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Research and program evaluation in Illinois: Studies on drug abuse and violent crime

Community Policing in Chicago, Years Five and Six: An Interim Report

May 1999

Prepared by
Chicago Community Policing
Evaluation Consortium

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Executive Summary

This is the fifth report on Chicago's community-policing program. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) began in April 1993. After an experimental period in five police districts, the program was expanded to encompass the entire city. According to this strategy, teams of officers are given long-term assignments to each of the city's 279 police beats. They are to spend most of their time responding to calls and working on prevention projects in their assigned area; to enable them to do so, rapid response units are assigned excess or low-priority calls. The problem-solving efforts of beat officers are supported by a coordinated system for delivering city services. By May 1995, virtually all uniformed officers had completed two days of problem-solving training, including instruction on how to use the service-delivery process. Beat teams are supervised by sergeants and mid-level managers who have received special training on several occasions. Civilian district advisory committees were created in all 25 districts, and the districts all began holding beat community meetings on a regular basis by June 1995. Each police district had the capacity to generate basic analytic crime maps by August 1995, and by that autumn organizing and problem-solving training sessions for the general public were being conducted across the city by teams of civilians and police officers.

A new planning process was created in 1996. It begins with the formal identification of beat problems and the resources required to attack them, and culminates in the formulation of beat, district and area plans that respond to those needs. Neighborhood residents are to be involved in crafting beat plans, through regular community meetings and advisory committees. During 1997, high-level tutorials were held for district managers to help them develop better plans. An advanced crime-mapping system was developed; data terminals were installed in patrol cars, and a modern database management system has been developed for the agency. The city's Office of Emergency Communication was formed to manage police and fire calls, using a sophisticated and highly computerized dispatching system. Interagency task forces and a bureau charged with enforcing city ordinances have been formed, and the city attorney's office has been mobilized to address problems created by drug houses and negligent landlords.

In 1993, the city created the CAPS Implementation Office. It is composed of a staff of civilian community outreach workers who are charged with assisting beat and district projects and sustaining participation in beat community meetings. The office has since added more staff members to support the court advocacy program and a new emphasis on housing and land use issues. Later, a housing court unit was added to work in conjunction with the city attorney's office. In 1998, the Implementation Office expanded to include organizers employed by the city and nonprofit organizations to conduct a new community mobilization effort. The Implementation Office has also taken over the coordination of city services, a task earlier assigned to the Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information. Beginning in 1996, the city has mounted a substantial civic education effort to support CAPS. Television and radio programs, billboards, videos, brochures, mailings, festival booths, and district and citywide rallies were targeted at promoting awareness of CAPS and involvement in its activities. In 1997, civilian and police trainers were added to the staff of the department's Education and Training Division. They are to deliver training and technical assistance to neighborhoods, community organizations and police beats.

The fifth report presents an overview of evaluation efforts since the release of the previous report in November 1997.

Citizen Involvement

Chicago's community policing effort features extensive roles for the public, and the first section of the report describes trends in citizen involvement. Since its inception, resident participation in the program has been one of its most significant successes. A large fraction of the city's population knows about the program. Since 1996, recognition of CAPS has grown from 53 percent to 79 percent. Over that period awareness grew among all major subgroups, with gains of 20 percentage points or more registered by most. Awareness of the program went up the most among young adults, and the least (but still grew by more than 15 percentage points) among older Chicagoans and Spanish speakers. Gaps *between* groups have not been erased, however. The largest cleavages are between high school graduates and those with less education, between English and Spanish-speakers, and moderate- versus low-income people. Differences among racial groups are relatively small, with African-Americans being the most likely to know about the program.

The largest source of information about the program is television; in 1998, almost 40 percent of Chicagoans recalled hearing about CAPS on television, a figure that has risen from 16 percent since 1996. The second most frequent way people recalled hearing about CAPS was word of mouth, including from a neighbor or friend; between 1996 and 1998, talk about the program doubled in frequency, to about 20 percent. There were also noticeable increases in the extent to which people reported hearing about CAPS via posters or signs, and from brochures, flyers or newsletters. Radio became a more common source of awareness between 1996 and 1997, and held steady in 1998. Television and personal communication were most frequently cited as a source of CAPS information by less educated people; newspapers were mentioned by more educated respondents. Television was most frequently cited by young people. Latinos relied on television; whites read about CAPS in newspapers; African-Americans heard about it from other people, by a smaller margin. Men heard about CAPS on television; women via personal conversations. Neighborhood newspapers were principally a source of information for homeowners.

Growth in CAPS awareness reflects in part the effects of a diverse and aggressive marketing effort coordinated by the city's CAPS Implementation Office. The campaign features promotional spots on radio and television, ads in local newspapers, posters at rapid transit stops and high traffic areas, CAPS advertisements on buses and billboards. The Implementation Office also advertises schedules for beat community meetings and distributes promotional material to community organizations, libraries, businesses, churches and schools. Newsletters have been distributed both citywide and in targeted areas, and city workers receive information about CAPS and the schedule for meetings in their beat. Staff members attend festivals, rallies, marches and prayer vigils. The city has also hosted a number of large workshops, conferences, conventions and neighborhood assemblies, and appreciation events for CAPS volunteers.

Actual involvement in the program remains constant, but high. During the first 11 months of 1998, an average of 234 beat community meetings were held each month, and attendance averaged 6,000 persons. Yearly attendance has grown from 59,000 in 1995 to over 66,000 in 1998. During the 47-month period between January 1995 and November 1998, a total of about 250,000 Chicagoans attended a meeting.

Involvement continues to be strong among some of the city's poorest and most crime-ridden communities. Compared to many other programs, participation in CAPS has been sustained in many of the places needing it most. Beat meeting attendance rates are highest in predominately African-American areas, while rates of participation in largely white areas are lower. Participation among Latinos is highest where substantial "critical masses" of Latinos reside, but this does not represent a large number of beats. In general, attendance rates are higher in lower-income areas where people do not have much education. Attendance is also somewhat higher in areas where test scores for the city's public school students are low and truancy rates are high, and more frequent where residents have health problems. Finally, participation is highest in high-crime areas. Attendance rates are positively correlated with the murder rate and with the rate for gun-related crimes of all kinds. The link between high-volume property crimes and participation is weaker, and stands at about zero for burglary and auto theft.

The 1998 survey enabled us to examine the factors that lead people to attend beat meetings. Community factors play a big role in stimulating involvement: beat meeting attendance is strongly linked to civic engagement, measured by involvement in an array of local organizations. While television increased awareness, it did not appear to stimulate actual involvement. Personal contact, on the other hand, does lead people to attend. Overall, 14 percent of Chicagoans reported attending a beat meeting during the past year, and those who attended went an average of almost four times. Based on the survey, those who attended thought beat meetings were productive and led to constructive action. However, direct observation of a large sample of beat community meetings led to a somewhat more pessimistic conclusion. During 1998 observers attended 459 meetings and made a record of what went on there. In general the meetings were good at the mechanics: they had clear agendas, information was distributed about crime patterns, a civilian co-leader was frequently there to help run the meeting, and a majority were effectively run. There was almost always an airing of local issues, but the meetings were weak at finding solutions to problems. Most actions were proposed by the police rather than residents, and the percentage of meetings at which solutions were discussed actually declined between 1995 and 1998. Residents were particularly ineffective at reporting back to the group about their recent problem-solving efforts. Volunteers were seldom recruited, and it was rare that residents left a meeting with a clear commitment to action.

The evaluation also interviewed a large sample of local CAPS activists, repeating a study that was conducted in 1997. They did not see many changes, but they generally were satisfied with the program on both occasions. Substantial majorities think the police are effectively fostering resident involvement in the program, that their district commander is doing a good job, and that their district's advisory committee is effective. Police officers who attend beat community meetings were also surveyed, and they were satisfied with how they were going. More than three-quarters were happy with levels of attendance, and almost all of them felt welcomed by the community members who were present.

Building Collective Efficacy

Another section of the report describes the inauguration of a new community organizing initiative that aims to rebuild the collective efficacy of city neighborhoods. Communities vary tremendously in their ability to solve problems on their own and to form partnerships with police and other agencies to tackle

others. Some areas are richly endowed with active community organizations, while others support only a few struggling civic associations. In some areas neighbors feel they can count on one another to watch out for trouble and even to intervene on their behalf, while in others residents believe that they are on their own, and do not even trust their immediate neighbors. Some communities have a proven capacity to get the help they need from public and private agencies, while others do not have any significant "downtown" connections they can mobilize for their collective benefit. Researchers have identified these factors as elements of what is known as "collective efficacy." In places where that is high, residents represent the norms of the community by stepping forward to safeguard them. They support a dense network of local organizations that can coordinate responses to problems when they emerge, and they can command resources from "downtown" when they are required.

The city's new initiative aims to build block-level organizations where there are none, involve existing organizations in CAPS, teach residents to solve problems in concert with beat officers, increase participation in beat community meetings and "jump start" local problem-solving projects. It is focusing its attention on some of the city's most troubled beats. The city's CAPS Implementation Office is coordinating the efforts of about 40 organizers working in approximately 90 target beats throughout the city. Some of the organizers work directly for the city, while others are on the staff of community-based organizations that have received contracts to conduct organizing projects. Their efforts represent a major new thrust for the city's program on the "citizen side" of community policing. There has always been a commitment to the importance of involving both partners in the community policing equation, but with a few exceptions the bulk of the city's investment has been on the police side of CAPS. This new initiative is slated to involve nearly one-third of the city's beats, and will test the ability of city government and community-based agencies to strengthen or build the efficacy of troubled neighborhoods.

The organizers vary dramatically in their professional experience, but all have had some training and refresher courses. The organizers working directly for the city are assigned to beats based on their background, language skills and familiarity with particular neighborhoods. Their activities are directed by a team of area coordinators that report to the Implementation Office. The contract agencies are locally-based organizations with roots in particular communities. Their organizers have worked independently of the Implementation Office, although they attend some training and coordination meetings. All of the city's organizers and nine of the 12 agencies are funded through the city's corporate budget; the remainder are funded by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC).

The problems the organizers face are considerable. Residents of the targeted areas are disproportionately poor, many do not have much education and few own their own home. A survey we conducted in a sample of targeted beats reveals that most lay below the city average on every relevant dimension. They are characterized by low levels of informal social control and relatively low levels of organizational involvement. Most were below the city average in their ability to mobilize politically to protect their interests. Residents of almost all of the beats were pessimistic about the quality of police service in their community; they did not think police were doing a very good job at controlling crime and disorder, and they felt that police were not particularly responsive to the concerns of residents.

This year's report examines the goals of the project, the activities of the organizers and some of the implementation problems that the program has encountered thus far. The organizers do many things:

they provide information about CAPS, organize marches and prayer vigils, hold educational workshops, provide city service information, work with local police and beat facilitators, and assist in problem identification and problem solving. They meet regularly with residents, police, church groups, businesses, block clubs and city departments. They also facilitate training and educational sessions for residents on different topics: problem solving, requesting city services, Adopt-A-Street, landlord training and block club organizing. They spend a great deal of time evangelizing for CAPS. They approach block clubs, local school councils, community organizations, churches and community leaders about getting involved. They post flyers and even do door-to-door canvassing. Once the organizers get people to the beat meetings, they try to motivate them to voice their concerns and act on specific issues: loitering, drug sales, violence, gang activity, prostitution, building issues, graffiti, gang intimidation and public drinking. Community empowerment and self-sufficiency are key goals of CAPS, and the organizers are cautioned against taking ownership of community problems. They are expected to provide direction and assistance in problem solving, but not to solve the problem themselves. Residents develop confidence in themselves primarily when they achieve something on their own.

The report also reviews some of the larger programmatic issues that this initiative raises. Like other aspects of the program, these will be examined in detail in the next evaluation report. One is whether an organizing style that stresses partnerships and cooperation, and “working within the system,” can be as effective as one that employs confrontation and conflict to build an “independent” community capacity to get things done. This project raises the question of whether the city needs to fund its critics. Another issue is the comparative effectiveness of conducting community organizing as a city-managed enterprise, versus “contracting out” this function. Among other issues, this includes the risk of supplantation, or the diversion of organizing funds toward other — worthy — goals perhaps dearer to the hearts of the city’s partner organizations. We have also observed the involvement of the problem-solving vehicles created by CAPS in struggles over gentrification in several communities, so we are paying special attention to this issue in diverse areas. Finally, the study will address questions associated with the renewal of collective efficacy in the city’s neighborhoods. What kind of success will the organizers have in creating viable community organizations? Is it possible to create lasting organizations in high turnover areas? Which strategies work and which do not? Where do strategies work, and why? What kinds of resources are needed to establish a working organizational infrastructure in the worst-off areas?

Citywide Program Implementation

The largest component of this year’s report examines the implementation of CAPS in the city’s 25 police districts. This section focuses on how effectively the CAPS program has been put in place and how entrenched the strategy is in the department’s daily operations. For this purpose, specific elements of the program were divided into four categories. Each was examined from a number of vantage points. A total of 125 lengthy personal interviews were conducted with police personnel and civilian district advisory committee chairs. More than 1,800 officers were surveyed at roll call and during beat community meetings. Another 240 beat officers and sergeants, and 197 civilian beat facilitators, were surveyed before being trained on how to conduct better beat meetings. All 25 civilian district administrative managers were surveyed as well. The evaluators also observed a large number of training sessions, management seminars, and planning and strategy meetings that were attended by district and

area personnel. This is the third study of program implementation, so we were also able to assess the city's progress on many key dimensions over time.

The first grouping included **beat teamwork and problem solving** activities. Overall, 16 districts received a passing grade of "satisfactory" for this aspect of the program, and nine were below par. Some of the better-implemented program components in this category were the utilization of the department's computerized crime analysis system, continuity of beat assignment, beat integrity and composition of beat teams. Intra-watch information exchange came off the worst because of the infrequency with which it is carried out, followed by utilization of key department forms that enlist the aid of support units, the intervention of sergeants to correct dispatching problems and the quality of beat plans. While officers' workloads occasionally permitted them to engage in preventive work, most were reluctant to request time away from radio calls to do so. Supervisors have assumed beat responsibilities, from team supervision to community meeting accountabilities, but many resent that they have increased duties for which they are not paid.

The second group of activities involved **district teamwork and planning**. Thirteen districts received a satisfactory rating or better on this dimension, while 12 were less than satisfactory. Half of the latter received a "poor," our lowest rating. Four of the five components of this category were often poorly implemented, including the effectiveness of the sector teams and district management team meetings, and the usefulness and dissemination of the districts' plans. The only program component that received an overall rating of "satisfactory" was the involvement of district advisory committee chairs in the district management team. Team meetings at the sector and district management levels were held on an infrequent basis, and district plans (none of which had yet been approved during this year's study period) were not considered to be worthwhile by more than half the commanders.

The effectiveness of **district management** was also assessed. Fifteen districts received a satisfactory score, including three that were doing very well. The performance of 10 districts was judged to be unsatisfactory, and one of them received a "very poor" rating. We observed only a handful of watch commanders who had managed to carve out a meaningful role for themselves in the Patrol Division's strategy, while many others lamented that they had no obvious CAPS-related capacity nor the time to engage in any additional functions. There were a few district commanders who were effectively supporting the program, but most simply met the main requirements of the program, and few had launched any innovative efforts on their own initiative. The civilian administrative managers are, on the whole, confident of their role in actual district management, but are not as optimistic about the future of the position within the department. With beat team sergeants becoming more adept in their leadership roles, neighborhood relations sergeants' involvement in CAPS has changed over the years. Neighborhood Relations offices continue to be a helpful, supportive contact for advisory committee chairs, who judged their efforts to be very good throughout the city.


Community partnerships were satisfactory in 13 districts, but below par in the remaining 12 areas. Among the activities in this category, court advocacy committees and beat community meetings were the most highly rated aspects of the program. Beat facilitators have begun running meetings in concert with beat team sergeants in many areas, and attendance is perceived to be improving. However, demographic representativeness continues to be difficult to achieve. The district's advisory committees were judged to be the weakest link in this aspect of the CAPS program, with many believing that a clear

role for them is elusive. In spite of this, many advisory committees are composed of hard-working and accomplished subcommittees.

This section concludes that CAPS implementation is at a crossroads. While the structure of the organization has changed to accommodate the new program, the new roles and responsibilities it created are being only fitfully carried out. Innovation has reached a standstill. Key mid-level managers are not well informed about the program, and do not feel responsible for ensuring its success. Several key aspects of the 1996 CAPS plan have been revised and reversed. Compared to past years, progress has been slight since our last report.

Community Support Initiatives

The final section of the report summarizes selected initiatives that have taken place during the course of the year, including community involvement in regulating liquor licenses, initiatives in Housing Court and the city's Law Department, and the creation of the Department of Administrative Hearings. Since the last evaluation report there has been increased attention to problems associated with liquor sales. The city has developed or made available more tools for regulating or even eliminating problem liquor establishments. One is the Vote Dry Referendum, which led to the closing of a significant number of liquor outlets. Another resource for tackling neighborhood level problems is Housing Court and the Law Department. Through these bodies, residents can take an active role in helping to identify and attack problem buildings in their neighborhood. This initiative has heavily involved the city's CAPS Implementation Office, as well as the Strategic Inspections Task Force, the Corporation Counsel, the Court Advocacy program and representatives of the Cook County court system. Collectively, these programs give residents and police the leverage to force landlords to clean up or sell buildings that are creating problems in a community. The report also discusses the formation of the Department of Administrative Hearings, which is the first municipal administrative adjudicatory system in the nation. It provides another mechanism for tackling "quality of life" problems through the enforcement of city ordinances via special hearing officers rather than by the court system.



Community Policing in Chicago, Years Five-Six

Introduction

This is the fifth in a series of reports examining Chicago's community-policing program. CAPS (Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy) began in April 1993. An experimental program was launched in five police districts, and many operational aspects of CAPS were field-tested during the subsequent 18 months. The program then began to encompass the entire city. A coordinated system for delivering city services in response to police service requests was operational citywide by July 1994. During the fall of 1994 the 20 remaining police districts began to divide their officers into rapid response units and beat teams.

According to the CAPS strategy, beat officers spend most of their time responding to calls and working on prevention projects in their assigned areas; rapid response units handle excess calls to enable beat teams to remain in their areas for most of their working hours. Sergeants and mid-level managers went through several training programs, and between January and May 1995, virtually all uniformed officers completed two days of problem-solving training. By then, civilian administrative managers had been assigned to all of the districts. Civilian District Advisory Committees were created in all 25 districts. The districts all began holding beat community meetings on a regular basis by June 1995, and they had the capacity to generate analytic crime maps by August 1995. By autumn 1995, organizing and problem-solving training sessions for the general public were being conducted across the city by teams of civilians and police officers.

A department general order released on April 29, 1996, codified many organizational features of the program. It created a new planning process that begins with the formal identification of beat problems and the resources required to attack them, and culminates in the formulation of district and area plans that respond to those needs. During 1997, high-level tutorials were held for district managers to help them develop better plans. Chicago's program envisions the formation of police-citizen partnerships for problem solving, so the 1996 general order directs beat officers to participate in a wide range of community meetings and events to ensure community input in setting their priorities. Beat plans are supposed to identify specific individuals or groups with whom officers will coordinate their efforts against the beat's priority problems. The role of sergeants who supervise the beat teams was clarified, and special training sessions were held for them. Leadership training was also conducted for many lieutenants, who have taken on new managerial roles. In the ensuing months new technology was introduced to the department. A more advanced crime-mapping system was developed; data terminals were installed in patrol cars, and a modern database management system was developed for the agency. The city's Office of Emergency Communications was formed to manage police and fire calls using a sophisticated and highly computerized dispatching system. The Strategic Inspections Task Force was formed in November 1996 to coordinate the efforts of police and other city agencies against gang and drug houses, and negligent landlords. Also in 1996, work on the first of the city's Super Blocks began. This project focuses the efforts of public and private agencies on particularly troubled blocks where residents can potentially be mobilized to reclaim their streets.

Between 1996 and 1998 the city also expanded its staff of community outreach workers, who are charged with assisting beat and district projects and sustaining participation in beat community meetings. The city also added more staff members to support the court advocacy program to place a new emphasis on housing and land use issues. Later, a housing court unit was added to work in conjunction with the city attorney's office. The end of 1996 saw the conclusion of the first joint police-citizen training effort, which fielded an organizing and education program in almost all of the city's 279 police beats. Early in 1997, civilian and police trainers were added to the staff of the department's Education and Training Division. They were to tailor the city's future training and technical assistance efforts to the needs of individual neighborhoods, community organizations and police beats. Special training sessions were held for sergeants who supervise beat teams. Beginning in 1996, the city mounted a substantial civic education effort to support CAPS. Television and radio programs, billboards, videos, brochures, mailings, festival booths, and district and citywide rallies were targeted at promoting awareness of CAPS and involvement in its activities. In addition, city attorneys have been assigned to selected district stations to work directly with officers on drug and gang problems in their beats. In a similar vein, the Cook County state's attorney has begun a community prosecutions program in which attorneys working out of a local North Side office intercede in a range of lower-level crime cases such as vandalism and mob action. Two additional offices are expected to open in the coming year.

Since the 1997 report there has been a further expansion of the city's community organizing effort. Organizers employed by the city and nonprofit organizations have been assigned specific targets for their community mobilization efforts. Block club conventions, a massive neighborhood assembly, CAPS rallies and a national conference on community policing have showcased Chicago's efforts. A new city department has been created that consolidates many kinds of CAPS-related civil cases for administrative adjudication, removing them from the courts. A new round of training has been held for beat officers, their sergeants, and civilian facilitators identified for each beat. Some of the police department's highest-ranking personnel have been involved in further CAPS training and planning sessions. Staffing levels of the Chicago Housing Authority's police agency have been reduced dramatically, and police districts that serve public housing areas have been called upon to pick up the slack. Finally, the program has experienced its first significant change in leadership since its inception. A new superintendent of police has been appointed and one of the original CAPS co-managers has departed.

This report presents an overview of evaluation efforts since the release of the last report in November 1997. At the end there is a list of detailed studies that have been completed; all of them are available on the World Wide Web at <http://www.nwu.edu/IPR/publications/policing.html>. The next section of this report examines citizen involvement in CAPS. Chicago's community-policing effort features extensive roles for the public, and this section describes trends in beat community meeting attendance, the public's awareness of the program, and patterns of involvement in CAPS. It examines the impact of the city's strategy for extending awareness of the program through a mass media outreach campaign. It also reports on what happens at beat meetings, based on an analysis of observations conducted throughout 1998. This section concludes with an examination of citizen participation as viewed by two key groups. One is a large sample of CAPS activists— individuals who play key roles in making the program work at the grass-roots level. The other is police officers who attend beat

community meetings. Both were quite positive about the citizen-involvement components of the program.

The next section of the report describes the inauguration of a new community organizing initiative by the city. It is aimed at increasing participation in beat community meetings and involvement in problem-solving projects in some of the city's most troubled beats. The city's CAPS Implementation Office coordinates the efforts of 37 community organizers working in approximately 90 beats throughout the city. This year's report examines the philosophy of the project and the activities of the organizers, and looks at some of the implementation problems the program has encountered thus far. It also reviews some of the larger programmatic issues that this initiative raises, including the roles of and relationship between government and independent community-based organizations as they attempt to rebuild the collective efficacy of communities in need.

The largest component of this year's report examines the implementation of CAPS in the city's 25 police districts. This evaluation focused on how effectively specific elements of the CAPS program have been put in place and how entrenched the CAPS strategy is in the Patrol Division's day-to-day operations. Using a variety of data sources, we assessed how far along the districts are in implementing the program's various elements, explored obstacles and inroads, and analyzed the strength of CAPS-related leadership at the district level. Program components related to teamwork and planning at all levels are examined individually and as they relate to the community partnership and problem solving. At the end of narrative sections, rating charts are provided for each category of components. The section closes with a summary of findings and a "big picture" conclusion.

The final section summarizes selected initiatives that have taken place during the course of the year, including community involvement in regulating liquor licenses, initiatives in Housing Court and the Law Department, and the continued development of the Department of Administrative Hearings. Since the last evaluation report there has been increased attention to problems associated with liquor sales. The city has developed and made available more tools for regulating or even eliminating problem liquor establishments. One is the Vote Dry Referendum which, having passed in several areas in the November 1998 election, led to the closing of a significant number of liquor sales outlets in those communities. However, controversy over this tactic has been substantial. Another resource for tackling neighborhood-level problems is Housing Court and the Law Department. Through these bodies, residents can take an active role in helping to identify and attack problem buildings in their neighborhood. This initiative has heavily involved the city's CAPS Implementation Office, as well as the Strategic Inspections Task Force, the Corporation Counsel, the Court Advocacy program and representatives of the Cook County court system. Collectively these programs give residents and police the leverage to force landlords to clean up or sell buildings that are creating problems in a community. This section of the report also discusses the formation of the Department of Administrative Hearings, which is the first municipal administrative adjudication system in the nation. It provides another mechanism for tackling "quality of life" problems through the enforcement of city ordinances via special hearing officers rather than the court system.

Citizen Involvement

One of the unique features of Chicago's policing program is the significant role played by the public. The CAPS model calls for formation of partnerships between police and citizens. Neighborhood residents are elicited to help identify problems, formulate solutions, and, when possible, to play an active role in solving them. The police are committed to working with residents, sharing information with the public and taking their concerns seriously when setting policing priorities. Important features of the program were designed to facilitate the development of closer working relationships between police and beat residents. This included the formation of special teams assigned to specific beats all over the city, and a dispatching policy that keeps these teams on their beat with enough free time to work with the community and engage in proactive problem solving. Each district has an advisory committee that regularly meets with commanders and their management teams to discuss local problems and priorities. They also sponsor subcommittees that focus on specific issues, ranging from the needs of senior citizens to housing. Many more get involved through community meetings held regularly in every beat. These meetings bring together police, residents and community activists, and they often are joined by representatives of city agencies and local political leaders. In this venue they are to discuss neighborhood problems and who needs to do what in order to solve them.

Awareness of the Program

Because so much of the program involves citizen participation, the CAPS evaluation focuses extensively on its visibility in the community and factors that are associated with actual involvement in its activities. In order to assess the visibility of the city's program, a survey of Chicago residents was conducted between April and September 1998. About half the interviews were completed by the end of June, 70 percent by the end of July, and 98 percent by the end of August. The interviews were conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois-Chicago. A total of 2,937 adult Chicago residents were interviewed by telephone, in either English or Spanish. Of the 502 respondents classified as Latinos, 58 percent preferred to be interviewed in Spanish, and in analyses below they are referred to as "Spanish-speakers." Responding households were selected using random-digit dialing, so that both listed and unlisted telephone numbers could be reached. For analytical purposes, respondents were weighted to correct for the number of adults and telephone lines in their household. The response rate for the survey was 41 percent.

In a citywide survey conducted in the spring of 1996, 53 percent of Chicago residents reported that they were either aware that the Chicago Police Department had adopted community policing or had heard about the CAPS program. One year later, 68 percent reported knowing about the program, and in 1998 that figure stood at 79 percent. These figures were derived from responses to two questions. The first briefly described a new community-policing program and asked respondents if they had heard about it in Chicago; 36 percent had. The remainder were asked specifically if they had heard about "CAPS, meaning Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy." About 65 percent of the remainder recalled the program on the basis of its title.

Table 1 presents the percentage of survey respondents who knew about the CAPS program among major population groups in the city. The calculations are based on data that has been weighted so yearly sampling fluctuations in the racial distribution of respondents are controlled for, making the figures more comparable across time. Differences between the 1996 and 1998 findings indicate that recognition of CAPS has increased substantially within every group over time. It went up the most — from 46 to 76 percent, or 30 percentage points — among younger adults (under age 30). CAPS awareness went up by 25 percentage points or more among many other groups, including both males and females, blacks and whites, and renters and homeowners. Gains of 20 percentage points or more were registered by almost all categories of respondents. This included respondents from both low-income and moderate-income households, a division made at an annual income of \$20,000. The most modest gains in CAPS awareness were reported by respondents who were interviewed in Spanish (from 47 to 65 percent, or an 18 percentage point gain) and those over age 65 (up 19 percent).

Table 1
Personal Background and Awareness of CAPS, 1996-1998

	1996	1997	1998		1996	1997	1998
Total percent aware	53%	68%	79%				
whites	52	73	78	renters	50	67	75
blacks	58	74	84	owners	58	74	83
Latinos	51	62	73	low income	48	59	69
Spanish	47	51	65	mod. income	59	76	84
English	54	71	80	not graduated	41	54	62
age 18-29	46	66	76	high school graduate	56	73	82
age 30-49	61	74	83	female	50	66	76
age 50-64	53	74	80	male	59	75	87
age 65 plus	46	53	65	<i>Number of Cases</i>	<i>1868</i>	<i>3066</i>	<i>2937</i>

Note: subgroup percentages based on data weighted to standardize the racial composition of the samples across years.

While program recognition generally increased over this time period, existing gaps *between* groups were by and large not erased. In 1998, the largest cleavage in the city's population was between high school graduates and those with less education; at recognition levels of 82 and 62 percent, they were separated by 20 percentage points. Gaps of about 15 percentage points were apparent between English and Spanish speakers, low- and moderate-income people, and between senior citizens and those aged 30 through 64. Differences in CAPS awareness among racial groups were relatively small: African-Americans stood somewhat above whites, while Latinos were least likely to be aware of the program. Program awareness increased the least among Latinos (by 22 percentage points) between 1996 and 1998.

This growth in CAPS awareness reflects in part the effects of a diverse and aggressive marketing effort coordinated by the city's CAPS Implementation Office. The mass media campaign began in early 1997. It features promotional spots on radio and television, ads in local newspapers, posters at rapid transit stops and high traffic areas, buses brightly festooned with CAPS advertisements, and billboards. The total budget for the 1997 media outreach program was over \$1.5 million; it exceeded \$1.6 million in 1998, and is budgeted at about that level for 1999. In 1998, the radio budget of about \$650,000 included announcements on Spanish-language stations. The television budget was about \$835,000, for spot commercials in English and Spanish on both broadcast and cable channels, including a sports network. The half-hour Crime Watch series continued to be presented on two cable channels, and during 1998 it began to be broadcast on the local NBC affiliate on Sunday mornings. It is estimated that 90,000 viewers saw the initial episode. The CAPS Implementation Office also spent about \$30,000 for newspaper ads, another \$30,000 for advertising on billboards and posters, and \$75,000 for advertising on Chicago Transit Authority vehicles and platforms.

The Implementation Office engages in many other activities that promote CAPS and encourage participation in its activities. Schedules for beat community meetings are posted on the Internet and displayed on the city's cable channel. Program materials are distributed to community organizations, libraries, businesses, churches and schools. For example, 130,000 copies of the *On The Beat* newsletter (50,000 of which were in Spanish) were distributed in September and October of 1998. Targeted mailings have been conducted in selected areas, with local sponsors ranging from a bank to a residential property management company. City workers continue to receive information about CAPS and how to participate, and are reminded of the schedule for beat community meetings in their area.

During 1998 the city hosted a number of very large community events that promoted the program. The Implementation Office sponsored its annual day-long CAPS workshop at the Whitney Young High School, attended in 1998 by 600 of the city's community activists. The workshop featured seminars on topics ranging from running effective beat community meetings to court advocacy. In June, 750 neighborhoods were offered the same kinds of workshops at a Block Club convention. In August, many Chicagoans attended at least part of a national conference on community policing that was sponsored by the city. In October an appreciation event was held for 750 CAPS volunteers at the United Center, and in November 3,000 residents attended a neighborhood assembly at McCormick Place.


On a smaller scale, CAPS outreach workers attended more than 130 of the festivals that flourish during the summer months in Chicago. Booths were set up where they explained CAPS, and encouraged participation in beat community meetings and involvement in programs, like court advocacy, that are organized through local district advisory committees. Staff members were involved in almost 100 local marches, rallies, prayer vigils and smoke-outs (group barbecues held at gang or drug-infested sites). Twenty CAPS workshops were held in various Asian languages during April and May. National Night Out on August 4th was the occasion for events in all 25 police districts. Beginning in January 1998, the community organizers that are described in the next section of this report also began to appear at beat community meetings and other public venues to encourage involvement in the program. Finally, a catalog of CAPS promotional materials are available for distribution, including magnets, pens, pencils, rulers and tee shirts. Coming soon are CAPS sticky notes.

The survey asked those who were aware of CAPS how they had heard about it. Figure 1 presents the percentage of Chicagoans who recalled learning about CAPS in various ways, comparing results from the 1996, 1997 and 1998 surveys. Respondents were allowed to name up to five ways in which they learned about CAPS or community policing. A majority (58 percent) identified only one source, but 14 percent named three or more information sources, so the percentages presented in Figure 1 add up to more than 100 percent.

Figure 1 indicates that many information channels have become more effective in reaching people over time. The most dramatic increase, from 16 to almost 40 percent, was in the proportion of Chicagoans who learned about CAPS from television, which is the most common source of CAPS awareness. The 1998 survey asked respondents if they had heard about CAPS on a cable station or on "one of the free stations, such as Channel 7 or 32." It is uncertain how reliable this account is, but 25 percent indicated that they heard about CAPS on cable television, 70 percent on broadcast television, and 5 percent on both. The second most frequent way people recalled hearing about CAPS was word of mouth, including from a neighbor or friend. Between 1996 and 1998, talk about the program doubled in frequency, from 10 to 20 percent. It appears that the spread of CAPS information via informal conversation is gaining momentum as overall awareness increases. There were also noticeable increases in the extent to which people reported hearing about CAPS via posters or signs, and from brochures, flyers or newsletters. Radio became a more common source of awareness between 1996 and 1997, and held steady in 1998.

Different people learned about CAPS in different ways. The contrasts between television, newspapers and word of mouth as sources of CAPS awareness were particularly striking. Television

Figure 1
Sources of CAPS Awareness



and personal communication were most frequently cited by less educated people; newspapers were mentioned by more educated respondents. Television was most frequently cited by young people; older residents recalled talking about CAPS or reading about it in a newspaper. Latinos relied on television; among those who had heard about CAPS, 63 percent cited television as their source of information. Whites read about CAPS in newspapers; one-quarter of them mentioned newspapers, compared to 8 percent of Latinos and 10 percent of African-Americans. African-Americans heard about CAPS from other people, by a smaller margin. Men heard about CAPS on television; women via personal conversations. Neighborhood newspapers were principally a source of information for homeowners.

Because Spanish-speaking Chicagoans were particularly unlikely to know about CAPS (or beat meetings; see a discussion of this below), we examined in detail differences in how English-speaking and Spanish-speaking Latinos recalled hearing about CAPS. Of those who had heard about the program, Spanish-speakers stood out only in terms of television; 73 percent of them, compared to 52 percent of English-speakers, became aware of CAPS via television. Written matter — posters, signs, flyers, newsletters, brochures, billboards and citywide newspapers — were more likely to reach English-speakers, despite the city's intensive effort to distribute Spanish-language materials. Even personal conversations were more likely to engage English-speakers, by a ratio of 3-to-2. Church and school-based outreach efforts reached both groups in about the same (small) proportion.

Is a program marketing campaign like that mounted for CAPS appropriate? It might seem unusual for a city to advertise its freely available public services so widely. However, governments at all levels recognize the importance of educating the public in tandem with legislating on their behalf. For example, in the health and safety arena, media messages that “smoking stinks” and that everyone should “buckle up for safety” have played an important role in increasing the effectiveness of regulation and taxation as public policy tools. Chicago's community-policing program depends to an important extent on active citizen involvement in its beat meetings, district advisory committees, court advocacy groups and other action projects, so it is important to broaden the public's awareness of the new opportunities for participation that it has created. Because CAPS represents a departure from past practice, program marketing plays an important educational function. Rather than simply asking the public to be the “eyes and ears” of the police, CAPS calls for the active involvement of residents in problem solving and in helping set police priorities. They not only need to turn out; they also need to understand their role in problem-solving policing. Finally, the public needs to understand how the program changes “business as usual” in this important and very expensive public agency, because they pay the bills. In the next fiscal year the police department's budget almost certainly will exceed \$1 billion. Police depend upon the communities they serve for financial as well as moral support, and as taxpayers, the public needs to understand the new department strategy that they are being asked to pay for.

Trends in Beat Community Meeting Participation

Beat community meetings are one mechanism for building and sustaining close relationships between police and the public. These meetings provide a forum for exchanging information, and a venue for identifying, analyzing and prioritizing problems in an area. They

also provide occasions for police and residents to meet face to face and get acquainted, a feature that was facilitated by the formation of teams of officers with a relatively long-term commitment to working in the beat. These meetings are the most important vehicle through which police-community partnerships can develop. Beat meetings began on a citywide basis in the spring of 1995, after the experimental period in a few test districts.


Beat community meetings are public gatherings open to all. They are generally attended by beat officers on duty at the time, a few team members from other shifts, and the sergeant who supervises the beat team. Officers serving in special units are often present as well, along with a representative of the district's neighborhood relations unit, and, sometimes, higher ranking members of the district management team. About half the beat team officers are attending off their regular shift, and they are paid overtime for coming. These meetings are sometimes attended by representatives of the city's service departments, local aldermen's staff and organizers from the city as well as those working for area community organizations. School principals and local business operators come as well. Beats are sometimes subdivided in larger or more diverse areas. In areas plagued by low turnout, adjacent beats have held combined meetings to boost attendance, and they sometimes meet less frequently. Although districts are required to hold beat meetings only once every three months, most meet monthly and are well publicized in most districts. Our most recent survey (which is described below) indicates that about 60 percent of Chicagoans know they are being held. The beats and districts sponsor other kinds of meetings as well, including marches, rallies and block parties that involve considerable numbers of residents, and smaller meetings between police and neighborhood activists. Recently, the districts have been encouraged to send officers to meetings held by block clubs and community organizations, rather than just expecting everyone to attend official beat community meetings.

This section of the report examines trends in citizen involvement in beat meetings. It is based on data drawn from brief forms completed by officers for beat community meetings. These forms detail where and when the meeting was held, who was there and what was discussed. They have been a reliable guide to the basics of the meetings, based on comparisons between the forms and reports by observers for the sample of beat meetings they attend each year. Occasionally the paperwork gets lost, but by keeping track of meetings it is possible to develop estimates of attendance when the data for a particular session is missing. These estimates are based on the average attendance at other meetings in the beat during the same season of the year; these seem appropriate because beat meeting attendance has proven to be very stable over time. For the most recent 12 months of data, an average of 234 beat meetings were held across the city each month.

Figure 2 charts trends in beat community meeting participation since January 1995. The left axis reports monthly attendance figures, while the right axis presents the cumulative total of attendees since the starting date.

Based on these estimates, it appears that Chicagoans attended beat community meetings about 59,200 times during 1995 and on nearly 62,120 occasions during 1996. The figure for 1997 was 65,300, and it was 69,700 for 1998. As the right axis on Figure 2 indicates, over the 48-month period Chicagoans attended beat meetings for a total of more than 250,000 occasions.

Figure 2
Trends in Beat Meeting Attendance, 1995-1998



As Figure 2 illustrates, attendance is very seasonal. It is lower in the winter months than during the summer, and the lowest attendance month is always December. December 1995 was the lowest turnout month on record; only 2,500 people turned out then for beat meetings. The “December Dip” has partly to do with the fact that many fewer meetings are held then; only 152 meetings were held in December 1997, for example, in contrast to the 250 meetings that were held (attracting 7,300 people) in September 1997. A reduction in the number of meetings in December may still be justified by low turnout that month, however. The average number of people who attend the meetings that are held is also always the lowest in December. An average of only 15 people attended beat meetings in December 1995 and 1996. On the other hand, turnout is determined in part by the “supply” of meetings as well as the “demand” to attend them. This is illustrated by August 1996, when many districts canceled their beat meetings. Total attendance was therefore low, but has been high every other August, when regular complements of meetings have been held. Holding regular meetings helps drive the attendance total upward.

These headcounts are silent on issues like how many new participants come each month and how many are regular attenders. As reported in the next section, the citywide survey conducted in the spring of 1998 found that about 14 percent of Chicagoans had attended at least one beat community meeting in the previous year. The median participant attended about two meetings per year, while frequent attenders contributed disproportionately to total meeting attendance.

Patterns of Beat Meeting Attendance


Where is attendance high, and where is it low? The answer to this question lay in combining meeting reports for each of the city's beats over the most recent 12-month period to calculate the average monthly attendance rate for each area. To compare attendance across beats it is necessary to take account of their varying size. The boundaries of the city's police beats were drawn to equalize workloads (measured by calls for service) among them, but they still vary widely in population. For example, in 1997, the bottom 20 percent of the city's beats in terms of population averaged 4,900 residents, while the top 20 percent had an average of 16,400 residents. In general, only adults come to beat meetings, so the denominator for each beat's attendance rate is the number of residents age 18 and older. These population figures are based on projections of the 1997 population of each beat calculated from post-1990 updates to the census assembled by Claritas Corp. This section examines patterns of attendance by comparing rates of attendance to demographic, crime and other data on the beats. In these analyses, nine beats are excluded because their residential population is very low; they are located either in industrial areas or in the downtown business district. All of the measures except beat racial composition were logged to correct skewed distributions.

Beat meeting attendance rates were often highest in places that could benefit most from them. Rates were the highest in the city's predominately African-American beats and lowest — once population is taken into account — in predominately white areas. Attendance rates were not strongly linked to the size of the Latino population, but they tended to rise a bit among beats that were at least 60 percent Latino. Figure 3 presents the relationship between the racial distribution of each beat's population and attendance rates. The plot presents regression lines that best describe the data, but leaves out the actual data points so that all three can be presented in one figure.

As Figure 3 illustrates, beat meeting attendance rates rose steadily with the proportion of the African-American population, and they were greatest in predominately African-American areas. Rates of participation in largely white areas were lower than others, on the other hand. There was a slight decline in attendance rates among beats where the Latino population averaged 20 to 60 percent. This was coupled with the increase in involvement at the upper end of that measure. This parallels findings presented in past reports. Beat meeting participation among Latinos is highest where "critical masses" of Latinos reside. This does not represent a large number of beats, however. Based on 1997 population estimates, just 34 of the city's 279 beats were more than 60 percent Latino. More Latinos lived in areas where participation rates were somewhat lower.

Other factors were linked to levels of attendance as well. In general, rates were higher in lower-income areas where people did not have much education. The correlation between attendance rates and a common poverty measure — the percentage of families headed by women — was +.44. Attendance was also higher in areas where test scores for the city's public school students are low, truancy rates are high and graduation rates are poor. The correlation between attendance rates and a composite achievement test score for the school serving each beat was -.36. Attendance was higher in areas where residents have health problems, including high rates of gonorrhea and tuberculosis, and high infant mortality. The attendance-infant mortality correlation was +.34. Finally, participation was highest in high-crime areas. For example, attendance rates were correlated +.38 with the murder rate, and +.44 with the rate for gun-related crimes of all kinds. Participation and vandalism were correlated +.49. The link


Figure 3
Race and Beat Meeting Turnout Rates, 1997-1998



between high-volume property crimes and participation was weaker; the correlation was $+ .22$ for property crimes of all kinds and stood at about zero for burglary and auto theft. Controlling for some of these factors, there was also a negative correlation between the typical size of residential buildings and attendance rates; people in high-rises were harder to attract to meetings. The link between home ownership and involvement was very weak. Interestingly, attendance rates were only slightly related to voter turnout rates for beats, and attendance was highest in beats offering the least support for the incumbent mayor in the 1995 election.

Figure 4 illustrates four of these patterns. It charts both the data for beats and (like Figure 3) the regression line that best describes them. It documents the link between beat meeting attendance rates, crime and affluence. Attendance was highest in low-income areas and lowest in beats that are home to a large proportion of college graduates. All of these relationships were strong, and persisted when other factors were controlled-for statistically. In multivariate analyses, attendance went up with crime and was still higher in less privileged areas. Statistically, crime was the strongest factor explaining participation rates. All of these relationships, and many more, proved to be very stable. Every one-year slice of the attendance data points to the same conclusions, and the regression lines that describe them closely resemble one another across time. This further documents how firmly attendance is rooted in the city's basic social factors, beginning with the geographical distribution of crime.

Figure 4
Patterns of Beat Meeting Attendance, 1997-1998



These patterns are significant for at least two reasons. First, they run counter to many of the pressures that historically have shaped police-community relations in poor and disenfranchised communities. Residents there have too often had a troubled relationship with the police who serve them. They are more likely to think they do not get good service, and that police are abusive toward their neighbors. Organizations that represent them may also not have a track record of cooperating with police, since their constituents too often fear them. Second, these findings run counter to the usual pattern of participation in voluntary, community-based programs. Those typically overrepresent the interests of better-off, home-owning and well-established areas. This is so common that it is the norm to expect a "middle-class bias" in volunteer-based social programs. Around the country, it has instead proven difficult to sustain the involvement of residents of communities that need community policing the most. However, in Chicago turnout rates for the city's community-policing program are positively related to many measures of need. They are especially high in predominately African-American beats and in high-crime areas, and in areas where schools and health programs are not effectively meeting the needs of residents.

The Participants

While official records account for how many people come to meetings each month, it requires a survey to profile who they are and why they are there, as well as to understand why many of their neighbors do *not* attend. So, in addition to asking about CAPS awareness, the spring 1998 survey also

quizzed respondents about their participation in community anticrime meetings. First they were asked whether there had been any effort to hold community meetings in their neighborhood, or if any meetings had been held to deal with crime problems. Awareness of these opportunities for participation in their neighborhood is an important first step in building citizen involvement in CAPS. Those who knew about local meetings were asked if they had attended, and those who had were asked if any police were present. If they were, the gatherings were classified as beat meetings, and respondents were asked to assess their effectiveness on several dimensions.

Overall, 61 percent of Chicagoans reported that community anticrime meetings were being held in their area. Awareness of these opportunities to participate varied. Young adults (49 percent), those who did not graduate from high school (55 percent), and Spanish-speakers (50 percent) were among the least likely to know these meetings were being held. On the other hand, homeowners (70 percent), those who had lived in their current neighborhood five years or more (72 percent) and those with household incomes greater than \$60,000 per year (87 percent) were the most likely to know that such meetings were being held. Awareness of meetings was lower than awareness of CAPS, with the exception being senior citizens, who tended to know more about their neighborhood than about community policing.

Among those who knew community meetings were being held, 28 percent (or 14 percent of all Chicagoans) reported attending at least one beat meeting. The average respondent who went to any meetings reported attending an average of 3.6 of them. Just over 50 percent went to just one or two meetings, and only 10 percent went to more than seven meetings a year. How did they know where to go? Beat meetings are usually held on the same night of the month and in the same location each month. Most of the meetings were held in church basements, park district field houses, schools, libraries, hospital cafeterias and other public and easily accessible locations; almost all started at 6:30 or 7 p.m. In surveys distributed at beat meetings during 1998, participants were asked how they heard about when and where meetings were held for their beat. They could choose multiple sources of information from a list, and some did. Of all the sources of information mentioned, the most important (37 percent) was brochures and flyers announcing the meeting. Personal conversations came next, at 22 percent. Thirteen percent read about the meetings in a local newspaper. Most (46 percent) indicated that they had heard from a neighbor; another 20 percent had heard from the police about the meeting.

Why did they attend? The 1998 citywide survey revealed two factors that seem to sustain involvement in beat meetings and are also relevant to the efforts of community activists and city agencies. The first is marketing: there were distinct differences between how people learned about CAPS and whether they turned out for meetings. The second is civic engagement. The more involved Chicagoans were in community affairs, the more likely they were to know about CAPS, be aware of beat meetings and actually attend the meetings.

While television was central to expanding awareness of CAPS, it appears to play a limited role in encouraging Chicagoans to attend beat meetings. The survey found that 29 percent of respondents who knew about CAPS and recalled learning about it on television actually attended a meeting; the comparable figure for those who did not mention television at all was 36 percent. Talking about the program with someone else had just the opposite relationship to attendance; 41 percent of those in this

category attended a meeting versus 28 percent who did not recall hearing about CAPS from someone else. Obviously, not all of these differences can be attributed to exposure to the program. As noted above, different kinds of people learned about CAPS in different ways, and these differences almost certainly affected their involvement in the program as well. For example, respondents who recalled learning about CAPS via newspapers also were significantly less fearful of crime and more positive in their views of police than everyone else who knew about the program, and both of these factors were also related to actually getting involved. However, in a multivariate regression analysis of meeting attendance, the positive effects of personal conversation and the negative effects of television exposure persisted even after controlling for 12 individual factors (ranging from age and race to language and home ownership) and two measures of people's personal experiences with the police during the previous year. Controlling for these factors, both exposure measures were highly significant. Although stronger evidence of an experimental nature would be required to confirm this finding, the survey suggests that television marketing promotes program awareness but not participation, while personal contact promotes both.

Another factor affecting involvement was the linkages that individuals have to their community. Figure 5 illustrates the strong relationship between civic engagement and CAPS involvement. It measures civic engagement using responses to four survey questions: whether respondents or anyone else in their household were involved in a neighborhood watch group or citizen patrol, the local PTA or local school council, a church or synagogue, or a block club or community organization. As the percentages arrayed across the bottom axis of Figure 5 indicate, 37 percent of respondents indicated that their household was not involved in any of those activities and another 37 percent were involved in just one. At the upper end, 2 percent of those who were interviewed were involved in all four of these kinds of organizations. The average household was involved in one type of group.

Figure 5
Organization Membership and CAPS Awareness




Figure 5 documents the linkage between civic engagement and levels of CAPS awareness, meeting awareness and actual beat meeting attendance. The differences are striking. Awareness of CAPS stood above 90 percent for those involved in three or four kinds of organizations, and awareness of neighborhood anticrime meetings was almost as high. Beat meeting attendance rose steadily with levels of civic engagement, rising above 40 percent among those involved in at least three kinds of local organizations. Each kind of organization was important and contributed to the rising levels of CAPS involvement depicted in Figure 5. While church involvement may seem relatively unrelated to community policing, during 1998 about one-third of all beat meetings were *held* in Chicago's churches, especially in predominately African-American communities where both CAPS and church involvement are particularly strong. Only families with children living at home reported being involved in school affairs, but among them some heard about CAPS from materials brought home by their children from the city's public and parochial schools. People with children living at home were more likely to know about CAPS, by about five percentage points. Among those belonging to a block club, 92 percent had heard of CAPS, and 86 percent had heard about anticrime meetings in their neighborhood. Not surprisingly, people who were heavily involved in community organizations were also more likely to report that they had learned about CAPS via word of mouth, a factor that was described above as related to participation. Other indicators of civic engagement point to similar conclusions. For example, among respondents who recently had asked a neighbor to watch their home while they were gone, 72 percent knew about neighborhood meetings, and 23 percent had attended a meeting. Both figures are well above the average. Finally, although it is not shown in Figure 5, those who were heavily involved in local organizations were likely to go to *more* meetings in a year than those who were not. Respondents who were involved in just one group went to an average of three beat meetings, while those involved in all four kinds of groups reported attending an average of almost five meetings.

Civic engagement was linked to CAPS involvement in part through its role in spreading awareness of the program. For example, among those who were not involved in any of the organizations examined in Figure 5, only 19 percent had heard about it via personal conversation. Among those with three or four affiliations, that figure rose to 35 percent. Civic engagement was also linked to CAPS awareness through flyers and newsletters, and through marches and rallies. On the other hand, the more involved people were with civic organizations, the *less* likely they were to have heard about it on television.

Residents who attended beat meetings were encouraged by what they saw. There was a strong consensus that they were useful and productive. Eighty-seven percent of those who attended at least one beat community meeting reported they had learned something there, and 92 percent reported that the meetings were "very" or "somewhat" useful for finding solutions to neighborhood problems. A large majority of attendees (72 percent, the same as in 1997), reported that actions were taken as a result of the meetings or that they noticed a change in their neighborhood resulting from decisions made at the meeting. People with more education were more likely to think that beat meetings were having an effect; the percentages who agreed with this proposition ranged from 56 percent among those without a high school diploma to 78 percent among college graduates. Higher-income respondents were more optimistic as well, but there were no differences between renters and homeowners in this regard, and not much difference between whites, Latinos and African-Americans. In addition to serving as a useful vehicle for problem solving, 91 percent credited the meetings as being "very" or "somewhat" useful in improving police-community relations.

This is not the only point at which we have observed the important role played by civic engagement. Not only is it related to CAPS awareness and beat meeting attendance, but other research has found that it is strongly linked to involvement in neighborhood problem solving. During 1995 and 1996, the city and the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety conducted problem-solving training for thousands of residents. The CAPS evaluation conducted a follow-up study four months later to examine who among the participants actually did anything with their new skills. The follow-up survey found that the most important factor distinguishing those who did was their level of involvement in community-based organizations just like those examined here. The more involved participants were, the more they did. Among those who were affiliated with four or more organizations, more than 80 percent had gotten involved in identifying and solving a local problem. Like respondents in the current study, trainees who were more involved in the organizational life of their community were also more likely to attend beat meetings and to have gotten involved in other CAPS-related activities. The involved community is the organized community.

What Happens at Beat Meetings?

What goes on when people do attend beat meetings? The survey indicates that large percentages think these gatherings are useful and lead to improvements in their neighborhood, but it does not tell us much about why. In order to examine the dynamics of beat meetings more closely, our observers attended hundreds of them throughout 1998. Most of the observers were advanced graduate students, and they carried out the observations between April and December. Selected beats that are involved in Chicago's community mobilization project (which is described in the next section of this report) were observed several times; all of the others were visited once. At each meeting observers completed forms recording specific details about the session, including where it was located, who attended and the basics of what went on. They were also trained to make judgments about such matters as how effectively police and civilian leadership conducted the meeting. Observers attended a total of 459 meetings in 256 different police beats. This analysis weights the data so that beats observed on multiple occasions are equated with those that were visited just once, and the unit of analysis is thus the beat. About one-third of the beats met in churches, 21 percent in park district buildings and 12 percent in schools. An average of 25 residents attended the meetings that were observed, along with almost seven police officers of various ranks. Four or more officers were present at more than 95 percent of the meetings.

CAPS planners had a clear vision of how beat community meetings were to be conducted and what was supposed to happen there: they were to be a place to share information, identify problems and make action plans. Both police and citizens were expected to take responsibility for problem-solving projects, and beat meetings provide a venue for everyone to review their progress and assess how well they are doing. Our early evaluation reports documented that many of them did not go according to these plans. Beat officers did not assume their intended leadership role; too many meetings floundered without a clear agenda; and not much crime information was shared. Later, there were attempts to remedy this, and during March and April 1998 — just before the observations began — the department conducted training sessions for civilian beat leaders, beat officers and sergeants that included segments on how to conduct more productive beat meetings.

One goal of the new observation study was to examine how closely activities in the field reflected the plans that were made downtown. To do this the observers gathered information on the elements of a “model meeting,” and their observations were used to rate the extent to which each actual meeting resembled an ideal gathering. The rating scale was based on 10 aspects of the meetings; these are summarized in Table 2. Another goal of the study was to determine whether there had been any progress made in the way meetings were conducted. To examine this, 1998 observations were matched to a sample of 165 beats observed in 1995. In total, 156 beats were observed both times, and some — but not all — model-meeting measures were recorded each time.

Table 2
Model-Meeting Index

<i>Agenda</i>	Was there a printed or verbal agenda for the meeting?	<i>Resident Feedback</i>	Did residents report back on previous problem-solving efforts?
<i>Information</i>	Were crime maps or crime reports handed out?	<i>Officer Feedback</i>	Did police officers report back on previous problem-solving efforts?
<i>Facilitator</i>	Was there a civilian facilitator for the meeting?	<i>Identification</i>	Were problems or issues identified at the meeting?
<i>Volunteers</i>	Were volunteers called for or sign-up sheets passed around?	<i>Solutions</i>	Were solutions proposed for problems that were identified?
<i>Action Component</i>	Did residents leave the meeting with a commitment to future action?	<i>Meeting Effectiveness</i>	Overall effectiveness with which the meeting was run.

Some of the meeting components summarized in Table 2 represent “the mechanics.” Were meetings well run? The observers reported that there was a clear agenda, either printed or clearly announced, for 65 percent of the meetings. On the other hand, minutes or summaries of the past meeting were presented in some fashion at only 12 percent of them (this measure is not included in the index). Under the department’s guidelines, for each beat a civilian “facilitator” is supposed to be identified, among whose tasks is to help organize and conduct public events. The observers noted that civilian facilitators actually were present (or at least visible to the observer) at 67 percent of the meetings. Observers also judged the overall effectiveness with which the meetings were run and concluded that about one-quarter were poorly conducted. Almost 60 percent were fairly effectively managed, and 15 percent were judged to be very effectively run. Officers who played leadership roles got somewhat higher marks than the civilians; just over 62 percent of the civilian leaders at the meetings were judged to be fairly or very effective, compared to 73 percent of police. However, meetings led by civilians or jointly between police and a resident were judged on the whole to be better run. There was also a fair degree of information sharing by police. Department guidelines call for crime information to be distributed at beat meetings, and this usually happened. The department’s crime analysis system can produce a variety of reader-friendly maps, crime lists and reports, and our observers reported that

either crime maps or printed crime reports were passed out at 70 percent of the meetings. There was a discussion of crime patterns or statistics, but no printed matter on hand, at an additional 8 percent of them.

The figures on the mechanics of meetings represent a significant improvement over what had been observed in the past. Among the matched beats, there was a clear agenda for 64 percent of the meetings in 1998, but for only 41 percent of the meetings in 1995. There were no crime reports at all for 40 percent of the 1995 meetings, but by 1998 that figure had been cut to 24 percent. The distribution of crime maps almost doubled. These improvements may reflect the training that beat officers, sergeants and civilian beat facilitators have received since 1995 on how to conduct beat meetings.

There was a great deal of variation in the extent to which different elements of Chicago's problem-solving model were enacted at beat meetings. All of the officers in the department's patrol division have been trained to employ a five-step process that features identifying and analyzing problems, developing and implementing solutions to them, and assessing the effectiveness of what they have accomplished. These problem-solving steps were also woven into the curriculum of the massive training program for neighborhood residents that was conducted in 1995 and 1996. The observers found that the most frequently met standard on the list presented in Table 2 was that there was a discussion of beat issues: all but one of the meetings involved identifying problems. Most problems were identified by the residents who were present, and police dominated the discussion of problems at only 14 percent of the meetings. There were usually discussions about how to solve them as well. The observers noted that solutions were proposed for most of the problems that were discussed at 77 percent of the meetings. As in past observations, most solutions (45 percent) were proposed by police. Residents proposed most of the solutions 14 percent of the time, and did so jointly with police at another 16 percent. When it came to debating or "brainstorming" about solutions rather than just throwing them out, police were also more likely to be involved than were residents. Residents debated solutions at 47 percent of the meetings, the police at 58 percent.

These data indicate that there was little change over time in the rate at which problems were identified at meetings or who did so. Residents brought up most of the problems that were discussed at 67 percent of the 1995 meetings, and at 71 percent of the 1998 meetings. On the other hand, the observers noted *less* discussion of solutions to problems in 1998 than in 1995. The role played by residents remained about the same each time (they took the lead in about 15 percent of the matched meetings), but the contribution made by police declined. Overall, the percentage of meetings at which there was a discussion of solutions to problems declined from 96 percent to 80 percent.

Past evaluation reports have also stressed the importance of follow-up reports at beat meetings about what participants are doing. Reports on problem-solving efforts presented at beat meetings serve several functions. These discussions help make it clear to participants that attending "pays off"—that they should attend because something actually happens as a result of the meetings. Reports on the problem-solving efforts of residents help sustain the enthusiasm of participants for the process, for it recognizes their contributions and may encourage others to join in. Beat meetings also provide a forum for residents to hold beat officers accountable. Calling for reports on their efforts since the last meeting helps savvy residents ensure that police and city service agencies actually follow up on problems

discussed at these sessions. The observers found that police contributed reports of their efforts fairly often; they reported on their problem-solving activities at 61 percent of the meetings. However, only 35 percent of the meetings featured residents discussing their own efforts.

Because sustaining effective citizen participation in problem solving has proven to be difficult in many areas of the city, the observers also kept note of the role of beat meetings in mobilizing participants. One factor they watched for was whether volunteers were called for or whether sign-up sheets were distributed at the meeting to engage participants in particular activities. They found that this happened at 39 percent of the meetings. Among the matched meetings, calls for volunteers declined a bit between 1995 and 1998, by four percentage points. Observers also made a critical summary judgment at the end of each session: did residents leave the meeting with a commitment to future action? When participants leave knowing what needs to be done as well as their role in those efforts, beat meetings may have a greater impact than when there is no commitment to any clear action. Observers were to assess each meeting on the basis of calls for volunteers, announcements of other meetings or activities, and action plans that were discussed. Based on these criteria, they judged that only 34 percent of the meetings met the standard of having an "action component."

To summarize all of these factors, a model-meeting index was created by summing indicators of each of the 10 components listed in Table 2. The index set a high standard by only counting meetings that were judged to be "very effective;" otherwise, the components of the index were either present or absent in each case. When the elements of the meetings were combined, the average meeting score was 5.6, and the median was 6. In short, the usual meeting met a bit more than half of our criteria. Across the beats, none of the meetings received a score of zero, and a total of 4 percent received just one or two points. At the other end of the scale, two of the meetings received a perfect score, and 19 percent of them received a score of eight, nine or 10.

What seemed to contribute to better meetings? One factor that has been identified in past reports remains important: civilian leadership. Meetings that were chaired by civilians, or jointly between them and a police officer, received an average rating of 6.3; those run just by police scored an average of 5.0. Civilians principally conducted 38 percent of the meetings that were observed, and did so jointly with police in 10 percent more. Among the remainder, beat officers ran 25 percent, their sergeants ran 11 percent, and neighborhood relations unit officers conducted 12 percent. Some police representatives did a good job. Among the components of the model-meeting index, civilian or jointly led meetings were more likely to have clear agendas, but so were the meetings run by sergeants. Civilian-led meetings were more likely to include calls for volunteers, but so were those run by neighborhood relations officers. Civilians and neighborhood relations officers were equally likely to run meetings that were judged to conclude with an action component, and jointly led meetings did a little better than them. Civilian or jointly led meetings were more likely to feature follow-up reports from civilians about their problem-solving activities, and they also were better at eliciting these reports from the police that were present (though sergeants were also good at that). However, only civilian-led meetings were consistently top-rated. Another general finding was that meetings run by beat officers were conducted least effectively on all of these measures.

In addition, meetings where more people attended, and meetings held in beats where the regular yearly pattern of attendance is high, were also more likely to approach the model. Beats with low scores

(ranging from one to four) on the model-meeting index had an average of 20 participants; those with high scores (seven to 10) averaged 30 residents. The total yearly attendance at the top-ranked beats (measured by official department records) averaged 77 percent higher than the bottom-ranked group. Meetings that included representatives of civic organizations, aldermanic staff, community organizers and city agency representatives also went better. Meetings were also more likely to "go by the book" in lower-crime areas. Beats in the low-rated category (with scores of one to four) had a 40 percent higher personal crime rate, and a 46 percent higher property crime rate, than those in the high-rated category. There appeared to be no differences associated with race; there was virtually no correlation between the racial composition of beats and their model-meeting index score. It was also possible, using the observations made on the spot, to compare the race of residents attending with that of the officers who were there. There was no apparent effect of either a disparity between the two groups, or racial homogeneity among police and residents, on how beat meetings were conducted. However, meetings resembled the model more closely in residential areas, while beats with a heavy concentration of businesses or industry tended to score lower.

CAPS Activists

In addition to surveying city residents about their awareness and involvement in community policing, we also made a special effort to represent the views and experiences of Chicagoans who are extremely active in CAPS. While fewer in number, their views are important. They are better informed about many aspects of police operations in their district, many are in contact with both beat officers and district managers, and they are very involved in CAPS-related activities.

During the fall of 1998, Northwestern University conducted telephone interviews with 659 CAPS activists, identified in a variety of ways. Some members of the initial sample were chairs or members of their district's advisory committees; others chaired the subcommittees that do a large share of the actual work of those committees. The initial list also included all beat facilitators that could be identified. When lists of CAPS activists did not include a working telephone number, reverse directories and the telephone company's information service were used to obtain as many as possible. The sample also included several hundred respondents who were interviewed in 1997; many of them had official roles in CAPS, but others were included because they were independent activists. The goal was to develop a sample that would yield completed interviews with at least 20 activists in each of the city's 25 police districts. A total of 888 names were initially included in the sample.

Interviewing took place in October and November 1998. Calls were made both during afternoon and evening sessions. Each session was supervised by an evaluation staff member; interviewers were all graduate students or experienced interviewers who have worked on other evaluation projects. They called sample numbers as often as 31 times to finally complete an interview. The average number of calls to secure a completion was 4.7. Some of the original sample numbers were reclassified as ineligible as the survey proceeded. A few potential respondents turned out to be local politicians who were listed "as a courtesy" on some directories of district activists, but they told us they were not involved at all. Others had moved away or died, or informed us that they were "dropouts" and no longer felt knowledgeable about their district. In addition to these ineligible respondents, others were not interviewed because they could not be reached. This included those who

were ill or out of town during the survey and households that never answered their telephone despite repeated calls. When interviewers reached someone, cooperation was high; only 10 respondents refused to be interviewed, and in four other cases someone else in the household refused for them. Many respondents knew about the evaluation, and they were eager to talk. After subtracting out ineligible respondents, but including those we could not reach, the overall completion rate for this survey was approximately 94 percent. (A detailed report on the survey is available on request.)

An important feature of the survey was that the respondents were fairly evenly distributed across the city because they were selected to represent police districts. They are not distributed to represent the city's population or even the city's CAPS activists, for districts vary a great deal in size and CAPS activity, but the activist sample does not. An average of 26 interviews were completed per district. The range was 19 to 36 respondents, and only one district fell below its targeted quota of 20 respondents. Six districts had more than 30 respondents.

Among the activists that were interviewed, 60 percent were members of their district's advisory committee. Forty-four percent served on a subcommittee, and 36 percent on other kinds of CAPS-related committees. Fifty-three percent had been a beat facilitator or chaired beat meetings. Almost 60 percent reported that they attended a CAPS training session, 55 percent had participated in a march or rally, and 80 percent regularly attended beat meetings. More than 75 percent indicated they had been involved in a significant problem-solving effort in their district during the previous year. Most had been involved in CAPS for some time. Almost half reported that they had been active since 1993, the year the program began, and 80 percent had been active since 1995, the year CAPS became a citywide program. They also had other connections to the community; 77 percent indicated that they were involved in a block club or community organization that was separate from CAPS. Slightly more than half were women, and 83 percent were homeowners. Half were white, 37 percent were African-Americans, and 8 percent were Latinos. Half were college graduates, and more than 80 percent were high school graduates. On average they were 52 years old, and only 3 percent of those who were identified and interviewed were under age 30. They had lived in their neighborhood for an average of 22 years.

Overall, activists were fairly optimistic about CAPS; 60 to 80 percent thought that police were doing a good job or a very good job at various aspects of the program. Table 3 summarizes their views on several aspects of citizen involvement in the program. It also presents figures for the same questions from the 1997 activist survey, which was conducted in much the same way. The questions in this table all refer to officers working in the respondents' own police districts or to their commanders.

Table 3 indicates that there has been little change in activists' views between 1997 and 1998. In 1998, between two-thirds and three-quarters of those interviewed thought district police were effectively fostering resident involvement in the program. They were most concerned about beat meeting attendance, but almost 60 percent thought police were doing a good job or a very good job at that. They were the most optimistic about the effectiveness of beat meetings, their district's advisory committee and their commander's cooperation with neighborhood organizations. Other questions about the districts' commanders received similarly favorable responses, including questions about their leadership, visibility in the community and implementing CAPS. Only one change between 1997 and 1998 was statistically significant. The proportion thinking that beat team officers were doing a good job

Table 3
 Activist Views of Citizen Involvement

	Percent good job or very good job			Percent good job or very good job	
	1998	1997		1998	1997
How good a job are police in your district doing at getting people to come to beat meetings?	58	59	How good a job is the police district doing at getting citizens and police working together to identify important local problems?	71	72
How good a job are police doing at holding effective beat meetings?	76	74	How good a job is your police district doing at getting citizens and police working together to identify actual solutions to those problems?	64	64
How good a job do you think your district commander is doing at working with neighborhood organizations?	76	79	How good a job is your district doing at holding effective District Advisory Committee meetings?	75	78
Are they getting beat team officers to work with organizations in their beat?	61	75	How good a job is your district doing at having effective District Advisory Subcommittees?	63	67

working with organizations in their beat declined by 14 percentage points, from 75 to 61 percent. This decline was not concentrated in just a few areas; seven districts received a noticeably lower score on this question. Among activists interviewed in 1998, African-Americans were more optimistic than whites about the effectiveness of beat meetings, and respondents with more education were less optimistic. Older respondents were also more optimistic on several measures.

The optimism expressed by activists about beat meetings paralleled that expressed by the general public. When activist respondents indicated that they had attended a beat meeting, they were asked the same questions that were used in the citywide study to evaluate beat meetings. When asked if the meetings were useful for finding solutions to neighborhood problems, 92 percent of city residents and 97 percent of activists agreed they were very or somewhat useful. When asked if any action took place in the neighborhood as a result of the meetings, 72 percent of the general public and 93 percent of activists indicated that it did. In both groups, more than 90 percent thought the meetings were useful for improving the community's relationship with the police.

Views of Police

What did police officers think about resident involvement? A later section of this report will review their reports of how well CAPS has progressed on many dimensions; this focuses on their views of beat meetings and the residents who attend. To assess police opinion, the observers distributed questionnaires to the police officers who attended beat meetings. They filled them out while the residents who were present completed their own questionnaires, and all of these materials were then collected. The observers (who were very busy with this) did not attempt to keep a formal record of individual response rates, but police questionnaires were successfully collected at virtually all of the beat meetings

they observed. There is fairly complete data for about 1,030 officers, while another 20 who received a questionnaire either skipped a number of questions or did not have time to complete the form. Those who responded were regulars. Almost 70 percent of the officers present during the observation sessions indicated that they attended every beat meeting, and another 17 percent replied that they attended approximately every other meeting. Less than 15 percent indicated that they went to fewer than half the meetings. Almost all attended for a particular reason. The survey asked what their responsibilities were at the meeting, and most named several. About 60 percent indicated they were there to make a presentation, give a report, describe crime statistics or provide information. More (67 percent) said it was their job to answer questions. One-quarter indicated they were responsible for completing CAPS service request forms, 15 percent were there to chair or co-chair the meeting, and 18 percent were sergeants who were there to supervise. Only 8 percent said they were there "just to attend," having no specific role.

The questionnaire, which had to be brief, included four questions about beat meetings. Officers were asked how satisfied they were with attendance at the meetings. Thirty-three percent were very satisfied, and 43 percent were somewhat satisfied. Not surprisingly, a strong correlate of this response was high average attendance at meetings held in the beat. Officers who reported that they were very dissatisfied worked in beats that averaged 19 residents per meeting; those who were very satisfied worked in beats that averaged almost 30 residents per meeting. In addition, officers who attended beat meetings frequently were more satisfied with the attendance.

The officers were also questioned about their relationship with residents who attended the meetings. More than 50 percent indicated that it was "very congenial," and another 42 percent that it was "somewhat congenial." This did not leave much room for real dissatisfaction, but the degree of congeniality reported by officers was linked to a long list of characteristics of the beats. Relations between police and residents were reported to be better in predominately white and well-off beats with low rates of violent crime. Things were less congenial in beats where there were concentrations of public housing, a large proportion of young adults (age 15 to 24) and where schools and health programs were not meeting the needs of residents. Officers who attended beat meetings frequently were more likely to feel they were well-received. About one-third of those who attended less than half the meetings thought residents were very congenial, while the comparable figure among officers who attended every meeting was almost 60 percent, and virtually none of them thought relations were at all strained. Age was strongly linked to how welcome they felt as well. Among officers in their twenties, 44 percent felt residents were very congenial; among those in their forties it was 57 percent; and among those in their fifties it was 62 percent.


Finally, the views of some officers were affected by the racial composition of the meetings they attended. White officers felt the most welcome at beat meetings where most of the residents attending were white. For example, white officers who reported that residents were "very congenial" were attending meetings where residents (based on the observations) averaged 68 percent white and 22 percent African-American, while white officers who reported that relationships at the meetings were strained were attending meetings that averaged 26 percent white and 67 percent African-American. Interestingly, Latino officers who reported that relations between residents and police attending the meetings were strained were most likely attending a meeting hosting a large proportion of Latinos in

which typically most discussion was conducted in Spanish. On the other hand, the views of African-American officers were unaffected by the racial composition of the meeting.

There were two questions about the demographic representativeness of the meetings, an important evaluation issue as well. The police who were present were asked how representative attendees were of the beat's population. Only 16 percent felt that participants were somewhat or not very representative. They were also asked if the problems that were discussed at the meetings usually concerned the entire beat, part of the beat or just individuals. About 40 percent thought that problems from all over the beat were being discussed, and another 40 percent thought they concerned just part of the beat. Ten percent indicated that the discussion of problems primarily represented individuals' concerns, and another 10 percent wrote in "all of the above." One factor that was linked to the perceived representativeness of the meetings was size: bigger meetings seemed better. In addition, meetings led by civilian facilitators, and meetings at which civilian leadership was judged to be effective, appeared to the officers to be more representative. Finally, when meetings closely hewed to the model-meeting index, police were more optimistic about them.

Summary

Chicago's community-policing program features a number of avenues for citizen involvement, and since its inception this has been one of its most significant successes. A large and still-growing proportion of the city's population is aware of the program, and that awareness continues to grow among all major subgroups. Differences remain among these groups, but they do not seem to be translated into differences in actual involvement in the program. Participation levels remain high, averaging 6,000 per month during 1998, and continue to be strong among some of the city's poorest and most crime-ridden communities. Compared to many other programs, involvement in CAPS has been sustained in many of the places needing it most. While television appears to be the principal force driving ever-higher levels of program awareness, community factors play the biggest role in stimulating actual participation. Beat meeting attendance is strongly linked to civic engagement. Involvement with groups that spread the word about CAPS and the meetings brings people out, as does word-of-mouth discussion of the program, and the flyers and newsletters that circulate easily in well-organized neighborhoods. When they attend, residents like what they see. Most thought beat meetings were productive and led to constructive action. Our observers came to somewhat more pessimistic conclusions, based on a systematic checklist of standards. The average gathering was good on meeting mechanics and on airing the issues, but weak at finding solutions to problems, especially by residents. Large samples of local CAPS activists interviewed in 1997 and 1998 did not see much change in terms of resident involvement, but their satisfaction level was quite high on both occasions. Police officers who attended beat meetings were fairly satisfied with the way they transpired. More than three-quarters were happy with attendance, and more than 90 percent thought they were fairly congenial in tenor. Most thought those attending represented the population of their beat, although they were less optimistic that problems from all over the beat were being represented.



Building Collective Efficacy Through Community Policing

Introduction

One lesson of research on communities is that they vary tremendously in their ability to solve problems independently and to form partnerships with police and other agencies. Many are richly endowed with active community organizations, some professionally staffed and encompassing a wide jurisdiction but more led by volunteers and representing residents of blocks or neighborhoods with small boundaries. Some areas support only a few struggling civic associations. In more fortunate neighborhoods, residents feel they can count on one another to watch out for trouble and even to intervene on their behalf. In others, people believe they are on their own and do not trust their immediate neighbors. Some communities have a proven capacity to get the help they need from public and private agencies at a variety of levels, while in other areas residents do not have any significant "downtown" connections they can mobilize for their collective benefit.

Researchers have identified these factors as elements of what is known as "collective efficacy," defined as mutual trust and a willingness to maintain public order. One of the core components of collective efficacy is the willingness of residents to actively represent the norms of the community by intervening to safeguard them when they are threatened. The willingness of residents to step forward and challenge those who violate popular norms is known as "informal social control." In most theories of social organization this is viewed as one of the principal ways communities maintain order on their own initiative. Communities that have a high degree of collective efficacy are exceptional in many regards. These communities are particularly good at defending themselves against the crime and disorder problems now so common in urban areas. Rates of violent crime are lower than we would otherwise expect, because residents of these tight-knit communities trust one another and are willing to take action in the best interests of the community. In these sorts of communities, in fact, what is perceived as beneficial for the common good is often indistinguishable from that which benefits an individual. Residents expect reciprocity; they assume that others will take the initiative when it is their turn. Regular acts of generosity, support and even courage are common in these communities. These areas almost always support dense networks of local organizations as well. These organizations act in a deliberate and purposive way to ensure community stability. They also are one vehicle for securing help from the outside when more resources are required than the community can muster internally.

Though the term "collective efficacy" is new, the practice is not. Many longtime Chicago residents insist that the city's neighborhoods were not always in such a desperate state. Once upon a time, neighbors were friendly, approachable and trustworthy. But times have changed. Father Michael Pflieger of St. Sabina's Church on Chicago's South Side had this to say in August 1998 at Chicago's National Conference on Community Policing:

We must recognize that we are a disconnected society. A few years ago, hundreds of elderly people died in a Chicago heat wave. But it was not the heat wave that killed them, it was disconnectedness. There was a time when neighbors knew one another and actually checked up on each other. Bodies were not left alone like

this. Parenting classes used to take place over the backyard fence, in the neighborhood, on the lawn.

It used to be that there was at least one neighbor who kept a close lookout on kids and always knew what they and everyone else in the neighborhood was up to. We called this Nosy Neighbor Syndrome. Though kids dread the NNS neighbor, we need them; they are sorely missed. Neighborhoods would be much safer places. The only solution is coming together. . . . Gangs are very together, but we don't talk to the neighbor next door.

Research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has documented the impact of collective efficacy on rates of crime and it looks like Father Pfleger is right. One study set its impact at a 40 percent reduction in violence. Communities that enjoy high levels of collective efficacy are safer and more secure. However, it remains unclear how areas where trust and reciprocity are low can develop or reclaim these features of community life. Neighborhoods that need trust and reciprocity the most by and large have the least. NIJ's research finds that collective efficacy is lowest in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and in racially or ethnically heterogeneous areas. Residential stability also plays a factor in sustaining collective efficacy, a challenge in a society in which perhaps 20 percent of the population changes residences each year.

The Community Mobilization Project

One focus of our evaluation has been the city's new community mobilization project. Since it is clear that traditional policing alone is insufficient to deal with the serious problems now commonplace in large cities, community activists, mayors and police look elsewhere for solutions. Community policing is promising, but it only works when there is a solid and stable organizational infrastructure to support it. Reflecting the citywide commitment to CAPS, the community mobilization project can be seen as an experiment in creating collective efficacy. The goals of this new city effort include:

- bringing block-level organization to areas where there is none
- involving already-existing organizations and their members in the problem-solving process
- identifying and securing the resources required to solve pressing problems
- training community members to solve problems in their neighborhoods in concert with their local beat officers and city service agencies

Communities are potentially a great resource and natural partner in helping manage crime and disorder problems, for a number of reasons. Supporters of community policing point out that residents have a vested interest in helping to rebuild their neighborhoods because property values and quality of life are closely tied to neighborhood-safety issues. Resident activists believe that if they do not care about the place they live, it is unlikely that anyone else will, including police. Community policing makes sense because residents have a firsthand understanding of community problems; they are often described by police as the "eyes and ears" of the community. They can relay valuable information to police that can lead to arrests and convictions. But residents can be more than just providers of information; they often play important roles in problem solving. Police Chief Norm Stamper of Seattle

pointed out at the National Conference on Community Policing in August 1998 that the “eyes and ears” version of community policing disempowers and disembodies residents. In a more robust version of community policing, residents do more than pick up the phone and dial 911. They are active participants in the development and implementation of solutions to crime, and they take responsibility for some portion of it. Implied in the notion of community policing is the hope that community participation will relieve some of the burden. The community mobilization project aims for that goal.

Chicago’s community mobilization project is directed by the city’s CAPS Implementation Office, which directs two teams of community organizers. Initially it involved 29 city-hired organizers working in 58 targeted beats. In addition, 13 private nonprofit agencies contracted with the city to do community organizing in another 28 beats. All of the beats were nominated by police district commanders. The community mobilization project represents a major new thrust for the city’s program on the “citizen side” of community policing. There has always been a commitment to the importance of involving both partners in the community-policing equation, but with a few exceptions — most notably, an effort conducted by the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety to train civilians in problem-solving techniques — the bulk of the city’s investment has been on the police side of CAPS. This new initiative was slated to give more intensified attention to nearly one-third of the city’s beats and will test the ability of city government and community-based agencies to spark community problem-solving initiatives. Since the community mobilization project began a little over a year ago, it has undergone considerable change. Personnel and organizational factors have reshaped the program, which continues to evolve.

The Problem: Getting Residents Involved

As reported in the previous section of this report, about 14 percent of Chicagoans indicate that they have attended one or more community beat meetings. Those who regularly participate in beat meetings tend to have a favorable opinion of the police and the value of CAPS. But what about those who are not part of the CAPS process? Our surveys indicate that while CAPS awareness is high, the drop-off between awareness and actual involvement is also high.

Community organizers know that it can be particularly difficult to stimulate active community involvement in the worst-off neighborhoods. CAPS has several hurdles to jump before it becomes a regular part of community life in these areas. Crime and fear tend to promote withdrawal rather than participation in community life. Crime and fear also destroy neighborhood cohesion, fostering suspicion and distrust rather than neighborliness. Residents also fear the very real threat of retaliation by violent drug dealers, so efforts requiring public meetings or organized cooperation may be unsuccessful in the most insecure areas. As a result, they lack the organizational infrastructure needed to get people involved. Quite often, organizations that do represent the interests of historically disadvantaged communities may not have a good track record of cooperating with police. Since their constituents often fear the police, organizations might be more interested in pressing for greater police accountability for misconduct toward civilians than in becoming closely identified with them. They believe that police do not care about their problems, and some believe that the police are actively hostile towards them. As a result, some residents are cynical about CAPS. They do not believe it really works; rather, they believe it is merely a public relations tool for the police. In addition, a series of recent events have strained relations between the community and police in Chicago. These include the resignation of

the police superintendent, along with unrelated allegations of corruption and dissatisfaction with how police handled the investigations of a few high-profile cases.

It is worth noting that pessimism and cynicism are not unique to the resident perspective; there are still a significant number of police who are dubious about CAPS. For them CAPS sounds too much like social work and not enough like policing. Some officers believe that CAPS blurs the important distinction between police and the community member. They argue that it is not their job to be "chummy" with residents of the area they serve. Chummy relationships, they contend, promote the false expectation that civilians are eligible for favors when they get caught up in traffic violations and domestic calls. They also believe that CAPS undermines the public deference and operational independence that is crucial for them to do their job. Other officers may agree with the goals of CAPS but lament the paperwork burden imposed by CAPS, believing it takes away time that could be spent on the street.

Thus, the community mobilization project is ambitious. It is no small task to get stubborn, distrustful or uninterested residents and police committed to working together productively. Community organizers face the difficult task of building productive partnerships between police, residents, community organizations and other stakeholders.

Organizational Structure

The CAPS Implementation Office is the headquarters for CAPS community outreach. Although it is a city office, its administration works hard to minimize the bureaucracy typical of municipal departments. Organizationally it is set up as a traditional hierarchy, directed by a CAPS project manager who provides the overall direction and guiding philosophy for the effort. The project manager fosters an "open door" policy in that he regularly asks his staff to speak to him directly whenever there is an issue or problem where he can help. Quite often he can help because he has working relationships with the mayor, police, aldermen and key community leaders all over the city. Working under the project manager is a field coordinator who manages a team of five area coordinators. Each area coordinator manages a small team of community organizers, each of which works beats within the five police districts in the area. Currently there are 24 full-time community organizers working through the Implementation Office, although the number may grow.

Another 13 community organizers report to 12 nonprofit agencies (one agency has two organizers) that have contracted with the city to conduct CAPS organizing. The agencies are local organizations committed to community improvement. Until recently, the agency organizers have worked largely independently of the Implementation Office staff. All of the organizers meet monthly with the project manager to discuss their activities, problems, bureaucratic issues and future events. The community mobilization project is funded by two revenue streams. All of the city's organizers and nine of the 12 agencies are funded through the city's corporate budget. The remaining three agencies are funded by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), a national nonprofit community development support organization.

The organizers vary dramatically in their professional experience and training. To help ensure that they all share a basic orientation, the CAPS Implementation Office sponsored two days of training,

one in January and again in October 1998. New employees as well as experienced organizers in need of a refresher course were involved. According to Implementation Office staff, some organizers have difficulty staying focused on CAPS; they get sidetracked by organizations and individuals in their beats who have different priorities and vehicles for getting things accomplished. Managers encourage these organizers to attend additional training to help them regain their focus. The pace of the October CAPS training was quick. Trainers described the CAPS mission, passed on information about city services and did some problem-solving training. Organizers with little experience thought the new information they received was useful, but many of them said they learned the most on the job and from more experienced organizers.


City-hired organizers are assigned to beats with special consideration given to their ethnicity, language skills and familiarity with particular neighborhoods. It is expected, for example, that organizers who work in beats that are predominantly Latino and Spanish-speaking, should speak Spanish themselves and live nearby. The independent agencies were selected because they had strong roots in the targeted beats they cover. The Implementation Office wants CAPS to reach all of Chicago's neighborhoods and is particularly sensitive to communication and cultural issues.

Organizers are assigned to police districts, each of which are composed of between nine and 15 beats. In each of the 25 police districts, the district commander has worked with the Implementation Office to designate at least two beats for organizing. The beats are typically the loci of the district's most serious crime and disorder problems and lack a stable organizational infrastructure. They are also places where beat-meeting turnout appears to be low. Organizers work to support existing organizations and create new ones where a vacuum exists. Though the organizers concentrate on specific beats, they are expected to provide support to the rest of the district's beats as needed. Like city organizers, agency organizers also concentrate on two target beats in a district. Agency-organizer beats were selected in the same way, also taking into consideration the agency's influence in particular areas.

Figure 6 depicts the location of the beats that were initially identified for action. It identifies the organizer and agency beats. It is apparent that the community mobilization project involves a significant fraction of the city's beats.

Table 4 presents a profile of the beats that were initially included in the program. It divides the beats into four categories, based on their predominant racial composition. Beats in the diverse cluster were approximately equally divided by race; about one-third were white, African-American and Latino, and about 7 percent Asian. Though the other clusters were much more homogeneous, it is worth mentioning that the white beats were about 4 percent Asian. Residents of African-American and Latino areas were the worst-off economically; in both cases about one-third of households reported earning less than \$15,000 per year, and an equal proportion were families with children that were headed by women. Residents of Latino areas had dramatically less formal education than those in other areas. Most residents were renters rather than homeowners in all of the beats.

Figure 6
Priority Beats



The Evaluation

Chicago's new program is so ambitious that the evaluation had to proceed on a sample basis. Nineteen beats were selected for intensive analysis from the original list of program beats. The beats that were chosen fell into one of five clusters. Three clusters represented the work of the contract organizations in African-American, Latino and diverse beats. Two clusters of city-organizer beats were largely African-American and Latino in character. Our most extensive data gathering takes place in these study beats.

In each beat we want to know "What is going on?" and "How does it fit into CAPS?" Part of the job is to become familiar with the problems that face the community and the programs that are actually being implemented there. Evaluation staff members sit in on planning and training meetings,

Table 4
Profile of Priority Beats

Median Percentages for Project Beats	Diverse Beats	Af-Am Beats	White Beats	Hispanic Beats	All Beats
percent white	36	1	64	3	22
percent black	28	98	3	11	22
percent Latino	32	1	12	82	52
percent rent home	70	73	57	73	70
percent not high school graduates	34	43	26	64	38
percent income under \$15,000	16	31	7	29	20
percent female-headed households	12	30	7	26	1
number of beats	17	32	14	9	72

Note: 1997 population estimates

conduct repeated interviews with key activists, attend public meetings and ride along with beat officers serving the areas. They are conducting an inventory of the organizations and resources of each beat to understand how effectively they are mobilized in support of the program. They also monitor how the program coordinates with police at the beat and district levels. During 1998, observers attended 167 meetings in targeted beats. There they completed observation forms that systematically recorded what took place, and they distributed questionnaires to residents and police officers who were in attendance. Within the scope of our resources, the evaluation will also document the general activities associated with the program and the activities of the organizations involved in it. We will remain in contact with all of the organizations and conduct periodic interviews with city organizers and project management staff.

Resident Views and Community Capacity: Survey Data

A survey was conducted of a small sample of beats involved at the beginning in the community mobilization project to establish a baseline profile of conditions there. Because it was necessary to contact people living in small geographical areas, respondents were selected using samples drawn from telephone directory listings, and the interviews were conducted by telephone both in English and Spanish. Nineteen program beats were involved in the study, and a total of 1,880 respondents were interviewed. The number of respondents ranged from a low of 62 to a high of 140 per beat. The overall response rate for the survey, conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois-Chicago, was 56 percent. Most interviews were completed between April and June of 1998 — shortly after the official beginning date for the mobilization project, but before most organizers were hired, trained and active in the beats.

The beats were selected to represent the kinds of areas that are involved in the project as a whole and the kinds of organizing that is going on there. Nine predominately African-American beats were selected, including five being served by city organizers and four by organizers hired by the

nonprofit agencies. Another six beats were predominately Latino in composition; three of which were city-organizer beats and three were agency beats. Finally, four beats were selected for the survey because they were racially diverse; all were served by partner organizations.


The survey examined residents' views of neighborhood problems, their awareness of CAPS and their involvement in beat meetings. It also gathered reports of the quality of police service in their community. The survey included questions measuring three dimensions we identified as important components of the neighborhoods' capacity to deal with problems: their participation in community-based organizations, their perceptions of willingness of their neighbors to intervene to reestablish order, and their views on what neighbors would do if their local police station were threatened with closure or if public housing were to be constructed in their community.

The baseline survey found that residents of most of the beats lay below the city average on all of these dimensions. Figure 7 depicts some key measures of neighborhood capacity and perceptions of the quality of police service for the 19 study beats, and it illustrates where they lay relative to the city as a whole. The height of the bars indicates the scores for each beat. Labels below the bars identify predominately African-American ("A-A"), Latino ("Lat"), and racially diverse ("Div") beats. They also signal whether they were city organizers ("City") or employees of community organizations ("Org"). City averages identified in Figure 7 are based on a citywide survey conducted at about the same time.

The study beats fared best on a measure of resident involvement in local organizations. The survey asked whether the respondent or someone else in the household was involved in a neighborhood-watch group or citizen patrol, a block club or community organization, or a Local School Council or PTA group in their area. Overall, 21 percent reported that their household was involved in a block or community group, 14 percent in a neighborhood watch or patrol, and 13 percent in a school-based group. These measures went together, for there was a mild tendency for respondents to be "joiners." The average correlation between the three was +.26. A summary measure of civic engagement was created by adding their responses, so households could score between zero and three on the index. Because these measures of civic engagement overlapped, most households did not belong to any local groups; overall, 67 percent of respondents received a score of zero. Only 11 percent reported that their household was involved in two or three of the kinds of groups on the list. Figure 7 presents the average score separately for each beat. As it depicts, the citywide score for Chicago averaged just below one organization per household. Of the 19 study beats, seven lay above that figure, but 12 lay below.

Responses to three questions were used to gauge the **strength of informal social control** in these targeted beats. The survey asked about the likelihood of their neighbors getting personally involved in stopping three kinds of incidents: children spray-painting graffiti on a local building, a teenager harassing an elderly person, and a fight in front of their home in which someone were being beaten up. Their judgments were used to represent the strength of the defensive web of social support that characterized each of the study areas. Respondents were most optimistic that their neighbors would intervene to stop teens from harassing senior citizens: overall, 35 percent thought they were "very likely" to do so, and 37 percent felt that they were "likely" to do so. On the other hand, 15 percent indicated that their neighbors were "unlikely" to act, and 19 percent thought such involvement "very unlikely." On the other hand, less than a majority thought their neighbors would personally intervene in a fight. Just

Figure 7
Community Mobilization Project Beats



over 40 percent thought that was unlikely or very unlikely, and another 15 percent volunteered that their neighbors would “just call the police.” The perceived likelihood that neighbors would intervene in the spray-paint scenario stood close to the figures for harassment of the elderly.

Responses to the three questions were consistent: they were correlated +.33 at the individual level and +.77 at the beat level. As Figure 7 indicates, the citywide average for this index was 3.03, very near the score for the “likely” response category. Most of the beats targeted by the mobilization program (16 of the 19 surveyed) lay below this figure, and one was tied with it. Compared to the city as a whole, most residents of these areas were not particularly optimistic that their neighbors would represent the collectivity norms by intervening to safeguard them when they were threatened.

The **political mobilization** index is based on responses to two questions asking how likely neighbors would organize to protest the possible closing of their local police station or public housing that might be built in their community. Both are topics in the news, and in 1992 a (failed) attempt by the city to close a number of district stations was a matter of extensive community debate. Police representatives doubted the station houses’ value, but residents perceived the threatened closings as a “take-away” that might affect officers’ responsiveness to local concerns. Presented with a similar

scenario, across the project beats almost 75 percent thought that it was likely or very likely that their neighbors would try to stop a station closing. The public housing issue remains a lively one due to wide discussion about scattered-site housing in the city. In the 1998 survey, respondents were asked, "Suppose that the city announced that public housing was going to be built in your neighborhood. How likely is it that neighborhood residents would organize to try to keep the public housing out?" About 30 percent thought this was "very likely" and another 30 percent thought it "likely." Thirteen percent thought their neighbors "very unlikely" to organize against such development.

Responses to these two questions were combined to create an index of the political mobilization capacity of the study areas. The two measures were correlated +.26 at the individual level and +.81 at the area level. The citywide average on this measure was 3.15, which placed the average Chicagoan just above "likely" on the response scale. As illustrated in Figure 7, 15 of the 19 priority beats lay below the city average on this measure.

The final benchmark data presented in Figure 7 represent beat residents' views of the quality of police service delivered in their neighborhood. Respondents to the survey were asked five questions about policing in their area.

How good a job are the police in your neighborhood doing to prevent crime in your neighborhood?

How good a job are the police in your neighborhood doing in keeping order on the streets and sidewalks?

How responsive are the police in your neighborhood to community concerns?

How good a job are the police doing in dealing with the problems that really concern people in your neighborhood?

How good a job are the police doing in working together with residents in your neighborhood to solve local problems?

Four questions called for assessments of "how good a job" police did, and those were measured on a four-point scale ranging from "very good" to "poor." Four categories ranging from "very responsive" to "very unresponsive" represented their responses to the fifth question.

Police got the lowest marks for working together with residents to solve problems: 56 percent gave them a "fair" or "poor" rating on this dimension. Police got their highest rating for responsiveness to community concerns. More than three-quarters of those interviewed gave them a "good job" or "very good job" rating, and only 9 percent felt they were "poor" on that dimension. People were very consistent in their views of neighborhood policing. The average correlation between the five sets of responses was +.66, and at the beat level the scores were correlated an average of +.93. As Figure 7 indicates, 17 of the 19 project beats included in the evaluation fell below the city average on an identical composite measure. At the outset, organizers for this project were working to encourage cooperation

with the police in communities that were not particularly optimistic about the quality of police service in their neighborhood.

Implementation to Date

Organizers do a number of different things: spread CAPS awareness; organize marches, prayer vigils and smoke-outs¹; sponsor educational workshops; provide city service information; work with local police and beat facilitators; and assist in problem identification and problem solving. Organizers spend a great deal of time in meetings. They meet with residents, police, church groups, businesses, block clubs and city departments. They also facilitate training and educational sessions for residents on such topics as problem solving, requesting city services, the Adopt-A-Street program², landlord training and block-club organizing. All of this is done with a focus toward increasing CAPS participation, building relationships within and between community and police, and the development of problem-solving skills within the community.

Maintaining good levels of participation at beat meetings is a continuing effort for all the organizers. The CAPS word needs to be spread, and the organizers are the evangelists. They do this in a variety of ways. They approach block clubs, local school councils, community organizations, churches and community leaders. They post flyers and even do door-to-door canvassing. To some, beat meeting attendance appears to be a "numbers game." But there is a good reason for wanting a healthy turnout at beat meetings. It is important that all of the problems and all of the interests of residents of the beat get represented there. A large turnout also increases the likelihood that the problems raised at the beat meeting are actually solvable with the resources (skills, time, willingness) that are available. A meeting with only five people means that those five people have to do the work that might otherwise be divided amongst 15 people. Some beat meetings regularly draw between 40 and 50 people, while others struggle to get 10. As we saw in the previous section, beat meetings more closely approximate the CAPS model when there are more people involved.

Once organizers get people to the beat meetings, they try to build constituencies for problem solving by motivating people to voice their concerns and act on specific issues: loitering, drug sales, violence, gang activity, prostitution, building issues, graffiti, gang intimidation and public drinking. The CAPS project manager frequently recites two favorite adages: "Take a person fishing, feed him for a day. Teach a person to fish, feed him for a lifetime;" and "Never do for another what he can do for himself." Community empowerment and self-sufficiency are key goals of CAPS. Organizers are regularly cautioned against taking ownership of community problems. They are expected to provide direction and assistance in problem solving, but never to solve the problem themselves. Residents develop confidence in CAPS and in themselves when they achieve something on their own. They also make life easier for organizers and police when they can solve their own problems.

¹A smoke-out is a temporary public barbecue set up where illegal activity (drug dealing, prostitution, public drinking) usually occurs.

²Adopt-A-Street is a public-private partnership in which local businesses, residents, block clubs, schools and other agencies "adopt" a site in the neighborhood and take responsibility for keeping it clean.

Organizers try to “get the ball rolling” in the focus beats by providing direction and assistance to CAPS participants. Usually this involves providing information about city services and a walk-through of the problem-solving process so that residents learn how to problem solve under the tutelage of Police Academy trainers. CAPS beat meetings are important because there are few opportunities for residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods to participate in community life. Under these circumstances, it is especially important that beat meetings be productive; otherwise, organizers risk galvanizing the pessimism that discourages people from joining CAPS in the first place. A small success can go a long way to build confidence and trust. Once organizers feel confident that beat residents understand and can manage the CAPS process, they start anew in a different beat.

When residents get organized and start working together, problems that once seemed insurmountable become manageable or even solvable. One of the area coordinators recounted the tale of reclaiming a park from gang members:

Black and Hispanic gangs ran the park and intimidated others from using it. Adjacent to the park was a dimly lit viaduct covered with graffiti. Both the park and the viaduct were good locations for crime. This particular beat suffered from poor participation at beat meetings. The organizer used the theme of the park to attract residents and they started coming to the beat meetings because everyone felt that the park was a serious problem. She helped organize a major cleanup of the park and viaduct. The city and the rail company provided paint and other resources to help clean up. About 40 people came to clean and now the park and viaduct look completely different. The park supervisor, who was part time, is now full time and this has made the park a family friendly place. In the spring they had their first park party. The police, park district and residents came. It was a major accomplishment.

This all began at a beat meeting. The group identified a problem, developed a plan and used available resources to solve the problem. Though the process seems simple enough, there are still many areas where this sort of organizing does not happen. Savvy activists know that problem solving and collective efficacy do not occur spontaneously or overnight. It takes persistence, training, teamwork and vision to make it work.

While the image of communities “pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps” is appealing, in many areas the most pressing problems may be beyond the capacity of residents to deal with on their own. Most organizers are upbeat and optimistic about their work, but there are a few who seem despondent about the ubiquitous drug dealing in their communities. An organizer expressed his dismay with the drug trafficking and change in the quality of policing in his area:

This [area] is extremely dangerous because it is saturated with dealers and criminal activity. The new officers zoom through the streets in their cars, and they don't stop to talk to residents or to check out suspicious loitering. [An intersection] was clean but now there are dealers, and they spill over into surrounding streets. Several months of good work seem to have vanished

overnight, and I don't understand why. With the new drug dealers and new officers, things are seriously worse than when we first started.

These beats need links to city- or metropolitan-wide institutions that can deliver the goods, services and economic capital they require to successfully tackle local problems. CAPS creates regular channels for securing some of these resources, and a mobilized community could gain more through political channels. Finally, the structure of beat meetings and district advisory committees created by CAPS can help residents to share, accumulate and prioritize their concerns, as well as to coordinate their efforts to deal with those at the top of their agenda. As a result, resources can be applied to pressing problems that are widely recognized by the community.

CAPS makes available a number of tools that help communities solve problems and improve the quality of life. City service tools include the city service request process; the Strategic Inspections Task Force, which enforces Chicago's anti-gang and drug house ordinance; the landlord training program, Fast Track demolition and liquor license control. There are also a variety of community-action tools: Court Advocacy, block club organizing, citizen patrols, parent patrols, safe school zones and the walking school bus, a program in which parents develop safe routes and walk groups of children to and from school. Other available resources include CAPS monthly beat meetings, the police department's computerized crime mapping and analysis system, and problem-solving training. Organizers report varying degrees of success and usage of these resources. The Strategic Inspections Task Force, for example, receives mixed reviews from organizers. Essentially the city uses building inspections and fines to motivate negligent building owners into caring for their property. Several organizers say that the Task Force was instrumental in getting problem buildings cleaned up. Almost as many, however, report that the Task Force's work is shrouded in secrecy, and one organizer even felt that it was extremely difficult to work with the force. This organizer could not get clear, timely answers about exactly what the Task Force was doing. Eventually the organizer and his group gave up pursuing a problem landlord because the Task Force had acted unilaterally (in their view), without consulting anyone about its course of action.

African-American organizers are especially fond of prayer marches and vigils as community-action tools. Organizers, residents, police and community leaders march through problem streets to demonstrate their unity and confront troublemakers by stopping in front of the drug hot spots, joining hands, and singing or saying a prayer aloud for the community. Though it is not clear what long-term effects prayer vigils have on drug houses, they do give the community the chance to point out hot spots to police and let the dealers know that the community is aware of what they are doing and that it disapproves.

Many of the organizers who have participated in Court Advocacy say that doing so has positive results. With input gathered at beat meetings or from other members of the community, Court Advocacy subcommittees, working with the police department, identify and track cases of interest to the community. Cases can range from violent crimes, such as murder or rape, to "quality of life" cases, such as drug dealing and public drinking, abandoned buildings and negligent landlords, and problem liquor establishments. Volunteers attend court proceedings associated with those cases and provide support for victims and witnesses who may be hesitant to testify in court. The presence of volunteers sends a message to the defendant, the judge and all other parties in the criminal justice system: the community

cares about the outcome of these cases and is willing to devote its time and energies to monitoring the workings of the judicial system.

Problems in Organizing

Differing Philosophies. Across the city, not all activists share the same philosophy of community organizing. Some organizers take a cool, quiet approach, working “within the system.” Others have no problem criticizing police and other officials and have adopted a confrontational, Alinsky style of organizing. Quieter organizers try to gain access to resources and services through a more cooperative approach. They claim their organizing methods build solidarity and promote positive relationships. They are quite willing to be confrontational toward those who threaten public order, but not toward their potential partners. Firebrand organizers use confrontation and pressure to get results. They are guided by a simple but, in their view, effective philosophy. As one put it, “You get results by putting pressure on key people.” “Key people” are those in positions of power. This includes police commanders, city agency directors, business leaders, the mayor and anyone else with the ability to effect change. An organization that is truly interested in improving the quality of community life, they argue, will not hesitate to challenge the police and other institutions if doing so yields positive results for its constituents. Confrontational organizers feel they are free to pursue results-driven strategies that stress accountability. Over the past year, we have had the opportunity to look at both organizing philosophies in action.

One community organization with a history of confrontational organizing spent much of 1998 pressuring a police commander to fulfill promises they claim he made: to increase patrols at drug and gang hot spots; to attend community meetings; and to provide progress reports and arrest information for the area. The police made efforts to meet the group’s demands, but the organization felt the efforts were “too little, too late.” When a bystander was shot in March 1998 in front of one of the district’s hot spots, tension between the organization and police escalated. Residents targeted a problem building and planned to picket it to demonstrate the community’s outrage. When activists arrived at the problem building, the police intervened and threatened to arrest them. This prompted two busloads of angry would-be picketers to descend upon the district station demanding the attention of the police commander, who was unavailable. Eventually an area deputy chief of patrol stepped in to mediate the dispute, and activists claim the deputy promised that the local police district would meet the community’s requests. A new commander was eventually installed, and activists in the area report that relations between police and the community have improved significantly since then, although a list of issues still remains open on their agenda. Although it had the opportunity, this organization decided not to become involved as a contractor in the city’s community mobilization project, because it would “cramp their style.”

This episode illustrates some of the tactics of confrontational organizing. In this instance, the community organization’s demands were acknowledged, and residents felt empowered through their participation in action against the police, and not just against crime. They believe that such unified, vocal groups can wield a political force strong enough to change the quality of policing in their area. They claim successes like these build trust and confidence among residents, as well as strengthen their commitment to the organization. However, this strategy runs afoul of one of the deepest fears of many police — a concern that has been documented by our surveys of officers in Chicago — a fear of losing

control over their agenda. Many police do not like to be told what to do by brash and accusatorial outsiders. Organizations that lose in a confrontation can end up in a worse position than before. Officers working in the area may become less cooperative and less willing to involve residents in decision making. It is also true that not all residents are fond of conflict. At one meeting during the confrontation described above, a neighborhood resident complained about the attitude, tone and harsh language used by activists. "There are young children here. If we're supposed to be setting the example, what is this?" This resident declined an invitation to participate in the organization's rally and said he probably would not return to another meeting.

The partnership-oriented organizing style favored by the CAPS Implementation Office claims its own advantages. CAPS-sponsored events often attract a wide variety of people. Police commanders, aldermen, church leaders and even the mayor participate in marches, prayer vigils and smoke-outs. These events have a very different feel than confrontational marches. Unity and partnership are key themes, and participants are visibly positive about the relationship between police, city agencies and community. Police and politicians are immediately available to residents, who take advantage of the situation to point out hot spots and other problems in need of attention like overgrown bushes, broken street lights, open fire hydrants, graffiti, problem liquor stores and abandoned vehicles and homes. Especially in African-American neighborhoods, these organizers use prayer vigils as a means of confronting drug dealers and gang members. Local churches quite often represent the best, if not the only, organizational infrastructure in troubled areas, so it is not surprising that those who go to church are the ones who participate in CAPS events. Marches make great use of prayer, song and preaching in these areas. These events are remarkable in that they consistently bring together people from all sides of the CAPS triad: police, the community and city service agencies. There are many organizers who are unafraid of confrontation and even seem to relish it, but not many work through the CAPS Implementation Office.

One city-hired organizer who later left the project questioned the constitutionality of Chicago's controversial anti-gang loitering ordinance — legislation that is strongly supported by the Implementation Office. He made no secret of his disappointment that the partnership between police and community in his district was unequal: "The [name withheld] District does not want any community activity without police approval. Unless the police sanction it, you can't do anything. But the police don't own the community; it belongs to the people who live there." From the point of view of confrontational organizers, residents need to be free to pressure police commanders and city agencies for better services, if that is what is required. They do not automatically trust that police are doing the best job they can and feel that organizers who work within the system are unlikely agents of change. Residents can become discouraged and drop out of the process when they feel that their progress is being slowed by official inaction. One resident who participated in beat meetings for several years became so frustrated with what she perceived to be police excuses for inaction that she set up a separate group to "educate people on ways to help themselves without the police and outside of CAPS."

Bureaucratic Issues. Dealing with the city inevitably involves bureaucratic problems. Glitches in the city bureaucracy delayed payment to the independent agencies for six months. Repeated promises that payments would be forthcoming, followed by further delays, created an atmosphere of distrust and anger. One agency had to lay off a respected organizer because it could not afford to pay her any longer. When the agency tried later to rehire her later, she declined. Since then, the agency has hired

another organizer, but it is difficult to calculate the loss of a staff member who had built a rapport with and earned the respect of the community. The funding problem did not affect the LISC-supported agencies, but it did bring attention to the fact that these agencies are not connected to the Implementation Office in the same way as are city-funded agencies. Partly because they are not paying them, the Implementation Office has also been less interested in closely monitoring the agencies funded by LISC.

Staff Turnover. Both the Implementation Office and the delegate agencies have had a fair number of personnel changes. At least six agencies have had staff turnover at the organizer or managerial levels. In one high-need area, the organizer has had to take on administrative duties formerly the responsibility of the agency director. This meant that community organizing slowed considerably. There has also been an ample amount of turnover of organizers hired by the Implementation Office, owing to several factors: job dissatisfaction, poor performance, contractual problems and internal conflicts. Turnover can disrupt and delay organizing; without a consistent, committed individual working to push things forward, the process stalls. Because CAPS only moves as fast and as well as the people behind it, staff turnover can profoundly affect the course of organizing efforts. Turnover almost inevitably necessitates new training, orientation and rebuilding. Turnover can be a trying setback in communities that come to rely upon particular organizers, activists, police, facilitators and other key players in the CAPS process.

Conflicting Agendas. In one of Chicago's diverse neighborhoods, the agency organizer holds problem-solving sessions with community members to attack drug sales, gang loitering and problem buildings. This agency's strategy is to invite only selected community members to participate in the problem-solving sessions, because its workers believe this to be the best way to ensure that they will assemble a committed, bright, and focused group to work on problems. However, other organizers say that this kind of selectivity promotes gentrification and is hardly appropriate for an agency promoting CAPS. As it turns out, most of the people who attend the problem-solving meetings tend to be white homeowners concerned about gang activity on a nearby busy commercial street. A city-hired organizer in the area claims that when she suggested that she print flyers in Spanish to invite the Hispanic population to beat meetings, she received a cold response.

The buildings that this group targeted are not dangerous. A while ago the residents asked police about calls [for service] they get at those [Hispanic-occupied] buildings. They said the buildings are fairly quiet. Now one of the residents is wondering what is going to happen to all those people living there. [The delegate-agency organizer] is silent on this issue.

We have observed that organizers on the agency side of the program have tremendous liberty to implement their own versions of CAPS, while the city-hired organizers have fielded more standardized versions of CAPS under the supervision of area coordinators. This is not to say that agencies regularly promote gentrification, but this particular problem — organizing in a diverse area — is fraught with difficulty. When varying cultures and social norms exist in the same neighborhood, conflicts can easily break out along those fault lines. People from different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds can have different definitions (and tolerances) of disorder. A police officer in the area touched on this theme when he described the challenges of implementing community policing in a diverse community:

[A white resident] called us not too long ago about gang activity at the end of her block. We went to check it out and found five Cuban guys in their sixties talking. Gang activity? Come on! They weren't even drinking. There's no need to give these guys a hard time. Over in Little Italy, near UIC [University of Illinois at Chicago], you see people hanging out talking all the time. No one has a problem with that.

On the anti-gang loitering law:

I don't think the law is a good idea. I used to hang out when I was a kid. I used to get into trouble, but it wasn't for hanging out on the corner. Even if kids wear the clothes and colors, that doesn't mean they are part of a gang. A lot of kids just think it looks cool, but they're not dealing or hurting anyone. I don't see the harm in hanging out and talking with your friends. That's part of growing up in the city. But we get a lot of calls. People are less tolerant of differences.

Evaluation Questions

The community mobilization project raises a number of important questions concerning the role of government and community organizations in building collective efficacy. Between now and the next report we will be examining these in the context of Chicago's new organizing effort. Studies of the distribution of anticrime organizations across neighborhoods indicate that these sorts of organizations are least common in disorganized, poor, high-crime areas. However, CAPS organizers are expected to help establish viable community organizations in beats in exactly these kinds of areas. Participation in local organizations is most often a function of opportunity, but if the opportunity does not exist, then it is unlikely that residents will establish effective anticrime organizations on their own. What kind of success will the organizers have in creating viable community organizations? Is it possible to create lasting organizations in high turnover areas? Which strategies work and which do not? Where do strategies work, and why? What kinds of resources are needed to establish a working organizational infrastructure in the worst-off areas? Chicago has experimented with "Super Block" projects involving a massive infusion of resources in small areas, but is this level of intervention necessary to turn a blighted neighborhood around? Organizers are working hard, but in the most desperate beats the program has been slow in getting off the ground.

In studying both city-hired and agency organizers, one inevitably asks, Which group of organizers is more effective? Should the city give financial support to independent community groups, essentially contracting out community organizing? Currently they form one arm of the community mobilization project. Or, is it more effective to directly employ city organizers managed by a city department? This is the other arm of the city's program.

Those who support the funding of independent community organizations argue that they act first and foremost in the best interest of the local community. These organizations can be staffed by trained and experienced professionals who are in close touch with local issues and who know how to deal with them. The best community organizations demonstrate a high degree of mobilization capacity. These organizations are attractive CAPS partners because they have dedicated constituencies that are willing

to work on designated problems in a timely manner. It is not uncommon, for example, for an agency to mobilize 50 people at the last minute for a march on a given issue. Some of the city's partner agencies also have special expertise in specific areas (community redevelopment, youth, elderly, schools) and relationships with civic associations. Strong community organizations do not have to expend the energy required to attract a volunteer base to a fledgling enterprise. Those who support the funding of existing organizations also raise the issue of trust. They argue that local community organizations are more likely to work for the good of the community, even if it involves challenging the status quo.

However, many effective organizations do not have credible expertise in crime prevention and neighborhood safety. They may be experienced at economic redevelopment or housing development, but many of those groups have little expertise in crime prevention. Another potential concern is supplantation — the risk that funds will be informally reallocated from CAPS toward non-CAPS activities. Successful community organizations inevitably develop unique areas of expertise, methodologies and philosophies. They also develop their own opinions on what constitutes effective and ineffective ways of using resources. They might, for example, believe that job training and assistance programs are more beneficial to the community than a crime-prevention project. They may be tempted to divert resources to support these good works, rather than change their focus in return for a contract. Some organizations in Chicago have already been criticized for implementing non-CAPS agendas under the guise of cooperating with the program. Can organizations and organizers with different and even conflicting versions of community policing both be allowed to call what they do CAPS and get funding for it? Because community organizations in areas of low collective efficacy are often at odds with the police and government institutions, this also raises the question of whether, as a political matter, government should be expected to fund its critics. Is a contractual arrangement between agencies and the city government an appropriate response to pressure from community organizations to fund their versions of neighborhood empowerment?

The community mobilization project is a relatively new program, and it is still struggling to define its direction and audience. During the next year we will be closely following events, and our next report will document the course the program has taken and its impact on the targeted communities.

Citywide Program Implementation

The implementation of Chicago's community-policing program has been under our scrutiny from its inception in April 1993. The program was instituted in five prototype areas and, after an experimental period, was introduced in several districts at a time to encompass the entire Patrol Division. By late 1994, program components had been introduced in all of the city's 25 districts, and we investigated each to gauge the extent of implementation. That field experience served as a pilot test for future citywide assessments. But, because the program is comprehensive and Chicago so large, for the two years that followed we focused the implementation evaluation on a sample of 13 districts that, in combination, represented the city's diverse communities.

This year, however, we extended our data-collection period and took an in-depth look at all of the city's police districts. Some of the specific components we examined are different than those in last year's study because as CAPS has matured, some aspects of the program that previously presented a challenge have been resolved, such as Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) dispatch performance and the delivery of city services, and are running fairly smoothly. Others, like problem documentation paperwork — while important to the program — were determined to be of lesser priority for in-depth analysis. Examined in this report are the extent and quality of program-component implementation; the appropriateness and effectiveness of police roles; the extent of performance of CAPS-related duties; the regularity and effectiveness of meetings; evidence of partnerships and their strength; and the use of available resources.

A total of 125 lengthy personal interviews were conducted with police personnel and civilian district advisory committee chairs. More than 1,800 officers were surveyed at roll call and during beat community meetings. Another 240 beat officers and sergeants, and 197 civilian beat facilitators, were surveyed before being trained on how to conduct better beat meetings. All 25 civilian district administrative managers were surveyed as well. The evaluators also observed a large number of training sessions, management seminars, and planning and strategy meetings that were attended by district and area personnel.

Methodology

The Chicago Police Department's General Order 96-3 (Patrol Division Strategy to Address Chronic Crime and Disorder Problems) clearly spells out all of the CAPS components and policies, so we use it as a blueprint for the way the program is to be implemented. Using the varied data sources listed above, we focused on the status of a list of specific program elements on a district-by-district basis.

The 25 elements we evaluated this year can be collapsed into four categories:

- **Beat teamwork and problem solving**, under which we looked at such things as beat team meeting efficacy; beat team composition, depth and use of beat plans, availability and use of downtime for problem solving, use and effectiveness of intra-departmental forms; ICAM use; continuity of beat assignment; regularity of intra-watch information exchange at change of watch; and sergeants' monitoring and intervention of assignments

to bolster beat integrity. An overview of beat team leader attitudes, officers' attitudes toward the problem-solving model and city services proficiency is also provided.

- **District management teamwork and planning**, examining quality of district management team meetings and the role of the district advisory committee chair in the management team; district plan usefulness, currentness and applicability; communication of the district plan to district personnel and the district advisory committee; and regularity and effectiveness of sector team meetings.
- **District management**, in which we considered command-level knowledge of and apparent involvement in the program; district administrative managers' roles and job satisfaction; and neighborhood relations sergeants' changing roles and overt attitude toward the program.
- **Community partnerships**, focusing on beat meeting effectiveness; community involvement in problem solving; district advisory committee and court advocacy activities; beat meeting attendance and representativeness; and officer interaction with the community.

As mentioned above, the evaluation team conducted personal interviews with district personnel as well as with district advisory committee chairs. It should be noted that 60 percent of the respondents were positionally defined (there is only one commander, neighborhood relations sergeant and district advisory committee chair per district); however, all of the watch commanders and beat team leaders that were interviewed had been selected by their commanders as the "best and most knowledgeable in the district," allowing the districts to have the best possible representation and providing evaluators with the most information per session. Each interview was guided by a standardized list of questions to ensure that we asked all appropriate questions of each respondent, and we posed each question to as many of the five respondents per district as was pertinent. (For example, questions about sergeants intervening on inappropriate radio assignments were not asked of the district advisory committee chair or neighborhood relations sergeant, whereas queries about district management team meetings were asked of each of the five informants per district.) The questioning process also accommodated additional or follow-up inquiries, enabling respondents to volunteer information as they wished. This allowed us to gather information that might otherwise have been missed. The 125 personal interviews were conducted from May through October 1998. Appropriate data from roll call, training and beat meeting surveys was added to augment interview findings. In addition, the evaluation team reviewed quantitative data on beat meeting attendance and service delivery.

When all interviews were completed, the evaluation team exchanged detailed notes, read through the data and independently rated each component and district according to a set of criteria. Most of these criteria were based on program descriptions and explanations contained in the Chicago Police Department's General Order 96-3 and various other Department documents and training materials. For each component, we established what constituted an acceptable level of implementation as well as what would occasion a lesser or greater rating. Evaluators collaboratively discussed and compared their conclusions. In most cases, the group's findings were uniform, but when there was variation, interview notes were revisited and discussed until consensus was

reached. Evaluators' findings were given numerical ratings on a three-point scale with the following values:

3.0 = very good 2.0 = satisfactory 1.0 = very poor
 2.5 = good 1.5 = poor

Assessments were charted, with components grouped into four major categories. Within each category, component results were weighted to reflect their importance — that is, elements important to the program, like daily intra-watch communication, were not assigned the equivalent weight of those deemed foundational, such as the efficacy of beat community meetings or the development and execution of sound beat plans. The four major categories were also assigned differing weights, and their combined ratings produced composite scores for the 25 districts. Table 5 shows percentages assigned to components and categories.

Table 5
 Component and Category Weighting

	component percentage	category percentage
Beat teamwork and problem solving		33
Beat team meeting effectiveness	20	
Beat plans	20	
Beat team composition	20	
Intradepartmental forms use	10	
Downtime for problem solving	10	
ICAM use	10	
Sergeants' intervention	5	
Continuity of assignment	2.5	
Daily intra-team information exchange at change of watch	2.5	
	100	
District teamwork and planning		17
District management meeting effectiveness	30	
Usefulness and currentness of district plan	25	
Sector team meeting effectiveness	20	
Communication of district plan to personnel and community	12.5	
DAC chair involvement in district management team	12.5	
	100	
District management		17
Commander understanding of program and involvement w/community	70	
Watch commander role/involvement	30	
	100	
Community partnerships		33
Beat meeting effectiveness	30	
Community involvement in problem solving	20	
District advisory committee	20	
Officer interaction with community	10	
Court advocacy subcommittee	10	
Beat meeting attendance	5	
Beat meeting representativeness	5	
	100	100

Based on our findings, this section of the report presents a panoramic snapshot of Chicago's community-policing strategy in spring and summer 1998. Each subsection that follows includes a brief explanation of that category's components, their importance or function in the program and rating criteria. When possible, we compare the current status of the program's elements with 1997 findings. Assessment charts for each category are included at the end of the section; alphabetic designations were assigned randomly to each district to preserve confidentiality. Summary data is then presented that assess the progress of individual components as well as district-level progress in implementing CAPS. A citywide rating chart concludes this segment of the report.

Beat Teamwork and Problem Solving

The CAPS strategy places much emphasis on teams and teamwork at all levels. The foundation of the team structure is the beat team, headed up by a sergeant and composed of officers working the same geographical area on all three watches. Meetings and information-exchange procedures were developed to foster collaboration within teams and between watches. With increased levels of teamwork, officers are expected to do more than respond to radio calls — they are encouraged to work proactively on problems as well. Resources have been made available to patrol officers, such as an automated crime-mapping program, assistance from centralized/citywide units and priority responses from city service departments. The following section analyzes how well each of the components that make up beat teamwork and problem solving has been implemented in the 25 police districts. Each component has been briefly described as it applies to the CAPS strategy; rating criteria have also been detailed. Survey data results (often shown in tabular form) further illustrating the level of component implementation are included where appropriate. Assessment Chart 1, found on page 74, shows results for each of the nine components in this category.

Beat team meeting effectiveness. Each of the 279 beats in the city has assigned officers from all three watches to groups called beat teams. A sergeant serves as a beat team leader, who monitors officers' problem-solving activities. These teams hold regular beat team meetings that serve two purposes: to foster team planning and strategizing, and to serve as an effective information-exchange tool. During beat team meetings, officers are to identify, prioritize and analyze crime and disorder problems, based in part on information gathered at beat community meetings. In addition, they design strategies and eventually evaluate their progress. The analysis and strategies are to be documented in beat plans, which are the teams' comprehensive plans of action. Beat team meetings also are to provide a structure in which all watches can meet. Before the advent of beat team meetings, officers across watches rarely had the opportunity to hold group discussions of conditions in their beat.

Beat team meetings were first introduced in 1996 and were fully implemented in all districts by 1997. This year we found that beat team meetings continued to be held consistently and had even become an accepted activity. And because meetings are now routinely held, this year we judged beat team meetings on the types of problem-solving activities that typically took place there. Districts where beat teams used the CAPS five-step problem-solving model and considered community input when setting priorities garnered ratings of good or very good. Districts received a satisfactory score when their beat teams simply reviewed problems and beat plans. Poor or very poor ratings were assigned to districts holding very brief beat team meetings of little substance, or where these team meetings were perceived as not useful or were not held at all.

Overall, beat team meetings were judged to be satisfactory, receiving a 2.0 rating citywide. Most districts conducted productive beat team meetings: more than half the districts (64 percent) had satisfactory scores, and another 20 percent received good ratings. Only 12 percent of the districts scored poor ratings for beat team meetings, and one district received the lowest rating of very poor. Also on a favorable note, more than half the officers surveyed (58 percent) reported that their supervisors take beat team meetings "very seriously," while another third believed their supervisors take them "somewhat seriously."

These positive findings were supported by the musing of one neighborhood relations sergeant:

I think, in some way, the beat team concept is the biggest success of CAPS. These guys are thinking of themselves as a team, and they really know what's going on in the beat.

Nonetheless, this year no district received the highest rating for beat team meetings, because to do so required that virtually all beat team leaders facilitate highly productive beat team meetings. The 20 percent of districts receiving above-average marks for this component did so because there were some industrious beat team leaders who stood out among their peers — leaders who provided their officers with supplementary information such as arrest reports, crime maps and other statistical information. Some relied on problem-solving flip charts to ensure comprehensive problem analysis.

The four districts rated below average for this component received substandard ratings due to evidence that their beat team meetings were held inconsistently or because their meetings were too brief to be productive. Two of the four lowest-rated districts recently mandated that beat team meetings must be held directly after the beat's monthly community meetings to cut back overtime expenses. Interestingly, both of these districts reported that beat team meeting productivity had since diminished, owing to the fact that residents often lingered after their beat community meeting, delaying the start of the officers' meeting or causing them to postpone discussion of tactical strategies.

The overtime issue is a significant one; a majority of those we interviewed mentioned that "the word is out" that overtime costs must be reduced. Threatened overtime restrictions not only appear to have a negative impact on beat-team meeting productivity, but they will ultimately prevent a full complement of officers from attending beat community meetings and effectively negate the 24-hour "team" perspective that is a critical aspect of the CAPS problem-solving model. One watch commander aptly described the difficulty that many others spoke of:

For two to three years we let [officers] think they had carte blanche with overtime. But now we're told to tighten this up and become more efficient. Officers had the expectation they could implement whatever strategies they needed, regardless of cost.

This watch commander questioned the need for monthly beat team meetings, instead suggesting that bimonthly meetings could address the budgetary issue. Further complicating the issue, the savvy watch commander added:

Some officers [are] motivated by their overtime checks as opposed to the actual strategies. The primary focus of many officers is to get in, get the meeting done, collect two hours [pay] and call it a day.

Beat team composition. Who attends beat team meetings influences the effectiveness of the session and, ultimately, problem solving. According to the CAPS general order, all beat officers are mandated to attend these gatherings because each watch's perspective is needed for a team of officers to have a holistic knowledge of its beat. There is an important reason to include other personnel: ancillary personnel can provide key information and make vital contributions to priority-problem identification and solution. Whether other personnel, such as foot or tactical officers, are assigned to beat teams is at the discretion of the districts.

Using this rationale and taking into account usual absences such as furloughs, details and sick leave, districts received a very good rating (3.0) when non-beat personnel were permanently assigned to the beat team or attended meetings regularly. When officers without beat assignments (tactical and narcotics, etc.) were occasionally invited to attend team meetings, districts received a rating of good. Satisfactory scores of 2.0 were assigned to districts that required meeting attendance of beat team officers from all watches, meeting the general order's standard. In districts where only one representative of each watch attended beat team meetings a poor rating was assigned; very poor ratings (1.0) were given where meetings were held inconsistently or officers refused to attend. In reality, districts did not always perfectly match our criteria requirements. For example, in some districts representatives from each watch attended beat team meetings (generating a low score), but officers without beat assignments such as foot patrol also attended, thus commanding a high score. In these instances, the discrepant scores were averaged to accurately represent what was happening there.

Most districts advocated well-attended beat team meetings, and with a citywide score of 2.2, this component is one of the strongest within the beat teamwork/problem-solving category. Virtually all the districts either required beat team officers from all three watches to attend or had the reasonable alternative of representatives from each watch in addition to representatives of other district units. Only two districts permitted "skeleton" attendance (a representative of each watch) or excused certain shifts from attending. A third of districts (32 percent) required all beat officers to attend and also invited non-beat team personnel to meetings on occasion, rating a 2.5; and 12 percent of the districts were given the highest rating for permanently assigning other units such as rapid response, tactical and foot officers to beat teams. One of these districts had also convinced Chicago Housing Authority police to attend beat team meetings on a regular basis.

Officers surveyed during third-watch roll calls were asked how often they attended beat team meetings. (Full results for this question are shown in Table 6). Not surprisingly, survey results show that beat officers attended beat team meetings more often than rapid response and foot officers, but one-quarter of the beat officers reported attending infrequently or almost never. As expected, rapid response officers who were surveyed attended very rarely: 54 percent reported they almost never attend.

Table 6
Frequency of Beat Meeting Attendance

	almost never	infrequently	almost every meeting	every meeting	total
beat officers	10	15	29	46	100%
rapid response	54	25	11	10	100%
foot officers	31	25	13	31	100%
sergeants	17	6	18	59	100%

Note: question was, "How often do you attend beat team meetings?"

Sergeants attend beat team meetings in the greatest proportion, which is not unusual in that most sergeants are beat team leaders and are responsible for facilitating meetings.

This year beat facilitators attended beat team meetings in some districts, though reception to the very idea was mixed among officers of all ranks. Of the 11 districts receiving good or very good ratings, only four districts invited beat facilitators to attend. Of interest is that none of the three districts receiving top ratings for this component invited civilian facilitators to its beat team meetings. In fact, a commander in one of the highest-rated districts in this component was adamant in his objection:

I'm very against [facilitators] going to beat team meetings. [Another commander] started it, but I'm gonna hold out against it. I think that the POs deserve to have a time to themselves, when they can say whatever they want. If the facilitators want to come and address the beat team at the beginning of the meetings, that's okay. But I don't think they should ever be allowed to sit in.

Of those opposing beat facilitator attendance, many voiced a concern for confidentiality, citing the need for secrecy for the successful execution of certain tactical efforts. One beat team leader also expressed concern that his facilitator's safety would be jeopardized if gangs learned of his insider knowledge. But other officers were more open to the concept, and one beat team leader stated that he valued the facilitator's input at beat team meetings. In at least one district a compromise was reached. According to the neighborhood relations sergeant:

The [CAPS] organizer and the facilitator go when they so request. The beat team was resistant at first. They're agreeable now, because they'll have a private meeting later if they want.

Survey responses of beat facilitators indicated that slightly more than half (52 percent) do not attend beat team meetings, while 35 percent regularly attended meetings. It appears that when facilitators are invited to meetings, they do attend.

Beat plans. Beat plans play an important role in the police department's problem-solving process, for they are the foundation of the department's strategies to address crime and disorder. Problems identified by residents at beat community meetings and by the beat team are supposed to be the basis of beat plans. Using beat-level problems as the basis for department strategies ensures that problems of the greatest concern to the beat team and community are addressed, and this "bubble up" planning process recognizes that the beat team and community best understand how their problems should be handled.

Beat team meetings and beat plans were first implemented in 1996, but not until 1997 were they dutifully completed. Last year beat plans were submitted in conjunction with district plans for executive review and were considered universally weak. Soon after, sergeants underwent a one-day in-depth beat plan training in the problem-solving process (explained in a later section) and relearned key aspects of beat planning. Though beat team leaders were to revise their beat plans after training, only a quarter of beat team leaders reported that they had done so. The department has not undertaken another citywide review since.

Districts were rated on whether beat plans were developed and whether they were actually used. Higher ratings of good (2.5) or very good (3.0) were given when beat teams showed they actively modified, referred to and closed their plans (when appropriate); analyzed problems from offender, victim and location perspectives; and included community input to problems. Satisfactory ratings (2.0) were given when beat plans were created and kept up to date. Lower rates were assigned to districts that did not complete beat plans or considered them useless.

Across the city, use of beat plans was rated just below satisfactory, at 1.9. Almost three-quarters (72 percent) of all districts were judged to have satisfactory to good beat plans; 44 percent received a satisfactory rating, and 28 percent attained good (2.5) marks. Five of the remaining districts scored a below average 1.5, and one district's beat plans were judged very poor. Among the 28 percent of districts that received a good score, a number of the beat teams analyzed their problems from offender, victim and location perspectives (referred to as the "crime triangle" in Chicago's problem-solving model). One watch commander reported returning beat teams' plans if problems were not analyzed that way. This watch commander also insisted on creative strategies; he rejected plans that solely listed increased patrol enforcement. Higher rated districts also included the community's input in their beat plans; another reviewed the problems listed on its beat community meeting flip chart when formulating and reviewing beat plans.

Officers surveyed at roll call were asked a number of questions pertaining to beat plans as well, and they reported significant use of them. According to these officers, beat plans were often discussed at beat team meetings: 64 percent said this happens "most of the time," and 26 percent responded "some of the time." Beat facilitators who had attended beat team meetings were asked in the survey if beat plans were discussed, and three-quarters of them attested to beat plans being reviewed.

A majority of officers reported that beat plans were updated regularly: 37 percent said "very often," and 40 percent said "somewhat often." Officers were also asked how often they fill out beat plan implementation logs, which document actions taken on particular beat plan problems. These forms were not liked according to the many officers we talked to, but a little more than half of the beat officers surveyed reported filling them out: 33 percent said they fill out the logs "very often," 30 percent said "somewhat often," and 24 percent said "not very often." Of particular interest were their responses to a question on whether they found beat plans to be useful. They were quite positive: two-thirds found them "somewhat useful" or "very useful." This is particularly encouraging in light of ongoing complaints beat officers have made about additional paperwork associated with CAPS.

Continuity of beat assignment. CAPS is a neighborhood-based strategy, which means beat teams are supposed to give particular attention to the residents and problems of the specific neighborhood to which they are assigned. It necessitates that officers devote as much time as possible to their beat to work with the community to solve crime and disorder problems. Early in the implementation of CAPS, the department determined that officers would keep the same job assignment for a minimum of one year, as opposed to switching assignments every few days or weeks, as they had in the past. This strategy, called continuity of assignment, not only enables police officers to know the crime conditions and issues of concern to the community on their beat, but it also allows officers to develop a sense of teamwork between officers through the beat team meetings and, ideally, to develop a sense of "ownership" for the turf. In practice, continuity of assignment is particularly challenging, for even when beat assignments are made and kept for the prescribed time period, there are unavoidable circumstances — transfers, promotions, medical leaves, vacations, partner incompatibility and detail assignments — that make temporary reassignments necessary. And the "24-7" nature of the job requires that a substantial number of fill-in and rotating officers (who inevitably lack full commitment to the beat) come in and out of the mix as needed. To further complicate matters, the community often has difficulty understanding that personnel shifts do not necessarily constitute a disregard for continuity of assignment.

Our criteria for rating continuity of assignment were based upon attempts made by a district to maintain officers' assignments, taking into account the inescapable situations listed above. Twenty-three of the 25 districts received a satisfactory (2.0) rating. Virtually all districts made honest attempts to keep officers assigned to their beats while juggling the summer and special-event details that sometimes derail continuity, as well as other daily disruptions such as vacations and medical leave. One district was rated slightly higher than the others due to its commander's assertion that continuity of assignment was a personal priority and that watch commanders were required to account for all assignment changes. Another district was given the lowest rating of very poor due to the inconsistency with which watch commanders assigned beat officers. According to a well-respected sergeant in the district, the watch commanders were new and inexperienced, and they did not consider continuity of assignment to be important.

Surveyed officers were asked whether the same officers consistently work in their beat or sector, and almost three-quarters (71 percent) responded in the affirmative. Many beat facilitators also responded that the same officers work their beat consistently: 55 percent of those surveyed answered "very often," and 34 percent answered "somewhat often."

Sergeants' monitoring of beat integrity. In addition to officers keeping the same beat assignments for one year, beat officers should also be answering calls for service primarily in their beat — their area of expertise — from the time they begin their tour of duty until the time they go home. This is known as beat integrity. The CAPS beat-integrity policy specifies that beat cars will be assigned calls off their beats only as a last resort; in many circumstances plainclothes tactical officers and sergeants are supposed to answer calls rather than beat teams being sent out of their areas.

Along with continuity of assignment, beat integrity goes to the heart of community policing. It is the neighborhood orientation that gives beat officers the opportunity to become familiar with crime conditions and issues of concern to the community on their beat and affords beat officers time to engage in mission-oriented patrol. Beat integrity also helps promote partnership among the police and the community, because beat team officers not only become more familiar with the residents, problems and resources there, but also community members become more familiar with and, ideally, trustful of the police officers whom they see regularly.

Because beat integrity is vital to the development of community partnership and problem solving, respondents were asked how satisfied they were with beat integrity in their district. Sixty percent of the commanders, watch commanders and beat team leaders interviewed rated beat integrity as satisfactory; almost a quarter (23 percent) rated it as good (2.5); and for the remaining 16 percent, beat integrity scored 1.5. Interestingly, higher-ranked supervisors were more satisfied with their districts' beat integrity. For example, commanders rated their district's beat integrity twice as favorably as did beat team leaders. The reasons for this are not clear, but we speculate that beat team leaders' opinions may be more negative because these sergeants hear beat officers being directed off their beats, while commanders may be more positive because they have a districtwide perspective and less daily exposure to the radio.

Because supervisors are to monitor the radio to be sure dispatchers are following the appropriate policies, we also asked whether supervisors support beat integrity by monitoring beat officers' assignments and intervening when necessary. Those districts where supervisors did monitor the radio were given a satisfactory rating, which is the highest rating that districts could receive for this component (either they monitor or they do not). Districts where there was evidence that sergeants monitored sporadically were assigned 1.5, and those keeping tabs on the radio only occasionally were given a very poor (1.0) mark.

The citywide average for this component was slightly below average at 1.8. Eighteen of the districts had sergeants who satisfactorily interceded when dispatchers made inappropriate assignments. In 24 percent of the city (six districts), there were reports that some sergeants did not intercede when inappropriate assignments were given to beat cars. These districts received a below-satisfactory rating of poor. Nowhere in the city was there evidence that supervisors ignored this responsibility entirely. Officers surveyed during third-watch roll calls were also asked if their supervisors corrected dispatchers; however, they reported less intervention than the supervisors who were interviewed. Slightly more than half (54 percent) of the beat officers surveyed reported that their supervisors intervened "rarely" or "not at all." Officers surveyed at beat facilitator training gave a similar report. Fifty percent reported that supervisors interceded on the radio very often or somewhat often, and the other half reported that this did not happen often at all. However, it is important to note that in many districts,

sergeants reported that dispatching had improved immensely over the previous year and that the need to intervene was no longer as prevalent.

Intra-watch information exchange. This component is commonly known as face-to-face relief, an established concept that was reemphasized with the inception of CAPS. The revival of this activity, augmented by a daily watch assignment record form, stemmed from the department's vision of making the organization more unified and one in which all members would share information with one another. Police researchers have noted how infrequently officers assigned to the same beat but serving on different shifts actually communicate with one another. Each watch begins policing its beat anew, with no "institutional memory" of what happened there even an hour before. For police, continuing events can be as disconnected as if they had taken place in different parts of town. The number of beats in a city may need to be multiplied by a factor of three to approximate the number of "worlds" in which officers work. This state of affairs presented problems even when policing was incident-driven, and in agencies committed to problem solving by teams of officers that are to be expert on local conditions, it is a very big problem.

In response, CAPS' managers underscored the importance of exchanging information across watches. Face-to-face relief entails communication between off-going and on-coming officers assigned to the same beat or rapid response unit and includes a discussion of information recorded on the off-going officer's daily watch assignment record. This one-page form, completed during each officer's tour of duty, is the basis for discussion during face-to-face relief at change of watch. The form documents actions taken, observations, community contacts, radio assignments, serious incidents, arrests and follow-up procedures relating to priority problems. The brief interaction enables newly arriving officers to ask questions and discuss ongoing problems with the officers they are relieving. It is to ensure that critical information is shared in a timely fashion so that officers beginning their workday are better prepared to deal with recurring incidents and are alerted to potentially dangerous situations that may flare up or intensify during their watches. The process also supports long-range problem solving by helping to identify chronic problems.

Evaluators rated districts on how consistently face-to-face relief was held. Districts were given a satisfactory rating (2.0) when supervisors reported holding regular face-to-face relief, and others were given lower ratings of poor or very poor when face-to-face relief occurred inconsistently or not at all. The highest rating any district received for this component was satisfactory; none scored any better.

Face-to-face relief was the lowest-rated component in the beat teamwork category, scoring an average citywide of only 1.4. Consistent intra-watch information exchange was rare. Only 28 percent of the districts claimed to hold face-to-face relief consistently; 32 percent of the districts scored poor ratings because they did so infrequently; and 40 percent received the lowest rating (1.0) for never holding intra-watch information exchange.

Reasons for the lack of intra-watch communication are not new — the same problems are recited year after year. One of the greatest problems is timing. In most districts, face-to-face is held after roll call for arriving officers, when departing officers are impatient to complete the check-off procedures

and leave. Roll call can extend until almost the end of the off-going officers' tour of duty, especially when training is taking place; then, even if the departing officer is willing to engage in a face-to-face information exchange, the arriving officer is already facing stacked-up calls. Another problem in many of the districts is the inadequacy of the district stations themselves. There is little room for both parties to meet to exchange information, or the district station parking lot is too small for both arriving and departing shifts' cars. A frequently cited reason for information exchange not taking place is that nothing significant happened during the previous shift. When something does happen, many supervisors believe that good officers share significant information, such as domestic calls, missing children and shootings, so the requirement that there be face-to-face relief does not need to be enforced.

Although it is not consistently held, supervisors we interviewed were mostly of the opinion that face-to-face communication is vital for officer safety and for their knowledge about the beat. While differences of opinion surfaced among supervisors about whether face-to-face communication should be enforced daily, a majority of officers we surveyed considered it at least somewhat useful: 34 percent of those responding reported face-to-face was "useful;" another 43 percent said it was "somewhat useful." Roll call survey results were more favorable than interview findings: 33 percent of officers reported their supervisors set aside time for intra-shift communication "very often," and 37 percent said they did so "somewhat often."

Because coordinating face-to-face relief is so challenging, some supervisors suggested that beat team members use the portable data terminals (PDTs) installed in virtually all patrol cars for exchanging information between shifts. The evaluators concur. Automating the daily watch assignment forms would give officers access to the beat's history of activities. Officers beginning their shift could scan the previous watch's activities and could verify, on the system, that they had reviewed them. This would reduce the need for officers to search one another out, particularly when nothing significant happened during that day's watch. A watch commander in one of the slower districts agreed:

Most of police work is mundane. An officer's eight-hour synopsis will often be unimportant. Officers share information when they need to; however, it's not necessary on a daily basis. Maybe in some districts it makes more sense because of the district. But it isn't necessary across the board, across all districts. Face-to-face is actually a hindrance because it reduces patrol time by 20 minutes. Officers have to come in early off the street to meet and sign paperwork. If guys want to find out what happened [on their shift], they should [be able to] look on the PDT.

Judging from our interviews, PDTs have been widely embraced by supervisors. Beat team leaders reported the system allows them to check on their officers, verify their assignments and communicate privately with officers instead of broadcasting across the radio. Officers also reported enjoying perks of the PDTs. One beat team leader described his enthusiasm for the PDTs:

I love them. I've been on the job [for a long time], and it's the one tool that I can't survive without. If the PDTs are down, it's like having . . . it's like having a bad hair day. Everything goes wrong.

In late 1998, the police department's Research and Development Division was awarded a grant to automate paperwork, including the daily watch assignment record. Plans are to automate all 1,200 of the department's forms. The project, which will take at least one year to complete, will be subcontracted to an outside company and, when completed, case reporting will also be automated.

Problem-solving downtime. As mentioned earlier, beat teams develop beat plans to address chronic problems and they are to work proactively to solve problems using such resources as the department's automated crime mapping computer system, centralized/citywide units, other district units and city service departments. To do this, officers must have time to work on their beat plans without responsibility for answering radio calls. For that reason, we asked respondents whether officers were able to request "downtime" from the radio to work on specific problems.

Districts received satisfactory ratings when officers were permitted to request downtime and took the initiative when possible. Good (2.5) ratings were given to those districts where supervisors encouraged officers to work on beat problems and take downtime. The highest score, very good (3.0), was given to districts where specific time-freeing policies were created. Districts where supervisors reported that beat officers were never permitted downtime, or that officers never requested it, received lower ratings of poor (1.5) or very poor (1.0). Criteria did not include how often officers actually went down from the radio because districts vary in the number of calls for service; ratings were based only upon whether districts allowed beat officers time away when it was feasible. For example, one busy district that encouraged officers to work out of uniform on specific problems admitted its officers had not done so for months due to staffing constraints. This district still received a rating of 3.0 for this component.

Ratings for problem-solving downtime were evenly distributed across the districts, with a citywide average of satisfactory (2.0). A third (32 percent) of the districts received good or very good ratings, 36 percent were rated satisfactory, and 32 percent were rated poor or very poor. Each of the five highest-rated districts permitted its beat officers to work out of uniform in special cars on problems when staffing levels permitted, and officers in these districts did request to do so. In one district, beat officers were given two full days a month to work on specific problems.

Respondents in four of the five lowest-rated districts reported their districts were too busy to allow officers to work on specific problems. However, we found "busy-ness" an unconvincing rationale for not permitting downtime. Using the total number of recorded offenses per 10,000 residents, divided by the number of beats per district (to control for number of officers), we found this excuse to be valid for only three of the poorly rated districts. Table 7 shows that the two busiest districts in the city and another with considerable activity received poor and very poor ratings, while three of the districts receiving very good ratings also had high numbers of recorded offenses. Even in those districts where officers are "slaves to the radio," supervisors recognized the importance of officers working on problems when possible. Also, three of the districts with very poor ratings fell in the least-busy category. These districts had little excuse to not allow officers time to work on beat plans.

Officers surveyed at afternoon roll calls were asked whether they have time during their shift for preventive work. Their answers differed depending on job assignment. As seen in Table 8, 20 percent

Table 7
Comparisons of Activity Levels and Granting of Downtime

	districts rated good and very good	districts rated satisfactory	districts rated poor and very poor
busiest	3 districts	3 districts	3 districts
moderately busy	4 districts	4 districts	2 districts
least busy	1 district	2 districts	3 districts

of beat officers stated they were able to take time for preventive work during their shift “very often,” while 44 percent said they could do so “somewhat often.” Similarly, 20 percent of rapid response officers believed they were able to take time “very often,” but only 32 percent thought they could take time away from the radio “somewhat often.” Foot patrol officers were most free to engage in proactive work: 76 percent reported being able to do so at least “somewhat often.”

Table 8
Time for Proactive Activities

	never	not very often	somewhat often	very often	total
beat officers	6	30	44	20	100%
rapid response	11	37	32	20	100%
foot officers	7	17	35	41	100%
sergeants	5	53	21	21	100%

Note: question was, “How much time do you have for preventive work?”

While more than half of beat officers answered they have time available to work on problems during their shift, they were more pessimistic when asked how often they could request and get downtime from their supervisors, as shown in Table 9. Only 49 percent of beat officers thought they could request downtime, and a third of rapid response officers believed the same. In each non-supervisory position, most officers did not feel they were able to request downtime from the radio.

This finding resonates with what supervisors reported in interviews. The majority of beat team leaders and watch commanders who allowed their officers to work on problems reported that ambitious officers work on problems between calls without formally requesting to go down from the radio. Supervisors reported they rarely heard officers requesting specific CAPS problem-solving downtime, but officers would ask for their calls to be held to enable them to patrol a park or meet with a business owner. One beat team leader from a satisfactory district said,

Table 9
Radio Downtime Requests

	never	not very often	somewhat often	very often	total
beat officers	20	31	32	17	100%
rapid response	29	36	20	15	100%
foot officers	19	31	37	13	100%
sergeants	13	40	27	20	100%

Note: question was, "Can you request and get downtime from the radio?"

[Officers] don't [ask for downtime] enough. I tell them to. Maybe they're afraid. Sometimes when officers request dispatch to go down to do problem solving, other officers 'cat call' [a sharp whistle on the radio to show displeasure]. Not everyone has bought into [CAPS] and they don't need to be. Officers need to be held more accountable and get grilled about what they're doing.

Computerized crime mapping and analysis. Computerized crime mapping and analysis was considered a key component of Chicago's community-policing program from its inception. The intent was to enable officers to isolate "hot spots," discover crime patterns, match crime trends with other events and conditions, and ultimately develop prevention strategies by means of ever-developing technology. A team of sworn and civilian members of the police department developed a user-friendly PC-based system known as Information Collection for Automated Mapping (ICAM). The ICAM system, which received international recognition for its innovative crime-analysis application, allowed police officers throughout the city to quickly generate crime maps by using a hand-held mouse to make selections from simple menus.

As is often the case with information technology, yesterday's innovation is today's dinosaur. The department quickly outgrew ICAM, which provided limited analysis capability. Users became proficient quickly and recognized the potential of a more sophisticated system for crime mapping and analysis. To meet that need, the in-house development team created the next generation of the system — ICAM 2, which retained key functions of the original program while adding substantially increased capabilities. The system was redesigned based on input gleaned from users at focus groups. A distinguishing feature of the new system is that, while continuing to be manipulated by mouse-driven menus, it taps into the many existing information databases of the Chicago Police Department and is set up to utilize new systems as they come online.

At the time of last year's report, a little more than half of all districts had operational ICAM 2 systems in their stations. This year all districts have the new installed systems, and three district personnel per watch underwent an eight-hour training session to enable them to provide instruction on the new system to their co-workers. All district personnel were trained in the use of ICAM 2 by the time of the evaluators' data-collection period.

Districts were rated according to whether officers use ICAM 2, as well as on what types of information they utilized. Districts reporting that their officers used ICAM 2 to generate maps for beat community meetings or to analyze crime patterns received a satisfactory rating. In districts where officers used the system in a creative manner or where district policies were developed to ensure that officers accessed the system, higher ratings of good or very good were given. Where ICAM 2 was rarely used due to officers' or supervisors' indifference, or where the system was not accessible to officers, lower ratings of poor or very poor were assigned.

Citywide, use of ICAM 2 was rated slightly above average at 2.2, making it one of the strongest components in this category. In fact, only three districts were found to be below average in ICAM 2 usage, receiving a 1.5 rating. A little more than half the districts (52 percent) were rated satisfactorily; 36 percent were rated good or very good. No district received the lowest rating of very poor.

Management makes the difference with computerized crime mapping usage: the three top-rated districts had commanders committed to the use of ICAM 2. One district required officers to use the mapping system at least once a week, with each sector being assigned a specific day to use it. In another district, the commander emphasized the importance of using ICAM 2 at roll calls and queried his watch commanders and beat team leaders about changes in crime patterns in their areas. In the six districts in the second highest classification, beat team leaders stressed the importance of ICAM 2. For example, one beat team leader required his officers to submit ICAM 2 reports with their daily watch assignment records. Another two districts required their supervisors to regularly use ICAM 2.

Many of those interviewed attested to officers' satisfaction with the color suspect photographs or "mug shots" now available on ICAM 2. Previously, officers would have to wait hours or days to receive mug shots when investigating a crime. Now, such photos are available virtually within minutes. Reports of beat teams and foot officers carrying self-made mug shot books occurred in more than one district. One beat team leader captured how officers use ICAM 2:

[District supervisors] make a big deal out of knowing the top 10 [crimes] in your beat. Most of the officers . . . know the top 10 without using a computer. [They use ICAM for] offender comparisons, mug shots or photos, [and] patterns. Starting [soon], we can use it for criminal history sheets. Every beat community meeting has an ICAM report, so when [residents] complain about something, you can have something in black and white to hand out.

Surveyed sergeants and officers were also asked how often they used ICAM 2. As seen in Table 10, supervisors relied on ICAM 2 more than did patrol officers. Over half of beat officers and rapid response officers surveyed reported using the mapping system "somewhat often" or "very often," but more than three-fourths of sergeants surveyed reported using the system somewhat to very often.

Intra-departmental forms. From the earliest planning days of CAPS, the department stated its commitment to involving the entire organization in community policing, and it anticipated that roles would be developed for the detective, tactical, gangs and narcotics units. These roles, however, have

Table 10
Frequency of ICAM 2 Use

	never	not very often	somewhat often	very often	total
beat officers	11	28	35	26	100%
rapid response	13	28	34	25	100%
foot officers	29	29	21	21	100%
sergeants	13	4	39	44	100%

Note: question was, "How often do you actually use ICAM 2?"

not yet evolved. Several small steps have been taken to stimulate greater cooperation among specialized units and the Patrol Division, one of which is the intra-departmental support service request form. This form allows beat team leaders to seek help (after getting approval from the sector management team leader, district commander and area deputy chief) from other divisions or units outside the district for documented priority problems on the beat. Response to the request, which should include information about the planned or completed mission, is to be returned to the sector team leader within 10 days.

The creation of the form recognizes that beat teams, although low in the departmental chain of command, understand their beats' problems best and should have the opportunity to request resources. And although the approval process is a typical bureaucratic labyrinth, submission of the form provides a record of steps taken to attack a problem. Therefore, the rating criteria for this component simply was based on whether beat team leaders made use of the request forms. Districts received ratings only of satisfactory or very poor; satisfactory ratings were given where there was evidence that beat team leaders had submitted requests; very poor ratings were given when district personnel stated that these forms were never used. In districts getting very poor ratings for this dimension, phone calls were generally made by supervisors instead of submitting a form. However, it should be noted that in many of the satisfactory districts, phone calls were also made to centralized/citywide units by commanders and watch commanders. The difference was that beat team leaders in satisfactory districts still submitted forms. Ratings were not lowered when supervisors other than beat team leaders relied on personal connections to access outside resources.

Use of the intra-departmental support form increased dramatically in the last year. Seventy-six percent of districts reported requesting outside units via the form compared to one-third a year ago. While relatively few took advantage of the form last year, beat team leaders were, on the whole, quite positive about its effectiveness; this year, those who had submitted intra-departmental forms continued to find other units' response timely. There were occasional complaints of slow response, but many attributed slow response to the outside units' manpower woes.

Surveyed officers were asked if supervisors ensure that tactical and gang officers provide appropriate support to field units. Although answers do not explain how supervisors secured this outside support by means of intra-departmental request forms or phone calls to unit supervisors, they do reveal the frequency with which these units were contacted. According to officers, centralized units were

rarely requested. A little more than a third of beat officers reported that district tactical and gang units were requested occasionally, but none of the officers indicated that outside units worked often with patrol units.

Other Key Program Components

The following three subsections detail findings on key program elements that were not entered into district ratings. Here we look at the utility of the problem-solving model, sergeants' attitudes about their CAPS-related roles and provision of city services in addressing conditions that contribute to crime in communities.

Problem-solving model. The underlying concept driving beat plans and beat teamwork is that officers should not only be responding to individual calls for service, but they should also proactively be working to solve chronic problems. Through proactive work or problem solving, officers' efforts should result in a more lasting impact on crime. A priority of police department managers is ensuring officers understand how to solve problems. In winter 1995, all patrol officers were trained in understanding and applying the CAPS problem-solving model, which consists of five basic steps: identify and prioritize; analyze; design strategies; implement strategies; and evaluate and acknowledge success. This five-step model is based on an established format known as SARA (scan, analyze, respond, assess). Strategy implementation is a separate step in the CAPS problem-solving model to highlight its importance and the distinctive skill and effort it demands. The CAPS-model's analysis stage features a way — the crime triangle — for officers to conceptualize problems. The crime triangle calls for officers to gather data about offenders, victims and locations of crimes. For police officers this was a new way to approach a problem; in traditional police work, officers focused on the offender aspects of a problem only.

The problem-solving model has been emphasized in a variety of trainings; however, thus far it is not clear to us whether officers use it nor whether they consider it useful. To get a read on this, at third-watch roll call surveys, we queried officers about how often they actually use the problem-solving model. Slightly more than half (55 percent) the beat officers surveyed answered that they use the model somewhat to very often. Rapid response officers use the model significantly less: only a third responded they use the model somewhat often to very often.

We asked officers who use the model a follow-up question about how useful they consider it. Not surprisingly, the relationship between the amount of use and perception of usefulness was complementary. The more officers used the model, the more useful they considered it, and vice versa. Of those who used the model very often, 69 percent considered it very useful. Three-fourths (77 percent) of those who reported using the model somewhat often considered it somewhat useful. Those who used the model not very often to never were divided between rating it not very useful and somewhat useful — 45 percent answered each way.

Beat team leaders. In the early days of the program, the responsibility for CAPS rested primarily on neighborhood relations personnel. Among their numerous duties, neighborhood relations sergeants and their staff were responsible for organizing and running beat community meetings. Over the past two years, beat team leaders (sergeants) have assumed the leadership role; today, virtually all beat team leaders take a turn supervising their own beat community meetings, and beat teams have become

more accountable to residents. Beat team efficacy centers on the skills and motivation of the beat team leader. In fact, in our 1997 problem-solving study, evaluators found that beat team leaders played a more critical role than commanders or watch commanders in producing strong beat-level CAPS problem-solving efforts. The efforts of beat team leaders greatly influence the entire team's performance. Because of this, during our interviews with beat team leaders we asked a number of questions pertaining to their responsibilities.

One thing we were interested to learn about was whether beat team leaders were able to stay in contact with their beat on a daily basis. Sergeants are notoriously few in number in many districts, and beat team leaders are sometimes assigned to oversee beats with which they have little contact in their day-to-day job activities. For example, sector sergeants are responsible for the three to five beats that make up the sector they supervise, but as beat team leaders they will also have 24-hour accountability to their beat (which may or may not be located in the sector they supervise) and beat team officers. In practice, this means beat team leaders who are on duty for only part of the day are responsible for the problem-solving activities across all three watches. In response to our question about this, 21 sergeants (84 percent) reported having daily interactions with their beat. Even in cases where sergeants were assigned to other sectors or had non-patrol assignments, beat team leaders dutifully drove through the beat and checked in with their beat team officers. An equally notable finding is that a third of all beat team leaders reported focusing their energies more on the beat for which they are the assigned leader than they do on the remaining beats in their sector, indicating that a sense of "ownership" developed at the supervisory level also. One beat team leader described his directed focus on his beat:

Yes, I work on my beat daily. I work in that sector. Before CAPS, I'd be on a car and I'd have the freedom to roam the whole district. But now, I leave here and that's where I go. I'm responsible for [one beat]. Responsibility for 15 beats means responsibility for none. Now that I'm assigned the one beat, I take that responsibility seriously.

Another beat team leader gave a very straightforward explanation:

I'm on my beat daily to the point where I focus on my beat more than on the other two in my sector. There's no incentive to watch the other two beats as closely. Why drive around [another beat]? You feather your own nest.

We also wanted to gauge whether beat team leaders have ongoing contact with their beat team officers outside the monthly or bimonthly designated team meetings. Ninety-two percent of beat team leaders interviewed had some form of additional contact and, among them, half were divided between interaction with officers on select watches and interaction with those on all watches. Sergeants with limited interaction normally saw officers on their own shift and one other, with a few mentioning that officers working the midnight shift were challenging to contact. Sergeants who had interaction with all three shifts often made special efforts to contact officers on other watches by trying to connect with them before or after their own shift ended, making phone calls or leaving messages at the station.

Evaluators also asked beat team leaders if they were comfortable with their level of responsibility. In almost all cases, beat team leaders did not volunteer for the position; rather, they were

appointed by watch commanders or the district commander. Overwhelmingly, sergeants reported being comfortable with their assignments; only three felt dissatisfaction because of the increased workload. Responses qualifying their level of comfort ranged from "responsibilities were not as bad as expected" to other more positive comments, such as:

Yeah, I'm comfortable. [Being a beat team leader] isn't really overwhelming, and it kind of forces you to be more informed and regularly look at statistics and use ICAM. And at times it's kind of challenging, but an interesting [kind of] challenging.

Though beat team leaders reported feeling comfortable with their assignments, a few sergeants voiced their discontent about the imbalance of responsibility among sergeants; those assigned to beat team duties have a greater workload, receive no additional compensation and have little, if any, incentive to excel. One beat team leader who was quite comfortable with the associated responsibility was very dissatisfied with the lack of parity:

I'll just say that the sergeants that are the beat team leaders are really the ones driving the CAPS program on a district level. Supervisors that are not sector management team leaders or beat team leaders are not involved. So they should give us more money. Why the hell would I do this? It's a lot of work. It's a lot of responsibility, where another guy right next to me doesn't have [the same responsibility]. I might get a higher efficiency rating, but . . . money. Give us money. What's at the end of the rainbow?

City services. A vital and innovative component in Chicago's community-policing program is the linking of city services to beat teams in order to more effectively address disorder problems, such as graffiti, abandoned vehicles and other neighborhood conditions, that contribute to crime and increase the perception of crime among residents. Officers can enlist the help of city services to enhance the success of the community-policing strategy for problems that they observe on their beat or problems residents mention at beat community meetings.

City departments involved in Chicago's community-policing program include the Department of Streets and Sanitation, the Department of Transportation, the License Commission, the Department of Planning and Development, the Department of Buildings, the Department of Consumer Services, the Department of Health and the Department of Zoning. The Department of Environment is developing its plan to contribute to the program. The CAPS Implementation Office serves as the conduit for city service requests.

Upon learning about troublesome conditions that can be acted upon by the various city departments that have a role in CAPS, police personnel complete a service request form and submit it to the Neighborhood Relations office. If it is determined that the situation requires immediate attention, neighborhood relations personnel contact the CAPS Implementation Office to report the situation and its priority nature; when immediate response is not required, a request form is forwarded to the CAPS Implementation Office. All requests are recorded by the Neighborhood Relations office and the CAPS Implementation Office and are tracked by means of a status printout distributed to the

districts. In addition, city agency representatives and City Hall's CAPS implementation manager meet with district commanders to review service concerns and implementation problems on a monthly basis.

Although the creation of an administrative system to coordinate the city service request process was initially a monumental undertaking, for the past two years the use of city service request forms has become quite routine, and the majority (82 percent) of respondents were satisfied with the timeliness of city service response. Only 16 percent of district personnel interviewed believed that city service response was unsatisfactory or slow. A district commander summarized his satisfaction with the city services component:

[City service requests are] going real well. You know, that's a really nice part of this program. I'm a lifelong Chicagoan, and as you may know, in the past, the only way to get anything done was to go through the alderman, and then you owed the alderman. But the way this is set up, it really levels the playing ground for everyone. Everyone is entitled to — and gets — a good level of city services.

Although the majority of those interviewed were satisfied with city service response, a small number were still frustrated about the long wait for action on the demolition requests for problem buildings. But they understood that legal entanglements caused these types of delays. A small number of those interviewed were also dissatisfied with Department of Human Services response, a resource often needed to bring temporary resolution to a variety of situations in the districts. Residents waiting for assistance often spent long hours in police stations waiting for a Human Services representative, and when representatives did arrive, resolution options were often quite limited. Police personnel recognized that the long time delays and lack of options most likely reflected the limited resources of the Human Services Department, but they were dissatisfied nonetheless.

Officers surveyed during roll calls were questioned about their satisfaction with city service response. They were slightly less satisfied than their supervisors, although more than half of those surveyed were very or somewhat satisfied.

Assessment Chart 1
Beat Teamwork and Problem Solving

<i>District</i>	<i>BTM effectiveness</i>	<i>Beat team composition</i>	<i>Beat plans</i>	<i>Continuity of assign.</i>	<i>Sergeants intervention</i>	<i>Face-to-face</i>	<i>Prob Solv downtime</i>	<i>ICAM use</i>	<i>Intradept forms use</i>	<i>Summary</i>
A	2	2.5	1.5	2	1.5	1.5	3	1.5	1	1.9
B	2	3	2.5	2	2	1.5	2.5	3	2	2.4
C	2	2	1.5	2	1.5	1	1	2	2	1.7
D	1.5	2	1.5	2	2	1	1.5	2	1	1.6
E	2	2.5	1.5	2	2	1	2	2	1	1.9
F	2.5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.1
G	2	2.5	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2.0
H	2	1.5	1.5	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	2	2	1.7
I	2	2	2	2	2	1	3	2	2	2.1
J	2	2.5	2.5	1	1.5	1.5	2	2.5	2	2.2
K	2	2.5	2.5	2	2	2	2.5	2.5	2	2.3
L	2.5	2.5	2	2	2	1.5	2	2.5	2	2.2
M	1.5	2	2.5	2.5	2	1	2	1.5	1	1.8
N	2.5	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2.5
O	2.5	2	2	2	2	1	3	2	2	2.2
P	2	2	2	2	2	1	2.5	2	2	2.0
Q	2	2	2	2	2	2	1.5	1.5	2	1.9
R	2	2	--	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
S	2.5	2	2.5	2	2	2	2	2.5	2	2.3
T	2	2.5	2.5	2	1.5	1	1	2.5	2	2.1
U	2	2.5	2	2	1.5	1.5	3	2.5	2	2.2
V	1	2	2	2	2	1.5	1	2	1	1.6
W	1.5	2	1	2	2	1.5	1	2	1	1.5
X	2	1.5	2	2	--	1	2	2	2	1.9
Y	2	3	2.5	2	2	2	2	3	2	2.4
Average	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.4	2.0	2.2	1.8	2.0

3.0 = very good
2.5 = good

2.0 = satisfactory
1.5 = poor

1.0 = very poor
-- insufficient information

District Management Teamwork and Planning

The next level of teamwork comprises supervisory and management groups. Sector management teams are composed of all sergeants assigned to that sector as well as the beat team leaders. Led by a lieutenant, a sector management team assigns resources and develops strategies to address beat priority problems and problems that transcend beat boundaries. The team is supposed to meet regularly to share information about beat plans and beat priority problems; to identify problems shared by beats in the sector; and to assess progress made on existing problems. Other key district personnel such as tactical, gang or rapid response supervisors may participate in team activities as needed.

The district management team — the next layer in this configuration — is headed up by the district commander. Members of this team include the watch commanders and lieutenants, as well as the neighborhood relations sergeant, district advisory committee chair and district administrative manager. As a group they set broad priorities that determine the use of sector and district resources to chip away at beat-level problems. Other responsibilities of this team include identifying underlying conditions that contribute to crime and developing strategies that will affect those conditions.

The following sections examine the quality of district management team meetings and the role of the district advisory committee chair in the management team. Also covered is district plan utility, and regularity and effectiveness of sector team meetings. Assessment Chart 2, found on page 81, shows results for each of the five components in this category.

Sector management teams. The first component evaluated in this category is sector management teams, which are rated on the regularity and effectiveness of their meetings. We assessed the types of activities teams reported engaging in as well as the extent to which beat teams within the sector appeared to work together on common problems. Watch commanders and beat team leaders were interviewed about this component.

Across the city, sector management team members' and their bosses' responses about their meetings indicated that these sessions were rated just below the satisfactory level in terms of effectiveness, receiving a 1.8 rating overall for the component. Forty percent (10) of districts characterized their meetings in terms that yielded scores lower than 2.0; among them, six received the lowest possible score. Twenty-four percent of the districts were judged to hold satisfactory sector team meetings, and another 32 percent held better-than-average meetings. Among the better-than-average group, sector team meetings in three districts garnered the highest possible rating. One district's sector teams were not rated because respondents' answers did not provide sufficient information for us to draw adequate conclusions.

The most common reason for districts receiving low ratings for this component was that their sector teams held team meetings very infrequently or not at all. When meetings were held, team members' accounts of the sessions often contributed to lowered ratings. For example, some sergeants complained that the meetings were merely recitations of the beats' problems, with no problem analysis or strategizing. One sergeant lamented the fact that team members "never get any feedback" at the meetings, and another characterized the gatherings as "a required meeting that's not productive."

Conversely, meetings that were deemed worthwhile and effective were those at which there was good exchange of information and those where there was an attempt to have beats within the sector work together when they had similar problems. One sergeant aptly described such a meeting:

Beat team leader sergeants go over problems they have, what solutions are being done, what resources are being obtained. . . . It's an open discussion. All the sergeants get involved.

Effective sector team meetings also were run by leaders who worked as mentors and who coordinated resources to address the sector's priority problems; one sector team leader had beat team members attend this higher level meeting four times per year. At these gatherings, this mentor would often include some CAPS-related training exercises.

This year we found that sector team meetings were held less frequently than they were last year. Last year about half the districts held monthly sector team meetings; 30 percent met every two months; 15 percent conducted meetings once every three months; and one leader reported meeting with his sector team twice yearly. This year's interviews revealed that 44 percent of the representative sector teams held meetings monthly, 16 percent held them quarterly, 12 percent convened rarely, and 16 percent did not hold meetings at all. And while frequency of holding meetings was not figured into sector management team meeting ratings (though not holding meetings at all guaranteed a rating of 1.0), it is perhaps notable that the three sector management teams whose meetings received a very good rating each convened monthly.

District management team meetings. Management teams at this level are composed of the district's commander, watch commanders, lieutenants, neighborhood relations sergeant, DAC chair and district administrative manager. The group is supposed to meet at least quarterly to set broad priorities that determine the allocation of district resources to chip away at beat-level problems; to identify underlying conditions that contribute to crime; and to develop strategies that will affect those conditions. The meetings provide a forum for the group to confer and share information for developing and updating the district plan.

We asked all those interviewed — district commanders, watch commanders, beat team sergeants, neighborhood relations sergeants and DAC chairs — about this component. In rating district management team meetings, we considered whether meetings were held on a regular basis; whether the district plan was developed, updated and monitored in that setting; and whether a full complement of district personnel, as well as the DAC chair, attended. Meetings that achieved this standard, based on team members' responses, received a satisfactory rating. Districts showing creativity or resourcefulness at their meetings merited a higher score.

Citywide, district management team meetings received a 1.9 mark. Twenty percent of the districts received the lowest possible score for this component, 28 percent rated a poor in this measure, another 28 percent were judged to be holding satisfactory district management team meetings, and the remaining six districts' management team meetings were rated to be good or very good. Among the lowest scoring districts in this measure, most held meetings infrequently (if at all), had key members of the team who reported never having attended such a meeting or had supervisors

attending who were not CAPS-oriented. As one commander described such team members, “[they’re] from the old school, and they’re not very articulate at the meetings.” One thing differentiated the three districts given very good ratings from the three that rated just below that: at very good meetings, beat team leaders and DAC chairs attended on at least an occasional basis; district management team meetings that rated a 2.5 had only one or the other in attendance.

On a positive (and surprising) note, despite the fact that district management team meetings got slightly lower than a satisfactory rating citywide, an overwhelming majority of those interviewed clearly were cognizant of the meetings’ purpose. All sworn respondents answering that they had attended district management team meetings were asked this follow-up question: “How are district management team meetings different from staff meetings?” Nearly every reply was a variation on this answer: “At district management meetings we concentrate on the beats and sectors, and on the effectiveness of the district plan. Staff meetings focus on general management topics like policy and personnel.” This citywide understanding of the spirit and purpose of district management meetings is a positive indicator.

Usefulness and currentness of the district plan. District plans, first developed in autumn 1996, are based on beat plans. They identify the district’s priority problems; describe the nature and extent of those problems; and identify underlying causes. District plans also address district resource deployment as it relates to priority problems.

District plans have a spotty history in the CPD. When commanders were originally told to produce plans, they were given little instruction about what they were to submit; the result was that the documents submitted evidenced a wide range of formats and quality. After the 25 district plans were reviewed independently by four people — the original CAPS co-managers and the chief and deputy chief of Patrol — the plans were rated. Though some plans were clearly stronger than others, all 25 needed additional work in any one or all of four areas: analyzing problems, devising measurable targets, identifying underlying causes and developing management plans.

Because of the importance of the district plans, the CAPS co-managers conducted a day-long, personalized tutorial in 1997 for each of the 25 district management teams to clarify expectations for the final version of the district plans, which were to be submitted within a few weeks of the tutorial. At the time we interviewed district commanders for this report, none had yet gotten feedback on, or approval of, the revised version of the district plan. Nevertheless, according to the department-issued district plan guide, the plan was to be reviewed at district management team meetings, where adjustments and modifications were to be made as necessary, with the DAC chair representing the community’s perspective. With the above in mind, we rated the usefulness and currentness of a district’s plan on whether it had been updated; on respondents’ judgements of whether it was being used in a consistent way; and on their perception of its usefulness. Questions about this component were asked of each of the five respondents in all 25 districts.

Citywide, usefulness and currentness of the district plan received a component rating of 1.8 — just below satisfactory. Fifty-six percent (14) of the districts’ plans were determined to be of below-average usefulness. Six districts reported that they had not been using the district plan, nor had they ever updated it, nor did they regard it as a document of any usefulness. Each of the six received a 1.0 for this component. The eight districts falling into the 1.5 range reported being in the process of updating their

document or having plans to do so. The three districts receiving a satisfactory (2.0) rating either had consulted the plan on occasion, had updated it or had acknowledged the plan's value as a "reference tool." Seven districts rated higher than the satisfactory level in this measure because they used their updated plan in a fairly consistent manner and their management team had obviously contributed to the plan's development, as evidenced by their answers. The one district that rated a 3.0 for district plan usefulness and currentness not only met all of the previously mentioned standards, but it also documented its updating process, detailed roles and expectations for team leaders on all levels (on contracts that required team leaders' signatures) and offered up its apparently comprehensive plan for our perusal.

The department is seemingly ambivalent about the importance of the district plan. A tremendous amount of time, effort and human capital was invested in providing customized instruction so management teams would have a clear understanding of what constituted a viable plan, yet no feedback was given on the amended product. The approval process seemed to have been upended when details of an unapproved controversial plan became public. The plan received much media attention, cost a commander his job, heightened the awareness of all district management teams to community sensibilities and led to a moratorium on plan approval. Shortly thereafter, the resignation of Chicago's police superintendent seemed to once again lower the priority of district plan approval, and the eventual departure of one of the architects/managers of Chicago's community-policing program also contributed to the indefinite delay of district plan feedback or approval. Commanders were unanimous in reporting that, as ordered, they had taken their district plan along when first meeting one-on-one with the new superintendent. However, the documents were not directly addressed at those meetings, and at the end of our data-collection period in October 1998 — a full 18 months after revised district plans had been submitted — not one commander had received word of plan approval.

This failure to breathe life into the district-plan concept provided a very handy excuse for a number of commanders and management teams already unconvinced about the merits of developing and executing such a plan. Among the 14 districts whose plan-usefulness rating was below the satisfactory level, an oft-heard incantation was that the plan had not been approved and had therefore not been implemented, updated, monitored or considered in any way. However, lack of official approval did not encumber management teams in the 11 districts that had at least some involvement with their district plan.

It was not possible to draw conclusions about why some district management teams were more positive about their plans' usefulness than others. Districts that monitored and augmented their plans — that regarded their district plans as viable documents — were evenly distributed throughout the city; they were "fast" and "slow" districts in terms of calls for service, and they were all fairly evenly distributed in terms of the strength of their initial district plan draft. A district's involvement in the implementation of its plan simply seemed to be directly related to the commander's personal opinion about the relative merits of such a document. This was certainly true in the district where the commander opined,

You wanna know how I'd rate [my district plan]? It's an academic exercise. The whole thing should be scrapped. The plan means nothing. We fly by the seat of our pants. That's the nature of this business. The plan is a joke. They tell me to do

it, I do it. It's got all the elements of a graduate school education in a 2nd grade paper . . . it sits in a drawer. I take it out when I have to do something to it. Then I return it to the drawer until the next time I'm told to do something to it.

Communication of the district plan. This component received the same below-average rating of 1.8 as did the closely related component above. Districts that shared their plan with supervisors received a satisfactory rating of 2.0, and those making efforts to communicate about the plan by discussing it at advisory committee meetings and roll call rated 2.5 marks. Districts that distributed the plan to its all officers were given the highest rating of 3.0. In districts where there was no evidence of a deliberate or uniform method for sharing the district plan with supervisors, a score of 1.5 was given, and 1.0 was assigned to districts that made no attempts to share their plan with anyone at any level. Two districts merited the highest score of 3.0; seven received a 2.5; and four earned satisfactory ratings (2.0). Of the remaining districts, five received a 1.5, and seven were assigned the lowest rating of 1.0.

The fact that district-plan usefulness and communication received an identical rating of 1.8 is somewhat coincidental. There was a one-to-one correlation between both ratings for 10 districts — seven of which were districts scoring below the satisfactory threshold in both components. The remaining three districts in this “identical rating” classification attained 2.5 ratings for both usefulness and communication of the plan. Of the 15 districts with a variance between these two marks, eight were less effective in communicating the plan to stakeholders than they were in utilizing it, while seven were more willing to share their plan than to update it or put it into practice.

It is somewhat difficult to draw conclusions about the variances, but it seems feasible to posit that management teams scoring below satisfactory on both measures believe the district plan to be a meaningless document. It may also be that communicative management teams scoring unsatisfactorily in district plan utility merely need more guidance in plan development and implementation. It should also be noted that one of the commanders whose district plan rated more favorably for utility than for communication explained his reason for not sharing his plan:

We got a directive to not give it out. And when the [area deputy] chief tells you not to give it out, you don't give it out. Not after what happened to [the commander who was reassigned because of the content of his district plan]!

Not surprisingly, three of the other four districts in that area (all of which reported to the same area deputy chief) received subpar ratings for communication of their district plans. If indeed these districts were actually directed to withhold information about their district plans (which goes against the spirit and philosophy of community policing), this fact reinforces the idea that the department is conflicted about district plans. Fortunately, many other districts throughout the city took the offensive district plan experience in stride and reviewed their district plans carefully before sharing them with district personnel and their advisory committees. As one neighborhood relations sergeant said,

We gave it to the DAC and to the supervisors, who were supposed to review it with their people. . . . We wrote it carefully, and I didn't think there was anything offensive in it, but after that happened in [the offending district], I looked it over with a new awareness.

However, a goodly number of surveyed officers claimed to have not seen their districts' plan. Combined roll call and beat community meeting survey results showed that 58 percent of officers in these two venues had not seen their district plans. It is perhaps notable that results varied by group: among third-watch officers polled at roll call, only 25 percent had seen the plan, but 55 percent of officers surveyed at beat community meetings said they had seen it.

Advisory committee chair involvement in the district management team. Ratings for this component were based on responses from commanders, neighborhood relations sergeants and DAC chairs on questions about the DAC chairs' interactions with the district management team as well as their role in developing district plans. Districts that welcomed their DAC chairs to participate in district management team meetings and involved them in some way in developing the district plan received a satisfactory rating. Lesser or greater involvement occasioned corresponding ratings, as is explained below. To be sure, this is not an assessment of DAC chairs or their involvement in the advisory committee; rather, it is a rating of the districts' willingness to acknowledge the community's role in district planning and priority setting.

DAC chair involvement was judged to be satisfactory citywide, with 60 percent of the districts attaining a rating of satisfactory or higher. In fact, 10 of the 15 districts in this classification received a 3.0 (very good) on this dimension, and five were given a 2.0. Of the 10 districts falling below the baseline, two were judged to be doing poorly in involving their DAC chair in management team activities, and eight were judged to be doing very poorly.

Specifically, the 10 districts scoring the highest mark in this component did so because they had been inviting their DAC chair to district management team meetings, and the DAC chair had attended, at least on occasion. The five districts receiving a satisfactory marks (2.0) had extended invitations but, for whatever reason, their DAC chairs had not yet participated in the sessions. These civilian volunteers had not been invited to participate in district management team meetings in the two districts scoring 1.5; however, one DAC leader had accompanied the management team to the district plan tutorial, and the other, under a previous commander, had attended a district management team meeting but was no longer receiving notice of upcoming meetings. The remaining DAC chairs had not been invited to meetings and, indeed, their districts were among those not holding meetings regularly.

A summary of the level of participating DAC chairs' involvement in district management meetings is as follows:

- Some chairs said they were only invited to one or two meetings per year, and they attended whenever invited.
- Two chairs said they attend, but it was not clear how often.
- One had not been to any formal meetings since being appointed chair but had attended a few informal meetings and would be attending a formal meeting the following week.
- One chair appeared to go regularly without realizing that the meeting was referred to as a district management team meeting.

Assessment Chart 2
District Teamwork and Planning

<i>District</i>	<i>Sector team mtg effectiveness</i>	<i>District mgmt meetings</i>	<i>Usefulness of plan</i>	<i>Communication of plan</i>	<i>DAC chair involvement</i>	<i>Summary</i>
A	1.5	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.7
B	2	1.5	2.5	2.5	3	2.2
C	1	1	1.5	1	2	1.3
D	2.5	3	1.5	2.5	3	2.5
E	1	1	1	2.5	1	1.2
F	2	2.5	2	1.5	3	2.2
G	1	1.5	2.5	1	1	1.5
H	1	1	1	1	1	1.0
I	2	2.5	1.5	1.5	3	2.1
J	3	1.5	1	1	2	1.7
K	2	2	3	2.5	1	2.2
L	2.5	2	1.5	1	1.5	1.8
M	2	3	1.5	2.5	2	2.2
N	2.5	2	2.5	2.5	3	2.4
O	1.5	3	1.5	1.5	3	2.1
P	1.5	2	2.5	3	3	2.3
Q	1.5	2.5	2.5	2	3	2.3
R	3	1.5	1.5	2	3	2.1
S	2	2	2	1.5	1	1.8
T	2.5	1.5	1	2	1	1.6
U	2.5	1.5	2.5	2	3	2.2
V	1	1.5	2.5	2.5	1	1.7
W	1	1	1	1	1	1.0
X	--	1	1	1	2	1.2
Y	3	2	2	3	2	2.3
Average	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.9

3.0 = very good
2.5 = good

2.0 = satisfactory
1.5 = poor

1.0 = very poor
-- insufficient information

District Management

District management, as a category, takes a look at the level of support Chicago's community-policing program is getting from top-level district management. While our study last year emphasized that strong leadership at the beat level was key for successful problem solving to take place in the neighborhoods, the role of upper management surely cannot be underestimated. Without the support of district leadership, even the most dynamic beat team leaders might confront significant obstacles; the message must be clear that CAPS is the modus operandi for the district. With that in mind, we evaluated district management — commanders, watch commanders, neighborhood relations sergeants and district administrative managers — though only ratings for the commanders and watch commanders are entered into the districts' composite scores.

A few caveats are needed here. First, this has been a year of transition in the CPD, as will be evident in what follows. In the introduction of this section of the report, we asserted that our findings present a "snapshot" of CAPS, but when it comes to district management, "time-lapse photography" would be a more apt metaphor. In fact, 13 of the 25 district commanders have changed since our last report, with several reassignments taking place during our data collection period. Several neighborhood relations sergeants also moved on while we were conducting this year's study; thus, occasionally, post-interview phone calls for answer clarification or follow-up questions proved difficult. So, many of the following ratings are for commanders who are no longer in those positions, and a few are for commanders who had been in their positions for a very short time when interviewed. Such was also the case for neighborhood relations sergeants, though change among them was not so pervasive. However, this is not a study of individual manager's performance; it is a study of how well the program is implemented, what factors contribute to its implementation and what obstacles stand in the way. Thus, while commanders and neighborhood relations officers have moved on, our study goals remain the same. At best, we will be able to draw profiles of best practices and understand the importance that command-level personnel play in those practices.

The following sections look at command-level knowledge of and apparent involvement in the program; district administrative managers' roles and job satisfaction; and neighborhood relations sergeants' changing roles and overt attitude toward the program. Assessment Chart 3, found on page 89, shows results for the two rated components, commanders and watch commanders. Neighborhood relations sergeant and district administrative manager findings in this section examine the roles of these two key positions, but are not included in the composite rating for the category.

Commanders. Commanders were rated on their overall understanding of CAPS and its components as well as on their apparent community-outreach abilities and relationships with the community. This was based on their interview responses, other district respondents' answers and, in some cases, years of observations and interactions by the evaluation staff.

Citywide, commanders rated a 2.0, signifying that their CAPS-related performance was considered satisfactory. Three commanders received the lowest possible rating of 1.0 (very poor); four were judged to be functioning poorly, and 10 were considered to be implementing CAPS satisfactorily in their districts. The remaining eight commanders fell into the better-than-

average classification, with five rating 2.5 and three receiving the highest possible rating of 3.0 (very good).

The top-rated commanders were quintessential community-policing practitioners. While law enforcement and crime prevention remained their top priority, they had a keen understanding of the philosophy and protocols of CAPS, and they were able to motivate personnel. These commanders generally had a visible presence in the community and were perceived as being accessible. In concert with their management teams, they developed comprehensive district plans (though DAC chairs should have had more district-plan involvement in two of the three districts) and creatively exploited the many new resources available to them as part of the program. These resources include city services, their civilian administrative managers and the unlimited talent among the community groups, business owners and individuals in the areas they served. The commanders also encouraged their officers to take advantage of enhanced intradepartmental cooperation and to engage in crime analysis as part of the problem-solving process. Another significant factor among them was that they generally had a more global perspective, realizing that team membership should not be limited to those listed in the general-order glossary. For example, beat teams in their districts were composed of rapid response, tactical, gang and foot patrol officers.

The next highest tier of commanders — the five rating 2.5 — shared many of the traits of those in the very good classification, but the total picture was not as clearly outstanding. These commanders, all of whom had been at the helm of these districts for at least two years, had more of a “smorgasbord” approach to the program and were somewhat selective of which components required their personnel’s full compliance. Of the districts they reigned, three were quite busy, with high levels of calls for service and high crime rates; the other two had among the lowest crime rates in the city. Each of these five commanders cited their district’s level of activity, community composition and staffing profiles (quieter districts attract older, less adaptable officers, while young aggressive officers are generally assigned to busier districts and so on) as factors making CAPS a less-than-perfect fit for their districts. Only two of the five would characterize themselves as CAPS proponents; however none of the remaining three is opposed to the tenets of community policing, and they might all be described as benign pragmatists. More than anything else, among these three, their leadership styles and attitudes combined well with neighborhood conditions and community demographics, resulting in a good composite commander score.

The group of 10 commanders receiving satisfactory marks were so rated for a great variety of reasons that cannot be easily clustered. Among these commanders were three whose scores were attributable in large part to the commanders whom they recently replaced; many of their answers to questions about CAPS-related systems were based on methods and tactics set up by the former district leader, and they had not been in their positions long enough for us to make a reasonable assessment about their community-outreach efforts. Another two commanders apparently had limited understanding of the program’s protocols and the ways in which they were to be implemented, but their community-outreach skills were very strong and well-suited to the populations they served. In fact, both garnered among the highest marks citywide from activists who rated their visible presence in the community. The five other commanders within this grouping were simply doing an adequate job of tapping available resources, reaching out to and engaging the community, and demonstrating, by example, that CAPS is the order of business in the district.

Like the commanders receiving satisfactory marks, the four commanders scoring 1.5 for CAPS-related leadership are not easily typified as a group. Two are somewhat new to their positions, and they perhaps were just getting in stride at the time they were interviewed. However, they did not seem inclined to implement CAPS with much gusto in their district. The third was clearly opposed to every aspect of the CAPS program except beat community meetings which, in the commander's own words were "the only worthwhile part [of the program]. The rest we do because we're supposed to do it." The last commander in this grouping had held the position for a considerable number of years, was reputed to be devoted to the "numbers game" and was described by some in the district as an obstacle to innovative CAPS implementation.

The three commanders receiving poor ratings appeared to be administratively challenged in terms of Chicago's community-policing strategy. They each led districts with high crime rates and challenging conditions. These formidable circumstances notwithstanding, these commanders appeared to be traditional enforcement-oriented officers who held leadership positions in an organization whose direction was changing. All were apparently estranged from their DACs, as evidenced by their inability to answer questions about their composition, accomplishments or current items being worked on. In addition, their concept of problem solving involved residents providing information to beat officers so they can solve discrete crimes or burglary patterns.

At the time the initial draft of this report was written, only 19 of these commanders retained the position described above. Since then, another six district commanders were moved laterally or demoted.

Watch commanders. As a group, watch commanders — those who direct all police activities on a specific watch — have largely been overlooked in CAPS. While there are responsibilities listed for watch commanders within the general order, an actual CAPS-related role for this key position was never carved out.

From the start of Chicago's community-policing program, the watch commander slot has been controversial. When CAPS was implemented, captains, who had always served as watch commanders, were transferred out of the prototypes as a first step toward flattening the rank structure. This was consistent with the department's stated intention to decentralize and push authority and responsibility down to the neighborhood and street level. In the place of watch commanders, lieutenants with two new designations — field operations and watch operations lieutenants — were to jointly share managerial responsibilities that had once belonged to the captains who supervised each watch. Problems began to emerge between the two lieutenants because it was not clear who had final authority over a host of practical management issues. There never was official clarification about who was to be in charge in every circumstance. Instead, lieutenants in the prototype districts learned to negotiate workable local solutions to the chain-of-authority problem caused by the flattening of the rank structure. But when the program expanded to the rest of the city, any captains remaining in the other 20 districts retained the watch commander position, and new responsibilities (like ensuring proper staffing of beat and rapid-response cars, and inspecting beat profiles and master beat files) were added to the largely unchanged watch commander job.

With this knowledge, we sought to gauge watch commanders' overall understanding of the CAPS philosophy, especially in regard to the allocation of officers and their level of involvement in the program. To do so, we probed commanders and beat team leaders about watch commander roles and interviewed a watch commander (selected by the commander) in each district.

Watch commanders garnered a 2.1 (satisfactory) rating citywide, with nearly half the watch commanders interviewed (48 percent) receiving a mark of 2.5 or 3.0. Twenty-eight percent of those interviewed got ratings of 2.0. The remaining 24 percent were rated below average, with three watch commanders getting a mark of 1.5 and three scoring 1.0.

The three watch commanders receiving top ratings were those who crafted significant CAPS-related roles for themselves. Each reported to have attended beat community meetings on a fairly regular basis to keep in touch with what was going on in the community, and two of the three were enthusiastic sector team leaders (unlike a goodly number of watch commanders who believed that they should not have sector team responsibilities). The third, though not a sector team leader, attended sector team meetings. These watch commanders also saw themselves as important contributors to the problem-solving process by, at the very least, ensuring that beat officers were able to take time away from radio calls to work on priority problems. One of these high-scoring watch commanders also voluntarily served on the district's advisory committee.

Another watch commander described his job, providing a good illustration of what we considered to be a good (2.5) role:

I try to see that people have the resources, or that they're aware of a problem and what resources they have. If officers want to work on something, I make sure they have the time. If they need additional cars, I make sure of that as well. Sometimes we'll let people change their hours. I coordinate the day-to-day activities and make sure they're doing their best to solve problems.

So widespread was the idea that watch commanders have little role in CAPS that many commanders expressed surprise when we asked them to nominate their best watch commander for an interview. Several watch commanders also seemed stumped about what they could contribute to our study. In fact, seven of the 25 watch commanders asserted that there was no role for them in CAPS. Two voiced their frustration:

The watch commander's role is minimal and that's the thing that should be looked at. Watch commanders were cut out of the program. That was when we went to field lieutenants and stopped having captains. We lost something. Watch commanders need to have input and direction.

By design, [our nonexistent role] is horrible. I'm not sure why they did what they did.

Beat team leaders were even more vocal about the matter. Sergeants in 14 districts contended that watch commanders had no overt role in CAPS. Interestingly, though, when we asked watch

commanders what their ideal role would be, four watch commanders quickly answered that they could not possibly take on the job of sector team manager because they already had too much to do, while one insisted that watch commanders should be sector team leaders “to maintain an appropriate level of involvement.” Eight others opined that nothing about their jobs should change. One hoped to someday be invited to a district management team meeting, and another explained that watch commanders should be required to “attend beat community meetings on a weekly basis to stay more in tune.”

Neighborhood relations sergeants. The role of neighborhood relations sergeants has been inestimable in the development of CAPS. From the very early days of the program, these sergeants and their staffs worked long, hard hours to launch community policing in their districts. Among the things this entailed were setting up beat community meetings and, for the first few years, running them; organizing DACs and their subcommittees, and attending the monthly meetings; organizing court-advocacy efforts; and setting up (and sometimes developing) beat profiles and master beat files.

We have interviewed neighborhood relations sergeants yearly since CAPS was launched, but until now, we used the information they provided only as vital background data to help us gauge their districts’ implementation status. In this report we take a look at neighborhood relations sergeants to assess their attitudes toward CAPS and their CAPS-related roles, as well as their apparent effectiveness as ombudsmen and intermediaries for the district and the community. We based our assessments on the quality of their interview responses, DAC chairs’ responses and, in some cases, years of observations and interactions by the evaluation staff.

Citywide, neighborhood relations sergeants received a satisfactory rating of 2.1. Four sergeants rated a mark of 3.0; another four were judged to be good (2.5); 12 were performing adequately and received 2.0 marks; and the remaining five sergeants rated below average, with one receiving the lowest rating of 1.0.

Sergeants scoring a very good rating exhibited creativity and commitment as well as a good understanding of the CAPS philosophy and its components. They were enthusiastic about facilitating community involvement and were apparently adept at doing so. These sergeants also made themselves available to beat teams to assist them with learning to facilitate beat community meetings and problem solving. In addition, they showed an awareness of, and sensitivity to, the various segments of the communities they serve. Those considered satisfactory showed an ample understanding of the program and were facilitating community involvement at an average level, while those who rated below average were not enthusiastic about CAPS nor helpful in engaging the community.

Nothing is more illustrative of neighborhood relations sergeants’ attitudes and outlooks than their own comments. Note the contrast between a top-rated sergeant and one receiving the lowest rating:

We all know that with the traditional role of policing, we did a great job of locking people up and taking them to court. But we weren’t solving the problems. We were putting out fires, but we weren’t solving the problems. The thing I like most about working with the community is that it holds the community accountable. Making them equally accountable for quality-of-life issues brings

more effective results in problematic areas. That's one of my big things. I really believe in that stewardship.

I believe that the whole [CAPS] program is a failure, so I don't see things that would improve the [beat community] meetings. There are no incentives for the police. Some really care, but there is no incentive. A lot of police don't even pretend they care. If there were incentives, that might turn things around. The same with sergeants, the beat team leaders. There's no incentives for them.

While Neighborhood Relations remains a vital link in the CAPS program, the role for many has changed to one of support rather than that of rainmaker, especially since beat team leaders assumed their leadership roles. As some sergeants explained:

Since the beat teams have started to be more active, the role of Neighborhood Relations has evolved. We provide a support function to the beat teams. On a districtwide basis, we coordinate things, but on a more macro level. We provide support.

[At this point my role is] basically to assist and give support for beat community meetings, beat team meetings, the district plan . . . supplying maps, and getting fliers made up and disseminating them, and bringing the community into the CAPS concept.

[My role now is] to provide the commander, sector leaders and beat managers with feedback from the community. My role is one of support of all sorts. Another thing I do is make sure that problems don't fall through the cracks. It's not as intense as it once was or as well-defined.

But others are still overwhelmed by their workload:

[It's] too much work! Just coordinating everything, babysitting. Everyone in here has to babysit for the officers to make sure they do things for the beat meetings.

[This job requires] a lot of hours, a lot of meetings. This position used to be a gravy job. Not anymore! There are a lot of after-hours scheduled because of community events.

We asked DAC chairs to rate whether they found their districts' Neighborhood Relations offices to be supportive of CAPS; as a group, they were quite positive, giving the officers a 2.5 rating citywide. Fifteen of the city's Neighborhood Relations offices garnered top ratings of 3.0, and one came in at 2.5. Seven were judged by their civilian advisory committee chairs to be adequately supportive of the program, and the remaining two districts were judged unsupportive. DAC chairs, who have ongoing contact with their Neighborhood Relations offices, were obviously content with their interactions, and this is a very positive indicator.

District Administrative Managers. These civilian members of the district office report directly to the commanders. The administrative manager oversees the district's automation systems, manages the master beat file, coordinates officer training, prepares reports, supervises administrative positions (except the district secretary) in the commander's office and has many responsibilities pertaining to facilities and equipment. Typically reporting to the district administrative manager are the timekeeper, review officer, citation clerk, civilian administrative assistants and custodial staff.

We surveyed district administrative managers, as we have each year of our study, but because not all of them chose to include their district number on the survey, we were unable to correlate their responses to other findings shown by district. So here we provide a statistical overview of what the district administrative managers are experiencing in this, the sixth year of this civilian management position.

In spring 1998, we found that 80 percent of the city's district administrative managers had been on the job for three years or longer, while the remaining 20 percent had held the position for less than one year. Nearly half (44 percent) of the group believed their job to be "quite different" than what they thought they had accepted, but just over half (52 percent) were convinced that the qualifications sought for the job were necessary. They were evenly split (one manager skipped this question) on whether they had received sufficient training prior to beginning the job; however, ample proportions stated they wished additional training would have been available in personnel management (65 percent), police operations (68 percent), computer systems (85 percent), conflict resolution (56 percent) and police culture (70 percent).

As has been the case over the years, district administrative managers did not believe there to be uniformity among the position citywide. Only one manager thought the job to be similar to that performed by the other 24 managers. Fifty-two percent stated that their job was only somewhat similar to others'; the remaining 40 percent thought the job to be somewhat or very dissimilar. Despite the differences, 72 percent reported that they believed their position to be an essential part of district operations, and 60 percent stated that their commanders were supportive of the position. However, they were more pessimistic about the likelihood of this position remaining a part of the district administration team: only 28 percent described themselves as very certain that the job would remain, while 44 percent were either somewhat or very uncertain.

District administrative managers appear to have experienced increasing acceptance by district personnel. Fifty-four percent believe sworn supervisors to be very supportive, while 56 percent believe the same thing of patrol officers. Slightly more (60 percent) answered that civilian staff are very supportive of them; however, the district secretary is still a bit of a challenge for the district administrative managers: only 40 percent agreed that the district secretary is very supportive. Fifteen of the 25 managers reported that tensions they initially encountered had lessened; though seven stated that tensions had stayed the same or worsened, and two declined to answer.

More than three-quarters (79 percent) of the district administrative managers supervise sworn personnel, while 58 percent of those who answered this question evaluate sworn personnel performance

as well. At least eight civilian managers (one declined to answer) have some involvement in the complaint register (CR) process.

Over the years we have noted that district administrative managers fall into two distinct categories: those with a community-outreach inclination and those with a district-operations focus. This year, 24 percent of the managers responded that they interact with the community somewhat or very frequently, but despite that fact, 56 percent said they handle incoming calls to the station. Only 12 percent attend beat meetings somewhat or very frequently, and 52 percent report attending DAC meetings somewhat or very frequently.

Assessment Chart 3
District Management

<i>District</i>	<i>Comm rating</i>	<i>Watch Comm rating</i>	<i>Summary</i>
A	2	2.5	2.2
B	2	2.5	2.2
C	2	3	2.3
D	2	3	2.3
E	2	2.5	2.2
F	2.5	2	2.4
G	1.5	2.5	1.8
H	1	1.5	1.2
I	2.5	3	2.7
J	1.5	2	1.7
K	3	2	2.7
L	1.5	2	1.7
M	2.5	2.5	2.5
N	3	2	2.7
O	2	1	1.7
P	2	2.5	2.2
Q	2	2	2.0
R	2	1	1.7
S	2.5	2	2.4
T	1	2.5	1.5
U	2.5	2.5	2.5
V	2	1.5	1.9
W	1.5	1.5	1.5
X	1	1	1.0
Y	3	2.5	2.9
Average	2.0	2.1	2.1

3.0 = very good
2.5 = good

2.0 = satisfactory
1.5 = poor

1.0 = very poor

Community Partnerships

Partnerships with the community are an essential part of the CAPS problem-solving process. Not only does the community serve as a source of information for the police through identifying, prioritizing and analyzing crime and disorder problems, but the community is also a resource for helping to solve the identified problems. The two formal mechanisms that exist for facilitating police-community partnerships are beat community meetings and District Advisory Committees. District Advisory Committees consist of several subcommittees, including Court Advocacy, which is a mandated subcommittee. The following sections examine beat community meetings, community involvement, officer interaction with the community, District Advisory Committees and Court Advocacy. Assessment Chart 4, found on page 103, shows results for each of the seven components in this category.

Beat Community Meeting Effectiveness. Beat community meetings are one formal mechanism for building and maintaining police-community partnerships. They provide a forum for community members and police to meet, exchange information, and begin the process of identifying, prioritizing and analyzing crime and disorder problems in the beat. These meetings are an essential part of the beat-planning and problem-solving process, and one of the foundations of community partnerships.

Questions about beat community meetings were posed to each of the five respondents per district. Ratings on beat community meeting effectiveness were based on a more general set of criteria than those used to generate the model-meeting index described earlier; this focuses on the reported tone of the meetings as well as on the types of problem-solving activities that took place there. Where the beat meetings were cordial and residents acted as the “eyes and ears” for the police, districts received a satisfactory rating. When residents were engaging in the five-step problem-solving process, holding sub-meetings or showing other forms of creativity, districts received a good to very good rating. Districts with adversarial meetings, meetings that were simply forums for airing complaints to the police, or meetings with low resident involvement received a poor to very poor rating.

Beat community meeting effectiveness across the city rated 2.1 on average, slightly above satisfactory. Only 24 percent of districts were judged to be poor (1.5), while 28 percent were deemed satisfactory (2.0) and 48 percent fell into the good (2.5) range. No districts received a very poor (1.0), and none received marks of 3.0. Nearly every respondent cited the difficulty of characterizing effectiveness of beat meetings districtwide because, in every district, some beats were holding strong, effective meetings while others were particularly weak. This lack of consistency accounts for why no districts received the extreme ratings of very good or very poor.

Police presence at the meetings typically consisted of beat officers, the beat team leader and other department personnel as needed, such as rapid response and foot officers. A survey of beat officers at third-watch roll call sessions revealed that 65 percent of beat officers attended every beat community meeting and an additional 18 percent attended every other meeting, so most beat officers participated in the beat community meeting process. Another survey administered at beat community meetings showed that officers and other police who attended the meetings took on specific roles. (Police could denote multiple responsibilities on the survey.) About two-thirds of the police at the

meetings answered questions from the community. Another third brought crime maps and statistics to the meetings, and 19 percent made presentations. Twenty-two percent assisted at the meetings by completing CAPS city-service request forms. A few, most likely beat team leaders, answered that they chaired beat meetings or set the agenda; 15 percent and 11 percent gave these responses, respectively.

Beat facilitators also played an important part in beat community meetings. One sergeant gave his perspective on just how important they were: "Our beat meetings are going pretty well — as long as there's good facilitators." Most neighborhood relations sergeants, when asked who runs the beat community meetings, answered that the beat facilitator was a part of the leadership. In fact, only four neighborhood relations sergeants said that police alone run the meeting. The other 21 sergeants said beat facilitators helped run the meetings in at least some of the beats in the district, depending on the leadership abilities of the beat facilitator and other dynamics of the beat.

In a survey of beat facilitators, nearly half responded that they ran their beat's meeting jointly with the police and another quarter responded that they ran the meeting alone. Beat officers' survey answers were in agreement: 59 percent stated that the beat facilitator had a role in chairing the meetings. In addition to chairing the meeting, beat facilitators also helped set the agenda. The beat facilitator survey indicated that 65 percent of beat facilitators helped set the agenda either with the police or alone. Beat officers thought that the beat team leader usually set the agenda; only 27 percent of officers thought the beat facilitator was involved. However, the beat officers may not have been aware of the extent to which the beat team leader worked with the beat facilitator in setting the agenda.

Beat officers and beat facilitators were generally in agreement that the relationship between police and residents at the meetings was congenial. Fifty-five percent of beat facilitators and 52 percent of beat officers thought the relationship was very congenial, while 36 percent of beat facilitators and 43 percent of beat officers thought it was congenial. Only 9 percent of beat facilitators and 5 percent of beat officers thought the relationship was somewhat strained. In accordance with our findings, districts with poor scores for beat community meeting effectiveness had slightly lower perceptions about the congeniality of relationships between police and community. Only 6 percent of beat facilitators in districts receiving satisfactory or good scores thought the relationship was somewhat strained, compared with 19 percent of beat facilitators in districts receiving poor scores.

Engaging in the problem-solving process is a key activity of effective beat community meetings, and problems addressed are to be of concern to the community rather than an individual or small group of residents. With this in mind, we queried beat officers about whether problems discussed at the meetings were often the concern of the entire beat. Forty percent answered in the affirmative, while 39 percent answered that problems discussed at meetings concerned only part of the beat. Only 10 percent of beat officers answered that the problems discussed at beat community meetings were usually of concern only to individuals, and about 12 percent thought all of the above could be true at varying times.

With more than 90 percent of those surveyed characterizing beat community meetings as congenial, a reasonable hope (six years into the program) would be that the community is now actually getting involved in problem solving beyond the problem-identification stage. However, beat team leaders' responses to interview questions about this matter indicated that such is not the case. Similar to last year's findings, all 25 beat team leaders said that the community helped identify problems, but only

14 beat team leaders said the community helped discuss the problems. (Two additional sergeants said they helped "a little.") When it comes to joint implementation of devised strategies, only responses from 12 beat team leaders could be categorized as joint implementation of devised strategies, and only eight of the 12 could give an example of joint implementation. So while these numbers do indicate that joint problem solving occurred at some beat community meetings, these beat team leaders represented the top beat team leaders from each district. Across the city, community involvement in problem solving was probably lower than the answers from these beat team leaders indicated. Last year's findings indicated that while some community members identified problems at the beat community meetings, they were not as involved in developing and implementing strategies.

This was substantiated by a survey of beat officers at beat community meetings, who were asked to identify who implemented solutions to problems raised at the meetings. (Officers were allowed to check all the options that applied, so the total exceeds 100 percent.) Only 15 percent of beat officers thought individual residents implemented solutions, and 11 percent thought that community groups implemented solutions. Fifteen percent answered that city services implemented solutions, and 13 percent listed CAPS organizers. The majority of beat officers, 54 percent, answered that police implemented the solutions developed at beat community meetings. Our beat meeting observers also reported that although residents took an active role in identifying problems, they generally were less likely to identify solutions or take action on the solutions.

On the other hand, beat facilitators surveyed at training sessions in the spring of 1998 had a more positive outlook on problem solving. In fact, 73 percent of beat facilitators answered that the community and police jointly analyzed problems, and an additional 9 percent answered that residents alone analyzed problems. Only 16 percent answered that police alone analyzed problems. Numbers for joint implementation of strategies were similar: 63 percent answered that police and residents together implemented solutions, 7 percent answered that residents or community groups implemented solutions and 22 percent answered that police alone implemented solutions. One possible explanation for the more positive opinions of beat facilitators is that officers and beat facilitators may have had different concepts of strategy implementation. Another explanation may be that beat facilitators had other examples of community involvement in mind that were not developed within the context of the beat community meeting itself.

Several districts developed creative ways to improve their beat community meetings. A few districts provided complaint forms for residents to fill out, so complaints that concerned individuals would not dominate the meeting and meeting leaders could move on to more substantial priority problems. After the meetings, the beat team took action on those complaints. One sergeant described his district's use of the forms:

We have complaint forms for a lot of the standard complaints, like parking problems, so if that type of problem is brought up, the beat officers can just ask whether or not they completed a form.

Some districts or beats varied their meeting structure to promote better problem solving. One district held separate problem-solving meetings every other month, and another district held abbreviated

problem-solving training in one beat of the district. The DAC chair in one district described how her beat broke into clusters at each meeting:

We have cluster groups [where] we break down in specific areas where people live. Then we discuss the problems in our cluster. The officers circulate, so depending how much time [there is] two to three officers pass by. They listen in, give suggestions or tell what has already been done about it, if they're aware of it.

Beat community meetings in the poor classification for effectiveness often resulted from adversarial relationships between police and the community. One sergeant said that police "get their heads bashed in" at meetings, which caused dedicated officers to drop out because they were so frustrated with the community. Several respondents complained that community groups have tried to manipulate the process, using their attendance at beat community meetings as evidence of their involvement in CAPS so they could apply for grant money. In another district, a sergeant described the troubled atmosphere at beat community meetings:

Beat community meetings, the ones that I've attended, still do not understand or partake in what is termed the police-community partnership. Every meeting that you'll ever go to, they'll say 'I have a problem at so and so street, what have you done?' Now, depending on what the problem is, everything I hear is a complaint. Instead of 'Oh, what can I do to help?' it's, 'Solve that.' So there's not any police-community partnership. It's usually just a complaint session. We just try to appease the community.

Beat Community Meeting Attendance. Attendance levels contributed to the overall effectiveness of beat community meetings. Evaluators rated attendance according to the perceptions of the respondents; all five interviews per district included a question about beat community meeting attendance. Districts consistently attracting 10 to 30 people to beat meetings were given a satisfactory rating. When attendance regularly exceeded 30 people, districts rated good or very good, and districts struggling with turnout were given a poor or very poor rating. For the most part, beat community meeting attendance was satisfactory, achieving a 2.0 component score. While attendance at one district's beat community meetings was rated very poor (1.0) and three districts' rated poor (1.5), 19 districts received satisfactory ratings of 2.0. One district's attendance was judged good (2.5) and one district's was judged very good (3.0).

In past years, informants were consistently disappointed with attendance levels at beat community meetings. However, perception of attendance has grown more positive this year, matched by a 6 percent growth in overall attendance at beat community meetings this year, according to beat-meeting-log figures. It is interesting to note that perceptions of beat community meeting attendance in each district as reported in the interviews roughly match that district's actual attendance figures; only one district stands out as markedly different than informants' perceptions. Similar to last year, attendance varied widely from beat to beat, with reports of anywhere from five to 150 community members participating. Last year, about a third of informants, both sworn and civilian, felt that attendance was too low in their districts; this year, fewer informants commented that attendance was not as good as they hoped. Several people

commented that attendance was improving, and overall opinions of attendance were more positive. According to 1998 beat community meeting logs, an average of 242 beat meetings were held each month with an average of 25 people per meeting.

Beat officers surveyed at beat community meetings gave a positive picture of beat community meeting attendance as well. Thirty-three percent of officers surveyed were very satisfied with attendance and 43 percent were somewhat satisfied. Only 17 percent were somewhat dissatisfied and 7 percent were very dissatisfied with attendance. Beat facilitators were slightly less pleased with beat community meeting attendance. Survey scores showed that 18 percent were very satisfied with attendance, 50 percent somewhat satisfied, 23 percent somewhat dissatisfied, and 9 percent very dissatisfied with attendance.

A variety of strategies were employed to try to increase attendance at meetings. One involved community organizers from the CAPS Implementation Office who worked in each district to improve attendance. In some districts, police told community members about the meetings whenever they interacted. Police also contacted community groups, asked businesses to display meeting announcements in their windows, distributed flyers to churches and announced beat meetings at other community meetings. Announcements were also posted on the department's community-policing web site on the Internet. One beat team leader described the outreach efforts for his beat:

To boost attendance, we have our own mailing list to remind people about the beat meeting. We have 100 people on the list now.

Beat Community Meeting Representativeness. Some segments of Chicago's population have been difficult to engage in CAPS, and because of this, we also delved into whether informants thought the entire community was represented. Assembling a representative group at beat community meetings is a very difficult task; even substantial outreach efforts have been ineffective in increasing representation. Beat community representativeness was rated according to informants' perceptions. Districts with racial and ethnic representation as well as turnout from public housing received a satisfactory rating. Districts where some beats had difficulty with representation were rated poor, and districts where the beats generally were not representative were rated very poor. Districts with racial, ethnic and public housing representation who also had participation from all age groups and areas of the various beats were given a good or very good rating.

Beat community meeting representation across the city averaged 1.5, a poor rating; only 28 percent of districts rated at satisfactory levels in regards to representation. Forty-four percent of districts were poor and 20 percent of districts received a very poor rating. One district received a 1.75 because while their representation was poor, their outreach efforts were good. One district was not rated because we were not able to glean enough information on the matter from interviews to make a reasonable assessment.

Low racial, ethnic and public housing representation has several causes. Public housing residents may have to cross gang lines to attend a meeting or may fear being associated with the police. Immigrant groups may be distrustful of police due to experiences in their countries of origin. Language barriers are

another common reason for low representation. And many groups may have little time for such activities. One commander spoke of his district's underrepresented group:

The problem is, though, that they're generally two-income families. They really work hard to take care of their families, and I don't know if we're missing them or they're just working too hard to get involved.

Survey findings from beat officers and beat facilitators were more positive on beat community meeting representativeness. Almost 47 percent of beat officers and 57 percent of beat facilitators thought the meetings were somewhat representative, and 38 percent of beat officers and 17 percent of beat facilitators thought they were very representative. Twelve percent of beat officers and 17 percent of beat facilitators answered that the meetings were somewhat unrepresentative, and 3 percent of beat officers and 8 percent of beat facilitators answered that they were not representative.

A variety of methods were tried to gain more representative participation at beat community meetings. Bilingual CAPS organizers worked to bring in the immigrant population through holding beat meetings in various languages. Police posted bi- and trilingual flyers in diverse beats. Some beats that were home to public housing rotated meetings every other month, since public housing residents tend to come only if the meeting is in their development, and other community residents tend to come only if the meeting is not in public housing. However, even with these creative and persistent efforts to draw a more representative group to the meetings, the task remained formidable. One beat team leader lamented the difficulty:

I'd really like to get the people from public housing to the meetings, but there's a lot of factors that prevent them from coming. This was such a priority for me that I spent a week going into the [public housing] buildings to talk to people and pass out flyers about the beat meetings. Not one person — not one — came to the next meeting.

Community Involvement. An integral element of community partnerships is resident participation in problem solving and in other activities that foster strong community-police relations. This unique element of the CAPS program means that communities take some responsibility for addressing crime and disorder problems in a wide variety of ways. All five interview respondents in each district had numerous opportunities to share information about community involvement in CAPS. Districts where residents had high levels of implementing problem-solving strategies or organizing other activities that united communities for crime-free neighborhoods received good or very good ratings. When the community acted as "eyes and ears" and attended beat community meetings, we rated the district as satisfactory in this component. Districts where few traces of community involvement were evidenced, including lack of attendance at beat community meetings, received a very poor rating.

Levels of community involvement varied widely across the city. Overall, community involvement received a component rating of 2.0, a satisfactory score. We judged that 20 percent of districts had very good (3.0) levels of community involvement and that 20 percent of districts had good (2.5) levels. Twenty-four percent of districts were satisfactory (2.0) in terms of citizen involvement, which meant that

the community attended meetings and notified the police of problems. Twenty percent were judged to be poor (1.5) and 16 percent were judged very poor (1.0).

It was not clear why some districts scored high and some districts scored low in community involvement. As reported last year, community capacity for problem solving can be influenced by a variety of factors, including assistance from community organizations, connection to political leaders and policy makers, and the electoral capacity of each beat. In regard to community involvement this year, some high-scoring districts had fairly high crime rates, suggesting that crime levels may have motivated the community to take action. However, other districts with high crime rates had low levels of community involvement. Districts that rated poor and very poor represented two extremes: they were either well-off districts with few major problems or they were districts with many problems where fear seemed to paralyze the community. Districts were scattered throughout the ratings in regard to racial composition. Two of the top districts in community involvement were largely African-American, as were two of the poorest districts. Two districts receiving good ratings for this dimension were largely Latino. Three primarily white districts fell into the very poor grouping, while other districts with a significant white population fared much better.

Community involvement can arise from a beat officer's efforts or from a community member's ingenuity. In one district, a police officer with an abundance of flower seeds wanted to involve the community in planting and beautifying a vacant lot. With assistance from the neighborhood relations sergeant and a grammar school principal, school children helped plant this lot. In another district, one of the beat facilitators developed a work program to clean up the community. Every Saturday morning, 15 to 25 youths showed up, took brooms and shovels, and cleaned. The beat facilitator paid the youngsters for their work out of his own pocket and solicited donations of tee shirts from local businesses.

Strong districts illustrated community involvement in a variety of ways. Marches were the most popular. One beat team leader held peace marches, anticrime marches and prayer marches. One district held "stand-ups," a combination of a march and a prayer vigil. Other districts organized neighborhood events to clean up parks, burned-out stores and railroad viaducts. Focusing on problem liquor stores or voting precincts dry was another popular strategy. One beat team leader described the community's efforts:

They went down to the Liquor Commission about the [tavern]. They got several people to go with them. The community is learning that they need to get involved to make real change.

In this case, once the community got involved, the problem with rowdy patrons was solved within a week; the owner of the tavern decided to comply with the community's requests. Other districts also focused on problem buildings. One commander described efforts in his district:

We identified buildings as a real problem here. Well, the community is out there all the time doing stuff. Like they take pictures of the buildings and show them to the judge or whatever.

Another person commented that with problem buildings, "the community will take over finding out who holds the title." One beat held marches and protests in front of a problem property and brought in zoning inspectors, eventually resulting in the cleanup of the property. Other approaches included positive loitering, painting house numbers in the alleys so the police can quickly identify a location, writing letters to problem stores, passing around petitions and developing a phone tree. The phone tree's purpose was described by a beat team leader:

The people had taken to hiding in their houses because of fear. So when they called the police, they had a phone tree, and they would call everyone else on the block who was home. And when the police came, the neighbors would all come out.

Officer Interaction with the Community. Because officer involvement at beat community meetings is mandatory, we sought to determine whether officers interact with the community otherwise. Satisfactory ratings (2.0) were given when officers saw and talked to residents outside of meetings. If officers gave residents their pager numbers and made an effort to attend extra meetings or participate in community cleanups, the district received a score of 2.5. Districts received a very good (3.0) rating when beat officers enthusiastically attended court, took pictures of dilapidated buildings, attended marches or the like. When there was little reported contact between beat officers and residents, the district received a poor (1.5) rating, and when there was no reported contact between beat officers and the community, the district was rated as very poor (1.0). Of note, few instances of outside interaction occurred in the districts. Therefore, each district was judged by the actions of a few officers who did interact with the community.

Most districts had one or more beat officers who interacted with the community on satisfactory levels or better. In fact, only four districts received an unsatisfactory rating, and of these four, only one was judged to be very poor. Five districts performed at satisfactory levels; 12 districts were judged to be good, and four districts received a very good rating. Citywide, interaction levels averaged 2.3, meaning those officers who did make the effort to work with the community were doing a good job of it.

In the one district that scored 1.0 for this component, an informant commented that they were too busy answering calls to interact with residents: "We're just too radio-driven." However, even in other equally busy or busier districts, some officers still gave out their pager numbers or found time to undertake special projects with the community. In at least three cases, district policies were directly related to the level of interaction officers had with the community. In one district, the commander commented, "You know, every beat officer gets two full days a month to work on problems in their beat, and they work with groups and individuals all the time." Another district required beat officers to visit each business in their beat once a month, while the third district required beat officers to contact the beat facilitator monthly. Other exemplary efforts by officers included painting house numbers in alleys and helping residents receive necessary food and clothing assistance.

District Advisory Committees. District Advisory Committees, composed of residents, business owners and other stakeholders in the community, are charged with helping the

commander identify broad issues related to crime and disorder. Once priority problems have been identified, the committee is supposed to develop strategies that can have an impact on those problems and, whenever possible, on their underlying causes. Since the character and problems of each district are very distinct, so are the foci and accomplishments of the DACs.

The DACs were rated according to how active the committee and its subcommittees were. Those with a clear focus who were working on specific activities and had representative membership received a very good rating. DACs who had defined their goals but had made little progress on carrying the goals out were assigned a satisfactory rating. Those with little sense of focus and no notable accomplishments received a very poor rating. DACs were rated against each other and grouped with other DACs functioning at a similar level. Overall, DACs were one of the weakest links in the community partnerships category, receiving a collective score of 1.7 — between poor and satisfactory. Only one district received the highest rating of very good, four were judged to be good and six districts achieved satisfactory marks, while 10 districts received a poor rating and three were deemed very poor. One DAC was not rated because we were not able to glean enough information about it from interviews to make a reasonable assessment.

DACs received slightly lower ratings this year than last year; 44 percent were judged satisfactory or better this year compared with 62 percent last year. This was partly a reflection of more stringent rating criteria; while DACs have had one more year to mature, they did not seem to gain ground. We have found this to be true year after year. One sergeant aptly described it:

It's an institutional problem. No one really understands what they're supposed to be doing here. The stated object is for the commander to hear the concerns of the community through them. And that's okay, but some of them have been sharing their concerns for five years now. The actual function of the DAC is information sharing. . . . But it doesn't seem like enough of a role for a group that meets every month.

As described, DACs suffered from a general lack of direction and appeared to have found it difficult to translate the theoretical framework of General Order 96-3 into applicable practice. Differing community dynamics have led to various interpretations of the DAC role. While this is necessary and appropriate, it makes it hard to create step-by-step guidelines for the DACs that continue to struggle.

Although DACs interpreted their roles differently, similar patterns still emerged in DACs' foci and projects. At least four-fifths of DACs have worked on non-mandated community improvement activities over the last year. These included: marches, vigils and picnics that demonstrated a community presence against crime; educational events; youth programs and cleanups. About one-fifth of DACs placed strong emphasis on the relationship and communication between police and community. About one-quarter of the DACs continued to create a strong structure and a codified process while undertaking other efforts as well.

The strongest DACs were those able to characterize the priority problems in the district, develop strong tactics to deal with these problems and mobilize enough of the community to

effectively carry out these strategies. For instance, one district chose problem liquor stores as a point of concentration. They have written letters to businesses encouraging them to be more responsible and asking them to post public signs. They have shut down several stores with assistance from their Court Advocacy subcommittee. The commander of the district had this to say about their work:

These stores were real problems. . . . They've also arranged marches against crime. All in all, I think it's been successful, because crime is down in all categories. We'll never know if their work contributed to that, but let's just hope so.

Another district selected youth issues as a major focus. They developed a truancy program that partners a subcommittee with a local hospital to try to keep kids in school. This district also transported youngsters to an after-school program sponsored by the district and coordinated various special events for youths.

Weaker DACs had difficulty at various steps in the process of defining the problems, developing the tactics and mobilizing the community. Generally, DACs were able to identify one or more priority problems in the district. According to beat facilitators surveyed at beat community meetings, 55 percent of the beat facilitators who attended DAC meetings answered that the DAC discussed priority problems "most of the time." Twenty-nine percent reported that the DAC discussed priority problems "sometimes," and only 17 percent answered "seldom" or "never." So while DACs identified and discussed priority problems, several DACs had a difficult time developing effective tactics against the problems and even more DACs encountered difficulty with getting sufficient numbers of people to assist. Nearly half of the DAC chairs commented that the need for more community participation was an obstacle. Some DACs spread themselves too thin and had more projects going than they had people to work on them. At least six DAC chairs reported they had no notable successes during the previous year.

DAC chairs shed light on why the committees struggled as they described the CAPS-related obstacles they faced. The need for more community participation topped the list. Several chairs also cited police apathy or a resistance to change on the part of the Chicago Police Department. Less commonly mentioned obstacles covered a wide variety of themes, including time constraints, lack of money or resources, ineffective beat facilitators and limited community awareness. On a positive note, one asset shared by the vast majority of DAC chairs was the support of the commander. A full 64 percent of DAC chairs felt their district commanders did a very good job of supporting them and 8 percent felt their commanders did a good job. Another 20 percent rated their commanders satisfactory in this regard, and only 8 percent of DAC chairs thought their commanders did a very poor job of supporting them. These last two DAC chairs commented that their commander did not provide enough leadership to the DAC and did not maintain enough contact with the DAC chair. One of the two said his commander treated the DAC like any other community organization. On the whole, DAC chairs maintained regular contact with their commanders; about eight chairs said they spoke with their commander four or more times a month. The commanders themselves saw their role in the DAC as a fairly passive one. Commanders gave reports on crime conditions, listened and took suggestions, and answered questions. Only a few took a more active role such as writing the agenda or running the meeting on occasion.

While DAC funding was a problem year after year, it no longer posed difficulty this year. DACs received a discretionary fund of \$4,000 a year from the CAPS Implementation Office to use for DAC-related expenses. Last year this account was very difficult to access, but this year only two DAC chairs mentioned that it was difficult to know what expenses the money would cover. DAC chairs revealed that this money is used for a variety of purposes. Over half the districts used this money for communication expenses, including newsletters. Transportation for the Court Advocacy volunteers or for other general purposes was also frequently mentioned. Other districts used the discretionary fund for refreshments at events, youth activities, general supplies, and awards and ceremonies. Most DAC chairs were satisfied with how the money was used. Seven chairs reported signing off on the use of the funds, and four chairs said they have direct access through request forms or by turning in receipts. Only one chair reported being unhappy with the use of the funds, and three said they were not aware of how the money was used.

Money and resources for DACs can originate from other pockets than those of the CAPS Implementation Office. District Advisory Committees often developed resources, partnerships and affiliations with groups in the district; some of them provided in-kind or monetary resources, while others provided support in different ways. Business-related connections were the most common, reported by 16 DAC chairs. These included chambers of commerce, business associations or local businesses. Connections with nonprofit groups were reported by nine DAC chairs, including community organizations, social service agencies, neighborhood associations and neighborhood councils. Religious connections tied nonprofits in frequency, and connections with schools or local school councils were mentioned by six DAC chairs. Parks were mentioned less frequently, but were still a factor for four DAC chairs. Interestingly, the highest-rated DAC only reported a low to medium level of resources, partnerships and affiliations, while several poorly rated DACs had high levels of connections. DACs functioned at all levels regardless of their ability to forge connections with groups in the district.

As illustrated previously, much work of the DACs was accomplished through various subcommittees. District Advisory Committee organizational guidelines specified that each DAC would appoint Court Advocacy and Senior Citizen subcommittees, and other subcommittees were to be established "as required to address issues of community concern, such as school safety, youth services, economic development, etc." Domestic Violence has been added to the list of mandated subcommittees to address the high volume of calls for domestic disturbances.

According to the DAC chairs, youth-focused subcommittees were the most popular, reported by 14 chairs. These subcommittees included Schools, Youth, and Youth and Family, which organized activities and forums and provided services. For instance, one DAC's youth subcommittee sponsored a forum at which youth and police could share ideas. Business and economic development subcommittees were also quite popular non-mandated subcommittees, reported by 13 of the 25 DAC chairs. Such subcommittees hosted job fairs and held seminars. Religious subcommittees were reported by seven DAC chairs. One sergeant joked:

Ecumenical is also strong. We bring in [the subcommittee chairs] when we need to bring the power of God on someone.

One district's religious subcommittee hosted an annual day for prayer.

One Saturday out of the year, ministers and church people from the [district] meet. And they stand on each corner in the [district], and they pray.

Neighborhood Watch and Citizen Patrol subcommittees were present in six districts, according to the DAC chairs. Less common subcommittees, present in three to four districts, included environmental/beautification, parks, legislative, housing, community network, and buildings/zoning subcommittees. Subcommittee usually reflected specific, and sometimes unique, characteristics of the district. One district had a gay and lesbian subcommittee, and another had hotel and hospitality subcommittees. Overall, the number of non-mandated subcommittees in districts ranged from a low of zero to a high of 13.

Court Advocacy. Court Advocacy, a mandated DAC subcommittee, is a group of community volunteers who track court cases and attend judicial hearings in cases that are of concern to the community. This vehicle for citizen involvement in CAPS shows support for victims as well as solidarity against crime. Court Advocacy volunteers generally consult with beat officers or other district personnel to identify cases that negatively affect the quality of life in their district, and the group actively and systematically follows them through the criminal justice system.

This year's study rated Court Advocacy subcommittees according to their membership, ongoing efforts and perceived success in court. Subcommittee that were especially active in these elements or showed creativity in implementation received a good or very good rating. Subcommittee with low participation, low court attendance, and a lack of community and beat-level input received a poor rating.

Citywide, all districts had active Court Advocacy subcommittees. On average, Court Advocacy subcommittees scored a 2.2, between satisfactory and good. Efforts in 28 percent of the districts were judged to be very good, 12 percent were good, 32 percent were satisfactory, and 28 percent were considered poor. Last year, 11 of 13 districts had subcommittees that were functioning well, compared to 18 of 25 this year. The slightly lower score for this year may reflect the difficulties of sustaining volunteer-based efforts. On a monthly basis across the city, an average of 218 people attended Court Advocacy meetings, and 362 volunteers attended 309 court cases.

In general, Court Advocacy subcommittees receiving a 1.5 mark served only a particular group or neighborhood in the district and/or suffered from low participation, while strong Court Advocacy subcommittees attended court frequently or daily and had adequate participation. Interesting practices of strong subcommittees included arranging court key dates so court advocates could make fewer trips to the courthouse, lobbying for legislation in Springfield and enlisting the assistance of the business community. Beat team leaders in districts with strong Court Advocacy subcommittees were more likely to report they could request assistance from the subcommittee than districts with poor subcommittees. Another interesting tactic involved sending court advocates to cases where they would not be recognized by the offender to address the common fear of retaliation. One DAC chair commented:

One of the things I like is that when a group goes to court, they always go to another part of the district.

Even districts that did not rate in the top groupings achieved some notable accomplishments. For example, a neighborhood relations sergeant in a district whose court advocacy efforts ranked at the satisfactory level told us:

They had success with getting the court moved back [to the district]. They [had] moved it to 11th and State. That ain't no place for a local court.

Assessment Chart 4
Community Partnerships

<i>District</i>	<i>BCM effectiveness</i>	<i>BCM attendance</i>	<i>BCM representation</i>	<i>Comm involve- ment in PS</i>	<i>Officer interaction w/ community</i>	<i>DAC</i>	<i>Court advocacy</i>	<i>Summary</i>
A	2	1.5	1	2	2	2	2	1.9
B	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	1.5	1.9
C	2	2	1.5	3	2.5	2.5	3	2.4
D	2	2	1.5	2.5	1	1.5	2	1.9
E	2.5	2	1.5	2.5	3	2	2	2.3
F	2.5	2	2	2.5	2.5	1.5	2	2.2
G	2.5	2.5	1.5	3	2.5	2	2	2.4
H	1.5	2	1	1.5	2.5	1	1.5	1.5
I	2.5	2	1.5	2	2	1.5	3	2.1
J	2.5	2	2	3	2.5	2	3	2.5
K	2.5	2	1.5	2	2.5	2.5	3	2.4
L	2	2	1	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	1.8
M	2.5	2	1.5	1	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.8
N	2.5	2	1	3	3	1.5	2.5	2.4
O	2.5	2	1.5	2	2.5	2.5	3	2.4
P	1.5	2	2	2.5	2.5	1.5	2	1.9
Q	1.5	1.5	2	1	2	2	2.5	1.7
R	2.5	3	2	2	2.5	2	3	2.4
S	2.5	2	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2	2.2
T	1.5	2	1	1.5	1.5	1	1.5	1.4
U	2.5	2	2	3	3	3	3	2.8
V	1.5	1	--	1	3	1.5	1.5	1.5
W	1.5	2	1.75	1.5	2	1.5	1.5	1.6
X	2	2	2	1	2.5	1	2	1.7
Y	2	2	1.5	2	2	--	1.5	1.9
Average	2.1	2.0	1.5	2.0	2.3	1.7	2.2	2.0

3.0 = very good
2.5 = good

2.0 = satisfactory
1.5 = poor

1.0 = very poor
-- insufficient data

Summary

The four broad program categories discussed in this section were assessed in terms of their depth and effectiveness of implementation in the city's 25 districts. The categories are beat teamwork and problem solving; district teamwork and planning, and district management; and community partnerships. Following are summaries of each category. Illustrated on Assessment Chart 5 on page 106 are district rankings from highest to lowest.

- The city's 25 districts are mounting acceptable **beat teamwork and problem-solving** efforts, as evidenced by a category rating of 2.0 citywide. The strongest components in this category are beat team composition and computerized crime mapping and analysis, each of which received a composite rating of 2.2 (just above satisfactory). The weakest component is intra-watch information exchange, which was rated at 1.4 (between poor and very poor), because it is carried out very inconsistently systemwide. On the whole, 16 districts were performing at or above satisfactory levels for beat teamwork and problem solving, while nine districts were performing somewhere between satisfactory and poor. Continuity of beat assignment is an entrenched concept citywide, and beat integrity is being maintained at satisfactory levels in most districts. Beat team meetings, which are held on a regular basis, have become an accepted activity among the rank and file, but overtime budget constraints threaten to decimate the 24-hour "team" perspective that is a critical aspect of the CAPS problem-solving model. While the team concept is being embraced at the beat level, face-to-face communication among team members at change of watch is seldom carried out. Beat plans are being used as a problem-solving tool on a fairly regular basis throughout the city, and a goodly number of beat officers are using the CAPS problem-solving model. ICAM 2 is being used throughout the city, at times for crime analysis purposes, but often to simply produce maps and lists for community meetings. Beat officers also report that they have occasionally had the opportunity to take time away from their radio calls to do preventive work, but many are reluctant to request this of their supervisors. A sense of beat "ownership" has developed among beat team leaders, and most are comfortable with the added responsibilities that come with this leadership position. Resentment persists about the fact that they are not remunerated for these additional duties.
- **District teamwork and planning** is just below the satisfactory level citywide; the composite score for the category was 1.9. The only component of the five in this category that received a satisfactory rating was advisory committee chair involvement in the district management team, which came in at 2.0. The other four components, sector team meeting effectiveness, district management team meeting effectiveness, usefulness of the district plan and communication of the district plan, each received a mark of 1.8 (between poor and satisfactory). Thirteen districts received a composite score for district teamwork and planning of satisfactory or better, while 12 districts were rated below satisfactory, with six coming in below the 1.5 (poor) threshold. The district planning process has been largely ignored by upper-level management, with no district plans having been approved. Despite this, a number of district management teams developed plans that have been put to use, but more than half of the district commanders do not consider district plans to be viable documents. A number of district management teams have also shared their plan with their advisory committee and district personnel. Though team meetings at the sector and district level are held on an infrequent basis, most everyone interviewed does

understand their purpose, and many district management teams have welcomed their DAC chairs to participate in planning activities on an occasional basis.

- **District management** was judged to be slightly above satisfactory, receiving a 2.1 mark citywide. Sixty percent of the city's 25 districts rated a composite score of satisfactory or better for CAPS-related district management, with the remaining 10 districts garnering below-average scores. Three districts came in at 2.7, the highest score attained for this dimension, while one district received the lowest possible score of 1 (very poor). Top leadership has changed in the four districts that received the highest and lowest scores. While a few top-notch CAPS practitioners emerged among commanders, many are simply requiring their troops to adhere to the general order to varying degrees, and others are disinclined or unable to launch anything more than a nominal CAPS effort in their districts. Watch commanders largely believe that they have a minimal role in Chicago's community-policing program, and while many claim to want to be involved, they hasten to add that they do not have time to take on any new responsibilities. A few watch commanders have carved out a CAPS-related role for themselves that goes beyond allocating manpower in compliance with the general order. Neighborhood relations sergeants' involvement in CAPS has changed over the years. Having put a successful system in place in the districts and with sergeants having assumed their beat-level responsibilities, neighborhood relations sergeants now perform the more appropriate role of steward rather than orchestrator. Neighborhood Relations continues to be a helpful, supportive contact for advisory committee chairs, who judged their efforts to be very good throughout the city. District administrative managers, many of whom have been on the job for more than three years, largely believe their jobs to be important to district operations. They are not so confident, however, that the position will remain a part of the district administration team. While civilian managers are feeling increasing support among district personnel, interactions with the commanders' secretaries remain somewhat challenging.
- **Community partnerships** were operating at satisfactory levels throughout the city, receiving a 2.0 rating for the category. On the whole, 13 districts were performing at or above satisfactory levels of community partnerships, while 12 districts were performing somewhere between slightly below satisfactory and poor. Court Advocacy subcommittees and beat community meetings received two of the higher scores in this category, whereas District Advisory Committees, struggling with defining their mission and their goals, were one of the weaker links in the community partnerships grouping. Beat community meetings are judged to be effective on average, and beat facilitators are running the meetings in concert with beat team sergeants in a substantial number of beats. Attendance at these meetings is perceived to be improving, but demographic representativeness is still difficult to achieve. Both officer interaction with the community outside of monthly beat meetings and community involvement in CAPS beyond problem identification are occurring only on a limited basis at this point.

Assessment Chart 5
District Rankings

District	<i>Beat team work/ps</i>	<i>District team work/ps</i>	<i>District management</i>	<i>Community partnerships</i>	Overall rating *
N	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.4	2.5
U	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.8	2.4
K	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.4
Y	2.4	2.3	2.9	1.9	2.3
I	2.1	2.1	2.7	2.1	2.2
F	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2
S	2.3	1.8	2.4	2.2	2.2
B	2.4	2.2	2.2	1.9	2.2
O	2.2	2.1	1.7	2.4	2.2
J	2.2	1.7	1.7	2.5	2.1
R	2.0	2.1	1.7	2.4	2.1
P	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.9	2.1
G	2.0	1.5	1.8	2.4	2.0
M	1.8	2.2	2.5	1.8	2.0
D	1.6	2.5	2.3	1.9	2.0
C	1.7	1.3	2.3	2.4	2.0
E	1.9	1.2	2.2	2.3	2.0
Q	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.9
A	1.9	1.7	2.2	1.9	1.9
L	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9
T	2.1	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.7
V	1.6	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.6
X	1.9	1.2	1.0	1.7	1.6
W	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.6	1.4
H	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.4
Average	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.0

*As mentioned previously, categories were assigned differing weights to reflect their importance.

3.0 = very good
2.5 = good

2.0 = satisfactory
1.5 = poor

1.0 = very poor

Conclusions

How does CAPS fare in its sixth year? It appears that the program is at a crossroads. While Chicago can point to many significant accomplishments during this period, important matters remain to be settled. On the positive side, a comprehensive program has been implemented in a large organization that is not particularly amenable to change, and important aspects of community policing have been assimilated into the department's routine operations. However, important aspects of the change process have been "on hold" for a substantial period of time. Many key department managers have not been involved in the program and do not clearly understand the responsibilities it brings. Implementation of important elements of the program remains spotty, but little was done to rectify the situation while this research was being conducted. Members of the top echelon of the police department recognize these problems, and recently announced initiatives intended to "jump start" the change process. Since all of our field research was completed before these initiatives were even announced, it is too early to assess the extent to which they may penetrate to the working layers of the organization.

It is important to not undervalue the very significant structural changes that have been made in the Chicago Police Department, nor the financial, organizational and political barriers that had to be breached to make them happen. The entire patrol function has been reorganized to support the work of dedicated teams of beat officers. It has been staffed by thousands of new officers to enable the teams to stay on their own "turf" while the agency continues to respond promptly to calls for service. A new communication system was built that can handle the dispatching procedures that keep the teams in place and can coordinate with the city's new 311 non-emergency number. Virtually every city department has been re-engineered to ensure that they can be responsive to service requests filed by police officers, and management systems have been put in place that hold the departments accountable for the promptness of their response. Officers, their supervisors and thousands of civilians have been trained in problem solving. Community policing and problem solving is integrated into the department's recruit training, and as time goes by it will become the only way Chicago police have ever operated. The department's information systems have (belatedly) joined the 20th Century, and the city is actually at the forefront in terms of the sophistication of data analysis and mapping capabilities available to rank-and-file officers, managers and (soon) the general public.

Compared to the past, and to virtually every police agency in the nation today, Chicago has also made tremendous strides toward involving the public in securing neighborhood safety. Virtually everyone in Chicago knows about the program, and those who get involved think that it is worthwhile. Attendance at beat community meetings remains constant at a surprisingly high level, even after the novelty of these gatherings has worn off. Attendance rates are high in higher-crime and often quite poor areas, which is another significant accomplishment. People who attend the meetings give them high marks for their effectiveness at improving neighborhood conditions. The city has made a considerable investment in mobilizing neighborhoods around CAPS activities. The districts' civilian advisory committees vary in their effectiveness, but they all have some resources and many have used them wisely. One activity they sponsor, the Court Advocacy program, in which every district participates, involves many active residents, monitors the progress of a large number of cases and appears to have increased the responsiveness of judges and prosecutors to community concerns.

Finally, in important respects, community policing has become a routine aspect of the city's life. Within the police department there is no longer any mention of the program being "just smoke and mirrors," nor an expectation that it might disappear after each mayoral election. Indeed, there is widespread consensus from within that the department will continue to keep CAPS on course. Our surveys have documented that significant numbers of officers who were dubious about the program during the early years have now come to accept it as a feature of their daily life. Many officers at all levels of the organization believe that the increased interaction, information sharing and sometimes joint action by police and residents have greatly improved their relationship with the public, especially among knowledgeable, involved and vocal neighborhood activists. Widespread awareness of CAPS and continued heavy participation in beat community meetings signals the extent to which the general public thinks that it is their program, too. By many measures, support for the program, like participation in it, is highest among African-Americans. Vocal activists everywhere are committed to the program, albeit concerned about how it is progressing. As one of the "signature lines" of a television series devoted to the program put it, "Safe neighborhoods are everybody's business."

However, after almost six years, it appears that this impressive pace of change has slowed, perhaps to a halt. The program lost one of its key architects during a period of significant upheaval in the department's management and suffered from the lack of a sworn manager with line authority within the organization. Some senior managers adopted a "wait and see" attitude with respect to the future of CAPS; others just wait for direction. This has contributed to inertia at the top. Progress in implementing existing elements of the program has suffered. For example, during this period there has been limited follow-through to rectify deficiencies in the department's planning process. Problem-solving plans made at the beat level are supposed to drive the formulation of district plans and the reallocation of resources from above to implement them, but this elaborate new system ground to a halt. Progress in the development of new organizational processes also suffered. For example, there has been little progress on the widely recognized problem of evaluating unit, team or individual performance, a key factor in reshaping any organization. In addition, despite the department's vision for itself, CAPS remains a Patrol Division program that has not significantly affected the work of other important units in the department. None of this has gone unnoticed by the rank-and-file. As one lieutenant put it, "The spark has gone out. The energy is gone."

At the operational level, in the districts and areas (combinations of five districts), some managers have apparently not embraced the program. Many new commanders have been appointed during this transitional period who came from parts of the department that were not involved in CAPS, and too many knew little about their new roles and responsibilities. We found that watch commanders — senior managers who are on the job and responsible for operations 24 hours a day — had no clear CAPS-related role and most did not see it as their responsibility to adopt one. CAPS training for area deputy chiefs, one of the most important management layers in the organization, began only after the bulk of our field work was completed. The department has mounted extensive training programs for its sergeants, and more are on the calendar, but between them and the top lie many management layers staffed by very large numbers of old-line leaders who have not been an effective "transmission belt," communicating the energy and enthusiasm evident at police headquarters into practice in the field.

Some also fear a retreat from commitments that were made and organizational reforms that were inaugurated in 1993 because they were seen as central to the CAPS philosophy. One is the

frequency and staffing of beat community meetings, and the newer beat team meetings. These have been among the program's most visible features and important successes. They are well attended by officers from all shifts because overtime pay is available for those who are off-duty at the time meetings are held. However, a recurrent theme in this year's interviews was that there is pressure to reduce officer attendance, and in some districts beat team meetings are being stacked immediately after community meetings in order to reduce overtime expenses. Although some respondents believe that team meetings held immediately after beat meetings are more efficient, a majority of those interviewed expressed the opinion that team meeting quality is diminished when meetings are stacked. In some areas, a scaling back in the frequency with which beat community meetings are held also threatens. As noted in the section above on citizen involvement, the regularity and visibility with which they are held are important factors sustaining beat community meeting attendance. Another apparent retreat was the resurrection of the civil service rank of captain. The abolition of this rank was emblematic of the department's commitment to pushing authority and responsibility down within the organization to gain nimbleness and flexibility in staffing and to reduce the bureaucratic distance between the top and the bottom of the agency. To be sure, it is important to foster long-term career paths within the organization. However, whether that is best accomplished by creating a new civil service category rather than identifying key jobs and rewarding those who take them on and do them well (jobs that could range from Master Patrol Officer to Beat Team Leader, Sector Leader and beyond) remains an open question.

Finally, implementation of CAPS remains highly variable at the street level. Our observations of beat community meetings found them good at the mechanics, but failed to find much evidence of problem solving, or that people were leaving the meetings with a project at hand. The average beat meeting, like the average district, received a "just average" rating. While awareness of the program by the general public has been rising, this has not translated into rising attendance rates. The most influential source of information about CAPS, and the one which has grown the most, is television, but it does not appear to stimulate actual involvement in the program. The reports of CAPS activists in the districts parallel our judgment, that while much has been accomplished, little has changed of late.

In recent months, the police department has moved to respond to many of these concerns. A new senior management team has been created with explicit responsibility for pushing CAPS implementation forward, and a sworn manager with line authority has been appointed. Commanders who demonstrated their ability to implement the program have been given new, higher-level responsibility for the program. The Research and Development Unit has been transferred into the part of the department that manages the patrol division and other field activities, to draw it closer to actual operations. Work is underway to develop a new "command accountability" system that will reinforce the department's expectation that the districts will identify and solve problems. This includes an increase in the responsibilities of area deputy chiefs that in turn will require an increase in their staff and analytic capabilities. It will also draw upon the analytic capacities of the modules of the department's new information systems that are available to managers. The Detective Division is again considering ways to get involved in CAPS. A new effort will be made to redraw the boundaries of the department's beats and districts, in order to better focus resources on the city's underlying problems. This process will face technical, bureaucratic and political hurdles of great magnitude. A senior staff member has been designated to manage the details of implementing all of these multiple "streams" of change within the organization. The department has also announced that it will continue its commitment to the program through ongoing training. Training is being planned this year for beat team leaders, sector managers and

district commanders. The training will be conducted both in the classroom and in the districts to further program implementation.

The consequences of these initiatives will only be apparent when the districts' performance rises above "just average," the level at which it now stands.

Community Support Initiatives

Community Involvement in Regulating Liquor Licensing

The City of Chicago has provided the community, police and city agencies with a number of tools to regulate or eliminate problem liquor establishments. At the neighborhood level, citizens can attend beat meetings to share information about problem establishments with the police and city agencies. At the next level, informal meetings can be held at the Liquor Control Commission, where citizens can bring their problems to the attention of the licensing authority. The Liquor Control Commission has been particularly effective at balancing the rights of license holders with the concerns of community residents. While holding a great deal of formal authority, the commission frequently attempts to broker informal, negotiated solutions to local problems that satisfy the needs of all the protagonists. When other solutions fail, there are time-honored and newly enacted ordinances that can result in fines, closings, suspensions or license revocations of particular establishments. An established but controversial tool is the Vote Dry Referendum. It allows citizens to vote, by means of a local option referendum, to prohibit the sale of alcohol in a particular precinct or at a particular address in a precinct — a process also known as “voting dry.”

Representatives of the Mayor’s Office, Liquor Commission, Law Department and CAPS Implementation Office held a series of planning meetings to create information/instruction packets for communities hoping to vote a premises or entire precinct dry. Informational meetings were held in each of the police districts, and the Office for Cable Communications produced and aired a show on Local Option Referenda. The program, entitled “Bad Liquor Establishments: What You Can Do!”, aired on a fairly continuous basis and listed neighborhood meeting times and locations.

The movement to allow residents to regulate or eliminate liquor establishments has not been embraced by all segments of the community. One particularly troubling consequence of vote dry referenda is that innocent business owners can lose their livelihood simply because their establishments — some of which have been in business for decades — are located in precincts with disreputable liquor license holders. Sympathetic residents are unhappy to see reputable taverns and package goods stores shuttered because of the effect such an action has on the innocent proprietors’ families and the social life of the neighborhood. Hence, while many residents are pleased with the new tools available to them to address “bad” liquor establishments, the issue remains under debate.

Housing Court and the Law Department

The linking of city services to Chicago’s community-policing program has enriched the police department’s arsenal, and the addition of the Strategic Inspections Task Force and the Corporation Counsel pilot program are proving to be effective weapons. These two enterprises enforce Chicago’s anti-gang and drug house ordinance, under which the city provides notice of a complaint to negligent landlords and follows up with an inspection of buildings believed to be serving as drug and gang houses. Both residents and police can identify a building as a place where gang members reside or sell drugs, or

where illegal activities are taking place. The Strategic Inspections Task Force confirms the reported activity and determines whether there are building code violations. Owners are given the opportunity to comply with an abatement plan which could include eviction and investment in security measures. If owners refuse to comply, they can be brought before the Code Enforcement Bureau and be compelled to meet the plan. Owners who refuse to comply with a prescribed plan can be criminally charged.

To bring the force of ordinance to the beat level, the city developed the Corporation Counsel pilot program in six police districts. Under the program, city attorneys with knowledge of the various building codes that can be employed to expedite the clean up of bad buildings have been assigned to selected district stations. Officers can go directly to an attorney for assistance in combating the social problems created by drug and gang activities.

Complementing these two efforts, the CAPS Implementation Office recently established a Housing Court Unit composed of two researchers and five field workers. Its mission is twofold: to educate residents and community groups about the process of taking action against problem buildings in their neighborhoods, and to work with the Strategic Inspections Task Force to provide ongoing attention to buildings that need to be brought into code compliance. In working with the community, Housing Court Unit staffers:

- increase the awareness and participation levels of stakeholders such as churches, schools and parent organizations so they can take action against delinquent property owners
- organize marches against problem landlords
- identify potential witnesses for cases that are referred to the Law Department
- generate petitions on problem buildings
- organize residents for housing court advocacy activities

In addition to ensuring that the process continues on priority demolition cases, Housing Unit staff also work with district personnel to identify buildings for the task force to address on their scheduled return to the district. The Implementation Office, which gets between 30 and 40 calls weekly on problem buildings, also has begun to assist in identifying potential gang and drug targets in the 19 police districts that do not yet have a corporation counsel assigned to work with beat teams and residents.

In cooperation with the Law Department, the Housing Court Unit will also begin to identify community residents and groups to assist in the monitoring of landlord compliance with consent decrees entered in Housing Court. Another plan under consideration is the involvement of community residents in monitoring agreements entered into by property owners. Efforts have been made to enhance community participation in Housing Court, with letters and petitions being circulated on some 2,200 abandoned properties identified by the Law and Buildings Departments.

To facilitate these many activities, the Housing Court Unit now has access to several city agency computer networks, including the CPD's ICAM 2 system, the Clerk of the Court's database, the Buildings Department's database and the city service request system.

The Department of Administrative Hearings

The City of Chicago recently established the Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), which is the first municipal administrative adjudication system in the nation. The department serves as a quasi-judicial forum for independent and impartial adjudication of municipal ordinance violations. Specially trained attorneys serve as hearing officers for DOAH cases, which are initiated by city departments whose personnel are responsible for protecting public health, safety, welfare and quality of life. Tickets for municipal ordinance violations, which can be meted out in response to a citizen or community complaint about a building, business or circumstance, are issued by city inspectors, parking enforcement aides, investigators or police officers. Thus, among the city agencies able to issue tickets are the Buildings Department, for complaints on building violations as well as gang and narcotics activities within drug houses, and Streets and Sanitation, for overflowing garbage or obstructions of the public way. Police-issued tickets for such violations as curfew, disorderly conduct, trespassing, drinking on the public way and other "quality-of-life" offenses are now also handled by administrative hearings, and officers are not required to appear at the hearing for the case to be decided. This new arrangement is particularly helpful to police officers, because in the past, many were reluctant to write tickets for quality-of-life issues due to the court attendance requirement and the tendency for these cases to be "thrown out."

DOAH hearing officers, who are currently presiding over 400,000 cases per year, completed a training curriculum that emphasized how these types of quality-of-life offenses impact the life of the community, erasing the long-held notion that these types of offenses were merely "petty or victimless" offenses. In addition, they visited selected neighborhoods to observe city inspectors, investigators and police officers working in the field. Several remedies are available to hearing officers, including monetary fines, orders of restitution, orders of compliance, license suspensions and community service; a hearing officer's order carries the same weight as that of a state judge. While hearing officers may not impose a jail sentence, failure to comply with the order may result in a charge of criminal contempt in county court.

In addition to expediently addressing quality-of-life issues that might contribute to gangs, drugs and violent offenders at the neighborhood level, the aim in establishing the DOAH was to increase adherence to municipal codes, increase public trust through a system that removes enforcement from departments that issue violations, and leave only the most serious cases to the courts. The new system streamlines the processing of ordinance violations, ideally without impinging on individual rights.

Project Papers
Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium

1. The Public and the Police in The City of Chicago, by Tabatha R. Johnson.
2. Winning the Hearts and Minds of Police Officers: An Assessment of Staff Perceptions of Community Policing in Chicago, by Arthur J. Lurigio and Wesley G. Skogan.
3. Partnerships for Prevention? Some Obstacles to Police-Community Cooperation, by Wesley G. Skogan.
4. Community Participation and Community Policing, by Wesley G. Skogan.
5. Spring 1994 Supervisor Training Evaluation Report, by Arthur J. Lurigio, Sheila Houmes and Sigurlina Davidsdottir.
6. Preparing Police Officers for Community Policing: An Evaluation of Training for Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy, by Gail Dantzker, Arthur J. Lurigio, Susan M. Hartnett, Sigurlina Davidsdottir, Kristin Donovan, and Sheila Houmes.
7. Evaluation Design and Survey Methods Report, by Wesley G. Skogan.
8. An Analysis of Beat Meeting Participation and Activity, by Scott Althaus.
9. District Advisory Committees: The Prototype Experience, by Jill DuBois.
10. Partnerships in Action, by Dominique Whelan.
11. Community Organization Survey Methods Report, by Justine H. Lovig and Robert VanStedum.
12. Community Organization Study, by Justine H. Lovig and Wesley G. Skogan.
13. 1995 CAPS Training Evaluation Report, by Marianne Kaiser.
14. Joint Community-Police Training (JCPT) Interim Report, by Marianne Kaiser.
15. Community Mobilization Around CAPS, by Susan Bennett. (currently unavailable)
16. 1996 Beat Meeting and Citizen Training Participant Study, by Justine H. Lovig, Jinney Smith, and Wesley G. Skogan.
17. Evaluating Problem Solving Policing: The Chicago Experience, by Wesley G. Skogan.
18. Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder and Fear, by Wesley G. Skogan.
19. Super Block Project, by Raj C. Udeshi.
20. Institute for Public Safety Partnerships: A First Year Evaluation, by Jennifer Comey and Marianne Kaiser.

Project Papers can be ordered for \$4.50 each from: Police Evaluation Consortium, Institute for Policy Research, 2040 Sheridan Road, Evanston IL 60208. Please pay only by a check made out to "Northwestern University." Papers can also be downloaded free of charge from the Institute's web site at www.nwu.edu/IPR/publications/policing.html.

New Books on Community Policing in Chicago

Community Policing, Chicago Style. By Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett. Published by Oxford University Press, \$29.95.

On the Beat: Police and Community Problem Solving in Chicago. By Wesley G. Skogan, Susan M. Hartnett, Jill DuBois, Jennifer T. Comey, Marianne Kaiser, and Justine H. Lovig. (To be published by Westview Press, summer 1999.)



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