Some agencies have referred cases to Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), of which 66 currently operate in the U.S. In addition, many respondents mentioned referring cases to Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (ATTFs). In the aftermath of September 11 Attorney General Ashcroft, following an Executive Order from President Bush, issued a directive for each U.S. Attorney to establish an ATTF. While there are 93 United States Attorneys stationed throughout the United States and U.S. Territories, we do not know how many currently have successfully implemented fully functional ATTFs.

As can be seen in Table 2, we found that local and state law enforcement organizations routinely report or refer transnational cases to at least one federal agency and/or regional task force, and local agencies reported all types to state police.

Providing Information to Federal Agencies or Regional Task Forces

In addition to asking about referring particular cases to federal agencies, regional task forces, etc., we sought to learn whether state and local agencies provided such agencies and task forces with information about transnational crime that was not necessarily associated with any particular case. As seen in Figure 21, the prevalence of this information sharing varies across crime types. While just 18 percent of agencies indicated upward sharing of information about illicit trafficking in art, animal products, or intellectual property, nearly all agencies provided information about drug trafficking (94 percent) and three fourths of the responding agencies provided information about illegal immigration (78 percent) and computer crime (75 percent).

[Figure 21 About Here]

Receiving Alerts from Federal Agencies or Regional Task Forces

While the questions about referral of cases and the provision of information were meant to assess the upward flow of information from the local and state level to the regional and national level, we also wanted to learn about information flowing in the opposite direction. From our pretest and focus group, we identified as an issue of local concern alerts put forth by federal agencies, with many law enforcement leaders expressing a desire for more meaningful information in alerts and advisories. In our instrument development work and in the literature review, we also heard about widespread dissatisfaction with the DHS Homeland Security Advisory System (sometimes referred to as the terror alert levels). Most of the feedback suggested that local agencies had not yet developed protocols for responding to particular alert levels, and that few individual officers were given concrete things to look out for or actions to take. Given this, we chose to focus on alerts rather than other forms of communication from federal and regional levels down to state and local levels. To keep discussions about the Homeland Security Advisory System from dominating the interviews and preventing us from learning about other types of alerts, we asked respondents about their agencies receiving "specific alerts beyond color codes from federal agencies or regional task forces" for each type of transnational crime.

Figure 22 presents data on state and local law enforcement agencies receiving alerts over the previous year for each crime type. As can be seen here, alerts from federal and regional levels are not as prevalent as the flow of information from state and local levels upward. The only crime type in which the prevalence of downward alerts exceeded the prevalence of upward information flow was crime related to homeland security (62 percent versus 44 percent, respectively).

[Figure 22 About Here]

Sharing Information with Other Local and State Agencies

In addition to the vertical exchange of information about each type of transnational crime across levels of government, we also designed the survey to gather information about horizontal or lateral exchange of information among state and local agencies. The pattern of

lateral informational sharing across crime types is similar to that seen in the upward referral of cases and the downward alerts issued by federal and regional law enforcement organizations. As can be seen in Figure 23, most state and local agencies indicated that they had shared information about drug trafficking (84 percent) and computer crime (64 percent) with other local and state agencies in the prior year. Less than half of agencies shared information about illegal immigration (40 percent), weapons trafficking (41 percent), or crimes related to homeland security (47 percent). Relatively few agencies said they shared information laterally about illicit trafficking in humans (23 percent), art, animal products, or intellectual property (21 percent), or about computer crimes (29 percent).

[Figure 23 About Here]

Working with Foreign Agencies or International Organizations

For each crime type, we also asked respondents whether their agency had worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations (either alone or with a federal partner) in the previous year. Figure 24 shows the percent of agencies in our sample reported to have worked with foreign agencies and organizations regarding each type of transnational crime. Clearly, cooperation with foreign organizations is rare, ranging from two percent (trafficking in weapons, art, animal products, intellectual property) to nine percent (drug trafficking) of the state and local agencies sampled.

[Figure 24 About Here]

Taken together, the information about upward, downward, and lateral information flow and cooperation suggests great variation across agencies. One of the primary determinants of this variation is local crime activity. Most respondents said that they had acceptable or good communication flow with the federal agencies and task forces addressing their priority crime issues, while the quality of cooperation with agencies with which they communication less frequently or those addressing lower priority crimes is less consistent. There were diverging opinions expressed about INS, in particular. Several respondents said that they have profound local illegal immigration issues, but that INS is so unresponsive that they no longer

make arrests for illegal immigration or refer such cases to them. Other respondents offered completely opposite opinions, saying that they had an excellent relationship with INS and that they were quite responsive. A common complaint about federal agencies is that they are eager to accept information from local law enforcement, and more than willing to accept help when it suits them, but that they seldom reciprocate with useful, actionable information or with other forms of assistance.

After crime issues, the level and quality of communication were attributed mainly to the personalities and working relationships between the individuals involved. In some cases, poor communication could be traced to past people and events and had become institutionalized. Several respondents recalled instances where they asked for help or were working with a federal agency, had a bad experience (usually, feeling that the federal agencies were unresponsive to their needs and /or were arrogant and condescending to local law enforcement), and resolved to have minimal future contact with the particular federal agencies.

Perceived Resource Needs

In addition to examining the levels, perceived seriousness, resources, and interagency cooperation concerning transnational crime, we asked respondents to indicate the resources they believed their agency would need to "prevent and respond to threats to homeland security or other international crime" in their jurisdiction. In our survey instrument development process, focus group and pretest participants made it clear that if we asked whether agencies currently had sufficient resources everyone would say "no," and if we asked whether additional resources were needed everyone would say "yes."

To address the expectation that all respondents would like more resources and believe they would be helpful, while pursuing our interest in what resources were considered of higher priority, we presented respondents a list of resources and asked them to indicate the "percentage increase in each of these resources you think you would need to prevent and respond to threats to homeland security or other international crime in your jurisdiction." The resources listed were (1) personnel, (2) training, (3) equipment, and levels of

cooperation with (4) federal, (5) state, (6) local, and (7) foreign law enforcement. Figure 25 presents the perceived need for increases in each of these kinds of resource, broken down by sub sample. Across most of the kinds of resources, respondents from large city agencies expressed the need for the greatest proportional increases, while state law enforcement indicated the need for the smallest increases. By a substantial margin, responding agencies cited the greatest need for personnel, training, and equipment to effectively address transnational crime, and indicated a need for relatively modest increases in additional inter-agency cooperation.

[Figure 25 About Here]

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Tables and Figures

[Attached File]

Appendices

Appendix A Questionnaire. [Attached File]

Appendix B Initial Contact Letter [Attached File]

Appendix C Follow-up Letter [Attached File]

Table 1: Sample

	Contacted	Responded	Response Rate
25 Largest Cities	25	12	**48%**
State Police	50	20	**40%**
Random Sample	175	152	**87%**
Total	**250**	**184**	**74%**

Figure 1: States Represented in Sample



Figure 2: Large Cities in Sample



Figure 3: State Police in Sample



Figure 4: Law Enforcement Concern About Transnational Crime



Figure 5: Perceived Citizen Concern About Transnational Crime



Figure 6: Perceived Trend: Human Trafficking



Figure 7: Perceived Trend: Weapons Trafficking



Figure 8: Perceived Trend: Drug Trafficking



Figure 9: Perceived Trend: Art, Animal, Intellectual Property



Figure 10: Perceived Trend: Illegal Immigration



Figure 11: Perceived Trend: Money Laundering



Figure 12: Perceived Trend: Computer Crime



Figure 13: Perceived Trend: Homeland Security



Figure 14: Percent of Jurisdictions with Investigations For Transnational Crimes



Figure 15: Percent of Jurisdictions with Arrests For Transnational Crimes



Figure 16: Crime and Terrorist Organizations Mentioned

- Drug cartel from ____ (country)
- Gangs
- Mafia
- Crime organization from ____
- Not sure
- Al Qaeda
- Russian Mafia
- Israeli Mafia
- Latin Kings
- Bloods
- KKK

Figure 17: FTEs Devoted to Transnational Crime

Figure 18: Agencies with In-House Special Units, Squads, Task Forces



Figure 19: Units, Squads, Task Forces

- **Counter-terrorism**
  - Domestic security task force
  - Counter terrorism team
  - Terrorism unit
  - Terrorist intelligence unit
  - Anti-terrorism unit
  - Homeland security task force
  - Homeland threat assessment
  - Special assistant for homeland security
- **Russian organized crime unit**
- **Port Security**
- **Drug task force**
  - E.g., narcotic enforcement team
- **WMD preparedness**
- **Special investigations**
- **Special ops**
- **Special tactics and response**
- **Computer investigations**

Figure 20: Percent Referring Cases to Federal Agencies or Regional Task Forces



Table 2: To Whom Local and State Agencies Report, by Crime type

AGENCY	Human Traff	Arms	Drug	Other Goods	Illeg Immig	$ Laund	Computer	Home Sec
FBI		X				X	X	X
ATF		X						
DEA		X	X			X		
INS	X		X		X			
Customs			X					
Secret Service						X		X
ATTF	X				X			X
JTTF	X				X			X
Local TaskForce	X		X				X	
State Police	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
HIDTA			X					
Border Patrol	X				X			
IRS						X		
Attorney General						X		
County Prosecutor							X	
US Army		X						

Figure 21: Percent Providing Information to Federal Agencies or Regional Task Forces



Figure 22: Percent Receiving Alerts from Federal Agencies or Regional Task Forces



Figure 23: Percent Sharing Information with Other Local or State Agencies



Figure 24: Percent Working with Foreign Agencies or International Organizations



Figure 25: Percent Increase Needed to Prevent and Respond to Transnational Crime



OMB No. 1121-0265
EXP: 05/31/2003

TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY

Abt Associates Inc., for the National Institute of Justice

INTRODUCTION TO BE READ BY TELEPHONE INTERVIEWER

Hello, I am _____ of Abt Associates, and we are conducting a study for the U.S. Department of Justice on the extent of state and local law enforcement involvement in fighting crimes related to homeland security and other types of international crime. While crimes involving the cross-border transfer of illicit products or services, or those instigated by foreign criminal or terrorist organizations are usually prosecuted at the federal level, uncovering and investigating them may often involve the time and effort of state and local law enforcement. This survey attempts to measure the extent of that burden on your organization.

Your (police department/Sheriff's department/agency) has been selected from among approximately 17,000 U.S. law enforcement departments and agencies to participate in this study. The survey will take approximately **30** minutes. The results are intended to inform the development of effective programs to fight international crime at state and local levels.

The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential: No specific law enforcement departments or individuals will be cited in any reports produced by this survey. **Your participation is completely voluntary**: **you may decline to answer any particular question, or stop altogether at any time.** Your refusal to participate will not jeopardize your relationship with the Federal Government or with your department or agency.

If you have questions about the study or about your participation in it, information for contacting Abt Associates researchers will be provided [Michael Shively at 617-520-3562, Sarah Kuck at 617-520-2998, or Dana Hunt at 617-349-2733]. Please note that these are toll calls.

May we begin the survey now? [If not, ask to arrange for a more convenient time. If the respondent wants to continue, read the following statement required by OMB]

Paperwork Reduction Act Notice. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, we cannot ask you to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. We try to create forms and instructions that are accurate, can be easily understood, and which impose the least possible burden on you to provide us with information. The estimated average time to complete and file this application is 30 minutes per application. If you have comments regarding the accuracy of this estimate, or suggestions for making this form simpler, you can write to Michael Shively or Sarah Kuck at Abt Associates, 55 Wheeler St, Cambridge MA 02138. The OMB control number for this questionnaire is **1121-0265.**

Working Definitions and Examples of International Crime

International crime is not an exact legal term, but it has come to mean criminal activities extending into and violating the laws of more than one country. Most international crime involves the cross-border transfer of illicit products, services, or information, and is often driven by organized criminal groups or terrorist organizations. This survey is particularly interested in several international crimes we will describe to you in a moment. Some of these crimes – such as trafficking in weapons– have local counterparts, but please remember that this survey is only interested in these crimes to the extent that they have international connections.

For this survey, we are interested in the following:

A. Crimes Related to Homeland Security (International Terrorism)

E.g., foreign organizations attempting to disrupt or destroy domestic infrastructure; threatening or killing American citizens and residents.

B. Various kinds of international trafficking, including illicit trade in:

- humans (for forced labor or sexual exploitation)
- weapons (biological weapons, firearms, munitions, or components of weapons)
- drugs
- other, including
    - stolen art or artifacts
    - endangered animals or animal parts and products
    - stolen intellectual property (e.g., pirated CDs, counterfeit clothes or watches, other trademarked materials)

C. Illegal immigration

D. Computer Crimes Reaching Across International Boundaries

- Money laundering
- Other, including
    - Identity and information theft
    - Unauthorized access, sabotage, viruses (“hacking”)
    - Internet commerce in child pornography
    - Theft and illicit transmission of intellectual property (music, books, patented materials)

E. Other international crime (open-ended, respondent provides)

Opportunities will be provided for respondent to address any international crimes of local concern, for example, extortion, corruption, bribery, or fraud occurring across international boundaries or in support of other international crime or terrorism.

SECTION A: INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENT, ORGANIZATION, AND JURISDICTION

Name_____ **Date**_____/_____/_____

Jurisdiction_____

Law Enforcement Agency_____

1. Which of the following best describes your position in the agency or department? **[Circle or Mark the appropriate response category]**

1 Chief
2 Superintendent
3 Sheriff
4 Captain
5 Lieutenant
6 Investigator
7 Crime analyst
8 Other **[SPECIFY]** _____

2.a. How many years have you held this position in this department/agency?

[enter number of years] _____

[If 2.a. is less than 1 year, ask 2.b and 2.c]

2.b. Previous position? _____

2.c. Previous agency/department? _____

3. How many total years of experience do you have in law enforcement?

[enter number of years] _____

SECTION B: INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES IN YOUR JURISDICTION

In the next section of the survey, we will ask several questions about crime occurring in your jurisdiction within the past year, and a few questions about crime trends occurring over the past 5 years:

1.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Trafficking in humans for labor and sexual exploitation*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 1.B.; if 0, skip to 1.D.]**

_____

1.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Trafficking in humans for labor and sexual exploitation*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 1.D,; if 1 or more, ask 1.C.]**

_____

1.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____
_____

1.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Trafficking in humans for labor and sexual exploitation*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 1.E.; if 0, skip to 1.G.]**

_____

1.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Trafficking in humans for labor and sexual exploitation*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 1.G,; if 1 or more, ask 1.F.]**

_____

1.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

1.G. **[If 1.A or 1.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Trafficking in humans for labor and sexual exploitation*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

1.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____
_____

1.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Trafficking in humans for labor and sexual exploitation*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

2.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 2.B.; if 0, skip to 2.D.]**

_____

2.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 2.D,; if 1 or more, ask 2.C.]**

_____

2.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____

_____

2.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 2.E.; if 0, skip to 2.G.]**

_____

2.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 2.G,; if 1 or more, ask 2.F.]**

_____

2.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

2.G. **[If 2.A or 2.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

___ Yes ___ No

2.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____

_____

2.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

3.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Trafficking in drugs*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 3.B.; if 0, skip to 3.D.]**

_____

3.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Trafficking in drugs*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? [**Record number; if 0, skip to 3.D,; if 1 or more, ask 3.C.]**

_____

3.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____

_____

3.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Trafficking in drugs*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 3.E.; if 0, skip to 3.G.]**

_____

3.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Trafficking in drugs*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 3.G,; if 1 or more, ask 3.F.]**

_____

3.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

3.G. **[If 3.A or 3.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Trafficking in drugs*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

3.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____

_____

3.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Trafficking in drugs*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

4.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 4.B.; if 0, skip to 4.D.]**

_____

4.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? [**Record number; if 0, skip to 4.D,; if 1 or more, ask 4.C.]**

_____

4.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____

_____

4.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 4.E.; if 0, skip to 4.G.]**

_____

4.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 4.G,; if 1 or more, ask 4.F.]**

_____

4.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

4.G. **[If 4.A or 4.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

4.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____

_____

4.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

5.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Illegal immigration*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 5.B.; if 0, skip to 5.D.]**

_____

5.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Illegal immigration*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? [**Record number; if 0, skip to 5.D,; if 1 or more, ask 5.C.]**

_____

5.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____

_____

5.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Illegal immigration*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 5.E.; if 0, skip to 5.G.]**

_____

5.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Illegal immigration*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 5.G,; if 1 or more, ask 5.F.]**

_____

5.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

5.G. **[If 5.A or 5.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Illegal immigration*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

5.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____

_____

5.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Illegal immigration*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

6.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Money laundering*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 6.B.; if 0, skip to 6.D.]**

_____

6.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Money laundering*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 6.D,; if 1 or more, ask 6.C.]**

_____

6.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____
_____

6.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Money laundering*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 6.E.; if 0, skip to 6.G.]**

_____

6.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Money laundering*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 6.G,; if 1 or more, ask 6.F.]**

_____

6.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

6.G. **[If 6.A or 6.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Money laundering*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

6.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____
_____

6.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Money laundering*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

7.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 7.B.; if 0, skip to 7.D.]**

_____

7.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 7.D,; if 1 or more, ask 7.C.]**

_____

7.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____
_____

7.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 7.E.; if 0, skip to 7.G.]**

_____

7.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 7.G,; if 1 or more, ask 7.F.]**

_____

7.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

7.G. **[If 7.A or 7.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

7.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____
_____

7.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

8.A. To the best of your knowledge, how many investigations for ***Crimes related to homeland security*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year. **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 8.B.; if 0, skip to 8.D.]**

_____

8.B. To the best of your knowledge, how many of the investigations for ***Crimes related to homeland security*** involved foreign nationals as suspects? [**Record number; if 0, skip to 8.D,; if 1 or more, ask 8.C.]**

_____

8.C. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals investigated? **[List all countries mentioned]**

_____
_____

8.D. To the best of your knowledge, how many arrests for ***Crimes related to homeland security*** have been made in your jurisdiction in the past year? **[If the number is greater than 0, ask 8.E.; if 0, skip to 8.G.]**

_____

8.E. To the best of your knowledge, how many individuals arrested for ***Crimes related to homeland security*** were foreign nationals? **[Record number; if 0, skip to 8.G,; if 1 or more, ask 8.F.]**

_____

8.F. What were the countries of origin of the foreign nationals arrested?

_____

8.G. **[If 8.A or 8.D. is greater than 0]** To the best of your knowledge, were the individuals investigated or arrested for ***Crimes related to homeland security*** associated with a known foreign terrorist group or criminal organization?

☐ Yes ☐ No

8.H. If "Yes," which groups or organizations? **[List all mentioned]**

_____
_____

8.I. To the best of your knowledge, is ***Crimes related to homeland security*** increasing, decreasing, or occurring at about the same rate over the past 5 years in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or Mark response category]**

Increasing	**1**
Occuring at about the same rate	**2**
Decreasing	**3**
Don't Know	**4**

SECTION C: LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO TERRORISM AND OTHER TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

1. Does your agency have in-house special units, squads, or task forces designed specifically for threats to homeland security or other international crimes?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If No, skip to 2]**

[If yes] List the name of the unit and tell us which types of crime it is designed to address:

Name of Unit, Squad, or Task Force		**International Crime Addressed**	
1.A.i.		**1.A.ii.**	
1.B.i.		**1.B.ii.**	
1.C.i.		**1.C.ii.**	
1.D.i.		**1.D.ii.**	

2. Does your agency collaborate with other agencies in special units, squads, or task forces designed specifically for threats to homeland security or other international crimes?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If No, skip to 3]**

[If yes] List the name of the unit and tell us which types of crime it is designed to address:

Name of Unit, Squad, or Task Force		**Affiliated Agency**		**International Crime Addressed**	
1.A.i.		**1.A.ii.**		**1.A.iii.**	
1.B.i.		**1.B.ii.**		**1.B.iii.**	
1.C.i.		**1.C.ii.**		**1.C.iii.**	
1.D.i.		**1.D.ii.**		**1.D.iii.**	

3a. In the past two years, has your agency received special training to help you distinguish domestic crimes from those with international connections?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If No, skip to 4]**

3b. **[If yes]** From what source? **[Mark all that apply]**

☐ Internal training ☐ External source(s) **[If external, answer 3c]**

3c. **[If external]** name all agencies or organizations providing the training] _____

_____

_____

4. Does your agency have protocols or guidelines for referring cases of threats to homeland security or other international crimes to federal or foreign law enforcement agencies?

☐ Yes ☐ No

5. In the past year, estimate the number of FTEs your agency devoted to addressing threats to homeland security or other international crimes (e.g., include all hours spent in investigation, interdiction, training, prevention).

_____ **[Enter number]**

6. Are there any additional resources your agency needs to prevent and respond to threats to homeland security and other international crimes?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 8]**

7. We will read a short list of different kinds of law enforcement resources, and we would like you to tell us ***what percentage increase in each of these*** resources you think you would need to prevent and respond to threats to homeland security or other international crime in your jurisdiction:

		% Increase	**Don't Know**
A.	Personnel	_____	_____
B.	Training	_____	_____
C.	Equipment	_____	_____
D.	Level of cooperation with Federal law enforcement	_____	_____
E.	Level of cooperation with State law enforcement	_____	_____
F.	Level of cooperation with other local law enforcement	_____	_____
G.	Level of cooperation with foreign law enforcement	_____	_____

8. In the past year, approximately how many arrests of foreign nationals have been made in your jurisdiction?
[*note to interviewer: this question is NOT restricted to transnational crime*]

[enter number of foreign nationals arrested] ☐

SECTION D: QUESTIONS ADDRESSING LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONES TO THREATS TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CRIME

1.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in humans for labor or sexual exploitation***?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 1.C.]**

1.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

1.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in humans for labor or sexual exploitation***?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 1.E.]**

1.D. [**If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

1.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in humans for labor or sexual exploitation***?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 1.G.]**

1.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

1.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Trafficking in humans for labor or sexual exploitation***?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 1.I.]**

1.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

1.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Trafficking in humans for labor or sexual exploitation***?

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 2.A.]**

1.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

2.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 2.C.]**

2.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

2.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 2.E.]**

2.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

2.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 2.G.]**

1.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

2.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 2.I.]**

2.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

2.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Trafficking in arms, munitions, biological weapons, or WMD?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 3.A.]**

2.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

3.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in drugs?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 3.C.]**

3.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

3.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in drugs?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 3.E.]**

3.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

3.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in drugs?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 3.G.]**

3.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

3.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Trafficking in drugs?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 3.I.]**

3.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

3.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Trafficking in drugs?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 4.A.]**

3.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

4.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 4.C.]**

4.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

4.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 4.E.]**

4.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

4.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 4.G.]**

4.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

4.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 4.I.]**

4.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

4.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Trafficking in other goods, such as stolen art, endangered species, or intellectual property?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 5.A.]**

4.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

5.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Illegal immigration?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 5.C.]**

5.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

5.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Illegal immigration?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 5.E.]**

5.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

5.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Illegal immigration?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 5.G.]**

5.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

5.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Illegal immigration?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 5.I.]**

5.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

5.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Illegal immigration?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 6.A.]**

5.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

6.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Money laundering?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 6.C.]**

6.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

6.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Money laundering?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 6.E.]**

6.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

6.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Money laundering?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 6.G.]**

6.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

6.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Money laundering?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 6.I.]**

6.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

6.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Money laundering?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 7.A.]**

6.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

7.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 7.C.]**

7.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

7.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 7.E.]**

7.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

7.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 7.G.]**

7.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

7.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 7.I.]**

7.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

7.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***Computer crime, such as unauthorized access to networks, viruses, identity or information theft, and child pornography?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 8.A.]**

7.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

8.A. In the past year, have you **referred cases** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***other crimes related to homeland security?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 8.C.]**

8.B. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

1.C. In the past year, have you **provided information** to Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***other crimes related to homeland security?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 8.E.]**

8.D. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

8.E. In the past year, have you **received specific alerts beyond color codes** from Federal agencies or regional task forces involving ***other crimes related to homeland security?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 8.G.]**

8.F. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

8.G. In the past year, have you **shared information** with other local or state law enforcement agencies involving ***other crimes related to homeland security?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to 8.I.]**

8.H. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

8.I. In the past year, has your agency worked with foreign law enforcement agencies or international organizations either alone or with a federal partner involving ***other crimes related to homeland security?***

☐ Yes ☐ No **[If no, skip to Section E]**

8.J. **[If yes]** Which agency or task force?

_____
_____

SECTION E: CONCERN ABOUT TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN YOUR JURISDICTION

1. In your opinion, to what extent are crimes related to homeland defense and other international crimes such as those we've discussed (EXCLUDING drug trafficking) considered by the citizens of your jurisdiction? **[Circle or mark response category]**

1 = not a problem
2 = a minor problem
3 = a serious problem
4 = a critical problem
5 = Don't Know

2. In your opinion, to what extent are crimes related to homeland defense and other international crimes such as those we've discussed (EXCLUDING drug trafficking) considered by the law enforcement officers in your jurisdiction? **[Circle or mark response category]**

1 = not a problem
2 = a minor problem
3 = a serious problem
4 = a critical problem
5 = Don't Know

3. In your opinion, how prepared is your agency to respond to homeland security issues? **[Circle or mark response category]**

1 = very well prepared
2 = well prepared
3 = adequately prepared
4 = somewhat unprepared
5 = very unprepared
6= Don't Know

SECTION F: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Is there any additional information about terrorism, other transnational crimes, or how law enforcement agencies respond to them that has not been covered in the survey, but that you think is important for us to know? (open ended, record response)

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Thank you for participating. The information you provided will be very helpful. If you have questions about the study or wish to add information, please feel free to contact us at 617-520-3562 (Michael Shively), 617-520-2998 (Sarah Kuck), or 617-349-2733 (Dana Hunt).

DATE

DEPARTMENT

Dear TITLE & NAME:

The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the Department of Justice, has contracted with Abt Associates to conduct a survey of a random sample of law enforcement agencies across the country regarding their experiences in dealing with transnational crimes. This survey is an information gathering exercise and not designed to look at any one agency or area, but rather to develop a better understanding about the local and state response to crimes that have cross-border implications and origins. By transnational crime we mean crimes such as terrorist activities, money laundering, identify fraud, trafficking in drugs, persons or artifacts. While some of these crimes may be outside of the local jurisdiction, like terrorism, NIJ is aware that local and state law enforcement is often the first identification point for these activities. The kinds of questions we would like to ask you would include:

- To what degree is your local law enforcement impacted by international crime?
- Who are the offenders (e.g., foreign born, local, etc.) and what types of international crime are typically committed?
- What resources are available to jurisdictions to help combat international crime and address homeland security issues?
- To what extent has working with Federal agencies helped combat international crime?
- What (if any) partnerships have been forged with Federal or foreign agencies to tackle the problem?

Our survey will focus on numerous crime types: threats to homeland security; trafficking in humans, arms, and drugs; illegal immigration; money laundering; and certain types of computer crime. In addition, the survey will explore communication between local police agencies and federal agencies.

Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may refuse to answer any of the questions at any time during the survey. The survey will take approximately 30 minutes to complete via telephone, and the information you provide will be kept strictly confidential. We are not gathering detailed statistical information. Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated and we will be happy to provide you with a copy of the survey and a summary of its results.

I will be contacting you shortly, but if you have any questions please contact me at **617-349-2750**; Dana Hunt, Ph.D. at 617-349-2733;or Michael Shively, Ph.D. 617-520-3562.

Sincerely,
Jazmin Kellis
Research Assistant

memorandum

Justice

Abt Associates Inc.

Date June 19, 2003

To

From Jazmin Kellis, Research Assistant

Subject Department of Justice Survey

As mentioned in previous correspondences, the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the Department of Justice, has contracted with Abt Associates (www.abtassoc.com) to conduct a survey of a random sample of law enforcement agencies across the country regarding their experiences in dealing with transnational crimes. **The Office of Management and Budget control number for this survey is: 1121-0265.**

Although we have attempted to contact you on numerous occasions, we have not yet set up a time to do the interview. This letter was sent in order to find out why. If it is a matter of time, please note that we are more than able to accommodate your needs by doing the interview in blocks or with various knowledgeable personnel. If you are just unsure of the material in the survey and its purpose, I would be more than happy to send you some additional information as well as speak with you in order to allay these concerns. Otherwise, let's set up a time to conduct this important data collection!

Please contact me at your earliest convenience: Jazmin Kellis (voice) 617-349-2750, email: jazmin_kellis@abtassoc.com, Michael Shively, Ph.D. 617-349-2733, or Dana Hunt, Ph.D. 617-520-3562.

Thank you,
Jazmin Kellis, Research Assistant