

POST 9-11 POLICING

**THE CRIME CONTROL - HOMELAND
SECURITY PARADIGM**

TAKING COMMAND OF NEW REALITIES

September 2005

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(Due to rounding, the total percentages in some tables do not equal 100.0%. Some survey items also permitted respondents to give multiple answers. Consequently, some tables display percentages that total well in excess of 100.0%.)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The September 11th attacks on the United States redirected priorities with a suddenness perhaps unprecedented in the American police experience. Homeland security, the constant threat of terrorism on our shores, concern with weapons of mass destruction, and security-related intelligence demands surged to the forefront of state and local policing. Requirements and implications of the Patriot Act, homeland security funding, and equipment and training distribution issues have penetrated the law enforcement enterprise at all levels. With no time for preparation, law enforcement repositioning to confront these demands and issues has been paralleled by 9-11 fallouts, including military (reserve) mobilizations that skim police manpower, material expenditures for overtime and color alert mobilization, and heightened concern for preservation of civil liberties.

September 11th impacts and demands intensified the urgency of pre-9-11 police priorities, harnessing new technologies, most notably information technology, and within this realm, interoperability capacities being most obvious. Palpable concern exists that new and still evolving homeland security requirements not be met at the expense of considerable gains in community policing and the restoration of public trust, meticulously crafted in recent years. Similarly, crime prevention and control – the core missions of law enforcement – though currently somewhat muted, remain the dominant concern in the world of law enforcement.

Suffusing this panoply of change is state and local budgetary stress. Many police agencies must address expanding missions in flat or diminishing resource environments. Productivity and asset-leveraging challenges are already evident and are likely to dominate functioning for the foreseeable future.

THE POST 9-11 POLICING PROJECT

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and the Police Foundation joined in 2004 to conduct a project to help position state, local, and tribal agencies to proactively manage a changed and continually changing police environment. Four objectives were pursued:

- **Objective 1: Profile High Impact Changes.** Identify and prioritize the forces and demands, currently evident and emerging, that are redirecting the police mission and roles.

- ❑ **Objective 2: Capture Best Practices.** Assemble information on successful policy, program, and resource deployment responses that agencies have undertaken to address changing conditions, missions, and roles.
- ❑ **Objective 3: Craft Promising Practices.** Surface or develop policy, program, and resource deployment ideas considered promising for addressing changing conditions, mission, and roles.
- ❑ **Objective 4: Package and Disseminate Practices.** Blanket the police community with user-friendly Action Briefs that summarize the best and promising practices information and ideas.

The partners regard this project as an essential effort to address the continuing need for up-to-date change management strategies for American law enforcement.

THE EVOLVING PARADIGM - THE POST 9-11 MODEL

From the totality of project work - Roundtables, CEO Survey, and Literature Review - an outline of post 9-11 policing emerged:

- ❑ **The Terrorism Dimension.** During the final years of what might be called pre-9-11 policing, the late 1990's through most of 2001, law enforcement was characterized by a strong sense of direction and clarity. Crime was in decline. Community policing had broad acceptance and support. Public trust was strong. That balance was shattered on September 11, 2001. While not yet universal within law enforcement, or felt with consistent intensity, there is recognition that for the first time since WWII, policing is being conducted, domestically, in a time of war; the United States faces a foreign threat within its own borders.
- ❑ **Shifting Eras and Mission Reconfiguration.** Domestic security obligations have rapidly augmented the pre-9-11 mission. Traditional pre-9-11 responsibilities such as community service and crime control are not and cannot be ignored. These remain the primary expectations of citizens and elected officials. Law enforcement's commitment to and belief in the now established crime control and community policing model remains firm. Yet, by the pressure of events and evolving professional concern, there appears to be a transition beyond the Community-Oriented Policing (COP) model of the 90s to a domestic security model. To some, a homeland security focus should be the next evolution of community policing.

- ❑ **Federally-Led Response.** The federal government has taken the lead in our national response. But state and local agencies are moving forward, forming new and strengthening existing regional arrangements, improving interoperability and information exchange and capability, engaging in various forms of terrorism response training, patrolling differently and experimenting with a rich mixture of operating strategies. Dissatisfaction with unfolding federal programming is readily apparent with distribution and targeting of funding and the terror alert system being most prominent.
- ❑ **A Leadership Imperative.** Though not specifically mandated, federally, locally, legislatively, or by policy directive, chief law enforcement executives recognize a moral and professional imperative to aggressively confront potential terrorism in their communities.
- ❑ **Readying for Action.** The numbing and confusing immediate impact of 9-11 on the collective police psyche has lifted and responses are clarifying. Terrorism prevention and response planning and programming is surfacing in many law enforcement agencies. Much of it is regionally networked and information and intelligence focused. The field is poised for a more aggressive response.
- ❑ **Business as Usual Mindset.** The previous observation notwithstanding, a mindset issue seems to exist. A belief is often shared that “terrorism is just a big city (or eastern) problem” and “nothing is going to happen in small town, rural America.”
- ❑ **The Financial Paradox.** A tightening resource situation parallels the expanding post 9-11 mission. Law enforcement leaders must educate citizens, government leaders, and especially legislators – those with financial powers – about domestic security issues, dangers, and financial requirements in order to ready an effective response.
- ❑ **Federal-Local Crime Control Partnerships.** State and local law enforcement is not experiencing withdrawal of federal crime control resources to any measurable degree, which was expected as agencies such as the FBI reoriented for the war on terror. Some suggest an identifiable shift in resources in the reverse – from local and state agencies to federal task forces, mainly Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).
- ❑ **Federal-Local Homeland Security Partnerships.** Intensified collaboration with DHS is required to better tailor funding strategies and formulas to state and local law enforcement needs. This is likely to occur as law

enforcement mobilizes its assets and gains consensus on required and potentially effective strategies.

- ❑ **Patriot Act.** State and local law enforcement support is solid for reauthorization of the Patriot Act. Revisions are favored with regard to reimbursement of costs incurred by local governments to detain suspected terrorists, to respond to color code changes, and to expand the definition of domestic terrorism to include violations of American Indian jurisdiction. Concern with singling out persons based solely on country of origin has been expressed. There is a strong sense of need to broaden understanding of the provisions of the Act beyond law enforcement professionals.
- ❑ **Preserving Public Trust.** There is widespread concern that the monumental public trust accomplishments of the past decade or so will erode as homeland security priorities take center stage. This concern is linked to diminishing resources and erosion of federal funds for community policing officers, school resource officers, and other staples of policing.
- ❑ **Changing Leadership Requirements.** Leadership requirements are changing to cope with new missions and issues. New knowledge and better practices information are required to balance homeland security augmentations and retain the integrity of traditional core missions. Law enforcement executives are engaging more federally, regionally, and locally; trying to sort out changing expectations and regain the stability of the pre-9-11 years, in a post 9-11 environment.
- ❑ **Promising Practices.** Finding state and local homeland security programs worth replicating is exceedingly difficult, attesting to both the need for innovative strategies and the rudimentary level of development work to date. The field is particularly anxious to assemble the assets required to address terrorism, most importantly prevention assets.
- ❑ **Issues Hierarchy.** The issues that are most critical to law enforcement CEOs today are:
 - Budget/Funding
 - Homeland Security and Terrorism
 - Recruitment, Retention, Staffing
 - Crime and Disorder
 - Crime Prevention
 - Public Trust

Judging by forces of change discussions at the Roundtables, and correlate impacts and responses, homeland security towers above all others. Note also, however, that the resource shortage issue overarches and suffuses the policing environment in its entirety.

MANAGING NEW REALITIES - BUILDING HOMELAND SECURITY CAPACITY

Every project initiative demonstrated and reinforced the preoccupation of law enforcement professionals with homeland security issues, their intellectual readiness to frame priority domestic security questions, tackle the answers, and their thirst for a “game plan.” For these reasons our promising practices phase concentrated on homeland security considerations.

Four promising practice briefs have been produced:

- ❑ Intelligence Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture
- ❑ Threat Assessment: Fundamentals and Guidelines
- ❑ Multi-Jurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats
- ❑ Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security

Individually and collectively, the briefs focus on the prevention factor of the Prevention - Preparedness - Consequence Management homeland security equation, honoring a call from the field. The documents attempt to summarize best current thinking in the respective subject areas, recognizing that work was done in a rapidly changing development environment. Operating models and hosting jurisdictions are referenced to direct readers to sources for further inquiry.

A PORTFOLIO OF CAPACITY BUILDING ESSENTIALS

The project identified 37 issues and needs to be addressed to begin to build a body of policies, programs, and practices that state, local, tribal, and special jurisdiction police require to meet the homeland security new reality. Issues and needs of groupings are:

- ❑ Leadership
- ❑ Prevention and Preparedness
- ❑ Technology and Intelligence
- ❑ Resources
- ❑ Community and Citizen Engagement

- ❑ Organizational Transformation
- ❑ Externals

These capacities are linked by their concentration on prevention, reflecting an articulated choice of law enforcement CEOs to focus on the still unmet needs on the prevention side of the domestic security/terrorism equation. Consequence management, also vital, has already been treated extensively, though more remains to be done on this side of the security equation as well, including building and refining collaborations.

CAPACITY BUILDING PRINCIPLES

Developed as an extension of the Post 9-11 Policing Project by the IACP governing body as part of its Taking Command initiative, the following principles are recommended for guiding capacity building work:

- ❑ **Terrorism is Local.** Terrorism occurs/will occur locally, in the streets and neighborhoods of America. Accordingly, local law enforcement is the front line for protection and response.
- ❑ **Bottom-Up Engineering.** Priorities, asset design and development, and funding formulas should be engineered from the ground up – from communities, towns, and cities.
- ❑ **Prevention is Paramount.** The need to focus on and value the prevention dimension of the Prevention-Preparedness- Consequence Management equation is a transcending capacity building requirement.
- ❑ **Non-Competitive Collaboration.** Priorities, asset design, development, and funding formulas must be fashioned non-competitively, by all first-response agencies and governing bodies at all levels.
- ❑ **Community Policing - Crime Control - Homeland Security Nexus.** Federal homeland security resource allocations and distribution must balance these integrated needs to be effective in any one and all areas.
- ❑ **Recognizing Diversity.** Priorities, asset design and development, and funding formulas must consider the material differences among law enforcement agency sizes, resources, clientele, and cultures.
- ❑ **A Permanent Place at the National Table.** The Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces,

among other federal entities, must engage state and local law enforcement in policy making more intensely and in more meaningful ways.

- **Urgency.** Four years have elapsed since 9-11-01. Urgency must drive developmental activities.

BUILDING ON EXISTING CRIME CONTROL ASSETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Homeland security programming should be incorporated into the totality of the police mission as seamlessly as is possible. Many, probably most, terrorism-engendered issues simply have not been dealt with before. Accordingly, state, county, municipal and special clientele law enforcement agencies have no choice but to develop and adapt new concepts and practices. Substantial infrastructure and a historical and contemporary body of “intellectual property” are in place in virtually every agency to meet development challenges. While first-time inventions seem required, existing crime prevention and control concepts and strategies, regional arrangements, intelligence-led policing, investigations and patrol capacities, and community policing and problem solving programming and skills are among the infrastructure capacities that should and will be exploited and fine-tuned to address domestic security issues successfully in coming years.

I. THE CHANGING STATE OF POLICING

The September 11th attacks on the United States redirected priorities with a suddenness perhaps unprecedented in American police experience. Homeland security, the constant threat of terrorism on our shores, concern with weapons of mass destruction, and security-related intelligence demands surged to the forefront of state and local policing. Requirements and implications of the Patriot Act, homeland security funding, and equipment and training distribution issues have penetrated the law enforcement enterprise at all levels. With no time for preparation, repositioning to confront these demands and issues has been paralleled by 9-11 fallouts, including military (reserve) mobilizations that skim police manpower and the heightened concern for preservation of civil liberties.

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PROJECT APPROACH

Believing that little scholarly work has been published to capture the changing state of policing, a belief validated as the project unfolded, the central methodological strategy was to assemble a cross-section of accomplished law enforcement leaders and innovators to share experiences and insights regarding: the nature and dimensions of the changing police landscape; how their agencies are coping with and adjusting to the changes; and experimental and promising innovations to enable police to meet the challenges of change. These concentrations parallel the intents of Project Objectives 1, 2, and 3.

CEO ROUNDTABLES

Three roundtables were conducted in May 2004 in Baltimore, Maryland. Approximately 100 participants and resource experts were involved. Project staff was deliberate in staffing the roundtables, attempting to comprehend professional diversity. Roundtable 1 was designed for sheriffs, Roundtables 2 and 3 for major city chiefs and for chiefs of medium and small cities. State, transit, campus, and tribal police chief executive officers (CEOs) were represented at Roundtables 2 and 3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of Domestic Preparedness resource experts participated in Roundtables 2 and 3.

The composition objective in Roundtable 1 of gathering sheriffs only was achieved. Due to availability problems, some mixing occurred in Roundtables 2 and 3. Early design allowed for the possibility of a fourth, even fifth roundtable but this option was not exercised when it became evident after three roundtables that the potential yield in information was not worth the additional costs.

LITERATURE AND RESEARCH REVIEW

A literature search was conducted to structure and focus roundtables, supply cogent read-ahead material to participants, and to build the state-of-practice knowledge of project staff. The search focused primarily on issues associated with Objective 1, forces of change and the changing police mission just prior to and after 9-11. The search yielded very little information, suggesting that the areas of inquiry had not been addressed for scholarly study, or even popular treatment in print media. Inquiries about ongoing or to-be-funded research that were directed to law enforcement and criminal justice funding agencies at the federal level yielded similar results. The voluminous and ever-expanding body of work on homeland security did not (as of early spring of 2004) address our subject. Volumes of information technology and intelligence literature available concentrated on problems, needs, and recommended solutions – obviously important issues – but not upon their effect on police culture, operations, and priorities, in a meaningful way. We do not know whether the past year has brought forward pertinent material.

CEO SURVEY

To inform the Roundtables, to begin to fill the literature and research void, and to assemble information with which to achieve project objectives, a 27-item survey was mailed to a stratified sample of approximately 500 (CEOs) municipal, county, state, tribal, transit, and campus law enforcement chief executives. Questionnaire design and targeting were governed by project objectives. CEOs were requested to comment on:

- **Forces of Change.** Influential forces that are or may be redirecting the mission and operations of American law enforcement agencies. Four sources of possible change were probed: 9-11 inspired change; changing fiscal/resource conditions; changing relationships with federal agencies (since or because of 9-11); other forces of change, such as demographics of service population, technology, and workforce expectations and challenges (i.e., the police culture).
- **Impacts of Change.** The impacts of identified forces on core police missions, services, and functions were explored including; public trust; community policing; crime prevention; patrol/field services; criminal investigations; youth crime and services; domestic violence services; victims assistance; traffic safety; drug crimes enforcement; technology acquisition; information and intelligence; recruitment and retention; training, and career development.
- **Response to Change.** Promising practices agencies have initiated, or are planning, to effectively manage identified changes. Promising practices

were defined broadly, as policies, programs or other actions considered to have potential for positive results.

- **The Future.** Suggestions regarding actions that local, state, federal governments and professional associations could or should take to help law enforcement agencies transition successfully in the post 9-11 environment.

The survey also focused on critical contemporary issues and changing post 9-11 leadership demands.

Professional staff from all participating associations designed the survey. Bureau of Justice Assistance representatives were engaged throughout the design process. They contributed topics, questions, and critiques. A panel of law enforcement executives critiqued a late draft.

THE SEARCH FOR PROMISING PRACTICES

Objective 2 of the Post 9-11 Policing Project was to Capture Best Practices, to assemble information on successful policy, program, and resource deployment responses that agencies have undertaken to address changing conditions, missions, and roles. The pre-roundtable survey was constructed to search for promising practices, as were the roundtables themselves.

ROUNDTABLE AND SURVEY RESULTS

The pre-roundtable survey did not produce the guidance hoped for going in to the roundtables. Responses were very broad and imprecise, a result due, in part, to use of open-ended questions. Our lack of knowledge of the subjects of inquiry and, as it turns out, that of the profession at large, precluded use of insightfully crafted forced-choice questions. The opportunity to draw out roundtable participants enabled us to gather somewhat better information. In the end, however, the roundtables failed to identify a body of promising practice information that even began to approach that which was needed to achieve project objectives or, more important, to supply the field with hoped for responses to post 9-11 change forces and conditions.

CRAFTING NEW PRACTICES

Based upon the unmistakable dominance of homeland security discussions, issues, and expressed needs at the roundtables, this area of practice became the focus of our work toward achieving Objective 3, Craft Promising Practices. A diagnostic procedure,

incorporating a content analysis of roundtable transcripts, led to selection and production of four homeland security-specific promising practice briefs:

- ❑ Intelligence Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture
- ❑ Threat Assessment: Fundamentals and Guidelines
- ❑ Multi-Jurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats
- ❑ Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security.

The briefs, individually and collectively, concentrate on the prevention factor of the Prevention – Preparedness – Consequence Management homeland security equation.

TAKING COMMAND

The moment is clearly at hand for leading police executives and practitioners to capture and define the state-of-policing today and set a course for the foreseeable future – to take control of a changing environment, exercise vision and follow with action. Inaction constitutes a disservice to the police profession and the communities it serves. Timing is appropriate. Approaching the fourth anniversary of 9-11, the policing profession has had time to sort out impacts and deliberate, to a degree, the questions of where the field is and should be focused. Agencies are adjusting to new realities with innovations, new approaches, and resource redeployments. The new paradigm, and its implications, is coming into focus.

SELECTING PROMISING PRACTICE PRIORITIES

Roundtable discussions surfaced a broad range of contemporary needs and issues, overwhelmingly linked to and generated by homeland security needs. Measured by on-the-ground operational activity and intensity of need, a subset emerged:

- ❑ **Local Intelligence Unit Development:** establishing an internal intelligence function with local/state police agencies; intelligence-led policing.
- ❑ **Threat Assessment:** regional and state; local response plans geared to federal threat level setting (color codes).
- ❑ **Private Security – Public Policing Partnerships:** local and regional models; OSAC model.

- ❑ **Multi-Jurisdictional Agreements and Partnerships:** criminal justice - police, fire, EMS; broader arrangements - public health, military resources, governing bodies.
- ❑ **Biological and Chemical Incidents:** planning, prevention, preparation; local and regional crisis and consequence management; community shielding - quarantine and decontamination plans; community mobilization and use of volunteers.
- ❑ **Policing Terrorism Locally:** state and local police officers' role in terrorism prevention; public's role - the COP-crime and terrorism connection; developing confidential informants; incident command protocols; criminal case management; balance of homeland security, crime control, and quality of life demands; constitutionally policing mass demonstrations; protecting public events (sporting events, for example).

To fulfill Objective 2, Capture Best Practices, four practice areas were selected:

- ❑ Multi-jurisdictional Arrangements (Mutual Aid)
- ❑ Intelligence Development
- ❑ Threat/Vulnerability Assessment
- ❑ Public-Private Partnerships

PROMISING PRACTICES DEVELOPMENT

Promising practice documents were developed by a mix of professional project staff and consultants. Development guidelines stressed brevity; program and agency references; a prevention orientation; and a crime control nexus, when possible. Neither the literature search, CEO survey, roundtables, nor these data sources collectively, yielded more than random and limited examples of promising practices and programs. This situation forms our perceptions, findings, and recommendations concerning the strong immediate need for law enforcement to build homeland security capacity.

Considerable energy was invested in an aggressive search for operational, agency-based program innovations and experiments in the practice areas selected for development.

- ❑ The National Sheriffs' Association accessed its membership directly.

- ❑ The IACP's State and Provincial Division accessed its state police membership directly.
- ❑ The Major City Chiefs project manager accessed transit agencies directly.

Person-to-person professional contacts were numerous. The Department of Homeland Security's protected website, the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS), was useful.

II. POST 9-11 POLICING: THE CRIME CONTROL - HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM

"For the first time since World War II we are policing, domestically, in a time of war."

Alberto Melis
Chief of Police, Waco, Texas

"City Council is still concerned about street crime. They never ask how many terrorists were arrested last week."

Charles Ramsey
Chief of Police, Washington, DC

THE ROUNDTABLES

Each roundtable was a one and one-half day event structured around project objectives. Core agenda items were:

- ❑ **Framing the Day.** Declaring and discussing Roundtable objectives.
- ❑ **Changing Realities.** Facilitated group discussion to surface the major forces of change in the Post 9-11 environment.
- ❑ **Lessons Learned from Changing Realities.** Facilitated discussion to surface the impacts of change on contemporary policing.
- ❑ **State and Local Innovations; Promising Practices.** Day ending prep sessions concerning promising practices (Day 1).
- ❑ **Selecting the "Best" of Promising Practices.** A 3-hour session to surface promising practices (Day 2).
- ❑ **Issues of the Day.** Based on interests that surfaced during Roundtable 1, Roundtables 2 and 3 examined: changing federal engagement in local crime control efforts; homeland security - the prevention dimension; crime trends; recruitment and retention; the Patriot Act.

Roundtable 1 was the most structured, employing results of the CEO surveys to introduce and manage topics. Roundtables 2 and 3 were less formal, an approach that seemed more comfortable to participants. Resource experts were added to Roundtables 2 and 3 to illuminate homeland security discussions and answer questions that were of

great interest to Roundtable 1 contributors, but could not be answered by project staff or contributors.

Two facilitators led each roundtable in a seminar format. Breakouts were not formed. Neither action plans nor consensus were called for. Three recorders were employed at each roundtable to capture pertinent comments. Lists of contributors and participants are provided in the appendix portion of this report.

THE EVOLVING PARADIGM - THE POST 9-11 MODEL

From the totality of project work – the Roundtables, CEO Survey, and the Literature Review – an outline of post 9-11 policing emerged:

- ❑ **The Terrorism Dimension.** During the final years of what might be called pre-9-11 policing, the late 1990's through most of 2001, law enforcement was characterized by a strong sense of direction and clarity. Crime was in decline. Community policing had broad acceptance and support. Public trust was strong. That balance was shattered on September 11, 2001. While not yet universal within law enforcement, or felt with consistent intensity, there is recognition that for the first time since WWII, policing is being conducted, domestically, in a time of war; the United States faces a foreign threat within its own borders.
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- ❑ **Business as Usual Mindset.** The previous observation notwithstanding, a mindset issue seems to exist. A belief is often shared that “terrorism is just a big city (or eastern) problem” and “nothing is going to happen in small town, rural America.”
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Judging by forces of change discussions at the roundtables, and correlate impacts and responses, including those we attempted (unsuccessfully) to “force” into discussion, homeland security towers above all others. Note also, however, that the resource shortage issue overarches and suffuses the policing environment in its entirety.

How homeland security obligations reshape police objectives, core services, such as patrol and investigations, and its ultimate impact on community policing is a chapter yet to be written.

III. NEW REALITIES - CEO SURVEY FINDINGS

“Homeland security obligations are like adding a book to a shelf that is already too full.”

Andre Parker
Chief of Police (former)
Richmond, Virginia

SURVEY DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT

The roundtables and the survey were reinforcing methodologies designed to reveal information to achieve project objectives; particularly Roundtables 1 and 2.

- ❑ **Profile High Impact Changes.** Identify and prioritize the forces and demands that are redirecting the police mission.
- ❑ **Capture Best Practices.** Assemble information on successful policy, programs, and resource deployment responses being taken to address changing conditions.

The survey was drafted, and redrafted numerous times by a design team composed of one or more representatives of each of the partner associations, and several project consultants, that conducted the post 9-11 project. Funding agencies representatives critiqued successive drafts, and recommended questions and topics for inclusion. A practitioner’s panel critiqued a later version of the instrument, which generated further modifications and refinements. The panel included six chiefs of police, an assistant chief of police, the superintendent of a state police agency, and three sheriffs. The instrument was not field-tested.

The survey was conducted in March, 2004. Responses were processed during the spring of 2004 with some rework on open-ended questions in August and September 2004.

THE CEO SAMPLE

The CEO sample totaled 449, roughly stratified by law enforcement agency type, size, and service population. Municipal agencies and county sheriffs accounted for just over 80 percent of the sample.

Table 1
CEO SAMPLE

Agency Type	Number	Percent of Sample
<input type="checkbox"/> Municipal Police	214	47.7
<input type="checkbox"/> County Police	9	2.0
<input type="checkbox"/> State Police	49	10.9
<input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff	154	34.3
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	<u>23</u>	<u>5.1</u>
Total	449	100.0

Other includes campus police; transit police; railroad police; department of public safety CEOs; tribal police; consolidated county/municipal police; and a state secretary of public safety.

SURVEY RESPONSE

Two hundred nineteen (219) responses (49 percent) were processed. In view of the overarching purpose of the survey - to identify with forces of change and the changing mission of police agencies post 9-11 - the number of responses was initially deemed sufficient. Subsequent work with the body of responses validated early judgment. The total number and, especially, distribution of responses by agency is not sufficient to support cross-jurisdictional comparisons that are more than barely suggestive of current realities. Characteristics of responding agencies are set forth in the following tables.

Table 2
SURVEY RESPONSE -- TOTAL

Agency Type	Respondents	Percent of Category	Percent of Respondents
<input type="checkbox"/> Municipal Police	116	54.2	52.9
<input type="checkbox"/> County Police	8	88.9	3.7
<input type="checkbox"/> State Police	40	81.6	18.3
<input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff	35	22.7	16.0
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	<u>20</u>	<u>87.0</u>	<u>9.1</u>
Total	219	--	100.0

Other: campus university police (6); transit (4); railroad (2); Department of Public Safety (3); tribal (2); consolidated county/municipal (2); and state secretary of public safety (1).

Municipal agencies account for just over half of total responses. State police CEOs responded heavily, especially as a proportion of the class (category). Sheriff responses were less robust, numerically and proportionally.

Table 3

SURVEY RESPONSE - AGENCY SIZE/POPULATION SERVED

Size of Jurisdiction	Municipal	County	State	Sheriff	Other	Total
<input type="checkbox"/> 1 million or more	8 (7.0)	2 (25.0)	30 (81.1)	5 (15.2)	6 (33.3)	51 (24.3)
<input type="checkbox"/> 500,000 - 999,999	8 (7.0)	4 (50.0)	5 (13.5)	3 (9.1)	2 (11.1)	22 (10.5)
<input type="checkbox"/> 250,000 - 499,999	17 (14.9)	1 (12.5)	1 (2.7)	6 (18.2)	2 (11.1)	27 (12.9)
<input type="checkbox"/> 100,000 - 249,999	26 (22.8)	1 (12.5)	0 (0.0)	9 (27.3)	0 (0.0)	36 (17.1)
<input type="checkbox"/> 50,000 - 99,999	23 (20.2)	0 (0.0)	1 (2.7)	9 (27.3)	1 (5.6)	34 (16.2)
<input type="checkbox"/> 25,000 - 49,999	15 (13.2)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (11.1)	17 (8.1)
<input type="checkbox"/> 10,000 - 24,999	12 (10.5)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (3.0)	3 (16.7)	16 (7.6)
<input type="checkbox"/> Under 10,000	<u>5 (4.4)</u>	<u>0 (0.0)</u>	<u>0 (0.0)</u>	<u>0 (0.0)</u>	<u>2 (11.1)</u>	<u>7 (3.3)</u>
Total	114 (54.3)	8 (3.8)	37 (17.6)	33 (15.7)	18 (8.6)	210 (100.0)

The distribution of responses by population served is limited in all categories, ranging from seven in the under 10,000 category to 36 in the 100-250,000 category. When responses from state police agencies are removed from the 1,000,000 or more category, this grouping totals 21.

Type of Jurisdiction Policed

Table 4

SURVEY RESPONSE - AGENCY TYPE

Jurisdiction	Respondents	Percent
<input type="checkbox"/> Urban	63	29.2
<input type="checkbox"/> Suburban	35	16.2
<input type="checkbox"/> Rural	14	6.5
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	11	5.1
<input type="checkbox"/> Urban, Suburban, Rural	45	20.8
<input type="checkbox"/> Urban and Suburban	31	14.4
<input type="checkbox"/> Suburban and Rural	<u>17</u>	<u>7.9</u>
Total	216	100.0

Responses from urban agencies are dominant, almost one-third of the total. The “combination” categories (urban, suburban, rural; urban-suburban; suburban-rural) include state police, sheriffs, and county police agencies.

Number of Sworn Officers by Type of Agency

Table 5								
SURVEY RESPONSE - AGENCY SIZE/SWORN STAFF								
Number Sworn	Municipal	County	State	Sheriff	Other	Total		
☐ 10-24	8 (7.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (4.2)	3 (16.7)	12	(5.9)	
☐ 25-49	8 (7.1)	0 (0.0)	1 (2.6)	4 (16.7)	1 (5.6)	14	(6.9)	
☐ 50 - 99	24 (21.2)	0 (0.0)	1 (2.6)	3 (12.5)	3 (16.7)	31	(15.3)	
☐ 100 - 249	24 (21.2)	0 (0.0)	5 (12.8)	6 (25.0)	4 (22.2)	39	(19.3)	
☐ 250 - 499	15 (13.3)	2 (25.0)	5 (12.8)	4 (16.7)	1 (5.6)	27	(13.4)	
☐ 500 - 999	13 (11.5)	0 (0.0)	13 (33.3)	4 (16.7)	2 (11.1)	32	(15.8)	
☐ 1,000 or more	21 (18.6)	6 (75.0)	14 (35.9)	2 (8.3)	4 (22.2)	47	(23.3)	
Total	113 (55.9)	8 (4.0)	39 (19.3)	24 (11.9)	18 (8.9)	202	(100.0)	

This respondent profile is characterized by dominance of larger agencies, with the 1,000 sworn members or more having the highest single response, and the 500-999 member agencies the third highest response. Small agencies are under-represented.

RESULTS - FORCES OF CHANGE

Seven questions were fashioned to profile high impact changes, to identify and prioritize forces and demands that are redirecting the police mission (Objective 1 of the project). They probe four areas: 9-11 inspired change; changing fiscal and resource conditions; changing relationships with federal law enforcement agencies; and other forces of change, such as demographics, technology, and workforce expectations and challenges. Table 6 summarizes the responses to these questions from the CEOs of 200 jurisdictions.

Overall, CEOs report material change, reaction to the September 11th terrorist attack and declining availability of funding being the most powerful drivers. Almost nine of every

10 agencies are experiencing terrorist-threat induced change. Six of every 10 are experiencing changing resource conditions, primarily declining resources, and six of 10 are confronted with other types of changes, crime issues (including drugs) population expansion (including changing demographics), and technology-related issues being most prevalent. Clearly, 60 to 80 percent of American law agencies are confronted with managing one or more dimensions of change, with no relief from traditional prevention, crime control, and community service obligations.

Consistent with any research endeavor that employs qualitative data, respondents' answers did not always easily or neatly fit into one category. For example, a response that included a reference to a particular technological advancement needed might fall into both "technology" and resources/funding." In these instances project staff selected the dominant or primary category.

Table 6		
FORCES OF CHANGE		
Force/Condition	Change (%)	No Change (%)
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>9-11 Inspired Change</u>		
1. 9-11 Inspired Operational and/or Policy Change	85.8	14.2
2. Legally mandated changes	16.6	83.4
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Changing Fiscal/Resource Conditions</u>		
3. Availability of local funding since 9-11	60.8	39.2
4. Availability of state funding since 9-11	66.2	33.8
5. Availability of federal funding since 9-11	80.3	19.7
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Changing Federal Relationships</u>		
6. Reduction/ withdrawal of federal law enforcement services since 9-11	26.6	73.4
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Other Forces of Change</u>		
7. Other major forces are changing mission and operations significantly	62.1	35.2

9-11 INSPIRED CHANGE

Eighty-six percent of responding CEOs report permanent policy or operational change in reaction to the homeland security threat. Change is mildly correlated with size.

Every responding CEO with 500 or more officers (88 agencies) reported change. Of 66 CEOs in the 100-499 sworn officer range, 83 percent reported 9-11 inspired change. Of responding agencies with fewer sworn officers, 10-99, 70 percent reported change.

Change is prevalent among most types of agencies:

- ❑ 38 of 40 state agencies (95 percent) report change
- ❑ 98 of 115 municipal agencies (85 percent)
- ❑ 27 of 35 sheriff’s departments (77 percent).

Of the 27 agencies that report no permanent change, 14 percent of respondents, 15, have 99 or fewer officers, seven have between 100 and 249, and four have between 250 and 499. It is surprising that no agency of substantial size reports being unaffected by terrorism, at some level.

Degree of Change. Degree or intensity of operational policy change ranges broadly among agencies. Asked to appraise the degree of 9-11 inspired operational or policy change, 183 CEOs reported as follows:

Response	Responding Agencies	Percent of Responses
❑ Marginal	10	5.5
❑ Marginal-Moderate	24	13.1
❑ Moderate	81	44.3
❑ Moderate-Substantial	35	19.1
❑ Substantial	33	18.0

“Moderate” responses stand out in this data set, approaching half of the total. The 37 percent response above moderate (moderate - substantial and substantial) suggests the strength of the 9-11 impact.

Larger agencies report greater change than smaller agencies. Percentage of responses in the moderate-to-substantial range, by agency size is:

Number of Sworn Officers	Percent Reporting Change
<input type="checkbox"/> 1,000 or more	95.2
<input type="checkbox"/> 500 - 999	93.3
<input type="checkbox"/> 250 - 499	83.3
<input type="checkbox"/> 100 - 249	77.4
<input type="checkbox"/> 50 - 99	52.4
<input type="checkbox"/> 25 - 49	72.8
<input type="checkbox"/> 10 - 24	60.0

Types of Change. The most significant types of change to threats to homeland security are: (responses)

Change Type	Number of Agencies	Percent of Responses
<input type="checkbox"/> Strategic Planning	106	48.4
<input type="checkbox"/> Training/Equipment	71	32.4
<input type="checkbox"/> Redeployment/Reorganization	66	30.1
<input type="checkbox"/> Interagency Collaboration	62	28.3
<input type="checkbox"/> Technology Increase/Upgrade	6	2.7

Strategic planning includes response protocols to federal color code alerts; Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response protocols; vulnerability, risk, threat assessments; state level terrorist response plans, and changes to a range of policies and procedures, including patrol practices.

Equipment responses center primarily upon communications and command center technology augmentation and upgrades; personal protective equipment (PPE) for first responders, with strong emphasis on bio-hazard protection; mobile command post buses; K-9 and bomb equipment; purchase of explosive ordnance, and, in one case, a patrol boat.

Respondents who cited specific types of training reported WMD training more frequently than other types including: terrorist training; bio-hazards; CERT (Community Emergency Response); terrorist acts and organizations; handling

suspicious packages and letters; ICS (incident command); equipment (PPE); station security; vehicle security; critical incidents; and consequence management. Almost 60 agencies reported training enhancements.

Agencies are reconfiguring organizations and adjusting patrol practices. Organizationally, agencies are creating specialized homeland security units. Nearly 50 agencies reported this action as a significant response to the threat of terrorism. None of these are intelligence units. Paralleling a trend toward specialized units, agencies seem to be modifying patrol practices, reassigning patrol officers to airports, government buildings, and sensitive infrastructure such as ports and research laboratories. A marked trend seems to have developed with regard to reorienting directed patrols from traditional targets to critical infrastructure, waterways and ports, industrial plants, water supply utilities, rail and other transportation facilities, gas transmission lines, telephone facilities, schools, courthouses, and public events. One respondent singled out a nuclear power plant. It appears that new patrol activity is being paid for with overtime monies in many jurisdictions.

New or intensified interagency and intergovernmental collaborations are burgeoning. Regional response groups; multi-agency task forces; regional intelligence centers; JTTF staffing (by local agencies); joint training; equipment purchasing and sharing; intra-city police-fire-EMS and other agency arrangements are changes of significance that are reported with frequency. One agency reports collaborative efforts with Mexican officials on border security matters.

Legally Mandated Change. Changes that have occurred and are occurring are CEO/agency-initiated. Almost 84 percent of survey respondents report that changes have not been or are not legally mandated. The 16 percent that do report legal mandates refer to new laws; funding/appropriations; training; and interagency cooperation. Training is most common, cited by 24 of the 36 agencies that report legal mandates. No patterns emerge with regard to type of agency. Of 24 agencies that report 9-11 generated training mandates, 11 are agencies with 1,000 or more sworn officers.

FISCAL/RESOURCE CHANGE

A set of questions was designed to investigate the impact of what was presumed to be a second major force of change – tightened and diminished resources. The questions were constructed to examine changing local, state, and federal funding availability independently. CEOs reported a very mixed picture. The expectation of universally diminishing or tightening resources was not confirmed.

With regard to local funding, 129 agencies, 61 percent, reported funding impact/change. A substantial number, 83, 39 percent, reported no impact/change.

Comparable data for availability of state funding were 141, 66 percent reporting impact/change and 72, 34 percent, reporting no impact/change. The most pronounced change reported was in the availability of federal funding, with 171 agencies, 80 percent, reporting a change, and 42, 20 percent, experiencing/reporting no change.

Funding Source	Impact-Change		No Impact-Change	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<input type="checkbox"/> Local	129	61%	83	39%
<input type="checkbox"/> State	141	66%	72	34%
<input type="checkbox"/> Federal	171	80%	42	20%

Of the agencies that described the nature of the impact/change (an open-ended item) in the availability of local funding, 80 reported a decrease in or lack of funding. Thirteen (13) noted the loss of a position. Partially balancing the picture were reports from 31 agencies that noted increases in funding. Only three reported additions to staff complements. Twenty-five (25) of these agencies reported increases in funding for training equipment.

CHANGING FEDERAL RELATIONSHIPS

An expectation existed among some Department of Justice officials that positioning terrorism at the forefront of the national agenda might impair the capacity of agencies such as the FBI to continue levels of traditional crime control support to local law enforcement agencies. However, survey responses indicate the reduction in support has been without perceived impact.

To the survey question *“Have any federal law enforcement agencies, with which you work or have worked, withdrawn resources or reduced services to your agency or community”* nearly 75 percent of respondents, 116 agencies, answered yes. The agency most frequently cited as having withdrawn resources or reduced services is the FBI. Thirty-two (32) agencies report that FBI reductions are associated with bank robberies and number of agents in the field. No other agency was mentioned more than two times.

A drill-down item questioned whether resource withdrawals or service reductions reduced the capacity of agencies to deal with a series of crimes normally associated with federal crime control efforts. Overall, local agency capacity is reported to be only

marginally affected. With the exceptions of fall-off in bank robbery and drug investigations, local agencies report no significant capacity loss.

Crime	Reduction in Capacity - Agencies	No Reduction in Capacity - Agencies
<input type="checkbox"/> Kidnappings	3 (1.4%)	216 (98.6%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Bank Robberies	35 (16.0%)	184 (84.0%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Homicides	1 (0.5%)	218 (99.5%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug Investigations	26 (11.9%)	193 (88.1%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Public Corruption	4 (1.8%)	215 (98.2%)
<input type="checkbox"/> White Collar Crime	10 (4.6%)	209 (95.4%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Training	7 (3.2%)	212 (96.8%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	7 (3.2%)	212 (96.8%)

It is suggested that the apparent conflict between the robust 75 percent “yes” responses and the 80 to 90 percent “no” reduction responses lies in the imprecise wording of the lead items that couples resources and services. A preceding question indicated significant reported fall off in federal funding. Respondents probably interpreted this item to refer to funding as well. The responses to the drill-down questions are more likely to convey current conditions.

OTHER FORCES OF CHANGE

To mine additional forces that might be redirecting the police mission the survey asked: *Beyond homeland security, and funding and resources, are any other major forces changing your agency’s mission and operations significantly (e.g., emerging crime issues, technology, population or demographic shifts)?* Sixty-four percent of respondents, 136, identified other forces while thirty-six percent reported none. Most prominent among other forces are:

Force	Agencies Reporting	Percent
<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing Demand for Services	22	10.0%
<input type="checkbox"/> Narcotics/Violent Crime	20	9.1%
<input type="checkbox"/> Population Expansion/New Immigration	17	7.8%
<input type="checkbox"/> Cyber Crime	17	7.8%
<input type="checkbox"/> New Technologies	15	6.8%
<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic Issues	6	2.7%
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Assorted Crimes)	23	10.5%

Notwithstanding that open-ended items draw fewer responses than forced choice questions, the response, collectively and by force type, is unexpectedly limited. A far greater response was expected naming changing populations and cultures. A more robust response was expected with regard to technology. Few multiple responses were received (more than one issue reported by one agency).

“Other” forces were identified by a broad range of agencies that reported on the item:

- ❑ 62% of reporting municipal agencies, 71 of 115
- ❑ 67% of state agencies, 26 of 39
- ❑ 60% of sheriffs, 19 of 32
- ❑ 74% “other agencies, county and other, 20 of 27.

RESULTS - IMPACT OF CHANGE

Three questions were fashioned to determine the impacts of change forces on core police missions, services, and functions. Two additional questions sought to place the impacts of forces in context by constructing a matrix of today’s most critical issues and separately, assessing post 9-11 impacts on leadership requirements.

CEO responses to these questions establish most clearly a professional preoccupation with resource issues, both funding and personnel, and homeland security issues. They also suggest concern for maintaining effectiveness in patrol, community policing, and a broad array of recruitment and retention considerations.

OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

CEOs assessed the impacts of the forces present in their individual policing environments on operational capacity, measured by strengthening or weakening of 14 core missions, services, and functions. Results are displayed in Table 13. The data present a picture that is mixed and difficult to interpret. Measurable strengthening of information/intelligence capacity is reported. This is not surprising in a post 9-11 homeland security environment. Strengthening technology acquisition, public trust, community policing, and training are suggested. Domestic violence, youth services, and victim assistance seem, clearly, uninfluenced (unchanged).

The only discernible indicator by agency size is more prevalent reporting of strengthening of information, intelligence, and technology acquisition by larger agencies.

Sheriffs report strengthening of community policing in greater proportion than municipal or state agencies, as they do with crime prevention, patrol and field services, criminal investigations, victim assistance, and traffic safety.

State agencies report strengthening of core services and functions in greater proportion than either municipal agencies or sheriffs: drug crimes enforcement; technology acquisition; and information/intelligence.

Municipal agencies report weakening of several core missions, functions, and services in greater proportion than sheriffs or state law enforcement agencies in: community policing; crime prevention; criminal investigations; youth services; technology acquisition.

State police report the largest operational capacity decline in patrol/field services; traffic safety; recruitment and selection; and training and career development.

Table 13
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF FORCES OF CHANGE

Core Mission, Service, Function	Stronger (%)	Weaker (%)	Unchanged (%)	Not a Core Mission (%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information/Intelligence	80	4	18	0
<input type="checkbox"/> Technology Acquisition	58	22	20	0
<input type="checkbox"/> Public Trust Initiatives	52	4	43	0
<input type="checkbox"/> Community Policing	44	19	34	4
<input type="checkbox"/> Training and Career Development	42	18	40	0
<input type="checkbox"/> Crime Prevention	37	18	42	3
<input type="checkbox"/> Patrol/Field Services	36	31	32	1
<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Investigations	28	23	47	2
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug Crimes Enforcement	25	24	49	3
<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic Safety	24	20	54	3
<input type="checkbox"/> Recruitment and Retention	14	20	66	1
<input type="checkbox"/> Victim Assistance	11	6	74	10
<input type="checkbox"/> Youth Services	8	15	70	7
<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence Services	7	5	77	9

CORE MISSION CONCERNS

Table 14 arrays responses to the question: *Of the core missions that have weakened, which concern you the most and why?* Capacity erosion is of greatest concern in the following areas:

- Recruitment/Retention/Staffing
- Patrol
- Community Policing
- Drug Crimes Enforcement
- Traffic Safety

Criminal investigations and technology follow closely. Not surprising, law enforcement agency CEO's prioritize the most direct services and crime control missions. Ascribing lowest priority to domestic violence and victim services is not surprising, either.

Table 14						
CORE CAPACITY WEAKNESS - PRIORITY CONCERNS						
Core Capacity	Priorities					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
<input type="checkbox"/> Patrol/Field Services	14	10	1	0	1	26
<input type="checkbox"/> Recruitment/Retention	18*	3	4	2	0	27
<input type="checkbox"/> Community Policing	7	4	3	1	0	15
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug Crimes Enforcement	8	4	2	0	1	15
<input type="checkbox"/> Traffic Safety	6	5	2	2	0	15
<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Investigations	3	5	1	5	0	14
<input type="checkbox"/> Technology Acquisition	4	2	2	2	3	13
<input type="checkbox"/> Crime Prevention	3	3	3	1	1	11
<input type="checkbox"/> Youth Services	3	1	3	1	1	9
<input type="checkbox"/> Training/Career Development	1	2	1	2	0	6
<input type="checkbox"/> Domestic Violence Services	0	1	1	0	0	2
<input type="checkbox"/> Victim Services	0	0	1	0	1	2
<input type="checkbox"/> Public Trust	2	0	0	0	0	2
<input type="checkbox"/> Information/Intelligence	1	0	0	0	0	1
TOTALS	70	40	24	16	8	158
* Retention and staffing shortage references						

COMMUNITY POLICING

To the survey question, *Has your agency modified community policing practices in response to any of the forces of change (you identified)?*, 124 respondents, 59 percent, reported “No,” while 86, 41 percent, reported “Yes.” The 40 percent response is notable. Results, by type of agency, are:

Agency Type	Have Modified Practices	Have Not
<input type="checkbox"/> Municipal	47 (42%)	66 (58%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Sheriff	17 (55%)	14 (45%)
<input type="checkbox"/> State	9 (23%)	30 (77%)
<input type="checkbox"/> County	4 (50%)	4 (50%)
<input type="checkbox"/> Other	9 (47%)	10 (53%)

For each class, the data track, roughly, with the aggregated totals, except for the state police agencies. Statistically, the pattern reported by state agencies stands out from the remaining classes, which is plausible, recognizing jurisdiction served and the differing community orientation of state law enforcement agencies.

Arrayed by size of agency, results reveal nothing distinguishing.

Agency Type	Modified Practices	Have Not Modified Practices
<input type="checkbox"/> 10 - 24	4 (33%)	8 (67%)
<input type="checkbox"/> 25 - 49	3 (23%)	10 (77%)
<input type="checkbox"/> 50 - 99	14 (48%)	15 (52%)
<input type="checkbox"/> 100 - 249	18 (47%)	20 (53%)
<input type="checkbox"/> 250 - 499	9 (38%)	15 (63%)
<input type="checkbox"/> 500 - 999	15 (47%)	17 (54%)
<input type="checkbox"/> 1,000 or more	17 (36%)	30 (64%)

A corollary question asked “Yes” respondents to describe modifications. The range of specific modifications reported was limited.

Table 17

COMMUNITY POLICING PRACTICES

Modification	Number of Responses
<input type="checkbox"/> Increased outreach	46
<input type="checkbox"/> Increased outreach to Muslim-Americans	6
<input type="checkbox"/> Increased personnel	5
<input type="checkbox"/> Reduced (COP) personnel	5

Twenty-one respondents declared simply a “negative impact” on community policing. Of these, 15 were municipal agencies. This set of responses was broadly distributed by size of agency.

The “increased outreach” responses may indicate a reinforcing (positive) impact on community policing from homeland security forces. The “negative impact” responses may substantiate the fear and threat to community policing, expressed in the roundtables. The numbers are much too small, however, to make positive conclusions at this juncture.

CRITICAL ISSUES

CEOs cited the most critical issues facing their agencies that were either “newly emerged post 9-11 issues or traditional issues such crime prevention, public trust, and recruitment and retention.” Two hundred nineteen respondents provided up to five prioritized issues, totaling 600. Priorities are displayed in Table 18 by issue grouping. Resource issues were cited most frequently, measured by number of references and Priority 1 placements. A closely allied cluster, labeled Recruitment/Retention, includes 118 references. Combined, these two clusters account for 282 references or 45 percent of the total. Homeland security issues were cited 144 times or 23 percent of the total. Crime and community policing are the next most cited issues.

RESULTS - RESPONSES TO FORCES OF CHANGE

Five questions were fashioned to assess how American law enforcement agencies are responding to forces of change. CEOs were asked to cite policies, programs, and other actions initiated in response to the forces of change in their environments that they consider to be promising or effective – Objective 2 of the project. Responses indicate a substantial level of activity, with distinct patterns, dominated by homeland security responses/actions.

Table 18
CRITICAL ISSUES - PRIORITIES

Issues	Priorities					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Resources</u>						
Budget – constraints, shortfalls; staffing; increasing service demand/workload; maintaining service levels; state mandates; L.L.E.B.C. losses	60	33	35	27	9	164
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Homeland Security</u>						
Terrorism; programs; training; bio-hazards; WMD; critical infrastructure protection	43	28	41	29	3	144
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Recruitment/Retention</u>						
Experienced officers, minorities; women; volunteers; promotional opportunities	30	32	28	16	12	118
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Crime</u>						
Prevention, reduction; crime rates; violent crime; alcohol abuse; juvenile crime; gangs; guns; drugs; meth labs	34	29	18	16	2	99
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Community Policing</u>						
Public trust; public relations; minority relations	10	16	12	12	6	56
<input type="checkbox"/> <u>Communications/Technology</u>						
Interoperability; information technology; intelligence	<u>9</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>41</u>
TOTAL	186	153	144	105	34	622

9-11 IMPACT RESPONSES

One hundred sixty-four agencies reported 452 responses to “Please describe any policies, programs, or other types of actions your agency has taken in response to 9-11 impacts that you consider promising or effective.” Table 19 summarizes the classes of actions that law enforcement agencies across America are introducing in reaction to 9-11 and in preparation for future homeland security threats. One hundred eleven agencies gave multiple responses including those in the table or others.

TERRORISM PROGRAM AND POLICY RESPONSES	
Action Class	Agencies Employing Response
<input type="checkbox"/> Local Partnerships and Interagency Collaborations	95
<input type="checkbox"/> Plans and Protocols	59
<input type="checkbox"/> Training	70
<input type="checkbox"/> Restructuring and Redeployment	60
<input type="checkbox"/> Community Engagement	18
<input type="checkbox"/> Information/Intelligence Sharing	67

Collaborations have been and are being forged among several levels of jurisdictions, JTFs and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) at the federal level, local/regional mutual aid arrangements, and intra-jurisdictionally with fire and EMS agencies. State - local arrangements are noted commonly. A number of police-private sector partnerships are also reported.

Focus of plans and protocols includes incident command, rapid deployment, biohazards, evacuation, special events, and suspicious packages and substances and recovery and displacement. Less specific responses in this category include general review and update of policy and procedures and revised mobilization plans.

The most frequent response in the training category was “training in general.” Specific types of training noted with regularity are WMD (most frequent response), terrorism and biohazards. Awareness training, for staff, joint exercises, and incident command are also noted.

Information and intelligence sharing actions are highlighted by increased regional, state, and federal law enforcement exchange initiatives; investments in analytical support; several community-oriented sharing arrangements; and one intelligence-led policing initiative. A cluster of interoperability actions addresses radio system upgrades and widespread equipment and technology acquisitions.

Many agencies are responding to post 9-11 needs by assigning responsibility, creating central specializations, officers and units, and forming special response teams. Forming a homeland security bureau, appointing a chief of homeland security, anti-terrorism units, water security teams, and expanded special operations are among the actions reported. Community engagement and outreach actions include public awareness programs, formation of CERT teams, and one reported Arab-Muslim outreach effort.

FUNDING/RESOURCE IMPACT

Asked to “Describe any policies, programs, or other actions considered to be promising or effective to respond to funding/resource impacts,” 137 agencies reported 257 actions. Table 20 summarizes the major actions that law enforcement CEO’s are introducing to cope with tightening resources.

Table 20	
RESOURCE/FUNDING RESPONSES	
Action Class	Agencies Employing Response
<input type="checkbox"/> DHS, State, Homeland Security Funding	75
<input type="checkbox"/> Training Initiatives	17
<input type="checkbox"/> Collaborations/Partnerships/Resource Sharing	25
<input type="checkbox"/> Productivity Measures/Cost Containment	34
<input type="checkbox"/> Technology Initiatives	11
<input type="checkbox"/> New Service/Initiatives	9

More than any other action, agencies have sought and received DHS homeland security funding. Funds have been used for restricted or directed purposes such as - PPE, training, technology, or other equipment.

Many CEOs note the leveraging potential of collaborations, mainly, and resource sharing, to a lesser degree. Collaborations are reported with local, regional, state, and federal agencies. Partnerships are reported among campus police agencies, with community associations, and in one case, the National Guard.

More varied, but robust in number, are the actions classified as Productivity/Cost Containment. These traditional cost-effectiveness and downsizing measures include: reduction in specialized units; best practices implementation; volunteer programs; civilianization; better allocation of resources; improved budgeting and cost controls; and greater oversight and control of overtime. These types of actions may or may not entail service cuts or quality reduction. Technology initiatives could have been folded

into the productivity grouping, but are reported separately. Specific initiatives reported include new radio systems; computers in cars; CAD systems; and new software. One sheriff's agency reports substituting technology for security patrols. It is surmised that these actions are reported by agencies that have experienced positive rather than negative fiscal impacts.

OTHER IMPACTS RESPONSES

Seventy-six CEOs/agencies reported 148 actions to respond to a range of other issues. In very large measure the forces/issues reported (and implied) duplicated earlier responses to the Terrorism and funding/resource forces and impacts. There were unexpectedly few references (only five of the 148 responses) to crime problems and issues.

Crime initiatives reported as promising or effective include: methamphetamine education prevention programs, including public billboards; and targeting at-risk children; a statewide crystal methamphetamine initiative; and street gang intervention programs.

Hometown security and anti-terrorism initiatives, predominately collaborations, dominate this set of promising practices references.

Fifteen agencies cited collaboration with local, state, and federal agencies, including a JTTF, creation of a fusion center in another, and a 50-person ERT in a third.

Seven agencies recognized and reported their community outreach efforts, one to the Arab community, and another to an undefined "emerging minority population."

Thirty-nine CEOs, the largest single bloc, noted none/not applicable/no significant actions.

FEDERAL RESOURCE WITHDRAWALS

To surface additional promising practices CEOs were asked to *"Describe policies, programs, or other actions taken in response to federal resource withdrawals/service reductions considered promising or effective."* Forty-two CEOs reported 75 actions, many of which link to the inquiry question, many of which seem general in interest. Among those that link directly are:

- Creation of a Firearms Investigative Unit
- Establishment of a Crime Scene Processing Team
- Roll out of a gang task force under the FBI Safe Streets Initiative

- ❑ Development of internal capacity for computer crime forensics and investigation
- ❑ The nurturing, cultivation, and enhancement of relationships with local LEA
- ❑ More regional response and partnerships
- ❑ The use of overtime to compensate
- ❑ Assigned officer to JTTF to increase intelligence access.

Numerous responses cited (re-cited) lack of impact of federal withdrawal or noted no loss of federal support.

CORE MISSION RESPONSES

One hundred fifty-eight actions were reported by 106 CEOs/agencies to compensate for core missions reported as weakened. Compensate is defined in the survey as “to maintain or restore capacity.” The survey instrument failed to ask respondents to couple compensating actions with a specific weakened mission. Accordingly, responses are reported and examined generically.

Seeking to augment or supplant funding and resources in an identifiable pattern of compensatory responses, 22 agencies report intensified efforts to acquire local and federal (grant) funding. A number of these, and several others, report new or intensified lobbying efforts directed at legislators and the seeking of community support. One agency is seeking “protection” from further cuts. One large jurisdiction’s city council is seeking to supplement public safety funds through sales tax increases, crime levies, parcel fees, and Indian gaming/casino revenues.

Reprioritization, redeployments and increasing the workloads of officers and units are reported by 22 agencies. Assigning a greater proportion of follow-up investigations to patrol officers, redeploying administrative positions to patrol, increasing patrol hours, using more overtime, and redeploying school resource officers (SROs) to the field are some of the strategies mentioned.

Some agencies are adding staff and/or creating new units, such as gang task forces, K-9 teams, and information or technology task forces.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

CEOs responded aggressively to a survey probe regarding current needs and directions for the future. To the question *“Excluding funding operations, what actions would you like to see local, state, or federal government or your professional association undertake to help your*

agency transition successfully in the post 9-11 policing environment?, one hundred eighty-one agencies submitted over 300 responses.

The responses can properly be viewed as the most quantitatively material consensus to date regarding post 9-11 issues of primary priority and the tools that are required to manage new realities. Table 21 summarizes the issues and priorities singled out by the CEOs. Overwhelmingly, the focus is on funding and domestic security.

Understanding that funding is always an issue and attempting to focus attention on non-financial requirements, CEOs were asked to exclude funding from their responses. Still, funding responses were commonplace. Surely, if the “exclude funding” admonition had not been stated, these responses would have dominated even more than they did.

Rivaling funding as an issue or need, measured in number of responses, are groupings we have labeled Intelligence and Information Sharing Training – Availability and Cost.

The Intelligence and Information sharing cluster is dominated by a call for continued and intensified federal/state/local intelligence sharing. (Intelligence regarding homeland security matters is implied strongly, but often not specifically stated.)

Training responses are concentrated “continued” and “increased” opportunities, with a noticeable number of references to no or low cost. Joint training and drills are referenced frequently. Standardization and certification is referenced, as is critical infrastructure, first responder, and in two cases, executive/leadership training. Like the intelligence/information cluster, the anti-terrorism focus is unarguably implied.

References to collaborative arrangements needs and priorities are prominent. The response in this class convey a new level of appreciation for the benefits, potentials, and essential significance of multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional arrangements in the war on terror and other law enforcement concerns, as well as references to specific needs and priorities such as equipment pooling and sharing and inter-agency task forces.

The Best Practices, Models, and Protocols class groups an eclectic assortment of issues, needs, and priorities ranging from important post 9-11 concepts such as retaining balance between traditional crime control concerns, such as drugs, and terrorism concerns to the need for specific tools, such as identity theft approaches. Responding CEOs emphasize the need to focus on terrorism prevention, realistic homeland security objectives and expectations, retention of focus on drug sales and gun violence (called domestic terrorism, more than once), and the need to have domestic security efforts led locally, not federally, including a national plan. Border security is referenced by several CEOs.

Table 21

POST 9-11 TRANSITION REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES

Capacity/Need	Agency References
<input type="checkbox"/> Intelligence and Information Sharing	55
<input type="checkbox"/> Funding, DHS Distribution Practices, Grant Acquisition	54
<input type="checkbox"/> Training – Availability, Cost	54
<input type="checkbox"/> Collaborative Arrangements and Partnerships, Regionalization	35
<input type="checkbox"/> Best Practices, Models, and Protocols and Standards (excludes Information and intelligence requirements)	30
<input type="checkbox"/> Communications – Systems and Technology	19

Communications – Systems and Technology priorities of law enforcement CEOs center upon continued or intensified efforts to achieve interoperable communications. Continued focus on improving technology is prevalent.

OBSERVATIONS - GLOBAL

The stated purposes of the survey included mining information to profile the predominant forces that are redirecting the police mission and roles in the post 9-11 era, examining the impacts of those forces, primarily on core missions, and capturing promising practices to address changing conditions and missions.

Being essentially open ended, the survey yielded very broad responses, lacking in the specificity that would be valuable at this juncture. This notwithstanding, a number of observations seem compelling to us, considering survey responses globally.

- The Dominant Issues.** Based upon the number and nature (content) of responses, the dominant post 9-11 issues, needs and priorities are: terrorism/homeland security; resources; recruitment and selection; intelligence and information sharing; communications technology/ interoperability.
- Clarifying the Post 9-11 Paradigm.** The field seeks clarification of and direction on post 9-11 objectives, expectations (realistic expectations), and roadmaps and tools to enable it to achieve the objectives.
- Homeland Security – The Primary Force.** There can be little question that the primary force redirecting the police mission is the threat of terrorism. The omnipresence of homeland security-specific responses throughout the survey stands as testimony.

- ❑ **Resource/Funding Pressures.** Suffusing all considerations is the need for resources, to fashion a national homeland security plan, and to compensate for diversion of existing resources for homeland security responses being undertaken by law enforcement agencies.
- ❑ **Grass Roots Capacity Building.** Without the guidance of a plan or direction from the profession at large, most law enforcement agencies are fashioning some level of response to the terrorist threat. At this juncture, this is a predominantly federal response and a grassroots response, but one that is not particularly well coordinated.
- ❑ **Terrorism Prevention.** Many CEOs are explicit in their admonition to concentrate on terrorism prevention. Consequence management is not underappreciated and balance is required, but the largest gap between current status and need is clearly on the prevention side.
- ❑ **The Regionalization Trend.** Prior to 9-11, inter-agency coordination was predominantly passive, characterized by mutual agreements, backup support, and some consolidated operations, such as records and information. The events of 9-11 have clearly spawned a surge in quantity and quality of collaboration, which, we submit, represents an important trend in police organization and operations.
- ❑ **At Risk Commitments and Capacities.** An ability to concentrate on core crime issues and, perhaps, to a lesser extent, community policing, seems apparent. Drug issues and violence, generally, are singled out.
- ❑ **Defining the “Other” Forces.** Whether caused by design failures or by the preoccupation with homeland security, the survey failed to reveal much in the way of “other forces” that are redefining police roles. We are certain that other forces of significance are unfolding. More work needs to be done to fill in this dimension of the post 9-11 paradigm.

REVISITING ROUNDTABLE FINDINGS

An explicit intent of the survey was to surface information to stimulate and inform roundtable discussion. Ninety responses were processed prior to the roundtables. Subsequently, the additional 129 were processed and examined in greater detail, largely to prepare this report. We have also employed survey data to “test” roundtable findings, exploring congruence and differences between the two sets of data, discussions, and observations. We find the data sets to be entirely reinforcing, free of conflict, and adding nuance from one to the other.

IV. MANAGING NEW REALITIES - BUILDING HOMELAND SECURITY CAPACITY

Despite repeated effort to focus roundtable attention on the range of influential forces that are changing law enforcement today, including budget issues, changing community demographics, and technology, participants were riveted to homeland security considerations and concerns. Homeland security issues also dominated the survey's production of forces of change, impacts, and directions to governments and professional associations. A drill-down analysis on the critical issues item responses further reinforced the homeland security priority. It is absolutely impossible to ignore the preoccupation law enforcement professionals have with homeland security issues, their intellectual readiness to frame priority domestic security questions, tackle the answers, and their thirst for a "game plan." For these reasons the Post 9-11 Policing Project search for promising practices concentrated on homeland security considerations.

At this juncture, the semblance of neither consensus nor a plan exists for assembling and developing the assets that state and local police require to confront terrorism - a body of concepts, strategies, and best practice tools. Critical problems, such as intelligence collection and coordination, equipment requirements, interoperability, and understanding of WMD, are being addressed, in piecemeal fashion, however, without benefit of an ordered/prioritized structure of issues, needs, and promising actions.

THE STATE OF HOMELAND SECURITY BEST PRACTICE INFORMATION

As law enforcement shapes, organizes, implements and evaluates a concentrated national strategy, state, local, tribal, and federal police agencies can serve well by innovating, evaluating, documenting and disseminating promising domestic security information practices and programs. The work of this project to assemble promising practices indicates that achieving this objective will require formidable effort. Finding programs of substance and demonstrated value that are worth replicating has been exceedingly difficult, attesting to both the need to build capacity and the rudimentary level of development work to date.

To command the label "best practice," a program or policy initiative or intervention must be evaluated, repetitively, and demonstrated to have positive outcomes with regard to a need, problem or objective. By this standard, based on our searches, few, if any, homeland security best practices exist. To command the designation, "promising practices," an initiative or intervention must meet a somewhat lower but nevertheless rigorous evaluation standard. Likewise, few programs appear to exist that meet these standards. Locating any homeland security initiatives with any documented evidence of success has already been discussed. Few policy and program initiatives are even described, much less evaluated. Although referenced as such, the documents created

by the Post 9-11 Policing Project are promising practices in the sense that they have been assembled, reviewed, and endorsed by expert practitioners.

PROMISING PRACTICE BRIEFS

The Post 9-11 Policing Project has produced four promising practice briefs:

- ❑ Intelligence Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture
- ❑ Threat Assessment: Fundamentals and Guidelines
- ❑ Multi-Jurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats
- ❑ Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security

Individually and collectively, the briefs concentrate on the prevention factor of the Prevention - Preparedness - Consequence Management homeland security equation, honoring the call from the field. The briefs concentrate on widely expressed needs, labeled as dominant in the preceding chapter. The documents attempt to summarize best current thinking in the respective subject areas, recognizing that work was done in a rapidly changing development environment. We have referenced operating models and hosting jurisdictions when possible to direct readers to sources for further inquiry.

A PORTFOLIO OF CAPACITY BUILDING ESSENTIALS

Table 22, Domestic Preparedness Capacity Development Priorities, lists 37 issues and needs topics to be addressed to begin to build a body of policies, programs and practices that state, local, tribal, and special jurisdiction police require to meet the homeland security new reality. Issues and needs groupings are:

- ❑ Leadership
- ❑ Prevention and Preparedness
- ❑ Technology and Intelligence
- ❑ Resources
- ❑ Community and Citizen Engagement
- ❑ Organizational Transformation
- ❑ Externals.

Table 22

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

LEADERSHIP	
1. New Leadership Roles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Terrorism education and awareness – community - Terrorism education and awareness – political leaders
2. Leadership Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Domestic security concepts and issues – knowledge acquisition
3. Collecting Wisdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Systematically and comprehensively collecting thoughts/experiences of chiefs - Best Practices Seminars (national dialogue required)
4. Mindset Issues	<p>Inadequate recognition of threat by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rural/small town law enforcement executives - Line officers - Political leaders
PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS	
5. Prevention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A comprehensive post 9-11 model – design - Vulnerability reduction (threat assessment) - Community engagement – strategies
6. Transportable Strategies	<p>Israeli and European experience and models</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lessons learned - Transportability to US
7. Critical Infrastructure/Site Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Building police expertise - Private Sector partnerships
8. Target Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bioterrorism - Food supply protection - Port and transit facilities protection - Public gatherings and events protection

Table 22

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

TECHNOLOGY & INTELLIGENCE

9. Crime Control – Domestic Preparedness Nexus

- Banking and financing
- Drugs
- Terrorists as organized criminals
- Good policing equals good terrorism prevention concepts

10. Best Strategies and Practices

- Promising programs – prevention
- Proven and promising programs – consequence management
(Tailored to agency characteristics, such as resources/size, is assumed.)

11. Intelligence-Led Policing

- Clarification of concepts
- Implementation models and examples

12. Information Overload

- Flow of critical information – quality not quantity

RESOURCES

13. Color Code Response Protocols

- Cost effective plans

14. Technology

- Employing for domestic security purpose
- Surveillance Cameras (DC/Chicago Experience)
 - Traffic Cameras (Irvine)
 - Helicopters (Charlotte)

15. Funding Issues and Schemes

- Cost implications of the 9-11 mission
- Federal funding responsibilities – current, long-term
- State and local funding responsibilities – current, long-term

16. Regionalization and Resource Sharing

- Plans -- prevention and/or response
- Communications -- technology and interagency
- Training
- Command models

Table 22

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

17. Recruitment and Retention

- New language skills, Arabic/Farsi speakers
- Competing with Federal agencies

COMMUNITY & CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

18. Community Engagement

- Educating to new realities
- Mobilizing for prevention
- Reporting suspicious activity
- Volunteers to support police efforts

19. Civil Liberties

- Violating/preserving
- Balancing to reflect new realities
- Profiling considerations

20. Cultures/Subgroups

- Bridge building -- Arab, Arab-American especially
- Intelligence mining

ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

21. Organization and Staffing Standards

- Minimum staffing standards - in-house capacity
- Minimum staffing standards - shared capacity
(Capacity refers to assets such as crime/intelligence analysts, threat assessment specialists, and privacy/constitutional protection specialists.)

22. Organizational Transformation

- Re-gearing for post 9-11 realities the:
- Patrol function
 - Investigations
 - Communications and dispatch
 - Traffic function
 - Crime and incident analysis
 - Tactical response operations
 - Color Code/ Alerts - mobilization requirements

23. H.S. Training

- Basic Academy models
- In-Service models
- New curricula requirements
- Intelligence-led policing
- Patriot and Clear Acts education

Table 22

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

24. Model Policies and Protocols
- New domestic preparedness policies and procedures
- Existing policies and procedures -- updates
- A comprehensive domestic security policy package
25. Crisis Care for Families of Officers
- During critical incidents
26. Infiltration of Police Agencies
- Understanding a new threat
- Developing proactive responses
27. Nationally Uniform Incident Response Standards
- Fire Service Model
28. Force Continuum
- Revisit/modify for terrorism prevention and response
29. Intelligence Analysis
- Revisiting and updating traditional approaches
- Finding/developing analysts
- Accelerating interoperability capacities
30. Traffic Stops
- Street and Highway procedures for terrorism
- Mass transit (buses)
- Train searches
31. Terrorism Needs/Problems of Small Departments
- Mounting a capacity in resource-starved environments
EXTERNALS
32. Legislation
Law enforcement positions on:
- Patriot Act
- Clear Act
- Funding levels
- Funding distribution formulas
33. Border Issues
- Local law enforcement responsibilities
- Protocols for handling illegal immigrants
- Legal issues

Table 22

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

34. Psychological Impact

Preparing for impact of mass casualties on:

- Officers
- Community

35. Media

- Roles and Responsibilities
- Promoting/Portraying Fear
- Community Education

36. DHS/ODP

- A Funding Roadmap
- Learning the New Vocabulary
- Powers and Authority
- Distribution Formulas
- Color Alerts - Reimbursement Issues

37. Collaborations and Partnerships

Planning and Programming with:

- Law enforcement agencies
- Fire and EMS
- Hospitals
- Transit agencies
- Port authorities
- Public works
- Social service agencies
- School districts
- Private sector agencies, especially communications and Hazmat organizations
- Public health and medical sectors
- Other non-governmental and volunteer agencies

These themes emerged from the roundtables. Recognized after the roundtables, through analysis of transcripts of the professional dialogue, they appear to be cornerstones and building blocks of the capacity every law enforcement agency requires. These capacities are also linked by their concentration on prevention, reflecting an articulated choice of CEOs to focus on the still unmet needs on the prevention side of the domestic security/terrorism equation. Consequence management, also vital, has already been treated extensively, though more remains to be done on this side of the security equation as well, including building and refining collaborations.

BUILDING ON EXISTING CRIME CONTROL ASSETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Homeland security programming should be approached and incorporated into the totality of the current police mission as seamlessly as is possible. Many, probably most, terrorism-engendered issues simply have not been dealt with before. Accordingly, state, county, municipal and special clientele law enforcement agencies have no choice but to develop and adapt new concepts and practices. Substantial infrastructure and a historical and contemporary body of “intellectual property” are in place in virtually every agency to meet development challenges. While first-time inventions seem required, and should be purchased, existing crime prevention and control concepts and strategies, regional arrangements, intelligence-led policing, investigations and patrol capacities, and community policing and problem solving programming and skills are among the infrastructure capacities that should and will inevitably be exploited and fine-tuned to address domestic security issues successfully in coming years. This approach promises a smoother transition than did traditional-to-community policing conversion attempts, which called for radical change to philosophy and practice, organizational forms, and staffing and training practices.

POST 9-11 POLICING PROJECT STAFF

POST 9-11 POLICING PROJECT STAFF

The Post 9-11 Policing Project is the work of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), and the Police Foundation. Jerry Needle, Director of Programs and Research, IACP, provided overall project direction.

❑ International Association of Chiefs of Police

Phil Lynn served as IACP's Project Director, managed development and publication of the four Promising Practices Briefs, and authored Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats. Andrew Morabito co-authored Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Police - Private Security Partnerships and analyzed post 9-11 Survey data. Colonel Joel Leson, Director, IACP Center for Police Leadership, authored Assessing and Managing the Terrorism Threat. Walter Tangel served as initial Project Director.

Dr. Ellen Scrivner, Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Administrative Services, Chicago Police Department, contributed to all phases of project design and co-facilitated the 9-11 Roundtables with Jerry Needle. Marilyn Peterson, Management Specialist - Intelligence, New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, authored Intelligence Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture.

❑ National Sheriffs' Association

Fred Wilson, Director of Training, directed NSA project activities, organized and managed Post 9-11 Policing Project Roundtables, and worked closely with IACP staff throughout the course of the project. NSA project consultants included Chris Tutko, Director of NSA's Neighborhood Watch Project, John Matthews, and Dr. Jeff Walker, University of Arkansas, Little Rock.

❑ National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives. Jessie Lee, Executive Director, served as NOBLE's project director and conducted most staff work.

❑ The Police Foundation

Edwin Hamilton directed Foundation project activities and managed Post 9-11 Policing Project survey formatting and analysis, assisted by Rob

Davis. Foundation consultants included Inspector Garth den Heyer of the New Zealand Police and Steve Johnson of the Washington State Patrol.

❑ **Major Cities Chiefs Association**

Dr. Phyllis McDonald, Division of Public Safety Leadership, Johns Hopkins University, directed the work of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. The MCCA team included Denis O’Keefe, Consultant, Corinne Martin, Program Coordinator, and Shannon Feldpush.

Dr. Sheldon Greenburg, Director of the Division of Public Safety Leadership, co-authored Engaging the Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Police – Private Security Partnerships.

PROMISING PRACTICES REVIEWS

Promising Practices drafts were critiqued and enriched by a series of practitioners/content experts including: Richard Cashdollar, Executive Director of Public Safety, City of Mobile, AL; George Franscell, Attorney-at-Law, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts and Lawrence, Los Angeles, CA; Mary Beth Michos, State Mutual Aid Coordinator, Prince William County, VA; David Bostrom, Manager, Community Policing Consortium, IACP; John P. Chase, Chief of Staff, IAIP, Department of Homeland Security; John M. Clark, Assistant Vice President/Chief of Police, Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad; John A. LeCours, Director/Intelligence, Transport Canada; Ronald W. Olin, Chief of Police, Lawrence, KS; Ed Jopeak, Analyst, Veridian; Jerry Marynik, Administrator, State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center, California Department of Justice; Bart Johnson, Office of Counter Terrorism, New York State Police.

EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT

The Post 9-11 Policing Project was initially conceptualized and guided throughout by the chief executive officers of the partner associations:

- ❑ Daniel N. Rosenblatt, Executive Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police
- ❑ Eugene R. Cromartie, Deputy Executive Director/Chief of Staff, International Association of Chiefs of Police
- ❑ Thomas N. Faust, Executive Director, National Sheriffs’ Association
- ❑ Jessie Lee, Executive Director, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives

- Hubert Williams, President, The Police Foundation
- Thomas C. Frazier, Executive Director, Major Cities Chiefs Association.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE

We gratefully acknowledge the technical guidance and patient cooperation of executives and program managers who helped fashion project work: James Burch II, Deputy Director; Michelle Shaw, Policy Advisor; and Steven Edwards, Senior Policy Advisor, Law Enforcement. Jan Carey served as the project's first program manager.

**POST 9-11 POLICING PROJECT
ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS**

ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

The partner associations are grateful to all law enforcement CEOs and professionals who contributed to the Baltimore Roundtables.

Sheriff Michael Acree
Douglas County, CO Sheriff's Office

Sheriff Drew Alexander
Summit County, OH Sheriff's Office

Jeff Allison
Special Advisor to the FBI
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
ODP

Sheriff Larry Amerson
Calhoun County, NC Sheriff's Office

Deputy Chief Michael Berkow
Los Angeles, CA Police Department

Sheriff Edward Bieluch
Palm Beach County, FL Sheriff's Office

Sheriff John Bittick
Monroe County, GA Sheriff's Office

James Bolden
Director (former)
Memphis, TN Police Department

SSA Daron Borst
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chief Theron Bowman
Arlington, TX Police Department

Chief James Bueermann
Redlands, CA Police Department

Sheriff Robert Carter
Clay County, IN Sheriff's Office

Darrell Darnell
Director, Preparedness Division
Institute for National Security and
Counterterrorism

Chief (retired) Jimmie Dotson
Chattanooga, TN Police Department

Chief Jerry Dyer
Fresno, CA Police Department

Sheriff Harold Eavenson
Rockwall County, TX Sheriff's Office

Sheriff Ira Edwards, Jr.
Clarke County, GA Sheriff's Office

Julian Fantino
Commissioner of Emergency Management
Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services, Canada

Sheriff R. Jay Fisher
Baltimore County, MD Sheriff's Office

Superintendent Rick Fuentes
New Jersey State Police

Sheriff David Goad
Allegany County, MD Sheriff's Office

Chief Melvin High
Prince George's County, MD Police
Department

Chief Randall Holt
Havre de Grace, MD Police Department

Sheriff Michael Jackson
Prince George's County, MD Sheriff's
Office

Chief (retired) Phil Keith
Knoxville, TN Police Department

Sheriff Aaron Kennard
Salt Lake County, UT Sheriff's Office

Chief Gary Margolis
University of Vermont Police Services

Sheriff Robert Markley
Morgan County, GA Sheriff's Office

Sheriff Phil Mask
Saline County, AR Sheriff's Office

Director James McMahon
New York State Office of Homeland
Security

Chief Walter McNeil
Tallahassee, FL Police Department

Chief Robert McNeilly, Jr.
Pittsburgh, PA Bureau of Police

Chief Alberto Melis
Waco, TX Police Department

Sheriff Jack Merritt
Greene County, MO Sheriff's Office

Sheriff Daniel Moore
Raleigh County, WV Sheriff's Office

Lieutenant Colonel Andre Parker
Illinois State Police

Ron Parthemore
Senior Law Enforcement Advisor
U.S. Secret Service

Sheriff Dallas Pope
Talbot County, MD Sheriff's Office

Chief Sonya Proctor
Amtrak Police Department

Chief Charles Ramsey
Metropolitan Police Department,
Washington, DC

Edward Reina
Director of Public Safety
Tohono O'Odham Nation

Chief Bob Ricks
Edmond, OK Police Department

Sheriff Brad Riley
Cabarrus County, NC Sheriff's Office

SSA Diego Rodriguez
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Chief Lynn Rowe
Springfield, MO Police Department

Kevin Saupp
Program Manager
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
ODP

Chief Doug Scott
Arlington County, VA Police Department

Sheriff Ted Sexton
Tuscaloosa County, AL Sheriff's Office

Sheriff George Sheridan
Delaware County, IN Sheriff's Office

Chief Darrel Stephens
Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC Police
Department

Chief Ralph Wilson
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority (MARTA) Police Department

Chief Garrett Zimmon
San Bernardino, CA Police Department

The material and viewpoints presented in this report do not necessarily represent the views of individual Roundtable participants.