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Lasting Effects of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention: The Early Years

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Introduction

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was created by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Pub. L. 93-415). It was officially established in June of 1975, in the U.S. Department of Justice.¹ This paper traces selected lasting effects of the OJJDP from its early years (1975-1982).

OJJDP Priorities

The Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (the JJDP Act), as amended, brought about three major reforms in the juvenile justice system: (1) prohibition of the placement of "status offenders"² and non-offenders (dependent and neglected) in secure (locked) detention or correctional facilities; (2) separation of status offenders and delinquent juveniles from adults in institutional confinement; and (3) prohibition of the secure detention of juveniles in adult jails and police lockups. In addition to these three measures, the JJDP Act served as the catalyst for other juvenile justice reforms.

OJJDP was expected to provide delinquency prevention programs that would result in fewer juveniles reaching the juvenile justice system. Community-based alternatives to incarceration were to be developed for status offenders and nonserious (nonviolent) juvenile

¹Initially an office of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), OJJDP is now an independent program bureau within the administrative structure of the Office of Justice Programs.

²The JJDP Act (at Sec. 223(a)(12)) defined "status offenders" as "juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if committed by an adult." Such offenses include running away, beyond control, truancy, curfew violations, alcohol possession or use, incorrigibility, and the like. It is by virtue of their "status" as juveniles that youngsters are subject to laws prohibiting such behaviors.

offenders. Accomplishing these two aims would help reserve juvenile justice system resources for more serious (violent) juvenile offenders, thereby improving system operations to some extent. Further improvements in the juvenile justice system were needed that would increase its fairness and effectiveness. These three priorities, preventing delinquency, improving the juvenile justice system, and developing alternatives to incarceration were immediately adopted by the Office.

OJJDP's first Presidentially appointed Administrator, Milton Luger (1975-1977), assiduously supported these priorities. A former juvenile corrections administrator, he was philosophically committed to JJDP Act reforms. He saw to it that the Office promulgated regulations consistent with the JJDP Act requirement that in order to receive funds under the Act states must accomplish deinstitutionalization of status offenders (DSO) and separation of juveniles from adults in institutions. (The mandate for removal of juveniles from adult jails and police lockups was added to the JJDP Act in 1980).

John Rector, OJJDP's second Administrator (1977-1979), continued the original thrusts while adding a strong emphasis on youth advocacy, including OJJDP support of litigation to expedite DSO, separation and development of alternatives to incarceration. He introduced a major restitution initiative as means of improving the juvenile justice system.

Ira Schwartz, the Office's third presidential appointee (1979-1981), was Administrator during initial implementation of the 1980 Congressional amendment requiring states to remove juveniles from adult jails and lockups. He continued the youth advocacy and restitution policies of the Rector administration.

The only significant change in OJJDP priorities during the early years occurred during the interim administration of Acting Administrator Charles Lauer (1981-1983). Although the Office had given passing attention to serious, chronic, violent juvenile crime throughout the early years, in response to the 1980 Amendment's emphasis on this type of crime, he implemented it as an OJJDP priority area (see Howell, 1981), while continuing to emphasize the major statutory mandates.

Thus throughout the early years of OJJDP, the Office saw its mission as consisting of three main objectives: delinquency prevention, juvenile justice system improvement and development of alternatives to the juvenile justice system. A major shift in the Office's priorities would occur in the early 1980's, under the administration of Alfred Regnery (1983-1985) who presided over the swinging of the pendulum from the treatment and rehabilitation policies of the previous two decades to punishment and deterrence as central policies.

Each of the following sections highlights selected OJJDP programs producing lasting effects in advancing these three objectives that were funded during the early years of the Office's existence (1975-1982). In addition, OJJDP's efforts to improve juvenile justice system statistics and contributions to program development and evaluation are featured. Space considerations preclude discussion of training and other support activities conducted by OJJDP.

Delinquency Prevention

Delinquency in a Birth Cohort Follow-up and Replication. In 1976 OJJDP funded a 15-year follow-up of a 10% sample of the original Philadelphia birth cohort studied by Wolfgang (1972) and his colleagues (Figlio and Sellin). This research (Wolfgang, Thornberry and Figlio, 1987), which examined the cohort's police records through age 30, provided important information on the extent to which chronic juvenile offenders maintained their deviant careers through their early adult years. The study found that offenses increased in seriousness into adulthood, arrests declined steadily after age 18 (providing initial documentation of the "maturation process") and about one-quarter of the adults had no records as juveniles.

The replication study focused on the cohort of some 28,000 children born in Philadelphia in 1958 who attended school there between the ages of 10 and 17. OJJDP encouraged improvements to the original study, such as including females and supplementing official data with a self-reported measure--which became a common feature of OJJDP-sponsored research. Cohort II males were much more likely than Cohort I to commit a violent index offense and showed a much higher probability of committing additional violent offenses. The offense rate of Cohort II members was higher and their delinquencies were more serious than those of the earlier cohort. The females studied in Cohort II showed less significant chronicity than did males (Tracy, Wolfgang, and Figlio, 1985).

The greatest immediate contributions of this research were its substantiation of the Cohort I findings regarding chronicity among males and its documentation of the increasing severity of delinquency among Philadelphia youths.³ More generally, this research, together with the original Philadelphia birth cohort study, would come to have a tremendous impact on public policy relating to juvenile offenders as well as federal research and program development.

³Due attention has yet to be given to the study's documentation of chronic delinquency among females.

Predicting Adult Careers from Juvenile Careers. Shannon carried out a study under OJJDP sponsorship in the late 1970's that was designed, in part, to serve as a comparison to Wolfgang and his colleague's Philadelphia study. Central to Shannon's research was the question whether similar patterns of chronicity might be found in smaller metropolitan areas. In Racine, Wisconsin, Shannon studied three youth cohorts born in 1942, 1949 and 1955. Although he found slightly less concentration of crime among chronic offenders, the findings regarding criminal patterns were very similar to those of the Philadelphia research. He also found that Racine youths' police contacts for serious crimes peaked earlier than was the case among Philadelphia juveniles. Less well-known is Shannon's examination of the theoretical relationship of juvenile to adult criminal careers. In due course, his findings regarding community characteristics and changes as related to development and maintenance of criminal careers will be widely recognized.⁴

The Young Criminal Years of the Violent Few. Donna Hamparian and her colleagues conducted a cohort analysis of 1200 youths born in Columbus, Ohio in 1956-60 who had at least one violent arrest. Funded by the Lilly Endowment of Indianapolis, this study found that violent juvenile offenders were a very small proportion (2%) of the total cohort; juvenile offenders did not typically progress from less to more serious crime, making it difficult to predict violent behavior; fewer than 10% of the cohort delinquents began their careers with a status offense; and recidivism increased following institutional confinement (Hamparian, et al., 1978).

OJJDP funded a follow-up study of the violent subgroup of the cohort into their mid-20's. It showed that:

- o Almost 60% of these individuals were arrested at least once as a young adult for a felony offense.
- o The first adult arrest was very likely to be prior to age 20.
- o Youths who were subsequently arrested as adults tended to have more arrests as juveniles, to have begun their delinquent acts earlier, to have continued them late into their juvenile years, and to have been involved in the more serious type of violent offenses as juveniles. They tended to have been committed at least once to a state juvenile correctional facility.

⁴For an excellent comparison and detailed discussion of the significance of Wolfgang's and Shannon's research, see Bursik (1989). His entire article is devoted to the two studies.

- o There is a clear continuity between juvenile and adult criminal careers (Hamparian, et al., 1985:3-4).

The Wolfgang, Shannon and Hamparian cohort studies influenced the course of subsequent juvenile delinquency policy, research, and intervention programming in profound ways. As a result of documenting the size of the chronic and violent offender subset, the severity of their offenses, and the relationship of juvenile to adult criminal careers, the juvenile justice system began to target these offenders for priority arrest, prosecution, adjudication and treatment. The findings buttressed arguments for adult court handling of juveniles who have committed serious and violent crimes and were used to support legislation restricting juvenile court jurisdiction in such cases.

Delinquency Prevention Research and Development Program. In 1977, OJJDP established a National Assessment Center on Delinquent Behavior and Its Prevention at the University of Washington. For three years, David Hawkins, Joseph Weis and their colleagues systematically reviewed the best empirical evidence available regarding the correlates, causes and theories of delinquent behavior, and evaluations of delinquency prevention programs. Following this comprehensive review, Hawkins and Weis developed a theoretical model for explaining delinquent behavior, called the "Social Development Model" (1985). Based primarily on a synthesis of control theory (Hirschi, 1969) and learning theory (Patterson, 1982), it identifies the family, school, and peer group as the major social units within which youths develop.

It suggests that the greater the degree of bonding and attachment to others within these social units, the lower the probability of delinquency. The model assumes that bonding in a social unit depends on three factors: (1) the extent to which opportunities for participation in the social unit are available to the child; (2) the skills the child uses in participating in the social unit to complete tasks, solve problems, and interact with others; and (3) the reinforcements or punishments provided through the social unit for behaviors that conform to or violate the unit's expectations.

From a developmental perspective, the formation of a social bond to the family is viewed as critical. Social bonding to the family provides a foundation from which the child can develop bonds to other social units encountered later in the process of social development (Hawkins, et al., 1987).

Beginning in 1980, the comprehensive Social Development Model was tested in Seattle, while the school-based component was implemented in other jurisdictions. OJJDP funding was prematurely terminated in 1983, before the comprehensive model was fully tested, by the new OJJDP Administrator, Alfred Regnery.

Continuation funding was obtained from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) to continue testing the program model. Results to date show that early intervention (grades 1-6) is associated with decreased rates of initiation of tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana use among low-income girls and decreased rates of delinquency among low-income boys. The intervention of teacher and parent training offered teachers and parents in experimental classes had stronger effects with children at risk by virtue of poverty than with subjects from the general population. This suggests that primary preventive interventions through the schools can have positive effects on those at greatest risk (Hawkins, 1991). These results indicate that Hawkins' and Weis' social development model is fulfilling its original promise.

Hawkins and Weis have made a brilliant contribution to delinquency theory. Integrating control and learning theory from a developmental perspective made eminently good sense. Their theory is one of the principal explanations of juvenile delinquency.

Gangs. Walter Miller completed an OJJDP funded pilot study of youth gangs in 1975 that was begun under sponsorship of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The primary aim of the research was to examine the popular notion that violent gangs of the 1950's no longer existed. Miller's study focused primarily on the eight largest U.S. cities among the 12 he studied. He found high levels of gang violence in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia and San Francisco. From data provided him by officials he estimated the youth gang population in these cities at least 760 gangs and 28,500 members. Police data from these cities indicated 525 youth gang-related murders in the three-year period from 1972 through 1974 or 25% of the juvenile homicides for those cities. Miller found that gangs of the 1970's differed from those of 20 years earlier: more violent, increased gun use, less formally organized and more prevalent in schools. (National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1976, pp. 2,8; Miller, 1975, 1976a and 1976b).

The results of this research prompted the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to fund an expansion of Miller's pilot study. His second study (1982) covered the late-1970's and focused on 26 U.S. cities and metropolitan counties. Miller obtained data and other information primarily through interviews with representatives of police departments, public and private youth service agencies, courts, and others.

Miller's respondents reported gang problems in half of the nation's large (over one million population) metropolitan areas. The 10 largest gang-problem cities contained about half the gangs. He estimated that 300 U.S. cities and towns contained about 2,300 youth gangs, with almost 100,000 members. About 3,400 youth gang-related killings were reported for about 60 cities during the 13-

year period preceding 1980 (1982, Ch. IX). His report presents extensive data on a wide variety of issues. Miller's major conclusions were:

- o Crime by members of youth gangs and other youth groups during the 1970's was more serious, more widespread, and more violent than at any time in the history of the Republic.
- o There were more law-violating youth groups and group members in the United States than at any time in the past.
- o Youth gangs were more active in more cities than at any other time.
- o There was a higher concentration of gangs in a single metropolitan area than ever before.
- o Gang crime was more lethal than any time in history; more people were shot, stabbed, and beaten to death in gang-related incidents than during any previous decade.
- o The amount of street crime committed by members of gangs and other kinds of groups reached an all time high.
- o The scope and variety of collective youth crime was greater than at any time during the past. There was an unprecedented proliferation of predatory activities by groups other than gangs, particularly involving robbery, looting, burglary, larceny, and extortion.
- o Members of gangs and other groups were more heavily armed than any time in the past. Such groups have always used weapons, but the prevalence and sophistication of firearms used in the 1970's was unprecedented.
- o The amount of property destruction by gangs and groups through vandalism and arson of schools, residential and commercial buildings, and automobiles was more extensive and costly than in any previous decade.
- o Criminal activity by gangs and groups in and around the public schools including assault, intimidation, extortion, and vandalism, reached unprecedented levels in the 1970's (Miller, 1982:148).

Miller must be given credit for dispelling the myth that "West Side" gangs of the 1950's were a "thing of the past." His research provided baseline national estimates of violent juvenile gangs, the first such empirical estimates to be established. Consequently, his findings will serve as the benchmark for examining changes in the

existence and patterns of gang violence for some time. This research provided some of the basis for his historical accounting of gang programs and theories (1985). Yet another important contribution of Miller's gang research is his conceptualization of the gang-related problem in terms of "law-violating youth groups." Quite properly he has insisted that the group nature of youth violence extends well beyond strictly defined gangs and that gangs are but one sub-type of law violating youth groups (Miller, 1980). Eventually, juvenile delinquency research must come to grips with this reality.

Miller's research had an immediate impact on Federal legislation. In the course of amending the JJDP Act in 1980, Congress encouraged OJJDP to place additional emphasis on serious and violent juvenile crime. In 1988, the JJDP Act was amended by adding a new "Part D--Prevention and Treatment Programs Relating to Juvenile Gangs". Miller's work was influential in both of these developments (Miller, 1978). For many years Miller has urged a more coordinated Federal effort in dealing with youth gangs (Miller, 1990). There is a likelihood that his recommendations in this area will come to fruition as well.

Learning Disabilities Research and Development Program. In 1976, OJJDP established a program designed to document the relative prevalence of learning disabilities (LD) among delinquent and officially non-delinquent populations, and to evaluate the effectiveness of remediation programming for delinquent youths diagnosed as having LD.

The research revealed that based on self-reports, LD youths were not more delinquent than non-LD juveniles, however they were twice as likely to be adjudicated delinquent as non-LD youth. That is, LD youth believed to be involved in delinquency were twice as likely to be officially declared delinquent by the juvenile court than as other youths engaging in similar delinquency. Therefore, the research results suggested the need for training juvenile justice system professionals in the use of procedures for identifying and referring LD youth to remediation programs. OJJDP supported a small program of such training from 1979 to 1984.

The evaluation of the LD remediation curriculum for preventing delinquency found it to be effective. This effort served to sensitize many juvenile justice professionals to the unique needs of specialized juvenile justice system clients.

School Crime Reduction Initiative. This program, funded in 1978, was aimed at preventing and abating school crime through the establishment of "school teams" -- work groups consisting of school staff members and students, which plan, design, and implement improvements in the school climate to help reduce crime, fear of crime, and disruptive behavior. Teacher teams were established in over 200 elementary, middle, and high schools located in 47 cities.

An independent evaluation of the program found the teacher teams approach to be effective under certain conditions:

- o Reductions of disruptive behavior, and attacks on students and teachers were greater in middle than either high or elementary schools.
- o It was more difficult to reduce theft and drug use in schools than to reduce personal victimization, classroom disruption and fear of crime.
- o Elementary and middle school teams were most effective when they sought to improve discipline, security, and the overall safety of the school.
- o Effective elementary school teams addressed the issue of student-teacher relationships.
- o Effective middle school teams worked on improving parent-teacher relationships.
- o Effective high school teams focused on active, responsible participation of both students and adults in solving school problems.

The success of this program, together with another school initiative described below, influenced the development of school interventions across the country and continue to do so.

Delinquency Prevention through Alternative Education. Funded in 1980, this program was designed to prevent delinquency through the development of alternative educational options for youth whose academic and social development needs were not being met in the traditional classroom setting. Alternative program components included vocational education and training, assistance in obtaining employment, counseling, remedial education, and tutoring.

The program evaluation (Gottfredson, 1986) indicated that participating schools showed overall improvement in measures of school safety: especially fewer victimizations of teachers, fewer classroom disruptions, less gang activity at school and less crime in the community. Two of the 17 funded programs were identified through the evaluation as particularly effective in preventing delinquent behavior: Milwood Jr. High in Kalamazoo, Mich. (primarily aimed at improving school climate); and St. Johns High in Charleston, S.C. (focused in part on direct preventive services to high-risk students).

The effective integration of program evaluation and development in this initiative was important to the success of the alternative

education programs. The research team, headed by Gary Gottfredson, Center for Social Organization of Schools at Johns Hopkins University, saw to it that the program evaluation was an integral part of the overall program. Among the many evaluations OJJDP undertook, this effort serves as a model for how to combine an experimental action program evaluation with program implementation.

Juvenile Justice System Improvement

Interstate Placement. Congress amended the JJDP Act in 1977 to authorize a study of the interstate placement of children (Sec. 243). This was one of several research areas Congress authorized OJJDP to pursue.⁵

Congress' interest in interstate placement was stimulated by a 1975-1976 survey conducted by the Children's Defense Fund. It yielded an estimate of 4,491 children having been placed out-of-state at any one time during the two-year period. However, the CDF believed this to be "a very conservative estimate, and that the actual figure may be at least 10,000 (CDF, 1978:59)."

The major aims of this research were to examine state statutes, policies, and procedures regarding the interstate placement of children; conduct a national incidence study; and to conduct field studies focusing on policies and practices regarding the out-of-state placement of children.

This nationwide research effort documented, for the first time, the extent of interstate placements as well as related laws, policies, and practices. It showed that the number of children reportedly placed out of state by state and local public agencies totaled 14,953 in 1978 (Hall et al., 1982:29). (The major reason for the discrepancy between CDF's estimate and the Academy findings is that CDF relied on state officials for the information whereas the Academy surveyed the public agencies handling such children.)

Major findings from the study included:

- o Local juvenile courts and local probation departments initiated and arranged more out-of-state placements than any other type of public agency (Hall, et al., p.30).

⁵The others were the role of family violence, sexual abuse or exploitation and media violence in delinquency, the possible ameliorating roles of recreation and the arts, and the extent to which youth in the juvenile system are treated differently on the basis of sex and the ramifications of such practices (Sec 243(5)).

- o The most common reason given for making out-of-state placements was to send children to live with relatives, in order to maintain family interaction and avoid institutionalization (pp. 46-47).
- o In over 76% of the cases, residential treatment/child care facilities and the homes of relatives were used for placements out-of-state (p. 49).
- o About half were arranged through interstate compacts (p. 64).

Clearly, the most important finding of this study was the large number of children placed out-of-state, separating children, in most instances, from their natural families and home communities. Inconsistent practices in the interstate placement of children were also documented, illustrating that such decisions often appeared not to be in the best interests of the child. As a result of the study, increased public attention was focused on policies and practices in this area. Several states drastically curtailed their interstate placements, focusing instead on attempting harder to meet the needs of children within their own states. This research helped reverse the more than century-old practice of extensive placement of children out-of-state.

Restitution. In 1978, OJJDP funded a national program of 41 restitution projects in 85 sites. These were designed to serve as alternatives to traditional juvenile justice system processing for youth adjudicated delinquent. As alternatives to further processing, youths were ordered to provide restitution to victims in the form of monetary compensation, community service, or direct victim service. The program stressed victim satisfaction, including involvement of victims in the restitution process. Major results of the program evaluation were:

- o During two years of operations, the 85 projects handled more than 18,000 referrals.
- o About half of these had been adjudicated for serious or very serious offenses.
- o Individual projects were very successful in seeing to it that offenders completed court-ordered restitution. (85% of the cases were closed in full compliance with restitution requirements.) On the average, juvenile offenders repaid 75% of the ordered dollar amount, with 90% of the monies repaid coming from themselves.
- o There were virtually no differences in successful completion of restitution orders between serious and minor offenders. Nor did offense seriousness appear to strongly affect the reoffending rate.

- o The reoffense rate, measured in terms of new court contacts while under program supervision, was 9% the first year and 14% the second. In three out of four sites, restitution program youth had statistically lower recidivism rates than did control group youth during a 3-year follow-up period, illustrating a clear suppression effect.
- o With regard to cost-effectiveness, it appeared that restitution should prove to be at least no more costly than probation, and less costly than other dispositions involving incarceration.⁶

Indisputably the most successful program initiative of OJJDP's early years (arguably, ever), the Office has continued to recognize restitution as a policy and program priority. Following completion of the initiative, a nationwide training and technical assistance program was launched, which operates to this day RESTTA (Restitution Education, Specialized Training, and Technical Assistance project).⁷

As noted by Schneider and Warner (1989:1-2), OJJDP served as a catalyst in the development and expansion of the restitution movement. At the time OJJDP launched its program, there were only 15 formal juvenile restitution programs in existence (Schneider and Schneider, 1977). By 1985, 65% of large juvenile court jurisdictions, and 33% of small ones had formal restitution programs (A. Schneider and Warner, 1989:2).

Evaluation of the Unified Delinquency Intervention Services (UDIS) Program. The UDIS program, an experiment designed and funded by the State of Illinois in Chicago, provided a system of "graduated sanctions" for chronic inner-city juvenile offenders. Level I sanctions consisted of less drastic interventions, e.g., arrest and release, temporary detention, and informal supervision. Level II comprised the UDIS program, consisting of community-based services, provided for those who recidivated at Level I. Level III, for those who failed at the second level, consisted of commitment to the Illinois Department of Corrections.

⁶These findings are from summaries of the OJJDP-funded restitution program evaluation by P. Schneider and Bazemore (1985) and A. Schneider and Warner (1989). Other reports of these evaluation results may be found in P. Schneider, A. Schneider, Griffith and Wilson, 1982; A. Schneider and P. Schneider, 1980; P. Schneider, Griffith and A. Schneider 1980; and A. Schneider, (1986).

⁷See A. Schneider, 1985a and A. Schneider and J. Warner, 1989).

In 1979, OJJDP funded a follow-up study of the "suppression effects" of each level of sanctions. This research sought to determine the effectiveness of each type of sanctions in reducing recidivism and suppressing additional crimes. It reveals that:

- o Both the UDIS program and incarceration through the Department of Corrections had a substantial impact on post-program arrests, court appearances, and violent offenses among the chronic offenders.
- o The effects of least drastic interventions, such as arrest and release, temporary detention, and supervision on chronic offenders were minimal.
- o The costs of the UDIS program and Department of Corrections programs were about the same (Murray and Cox, 1979).

This research added to the body of knowledge that community-based programs can be effective in treating high-risk offenders. At the same time, it supported program development for chronic, violent juveniles by demonstrating that programs that incorporate a system of graduated sanctions have a higher likelihood of success.

OJJDP launched two major intervention programs of its own that targeted chronic, serious or violent juvenile offenders--the Serious Habitual Offender Program and the Violent Juvenile Offender Program.

The Serious Habitual Offender Program, begun in 1983, was based on the results of the OJJDP-sponsored cohort research studies by Wolfgang, Shannon and Hamparian. It selected 20 cities in which police, prosecutors, schools, welfare, and probation workers were organized to gather, maintain and share information on their worst juvenile offenders: those with three or more serious (UCR Part I) offenses. These "serious habitual offenders" (SHO's) were given priority attention for arrest and prosecution. The strategy was to "throw the book" at them and, through escalating penalties, to lock them up through their crime-prone years.

In the 20 cities, SHO's comprised less than 2% of all arrested juveniles. Oxnard, California has probably had the most success with the strategy. Recent claims attribute a 38% drop in violent crimes (including a 60% drop in murders) and a 29% decrease in burglaries to the program (Methvin, 1991:4).

Violent Juvenile Offender Research and Development Program, Part I. Established in 1981, this program was designed to test the capability of the juvenile justice system to deal with the chronic, serious, violent offender in an innovative fashion as compared to traditional juvenile justice and adult court intervention. A specific goal of the effort was to test an intervention model for the treatment and reintegration of violent juvenile offenders

designed to reduce violent crimes through an individually-based case management strategy with strong emphasis on planned, integrated aftercare.

A total of 244 males were assigned to treatment or "control" groups. Those provided treatment had been charged with an average of nearly 8 prior offenses, resulting in an average of over 3 prior adjudications each. One-fourth had previously been incarcerated.

Evaluation results showed that:

- o The case management approach helped identify appropriate treatment and ensured a consistent reward structure.
- o Case managers felt that the violent offenders whose treatment they managed made progress in virtually all treatment areas while still in the program.
- o Treatment youths showed the most consistent progress in strengthened family relations.

Had the funded jurisdictions not experienced implementation problems, there is every reason to believe that this program would have been very successful; because the evaluation showed program effectiveness where implementation progressed smoothly, and many of the program elements have been found to be successful in other studies. These include:

- o Case management systems to ensure a consistent reward structure and appropriate treatment;
- o Comprehensive diagnostic assessment and availability of a variety of services to meet individual needs;
- o A correctional system of graduated sanctions;
- o Small residential treatment settings; and
- o A multi-phased approach to gradually moving serious offenders from more secure settings back into the community, with post-program reintegration services.

Youth in Adult Courts. In 1978 OJJDP commissioned the Academy for Contemporary Problems to undertake a nationwide study of adult court handling of juveniles, in order to fill an important knowledge gap. The study was designed to: 1) estimate the number of youth transferred to criminal court; 2) identify the legal procedures by which juveniles were referred to adult court; and 3) identify the types of offenses for which juveniles were referred to adult court and the sentences received. The base year for data collection was 1978. Over 3,100 counties were surveyed and case studies were made in 10 states. Major results follow (Hamparian,

et al., 1982:204-209).

- o In 1978, over 9,000 juveniles were judicially waived to adult court; 2,000 were referred to adult court under concurrent jurisdiction provisions; 1,300 because of excluded offense provisions; and 250,000 16 and 17 year olds due to lower ages of adult court jurisdiction in 12 states.
- o Most juveniles referred to adult courts for trial were not charged with personal offenses.
- o Most of the youth tried in adult courts were convicted or pled guilty.
- o Youth tried in adult courts were more likely to receive community sentences (probation or fine) than incarceration, except for the excluded offense category.
- o Youth convicted as adults and sentenced to adult corrections facilities could probably expect to do more time than they would under juvenile dispositions.

The research team concluded that:

"Our research to date revealed that adult courts in 1978 ordered fines and probation in half of the cases initiated against juveniles through judicial waiver or prosecutorial mechanisms. Further, where confinements were ordered, maximum sentences did not exceed one year in over 40% of the cases. All of these sanctions are normally within juvenile court dispositional powers. More important, if the belief that youth in adult courts receive longer, tougher sentences is erroneous, it suggests that current attempts to ease the referral process may be counterproductive. A study to test the validity of the hypothesis is very much in order (Hamparian, et al., 1982:228)."

This research did not have the impact that it deserved, for two main reasons. First, it was culminated in the early 1980's, at a time when the juvenile and criminal justice policy pendulum was swinging back from treatment and rehabilitation policies to punishment and deterrence. Second, OJJDP did not widely publicize the findings, nor proceed with the planned training and information dissemination. In time, the results of this research will be revisited.

Juvenile Justice Standards. During the 1970's four major sets of standards addressing virtually every aspect of the administration of juvenile justice were developed by:

- o The Institute for Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile

- Justice Standards;
- o The National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals' Task Force on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention;
- o The National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and the
- o The American Correctional Association's Commission on Accreditation for Corrections.

These efforts resulted in 30 volumes of standards related to juvenile justice.

The juvenile justice standards developed with the support of OJJDP were those of the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1980). Congress had mandated their development in the original legislation. They were expected to be "consistent with" the provisions of the JJDP Act. They were. They provided a national bench mark against which state juvenile codes could be measured. Beyond developing the standards and providing initial training in understanding and sorting through the volumes, OJJDP did little to support their widespread implementation.

OJJDP supported the development of model policies and procedures for juvenile detention and correctional facilities that were a synthesis of compatible standards. In part, this was a technical assistance tool for meeting the American Correctional Association (ACA) accreditation requirement of having policies and procedures relating to all of the various standards. Out of this project OJJDP selected several National Juvenile Detention Resource Centers to serve as host training and technical assistance centers for those in the field interested in building upon the Model policies and procedures (One still exists in Ft. Meyers, Florida). There was limited, sporadic support for the ACA Juvenile Accreditation Process as a means of standards implementation (Allen-Hagen and Howell, 1982).

It is impossible to assess the long term impact of the juvenile justice standards. A few states systematically reviewed the various sets of national standards and incorporated some of their provisions into their state juvenile codes. Potential for more lasting impact rests with a new effort Congress required OJJDP to undertake in 1988--a national study of "conditions of confinement" in juvenile corrections. Part of this study involves assessing the extent to which such conditions are consistent with national standards. This effort is underway.

Alternatives to the Juvenile Justice System

Massachusetts Juvenile Corrections Reforms. In 1969, the Director of Youth Services resigned following a series of crises in the State training schools. His successor, Dr. Jerome Miller, took office with a mandate to develop new programs. Over the next two years, Miller established "therapeutic communities" within the existing training schools, but adherents of the old custodial philosophy resisted his reforms. By 1971, Miller concluded that therapeutic communities could not be run successfully within the traditional training schools. He closed the training schools and replaced them with a network of decentralized community-based services and a few, small secure-care units for violent juvenile offenders.

The Massachusetts changes constituted the most sweeping reforms in youth corrections in the United States since the establishment of juvenile training schools and juvenile courts in the nineteenth century. Miller demonstrated that juvenile corrections need not be centered around large training schools.⁸

Massachusetts' juvenile corrections reforms were extensively and carefully studied for almost a decade by a team of Harvard University researchers headed by Lloyd E. Ohlin. His principal colleagues in the effort were Alden D. Miller and Robert B. Coates. Their research, sponsored mainly by the OJJDP, yielded six books and numerous other works.⁹

⁸From 1971 to 1975 development of community-based programs in Massachusetts was supported in part by LEAA funds; from 1975 to the present, with JJDP Act formula grant funds awarded to the state by LEAA and OJJDP.

⁹For a detailed historical account of the reform effort see Ohlin, Coates and Miller, Reforming Juvenile Corrections: The Massachusetts Experience. For an analysis of the change process see Miller, Ohlin and Coates, A Theory of Social Reform: Correctional changes Processes in Two States. Coates, Miller, and Ohlin, Diversity in a Youth Correctional System examines the effectiveness of the diverse programs established in the state as alternatives to the training school system. Designing Correctional Organizations for Youths: Dilemmas of Subcultural Development (McEwen) provides a detailed examination of problems encountered in both innovative and traditional correctional programs. Neutralizing Inmate Violence: Juvenile Offenders in Institutions (Feld) examines the connection between the official correctional organization and inmate subcultures. Finally, Delinquency and Community: Creating Opportunities and Controls (Miller and Ohlin) provides an overview

These studies began when Jerome Miller was appointed Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services in 1969. Ohlin, Miller and Coates took full advantage of the opportunity to not only evaluate the effectiveness of the community-based programs Commissioner Miller established in Massachusetts to replace the training schools, but also carefully studied the reform process.

Their research focused on five major issue areas (Miller and Ohlin, 1985:24-27):

The first compared traditional training school regimens with milieu therapy cottages Commissioner Miller established before closing the institutions. The guided-group interaction forms of treatment reduced acts of violence and neutralized the oppositional nature of subcultures in the institutions. Thus the innovative treatment programs the Commissioner developed were more successful than he realized (Feld, 1977).

The second extended the subculture studies to the community-based programs. Isolated residential programs had much the same effects as the institutional cottages Commissioner Miller had established. However, the lack of follow-up services following release resulted in less durable gains than might otherwise have been realized. More enduring changes were found among clients provided treatment in the more open nonresidential programs (McEwen, 1977).

The third involved comparing the recidivism (defined as subsequent contacts with juvenile or adult criminal justice agencies) of institutional versus community-based programs. Training school graduates showed overall slightly lower rates of rearrest or reconviction. However, where community-based programs were more firmly in place, lower recidivism rates were found among community-based program graduates (Coates, Miller and Ohlin, 1977).

Perhaps the most important finding of this study, however, pertained to the short-term impact of most forms of treatment. Although the results documented positive changes in youth, especially in many of the group process programs, these changes correlated less highly with recidivism than the experiences of youth before adjudication and after release from the programs to unsupervised living in the community. It thus appears that youth correctional programs will have

of the research results with particular focus on the requirements of community-based delinquency prevention. Other publications on this landmark research include Coates and Miller (1973), Coates, Miller and Ohlin (1973), and Miller, Ohlin and Coates (1977b). Also, see Jerome Miller's (1973) view of the politics of correctional reform. For more recent updates on the status of Massachusetts' reforms, see Arnaud and Mack (1982) Loughran (1990) and Lerner (1991).

limited short-term effects unless they engage the relationships and problems a youth must deal with when free of correctional supervision. In short, community-based programs must be more fully integrated into the everyday life of the community... (Miller and Ohlin, 1985:26).

The fourth concerned the study of social and organizational change in the reform process. In perhaps the most innovative feature of this research, Alden Miller developed a theoretical scheme that identified and tracked the interest groups and coalitions that influenced the reform process. Rooted in several social science theories of individual and group behavior, this model permitted simulation as well as projections of interactions to predict the future of the reform and counter-reform process (Miller, Ohlin and Coates, 1977).

The fifth involved an examination from the standpoint of delinquency prevention of the integration of community-based correctional program services with the differential opportunity structure of the community. Miller and Ohlin concluded:

If we wish to develop better delinquency prevention and control policies and programs for youth in the future, it will be necessary to understand more fully how they can be organized and integrated in communities prepared to accept responsibility for a major part of the problem and its solution (1985:27).

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency conducted a 1984-1985 study funded by the Edna McConnel Clark Foundation, of Massachusetts' Department of Youth Services that constituted a 10-year follow-up of the evaluation carried out by Ohlin and his colleagues. Designed to examine the effectiveness of current youth services for delinquent youth, it compared the Massachusetts' juvenile corrections programs with that of California. It revealed that youth who spent five months in a Massachusetts program followed by supervision in the community had a rearrest rate of 51%, while youths who spent 14 months in a California institution had a rearrest rate of 70%. Of those released from Massachusetts correctional programs, only 23% were reincarcerated while 62% were reincarcerated in California. This study also found that youths under community-based supervision in Massachusetts accounted for a small fraction of crimes in the State, and that there was a tendency over time for these youths to commit less serious crimes (Krisberg, Austin and Steele, 1989).

Other states have followed Massachusetts' lead in closing large training schools and replacing them with community-based programs. Pennsylvania has closed its training school and provided a combination of programs run by the state and private organizations. Utah has opted for community-based programs in lieu of training schools. Maryland has closed one training school and reduced the

population of the remaining one. Florida has reduced its training school population and developed some community-based programs (Lerner, 1990:12)

Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO). In 1976, OJJDP funded 13 DSO projects that had as their major objective deinstitutionalization of status offenders, primarily through the creation of alternatives to detention and prohibiting, through legislation and policy, their placement in detention centers and training schools. It was anticipated that community-based programs would reduce the recidivism rate among status offenders. The DSO projects provided a variety of alternatives to detention and incarceration, including foster homes, shelter-care, and home detention. Eight of these projects were included in an independent national evaluation funded by OJJDP. These projects served more than 16,000 youths over a two-year period.

It is not possible to do justice to the results of the DSO evaluation here. A full discussion may be found in Kobrin and Klein (1983).¹⁰

Ann Schneider (1985) carefully reviewed more than 70 empirical studies of DSO, covering 38 different programs, including OJJDP's, in 19 states. Her findings included:

- o Comparisons of DSO and "nonDSO" youths generally showed no differences in recidivism.
- o Commitment of status offenders to public correctional institutions has declined since the beginning of the Federal effort in 1974, but it has not been ended. There has been a substantial increase in commitments to private correctional institutions.
- o The impact of DSO on local detention is not clear.
- o Both major strategies for reducing or eliminating the secure confinement of status offenders, developing alternative programs and issuing absolute prohibitions against confinement, produced unintended side effects.
- o Many jurisdictions that developed alternatives without prohibiting confinement experienced "net widening"

¹⁰This book is a commercial publication of the three-volume report made to OJJDP (Kobrin and Klein, 1980). See especially the Executive Summary to the report to OJJDP (Kobrin and Klein, 1980a), and in their 1980 SAGE book, the concluding chapter, "DSO Realities and Implications: A Summary Statement", pp. 270-322; and the Appendix (pp.323-324), which lists over 20 publications based on DSO evaluation data. Also, see Klein (1978).

effects.

- o The absolute prohibitions against confinement produced changes in the use of discretion, popularly termed "relabeling," which resulted in many of the cases that previously might have been treated as status offenders being handled as minor (delinquent) offenses.
- o Available data on the juvenile justice system suggest a continued recognition of the need to provide services to juveniles whose behavior is noncriminal, though troublesome. The trend is toward less restrictive environments in which to provide those services (A. Schneider, 1985:v-vi).

The DSO evaluation results spurred OJJDP to undertake a more concerted effort to help States accomplish status offender deinstitutionalization. These findings provided a basis for arguments that exceptions should be made to DSO for chronic status offenders. In 1980 the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges persuaded Congress to amend the JJDP Act to permit incarceration of status offenders who violate valid court orders. Aimed at chronic status offenders, this provision remains in effect.

This major DSO experiment and its evaluation made a number of important contributions to juvenile justice programming. On the one hand, the results illustrated that DSO was possible and could be cost-effective; on the other, they demonstrated that accomplishing DSO through systemic changes was more difficult than many believed. In general, this grand-scale experiment helped focus national attention on juvenile justice system handling of status offenders and helped initiate serious efforts to provide programming to meet their needs.

Perhaps the longest lasting lesson of the DSO program was recently and succinctly stated by OJJDP's present Administrator, Robert W. Sweet, Jr.:

Removing noncriminal juveniles from secure confinement may well prove to be the easiest part of the process. Ensuring effective programs and services that reduce recidivism and deter future status offenses or delinquent acts is the far more complex challenge facing those not simply pursuing compliance with the JJDP Act, but seeking to build a juvenile justice system that helps our troubled youth, strengthens our families, and protects our citizens (Sweet, 1991:414-415).

Statistics Improvement

Shortly after its establishment, OJJDP undertook efforts to

improve juvenile justice system statistics on juvenile crime and offenders as well as delinquent behavior and victimization. Having recognized that national-level data on juvenile crime were inadequate, OJJDP sought to improve juvenile delinquency data regarding police arrests, court processing, correctional confinement, self-reports, and victimization. Attention was initially focused on juvenile corrections and juvenile courts.

Detention and Corrections Data. Prior to 1971, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) conducted an annual survey of public juvenile correctional facilities for adjudicated children and diagnostic or reception centers. Reports were published under the title, Statistics on Public Institutions for Delinquent Children.

From 1971 through 1977 (except for 1972 and 1976), Children in Custody, a bureau of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS--now the Bureau of Justice Statistics), sponsored the census, which produces reports entitled Children in Custody. The census was broadened in 1971 to include public facilities serving children awaiting court action as well as adjudicated youth. Shelter care facilities and detention centers were added to the enumerated facilities.

Following creation of the Office in 1975, OJJDP began working with NCJISS to expand and modify the census to produce information that would be more compatible with JJDP Act objectives. Differentiating between "institutional" and "open" facilities¹¹ and adding private facilities were the most significant changes during the late 1970's. OJJDP began funding the census in 1979. As a result of OJJDP-inspired enhancements the Children in Custody Census has become a more useful source of information on national detention and incarceration trends and a more effective tool to examine such issues as the extent to which status offenders have been deinstitutionalized.

Court Processing. Federal collection of juvenile court data began in 1926, with voluntary submission of statistical forms on each case handled by about 100 courts. Juvenile Court Statistics reports were based on these. Growth in the number of juvenile courts and the number of cases handled precluded maintenance of this system by the mid-1930's. At that point, courts were asked to submit aggregate reports of the number of different types of cases courts

¹¹Facilities were classified as "open" if they displayed a relatively high degree of client access to community resources and a low degree of physical and staff controls. In contrast, limited access to the community and prevalence of relatively strong control measures were taken as indicators of an "institutional" setting.

handled each year. Thus the Juvenile Court Statistics report became an aggregate national summary.

Following enactment of the JJDP Act, Federal responsibility for reporting such data ensued to OJJDP. The Office awarded a grant to the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ), the research arm of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, to continue, expand and improve national data collection and to produce the annual Juvenile Court Statistics report. By the early 1980's, NCJJ had succeeded in transforming the data base back into detailed case-level information through voluntary collection of automated files that some states required their courts to complete. (Simultaneously, OJJDP supported development and transfer of an automated juvenile court information system.) Consequently, the national information on juvenile court handling is now comprehensive and a growing National Juvenile Court Data Archive has been established and maintained that can be used for policy analyses and program development.¹²

Police Data. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation has always been committed to improving its data and has been most cooperative whenever OJJDP or its grantees required access to its data files, the Bureau's resources and the cost of advanced technology to police departments have precluded making desired enhancements to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) until recently.

In 1982, the Bureau of Justice Statistics funded a comprehensive study of the UCR program, which presented its recommendation in its 1985 report, Blueprint for the Future of the UCR Program (Poggio, et al.). Following a 1987 pilot study, the FBI began a nationwide program to update the UCR with a new system, the National Incident-Based Reporting System, under which law enforcement agencies are asked to provide detailed information on each crime and related criminal incidents, including offender characteristics, all charges (instead of only the most serious one), the victim-offender relationship, and circumstances surrounding the incident.

Self-Reported Delinquency. The National Institute of Mental Health began funding the National Youth Survey (NYS) of self-reported delinquency, alcohol, and drug use, and other problem behavior in 1975. OJJDP joined in its funding in 1978. In addition to partially funding the second through fifth years, OJJDP fully sponsored the addition of the drug component. NYS uses a longitudinal prospective probability sample of youth aged 11-17 in 1976 and 21-27 in 1986.

Estimating the contributions of the NYS to the juvenile delinquency

¹²For more detailed information, see National Center for Juvenile Justice, Guide to the Data Sets in the National Juvenile Court Archive. Washington, D.C.: OJJDP, November 1991.

field is a challenging task. At a minimum, this body of work constitutes an enormous addition to: 1) our understanding of the causes and correlates of delinquency; 2) theory-building, through development and testing of an integrated theory; and 3) the state-of-the-art of conducting self-reported research (Elliott, Huizinga and Ageton, 1985; Elliott, Ageton and Canter, 1979).

The addition of the drug component to the NYS represents a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship between juvenile delinquency and drug use. Before the survey, the causal order of these phenomena was unknown. Examination of the survey results from 1976 through 1983 by Elliott and his colleagues has shown that while delinquency and drug use were positively associated, there was no evidence that drug use causes delinquency except sexual assault and chronic involvement in serious forms of delinquency. The researchers concluded that the relationship between drug use and FBI "index" crimes appeared to be developmental rather than causal. (Elliott, Huizinga and Menard, 1989; Huizinga, Menard, and Elliott, 1989; and Menard and Huizinga, 1989).

This research made an important contribution to the debate on how to treat juvenile delinquent drug abusers by documenting the shared causality of delinquency, drug abuse and mental health problems. Over the past decade, strategies developed to combat and treat drug abuse among juvenile delinquents have tended to ignore the interrelationship of the three phenomena and tried to treat them separately. Eventually, this research will serve to guide development of programs that treat delinquency, drug abuse and mental health problems concurrently.

OJJDP's efforts to improve juvenile justice system statistics would continue throughout the 1980's. An important bench mark was achieved in the latter part of the 1980's with the completion of a comprehensive national assessment of the quality and usefulness of juvenile justice statistics (Lynch, Allen-Hagen, and Lindgren, 1989), which would provide a long-term plan for major upgrading of such data in order to make them more useful both for policy formulation and research.

Program Development and Evaluation

OJJDP has also made a lasting contribution to juvenile delinquency program development by virtue of the procedures it followed in the early years in the development and implementation of major program initiatives. The design of each action program was preceded by an assessment of current knowledge. Results of this assessment were then used to determine the goals and specific objectives of each program. Evaluation, often experimental, commenced with program

implementation. In some instances, the Office brought the evaluation team on board before funding the program.¹³

As a consequence of these steps, OJJDP was commended by Congress, and the above approach was recommended to other Federal agencies, (some of which subsequently adopted it to some degree). More importantly, the Office's approach to integrating research, program development and evaluation contributed to integration of these enterprises at state and local levels. Practitioners and researchers began to develop a more healthy respect for each other. Practitioners and policy makers became more interested in research and evaluation results, and researchers became more sensitive to the perspective and political constraints of practitioners.

Conclusion

OJJDP was created by Congress to serve as the first major federal agency charged with responsibility for the national coordination of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention activities. In many respects, the Office constituted an experiment. There were failures among the early programs it supported. On the other hand, some notable successes were realized in the early years as the Office sought to advance the state-of-the-art of juvenile delinquency.

At the federal level, OJJDP succeeded in establishing its presence and in ensuring that the juvenile justice system was recognized as a separate and necessary entity in the nation's criminal justice apparatus. It began the endless task of convincing federal, state and local policy makers that if America is to combat crime effectively, prevention of juvenile delinquency must be the starting point. At the same time, a forum was provided for juvenile delinquency research and program development.

Although fully tracing the lasting effects of early OJJDP programs and research is a futile exercise, a number of tangible results have been noted. These may be summarized as follows:

Delinquency Prevention:

- o enhanced understanding of the development, maintenance, and desistence of delinquent careers into young

¹³LaMar T. Empey was instrumental in the development of this integrated approach in OJJDP. His advice was incorporated into an important publication (1976) that Office staff used for guidance and also distributed throughout the Country for the benefit of practitioners and researchers.

adulthood;

- o substantiation and expansion of knowledge regarding chronicity among juvenile delinquents;
- o initiation of the development of new delinquency prevention theory and interventions;
- o development of national information on youth gangs and collective youth crime; and
- o development of programs for preventing school violence.

Juvenile Justice System Improvement:

- o development, and nationwide implementation of restitution programming;
- o identification of the common denominators of effective treatment and control programs for serious, chronic and violent juvenile offenders; and
- o development and proliferation of standards for the administration of juvenile justice.

Alternatives to the Juvenile Justice System:

- o support and study of statewide juvenile corrections reforms; and
- o deinstitutionalization of status offenders.

In addition, OJJDP has made major contributions to improvement of national statistics on juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice, and program development and evaluation.

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