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
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Charles A. Russell and Captain Bowman H. Miller, United States Air Force

**T**HROUGHOUT the past decade, a steady rise in terrorist activity in many nations has generated a flood of academic, military and journalistic studies. In most of these analyses, however, the primary focus has been on the mechanics of terrorism rather than on the individuals involved. As a result, such subjects as the rural to urban shift in the locus of most terrorist and guerrilla operations, as well as the structure, organization, financing, weaponry, strategy and tactics of various terrorist groups, have been explored in some detail.

In recent years, equally careful attention has been given to the problem of transnational terrorism and the increasingly close interrelationships existing between terrorist organizations in widely separated geographic areas of the world. However, until the well-publicized exploits of the now infa-

mous Venezuelan terrorist "Carlos" (Ricard Ramirez Sanchez), considerably less attention was given to an examination of the individuals involved in terrorist activity.

Nevertheless, as Dr. Chalmers Johnson pointed out at the 25-26 March 1976 Conference on International Terrorism in Washington, DC, additional knowledge is necessary in this important area.<sup>1</sup> Without knowledge as to the type of individual engaged in urban terrorism and those factors motivating his actions, coping with the problems of both national and transnational terrorism will become increasingly difficult.

While this article does not pretend to close this important research gap, it is an effort to determine if there are truly common characteristics and similarities in the social origin, political philosophy, education, age and family

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## TERRORIST PROFILE


background of individuals engaged in terrorist activities. Based on a compilation and analysis of published data regarding more than 350 terrorist cadre and leaders from Palestinian, Japanese, German, Irish, Italian, Turkish, Spanish, Iranian, Argentine, Brazilian and Uruguayan groups active from 1966-76, an attempt is made to draw a sociological portrait or profile of the modern urban terrorist.<sup>2</sup>

To ensure the greatest possible accuracy in this portrait, data were collected only on those individuals active in some 18 revolutionary groups known to specialize in urban terrorism versus rural guerrilla warfare. Accordingly, among the Palestinians, emphasis was placed on persons associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Black September Organization (BSO) while, in Japan, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), a group which al-

ways has operated outside that nation, was chosen. In the Federal Republic of Germany, attention was given to the Movement Two June (M2J) and the Baader-Meinhof (BM) group. In Northern Ireland, the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA-P) was the target. In Italy, similar emphasis was placed on the Red Brigades (RB) and the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (APN). In Turkey, the Turkish People's Liberation Army (TPLA) of the early 1970s was selected. For Spain, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement, specifically *ETA-V*, and the Marxist-influenced Anti-Fascist Patriotic and Revolutionary Front (*FRAP*) were used. Finally, in Latin America, the Argentine *Montoneros* and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (*ERP* (*Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo*)) in that country, the Brazilian groups following Carlos Marighela and the



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Uruguayan *Tupamaros* were of interest.

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In organizing information regarding the personnel, data have been summarized under eight headings: age, sex, marital status, rural versus urban origin, social and economic background, education or occupation, method or place of recruitment and political-economic philosophy. In each category or heading, factors common to terrorists from various areas of the world are indicated as well as those which appear to vary depending on national origin. The article concludes with a summary of commonalities and differences regarding terrorists from various geographic areas.

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#### Age<sup>a</sup>

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In the 18 groups studied, the age for active terrorist cadre versus leadership was remarkably consistent from group to group. Except for individuals affiliated with Palestinian, German and Japanese organizations, the usual urban terrorist was between 22 and 25. Among the Uruguayan *Tupamaros*, a group particularly active in the 1966-71 time frame, the average age of arrested terrorists was 24.1. In neighboring Brazil, where revolutionary elements were very active in the late 1960s, and, in Argentina, wherein terrorism has almost become a way of life since the early 1970s, individual terrorist cadre averaged 23 and 24 respectively. For other Latin nations such as Spain and Italy, almost identical figures were noted. In Spain, for example, arrested members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement averaged 23.2 and those associated with the Marxist-Communist *FRAP* were 24.6. Even in Iran, Tur-

key and Northern Ireland, the same general pattern continued with ages averaging between 23 and 24.

Only in Japanese, Palestinian and West German groups was there an upward trend in cadre age. In Japan, based on arrested members of the Japanese Red Army, average age was approximately 28. For those affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Black September Organization, data on identified and arrested terrorists indicate most were in their late 20s. In the case of the Baader-Meinhof organization and the Berlin-based Movement Two June, data on more than 100 cadre members reflected an average age of 31.3.

While a precise explanation is not readily available regarding the significantly older age of at least the Palestinian and West German terrorist cadre, one possible reason may lie in the composition of the groups. In both cases, the terrorist organizations in question are not composed primarily of graduate and undergraduate university students as is the case for many of the groups studied. Instead, many members of both Palestinian and West German organizations are university graduates who have become junior professional people, doctors, lawyers, and so forth. By virtue of this fact alone, their average age is higher than that of the almost purely student groups.

While age trends for members of many terrorist groups have been relatively stable over the last decade, there are recent indications, particularly among the Spanish, Latin American, Irish, Iranian and Turkish organizations, that the 22 to 25 age level may be dropping. It would appear that the often anarchistic-revolutionary philosophy heretofore largely a province

## TERRORIST PROFILE

of the university students has permeated into the secondary school level. Thus, arrests of Spanish *ETA-V* members in the spring of 1976 disclosed a number in their teens. Similar developments were evident in Argentina, Iran and Turkey. In Northern Ireland, some of the terrorists apprehended have been as young as 12 to 14. There also are signs that the age of Palestinian terrorists may be lowering. Those individuals involved in the 11 August 1976 attack on the Israeli El Al terminal in Istanbul's Yeşilköy Airport, for example, were 23 and 24.

Although terrorist cadre continue to fall into the early and mid-20s, the leadership level of many terrorist organizations is much older. In Brazil, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Carlos Marighela and his successors often were in their late 40s or early 50s. Marighela, generally considered the leading theoretician of urban terrorism, was 58 at his death in November 1969. Among Argentine, Uruguayan and Italian terrorist elements, leadership is or was in its mid-30s or early 40s. In Argentina, Mario Santucho—founder and leader of the highly effective People's Revolutionary Army—was 40 at his death in July 1976. His chief lieutenants, Enrique Gorriarán, José Urteaga and Domingo Mena (also killed in July), were only slightly younger than Santucho. Raul Sendic—chief of the Uruguayan *Tupamaro* organization—was 42 when his group began significant operations in the late 1960s. Renato Curcio, leader of the Italian Red Brigades, was 35 when arrested in early 1976.

In the Palestinian groups, policy-level leaders are often in their late 40s or early 50s. Similarly, in Germany, Andreas Baader, founder of the Baader-Meinhof organization, is 33, and many of his group's current or

former leaders (Horst Mahler, 40; Christa Eckes, 46; Gudrun Ensslin, 36; and Holger Meins, 35) are in their late 30s and early 40s. Ulrike Meinhof, the co-founder and chief ideologue of the Baader-Meinhof group, took her life at age 42 in May 1976 while on trial in Stuttgart.

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### Sex 4

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Despite minor variations among some of the groups studied, urban terrorism remains a predominantly male phenomenon. During the period examined (1966-76), almost all significant terrorist operations (well over 80 percent) were directed, led and executed by men. In Latin American terrorist organizations (the Argentine *Montoneros* and *ERP*, the Brazilian successors to Marighela and the Uruguayan *Tupamaros*), women's membership was less than 16 percent (based on arrested identified terrorist cadre).

Among these organizations, the *Tupamaros* made perhaps the most use of women; however, with few exceptions, the role of these women was confined to intelligence collection, operations as couriers, duties as nurses and medical personnel and in the maintenance of "safe houses" for terrorists sought by police and for the storage of weapons, propaganda, false documentation, funds and other supplies.<sup>5</sup> Interestingly, the elusive Venezuelan terrorist "Carlos" (Hich Ramírez Sánchez), associated with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine operations in Europe, also used his women contacts in Paris almost solely for these purposes.<sup>6</sup> In Spanish, Italian, Turkish and Iranian terrorist groups, this same predominantly sup-

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port role for women has been noted.

There have been numerous well-known exceptions to this generalization. Thus, Leila Khalid and Fusako Shigenobu were highly effective leaders in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army respectively. Together, they were instrumental in arranging the initial PFLP training of JRA and West German cadre in Lebanon during the early 1970s. Today, Shigenobu still is considered the actual leader and operational brains behind the JRA.

In Latin America, Norma Ester Arostito was a co-founder of the Argentine *Montoneros* and served as chief ideologue of that group until her death in 1976. In Spain, Genoveve Forest Tarat played a key role in the December 1973 *ETA-V* operation which resulted in the assassination of Spanish Premier Admiral Carrero Blanco as well as the 13 September 1974 bombing of a Madrid restaurant (Cafe Rolando) which resulted in 11 killed and more than 70 persons wounded. In this same context, Margherita Cagol, the now deceased wife of Italian Red Brigades leader Renato Curcio, appears to have played an important role in that organization and quite possibly to have led the RB commando team which freed Curcio from Rome's Casale Monferrato jail on 8 February 1975.

While these and many other women have carried out key leadership or operational roles in varied terrorist groups, most women terrorists continue to function in a supportive capacity. Significantly, this frequent relegation of women to a support role is not the product of "male chauvinism" but, rather, practical experience. In the minds of most terrorist leaders, and as demonstrated by actual operations, women are simply more effective

than men in such supporting activities. Several women living together (yet actually operating a "safe house," weapons storage cache or document fabrication facility) are infrequently seen by security personnel as something unusual, whereas a gathering of men in an apartment or house might well be viewed with substantial suspicion. Similarly, in the terrorist view, women—by virtue of their sex alone—are more adept at allaying the suspicions of security personnel. As a result, posing as wives or mothers, they often can enter areas which would be restricted to men, thereby obtaining useful intelligence information on government or business operations and activities.

Although women have functioned in a secondary role in most terrorist groups, they have occupied a very important position in the West German Baader-Meinhof organization as well as the Movement Two June. There, women constitute fully one-third of the operational personnel. In addition to the leading role of Ulrike Meinhof in founding the Baader-Meinhof group, nearly 60 percent of that organization and Movement Two June personnel at large as of August 1976 were women. Four of these women escaped from jail in West Berlin in June 1976. Several others were freed during the successful kidnapping of Peter Lorenz, Christian Democratic mayoral candidate in Berlin, by Movement Two June on 27 February 1975 and have since joined forces with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

In the West German context, there appears to be no real terrorist division of labor based on sex.<sup>7</sup> Women such as Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, Ingrid Siepmann, Hanna Krabbe, Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann and Angela

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Luther all have been identified in leadership roles and as participants in robberies, burglaries, kidnappings, bombings and other operations. In this context, Gabriele Kröcher-Tiedemann was responsible for the "execution" of Austrian police official Anton Tichler during the December 1975 attack on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries oil ministers meeting in Vienna. Ilse Jandt, a former associate of the M2J, planned and carried out the assassination of German terrorist turncoat Ulrich Schmoecker in West Berlin on 5 June 1974.<sup>8</sup>

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### Marital Status<sup>9</sup>

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The unmarried terrorist is still the rule rather than the exception. Requirements for mobility, flexibility, initiative, security and total dedication to a revolutionary cause all preclude encumbering family responsibilities and normally dictate single status for virtually all operational terrorist cadre. Statistics regarding arrested or identified terrorists in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia reflect over 75 to 80 percent of the individuals involved were single. Some of the few married individuals involved in German terrorist activities (Horst Mahler, Ulrike Meinhof and Angela Luther) severed ties to spouses and children in order to pursue terrorist methods.

Only in the Uruguayan *Tupamaros*, a group which, according to revolutionary theorist Régis Debray, may have made the greatest use of women,<sup>10</sup> were a significant number (still less than 30 percent) of the terrorist cadre in a married status.<sup>11</sup> Of interest in regard to this group is the

fact that the married status of many *Tupamaros* posed some significant operational problems for that group. In those instances where the wives of *Tupamaros* were arrested and subjected to interrogation, morale considerations almost compelled the group to seek their release. As a result, in operations such as the 8 March 1970 attack on the women's prison in Montevideo where the effort secured the release of 13 women *Tupamaros* and was a propaganda morale victory for the organization, the cost was high in casualties suffered by the attack team. Thus, the decision of most terrorist organizations to use unmarried or separated personnel appears sound from an operational point of view.

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### Rural versus Urban Origin<sup>12</sup>

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As pointed out by Carlos Marighella, probably the most widely read, known and imitated theoretician and practitioner of urban guerrilla warfare, the terrorist must be intimately familiar with the terrain in which he operates.

*What matters is to know every path a guerrilla can use, every place he can hide, leaving the enemy at the mercy of his own ignorance. With his detailed knowledge of the streets, and all their nooks and crannies, of the rougher ground, the sewers, the wooded ground . . . urban guerrillas can easily elude the police, or surprise them in a trap or ambush. If he knows the ground well . . . he can always escape arrest.*<sup>13</sup>

In view of the above, it is not surprising that most urban terrorists are natives or long-time residents of metropolitan areas, particularly the cities in which they operate. In Argentina,

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
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
August 1977



1-Andreas Baader  
2-Ulrike Meinhof  
3-Gabriele Krücher-Tiedemann  
4-Mario Santucho  
5-"Carlos" Illich Ramirez Sánchez



Photos courtesy of authors





## TERRORIST PROFILE

where the *ERP* and *Montoneros* have been so successful in urban operations during the past six years, approximately 90 percent of their members are from the greater Buenos Aires area itself. In Brazil, the bulk of Marighela's followers and imitators came from Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Santos and Recife, while, in Uruguay, over 70 percent of the *Tupamaros* were natives of Montevideo, their primary area of activity.

In Iran, Turkey, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, most terrorists are from urban areas, particularly Teheran, Ankara, Rome, Milan, Genoa, West Berlin and Hamburg. Similarly, a significant number of the Japanese Red Army members, who operated so effectively with European-based members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine during the years 1972-74, are from Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka or other Japanese metropolitan centers.

Even in Spain, this same trend is evident. There, however, although most members of the Communist Anti-Fascist Patriotic and Revolutionary Front are from larger cities such as Madrid or Barcelona, members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement generally come from smaller centers in the Basque region such as San Sebastián and Bilbao.

In addition to an urban background, several European terrorist groups have tended to focus operations in a specific region or city of origin or in familiar nearby areas. Thus, in Italy, the Armed Proletarian Nuclei, which traditionally has operated in south and central Italy, focuses its activities in Naples, Reggio Calabria and Rome while the Red Brigades, of northern Italian origin, have been most active in Milan, Genoa, Bologna, Turin and Florence.

In Germany and Spain, similar patterns are evident. In the Federal Republic, the Movement Two June—which originated in West Berlin—confined much of its activity to this city while the Baader-Meinhof organization, born in Frankfurt, operated primarily in this base area and surrounding cities. In Spain, with few exceptions, most activities of the Basque *ETA-V* have been in the Basque Provinces and particularly the area surrounding the city of San Sebastián. In contrast, *FRAP*, a group composed largely of Marxist students from Madrid and Barcelona, has tended to emphasize operations in their areas. Other identifiable patterns of this type are evident in Turkey (with the Ankara-based Turkish People's Liberation Army focusing on operations in that city) and in Iran (with the People's Strugglers and People's Sacrifice Guerrillas both stressing activities in Teheran and its environs).<sup>14</sup>

For the Palestinian organizations, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, many members appear to have been born in or lived for significant periods of time in major urban areas. In addition, many Palestinians, including some of those now affiliated with the PFLP, were educated abroad (in 1969, some 6,000 Palestinians were studying abroad).<sup>15</sup> Trained in European and various Middle Eastern universities in such cities as Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Berlin, London, Cairo, Beirut and Paris, these individuals were intimately familiar with urban life, normally spoke a foreign language and were able to integrate into and live in any metropolitan area without difficulty. The success of Palestinian terrorist operations in Europe over the past four to five years attests readily to this fact.

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 Social and Economic Background <sup>16</sup>


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In conjunction with their urban origin or longtime residence in metropolitan areas is the predominantly middle-class or even upper-class background of many terrorist cadre and leaders. A statistical review of data on arrested/identified terrorists associated with the 18 groups mentioned earlier reflects well over two-thirds of these individuals came from the middle or upper classes in their respective nations or areas. In most instances, their parents were professional people, governmental employees, diplomats, clergymen, military officers or sometimes even police officials.

Although these parents were part of the existing social and economic systems, many of them had been frustrated in their efforts to use them as vehicles for upward social and economic mobility. Liberal in political outlook, they frequently advocated significant social and political change. When these parental views were coupled with the radical socioeconomic doctrines so popular in most university circles during the 1960s, this combination of forces—added to general student distrust of “democratic institutions” as effective media for implementing social change—may have moved some young people toward terrorism and guerrilla war as methods of achieving the desired change or obtaining the power to implement such changes.

While space limitations do not permit a detailed case-by-case analysis of the more than 350 terrorists studied, a cursory look at the background of some group leaders and cadre demonstrates their middle-class origin. Thus, in the Baader-Meinhof organization

and the Movement Two June, over 65 percent of the membership was from the middle class. Baader was the son of a historian, Ulrike Meinhof the daughter of an art historian, Horst Mahler the son of a dentist, Holger Meins the son of a business manager and Gudrun Ensslin the daughter of a clergyman. In the Japanese Red Army, a similar pattern was evident. There, the leading female member, Fusako Shigenobu, was the daughter of an insurance executive while cadre members and leaders such as Maruoka Osamu, Hidaka Toshihiko, Nishikawa Jon and others were products of a middle-class environment. The same is evident among the Uruguayan *Tupamaros* whose membership rarely included individuals from the working class and whose composition was over 90-percent middle- and upper-class students and young professionals.

As pointed out in November 1970 by then Uruguayan Chancellor Jorge Peirano Facio, “For each family of the upper social class there is a Tupamaro.” <sup>17</sup> In Argentina, the same general situation prevails with members of the Trotskyite *ERP* and the radical Peronist *Montoneros* from these same general social levels. Even in areas such as Turkey, Iran and among the Palestinian organizations, where one might expect some breakdown in the pattern, it remains generally consistent.

Only in the ranks of the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army is there a real deviation from the norm. To a significant degree, this may result, as pointed out in several studies on this organization by the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict, from the fact that Catholic families in Northern Ireland traditionally have been relegated, by political means, to the lower economic

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and social levels through a process of deliberate discrimination. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that many cadre and leadership within the IRA-P are not drawn from the middle and upper classes. This situation, however, stands out as almost the sole exception to an otherwise general and consistent pattern.

### Education or Occupation <sup>18</sup>

As might be anticipated from preceding comments, the vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadre or leaders are quite well-educated. In fact, approximately two-thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate students. Among the Latin American terrorist groups, particularly the Uruguayan *Tupamaros* and the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army and *Montoneros*, the figure neared 75 percent. In even such essentially nationalist organizations as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement, more than 40 percent of the identified leaders and cadre members who have been arrested had some university training and many were graduates. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the same pattern was evident with approximately 80 percent of the more than 100 identified terrorists involved with the Baader-Meinhof organization and Movement Two June having received at least some college education. For the latter group, the Free University of Berlin was a particularly fruitful recruiting ground.

In Turkey and Iran, university-trained terrorists were the rule rather than the exception. The Turkish People's Liberation Army, a group re-

sponsible for the March 1971 kidnapping of four US Air Force airmen in Ankara and the subsequent March 1972 kidnapping and execution of three NATO technicians, was composed almost completely of students from the Middle Eastern Technical University (METU) in Ankara. Leading the TPLA group involved in this operation was Denis Gezmic, a METU graduate. Within Iran, a substantial number of those involved in terrorist activities were persons with a university background. In Teheran, for example, Resa Resa'i, the 2 June 1973 assassin of US Army Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins, was a dentistry student at the time. Other significant assassinations and terrorist acts in Iran, such as the attacks on the US officers Price, Shaffer and Turner, were carried out in large part by Iranian university graduates.

For Palestinian groups, as pointed out by Dr. Paul Jureidini at the Washington, DC, Conference on International Terrorism, most leading terrorist cadre are not only products of a middle-class environment but also university students or graduates.

Coupled with the generally high educational level of operational cadre was an equally high level for group leaders. George Habbash, chief of the very active PFLP, is a medical doctor. His counterpart and frequent rival, Yasir Arafat, is a graduate engineer. Renato Curcio, founder of the Italian Red Brigades, is a sociology graduate. Roberto Santucho, now deceased former leader of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army, was an economist, and Raul Sendic, creator of the *Tupamaros*, a lawyer. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Baader-Meinhof leader Horst Mahler (now imprisoned) is a lawyer, Meinhof was a journalist, Ensslin and Luther teach-

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ers and Jan-Carl Raspe a graduate sociologist. Practicing doctors and nurses also have been active terrorists in these West German groups.

Although spanning a rather wide educational spectrum, the formal training of both terrorist leaders and cadre, in most groups, tended to focus on the humanities, with particular emphasis on law, history, economics, education, sociology, philosophy and medicine. In contrast to this general arts and sciences curriculum, Iranian and Turkish terrorists tended to be educated in the more exact sciences, particularly in technical fields such as engineering. As a general exception to the entire educational pattern, however, is the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, essentially for the reasons set forth in the earlier discussion of social origin.

*The Provisional IRA, and the extremist Protestant groups which arose in reaction to it, are the only terrorist organizations in the world which even in their leadership have practically no intellectuals.*<sup>19</sup>

As stated earlier, particularly in regard to Latin American terrorists, the dominant occupation among these individuals is now and always has been that of student. Often in their early 20s, *Tupamaros*, *Montoneros*, *ERP* members and the various followers of Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Mari-ghela frequently have conducted terrorist operations almost as a direct part of their college curricula. Operating from university centers, which by law and tradition were immune from government search, more than 70 percent of the arrested identified terrorists in Argentina and Uruguay were students. In Brazil, the percentage was well over 50. When older individuals also were active in these groups, they usually were white-collar

workers and professionals. Outside Latin America, although the percentage of student terrorists was somewhat less, this occupation remained important. Similarly, of the professionals, the law, economics and medicine were particularly prevalent among European and Middle Eastern terrorist leaders and cadre. In like manner, universities in West Berlin, Frankfurt, Heidelberg and Hamburg in Germany and elsewhere in Europe have served as operational bases for terrorist efforts.

Method-Place of Recruitment<sup>20</sup>

Considering the important role played by students and university graduates (or dropouts) in most terrorist movements, it is not surprising that many large universities have been and are now primary recruiting grounds for operational terrorist cadre. Quite often, young men and women first encounter anarchistic and Marxist doctrines on entrance into a university where the prevalence of such concepts is often coupled with a strong Marxist bias on the part of professors and administrators. When these developments are linked with frequent Marxist domination of student federations, it is not surprising that the university has become an ideological training ground for future terrorist cadre. Thus, for the Japanese Red Army, the Universities of Tokyo, Rikkjo and Kyoto have been very important. In Spain, both the Basque *ETA-V* and the Communist-supported *FRAP* have been staffed by graduates from the Universities of Madrid and Barcelona. In Italy, the universities in Rome, Turin and Bologna are fertile recruiting grounds

## TERRORIST PROFILE

for anarchistic groups such as the Red Brigades. In Latin America, the National University in Montevideo, the University of Buenos Aires and those in Brazil have supplied a substantial percentage of those individuals involved in urban terrorism.

The pattern also continues in Iran, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. There, the universities in West Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Heidelberg, Munich and Stuttgart have been the basic training centers for many German terrorist groups. Finally, even in the case of the Palestinians, many of whom were educated abroad, universities were frequent recruiting bases. Only in Northern Ireland and to some extent in the Basque *ETA-V*, as well as among certain Palestinian groups, is the pattern broken. In each of these cases, however, terrorist recruitment often is based on the primary appeal of nationalism rather than an anarchistic and Marxist political philosophy.

For those few terrorist groups which include both intellectual and criminal elements, the place of initial recruitment for the latter is often a prison. Thus, the Italian Armed Proletarian Nuclei frequently makes initial contact with a potential terrorist while he is still serving a prison sentence. Facilitating the release of such an individual or providing assistance to him after release, APN is able to assess his potential for terrorist activity. If useful to the organization, such a person often can be recruited without much difficulty. In this manner, Martino Zichitella, the ANP member killed in the 14 December 1976 assassination attempt against Rome's anti-terrorist chief Alfonso Noce, apparently was drawn into the organization. The same has been true for the imprisoned Baader-Meinhof cadre whose

stated objective is to politicize fellow inmates for the continued revolution once freed from confinement.<sup>21</sup>

### Political Philosophy<sup>22</sup>

The question of a political philosophy is most difficult to treat as a category since it defies a statistical response. Using the basic definition of terrorism as a tactic used by weak groups against larger opposing forces in pursuit of political objectives, one can discard terrorism itself as meeting the criteria of a philosophy. Three basic ideological tendencies are at play among most major terrorist groups operating today—*anarchism*, *Marxism-Leninism* and *nationalism*. It is the combination of these three in specific contexts which produces the variant left-extremist philosophies espoused by most terrorists today.

Nationalism is rarely an important ingredient in such views. Of the 18 organizations studied, it can be considered significant only in the case of three: the Basque *ETA-V*, the Irish Republican Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Even in these groups, however, it is blended strongly with Marxism. For most other organizations, such as the Japanese Red Army and the West German Baader-Meinhof group<sup>23</sup> and the Movement Two June, the mixture is a combination of anarchism and Marxism with the latter as a predominant element.

Although basically Marxist, the majority of terrorist organizations today reject the passive outlook of orthodox Soviet communism in favor of the revolutionary violence advocated by Carlos Marighela. In return, the orthodox Communists normally reject

terrorists who lack political objectives in favor of their country.

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terrorists as "bourgeois gangsters" who lack a political foundation and have abandoned the tested social and political Communist Party structure in favor of short-sighted and often counterproductive "hooliganism."

Accordingly, it should be no surprise that the terrorists discussed in this profile related more closely with the Trotskyite Fourth International than Soviet communism.

*Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution' emphasizes, in its international aspects, the global nature of the phenomenon, the necessary links between revolution in one country with that elsewhere. Ethnic, cultural and national distinctions will on this thesis be unable to withstand the revolutionizing tide. . . .*<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in the final analysis, the philosophical underpinnings of most modern terrorist groups may be found in a loose synthesis of the views developed by Mao, Trotsky, Marcuse, Fanon and particularly Marighela.

One can draw a general composite into which fit the great majority of those terrorists from the 18 urban guerrilla groups examined here. To this point, they have been largely single men aged 22 to 24, with exceptions as noted, who have some university education, if not a college degree. The women terrorists, except for the West German groups and an occasional leading figure in the IRA, JRA and PFLP, are preoccupied with support rather than operational roles.

More often than not, these urban

terrorists come from affluent, urban, middle-class families, many of whom enjoy considerable social prestige. Like their fathers, many of the older terrorists have been trained for the professions and may have practiced these occupations prior to their commitment to a terrorist life.

Whether having turned to terrorism as a university student or later, most were provided an anarchistic or Marxist world view as well as recruited into terrorist operations while in the university. In the universities, these young products of an affluent society were confronted initially with and provided anarchistic or Marxist ideological underpinnings for their otherwise unstructured frustrations and idealism.

While no international trend is as yet readily discernible, there are indicators that, in a number of countries, to include Argentina, West Germany, Iran, Northern Ireland and Spain, urban terrorist groups - or the phenomenon of urban terrorism itself - are recruiting younger and younger adherents. Increasing numbers also are drawn from those who are undergoing vocational training in preparation for work in skilled trades, many of which are adaptable to terrorist requirements - for example, electrician, gunsmith, mechanic and printer. To what extent this development may alter the preliminary composite sketched in this article is an area deserving additional research and attention.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Conference on International Terrorism, 25-26 March 1976, Department of State Auditorium, Washington, DC. Conference participants included representatives from the academic, industrial, journalistic and governmental communities. Also present were speakers from the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel and the United Kingdom.

<sup>2</sup> Most of the data used in this article was abstracted from general circulation English, French,

German, Spanish and Italian-language newspapers, government documents, research publications, and so forth. In regard to Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, a substantial amount of government documentation on terrorist personalities and groups also was available. For Turkish, Irish and Cuban terrorist organizations and individuals, however, data were obtained primarily from newspaper reports and academic studies. In the

## TERRORIST PROFILE

case of the Palestinian groups discussed, the authors are particularly indebted to Dr. Paul Juraidini, vice president, Abbott Associates, Inc., Alexandria, VA. A speaker on "Terrorism in the Middle East" at the above cited conference, Juraidini, a native of Lebanon, is the author of numerous classified and unclassified articles, research papers and monographs on the Palestinian movement as well as a consultant to several Department of Defense agencies. He is also a regular speaker at the US Air Force Special Operations School on Middle Eastern problems and insurgency.

3 The most fruitful sources of age data on terrorist cadre were governmental reports such as the Spanish *Terrorismo y Justicia en España*, Centro Español de Documentación, Madrid, Spain, 1975. Also useful were academic analyses and polemics such as Ernesto Mayans "Los trabajos y los días, una cronología" (a day-by-day account of Tupamaros operations from 1962 through 1971) in *Tupamaros: Autología Documental*, Edited by Ernesto Mayans, Centro Intercultural de Documentación, Cuernavaca, Mex., 1971. Also useful were *Favola* Broadcast Information Service reporting and the following newspapers: *The New York Times*; *The London Times*; *The Economist*; *Informaciones*, Ya and ABC of Madrid; *La Nación* of Buenos Aires; *O Jornal do Brasil*; *Le Monde*; the English-language *Turkish Daily News* of Ankara; *La Stampa* of Turin; *Il Messaggero di Roma*; *Corriere della Sera* and *Il Giornale* of Milan; and *The Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in West Germany.

4 *Ibid.*

5 See "El papel de la mujer," *Los Tupamaros en Acción*, Editorial Diogenes, Mexico City, Mex., 1972, pp 56-62. This book, with a new prologue by Rogis Debray, is a reprint of an earlier *Tupamaros* handbook published in Argentina under the title *Actos Tupamaros*.

6 See "The Number 1 Terrorist," *Japanese Times Weekly*, 4 March 1975; "Carlos, el terrorista es miembro de FPLP" and "La embajada cubana en Paris, complicada en el terrorismo," *Informaciones*, Madrid, Spain, 11 July 1975 pp 2-3; and the three-part series in *Der Spiegel*, 26 July and 2 and 9 August 1975.

7 See also Dr. Hans-Josef Horehem, *Extremisten in einer selbstbewussten Demokratie*, Freiburg, FRG, 1975, pp 26 and 27. "Women are involved not only as helpers, informants, intelligence collectors but as active fighters who carry pistols up to 9 millimeter under their coats or in their purses which they readily use if necessary to avoid arrest. . . . Of the 22 activists of the RAF nucleus, 12 are women. Of the 20 activists who later augmented the RAF, eight are women. The concept and activity of the RAF are also the result of an explosive emancipation of the participating female activists." (English translation by Howanna H. Miller.)

8 *Siehere Sicherheit*, Bonn, FRG, 14 April 1975, p 1.

9 See note 3 above for general source materials.

10 Rogis Debray, "Prólogo," *Los Tupamaros en Acción*, *op. cit.*

11 Mayans, *op. cit.*

12 See note 3 above for general source materials. See also Rolf Tophoven, *Guerrilla ohne Grenzen*, p 127; "As preguntas a un Tupamaro," *Punto Final*, Santiago, Chile, 2 July 1968, pp 5-8; Andy Tinsler, "The Politics of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla in Brazil," *Konkordia*, October 1970, pp 30-31; "La actividad terrorista en Brasil," *Este & Oeste*, Caracas, Venez., December 1969, pp 8-9; Charles A. Russell, James F. Scheckel and James A. Miller, "Urban Guerrillas in Argentina: A

Select Bibliography," *Latin American Research Review*, Volume 9, Number 3, Fall 1974, pp 51-89; *Il Messaggero di Roma*, Rome, Ital., 10 February 1976; Hubert O. Johnson, *Recent Opposition Movements in Iran*, Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, June 1975, pp 305-20; Interviews with Dr. Paul Juraidini; *Terrorismo y Justicia en España*, *op. cit.*; and Dr. Hans Josef Horehem, "West Germany: The Long March Through the Institutions," and "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," *Conflict Studies*, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, Eng., February 1973 and June 1974.

13 Carlos Marighela, *For the Liberation of Brazil*, Cox & Wyman, London, Eng., 1971, pp 74-75.

14 "El jefe de la brigada antiterrorista herido en un atentado," *Informaciones*, 15 December 1976, p 10; "Comoción en Italia tras los recientes actos de terrorismo," *ABC*, 16 December 1976, p 27; and "Tupamaro a la Italoona," *Cambio 16*, 2-8 February 1976, pp 49-50.

15 Barbara Anne Wilson, *Conflict in the Middle East: The Challenge of the Palestinian Movement*, Center for Research in Social Systems, Washington, DC, January 1969, pp 20-30 and 35-36.

16 See prior citations for source materials as well as *Uster: Politics and Terrorism*, Edited by Brian Crozier, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, Eng., June 1973. See also Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp 259, 305, 331 and 333; and the two *Conflict Studies* by Horehem, *op. cit.*

17 Mayans, *op. cit.*

18 *Ibid.*; Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp 259-320, 331, 333 and 334; *Arab World*, June 1973; "Secretly to Death," *Economist*, 4 June 1972, p 44; *Il Messaggero di Roma*, *Corriere della Sera*, *Il Giornale Nuovo*, 19 January 1976; *Daily America*, Rome, Ital., 20 January 1975; and *Le Monde*, 17 and 24 February 1972.

19 Richard Chatterback, *Terrorismus ohne Chance*, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, FRG, 1975, p 174.

20 See also "La universidad de la República y el Marxismo," *Este & Oeste*, Caracas, Venez., October-November 1971, pp 1-6; "El problema de la Incestral Peronista," *Este & Oeste*, Caracas, Venez., May 1974, p 15; and "El ERP y la subversión de Extrema Izquierda en Argentina," *Este & Oeste*, Caracas, Venez., May 1971, pp 4-10.

21 "El jefe de la brigada antiterrorista herido en un atentado," *Informaciones*, *op. cit.*

22 For a useful review of the political philosophy of terrorists and terrorist groups, see Robert Moss, "The City and Revolution, Political Violence in Western Societies and the Roots of Revolution," *The War for the Cities*, Coward, McCann & Geoughman, Inc., NY, 1972, Chapter 1, pp 17-20; Edward Hyams, *Terrorists and Terrorism: Part I, The Theorists*, St. Martin's Press, Inc., NY, 1974, specifically Chapters 1-4; and Paul Wilkinson, *Political Terrorism*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1974, Chapters 1-3.

23 For detailed information on the political views of the Bander-Meinhof organization and leadership, see *Documentación über Aktivitäten anarquistischer Gewalttäter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Documents on Anarchist Criminals in the Federal Republic of Germany)*, a compendium of confiscated Bander-Meinhof writings seized during raids on terrorists' cells in July 1973 and on 4 February 1974, published by the German Interior Ministry (in German) during 1974.

24 Anthony Burton, *Urban Terrorism: Theory, Practice and Response*, Free Press, NY, 1976, p 109.