



THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION:
EVOLUTION VS. REVOLUTION

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JUVENILE JUSTICE REVOLUTIONS

The development of juvenile justice administration reflects an uneven set of events that have been revolutionary rather than evolutionary in nature (See, for e.g., Lemert, 1970). The first, at the end of the 19th Century, was the result of morally indignant citizens who demanded the separation of juvenile from adult offenders. As a consequence of their work, they helped to establish the juvenile court.

These "moral entrepreneurs" (Platt, 1969) believed that children could be saved, provided they were diagnosed and treated. Based on the concept of *parens patriae*, the court proceeded to individualize these juvenile offenders, create child guidance clinics to work with troubled youth, and utilize indeterminate sentencing. Flowing from the growth of professionalism and psychoanalytic theory, the courts expanded throughout the country and made decisions ostensibly based on the "best interests of the child."

The administration of juvenile justice, therefore, remained essentially a local process, since most courts and their attendant probation departments were county operations. However, as an adjunct to this revolutionary development, states came into the picture as they developed training and/or reform schools to which adjudicated youth could be committed. Bureaucracies flourished while these state agencies expanded operations, including the development of aftercare programs for those youths released from the state facilities.

For the most part, youths up to the age of 18 were caught up in an ever-widening social service and social casework net as well-meaning care-givers provided "professional" services to the youths and their families. Laws were enacted to give the juvenile court more and more authority to deal with delinquent and status offenders, as well as dependent and neglected children.

The second major revolution in juvenile justice administration occurred with the *Gault* decision (*In re Gault*, May 15, 1967), which drastically changed in theory and practice the idea that constitutional safeguards could be forever minimized or neglected by the courts. In this historic

Supreme Court decision, the justices stated that in many ways a juvenile court hearing is similar to a criminal proceeding and, as such, a juvenile is entitled to due process of law.

As a consequence of *Gault*, the courts could no longer pretend that proceedings were not adversarial in nature or that they were privileged to do whatever they wished according to the "best interests of the child" and behind a screen of confidentiality. This significant change in operations not only unleashed the lawyers, it affected such issues as rules of evidence, appeals, the nature of the various hearings, detention, and commitments, among others.

Although juvenile courts continue even today to cling to individualization and treatment efforts, a third revolution occurred. Impacted by the results of various studies, especially by those which claimed that "nothing works" (See especially Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks, 1975), the juvenile justice system resisted the change in philosophy that overcame the adult criminal justice system.

Here, incapacitation rather than treatment - a response to political intimidation, became the overriding goal. Yet, even the California Youth Authority succumbed and changed its programmatic priorities accordingly. The "rehabilitative ideal," as defined by Allen (1964) began to shrink in importance throughout the adult and juvenile justice systems.

Within the last two decades, a fourth revolutionary change in juvenile justice administration occurred, primarily as a result of federal intervention. While both the courts and juvenile institutions treated adjudicated and non-adjudicated (status offender) youths as though they were part of a homogeneous population, federal impetus developed to separate them. Further, there was a pronounced effort by federal agencies to separate all juveniles from adults where correctional facilities are concerned.

Both local courts and state programs have been dramatically affected by this effort, especially as a result of inadequate detention and commitment resources and because they were unprepared for such programmatic and philosophical changes. Nonetheless, federal agencies, such as the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), have rigorously pursued these efforts as they have promulgated standards and enforced them, especially through control over the availability of funds.

Concomitant with this revolution have been three other significant developments. Although primarily directed at adult systems, juvenile justice administration also has been caught up in "consent decrees." Here, the courts have responded to suits which allege constitutional deficiencies in operations as well as physical plants and are forcing changes, frequently against the will and

desires of administrators. Even though many court-imposed changes have been viewed positively, the dearth of resources has mitigated against their implementation in a speedy manner.

A second development has been the upswing in programmatic innovations or alternative sanctions/dispositions. These have included intensive supervision programs (which frequently are no different from what probation was years ago), house arrest and electronic monitoring, community service, and restitution programs, among others.

A third development has been that of privatization. Although much more popular within the adult system, privatization has been accepted on a tentative basis within juvenile justice administration. For decades, there have been private vendors in such areas as residential treatment programs and in the provision of other rehabilitative services, but private probation has entered the field as well. (See, for e.g., OJJDP, 1989 and Jengeleski, 1986.)

The extent to which such privatization is a trend that will increase or will plateau is yet to be determined. However, in view of increased caseloads, overcrowded facilities, diminished resources, reduced budgets, and heightened concern by citizens and legislators for swift responses to the increasing numbers of violent, chronic offenders, the likelihood of increased use of privatized resources appears to be inevitable, even though such efforts tend to be resisted by many administrators, as well as line staffs and their unions.

The fifth and current revolution is concerned with the "politics of fear." As though we had reverted to Classical criminological times where offenders (adult or juvenile) were thought to commit offenses as a consequence of free will and the avoidance of pain, law-makers have come down hard on law-breakers. The average citizen is not only frightened, he or she is almost willing to discard constitutional safeguards in order to incapacitate the chronic, violent offender, and claims to be willing to pay for increased incapacitative services.

As a consequence, we no longer hear the old slogans of "let the punishment fit the crime" and "sure and swift punishment." Instead, the new slogan is "three strikes and you're out." Irrationality is replacing rationality as we attempt to build our way out of this situation with more correctional facilities than are affordable. This madness has also resulted in more and more youths being certified or transferred to criminal courts, where they are tried as adults and committed to adult institutions.

Just as mandatory minimum sentences, harsh sentencing guidelines, and the curtailment or abolition of parole have overtaken the adult system, the juvenile justice system is likely to witness similar changes in the law for youthful, but violent, chronic offenders.

While there is no one who can predict exactly when this fifth revolution will end, the likelihood of even more harsh and punitive responses to the current delinquency and crime problem will not abate in the near future. In fact, conditions are likely to get worse before they will get better.

A sixth revolution, perhaps, is in the making. Spurred by the work of Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and Vice President Gore's national task force, the notion of "reinventing government" has taken the country by storm and is achieving widespread consideration. Additionally, the seminal ideas of W. Edwards Deming concerning what has come to be known as "Total Quality Management" have had a significant influence on business, industry, and government.

Both reinventing government and TQM are not necessarily new in and of themselves, for they build upon the works of many others. However, both not only capture the imagination of top-level policy-makers and administrators, they make sense as alternative styles of organizational structure, operations, and management.

The extent to which these ideas will impact juvenile justice administration, however, is problematic; thus, whether or not there will be a sixth revolution is questionable, as will be discussed later.

FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP

An examination of the five actual revolutions in juvenile justice administration suggests that these dramatic changes in philosophy, operations, and processes have been instituted primarily by external agents. That is, except for the creation of the juvenile court itself and the development of some innovative programs, almost all of the significant changes have been imposed upon the system and, frequently, against the desires and wishes of its top-level administrators (including juvenile court judges).

This suggests that like their counterparts in the adult system, juvenile justice administrators have been failures as leaders. They have not developed a sense of vision; they have not engaged in strategic planning; they have not attempted to develop a true system of justice; they have not evaluated programs and/or policies and procedures; and they have resisted efforts at improvement.

While I have described these adult correctional managers as "failures" insofar as leadership is concerned in a series of articles over the years (See Cohn, 1973, 1979, 1981, 1987, and 1991), much of what I have discussed is equally applicable at the juvenile level of operations.

By and large, we can find few examples of institutional leadership on the part of juvenile court judges. Except for permanency planning, these judges have not assumed the mantle of

advocacy, nor have they attempted to evaluate existing programs in order to determine their efficacy. The courts and all other juvenile justice services have been bludgeoned repeatedly by appellate courts, law enforcement, prosecution, citizen groups, and the media. Much of this criticism is unfair, especially since the so-called system traditionally does not deal with offending youths unless and until they have been brought before the courts. Prevention has been synonymous with recidivism reduction.

However, from an organizational perspective, we have not witnessed a willingness by justice managers to confront, utilize, and otherwise deal with change in a constructive manner. The courts tend to be organized programmatically in much the same manner as when they were created a century ago. Juvenile institutions, with or without effective treatment and training strategies, operate as they have for decades, albeit with tremendous overcrowding. And, state agencies have become mega-bureaucracies that are rule-bound, but do not help to alleviate problems, problem-solve, or develop the needed resources to implement reasonable and appropriate standards.

MISSION AND PHILOSOPHY

I have suggested (Cohn, 1991) that there are two kinds of administrators in the system. The first can be described as *pedestrian*; that is, he or she lacks vision, is reactive, sees change as a hindrance to management, takes the job one day at a time, does not particularly plan for the future, and seeks to keep his or her agency alive by dealing with superordinates in a careful and non-disruptive manner.

The *progressive* administrator, on the other hand, has a sense of vision, is proactive, recognizes that change is inevitable and therefore seeks to harness it in constructive ways, works to develop a true system of services, is innovative when it comes to programming, develops policies and procedures that are responsible and responsive to client and community needs, seeks community involvement where appropriate, and provides leadership for staff as well in his or her dealings with superordinates.

It is the progressive administrator who constantly evaluates programs and personnel in fair and meaningful ways and is prepared to change that which needs to be changed. He or she accepts differences of opinion as helpful rather than as a hindrance and views conflict as a springboard to change. The progressive manager is realistic about contemporary values and beliefs, especially those espoused by the public and by law-makers, and seeks to adapt in a constructive manner.

The progressive administrator, regardless of locus, perceives the agency's mission as that of providing care and custody of those offenders under supervision while simultaneously and to the

extent possible ensuring public safety. He or she translates these lofty goals into programmatic activities, with appropriate and needed resources. There is a constant attempt to ensure the attainment of goals and objectives through a delivery system of services and in a cost-effective manner.

Additionally, the progressive manager respects public values and sentiments, while simultaneously respecting the rights, needs, and dignity of those under supervision as well as the agency staff.

ROLE OF TOP MANAGEMENT

The role of top management, then, is to have a sense of vision and to translate that vision into a set of understandable, attainable, and reasonable goals; develop programs to implement those goals; to create and deploy appropriate resources to ensure an effective delivery system of services; and to provide for on-going evaluations to determine successes and failures of programs.

The key to an effective organization has to be related to responsible and responsive programming as well as organizational arrangements, which can be translated into action strategies by a cadre of trained and committed staff.

Therefore, a delicate balancing act is required on the part of administrators; that is, the development of a set of strategies that recognizes societal, staff, and offender needs while simultaneously developing and deploying those resources required for implementation.

If we define a formal organization as a social system of people in interaction in goal-directed behavior, then we are forced to recognize the systemic nature of any agency's operations. Although composed of several units or divisions, a successful and effective juvenile justice organization must respect and operate as a system and, hopefully, in synergistic ways. It must accept the fact that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

As English (1993) has suggested, the operations of such an agency is analogous to an orchestra: all units must operate in concert and harmoniously to create a pleasant sound. When an agency operates in an orchestrated manner and with an appropriate leader, it can attain its stated goals and fulfill its mission.

No organization is ever static; rather, it is always in a dynamic state of tension - tension over goals, strategies, needs, values, philosophies, internal and external pressures, and the needs and desires of stakeholders, staff, and superordinates. And the tension never ceases, it only changes in substance and in direction.

More so than ever before, juvenile justice administration can no longer operate as a 'closed' system where until recently the walls around a correctional facility kept people out as well as offenders in. The system has been opened through judicial intervention, and as a result of concerned legislatures and frightened citizens, who have come to demand higher levels of organizational success and effectiveness.

Consequently, both juvenile and adult court and correctional administrators are being asked to do and accomplish more, but with fewer resources. And, this occurs in the context of a changing society in which some offenders have become more chronic and violent in their drug-dependent, criminal and delinquent behavior.

Therefore, it must be clearly understood that it is not good public policy to reach for alternative programmatic or organizational alternatives merely as a response to public or political rhetoric. Changes must be planned, appropriate, and congruent with agency mission. Changes should be developed because they are 'right' and right for the total system. Changes must also 'fit' into the organization's structure, be acceptable to staff who are responsible for implementation, and because they are appropriate for the care and custody of clients and in the interests of public safety.

Changes are right and they fit even more so when the agency can accomplish its declared mission more effectively, when they are cost-effective, and when they simply amount to good public policy. Changes are right and fit, moreover, when they help to reduce delinquency and crime and when the organization increases its productivity (i.e., its success).

This productivity should never translate into bigger and better numbers, which relate directly to what Selznick (1957:27) has called "organizational achievements." These are all the numbers that reflect activities and processes, such as numbers of cases handled, dispositions, commitments, training hours, new pieces of equipment, and new forms and manuals, as examples. Not one of these alone nor all of them collectively address the issue of goal attainment. They are, however, valuable indices of work and reflect activities about which the agency can take pride.

On the other hand, this productivity should relate to what Selznick calls "institutional success," which reflects on the attainment of explicit agency goals and addresses the question: How well are we doing in meeting our goals? If, for example, the agency has a goal of reducing recidivism, then institutional success is measured by the degree to which that goal has been attained. Numbers are important for they tell us what has occurred. But, goals are more important, for their accomplishment tells us how successful the organization really is.

IS TQM A PANACEA OR PALLIATIVE?

Over the years, business and industrial organizations have involved themselves with fads, which have been developed by well-intentioned theorists preoccupied with finding different and better ways of doing business. Government has always lagged behind business and industry and juvenile and adult justice organizations have even been more laggard. This has occurred either as a result of resistance to change and/or ignorance of the new ideas and movements.

English (1993: 17) summarizes the situation as follows:

If we examine the public bureaucracies in which juvenile justice programs and services are delivered, we find that they mirror the outdated, top-down management protocols of mass-production industrial economics.

This approach has led to a juvenile justice bureaucracy whose hallmarks include categorical funding; large caseloads; top-down management; limited professional training; and accountability based on eligibility, rule compliance, and contract monitoring.

What English and others indicate is that we have developed bigger but not necessarily better government, which is ruled by ever-increasing bureaucratization. Further, we have become so rule-bound, that there is hardly any room for the progressive administrator to innovate or create. Further, we have witnessed a set of conditions which reveals that line staff have decreasing authority, state and federally imposed standards and regulations increasingly strangle rather than help, and communities are less and less empowered to assist in policy-making and priority-setting in juvenile justice as in almost all other areas of government activity.

It is interesting to note that the development of community-based services and programs is on the increase programmatically both in juvenile and adult corrections. However, such activities tend to be developed without real community involvement and certainly no empowerment. As we listen to some administrators in the field, it is as though such a development is truly new and innovative. However, just the opposite is true.

As long as 60 years ago, the Chicago Area Project was developed to reduce delinquency by involving indigenous community leaders in the planning and development of community-based programs. The same model was utilized in the creation of Mobilization for Youth in New York. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was also created according to this same kind of model, which required the involvement of professionals and lay people in the planning and development of federally-funded programs at the state and local levels of justice operations.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention both require community involvement in the design of programs and the awarding of federal monies at the state level. The increasing attention being given to "community policing" also reflects the idea that if citizens are utilized in a cooperative manner with the police, local law enforcement can be enhanced. And, as Miller and Ohlin (as quoted by English, 1993:18) report, two key features of successful youth programs include location in the community and involvement of local leaders in day-to-day operations.

Both reinventing government and TQM are unquestionably demanding insofar as jargon and concepts are concerned and build elaborately upon the previous works of such organizational researchers as Likert, Blake and Mouton, McGregor, Richard Hall, Jay Hall, Etzioni, Argyris, Bennis, Peters, Drucker, Herzberg, Maslow, and Schein, among others.

These authors reject both classical and human relations management and urge administrators toward participative or democratic management. They are both descriptive and prescriptive in their writings and tend to ask for a balance between concerns for production and concerns for people. Further, their research indicates that if staff are involved in decisions that affect them in their daily work, they not only will have higher levels of commitment to the organization, they will be satisfied on their jobs and will be more productive.

However, since most of these authors are concerned with business and industry, little attention has been paid to the service aspects of government and almost none to the structure, organization, and management of justice-based programs. Also, while they skirt the issue of line staff empowerment or otherwise use different terms, almost none expresses any concern about community-based empowerment.

So, in some ways, reinventing government and TQM are new concepts and indeed have applicability for justice operations. But, whether either is a palliative or fad or is a panacea for our problems remains to be determined. Nonetheless, Sashkin and Kiser (1993: 39) help us to set the stage by defining TQM:

TQM means that the organization's culture is defined by and supports the constant attainment of customer satisfaction through an integrated system of tools, techniques, and training. This involves the continuous improvement of organizational processes resulting in high quality products and services.

TQM also requires that this organizational culture include shared values and beliefs that support quality for the customer. Here, the term "customer" is used almost synonymously with such

words as "client" and "consumer," even though, as Keiser (1993: 10) states, there are indeed semantic differences.

According to Sashkin and Kiser (1993: 3), there are three critical aspects of TQM. These include:

1. Counting, which involves the tools, techniques, and training, all used for analyzing, understanding, and solving quality problems. That is, what is to be measured and evaluated that will assist in determining what is effective and successful and, importantly, what changes need to be made in service delivery as a result of such evaluation.

2. Customers, which is concerned with what they need or want. This also includes processes for determining customer needs and wants and assessing such as driving forces and central concerns for the organization's operations, goals, and policies.

3. Culture, which is the organizational context in which TQM can be developed and maintained. It reflects the shared values and beliefs, expressed by leaders, that define and support quality.

Juran (1981), also a driving force in TQM, describes an approach for designing concern for the customer into organizational operations. As a management process, he has created a "quality trilogy." It includes quality planning, quality control, and quality management, which show how to plan, coordinate, and integrate a concern for quality into all organizational operations.

He also has developed a "quality planning roadmap," which includes the following six steps:

1. Ask: Who are our customers?
2. Ask customers: What do you want and need?
3. Ask: What do these needs mean to us?
4. Ask: What are the characteristics of a product/service that satisfies these needs?
5. Ask: How do we make this product? Or: How do we deliver this service?
6. Put the plans into operation. (As quoted in Sashkin and Kiser, 1993: 68-69)

Implied throughout this roadmap is the constant emphasis on measurement or evaluation in order to build customers' needs into organizational operations. Furthermore, both the six-step model and the evaluation process must not be viewed as a one-time-only event. IT must be repeated over and over again, since, as discussed previously, no organization is static, but is dynamic in terms of tensions and conflicts. Therefore, the accrual of customer-based data as an on-going process is crucial for the measurement, development, and maintenance of quality services.

TQM is viewed as significantly more than a participative or democratic style of management. It is that, but it also deals with authority, responsibility, accountability, and empowerment. And, it involves staff, management, and customers (clients, superordinates, and the community). However, TQM cannot possibly succeed unless and until top management is committed to the concept, works to institutionalize it operationally, and trains staff to make it work.

Therefore, TQM in juvenile justice or in any other kind of organization possibly can work if:

1. Top management wants and plans for it.
2. Top management provides on-going and consistent leadership.
3. Staff receive on-going training.
4. Teams of personnel from all levels of the organization assist in planning and implementation.
5. Staff are given appropriate authority and responsibility and are otherwise empowered to make decisions.
6. Quality and indicators of quality, with regard to outcomes (service delivery) are well-defined and linked to organizational goals.
7. All personnel are appropriately held accountable for their performances.
8. Innovation, creativity, and "entrepreneurial" problem-solving behaviors are encouraged, but controlled at the same time.
9. Organizational goals and objectives are understandable, attainable, and measurable.
10. Needed internal and external resources are defined and made available.
11. Appropriate standards, policies, and procedures are developed.
12. There is consensus on priorities.
13. There is an on-going process of evaluation to determine: "How well are we doing?" and in order to distinguish between success and failure.
14. A climate of trust is developed and maintained throughout the organization.

The term "culture" is found throughout the literature on TQM. According to Urquhart (as quoted by Sashkin and Kiser, 1993: 111), it is defined as follows:

Culture is the cumulative perception of how the organization treats people and how people expect to treat one another. It is based on consistent and persistent management action, as seen by employees, vendors, and customers.

In business and industry, the use of the term "customer" is both obvious and easily defined. In juvenile justice administration, the term is not so easily defined. The customer could be the client. It could also be the community. Or, it could include all of the superordinates to which justice staffs must report, including judges, local and state administrative officials, and, perhaps, even legislators. Yet, if we are to be concerned about empowerment above and beyond staff empowerment, then all of the other kinds of "customers" are legitimate and must be taken into consideration as TQM becomes operational.

IMPLEMENTING TQM IN JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION

If the question is: Should TQM be implemented throughout juvenile justice administration? The answer is Yes.

If the question is: Can TQM be implemented throughout the system? The answer is very problematic.

Let us examine some of the forces that will impede TQM development.

1. Notwithstanding the various revolutions, the juvenile court and its related services and programs have a 100 year history of tradition that will not easily be changed.

2. It is questionable that there are sufficient numbers of progressive managers in the system who will want to implement TQM.

3. Too many top-level administrators probably think that they are already utilizing TQM and, therefore, do not need to do anything more but polish already existing, satisfactory management techniques.

4. The word "empowerment" is foreign in the vocabularies of most top-level administrators. If they have not empowered staff, they will resist empowering the community.

5. Line staff and their unions intensely dislike organizational tinkering, especially those programs which require changes in attitudes and behavior. Union contracts will also be aggravating factors.

6. Although juvenile justice administration has long favored community-based programming, the involvement of lay people in decision-making and priority-setting has not been a tradition. In fact, considerable animus exists insofar as agency-community relationships are concerned as a result of the plopping of community-based facilities without citizen involvement. The NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) syndrome can be found wherever juvenile justice operates.

7. Most agencies will not take kindly to the community being involved in day-to-day operations, notwithstanding that TQM demands that the community be treated as a customer.

8. It is questionable that top-level administrators and line staff as well will be willing to commit the time, energy, and resources needed to involve and educate staff in order to empower and involve them in daily operations.

9. State agencies are likely to resist efforts to empower local agencies and thereby have to give up power and control.

10. Many top-level administrators are fearful of evaluating programs for fear that they will be assessed as unsuccessful. This translates into the possibility of losing funding.

11. Too many administrators will not be willing to work as hard as the implementation of TQM requires.

12. Currently, the development of goals and objectives tends to be couched in abstractions, which leads to inadequate if not non-existent measurement. Agencies tend to publish their lists of organizational achievements and remain unprepared to measure institutional success. There is little evidence that this will change, which is required by TQM.

13. Many administrators have only recently learned how to problem-solve. The likelihood that they can switch to problem-finding is problematic; i.e., identifying and defining problems.

14. Since many juvenile court judges have not provided leadership either in the community or in the management of court services (e.g., probation and detention), it is unlikely that they will take a proactive stance in promulgating TQM.

15. As a result of budget crunches, many administrators will forego TQM development with the claim that there are insufficient resources and time for the training required.

16. Many administrators simply will not be willing to share the responsibility for decision-making that TQM requires, which means they will find excuses and rationalizations for their unwillingness to empower staff and communities.

17. Many judges and administrators will be falsely satisfied that the "Balanced Approach" to community-based supervision, which includes concerns for accountability, offender competency development, and community protection, meets most of the requirements of TQM. They will also be unable to recognize that this approach continues to put the onus on the offender with regard to his or her delinquent behavior and minimizes the responsibility of the organization to develop quality-based services that meet the needs of all "customers." (See, for e.g., Bazemore, 1992; Maloney et al, 1988.)

18. For many administrators, the wish is for "more of the same." They cling to this philosophy even when the "same" has consistently failed to control or otherwise prevent delinquency and crime. Further, they cling to old notions even without appropriate evaluation.

19. Since many administrators and their agencies currently are preoccupied with mere survival as a consequence of diminished resources and overwhelming caseload increases, it is unlikely that they will take the time to learn exactly what TQM is and/or to find the time to be trained in its processes. Further, the resources available for training juvenile justice administrators are scarce. (See, for e.g., Janes, 1993.)

While the above list suggests that it will be a Herculean task to introduce TQM into the juvenile justice system, an incremental development is a distinct possibility. There are indeed sufficient numbers of sophisticated, progressive administrators within the system who will recognize the merits of TQM and will work for its implementation. While business and industry will take the lead in TQM adoption, juvenile justice can be expected to lag behind for some time to come.

This may be particularly true for too many in the field will continue to tinker with improving the management of the system rather than trying to change the system itself. Further, as Einstein once said, "Everything has changed but our way of thinking."

JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Obviously, no one has a crystal ball that will reveal the exact nature of the future. Yet, when one attempts to explore what the future is likely to be, there is a difficult balancing act that is needed to distinguish between preference and prediction. Both forced and voluntary changes in the system can be perceived as palliatives as well as panaceas. And, only history will be able to reveal which is which, and only history will tell us whether TQM truly marks the sixth revolution.

Nonetheless, the following is offered as points for consideration.

1. The concepts of TQM and reinventing government will impact juvenile justice administration only minimally unless various influential groups and federal agencies with available funds push for their implementation.

2. Against the will and desires of juvenile justice officials, privatization will increase substantially in order to create services and programs without governments having to go bankrupt as they expend scarce resources for capital outlays and personnel. Privatization of facilities will head the list, with probation services a close second.

3. State legislation will be introduced throughout the country that will erode the form, substance, and processes of juvenile courts. This legislation will include (1) mandatory minimum

sentences for the chronic, violent juvenile delinquent, (2) curtailment of aftercare services, (3) fixed terms as a result of sentencing (dispositional) guidelines, (4) a requirement that certain categories of offenders must be transferred to adult courts for trial, and (5) juvenile courts will have less flexibility since all hearings will be less confidential.

One consequence of the above will be a heightened role for the prosecutor, who will engage more and more in plea bargaining in delinquency cases, if for no other reason than to manage prosecutorial caseloads. An additional result will be that the juvenile court will appear more than at any time in the past like its adult, criminal court counterpart.

4. All juvenile court hearings will become more adversarial in nature, with a consequent increase in appeals.

5. Citizen groups will organize to ensure that legislatures do indeed pass controlling legislation and juvenile court judges will be required to be more punitive in dealing with the chronic juvenile offender. (See, for e.g., Crowe, 1991.)

6. Notwithstanding citizen expressions of concern for changing youthful offenders and the push for more community-based services, the NIMBY syndrome will continue to prevail, thus putting a damper on increased community-based programming.

7. Juvenile justice-serving, membership organizations will lament many of these backward movements, but will have little impact on changing community and legislative values and beliefs.

8. Juvenile court judges will continue to play passive leadership roles and will consequently have little impact with regard to change issues.

9. State agencies concerned with juvenile justice will be reduced bureaucratically and will have responsibility only for standard-setting, training, data collection, organizational audits and inspections, and the provision of technical assistance and consultations. They will also award and monitor subsidies to local governments, which will be expected to provide all detention services for youths who have committed "minor" offenses.

10. Dependent and neglected children and some status offenders will no longer be handled by the juvenile court. Instead, they will be dealt with exclusively by family courts or social services agencies.

11. Departments of Juvenile Corrections will be created to deal with the older, chronic, violent offender, who will be sentenced by juvenile courts for mandatory, fixed terms (See #3 above), and who will not be eligible for aftercare (parole). Older and more serious delinquents will continue to be transferred to criminal courts for trials.

12. Since all non-violent and non-chronic youthful offenders will be dealt with at the local level, with state subsidies, there will be a push for additional residential treatment centers, most of which will be privatized.

13. Treatment programs for youths will expand since society generally will continue to believe that young people have a chance to change. Such efforts will be particularly expanded for the serious, drug dependent and adolescent sex offenders. As a consequence, fewer and fewer youths will be sent out of state for treatment.

14. Because of continuing overloaded caseloads and overcrowded institutions, there will be a spate of new and different dispositional alternatives - all geared toward working with youths in the community, but against community desires and sentiments.

15. The pressures for changing juvenile court operations and the management of youthful offenders will not abate unless and until (1) the public's fear of crime and delinquency is substantially reduced, (2) politicians reduce their rhetoric about the problem, and (3) the numbers and rates of violent crime by youthful offenders are substantially reduced.

16. Changes within juvenile justice administration will continue to be imposed by external agents rather than as a result of internal analysis and decision-making by juvenile justice top-level officials.

CONCLUSION

Change within juvenile justice administration is inevitable. A frightened citizenry, concerned legislators, and increasing concerns about the failure of juvenile courts to control the serious delinquency problem will almost guarantee that dramatic changes in how we deal with youthful offenders will occur. As discussed above, moreover, these changes will be imposed on the system by external agents rather than as a result of internal decision-making.

The failure of top-level officials to demonstrate leadership and vision will not only provide the basis for such changes, it will help us to understand why the reinvention of government and the implementation of TQM in juvenile justice administration is likely to have little if any impact in the immediate future.

However, for those who will work for constructive and lasting change, an admonition is in order:

...there is always a tendency to expect too much when we embrace new ways. Many of us...often anticipate that we can solve more problems, make more things right,

than we actually can. And, more often than not, we think we can do it all overnight.

Unbridled enthusiasm sets us up for disappointment. (Hall, 1980: 244-245)

It is quite likely that the juvenile court and the rest of the juvenile system will be significantly different in the 21st Century from what we have traditionally experienced. People view the system as broken; therefore, it needs to be fixed. The questions are: Who will do the fixing? and What will the fixing look like?

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