BALTIMORE'S COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: A CASE STUDY

Prepared for
The National Institute of Justice

March 25, 2004

BOTEC Analysis
CORPORATION

By:
Jeffrey A. Roth
George L. Kelling

Table of Contents

Overview

The story of the Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program has its historical roots in community organizing around housing problems with a heavy focus on problem-solving through sophisticated and, for Baltimore at least, time-tested legal processes. The centrality of housing and neighborhoods is not surprising: Baltimore has a unique style of row houses which lend themselves to a "domino" process once any of them are allowed to deteriorate or are abandoned. Moreover, the existence of "back houses" on lots—houses that face alley-like streets—and the warren-like paths between many of the houses and lots contribute to the vulnerability of many neighborhoods to drug dealing and drug houses. Virtually all elements of Baltimore's efforts in CCP can be linked in one way or another to the issues of community organizing and housing. Baltimore is a test of the strategy that community-organizing can be the lynch pin of a community's attempts to restore order, prevent crime, and improve the quality of urban life.

Baltimore is one of America's historic cities. Originally a port and industrial city, it is now one of the nation's research and medical centers, with a significant tourist, shopping, and sports center in its redeveloped Inner Harbor area. Beyond the Inner Harbor and commercial downtown, however, the current configuration of Baltimore's crime problem is intimately linked to its history. Like many other northeastern cities, its unique and historic housing stock gives the city charm yet, in light of social, economic, and demographic changes, burdened the city with a plethora of marginal and abandoned homes. These homes, in turn, became breeding grounds for disorder, fear, drug sales and use, and serious crime, creating what Wesley Skogan has called "the spiral of urban decay."

Over half of Baltimore's housing stock consists of row-houses, most of which were constructed during the late 1800s on streets laid out in a typical grid pattern. As port operations and shipbuilding have declined over decades, Baltimore's population has dwindled—from 950,000 in 1950 to 712,000 in 1995. As one assistant prosecutor said, hyperbolizing only slightly, "300,000 people moved away, and they didn't take their houses with them." The resulting excess housing stock, estimated currently at 19,000 units by city officials, has created a spawning ground for urban problems. The spiral of urban decay is clear: houses are abandoned; furniture and trash are strewn in public spaces; "metal men"–looters who strip copper from abandoned houses and sell it—make housing reclamation either impossible or prohibitively expensive; abandoned houses become "crack houses" or are used for other illicit purposes; struggles for control of drug dealing turf lead to intimidation and shootings; and more residents abandon houses.

Baltimore's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) and its core program elements have their origins in Baltimore's attempt to interrupt this spiral of urban decay. Before Baltimore received its CCP grant, this attempt already included a number of separate initiatives arising from an intersection of public and private interests: the priorities of Mayor Kurt Schmoke, a former prosecutor; the appointment of a new police chief with expectations of reforming a troubled department; the redevelopment of Baltimore's Inner Harbor and neighboring Camden Yards areas as a center for tourists and baseball fans; a much-publicized partnership in the high-crime Sandtown-Winchester area, involving the city government and the Enterprise Foundation founded by James Rouse, the developer of the Inner Harbor; efforts by the Downtown Partnership, an organization of business interests in the "working downtown" area that adjoins the Inner Harbor and Camden Yards; and, most proximate to CCP, a comprehensive strategy of community organization and legal action developed in partnership by two seasoned non-profit organizations, the Community Law Center (CLC) and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA). The Baltimore CCP grantee is the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice, which administers the grant and subcontracts, serves as a facilitator for the CCP partner organizations, and handles exceptional outreach and coordination problems.

The theoretical and practical underpinnings of the CCP program are found in CLC and CPHA and therefore, neighborhood housing strategies are never far removed from CCP efforts. Using strategies developed by CLC and CPHA and tested in the Boyd Booth neighborhood, CCP funds are used to broaden, "ratchet" up, assist and connect existing institutional and community-based activities and capacities (new agencies were not created by CCP), and harness their energies in support of priorities defined by fledgling community organizations. While not all involved entities have housing as a primary focus, they may contribute to the project in more indirect ways. For example, the Victory Outreach Program manages crews that clean trash from illegal dumping sites and abandoned housing; the Drug Court assigns service crews to help maintain the neighborhoods. Both the core communities and apprentice communities emphasize developing defensible space plans and encouraging landlords to keep their properties both habitable and drug-free. Signs of success to the neighborhood include: boarding up abandoned buildings, reclaiming homes, keeping lots clean, and the formation of homebuyer's clubs in communities where people before had not wanted to purchase property.

This case study of Baltimore's CCP program was written as a result of site visits made to various CCP programs and interviews with CCP participants between November, 1995 and March, 1997. It also incorporates data from BOTEC's CCP Coalition Survey and Community Policing Survey, as well as information contained in federal and local documents and reports. Follow-up

phone calls were made during December, 1997 and January, 1998, to key participants in order to write the epilogue.

Background

City Profile

Baltimore, the largest city in the state of Maryland, is approximately 40 square miles with a population of about 700,000. The city is roughly a square whose southeast quadrant is penetrated by the broad Patapsco River, which gives deep-water access through the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic Ocean. Warehouses, piers, and dry-docks line both sides of the river; behind them on both banks are marshes, old factories, and modest homes originally built for laborers who walked to work. At the head of the Patapsco is Baltimore's "crown jewel," the recently redeveloped Inner Harbor. The Inner Harbor draws tourists and locals to a convention center, fashionable hotels, shops, and restaurants. Adults and children can tour three historic ships, including the U.S.S. Constellation; attend a professional baseball game at the new Camden Yard stadium; attend plays and concerts at the Morris Mechanic theater; or visit the Maryland Science Center, National Aquarium, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Museum, or a number of other attractions.

Immediately north of the Inner Harbor is the downtown business district that retains a well-maintained historic charm. In all directions except the Southeast, the Inner Harbor and business district are surrounded by a patchwork of small neighborhoods, generally separated by natural features, railroad tracks, or highways. Much of this crescent (containing the CCP core neighborhood) with its crime, drug markets, and abandoned row houses and storefronts could be described as "run down." However, Baltimore's neighborhoods are distinctive, and even the poorest ones have some pleasant streets, active commercial facilities, or both. One searches in vain for sprawling private or public housing projects and one can find some thriving ethnic communities, historic functioning open markets, and parts of neighborhoods being actively rehabilitated. Beyond the crescent, to the far Northwest and Northeast, are neighborhoods with well-maintained homes, large parks, golf courses, a zoo, the Pimlico Race Course, and the campus of Johns Hopkins University. Beyond the city limits lie suburbs with a population of 1.6 million.

According to the 1990 census, the city population is 59 percent black and 39 percent white. About 22 percent of the population lives in poverty, compared to 10 percent of the entire metropolitan area and 13 percent of the United States. While the greater metropolitan area is slightly better off than the United States as a whole, the city itself is significantly poorer, with 44 percent of households earning less than $35,000 per year.

In recent years, Baltimore has been ranked between the 97th- and 126th-best cities out of 300 by *Money*'s Survey of the Best Places to Live. Three of its hospitals are ranked among the nation's best. About 15 percent of the city's K-12 students attend private schools, compared to 14 percent for the metropolitan area and ten percent for the nation as a whole. Culturally, the city is well-endowed with 32 museums, 16 professional theaters, and two symphony orchestras.

In short, Baltimore still has significant physical, economic, and cultural resources left from nearly two centuries as a major port, trading hub, and manufacturing center. Hit hard by the decline of heavy industry between 1960 and 1980, the city population dropped by more than 200,000 people. A succession of two activist mayors backed by a willing private sector have attempted to arrest the decline by placing major bets on the redevelopment of the Inner Harbor and a shift to high-technology industry. A network of community-based organizations has survived to assist those left behind by the industrial shift, and the Comprehensive Communities Program is implementing a strategy to harness their efforts toward arresting crime and disorder. A recent $100 million Empowerment Zone grant may help complete the revival of the local economy and return the city to its former state of health.

Crime Problem

Baltimore's crime trends mirror its economic and demographic trends. According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, between 1980 and 1993, per capita rates of crimes reported to police rose 75 percent (from 27.5 to 48.2 per 100,000 population) for murder, 42 percent for all index violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), and 25 percent for the index property crimes (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). Arrests for drug violations more than doubled between 1985 and 1993, according to Baltimore's CCP grant application.

The 1993 to 1995 period saw a small decrease in the reported murder rate (from 48.2 to 45.6 per 100,000 population). Violent crime overall leveled off, as declines in murder and robbery were offset by increases in reported rapes and aggravated assaults. The reported property crime rate rose by eight percent, as increases in motor vehicle thefts and larcenies countered a decline in burglaries.

Unified Crime Report Data

Baltimore Crime		1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
	Population	771,097	783,542	764,893	763,880	763,138	736,014	748,099	755,517	732,968	739,180	712,209
Murder*	*Raw*	213	240	226	234	262	305	304	335	353	321	325
	per 100,000	27.62	30.63	29.55	30.63	34.33	41.44	40.64	44.34	48.16	43.43	45.63
Forcible Rape	*Raw*	592	660	595	517	541	687	701	749	668	637	683
	per 100,000	76.77	84.23	77.79	67.68	70.89	93.34	93.70	99.14	91.14	86.18	95.90
Robbery	*Raw*	7771	7989	7466	7396	7966	9477	10770	12263	12376	11275	11353
	per 100,000	1007.79	1019.60	976.08	968.21	1043.85	1287.61	1439.65	1623.13	1688.48	1525.34	1594.05
Aggravated Assault	*Raw*	6922	6340	6008	6574	6849	7473	7257	8452	8548	8718	9134
	per 100,000	897.68	809.15	785.47	860.61	897.48	1015.33	970.06	1118.70	1166.22	1179.42	1282.49
Burglary	*Raw*	13872	14321	13475	14251	14315	14753	16230	16298	17901	15897	16569
	per 100,000	1799.00	1827.73	1761.68	1865.61	1875.81	2004.45	2169.50	2157.20	2442.26	2150.63	2326.42
Larceny-Theft	*Raw*	30732	29850	30319	32606	33267	35383	39213	40717	41451	42402	45619
	per 100,000	3985.49	3809.62	3963.82	4268.47	4359.24	4807.38	5241.69	5389.29	5655.23	5736.36	6405.28
Motor Vehicle Theft	*Raw*	6019	6873	7464	8443	8173	9911	10593	11300	10623	13533	11172
	per 100,000	780.58	877.17	975.82	1105.28	1070.97	1346.58	1415.99	1495.66	1449.31	1830.81	1568.64

*Murder includes non-negligent manslaughter

Local Government Context

Baltimore is an independent city, not a municipality of any county. The city has a mayor-council form of government with a "strong mayor" elected directly by city voters. The mayor and 19 council members—three from each of six districts, plus a council president elected at large—are elected to four-year terms. The mayor has veto power over council bills, and the council is forbidden from adding items to the mayor's budget.

The city is widely viewed as the beneficiary of two successful mayors with quite different styles over the past 15 years. Former mayor William Donald Schaefer, who went on to be governor, relied on an informal style and regular contacts with neighborhood associations for his electoral base and countered the economic decline with a series of public-private partnerships, of which Harborplace was the most visible. Currently, Kurt Schmoke, Baltimore's first elected black mayor, is in his third term. A Rhodes scholar and former prosecutor, Schmoke was most recently challenged by a member of the city council who criticized his aloofness from the neighborhood associations. Schmoke has been attacked by conservatives for approaching drug use as a public health issue, his aggressive granting of contracts to minority- and woman-owned businesses, his support of Afrocentric teaching for black children, and the city's contract with the Nation of Islam for security at a public housing project involved in CCP.

Fiscally, however, Schmoke is applauded for his 13 percent cut in the number of city employees, his build-up of city reserves, and his success in continuing the development of downtown Baltimore. The city's S&P bond rating is A, and it generally ranks in the top third among large cities in terms of fiscal strength. Along with others, he shares credit for Baltimore's 1995 award of a

$100 million Empowerment Zone grant from the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The CCP grant is housed in the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice (MCCCJ). Its director, L. Tracy Brown, sits on the mayor's cabinet. MCCCJ was established in 1969 to coordinate anticrime activities and to administer LEAA grants. Its functions also include staff support to the mayor on criminal justice issues, representation of the mayor on task forces, and administration of funds. At the time the CCP grant was awarded, MCCCJ was administering a CSAP Community Partnership grant, a BJA Violence Against Women Technical Assistance and Demonstration Program grant, and an NIJ grant for the Mayor's Caucus on Crime and Neighborhood Revitalization.

Local Police

Commissioner Thomas Frazier heads the Baltimore Police Department (BPD). He was recruited from the San Jose (CA) Police Department to take over the roughly 3,000 person BPD in 1994. Widely viewed in Baltimore as a "reform" appointee, he was recruited both to control escalating violence and reinvigorate a troubled police department. The problems of the BPD were multiple and documented in the 1992 "Gaffigan" report. Steven Gaffigan and Robert Wasserman conducted this organizational study of the BPD; the former is a well-known police consultant and educator who is currently a staff member in the Justice Department's COPS office; the latter is a well-known police consultant who most recently consulted in developing new forms of policing in Bosnia. According to the Gaffigan report, the BPD's problems included structural over-centralization, over-specialization, remoteness from the community, being overly tied to rapid response to calls for service as the primary means of delivering police services, beat structures that were unrelated to neighborhood boundaries, and a variety of other administrative problems associated with training, recruitment, supervision, and staff evaluation.[1] Moreover, according to the May 13, 1994, *Baltimore Sun*, Commissioner Frazier also inherited a department known for abusiveness, petty corruption, and racial divisiveness. While racial tensions continue (Baltimore *Sun*, April 26, 1997), they do not appear to have affected the department's role in CCP.

A self -described protégé of Joseph McNamara, former Chief of Police in San Jose, Frazier is strongly committed to community policing as well as restoring departmental integrity and efficiency. The first evidence of this commitment to community policing is found in the allocation of CCP

1 Policing Baltimore in the 1990s: Assessment of the Department toward Community Policing, January 1992, unpublished document.

community policing funds that atypically were allocated to professional community organizers as well as to community police officers with the encouragement of Frazier. Other signs of the BPD's commitment to community policing are found in the development of an experimental 311 system for non-emergency calls (a development that has received national attention); in the elimination of three layers of command (captains, colonels, and lieutenant-colonels); and in the devolution of authority in Baltimore's nine police districts to majors. A further experimental decentralization of authority occuring in the Southwest District's three sectors where three sector lieutenants now have power. This management system is known as "sector management" for lieutenants as opposed to management of watches—the traditional purview of lieutenants.

The department is deeply committed to the idea of community development and sees itself as a key agency in community development and restoration—hence Frazier's advocacy of aggressive community organizing on which to build community policing. Congruent with this goal, Chief Frazier implemented a Block Representation Program in an attempt to go beyond Block Watch—which focuses on literal "watching"—to aggressive community organizing and problem-solving. His goal is to have every block in the city represented by at least one resident. Moreover, the department sponsors a variety of community/youth programs including the Baltimore Police Youth Choir, Police Explorers, Police Activities League (PAL), a Safe Haven Network, a Community Party Resource Bank (a party wagon equipped with a grill, audio system, soda dispenser, and other equipment to help neighborhoods conduct local celebrations and parties), and the Warbrook Institute of Criminal Justice (a program to interest high school youth in criminal justice careers that offers college credit for senior year work).

Community Context

Baltimore's grant application highlights several features that influenced the shape of its program strategy. These include: a three-century economic history as a great city whose population has dwindled in recent decades; traditions of innovation in science, industry, and urban policy; traditions of religious and ethnic diversity, coupled with episodic political radicalism; and a terrain that encouraged Baltimore's development as a "city of neighborhoods" that are self-contained and distinct. Indeed, traces of all these features can be seen in the Comprehensive Communities Program.

Economic History

Baltimore's history can be traced to 1729, when a collection of gristmills, tobacco farms and warehouses, port facilities, and homes clustered around the navigable head of the Patapsco River first incorporated as a town. Deep-

water access through the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic Ocean assured the town's development as a port. During the American Revolution, opportunities in privateering, armaments manufacturing, and the trading of other military supplies created a thriving local economy. Later, roads stretched from Baltimore toward expanding markets in the Midwest. Along with a geographic advantage—Baltimore is 150 miles closer than any other Atlantic port to the Midwest—and early nineteenth-century construction of canals and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, access to water and land transportation assured Baltimore's growth into a major trade center by the 1860's. By that time, the city had also become a center for manufacturing iron, heavy machinery, clothing, and other goods. The city's downtown was nearly destroyed by fire in 1904, but prospered during World Wars I and II.

Baltimore's port still ranks among the three most active in the United States. The city is connected to the north and south by rail and by I-95, and to the Midwest by I-70. It is connected to the rest of the world by a busy international airport, which also serves Washington, DC. However, the city's industrial base has eroded in recent decades as the national economy became more service driven; indeed, the total number of manufacturing jobs in Baltimore fell by one-half during the 1980s. Major employers of lower-skilled workers such as Westinghouse, Bethlehem Steel, Martin Marietta, the railroads, and the shipbuilders all laid off employees. Recent growth in electronics, aerospace, and biotechnology has occurred largely outside the city, forming a crescent, that has employed more-educated segments of the population.

For these reasons, Baltimore's population in the mid-1990s is smaller, poorer, and less-fully-employed than 40 years ago. The city population has fallen by about one-fourth, from the mid-900,000s to the low 700,000's, while the population of the entire metropolitan area grew to 2.3 million. The city's poverty rate is four and a half times the rate of surrounding metropolitan counties. A majority of the lowest-income families in the metropolitan area live in the city, and 70 percent of the metropolitan-area population with an income of less than half the poverty level live in the city.

As noted in the grant application, the characteristics of Baltimore's housing mirror the characteristics of its population. While those who could afford to left for the suburbs during the 1970s and 1980s, such flight is not an affordable option for those who remain. The decreased population results in a substantial share of abandoned housing. The remaining units are virtually the only places the poor can afford to live. By 1990, more than half the city's stock of 295,000 housing units were being rented, 19,000 units were vacant, and the median monthly rent was only $321. Seventy percent of all units in the metropolitan area that rent for under $400 per month are in the city. Of all owner-occupied houses in the city, 44 percent are valued at under $50,000, compared to just 2.3 percent in the surrounding counties. This situation

gives absentee landlords substantial control over the quality of city life while giving city residents a large incentive to commit to improvements.

Both Baltimore's recent economic history and its Comprehensive Communities Program have been influenced in various ways by the Rouse Corporation and its philanthropic arm, the Enterprise Foundation. Since the 1960s, Rouse has been a major player in land subdivision and real estate construction, and no doubt many of those who left neighborhoods inside the city limits now inhabit Rouse-built houses in the suburbs. Founder James Rouse retained an interest in innovations involving planned urban growth; indeed, the corporation's planned community of Columbia, Maryland, some 18 miles outside Baltimore, is today a self-sustaining city of nearly 100,000. During the 1980s, the Rouse Corporation was the major private partner in the $825 million public-private development of Harborplace, the area around Baltimore's historic Inner Harbor. Inner Harbor tourism contributes significantly to Baltimore's economy, sustaining nearly 16,000 hotel rooms within walking distance of the harbor. During the early 1990s, the Enterprise Foundation became a major financial partner in Community Building in Partnership—a multi-million dollar public-private venture with the goal of total physical, social, and economic transformation of Sandtown-Winchester, one of the five CCP core neighborhoods.

Innovation in Technology and Urban Policy

Baltimore has a history of innovation in science, industry, culture, and municipal planning. While the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was among the nation's first, Baltimore was also the site of the first American telegraph line, the first gas light, and the first dental school. Johns Hopkins University has become a leading medical research center since its founding in the 1870s; its world-renowned hospital lies physically adjacent to, but socially distant from, one of the CCP core neighborhoods. Baltimore still benefits from a philanthropic legacy bequeathed during its heyday of innovation and industry: gifts to the city included the Enoch Pratt Free Library, the Walters Art Gallery, the Maryland Historical Society, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Museum are all examples.

In the wake of housing shortages following World War II, Baltimore introduced a number of innovations in urban policy—specifically in the areas of code enforcement, public housing, urban renewal, and formations of a City Planning Department and a regional planning council. One legacy of these innovations is physical. Row houses are prevalent and architecturally fairly uniform within any given neighborhood. Even in poor neighborhoods, block after block is still characterized by red-brick townhouses with trademark white marble steps. Rental apartments are more likely to be in buildings with ten or fewer units than in huge high-rises. The city has over 70 parks covering 6,000 acres—nearly one-fourth of its total area. Certain

neighborhoods are characterized by architectural innovations, such as the "inner-block park" in the center of each block in Harlem Park, a CCP core neighborhood.

Another legacy of Baltimore's early ventures into urban planning is organizational. Three of the CCP partners have deep roots in the city's tradition of active planning to improve the city's quality of life. Through years of cooperation and experimentation and an "interlocking directorate" of leadership, these organizations developed what became the comprehensive strategy for the Comprehensive Communities Program.

First, the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA) was organized in 1941 to help ordinary citizens take active part in shaping the conditions in which they lived. Through pioneering community organization activities, CPHA took active roles in improving education, shaping the municipal response to court-ordered school desegregation, desegregating housing, and scattering public housing. Later, it organized the Citywide Liquor Coalition to lobby for tighter regulation of taverns and package stores and to ban outdoor liquor ads. Today it leads citywide coalitions concerned with housing, liquor, drugs, and schools. CPHA's Resource Center for Neighborhoods provides training and technical assistance in leadership to community associations across the city. As a CCP subcontractor, CPHA provides community organizers to the CCP core neighborhoods and apprentice communities.

Second, the Community Law Center (CLC) was incorporated in 1983 by a group of community organizers and lawyers who were active in community-based organizations. Their concerns were the lack of affordable legal services to community-based organizations and the lack of private law firms' expertise in the issues relevant to low-income communities. With foundation funding, CLC has evolved since the mid-1980s into a self-described "general counsel for the community." With nuisance law as a framework, the principle that compensation is due when the use of one property inflicts harm on the neighbors, CLC used a strategy of litigation and legislation to attack billboards advertising alcohol and tobacco, and later, abandoned houses.

During the 1990s, working with CPHA organizers, CLC developed strategy, tactics, and organizational and statutory infrastructure for enabling community associations to identify and document nuisance properties and file suits directly to acquire nuisance properties. CLC created a subsidiary, Save a Neighborhood, Inc., to renovate the recovered properties, acting as receiver on behalf of the neighborhood organizations. As part of the Sandtown-Winchester transformation, CLC scaled its litigation/receivership model up to mass production standards, completing 370 cases in 18 months. Early in 1994, CLC began working with CPHA to help a coalition of community organizations in the Boyd Booth area implement the model.

CLC and CPHA thus developed the concept for Baltimore's comprehensive strategy, and Boyd Booth, which became a CCP core neighborhood, became the proving ground. Significantly, much of the CCP grant application was written at CLC, and co-author Michael Sarbanes, a CLC staff attorney, left to become the first CCP coordinator.

A third *pro bono* advisor to community organizations, the Neighborhood Design Center (NDC) also significantly, if less prominently, partnered in the precursors to CCP. NDC, a 27-year-old organization of civic-minded architects, engineers, landscape architects, interior designers, and others had long offered advice on technical issues related to the physical environment. NDC projects have included renovations of buildings owned by public agencies and community non-profits, conversions of commercial properties to non-commercial social service uses, design and engineering of parks and playgrounds, and streetscape designs for renovating entire city blocks. NDC's interests came to include Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The organization participated actively in the CCP precursor projects in Sandtown-Winchester and Boyd Booth, and also in CCP planning. Although not initially a CCP subcontractor, NDC became one in the second-year CCP grant.

A City of Diverse Neighborhoods

Baltimore's diversity dates back to the 1600's. While Maryland was initially settled by Roman Catholics, one of the General Assembly's first two land grants was to a Quaker, Charles Gorsuch, in 1661; this strong Quaker influence continued through the late nineteenth century. While Baltimore had been a prosperous slave port, and the city and state were dominated by secessionists during the Civil War, Quaker abolitionists operated an active station on the underground railroad. Shortly thereafter, Johns Hopkins, a Quaker merchant, endowed the university that bears his name. Today, Roman Catholicism is the dominant religion in Baltimore and venerable Catholic institutions play active roles in Baltimore's CCP. For example, a hospital founded by sisters of the Order of Bons Secours in 1919 is the major community institution remaining in the Boyd Booth area, where the comprehensive strategy for Baltimore's CCP was first tested. Today, the order works closely with CCP and the neighborhood associations in the areas of literacy, housing, neighborhood clean-up, community health care, and various forms of technical assistance.

Like most Atlantic port cities, Baltimore experienced waves of European immigration. While the English predominated, Italians, Scots-Irish, Poles, Greeks, and Ukrainians all made marks in the city that remain to the present day. Indeed, one resident in nine today is either foreign born or the child of an immigrant who arrived after 1970. The city has had a substantial black population throughout its history, which grew from 18 percent of the

population in 1940 to 55 percent by 1980, and became 60 percent of a smaller population by 1990. The city also contains sons and daughters of blacks from the South and whites from Appalachia, both attracted by jobs around the time of World War II and left behind by the transition to a high-skill, suburban-based economy. Today, Baptist and evangelical churches with black and white congregations outnumber Roman Catholics, and the broad CCP tent is also supported by the Assembly of God's Victory Outreach program for recovering substance abusers.

Baltimore's terrain—hilly and criss-crossed by the harbor, streams, ridges, and nineteenth-century factories and railroad trackbeds—was conducive to Baltimore's development of distinct neighborhoods (rather than a single broad expanse). This course of development had at least two implications for CCP development. First, it made existing socially-defined neighborhoods the appropriate "building blocks" for the program; each neighborhood could be treated as a separate laboratory. While coalitions of neighborhood associations could form, there was no requirement for any budding leader to take on responsibilities outside their neighborhood before appropriately confident.

Second, the general CCP model had to be tailored and introduced with explicit respect for distinct ethnic and religious traditions that have endured, in some cases, over centuries. Many Baltimore neighborhoods have retained their ethnic character, so that with little driving or even shorter water taxi trips it is easy to shop in ethnic stalls in 150-year-old open municipal markets and dine in Little Italy, a traditional Jewish deli, and a famous German restaurant in the course of a week-end. The Inner Harbor area still hosts a succession of ethnic week-ends throughout the summer, each celebrating a different culture. Even in low-income, high-crime areas, black merchants called "A-rabs" still sell produce from horse-drawn carts as they have for a century; behind a few drug markets one can find garages converted into stables for the distinctive "A-rab" horses.

Despite the diversity, there seems to be little overt hostility across neighborhoods, ethnicities, or religions. Introduction of the basic CCP model is, however, complicated by differences across participating neighborhoods in the local leadership's race, class, religious affiliation, local traditions, and prior experience with community development. Overlaying these differences is a healthy skepticism and suspicion that what works on the West Side may not work in East Baltimore, or even in the near-by New Southwest

CCP Planning and Organization

Baltimore was one of sixteen sites invited by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to apply for both planning and implementation funding to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to combat crime. As stated in BJA's *Fact Sheet on the Comprehensive Communities Program*, "(t)he two defining principles of the CCP are (1) that communities must take a leadership role in developing partnerships to combat crime and violence, and (2) that State and local jurisdictions must establish truly coordinated and multi-disciplinary approaches to address crime- and violence-related problems, as well as the conditions which foster them."[2] Each site was mandated to include jurisdiction-wide community policing and community mobilization prevention initiatives in their strategy. In addition, sites were asked to create programming, based on identified needs, in the areas of youth and gangs, community prosecution and diversion, drug courts with diversion to treatment, and community-based alternatives to incarceration.

The Comprehensive Communities Program was implemented in two phases. Under Phase I, invited jurisdictions submitted an application for approximately $50,000 of planning funds to support the design and development of a comprehensive strategy. All proposals for Phase I funding were due April 29, 1994. Most of the sites were notified within a month awarded funding for Phase I. During this planning phase, technical assistance in the form of workshops and meetings were offered to the sites. During July, 1994, representatives from each site were mandated to attend a two-day Phase II (Implementation Phase) Application Development Workshop. All Phase II applications were due to BJA on August 15, 1994.

Baltimore began expending its CCP money during March, 1995. Its initial end date in December, 1995, was extended until October, 1996. The program received a second year of funding through the end of 1997.

[2] Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Fact Sheet Comprehensive Communities Program*, U.S. Department of Justice, 1994.

Baltimore Timeline



The Planning Process

The planning process that created the Baltimore CCP occurred in separate stages concerned with strategy and organizational process.

Baltimore's comprehensive strategy began to evolve several years before the Justice Department announced the Comprehensive Communities Program. Between 1992 and 1994, CPHA and CLC collaborated on neighborhood rebuilding efforts in the Franklin Square and Boyd Booth neighborhoods. CLC had already developed its legal strategy for turning abandoned houses from drug distribution outlets into livable homes. That strategy rested on filing nuisance abatement lawsuits against negligent absentee landlords but required several forms of assistance from neighbors. These included identifying the problem properties, exercising their legal standing as parties injured by misuse of the problem properties, establishing a record of notices to landlords, demonstrating their willingness and capacity to manage and restore the properties, and maintaining a visible presence in court. Sandtown was also an early target neighborhood, but program activities were initially limited to vacant house receivership actions.

By the early 1990s, CPHA had five decades of community organizing experience. Much of its recent experience had been gained in neighborhoods besieged by drug trafficking where organizers overcame local apathy and fear in an effort to stimulate neighborhood action. Thus, CPHA was a natural partner for stimulating the community action needed to complement CLC's legal model.

In the spring of 1994, Baltimore piloted its comprehensive strategy in the Boyd Booth area of West Baltimore. Boyd Booth was a poor area that contained one of the oldest, most active drug markets in the city. The area suffered more than a doubling of violent crime between 1985 and 1992, compared to a 40 percent increase for the entire city. Fortunately, three community associations survived: the Boyd Booth Community Association; the Carrollton Ridge Community Association; and the Fayette Street Outreach Committee. In 1991, Mayor Schmoke brought community leaders together with several private and public organizations, including the Community Economic Development Corporation and Bon Secours Hospital, to create the Boyd Booth Task Force. In the spring of 1994, ongoing Task Force efforts were augmented with legal support from CLC, a CPHA organizer funded by the Abell Foundation, and a defensible space plan developed in consultation with Oscar Newman. During the twelve months ending in August, 1994, violent crime was reduced by 32.5 percent, and the CCP leadership credits its comprehensive communities strategy for this reduction.

Organizationally, the CCP Phase I planning effort began in early 1994 under the aegis of MCCCJ. MCCCJ developed the following core leadership as a Planning Committee: the primary participants in the Boyd Booth effort; Community Building in Partnership, Inc., the non-profit organization responsible for the much-heralded Sandtown-Winchester community transformation; the Enterprise Foundation, which had contributed major financial support to the Sandtown effort; the Baltimore Police Department; the U.S. Attorney's Office; and community associations from what became the five original CCP "core neighborhoods." These core neighborhoods included Sandtown-Winchester, the "Middle East" neighborhood of Historic East Baltimore, Boyd Booth, Franklin Square, and Harlem Park.

MCCJ hired CLC to refine the comprehensive strategy and write the CCP application. CLC attorneys and staff elaborated on the CLC/CPHA/Boyd Booth model in the CCP comprehensive strategy and wrote the grant application under contract to MCCCJ. CLC and CPHA had assisted four of the five CCP core neighborhoods, thereby creating the neighborhood infrastructures, inter-neighborhood network of support organizations, and a track record of successes needed to sell and execute the comprehensive strategy.

During the Phase I planning process, Planning Committee representatives, especially the CLC grant writers, met with additional stakeholders and potential partners to gain their support and participation in the program. Among these, the principle partners beyond the Planning Committee included: Mayor Schmoke and his subcabinets for human services and public safety; the Baltimore City Public Schools; the Department of Housing and Community Development; the State's Attorney's Office, Baltimore's local prosecutor; Baltimore City Partnership for Drug-free Neighborhoods; the city's CSAP Community Partnership; the Drug Court Committee; the Correctional Options program of the Maryland Department of Corrections; the Alternative Sentencing Unit; Boys and Girls Clubs of Maryland; and the Neighborhood Design Center. In addition, twelve community associations were selected as "apprentice communities" to receive training in preparation for implementation of the comprehensive strategy.

CCP planning was widely described as open and extended. Although the CLC/CPHA/Boyd Booth model oriented the planning process from the beginning, its elements were proposed and discussed with the relevant organizations, modified, and integrated with new components during weekly Planning Committee meetings and frequent meetings between the grantwriting team and partner organizations. While that model remained the centerpiece of the submitted grant application, the planning process had clearly enriched the basic model by placing additional resources (especially for neighborhood clean-up) at the disposal of community associations and creating links from the Planning Committee to other organizations.

By all accounts, the planning process was characterized by a remarkable absence of battles over strategy, resource allocation, and organizational "turf." The dearth of infighting is due to the following. First, the basic model was well articulated from the outset; it had a record of at least partial success in two neighborhoods, and it was expandable to give roles to additional organizations. No competing alternative vision existed.

Second, the model was a shared common vision by a dominant subset of core Planning Committee members (CLC, CPHA, and MCCCJ) who comprised a long-standing personal and organizational network. CLC "alumni" moved on to positions in various partner organizations, and several organizations collaborated in previous efforts to build neighborhoods' capacities to set goals and pursue them. The plan therefore had a preeminent position it would not have enjoyed had it been "parachuted in" by the federal or state government, or by an outside consultant. "New players" such as the Baltimore Police Department, the Boys and Girls Clubs, and the Baltimore City Schools seem to have viewed cooperation with the basic strategy during the planning phase as their best chance to get resources from the program.

Third, community associations trusted CLC and CPHA from the outset because of those organizations' "years in the trenches" helping marginalized neighborhoods gain a voice. This legacy of trust helped Planning Committee leaders bypass some early processes that might otherwise have been needed to gain credibility.

Fourth, CCP leadership successfully used objective-setting and performance monitoring as management tools to winnow out ideas incompatible or irrelevant to the whole, to hone and structure more promising ideas, and to gain specific organizational commitments and monitor them after the grant award. A "Work and Evaluation Plan" matrix was presented when planning began and refined during the planning process. It listed specific tasks, activities, indicators of accomplishments (e.g., performance), and timetables for implementation and measurement. By the time the grant application was submitted, the 29-page matrix was in place as a "contract" between CCP leadership and the organizational participants. The matrix also served as a management tool, and a self-documenting record of achievements that could be shown to prospective future funders.

CCP Administrative Structure

CCP is housed in the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice (MCCCJ), whose director is one of six Mayoral Cabinet members. Baltimore's Mayoral Cabinet serves staff functions and represents the mayor; it does not have line authority over the city's large operating agencies. MCCCJ also administers a federal domestic violence grant and a CSAP Partnership grant, which supports the Baltimore Partnership for Drug-Free

Neighborhoods, one of the CCP partners. The initial CCP grant allocated $162,000 for salary and fringe for 15 months; this included the CCP director and assistant director at 100 percent time, and the MCCCJ director at ten percent time. Both the CCP director and assistant director were hired specifically for CCP; the director came from CLC, and the assistant director came from a local university with a degree in urban planning.

As the grantee agency, MCCCJ took responsibility for coordinating and monitoring all components. The grant application noted two additional MCCCJ responsibilities: "leveraging systemic changes identified by communities as they implement [the comprehensive strategy]; and ensuring that information transfer and replication programs are institutionalized in a lasting way in the non-profits responsible for them." Explicit acceptance of these responsibilities suggests that sustainment and expansion of CCP accomplishments under the initial grant were important goals from the outset.

CCP Budget Components

MCCCJ took financial responsibility for the grant, using Baltimore municipal government financial and administrative procedures and offices. To accomplish this fiscal program, MCCCJ entered into contracts with various governmental, non-profit, and community-based agencies. The following table summarizes the contracts in the Year One budget by agency and function, as related to CCP objectives.

Table 3: Summary of Baltimore CCP Year-One Budget by Contractor and CCP Objective

Agency	Policing	Community Mobilization	Alts. To Prison: Drug Court	Alts. To Prison: Clean-Up	Youth Initiatives	Institutionalization/ Coordination
MCCCJ						$162K
Baltimore Police Department	CP $450K Sweeps 205K Pros. 87K Equip 90K Train 25K $857K					
Citizens Planning and Housing Association CPHA)		$142K				
Community Building in Partnership (CBP)		$24K				
Historic East Baltimore Community Action Coalition (HEBCAC)		$24K				
State's Attorney: *Housing Code Prosecutor* *Drug Court Prosecutor*		$50K	$87K			
Housing Department (Code Inspector)		$31K				
Community Law Center (CLC)		$152K				
Baltimore Coalition Against Substance Abuse (BCASA)			$51K			
Save a Neighborhood, Inc. (SAN), and Anti-Blight Organizations (ABOs)				$340K		
State of Maryland: Citizenship Law-related Education Program (CLREP)					$92K	
Boys and Girls Clubs					$200K (off-budget)	
TOTALS	**$857K**	**$373K**	**$138K**	**$340K**	**$292K**	**$162K**

Several features of this Year One budget warrant special attention. First, while the Baltimore Police Department was the largest single proposed contractor at $857,000, nearly as much money—$733,000—was allocated to six non-profit organizations. This distribution reflected not only the CCP leadership's commitment to sharing CCP resources with the community itself, but also Baltimore's "depth of talent" in community mobilization. Six strong organizations already existed with the capability to mobilize CCP core neighborhoods and apprentice communities to implement the comprehensive strategy.

Second, while the "norm" suggested by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) was $1,000,000 for community policing, the Baltimore Police Department received only $857,000. During negotiations between MCCCJ and the Baltimore Police Department, Commissioner Frazier agreed to a reallocate the difference to CPHA community organizers, stating that "My vision of community policing includes community organization." Of the $857,000, the community policing share of $450,000 was originally programmed for overtime foot patrols in the CCP neighborhoods. Because union rules required overtime to be awarded on the basis of seniority, this

arrangement led to constant turnover. When the CCP leadership pointed out the problem, Commissioner Frazier immediately agreed to a "backfill" strategy where the CCP community policing funds covered new junior officers to replace more senior officers.

Third, while $138,000 was spent in ways that met BJA's requirement of supporting Baltimore's Drug Court, none of those funds went to the Drug Court itself. Rather, funds were allocated to achieve two objectives for Drug Court offenders from the core neighborhoods. The State's Attorney's Office received $87,000 to prosecute offenders in order to achieve sentences that fit individual needs and the suitability for community service. The Baltimore City Alliance Against Substance Abuse (BCASA), a non-profit organization, received $51,000 to hire and equip a social services coordinator to develop and arrange support services for offenders from the core neighborhoods under Drug Court supervision.

Fourth, more than ten percent of the budget supported community efforts to eradicate neighborhood problems related to abandoned or neglected housing. The State's Attorney and City Housing Department received a combined $81,000 for the prosecution of "problem landlords" and related housing code inspections; CLC received $152,000 to develop the capacity of community associations to replicate the legal strategy, which rests on nuisance law.

Fifth, reportedly at the request of BJA, the Maryland Boys and Girls Clubs allocated $200,000 from their own budget to support and coordinate programs in the CCP core neighborhoods.

The $400,000 Year Two budget submitted to BJA reflected a tighter focus on the comprehensive strategy developed at CLC and CPHA. Community organization received 55 percent of the Year Two budget. Another 20 percent was allocated to community policing, and 14 percent was allocated to continue the Drug Court social services coordinator. Six percent was allocated to the Neighborhood Design Center for assistance to community associations for CPTED planning, and the remaining about five percent was allocated to CCP administrative expenses.

For the most part, the CCP leadership's approach to administering these contracts is a problem-focused and "hands-on" partnership. As problems or opportunities are identified in the neighborhoods, the CCP leadership is likely to play a role in bringing together representatives of several partner organizations. BCASA social services coordinator and the neighborhood CPHA community organizer prevented a proposal to Harlem Park community residents for rehabilitating an abandoned property to serve as an "Oxford house" for Drug Court supervisors. They were assisted by the CCP

director, and the church-affiliated non-profit housing developer. A single training session for apprentice community leaders involved CPHA, the Baltimore City Partnership for Drug-Free Neighborhoods, and CCP

leadership; previous training sessions in the series involved CLC staff. CCP, CLC, and the State's Attorney's Office were all involved in planning a legal attack on seven large salvage yards to eliminate the market for the scrap copper "metal men" strip from abandoned houses.

Two of the CCP contractors appear to be operating outside this web of constant interaction. Historic East Baltimore Action Coalition (HEBCAC), whose neighborhood is geographically separated from the other core neighborhoods, operated independently of the rest of CCP while its neighborhood was one of the original five. Initially, coordination with the Boys and Girls Clubs seemed to be sporadic at best.

The CCP Strategy

Baltimore's Comprehensive Community Program defined an explicit "comprehensive community-based anti-drug strategy" and is using CCP funds to support this initiative in two ways. First, CCP supports implementation of the comprehensive strategy in "core neighborhoods" whose pre-CCP histories of community organization provided the necessary organizational infrastructure. The five original core neighborhoods were Boyd Booth, Harlem Park, Sandtown, Franklin Square, and Middle East. Second, CCP helped "apprentice neighborhoods" prepare for implementation of the strategy.

At the end of the first-year grant, the federally-funded Empowerment Zone (EZ) absorbed three of the original CCP core neighborhoods—Harlem Park, Sandtown, and Middle East. They were replaced by three "graduating" apprentice communities—Mill Hill, South Menroe Street, and New Southwest. At that time, the number of apprentice communities expanded to 20.

Explicitly, the Baltimore CCP leadership described the program in terms of three frameworks: functional budget categories, basic principles, and community-based strategies.

Functionally, the grant application operationalizes the comprehensive strategy into the budget categories used above in Table 3.

In terms of guiding principles, the *Baltimore Comprehensive Communities Program Summary*, which is used to introduce the program to Baltimore audiences, lists the following:

1) The community must take responsibility for developing a strategy and setting priorities;

2) The strategy must be firmly anchored in participation in each block;

3) The community must be open to partnership and ongoing collaboration with police, other government agencies, businesses, religious institutions, and non-profit organizations;

4) The strategy must be comprehensive (i.e., must approach the problem from many sides).

In terms of community-based strategies, the *Summary* lists the following:

1) Denying the drug trade space in which to operate [Examples: neighborhood board-ups of vacant drug houses, filing drug nuisance abatement suits to evict drug dealers, requesting landlord screening of prospective renters to prevent rentals to drug dealers, cleaning up vacant lots used as drug stashes, and various "defensible space" tactics: fencing off alleyways, strategic increases in lighting, and removing public telephones from drug market areas.]

2) Maximizing the accountability and participation of all stakeholders in the community [Examples: letters to absentee landlords requesting involvement, working with Bons Secours Hospital on cleanups and housing planning, recruiting neighborhood churches in vigils and marches, and involving Victory Outreach in cleanups and marches];

3) Removing the sense of impunity by working with the criminal justice system [Examples: telephone trees, BPD foot patrol officers with cell phones, ongoing routines for getting quick response by BPD to crime and drug problems, and catching drug dealers through defensible space];

4) Expressing community intolerance for drug trafficking [Examples: community vigils on drug corners, anti-drug signs in windows, anti-drug spray-paint "tags" on board-ups, and picnics/cookouts on drug corners];

5) Providing positive alternatives for children and adults, especially recovering addicts [Examples: youth clean-up/beautification for stipend and field trips, and Christmas dinner for Victory Outreach participants];

6) Developing community capacity to sustain the effort [Examples: incorporated community associations, and leadership transition to "second generation."]

Baltimore's CCP strategy envisioned more than functions, principles, strategies, or services that could easily be cut at the end of the grant period.

Rather, the program intended from the outset to launch neighborhood-level capacity-building efforts that would continue indefinitely and to develop new organizational links to support community needs. Program leaders stated they had "always thought of CCP as providing *breakthrough* dollars—as a means of spiraling up lots of people's *activities* to change the way communities get their needs met (emphasis added)."

Stated differently, CCP is intended to build neighborhoods' capacities to access and use public and private resources to meet their needs. Another way to describe Baltimore's CCP strategy is in terms of the specific resources participating neighborhoods are expected to mobilize as a result of CCP participation. These include:

1) Timely and effective law enforcement responses to needs expressed by the community;

2) Restoration of abandoned housing units, or at least an end to the associated drug dealing, looting, and visible deterioration;

3) Timely clean-ups of abandoned properties and illegal dumping sites identified by the community;

4) Community-based recovery services and structured supervision for substance abusers in the neighborhood.

Baltimore's CCP strategy is to build neighborhoods' capacities to meet law enforcement needs through community policing; to provide effective community input through organizational and legal channels; and to coordinate service delivery to the participating communities.

CCP Program

Implementation of Community Policing

At the time of the first site visit (November, 1995), community policing in target neighborhoods consisted primarily of overtime foot patrol officers assigned to neighborhoods on a rotating basis (a contractual issue related to the assignment of overtime). By the second visit (June, 1996), hand-picked foot patrol officers were assigned to target neighborhoods on a permanent basis, with CCP funds used to "backfill" foot patrol officers' previous assignments with junior officers. During each Baltimore site visit, the evaluators spent time with community officers.

During the early phases of this evaluation, community policing was provided to neighborhoods by part-time overtime officers. The question was whether allocating funds to community organizers was a way of either avoiding departmental commitment to CCP and community policing or a way to bide time while Frazier really took control of the department. The notion that Frazier could be either waiting to play his hand or that he was uncommitted to CCP was not implausible; by the time of the first visits, community organizers had been hired and fielded into communities, while the proposed community policing involvement was minimal—part-time assignments of officers working overtime. Moreover, Chief Frazier was a reform administrator—obligated to move quickly and forcefully in at least two areas: tactically, to control violence, and organizationally, to restore departmental integrity and efficiency. Due to change in circumstances, all thirteen community officers now patrol their neighborhoods. To monitor this program and show his commitment for it, Frazier himself has patrolled with community officers—a rare but valuable managerial practice for top police managers. Moreover, the BPD's current commitment to community policing, as noted above, seems substantial and broadly based in the department.

Community officers in target neighborhoods have "complete flexibility" regarding their hours of work and activities; they are viewed as needing low levels of supervision. Strong collegiality seems to characterize the relationship between Officers Narango and Slide, with both acknowledging that Narango is Slide's mentor. The beats they patrol are relatively large but manageable; Narango's beat covers a seven by six square block area (the parameters of which we walked in less than an hour and a half, including several stops in stores). Officer Slide patrols two different beats and has a car available, unlike Officier Narango. Each neighborhood has a substation that serves both as a place to meet with citizens and other neighborhood service personnel and as a place to keep records and equipment.

Narango saw himself as a traditional patrol officer, doing traditional and routine work, and this role was important to him. He did not see himself as a community relations or community service officer. Narango saw himself as a law enforcement officer. He acknowledged many officers did not see his current work in the same way, but this was not a problem for him. He felt confident having "won" his spurs as a "tough" cop by being a formidible member of the drug enforcement unit. He had his share of complaints for being a "prickly" officer in the past (a fact he acknowledges and does not brag about), which is important in maintaining both his personal credibility and his function's credibility with other officers. The respect other officers have for Narango is apparent in station house bantering, asides, and "joshing" in which he is involved. Yet, Narango understands that he is much more than a law enforcement officer focused on felonies. As the *Baltimore Sun* describes him:

> Narango is the sheriff. Part enforcer, part cajoler of residents, he is primarily an intelligence gatherer. He is armed not only with a gun but with a pager; the number is passed out in community meetings and residents use it. He in turn tells neighbors about sanitation, housing, and other problems he notices during his walks (January 30, 1997).

This information is not only used to report and solve neighborhood housing and sanitation problems, it is used to solve crime problems. For Slide and Narango, a close relationship exists between them and the officers who patrol in cars. First, because of their access to information, the foot patrol officers understand the nature of many calls for service that they can handle by themselves, thereby relieving officers of many calls. Second, they can get information and make observations that can result in many good arrests—arrests they happily "give away" to patrol officers so that they do not have to be "bogged down" by arrests. Third, they can use their good relations with business owners and residents to gain access to concealed locations from which they observe drug markets, gather evidence, and direct tactical operations by radio.

Both Officers Narango and Slide emphasize "talking to 'em"—that is, developing close relationships with all residents and users of neighborhoods, including prostitutes, drug dealers, and other troublemakers. Narango began with a "zero tolerance" approach: immediately coming down hard on people who were violating the law or creating a problem. As time went on, however, he described a more respectful, sympathetic approach: "You have to treat everyone with respect."; "People need to save face."; "If I recognize them and treat them properly, they will do the same to me. You just have to keep talking to them." The old way was "Get off the streets now," or "I'm not going

to talk to you anymore." Now, it's "talk to 'em"—get to know their stories and respect them. Narango feels safe in neighborhoods: "A lot of people will 'drop a quarter' if anyone planned to hurt me." "If the community is safe for me, it's safe for them (residents including potential troublemakers)."

As a young African-American, Officer Slide relates especially easily to young men in the neighborhoods he patrols, and finds that these relationships give him access to different kinds of information. As an occasional participant in pick-up basketball games at an outdoor court, he knows who on the sidelines is waiting for a chance to get into the game, and who is content to "just blend in" while waiting for the next drug customer to drive by. Young men in the neighborhood have brought him drug stashes they've found on the street; he acknowledges some of them are dealers trying to eliminate competition, but insists that at least one cooperative dealer gave him another dealer's stash out of outrage that someone would store drugs in front of his mother's house. A walk-along with Officer Slide is constantly interrupted by boys and girls who look to be ten to 14 years old wanting to tell him who skipped school that day, where drugs are hidden, and where drug dealers have taken over a secret play area in the basement of an abandoned house.

Slide is careful to maintain his "official" presence by patrolling most often in full uniform. He typically accompanies a tactical squad on drug raids, so that neighbors who tipped off the police have a sense of reward for their help. He breaks up groups of loitering teenagers he finds on the street and debates with prostitutes about the dangers of AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases.

Foot patrol in Baltimore works well because officers have specific tools available to solve problems, including well-organized communities, skilled community organizers, good legal support (e.g. housing lawyers), and neighborhood networks of service agencies (Neighborhood Service Centers). These tools are immediately available since neighborhood leaders, lawyers, and service personnel meet on a regular basis. Each officer is integrated into the overall patrol strategy in his sector. Narango is able to command supplemental police services for problems on his beat when they are required. On one particular occasion, Slide was patting down a suspected drug dealer beside a basketball court and two patrol cars appeared in less than a minute. These officers offered to "shut down the [basketball] game," but quickly acquiesced to Slide's request that they allow the game to continue.

The synergy between community officers and other CCP components was amply demonstrated when Officer Slide took a visiting evaluator to a planning meeting of the Mill Hill Community Association, which had recently graduated from apprentice community to core neighborhood status within CCP. The meeting was a two-hour walk through alleys and streets with Officer Slide, two association leaders, the CPHA community organizer, and a CLC housing attorney.

The Association members offered address-by-address inventories of problems ranging from dog droppings to illegal trash dumps to active drug markets. By the end of the tour, the CPHA organizer had a long list of needed clean-ups that she planned to request from Victory Outreach, who managed the local community service crew. But the community residents had much more detailed information to share. They could describe the daily cycle of each drug market over a 24-hour period, they knew whether transactions involved a simple exchange on the street or a multi-step process, and they knew who the dealers were: young men who had "come to visit their grandmother" and never gone home, dealers who had set up shop in the homes of fearful addicted customers, dysfunctional families, or groups of youth who congregated on certain corners at certain hours, then disappeared. Officer Slide was able to fill in details, tell residents when more information was needed, correct occasional misinformation, and inform residents about the possible police response.

By the end of the tour, the group had developed detailed plans for dealing with a variety of specific problems, using tactics selected from a broad array of choices. Drug house landlords who failed to screen tenants would receive a suggested screening checklist from the community association, accompanied by a history of police drug raids on their properties and a threat of a nuisance suit from the CLC attorney. Officer Slide volunteered to produce the drug raid records; he also told the association leaders where more evidence was needed to get a court order permitting a raid. Owners of abandoned properties would receive requests for clean-ups, board-ups, or block-ups, whichever was needed, often along with notice of intent to file a receivership action to take ownership of the property. As the association members recounted the history of "Gypsy Joe," a 15-year-old with a violent temper who sold drugs from one of the nicer houses in the neighborhood, the CPHA organizer made notes of what she would tell the Department of Youth and Family Services: his father had died of AIDS, his mother was incapacitated by heroin addiction, and his 18-year-old brother was trying to keep the family together. When an association member mentioned the name of someone eyeing the group from a distance, the CLC attorney realized that he was someone she had only spoken to by telephone: the owner of some 70 "problem properties" that CLC was investigating. She took the opportunity to establish a personal rapport with the landlord and offer herself as evidence that CLC's actions were not intended as a vehicle for punishing landlords who rented to African-American tenants. Later, as the association members floated various ideas about CPTED planning, Officer Slide responded with predictions based on his detailed knowledge of what hiding places, escape routes, and buyers' and sellers' commuting patterns would be disrupted by the use of CPTED.

Clearly, much of the foot patrol officers' work goes well beyond traditional policing. Narango reports that he is so satisfied with his new role that he has

decided to put off his planned retirement—that is, as long as he is allowed to police neighborhoods as he now does. By this qualification he means that he does not want to get "bogged down" in meetings and be taken off the street. Officer Slide seems to be enormously satisfied with his role as well. There are reports, however, that in at least one case, a community officer was bothered enough by what he saw as unrealistic demands being placed on him that he requested a transfer. The community organizer and other representatives defused the situation. However, the officer decided to carry through with his transfer so that he could patrol in the neighborhood in which he lived. Even that officer did not want to be relieved of his role as a community officer.

Breakthrough Operations Task Force

Baltimore has yet another community policing approach. The Breakthrough Operations Task Force was created in September, 1993, after the BPD received a state grant. Officers were selected for the Task Force from all nine districts. It grew to 50 officers, eight sergeants, and an administrative assistant. This Task Force conducts elaborate actions against drug dealing and offers intensive enforcement in needy areas. First, three squads of seven officers chase the dots (pin locations of problems onto maps). Second, one operation squad picks out the most troubled area in the city for aggressive enforcement. Using undercover and video, the Task Force buys from as many dealers as possible over a two-month period. Because of previous planning, the state does all the indictments and the judge presets high bail—primarily because the evidence gleaned during the operations is so overwhelming. Third, a critical case squad of six investigators and a sergeant handled cases where there was a potential homicide. Finally, a gun recovery effort was initiated based on experiences in Kansas City. The Violent Crime Task Force last year focused on arresting out-of-neighborhood drug buyers (and sellers secondarily) in the area. Tactics included following cars frequently seen in the area, arrests for loitering (which drew some flak because the arrests led to heavy overtime pay), and drug stings. This resulted in a 75 percent increase in drug arrests and a 35 percent increase in all arrests, from January to August, 1994, and the same time period in 1995. While not funded by CCP, these efforts have been noticed by community residents, who see police "doing something" about problems. The activity has helped to reduce serious crime during the same period; murder was down 19 percent while robbery was down thirteen percent.

Organization for Community Input

Baltimore's CCP emphasized three approaches to organizing for community input. First, the program relied on community organization in the five core

neighborhoods to develop local leadership and to augment their capacities to define needs, develop remediation strategies, and articulate specific and effective requests to the Baltimore Police Department, Department of Public Works, Housing Department, and other public and private agencies. Second, for problems related to abandoned and run-down housing, the program relied on community-focused legal interventions to mobilize resources, take control of the problem properties, or both. Third, the program trained three to five volunteers from each of twelve apprentice communities to teach the strategies used in the core neighborhoods; during the second-year grant period, three of the twelve communities "graduated" to core neighborhood status, replacing three of the original neighborhoods absorbed into the Empowerment Zone.

Community Organization

CCP-funded community organization in the five core neighborhoods reflected variations on a basic theme: technical and organizational assistance to, and securing city resources for, local organizations. The variations reflect previous responses to crime, drugs, and other problems in the CCP core neighborhoods. These responses have left important but varying legacies in terms of neighborhood organizations, reduced crime, and reduced fear of crime.

Baltimore CCP funds were used to hire six FTE organizers and to support 25 percent of their supervisor's time for 13 months. Four organizers and the supervisor were hired by Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA) to work in Boyd Booth, Franklin Square, and Harlem Park. The fifth organizer, based in Sandtown-Winchester, was employed by Community Building in Partnership (CBP), the non-profit program that led the community transformation in that neighborhood for several years with "showcase-level" support from the Baltimore city government and the Enterprise Foundation. The sixth organizer was employed by HEBCAC and worked in the Middle East neighborhood.

Each organizer's objective was to guide neighborhood leaders through the following basic strategy:

1) Survey lot-by-lot neighborhood problems, including abandoned houses, drug houses, open-air drug markets, crime hot spots, and properties needing clean-up (this "needs survey" approach is intended to accomplish the goals of "hot lines" for reporting crime but offers a veil of anonymity to residents who want it);

2) Present these problems to the Community Law Center, police, Department of Public Works, and other entities that can offer assistance;

3) Recruit and train block captains; organize clean-ups; organize logging of criminal activity; organize street actions (e.g., marches, rallies, vigils) to take back public spaces; modify the environment (e.g., with gardens, chain-link fences, community board-ups) to establish defensible public and private space;

4) Arrange community support for recovering addicts in their home neighborhoods.

In the core neighborhoods, neighborhood leadership existed before CCP grants were awarded. Therefore, community organizing resources were used largely to implement and expand elements of neighborhood strategies already underway at the start of CCP. Neighborhood organizers utilized a wide range of strategies: proposing and advocating innovative problem-solving tactics to neighborhood leaders, "networking" to mobilize external resources and fit them into the tactics planned by the leaders, and celebrating neighborhood accomplishments.

Variations in this comprehensive model have played out in several of the core neighborhoods, with key roles played by the CCP-funded community organizers (Appendix A).

Community-Focused Legal Intervention

CCP puts both civil and criminal justice processes at the disposal of core neighborhoods as tools for ending the drug dealing, violence, looting, public health problems, and declining property values associated with abandoned, deteriorating housing. CCP funds the Community Law Center (CLC) to carry out civil actions. For criminal actions, CCP funds a housing prosecutor in the State's Attorney's Office, supported by an inspector in the city Housing Department.

Civil Processes

The CLC 1994 Annual Report describes its program in terms of the following five tactics.

Neighborhood Inventories

Neighborhood inventories are carried out by community associations in the CCP core neighborhoods. Using plot maps, the inventory marks the addresses or locations of such neighborhood nuisances as abandoned houses, crack houses, open-air drug markets, and lots needing clean-up because of illegal dumping or accumulation of trash. CLC staff assist community residents in using a CLC database and software to trace the owner(s) of "problem properties" and their mailing addresses. These searches often

identify landlords with responsibility for multiple problem properties, who receive high priority in using one or more of the following tactics.

Drug Nuisance Abatement

Drug nuisance abatements are sought against owners of occupied properties being used as drug markets. Community residents document the drug activity, assist police, then fashion a remedy such as eviction or arrest of the drug dealer.

Self-Help Nuisance Abatement

Self-help nuisance abatements are usually carried out for vacant properties, which permits an injured party to fix a problem if the owner refuses to do so. The community association initiates self-help abatements in "three-letter campaigns," which first urge the owner to solve the problem, then offer to assist in solving the problem, then threaten a receivership action if the problem is not solved. With abandoned houses, typical solutions involve clean-ups of the lot, secure board-ups to block access through doors or windows that face the street, and concrete block-ups to prevent access through less visible entrances.

Vacant House Receivership Actions

When rehabilitation of a vacant property is a viable option, CLC helps neighborhoods pursue receivership actions, in which the association takes ownership of the property and carries out the rehabilitation. During the 1992 to 1994 period, as CLC was pursuing receiverships in high volume as part of the Sandtown-Winchester restoration effort, it created a non-profit subsidiary, Save a Neighborhood, Inc. (SAN), to serve as receiver and manage rehabilitation of housing.

Community-Landlord Committees

In neighborhoods where problem properties can be identified before abandonment and a viable neighborhood association exists, CLC has assisted in establishing landlord-tenant committees to stop deterioration.

Financially, CCP supports this strategy by funding CLC for one and a half attorneys, one paralegal, and ten percent of the executive director's time to continue implementing the strategy in four of the core neighborhoods and to begin using it in the Middle East neighborhood. CCP also advanced CLC's work through synergistic effects; other programs, strengthened by CCP resources, are now better able both to support and benefit from CLC's work.

For example, community associations strengthened by CCP complete more timely and detailed neighborhood inventories. This helps CLC maximize its effectiveness by focusing on clusters of neighboring properties that may be blighting an entire block, and on landlords who own multiple problem

properties. Focused legal actions have greater neighborhood impacts than piecemeal suits against landlords who happen to come to CLC's attention.

Similarly, both SAN, which has taken over management of the neighborhood clean-up component of CCP, and Victory Outreach, one of the clean-up organizations, have begun doing clean-ups, board-ups, and block-ups for fees, usually paid by landlords in successful self-help nuisance abatement suits. Not only do those organizations benefit financially, but their availability to perform rapid, secure board-ups at the request of neighborhood associations encourages associations to undertake such suits. Finally, as community associations grow stronger with CCP support, they are better able to engage landlords in preventing deterioration through community-landlord committees, including the one formed by the Franklin Square Community Association.

Six months into the first CCP grant period, CLC staff considered their biggest success devising the comprehensive strategy and then working with the organizers to mobilize communities to use the strategy. Mobilization involved getting community associations to trust the legal veil of confidentiality established by the needs assessment (i.e., in contrast to filing a complaint as an individual). It also involved mobilizing community associations to sue and training them to be "good clients" by writing and tracking correspondence, which would be needed later as documentation.

At that time, three major remaining problems were cited. First, communications with police were not uniformly positive, which complicated actions against the owners of crack houses. Second, even after several meetings, one community association was still failing to develop concrete tactics to deal with the landlords. Third, CLC had difficulty mobilizing the city to deal with sanitation problems; additionally, CLC had difficulty forcing landlords to pay for services contracted by CLC to fix up their properties.

However, in another six months, police became more responsive to community complaints. CLC developed a manual for use by CPHA in the apprentice communities to teach the community associations their roles in the kinds of cases that come up most frequently in core neighborhoods.

Criminal Remedies

CLC's strategies frequently succeed in getting problem properties boarded up or torn down, but for difficult cases requiring criminal prosecution, CCP funds support a housing code prosecutor and inspector in the State's Attorney's Office.

Prior to 1996, the city's first attempts to deal with abandoned and improperly maintained homes focused on reclamation or processing cases against landlords. These enforcement efforts were handled by the Department of

Housing and Community Development, but with a limited staff of two. In 1996, the mayor expanded the role of social services directors in the neighborhood "hubs" (where residents request municipal services) to include all local services, including house and enforcement, public works, and planning. Unfortunately, they lacked the legal knowledge to assure winnable cases were developed so legal staff were overwhelmed with unwinnable cases, false hopes were raised in the neighborhoods, resources were poorly coordinated, and "more homes were being abandoned and lost than were either being reclaimed or restored by owners." Beyond poor resource and case management, problems occurred because demand simply did not exist for the reclaimed houses. CLC stepped in and arranged for the community associations to be designated as agencies that pursue remedies with funding from CCP.

Consequently, a shift was made to a strategy of *reducing* the housing stock through a community and problem-solving orientation facilitated by CCP funds; a powerful tool was the "three letter campaign." Besides stirring some landlords to action, the letters served the legal function of documenting adequate notice to landlords.

The existing hubs are reorganizing into new Neighborhood Service Centers. The Center directors will direct housing inspections in their neighborhoods and the foot patrol officers will make referrals, but the State's Attorney's Office wants community organizations to set logical priorities. Assistant prosecutors who handle these cases meet with the organizations to explain the elements of winnable cases, and the logic of priority-setting, and that housing violations are crimes against the community.

Moral issues are clouded by the fact that the "wealthy white suburbanite slumlord" is reportedly becoming a myth. According to the community prosecutors, this population largely divested property in the cities when restrictions regarding lead paint took effect or, later, when mortgage money dried up during the high-interest periods in 1980. The current owners are relatively poor people who "got stuck" with the properties; some of them thought they had divested but had to take properties back when the savings and loan associations collapsed. The poor housing market was worsened by federally subsidized rehabilitation, (where investors created habitable but unwanted housing), and by suburban developers (who attracted city residents out to the suburbs).

Given the poor market, sentences sought are likely to be community service, with fines requested only for the landlords who can afford to pay. The community is also asked to send large numbers of residents to attend court hearings, to make their presence known to judges. The presence of neighbors helps the State's Attorney maintain the moral "high ground" against property owners toward whom juries might otherwise be sympathetic.

The CCP-supported Assistant State's Attorney assigned to housing prosecution works with all five core neighborhoods. Case referrals filter through CPHA community organizers but there are still too many cases for her to bring them all to court. Therefore, she sets priorities by considering harm from the violation, the availability of non-criminal options, and the likelihood of getting convicted landlords the resources needed to remediate the problem. She communicates these criteria informally to the neighborhood organizations rather than through written agreements.

Despite their success, prosecutors recognize the real problem lies beyond legal remedies. Possible solutions would be to reduce supply by extending lots back and demolishing the alley houses in back of the street houses (although that would create a dispossessed population), and to upgrade the Section 8 standards that currently subsidize ownership of bad properties.

Apprentice Communities

Because apprentice communities are in earlier stages of problem definition and community organization, resources for organizing are being used to train their neighborhood leaders in strategy development and to inform leaders about the roles that legal, criminal justice, and other interventions can play in implementing their strategies.

The fifth and final training session for apprentice community leaders occured in December, 1995. Topics for the first four sessions had been: reviewing the five basic principles for anti-drug training; developing defensible space plans; finding and working with landlords; getting residents involved; developing a community outreach plan; observing and documenting crimes; and, explaining the criminal justice system.

Topics for the fifth training session were developing a community-based youth program, developing a strategic anti-drug plan, and writing a grant application. The attendees were groups of three to five neighborhood leaders from each of the ten apprentice communities, most but not all of whom had attended previous training sessions.

Training was of high quality in the sense of presenting concrete advice, maintaining enthusiasm, involving trainees in activities, and addressing trainees' questions. For example, the session on designing youth programs began with an introduction that emphasized identifying and connecting with a target youth population and locating and mobilizing people and resources already in the neighborhood. Most of the time was spent on an exercise where attendees identified obstacles to designing effective youth programs. The trainer helped the group operationalize obstacles and develop creative solutions. The process worked well and produced an interesting catalogue of obstacles and responses (Appendix A). Following this session, groups were given the exercise of planning a youth activity that could take place in their

neighborhoods by March, 1996. Organizers and trainers circulated among groups to insure that plans were specific (target audience, approach, and nature of event), included implementation strategies, and drew on neighborhood resources.

The CPHA director gave a brief lecture on proposal-writing and fundraising and reviewed the elements of the comprehensive strategy. The training session ended with a 2-hour exercise geared towards developing a comprehensive strategy for each group's neighborhood. At the end of the exercise, all groups summarized their strategies for the entire set of attendees. The strategies drew on needs analyses that had been previously prepared using the CLC/CPHA model, the lot-by-lot needs assessments, and a defensible-space approach to analyzing the problems. Most groups understood how to apply the model; variation appeared in the fractions of neighborhoods where the analyses had been completed. Components of neighborhood plans were generally quite detailed and included tactics, who does what, and milestones of achievement. Each plan was to be designed for completion by approximately June, 1996. (Components of the apprentice neighborhoods' plans can be found in Appendix A.)

By June, 1996, the CPHA director reported measurable successes in ten of the twelve apprentice communities. The ten successful communities turned their comprehensive strategies into successful applications for $3500 mini-grants from the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention.

The leader of one apprentice community association (Southwest Community Council, known locally and proudly as "Pigtown") reported partial completion of the comprehensive plan developed seven months earlier, plus some large unanticipated successes. The Council had gone from zero to 23 block captains of its planned 60-80, and its planned tot lot had been opened on schedule. Only its plan to complete its lot-by-lot needs survey had stalled, because the person heading that effort "got involved in other issues." The Council leader lamented the absence of a full-time community organizer, expressed concern that even the new block captains' momentum might drop without "someone who could stay on top of things daily." Nevertheless, there had been some unanticipated successes: completion of Pigtown's piece of a seven-year grant application; a 20-ton community clean-up, described as "the biggest in Baltimore's history;" strong liaisons with police, including a local "ten most wanted list" that had shut down several major dealers; a citizen patrol that dispatches four to six people every night; writing 15 to 20 nuisance abatement letters in conjunction with CLC in the aftermath of a drug raid that emptied several houses; the resolution of several local rivalries that had disrupted the Council; and the continuation of a successful newsletter.

The CPHA director reported most of the successful apprentice community associations were in the process of setting up the youth programs they had

designed at the training session. Most, he stated, had shifted their focus from crime to youth because crime rates had fallen so dramatically. To satisfy the new interest, the November training was followed by a second training on the subject, where community leaders were required to bring youth in order to qualify for a small grant to start their youth programs. The director felt the requirement had been largely successful in getting adult leaders to recognize and talk to the affected youth directly.

Organization for Service Delivery to Targeted Clients and Neighborhoods

Baltimore's CCP targeted two categories of clients in the core neighborhoods for individual services: substance abusers and youths. In keeping with the program focus on building community capacities, services were delivered to substance abusers in a way that meets community needs under priorities set by the neighborhood associations rather than by a city bureaucracy.

Substance abusing offenders processed through the Baltimore Drug Court generally received a variety of social services arranged by the CCP-funded Social Services Coordinator. These social services were intended to meet offenders' needs, provide necessary structure, and prepare them for suitable employment. One vehicle for the transition to employment is a non-incarcerative sentence to work doing neighborhood clean-ups on a Community Service Crew (CSC). In turn, CCP engineered the transition of CSC supervision from the city's Department of Public Works to four non-profit agencies in the core neighborhoods, which allocate CSCs to clean up specific sites designed by neighborhood associations as "high priority." With second-year funding, CCP contracted with the Neighborhood Design Center (NDC) for Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) consultation for the core neighborhood and apprentice community associations.

CCP also coordinates or funds two categories of youth services. The first is a pair of Boys and Girls Clubs in a public housing project in the Middle East neighborhood. The second is a Peer Mediation Institute operated by a subsidiary of the Baltimore City Schools, which trains peer mediation skills to selected students and to neighborhood association leaders.

Drug Court Social Services Coordinator

CCP funds a Drug Court Social Services Coordinator employed by the Baltimore Coalition Against Substance Abuse (BCASA). BCASA is the successor to a Baltimore Bar Association committee formed around 1990 to share information among defense attorneys who, at that time, were finding that 80 to 90 percent of their cases were drug-related. The Drug Court itself

was a response to an early BCASA recommendation, and BCASA continues to play an oversight role.

BCASA's interests overlap with CCP's in several ways. It operates heavily in the same core neighborhoods as many Drug Court clients reside. BCASA lawyers worked with CLC lawyers to develop the comprehensive strategy, and it still helps support CLC in implementation. BCASA works to develop providers of services to help Drug Court clients deal with their social problems, gain literacy, and reintegrate into the community.

In BCASA's view, the Drug Court Social Services Coordinator has a symbiotic relationship with BCASA. He utilizes community resources that BCASA has developed, but his utilization and outcome monitoring helps BCASA evaluate the resources and select successes for which to advocate broad-scale replication. Also, they work together to develop neighborhood-level infrastructure for reintegrating drug court offenders back into their communities. In this way, they work jointly to put responsibility back on neighborhoods to help the police, gather intelligence, and to leverage resources on behalf of Drug Court clients.

The Drug Court Social Services Coordinator arrived in October, 1995, about a month before the first site visit. His previous job had been similar—to coordinate social services for Baltimore releasees from boot camps. Therefore, he already had a detailed strategy and thorough knowledge of available resources for this population.

From the outset, his strategy was to put a Help Desk in the Drug Court, to serve as a central location where offenders could be connected with the social service resources available in their neighborhoods. The process begins at the defendant's first appearance with a needs assessment based on the Addiction Severity Index (ASI) and the creation of a card file. The coordinator matches services to needs, arranges access, then monitors the offenders' participation and providers' delivery of services, the offenders' progress into jobs or school, and the utilization of long-term help.

The Coordinator repeatedly emphasized the need for a systemic approach to resolving multiple problems and the synergy from having multiple program components. In his view, the most common ancillary needs of Drug Court offenders were: alleviating homelessness, which aggravates other problems and complicates delivery of all services; substance abuse relapse prevention; finding employment, even though some help is already available; and obtaining medical care, which is "nonexistent" for all but homeless Drug Court clients.

To meet these needs, he immediately began five initiatives, four of which centered around long-term housing:

1) Housing renovation projects where offenders carry out the rehabilitation and then live in the house under supervision following the Oxford House model;

2) Use of the Oxford House as a one-stop social service center for resident and non-resident substance abusers in the neighborhood;

3) Similar programs for women and their children in the neighborhood;

4) "Family houses" to provide family support and day-care for the children of Drug Court clients who find employment;

5) Using available local agencies for job training.

Six months later, his plan had evolved into a more formalized strategy called Community Support for Recovery (CSR), which was guided by a working group of community-based organizations, the faith community, and recovering addicts. CSR emphasized health, housing, and jobs. To deal with Drug Court offenders' health needs, he formed partnerships with the Lions Club and with Liberty Medical Center (a subsidiary of Bons Secours Hospital) for other clinic services.

For housing, CSR added temporary housing in addition to the long-term initiatives proposed by the Coordinator by identifying transitional housing units and setting up communications for probation officers to identify addicts in need. The Coordinator provided several examples of emergency responses to impending evictions of Drug Court clients because of housing code violations. His responses included obtaining court-ordered delays in eviction, obtaining donated smoke detectors on an emergency basis, and obtaining donations of food and clothing. To meet longer term needs, he set up an addict support program in the Flag House Public Housing Project in Middle East, began helping the Southwest Community Council obtain three neighboring houses for a residential treatment facility, and added a day-care center to a women's facility.

To help Drug Court clients enter the job market more quickly, the Coordinator arranged with the state of Maryland for an expedited process for addicts to obtain identification cards needed for employment—shortening the waiting time from twelve weeks to three. He also set up an employment network with the Urban League, the Mayor's Office of Employment Development, and a pre-release employment program.

Finally, he launched two advocacy initiatives on behalf of recovering addicts. The first was the production of a graphic videotape made in a heroin "shooting gallery," intended for use in recruiting volunteers to work with addicts. The second was training in advocacy for addiction services.

Alternatives to Incarceration

Baltimore's primary alternative to incarceration involves Community Service Crews (CSCs), where offenders, primarily Drug Court referrals, are assigned to perform community service in their neighborhoods. When CCP began, the Baltimore Department of Public Works ran the crews. The CCP objective was to develop community-based, non-profit, anti-blight organizations that would place the crews at the disposal of neighborhood associations. This objective had been formally met by June, 1996, although not without some lingering operational difficulties.

CSC workers operate in four crews in the CCP core communities doing clean-up and trash removal. Crew priorities are set by neighborhood leaders and communicated by the CPHA organizer to the program manager, who disseminates the information to the work crew leaders. Offenders who successfully complete their community service requirements are offered 20-week jobs at $7/hour and receive assistance (and employment references) in hunting for permanent jobs or in registering for GED training.

The program was "incubated" with CCP funds during the first grant period. Management consisted of one full-time staff member of Save a Neighborhood (the non-profit Community Law Center affiliate that acts as court-appointed receiver in abandoned housing cases). Initially, direct supervision occurred through regular Department of Public Works crew leaders, with salaries paid by CCP. One full-time CCP-funded case manager recorded offenders' hours worked against their community service requirement and investigated no-shows. By June, 1996, direct crew management was turned over to four community-based, non-profit, anti-blight organizations: HEBCAC, for Middle East; Victory Outreach for Boyd Booth and Southwest; St. Pius V Housing Corporation and Civic Works for Harlem Park; and Community Building in Partnership for Sandtown-Winchester.

Between September, 1995, and April, 1996, 351 Drug Court offenders worked on CSCs, each with an average of 30 hours of community service. Workers collected 873 tons of trash and 98 participants completed their community service requirements.

No-shows are a continuing problem, especially in New Southwest. Typically, only two to six of 50 assigned workers show up, compared to 10-15 of about 35 assigned in Middle East. The case manager isn't sure what accounts for the differential but believes the Middle East crew manager is especially effective (good at "keeping them tight") and also believes that the expectation that attendance will be high enough to accomplish something significant keeps workers coming back. No-shows are especially problematic near the completion of community service.

Besides no-shows, the other major perceived problem is lack of equipment; large trucks are needed to carry double crews and bush hogs for moving big piles of trash that develop from repetitive illegal dumping.

One of the four community-based organizations that took over a community work crew is Victory Outreach (VO). Victory Outreach is an old national program, licensed under the Assembly of God Church to provide a Christian-based residential program for addicted men. The Baltimore facility is a former warehouse donated by Bon Secours Hospital, which is still undergoing rehabilitation. It can hold 100 men in large rooms with bunk beds, but currently has only 50— some court-referred, some brought in from the street.

For new residents, Victory Outreach explains house rules, and orients the new resident into the program, and arranges any necessary medical attention through the Health Care for the Homeless Program. The program involves meetings, witnessing, house duties (rehabilitation and cleaning), and fundraising activities such as car washes, neighborhood clean-ups/trash-hauling, and fix-up/board-ups of abandoned housing.

To date, Victory Outreach connections to CCP have been indirect; CCP-funded community organizers have stimulated clean-ups and board-ups that create opportunities for VO residents to work and earn money for themselves and VO. CCP is not seen as vital to the VO program; no preparations were evident for taking over the CCP-funded community work crew.

Youth Programs

Boys and Girls Clubs

The Boys and Girls Clubs of Maryland (B&GC) agreed to operate two clubs in the recreation center in Flag House Courts, a public housing project in East Baltimore. The first is Flag House, a "traditional" Boys and Girls Club, while the second, Cross Roads, is a day reporting center for 15 to 16 year-old adjudicated juveniles. It was established with an OJJDP Disproportionate Minority grant to the state but now operates with state funding. Juveniles assigned to Cross Roads spend six hours per day in the program for up to 22 days at a daily charge of $45 to the court.

The connection of these B&GCs to CCP was tenuous from the outset; BJA required B&GC to allocate $200,000 for programs at this location "coordinated" with CCP as a condition of the grant. The program content was itself impossible to pin down, and CCP leadership had difficulty deciding how best to make use of the clubs.

B&GC staff stated they were planning a needs assessment but offered rather generic possible performance measures for the Flag House program including: calls for police service; "being alive and (financially) well;" services

delivered; operation of a safety patrol for the youth *en route* to the club; and number of members. B&GC staff also stated their belief that the B&GCs would help legitimize a new "koban" in the housing project, funded by the Eisenhower Foundation. The koban is in a unit of the project staffed by three officers over the twenty-four hour period. It opened the week before the first site visit and was flooded and therefore unavailable for observation during at that time. Its functions and performance were unclear, as was its relationship to B&GC and CCP. Neither the Boys and Girls Club nor the koban was mentioned in recent progress reports or the second year grant application.

Alternative Dispute Resolution Center

The Conflict Resolution Center (CRC) is operated by the Citizenship Law-Related Education Program (CLREP), a state of Maryland program under a CCP-funded contract. The Center has three functions: a clearinghouse/ lending library of materials on violence prevention and conflict resolution; city-wide training of trainers in conflict resolution; and training 75 middle-school students from the five CCP core neighborhoods in peer mediation.

CRC was a response to a request to the mayor made several years earlier by the incoming superintendent of schools. During three city-wide summit conferences, students had requested a peer mediation program (in addition to a hot line to report drugs and guns, more police in schools, Safe Havens along routes to school, and more adults around schools). The mayor began informal discussions with CLREP, a Maryland state agency that already had an ADR curriculum. CLREP introduced peer mediation in the Robert Poole Middle school, where it worked well; CLREP then expanded the program into two elementary-to-high-school clusters, along with the STAR curriculum from the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence. While the CLREP services had been free to the original clusters, schools more recently had received CLREP services under contract—some Title VI money was combined with the schools' funds, allocated by principals under site-based management, as a sign of commitment to the program. CCP funding was used in five ways:

1) Peer mediation was offered in four schools: 130 students and 40 faculty and staff were trained during the first year of the grant. The CCP community organizers, community police officers, and community leaders also attended the training to facilitate bringing the student mediators into other neighborhood CCP activities such as clean-ups.

2) A library/resource center opened in late 1995. While the Center had an ample supply of materials in several media, it was located in a school system building in a middle- to high-income area of

residential North Baltimore, a good 40-minute drive away from the nearest core neighborhood. Perhaps as a result, it was only receiving about 13 visitors per quarter. However, it was receiving about 9.7 telephone inquiries per day from schools and 1.5 per day from elsewhere in the community;

3) Training and materials were provided to the CCP community organizers;

4) Training of trainers in mediation and team-building was provided for the core neighborhood community leaders. The idea was to build community capacity through a self-perpetuating corps of community leaders skilled in mediation;

5) CLREP maintained a pool of mediators available to go out to core neighborhoods to assist as disputes arose in the course of organizing the neighborhood and working with landlords.

CRC and CLREP staff described the program as successful in generating higher school attendance, lower suspension rates, less fear, and higher perceived safety in the schools. But staff did note that one-year grants were insufficient for the two- to three-year process of changing a school climate.

Network Analysis

Theory and Application

Network analysis has emerged as a popular analytic strategy for understanding social relations, and is an appropriate tool for shedding light on CCP partnerships. Network analysis has a long history of use in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology (see Scott, 1991), and has now been used in other fields such as political science and education. The network approach assumes that (1) individuals are not isolated but rather function as part of a social system whereby their behavior is influenced by others, and (2) these social systems are structured and organized, and therefore, can be analyzed as predictable patterns of interaction. Thus, network analysis allows us to examine the structural properties of social relations by examining the interactions between individual actors in a social network. Knoke & Kuklinski, (1982, p. 10) describe the two essential qualities of network analysis as "its capacity to illuminate entire social structures and to comprehend particular elements within the structure."

Recent advances in the theory and techniques of network analysis have been substantial (see Wasserman & Galaskiewicz, 1993; 1994 for reviews). Despite these advances, the utilization of these techniques and models for the

study of community action and public elites has been limited (see Knoke, 1993).

The Comprehensive Communities Program was designed primarily as a vehicle to facilitate the development of citywide networks and partnerships—collective entities that were hypothesized to improve the odds of preventing urban violence and disorder above and beyond what could be expected from individuals and agencies working independently. In the context of the present study, network analysis is an important strategy for identifying patterns of interaction among those who play key roles in each CCP coalition. These wave one network data provide an empirical look at the relationships and social networks that were taking shape early on in five CCP cities.

Boundary Specification

Specifying the boundaries of the network in advance of data collection is an important part of network analysis. Unlike typical random sampling approaches, limits on the population or the sample must be carefully imposed. Essentially, we adopted a "realist" (Laumann et al., 1982) approach to boundary specification by allowing each CCP site to define their own network.[3] The CCP proposals (prepared by the sites) were used by the research team to identify a preliminary list of potential actors and organizations within the CCP network. These lists were mailed to the CCP project director for review, who then recommended deletions and additions. The realist approach uses the criterion of "mutual relevance" to decide who belongs in a network. Here, the assumption is that individuals and groups are included in the network if they have a mutual interest in the CCP project and some capacity to influence the outcome. Indeed, there is reason to believe that individuals were included in the proposal (or later included in the network) because of their position in particular organizations or projects associated with CCP.

Sampling was not necessary in this study because the network populations were relatively small. Hence, all identified members of each network were included in the data collection effort.

Data Collection Methods and Procedures

The network data in this case study were collected as part of our Coalition

[3]The realist approach can be contrasted with the nominalist view. With the latter, network boundaries are determined by the researcher's theoretical framework.

Survey. The Coalition Survey was sent to sites from September, 1995 to June, 1996, depending on the site. This network analysis then is a snapshot of the relationships and social networks during the first half of the CCP implementation phase.

To measure CCP-related networks, respondents were given a list of individuals who were believed to be affiliated with the CCP coalition in their respective cities, and then asked how often they have contact with each individual on the list. Possible response options were "daily, weekly, monthly, every few months, never."

To enhance the network analysis, individual cases were dropped when they did not have sufficient contact with other members of the network. Including persons with rare or occasional contacts in the network would have distorted the results by causing more dense (and therefore less interpretable) clustering of the remaining actors. Hence, after examining the frequency distributions, a decision was made to include only respondents who reported having contact with at least 10% of the total network "at least every few months." The effects of applying this inclusion criterion are described separately for each site. The analysis strategy can be found in Appendix B.



Codes:					
AS=Alternative Sent.	CB=Com. Bld. Part.	CR=Carrollton Assoc.	HE=HEBCAC	NH=Nehemiah House	RC=Reclaim Our Com.
BB=Boyd Booth Assoc.	CJ=Mayor Coun. on CJ	DE=Dept. Edu.	HP=Harlem Park Coun.	NS=New SW. Assoc.	SA=State Attorney
BC=Coal. Ag. Sub.Abuse	CL=CLERP	FO=Fayette St. Out.	LC=Com. Law Center	PD=Police Dept.	SN=Save a Neigh.
BG=Boys and Girls Club	CO=COIL	FS=Franklin Sq. Assoc.	LS=Lafayette Sq. Assoc.	PP=Parole/Probation	SP=St. Pius V Com.
BL=Balt. Law School	CP=CPHA	HC=Dept. Hous./Com.Dev.	MK=MLK Improv. Assoc.	PW=Public Works Dept.	SW=St. Wenceslaus

Baltimore Network Analysis

Baltimore's CCP initiative involves a wide range of not-for-profit neighborhood organizations, social service agencies, and city departments working together to improve conditions in specific target neighborhoods. This network analysis attempts to capture some of the dynamics that define these relationships.

A total of 50 persons were evaluated in the original network matrix, but four were dropped because of insufficient network data. The level of interaction within the network varied considerably from one individual to the next. Persons in the network had contact with anywhere from 4% to 52% of the total network, with a median of 26%. Only two respondents did not meet the minimum criterion for inclusion in the network analysis (i.e., having contact with at least 10% of the total network "at least every few months.") Thus, a final sample of 44 cases was used in the network analysis.

As might be expected, people reported the most contact with the key community leaders and managers of the CCP initiative in Baltimore. Two of the five most frequently contacted persons were the Director (52%) and Assistant Director (46%) of the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice—both individuals who played central roles in writing the CCP proposal and overseeing CCP program activities citywide. Also among the top five: representatives from the Community Law Center (48%)— another pivotal group that provides legal services to community organizations; Save a Neighborhood, Inc. (44%) — a receivership created for successful actions against vacant houses; and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (42%) — the prime mover behind the CCP community organizing effort.

A two-dimensional smallest-space analysis was used to depict the observed relationships. Kruskal's stress statistic (used to measure the goodness of "fit" of the solution) was satisfactory. The stress value is .25 and the R^2 value is .65.

Four clusters emerged from the Baltimore network analysis. Moving clockwise from the left, the clusters have been designated "Leaders," "Core Community Leaders," "Rim Participants," and "Core Community Organizers." As the names suggest, the horizontal axis clearly measures proximity to leadership, with the CCP director at the extreme left and, with rare exceptions, progressively less engaged participants as one moves to the right. The vertical axis appears to provide a slightly less precise measure of proximity to neighborhood residents. Persons who are located higher on the diagram either are neighborhood residents or spend more of their time communicating with residents than do persons who appear lower in the

diagram.

The "Leaders" cluster contains the "originators" who began developing the comprehensive strategy before the advent of CCP, as staff of the Neighborhood Law Center (NLC) or the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA). Other organizations represented include the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ—the CCP grantee), Save A Neighborhood (which works very closely with CLC), the Baltimore Police Department, and other organizations to which originators later moved while remaining engaged with CCP initiatives.

Two clusters of "core" participants were identified ("leaders" and "organizers") and they include individuals associated with the core and apprentice neighborhoods in which CCP was most active: Boyd Booth, Franklin Square, Carrollton Ridge, Harlem Park, and New Southwest. Members of the "Core Community Leaders" cluster include the resident leaders of neighborhood-based associations and organizations, and the assistant state's attorney who prosecutes housing code violations. Members of the "Core Community Organizers" cluster include the community organizers in those neighborhoods who are employed by CPHA or Community Building in Partnership. This cluster also includes an Alternative Sentencing staff member responsible for enforcing community service requirements. This member rarely communicates with neighborhood association members but communicates daily with sentenced members of the community service crews assigned to those neighborhoods.

"Rim Participants" cluster includes two categories of members. First are leaders and staff of organizations that serve as resources for the CCP neighborhoods, providing technical assistance and services in such fields as dispute resolution training, law-related education, youth programs, and substance abuse treatment and prevention. The second are residents and community-based organizations associated with two neighborhoods that participated less actively in CCP at the time of the survey; Middle East, which later "graduated" to Baltimore's Empowerment Zone and Fayette Street Outreach, an apprentice community that became a core neighborhood some months after the first survey.

While the four clusters are linked by communication and interaction between their members and the members of adjacent groups, a look at the bigger picture (i.e. the total set of CCP participants) suggests that Baltimore has a doughnut-shaped network with a hollow core. This is a common pattern among CCP networks in other cities.

Sustainability

From the outset, the CCP leadership deliberately aimed to keep funding at a low level. The concern was that higher dollar amounts might require large bureaucracies, which in turn might be less receptive to the needs of poorer communities without "grantsmanship" experience. Nevertheless, the goal of sustaining CCP has been addressed in several ways to date. The CCP concept was further disseminated through coordination with Baltimore's new $100 million federally-funded Empowerment Zone (EZ), which includes three of the original CCP core neighborhoods: Sandtown, Middle East, and Harlem Park. These three neighborhoods are "graduating" from CCP to the EZ for financial support. In return, the CCP leadership provided the entire EZ the full five-part training workshop it had developed for the apprentice communities, and the EZ leadership agreed to follow the CCP comprehensive strategy closely in its own public safety planning for the rest of the Zone.

The Year Two CCP grant application continued the program in the two remaining original core neighborhoods and extended it to an entering class of three core neighborhoods selected from the original apprentice communities: Edmonson, Mill Hill, and Reservoir Hill. In addition, the Year Two grant extended CCP to 20 new apprentice communities.

CCP leadership has sought or secured commitments of $900,000 in resources in addition to its $400,000 Year Two BJA grant. The $900,000 includes $400,000 of in-kind contributions (i.e., foot patrol officers from the Baltimore Police Department, lawyer/paralegal services from the University of Baltimore, community services crew leaders and trucks from the Department of Public Works, and *pro bono* assistance from the Neighborhood Design Center). It also includes $240,000 in Byrne Grant funds plus a private match, and $250,000 in Law Enforcement Block Grant funds.

As indicated in its Sustainment Plan, CCP leadership is searching for additional public and private funding sources. One piece of this search is a plan for an impact evaluation whose results, it is anticipated, will help the leadership eliminate or modify program components not having their desired impacts and encourage funding sources to support the effective programs.

Interim Summary

In late 1996, Michael Sarbanes was appointed as Executive Director of the Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention. His appointment was both a recognition of the sense of success that has emanated from Baltimore's efforts and the first step in broadening the Baltimore model to include the rest of Maryland. As noted in the Overview, the origins and basis of Baltimore's CCP effort is found in pre-existing community organizing which centered around improving Baltimore's troubled housing situation. CCP funding was pivotal in furthering the development of these nascent community organizations. It multiplied the number of participating neighborhoods, provided important skills to neighborhood leaders, and furthered BPD's development of community policing during an important period of departmental reinvigoration. Two lessons seem paramount—that important crime control efforts can have their origins in the community, and that these communities can develop skills to deal with complex problems.

In its first two years, Baltimore's CCP program extended the earlier successes in Boyd Booth; successfully replicated the model in three of the other four "core neighborhoods"; and brought twelve more "apprentice communities" to the launch stage for comprehensive prevention of drug trafficking and crime; and "graduated" four neighborhoods from apprentice to core status. The program has built grass-roots capacity for the core neighborhoods to effectively marshal and utilize resources from the police, prosecutor, other city agencies, and private organizations toward the goal of safer, more-orderly neighborhoods. Open questions at this time include whether the previous successes will be maintained in three of the original core neighborhoods that lie within the federally-designated Empowerment Zone (EZ), expanded in two that remain in CCP, and extended to three apprentice communities that recently "graduated" to core status. Additional questions include how CCP will weather a change in leadership, whether its partnership with the Baltimore Police Department will continue to flourish, and whether the program will achieve its sustainment goals after CCP funding expires.

An Epilogue to Baltimore's CCP Case Study

CCP Programs/Initiatives Since the Case Study Was Drafted

Three categories of CCP initiatives have occurred in Baltimore since the case study was drafted. These may be labeled extension, institutionalization, and augmentation of the comprehensive strategy implemented under CCP.

Extension of the strategy has occurred through program expansion, diffusion, and replication. Programmatically, CCP leaders report expanding the program to provide community organization in 13 core communities and training in 37 apprenticeship communities by the fall of 1997— up from 5 core communities and 12 apprentice communities when the case study was completed. Of the new core neighborhoods, the most active ones added during 1997 were Fayette Street Outreach, Edmondson Community Organization, Mill Hill, and New Southwest.

Diffusion of the CCP comprehensive strategy to Baltimore's Empowerment Zone (EZ) occurred when three of the original CCP core neighborhoods -- Middle East, Sandtown-Winchester, and Harlem Park were absorbed by the EZ. These neighborhoods "graduated" from CCP during 1996 and early 1997.

In September 1997, replication began "ramping up" in five new neighborhoods— plus a combined neighborhood made up of three original CCP core neighborhoods— with funding from HotSpot Communities (HSC), a BJA-funded program administered statewide by the Maryland Governor's Office of Crime Control and Prevention (GOCCP). GOCCP is headed by the first Baltimore CCP director, Michael Sarbanes, who designed HSC to replicate Baltimore's comprehensive CCP strategy (plus police/probation coordination) in 36 neighborhoods throughout the state. MCCCJ has administratively combined CCP and HSC because of program similarity and the fact that three original CCP core neighborhoods will receive HSC support.

Throughout 1997, several CCP initiatives were planned and carried out to institutionalize the comprehensive strategy by giving neighborhood associations the capacity to access resources directly as an alternative to using MCCCJ as an intermediary. These initiatives include:

1) Technical Assistance—CCP funds support technical assistance to neighborhood associations in problem-solving, advocacy, and financial management; the latter will assist them in obtaining grants directly;

2) Neighborhood Service Centers—CCP funds support successful efforts by neighborhood associations to use newly created Neighborhood Service Centers to obtain services from a variety of city agencies directly;

3) Public/private Partnerships—CCP-supported organizers have help their neighborhoods obtain resources directly from private-sector organizations. These include funds and worker transportation provided by the Inner Harbor Renaissance Hotel to the Franklin Square Association, and dumpsters obtained by Mill Hill from a salvage yard that has been a market for "metal men" stripping copper and other hardware from abandoned houses in the area.

Finally, augmentation of the youth component of CCP began in mid-1997 and is continuing through early 1998. New elements include youth service activities, summer programs, and leadership training, in addition to continuing dispute resolution education. The Youth Tribunals in partnership with the Department of Juvenile Justice are also underway, with planners, including youth, from five neighborhoods. A Youth Tribunal will be a diversionary program to keep youth out of the juvenile justice system while holding them accountable for their actions against individual victims and the community. Current plans are to incorporate both the Teen Court and Community Conferencing restorative justice models for youth who plead guilty to misdemeanors.

New Problems/Issues

As CCP— and the comprehensive strategy that preceded it by two years in three neighborhoods— matures, the successful track record itself is beginning to pose a new kind of problem. CCP and CPHA leaders point to an emerging restlessness and search for new challenges, among both staff and community leaders.

At the senior staff level, individuals' searches for new challenges have created turnover with bittersweet consequences. Fortunately, staff departures in Baltimore have meant "spreading the vision" rather than "leaving the scene." Departing staff have moved to positions where they are furthering the CCP vision; nevertheless, CCP partners have had to devote considerable time and effort to filling vacancies. The departure of the original CCP director to GOCCP created a gap in Baltimore but led to statewide replication of the Baltimore strategy. The departure of the MCCCJ director to become community court coordinator for the Greater Baltimore Committee is expected to strengthen neighborhoods' voices in setting punishments for residents arrested for minor violations of statutes to

maintain order; however, the resulting vacancy dominoes included promotion of the second CCP director to the MCCCJ directorship and the search for a third CCP director. Similarly, the CPHA supervisor of the CCP neighborhood organizers left to direct the housing and economic development program at Bon Secours Hospital. While his move can be expected to enhance the hospital's substantial contribution to quality of life in three of the CCP core neighborhoods, it has created a large vacuum for CPHA and the CCP partnership.

While dealing with the aftermath of turnover, senior staffs of the CCP partners have been dealing with expansion as CCP has spread to new neighborhoods and the HotSpot Communities initiative has "ramped up." HSC will involve some 60 police and probation officers, and organizers are needed for at least five new communities.

Among the early core neighborhood leaders, senior CPHA staff reports early signs of "getting tired" and "what's next?" attitudes. As threats of drugs and violence recede, older community leaders recognize more is needed to restore the neighborhood vibrancy they recall from three and four decades ago. Yet despite growing signs of community efficacy and social capital in the neighborhoods, the associations currently lack the financial and organizational capacity to undertake large-scale economic development programs. For these reasons, the CCP and CPHA leadership recognize the need for collaborative stock-taking and goal-setting as a means of sustaining the interest of current community leaders, building a new indigenous leadership cadre, and restraining primary support agencies from forging ahead into inappropriate initiatives. While enhancement of the youth component of CCP is an outcome of such collaborative planning, the leadership recognizes that more is needed.

The national emergence of “zero tolerance” policing strategies— typically crackdowns on misdemeanors and order violations— has prompted some debate within Baltimore. BPD currently uses such crackdowns in selected neighborhoods for limited time periods, and political pressure is mounting to expand use of the tactic. Both BPD and MCCCJ are currently resisting this pressure on the grounds that more police and criminal justice resources would be needed along with statutory changes to permit citations instead of arrests for the minor offenses.

Resolution of Old Problems/Issues

Baltimore's CCP was facing few significant problems at the time the case study was written. The program has moved quickly in three ways to resolve the newly emerging problems discussed above. First, CPHA has undertaken extensive staff development efforts using HSC funds to maintain capacity in

the old CCP neighborhoods, to build organizing capacity in the new CCP and HSC neighborhoods, and to transfer the knowledge and experience base from the departing staff to the new staff. Second, MCCCJ has begun to experiment with new ways of supporting work at the neighborhood level. For example, recognizing its growing need to delegate assignments and the growing capacity of neighborhood associations to absorb them, MCCCJ has recently begun giving small grants directly to selected neighborhood associations for specific tasks. Third, the CCP partners have begun launching neighborhood work groups to plan and carry out a response to a given problem at the neighborhood level (with recourse to MCCCJ and the other support organizations on an "as needed" basis).

As a result, BPD and the other partners are sensing that the nature of work is changing for staff in the communities. Beyond their former roles as implementers of solutions to neighborhood problems, neighborhood-level staff are assuming responsibilities as administrators of larger joint police/community efforts. With the expanded role of staff, isolated examples of communication problems have begun to occur (e.g. between community service crew operators and some community-based organizations).

In the neighborhoods, CCP has conducted a number of Victory Suppers, where accomplishments are recounted and celebrated. While the suppers were originally planned as a means of collecting qualitative information for a local evaluation of CCP, the celebrations have been morale-builders for community residents. Moreover, the discussions have provided a forum for planning future efforts that build on previous accomplishments, use neighborhood strengths, and address community priorities.

Synergistic Effects of CCP

Specific Outcomes of Synergy

Long lists of CCP accomplishments through early 1997 appear in the case study itself, and have been documented in progress reports to BJA. While it is arguable that these accomplishments could have been achieved by organizations operating independently with the same level of resources, the synergy itself has enhanced them in at least four ways. First, they created a cumulative effect that changed local ambiance because they have been focused in specific areas: instead of a cleaned-up lot in one block, a secure board-up a mile away, and the removal of a drug market elsewhere, a resident or visitor experiences all at once as a change in the entire character of the neighborhood. Second, because of CCP-supported communication links and technical assistance, accomplishments reflect the priorities of the neighboring communities to a greater extent than they would otherwise.

Third, for several reasons, the accomplishments are more likely to be maintained because of the synergy. Multiple entities including BPD, other agencies, community-based organizations, community organizers, and neighborhood associations— all share responsibility for the spaces in which the accomplishments occur. Less fearful residents, encouraged to pay attention to their surroundings, discourage disorder and crime by their greater presence on the street. Some drug markets and other threats to public safety, once removed, have been less likely to recur because of fences or other barriers encouraged or erected by CPTED-trained police and residents.

Fourth, the synergy facilitates efficiency. For example, instead of paying both for supervision of persons serving community service sentences and for clean-ups of blighted neighborhoods, the city pays only once when the supervised offenders on community service crews perform the clean-ups. Moreover, clean-ups and other physical enhancements in neighborhoods produce an extra public safety effect when they are carried out under CPTED principles.

More recently, the youth program expansion is moving beyond crime prevention to other objectives, such as recreation and skill development. Leadership at CCP and CPHA believe that the community interest and capacity needed to expand the youth program beyond crime prevention are themselves synergistic outcomes of earlier successes in the CCP neighborhoods. That is, reducing the visibility of drug markets and making them less violent accomplished two things: reducing the social prominence of negative role models; and reducing youths' fear of being on the streets and using available recreational facilities. At the same time, positive relationships with familiar foot patrol officers help make youth less resistant to the officers.

Synergistic Effects on Agencies

The fundamental synergistic effect on agency relationships has been the broadening of the pre-CCP partnership between CPHA and CLC to include MCCCJ and, through it, other agencies (especially BPD). The CPHA/CLC partnership incubated the strategy of legal advocacy and community organization on behalf of neighborhoods, which became the organizing principle for CCP. However, that partnership lacked the resources to carry out solutions that emerged from advocacy and organizational activities in ways that met neighborhood needs. Extension of the partnership to MCCCJ offered a mechanism through which the neighborhoods supported by CPHA and CLC could mobilize all the the relevant agencies to implement a broad spectrum of remedies for neighborhood problems. As one CPHA leader

described it, MCCCJ gave CPHA a means within local government "to raise their neighborhoods' issues to the city level."

CCP also gave CPHA and CLC new internal resources. With CCP resources, CPHA developed new capacities to mobilize agencies accessed through MCCCJ and give them the experience needed to mobilize them effectively. CPHA also hired additional staff, who offered both "bench strength" and articulate, informed advocates for their neighborhoods on a variety of local commissions and boards.

Perhaps the strongest synergistic effect on interagency relationships that is clearly attributable to CCP has been the expanded working relationship between MCCCJ and BPD. The growth of that partnership was a product of both Commissioner Frazier's arrival and the new flow of CCP resources. What began as a "resource partnership" focused on securing funding for both parties became a working partnership when Frazier encouraged the reprogramming of 20 percent of the Federally recommended $1,000,000 share of first-year CCP funds from BPD to CPHA for community organization. Later steps included BPD's permanent assignment of foot patrol officers to CCP core neighborhoods and, in the Western District, internal changes to permit those officers to mobilize tactical resources when appropriate to meet specific needs identified by the core neighborhood associations. Most recently, to enhance MCCCJ monitoring and evaluation, BPD has begun using its newly acquired geographic information system (GIS) capability to produce crime statistics specifically for CCP neighborhoods rather than for BPD sectors and beats, which overlap CCP and non-CCP neighborhoods.

Possible Effects on Crime

CCP effects on crime have been difficult to pin down, for reasons of timing and units of measurement. The CCP neighborhoods of Boyd Booth and Carrollton Ridge reportedly experienced 30- to 40-percent decreases in violent crime rates during the year preceding CCP as they implemented the organizing/legal advocacy components of the comprehensive strategy. Trends since then are less clear, primarily because the BPD administrative areas for which crime statistics are compiled mix CCP and non-CCP neighborhoods. MCCCJ expects to receive crime data for the relevant period specifically for CCP neighborhoods within a few weeks, for use in its own evaluation of CCP.

Sustainment of CCP

Sustainment of CCP Programs/Initiatives

Beyond the continuation funding described in the case study, Baltimore CCP has continued to receive public and private funds to sustain and expand the program. In July 1997, MCCCJ obtained over $1 million in HotSpots Communities funds provided by BJA and administered by the state of Maryland. Much of this funding will support replication of the Baltimore CCP strategy in additional neighborhoods. HSC funds will also increase resources for the CCP core neighborhoods of Boyd Booth, Carrollton Ridge, Fayette Street Outreach, Franklin Square, and New Southwest.

In addition, by the end of 1997, the program had obtained: $180,000 in Byrne Grant funds with $60,000 match from CLC; a $60,000 share of Baltimore's Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds; $35,000 from the Merck Foundation for youth organizing; and $5,000 each from the Abell and Annie E. Casey Foundations for the local CCP evaluation.

Sustainment of CCP Processes

For at least three reasons, prospects seem bright for sustainment of the processes created under CCP in Baltimore.

First, from the outset, Baltimore's CCP placed less emphasis (than most other grantees) on service delivery. Rather, Baltimore emphasized developing mechanisms for high-crime neighborhoods to mobilize public resources while building neighborhoods' capacities to use those resources wisely. Once created, such mechanisms develop constituencies in both the neighborhoods and permanent (i.e., non-political) local government. Consequently, it seems likely that links created by CCP will be less vulnerable to future political or economic changes than would services that can be "turned on and off" through decisions of single agencies.

Second, as discussed earlier, CCP staff turnover in Baltimore has generally occurred when a person who shared the CCP vision moved to a different public or private agency that controls resources in Baltimore. Consequently, there is a broad network of skilled, well-connected advocates for the CCP institutions who share a common vision. The diffusion of that common vision into so many agencies seems likely to sustain the CCP institutions for some time to come.

Third, as previously mentioned, CCP has been supporting technical assistance to enable neighborhoods to obtain city resources for themselves,

without intervention by CCP or MCCCJ leadership. This technical assistance should help ensure that the processes set in motion by CCP would continue even if the program itself disappeared or a change in political leadership took MCCCJ in an entirely different direction.

Final Conclusions About CCP Success

Beyond question, Baltimore's CCP has succeeded in expanding and improving the mechanisms through which residents of high-crime neighborhoods can mobilize resources to improve their quality of life. It has succeeded in developing those neighborhoods' capacities to organize themselves and to direct those resources wisely. On the basis of informal observation during site visits, the program succeeded in reducing signs of social disorder and physical decay in some very stressed neighborhoods. It has succeeded, to the extent that one could reasonably expect at this time, in institutionalizing itself both financially and organizationally into Baltimore life.

The CCP impact on crime is less clear at this writing, but program leaders and the Baltimore Police Department are taking the steps needed to estimate this figure. It is also unclear how replicable the program success is in localities that lack certain advantages that Baltimore had when CCP began. Among these are a history of strong commitment to neighborhoods; leadership in state and local government, including law enforcement, which is open to innovations that pass some degree of control to citizens and community-based organizations; and— most importantly— a network of non-profit organizations with a common vision and decades of experience in legal advocacy and community organization on behalf of the neighborhoods most severely disadvantaged by crime and substandard housing. The ongoing replication of Baltimore's CCP strategy in 36 heterogeneous communities across Maryland offers a unique opportunity to learn about the transferability of Baltimore-style CCP to other localities.

Appendix A: Selected Accomplishments

Accomplishments in CCP Core Neighborhoods

Boyd Booth

Boyd Booth is a 525-house residential neighborhood served by BPD's Southwest District. Home ownership is about 18 percent, and the residential vacancy rate is about 22 percent. In 1991, drug dealing was rampant. About that time, five residents began to organize their neighbors and demand attention from BPD. After some negotiation, a BPD community relations officer met with interested residents, got their assistance in surveillance, raided the problem houses, and arrested the then-active dealers, who were outsiders to the community. A neighborhood clean-up with Department of Public Works (DPW) assistance followed. The early efforts evolved into a community association which, even before the CCP program, negotiated standard operating arrangements with police: residents dial 911 or call "their" community officer, who responds.

Neighborhood capacity developed before CCP seems to have been an important ingredient for success. At least three active community associations exist, and CCP has worked most extensively with two of them: the Boyd Booth and Carrollton Ridge Community Associations.

The Boyd Booth Community Association history played a formative role in devising Baltimore's comprehensive strategy. With the assistance of a community organizer initially funded by the Abell Foundation, Boyd Booth mobilized a great deal of assistance from many of the agencies already mentioned. This experience was used to create a partial blueprint for the Baltimore CCP.

Because of this base, developed over two years and six months of CCP support, community association leaders described Boyd Booth as a "neighborhood they wouldn't want to leave,"—one where neighbors watch out for one another, correct each other's children, and instantly report suspicious activity before it becomes a problem. According to BPD, comparing January to August periods between 1993 and 1995, Boyd Booth saw decreases of 52 percent in violent crime, 80 percent in drug-related calls, and 80 percent in drug arrests.

Besides helping the Boyd Booth neighborhood obtain its foot patrol officer, specific contributions of CCP-funded community organizers included: guiding an update of the lot-by-lot needs assessment; getting the BPD to cooperate with "forward observers;" checking city plans for imploding and rebuilding a

block in the neighborhood; getting a street blocked off as a tot lot; providing technical assistance for a newsletter produced by neighborhood children; and acquiring public wall space for a street mural painted by community artists.

The Carrollton Ridge Community Association began organizing around 1990. The neighborhood contains substantial numbers of both blacks and whites, and the Association leader describes the organization as having a heavy Christian focus. For example, Association officers expressed concern about "setting boundaries between government and families" (i.e., relaxing church/state separation and legal restrictions on corporal punishment).

Organizational priorities have been keeping the neighborhood clean, targeting landlords to fill or maintain their vacant properties, reducing drug activity, and reducing truancy. By November, 1995, the neighborhood association was sharing a large house with a Southwest District BPD substation; at the time, community leaders described the space-sharing as "symbolic for now." The Association undertook a wide variety of projects targeted at problem landlords, building a sense of community, and social services for addicts.

By June, 1996, the year-to-year violent crime rate had dropped about 50 percent in Carrollton Ridge. Some problems remained, however. The Association president cited the need for more clean-ups. She praised the help they had gotten from Victory Outreach in this area but acknowledged that the Association had not yet begun pushing prosecutors to seek community service sentences for drug offenders from the neighborhood, so that the sentenced offenders could augment work crews. She expressed concern that Association membership growth had leveled off. She attributed the plateau to fear of getting involved; however, based on information from the community organizer, CCP leaders believed the problem was that some residents who were non-white or non-evangelical Christians felt unwelcome in the Association.

Franklin Square

Franklin Square is a neighborhood of about 5,000 people in the Western District of BPD. The neighborhood is poor and vulnerable to high crime rates. It contains scattered-site public housing and several open air drug markets, one on a main thoroughfare. The Franklin Square Community Association has existed for several years. Before the CCP grant, it worked with CLC on several drug nuisance law cases, with Bons Secours Hospital, and other non-profit housing developers to write a comprehensive housing plan. Early efforts begun with help from the CCP-funded organizer included taking back public spaces and the empowerment of long-term residents.

By June, 1996, the Community Association had received help from the CCP-funded community organizer for over a year and had some successes to show

for it. Membership had grown from 20 to 50. The Community Association was successfully running an active "hot line" to receive anonymous drug trafficking tips and pass them on to police. The president took some satisfaction from seeing their efforts were at least moving the markets around and had caused the sellers to go to "two-step" transactions, in which money was given at one point and drugs received at another; this two-step process seemed likely to discourage some purchasers. The Association had worked out a cooperative solution with police to solve a previous problem with drug dealers who jumped into a soup kitchen line when police appeared; the Association now passes out numbers to non-dealers in line so the dealers are easily identified by the police.

Other accomplishments included getting the neighborhood "adopted" by the Renaissance Hotel, getting trash removal by Victory Outreach, setting up an arrangement for the Association to notify Protective Services of unsupervised children, and successful assistance in prosecution of a slumlord with many problem properties in Franklin Square. The Association was starting work on a defensible space plan and guidelines for landlords on how to avoid renting houses to drug dealers. A problem had arisen with some drug users allowing dealers to sell drugs from their (rented) homes; complaints from the Association led to the eviction of some of the users causing this problem. Violent crime decreased about 40 percent from the preceding year.

Middle East

Middle East is a neighborhood just east of Johns Hopkins Medical School and Hospital. It lies within Historic East Baltimore, a community targeted for rebuilding by Mayor Schmoke several years ago. Schmoke's initiative had created the East Monument Street Task Force, which developed a set of recommendations and tactics for reversing community decay throughout East Baltimore. As a long-term successor to the one-shot Task Force, the Historic East Baltimore Community Action Council, Inc., (HEBCAC) was created. The agreement was made in January, 1994, and the organization became operational the following August. HEBCAC is a non-profit organization governed by a board of directors representing community residents, the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, the city of Baltimore, the state of Maryland, and local businesses.

HEBCAC undertakes activities with the following objectives: public safety; environment; economic development (i.e., "using land to create jobs"); employment development (i.e., lining up new employers, including Johns Hopkins); physical development (i.e., encouraging home ownership and improving the housing stock); communications; and youth development and education.

Under the first-year BJA grant, HEBCAC was the CCP contractor responsible for community organizing in the Middle East CCP core neighborhood. However, this organizing was a small part of HEBCAC's agenda: Middle East is only seven blocks within HEBCAC's organizing area of perhaps 120 blocks. HEBCAC had no significant role in CCP planning or proposal development, but was reportedly developing a strategy similar to the CCP. Middle East was later absorbed into the Empowerment Zone, and HEBCAC is not included in the second-year grant. Components of the strategy for Middle East included taking back public spaces, empowering the neighborhood, and involving the community.

By June, 1996, relations between CCP and HEBCAC had cooled, and CCP leadership viewed Middle East as the "weakest core neighborhood." CCP leadership attributed the problems to several causes: the Community Association president (who had been a "Committee of One" for several years) had been sidelined by a stroke; HEBCAC had made some initial tactical errors (that took on greater importance because the organization was new and untested in the neighborhood); and fear of retribution among residents was higher than in other neighborhoods.

Apprentice Neighborhood Plans

The following plans were developed during a day-long training session on comprehensive planning held in December, 1995. By March, 1996, the state of Maryland had awarded $3,500 mini-grants to carry out ten of the plans.

Park Heights

1) Safe Havens (initially to be operated by twenty-five already-trained parents on routes to school, later to be expanded to businesses and the branch library).
2) Extending substance abuse awareness programs from middle to elementary school.
3) Youth Advisory Council to issue RFP, award, and monitor grants for projects by youth.

Southwest Community Council

1) Recruit a block captain to operate on each block.
2) Inaugurate the Tot Lot (on a lot already chosen).
3) Finish the physical survey, mapping, and landlord identification needed to launch nuisance abatement suits.

Reservoir Hill

1) Mobilize residents for a drug-free community.
2) Help all schools in the neighborhood be designated as drug-free schools.

Circle Improvement Association

1) Launch a Youth Band (with ancillary drug discussions, neighborhood cleanups, and other activities).
2) Start a drug prevention program.
3) Do a clean-up and plant a community garden in a vacant lot at Norfolk & Overview.
4) Conduct reboardings of vacant houses where needed.

Belair-Edison

1) Complete block captain recruiting.
2) Start a Youth Advisory Committee.
3) Begin community-oriented policing in the neighborhood.

Patterson Place

1) Turn a vacant lot into a community tree nursery to create defensible space, to provide a youth activity, and to provide the raw materials (trees) for replication.
2) Complete a tenant-landlord accountability project whose standards the community will help informally enforce on tenants and which outline, community expectations of landlords.
3) Create Project CATCH (Citizens Against Tough Crime Houses), a phone tree for reporting/discussing crime, and present it to the police.

Irvington

1) Put up a fence and add lighting to create defensible space around the Rite-Aid Drug Store.
2) Launch a neighborhood youth community service crew.
3) Establish a Youth Advisory Council for the neighborhood.

Baltimore-Linwood

1) Launch a youth program with a party in December and a meeting in January to get the youths' ideas.
2) Finish recruiting block captains and holding block meetings on every block.
3) Hold an anti-drug/anti-crime march to launch community policing in the neighborhood.

Obstacles and Remedies for Successful Youth Programs Identified in Apprentice Community Training

Obstacle:	Parents don't get involved and kids can't get parents permission to attend the programs.
Response:	Set up activities that pull parents in to do specific jobs (arrange for sound systems, get park permits) so they can see the positive features of the program. Schedule some youth activities in public places where parents of the target population of kids will see them.
Obstacle:	The highest-risk population of kids is missed because recruiting takes place in the school.
Response:	"Wear the kids down" by recruiting and holding activities where the at-risk kids spend time. Recruit kids and run events on the drug corners—it's not as hard as it seems and the at-risk kids can't miss them. Get rid of program volunteers who don't like kids.
Obstacle:	Planned activities for kids are "uncool" so kids don't participate.
Further Discussion:	Problem is often described as kids being taunted for "acting white" if they participate. This excuse and the taunting itself may be masks for other more tractable obstacles: kids afraid to cross social geographic boundaries (e.g., to enter gang turf, enter a neighborhood of different social economic status or ethnicity) of importance to them; kids afraid to cross boundaries set by parents when kids were younger; fear/awkwardness at entering a new social

hierarchy, which is a problem any time a kid enters a new group.

Response: Locate activities where target population doesn't have to cross kids' or parents' geographic boundaries. Ask some kids to help "new kids" enter the social hierarchy that is planning or attending the activity.

Obstacle: Timing. At-risk kids need programs and adult supervision between three and six p.m. (when parents are working) and after ten p.m. (when parents are sleeping).

Responses: Plan activities at a variety of times (but in locations where neighbors won't complain about noise at late-night activities—they complain about Midnight Basketball in some locations). Lobby recreation centers to run them at the specified times.

Obstacle: Unresponsive recreation centers: poor facilities, open during school hours but closed on week-ends; schedules keep changing; activities not at best times.

Responses: Get kids to write request letters to the editor, mayor, and city council because they work better than adult letters. Call the central office downtown instead of the local center. Where some program is a component of a government or foundation grant, use the leverage. Go to the mayor's public meetings; he has staff filter through the audiences to draw people aside and follow up on problems they raise, and it works.

Appendix B: Network Analysis Strategy

Distances among the targets were measured using a structural equivalence approach (cf. Lorrain & White, 1971), which overcomes some of the shortcomings of the conventional graph theory. Following the lead of Heinz and Manikas (1992), distances among the targets were measured by determining the overlap of acquaintances for any two actors, defined here as "the degree to which the persons who are in contact with each of them are the same people (p. 840)." The main benefit of this structural equivalence approach is that it circumvents the problem of missing data and allows us to compare patterns of contact for individuals who are not interviewed. This is only possible because our sample includes a sufficient number of respondents who know both individual targets. The alternative approach (i.e. the graphic theoretic approach, which measures similarity by counting the number of links in the communication network to get from person A to X) would require the collection of data from all people in the chain.

Multidimensional scaling was used to analyze our network data. As Scott (1991, p. 151) observes, "The mathematical approach termed 'multidimensional scaling' embodies all the advantages of the conventional sociogram and its extensions (such as circle diagrams), but results in something much closer to a 'map' of the space in which the network is embedded. This is a very important advance." For the present analysis, we have used the non-metric multi-dimensional scaling technique called "smallest space analysis," which uses asymmetrical adjacency matrix of similarities and dissimilarities among the targets. (See Kruskal & Wish,1978; Scott, 1991 for a discussion of advantages over metric MDS). The data have been recoded to binary form, so that 0 indicates person X has had no prior contact with person Y and 1 indicates that X and Y have had some contact, i.e. at least "every few months." The non-metric MDS program is able to produce a matrix of Euclidean distances (based on rank orders) which is used to create a metric scatter plot. These plots are displayed as the two-dimensional figures below.

The output of MDS is a spatial display of points, where each point represents a target person in the network. The configuration of points should inform us about the pattern of affiliations and contacts in the network. The smaller the distance between two points, the greater the similarity between these two individuals with respect to their social contacts. The location of person X in multidimensional space is determined both by X's own social connections and by the connections of those who have chosen X as an affiliate. The MDS analyses were performed using SPSS Windows 6.1.

Technically, the data could be analyzed at either the individual or

organizational level and each approach has some advantages. At this time, we have decided to analyze the results at the individual level, primarily because of some highly visible individuals who played central roles in the conceptualization and implementation of CCP programs. Still, we are able to connect individuals to organizations, and tend to view them as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated. We are likely to use organizations as the unit of analysis for a planned longitudinal analysis because of the attrition problem in network and panel data.

To determine the appropriate number of dimensions for the data, a series of analyses were performed and a "stress" statistic was calculated for each solution. In MDS, stress is the most widely used goodness-of-fit measure for dimensionality, with smaller values indicating that the solution is a better fit to the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).[4] By plotting the stress values for solutions with up to four dimensions, it became apparent that the "elbow" point (i.e. where any additional increase in the number of dimensions fails to yield sizeable reductions in stress) occurs at two dimensions. This pattern was evident at all five sites, and hence, we elected to use a two-dimensional solution across the board. Beyond relative stress levels there is the issue of absolute stress values. Stress values ranged from 18 to 20 percent, with one exception (25%). These values are considered acceptable in the literature, although figures above 20 percent suggest a weak fit (see Kruskal, 1964; Scott, 1991).

The data were analyzed, presented, and interpreted separately for each CCP site. Statistics reported include stress values calculated from Kruskal's Stress Formula 1 and the squared correlation (R^2). The R^2 value indicates the proportion of variance of the disparity matrix data that is accounted for by their corresponding distances.

After calculating the solution and mapping a multidimensional configuration, the final step is interpretation. This involves assigning meaning to the dimensions and providing some explanation for the observed arrangement of points in space. In other words, what do the clusters of points mean and how should they be interpreted? As Scott notes (1991, p. 166), "...this process of interpretation is a creative and imaginative act on the part of the researcher. It is not something that can be produced by a computer alone."

---

[4]Technically, stress is defined as "the square root of a normalized 'residual sum of squares.'" Dimensionality is defined as "the number of coordinate axes, that is, the number of coordinate values used to locate a point in the space." (Kruskal &Wish, 1978, p. 48-49).

Limitations and Cautions

We should be cautious not to over-interpret or draw causal inferences about the observed networks for several reasons. First, these analyses and graphic presentations provide a one-time snapshot of interactions between individuals early in the CCP project. Consequently, these data will not allow us to tease out any pre-existing relationships and networks that may be operating. Thus, whether these networks are CCP-induced or reflect pre-existing relationships is unknown. A longitudinal look at these networks is currently in progress to see how these linkages change during the course of the CCP funding. Combined with careful fieldwork, this should give us a stronger assessment of CCP's contribution. Second, these analyses are limited to interactions between individuals, which may or may not reflect the nature and extent of partnerships between agencies. To capture interagency contacts, our unit of analysis for the longitudinal analysis will be the organization/agency rather than the individual (This analysis strategy also avoids the individual-level attrition problem that is always present in longitudinal data). Finally, the present analysis is limited by the nature of the original sample. Who ends up in the sample can have a large influence on the outcome of network analysis. While we are satisfied that this problem has been minimized by allowing sites to self-define a comprehensive list of CCP participants, nevertheless, we suspect that some individuals and groups have been overlooked at each site. Generally speaking, one might characterize this network analysis as a study of "elites" — in this case, community, city and agency leaders. Networks that may exist among street-level employees and community volunteers are under-represented (although not completely absent) from this analysis.

Despite these limitations, network analysis provides an important empirical tool for examining the nature and extent of community-based partnerships and coalitions. While it is easy to talk about "interagency cooperation" in grant proposals or in personal interviews, it is not so easy to create the illusion of a network (for the benefit of researchers and others) when members of that network are asked, individually, about their frequency of interaction with one another. The results here suggest that the number and density of networks varies by site and that resultant patterns of contact are generally consistent with our field observations.

References

Heinz, J. P., & Manikas, P. M. (1992). "Networks Among Elites in a Criminal Justice System." Law and Society Review, 26: 831-861.

Knoke, D., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1982). Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Knoke, D. (1993). "Networks of Elite Structure and Decision Making," Sociological Methods & Research, 22: 23-45.

Kruskal, J. B., & Wish, M. (1978). Multidimensional Scaling. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Laumann, E. O., Marsden, P. V., & Prensky, D. (1982). "The boundary specification problem in network analysis." In R. S. Burt & M. J. Minor (eds.) Applied Network Analysis: Structural Methodology for Empirical Social Research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Lorrain, F., & White, H.C. (1971). "Structural equivalence of individuals in social networks." Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1.

Scott, J. (1991). Social Network Analysis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Wasserman, S., & Galaskiewicz, J. (1994, ed.). Advances in Social Network Analysis. Newbury Park, CA:Sage.

Wasserman, S., & Galaskiewicz, J. (1993, ed.). "Advances in Sociology from Network Analysis."Special issue of Sociological Methods & Research.