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Annotation: This is an inventory of crime prevention programs in North America and Europe with an emphasis on property offenses, especially burglary, theft, and auto-crime.

Abstract: Crimes not covered in this report are environmental and economic crime, organized crime, traffic offenses, sexual offenses, drug and alcohol offenses, and offenses against the State. Information was obtained from a questionnaire sent to experts in criminal justice policy in every country in Europe and North America. Thirty countries provided some form of response. The most fruitful information source, however, was a literature search. Two international conferences also provided information for this report. The crime prevention measures discussed are categorized according to social crime prevention, situational crime prevention, and community crime prevention. The chapter on social crime prevention describes measures designed to mitigate the root causes of crime and the factors that cultivate dispositions for persons to commit crimes. Programs discussed focus on the family, the school, employment, health services, and urban planning. The chapter on situational crime prevention focuses on measures that reduce opportunities for offending. Topics include security measures that hinder offending, measures influencing the costs and benefits of offending, and multi-measure situational crime prevention. The third chapter describes community crime prevention measures in the areas of housing policy, community development, the root causes of crime, the socialization of youth, and police crime prevention. A fourth chapter discusses the planning, implementation, and evaluation of crime prevention. Appended supplementary information and 120 references

Main Term(s):   Community crime prevention programs; Property crime statistics

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The present report covers recent initiatives in crime prevention through- out Europe and North America. The material on which it is based was gathered by the Helsinki European United Nations Institute (HEUNI) in response to the request of the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control for an inventory of crime prevention measures.

The inventory requested by the Committee, to be submitted by the United Nations Secretariat to the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (27 August - 7 September 1990), shall contain only a small portion of the material obtained. Because of the value of the other material in demonstrating the potential benefits and drawbacks of the various methods of crime prevention that have been tried in Europe and North America, HEUNI decided to publish a more in-depth analysis of the issue.

As noted in the Introduction, the material has been gathered from a number of sources. HEUNI would like to express its sincere appreciation to the experts and organizations that have provided this material. These experts include not only those identified in appendix 1, but also the participants at the two international meetings held in the course of the preparation of this report (see appendices 2 and 3), hosted respectively by the Home Office of England and Wales, and by the Ministry of the Interior of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. HEUNI wishes in particular to thank Mr. David Faulkner, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Home Office for his active encouragement of the project, and Minister Vladimir Bakatin of the Ministry of the Interior for hosting the international seminar in Moscow.

The report has been written by Mr. John Graham of the Research and Planning Unit of the Home Office, as an ad-hoc expert at HEUNI. He has been able to bring his

wide experience to bear in the challenging task of sifting through the considerable amount of information that is available on crime prevention. His report not only summarizes the results of crime prevention initiatives throughout Europe and North America, it also serves as a guide to practitioners and other interested parties in designing their own projects.

Helsinki, 30 June 1990   Matti Joutsen
                                                      Director, HEUNI

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INTRODUCTION

Crime prevention, both in terms of policy and practice, varies considerably between the countries of Europe and North America according to prevailing cultural, political and intellectual traditions. There are substantial differences in the way these countries perceive and conceptualise crime prevention and thus in the way they plan, co-ordinate and implement policies at the national level. In some countries, Inter-Ministerial forums or National Crime Prevention Councils with representatives from various public and private bodies devise, plan and co-ordinate crime prevention strategies. In others, crime prevention is largely the responsibility of individual Ministries, the police or the Public Prosecutor's Office (Council of Europe, 1988).

The emergence of national strategies for preventing crime should be seen in the context of the principal social, cultural and economic changes which countries in Europe and North America have experienced over the last two to three decades. The most significant of these developments has been the social and economic emancipation of an increasingly pluralist generation of young people, the decline of traditional socialising structures (especially the role of the church and to a lesser extent the family), the early growth of the welfare state and the culture of dependency which it spurred and the later reversal of this process towards greater self-reliance and empowerment. The latter has led to a revival of interest in community care and development, the mobilisation and participation of local residents in community affairs and attempts to bring back into mainstream society and its institutions those marginalised and/or alienated from them.

Over the same period, the formal processes of criminal justice - apprehending, prosecuting, sentencing, punishing and rehabilitating offenders - have been shown to have only a limited effect in controlling crime. Steinmetz (1982), for example, laments the shortcomings of general and individual deterrence and concludes that there is no convincing evidence that the detection and conviction of offenders deters

6

either themselves or others from further offending. Clarke and Hough (1984) have demonstrated the limits of police effectiveness, showing that increases in police manpower do not necessarily lead to reductions in crime or clear up rates and may even lead to increases, at least in recorded crime. Rates of recidivism following release from prison are notoriously high and many studies of therapeutic intervention have shown how relatively ineffective treatment is (see,in particular, Martinson, (1974)).

As a result, criminal policy in many countries has turned towards developing proactive measures to prevent and reduce crime, which are much cheaper than the costs of providing police forces, courts and prisons and would appear to hold out more promise of success in combatting the problem of crime. Responsibility for crime prevention has consequently broadened to include agencies and individuals *outside* the criminal justice system. Crime has become a common public concern and its prevention is no longer seen as the exclusive province of the specialist, although the relationship between crime prevention and the criminal justice system remains complex and diverse.

In some countries, most notably those in Eastern Europe, the functions of law enforcement and crime prevention are perceived as inextricably linked. Thus the courts take responsibility not only for adjudication, but also for identifying and resolving the underlying causes of specific offences. So, for example, where an offender is found guilty of theft from the workplace, the *employer* will be issued with a directive to prevent such thefts from recurring. Failure to comply can result in the employer being penalised by the court. The courts therefore actively try to change the conditions and situations which contribute to criminal behaviour, rather than merely relying on the principle of general deterrence.

A similar example consists in the use of informal tribunals for resolving disputes in schools, the workplace or the local neighbourhood. Run by ordinary citizens rather

than professional lawyers, such tribunals can provide an important link between formal systems of crime control and informal sources of social control in the community. Other manifestations of the merging of the functions of law enforcement and crime prevention are, however, potentially more perilous. The increasing involvement of ordinary citizens in some types of crime prevention, particularly citizen patrols, can inadvertently foster vigilantism and "private" justice.

In other countries, crime prevention is much more closely aligned to social and public policy than law enforcement and the role of the criminal justice system. In these countries, the trend seems to be towards seeking ways of strengthening the internal controls of individuals, groups and neighbourhoods, often mobilising resources at the local level, whilst reducing reliance upon controls imposed by the criminal justice system and its agencies.

Clearly the relationship between the criminal justice system and crime prevention is complex and variable. What is done in the criminal justice system will inevitably affect levels of recorded crime and strategies for its prevention. Preventive measures can be targetted on those who have already committed offences, those at risk of offending or the population at large. In response to this study, the countries of Europe and North America reported very wide variations in their perceptions of what constitutes crime prevention. Some included the work of the criminal justice system and the prevention of recidivism. Others referred to diversion from court schemes, crisis intervention and treatment as preventive measures. This left a most difficult task - how to define and classify crime prevention and what parameters should be drawn concerning the scope of the study.

Defining and classifying crime prevention

Although crime prevention has long been considered one of the main objectives of criminal policy, it remains a rather vague and ill-defined concept. It may be more

appropriate to discuss crime prevention in terms of possible approaches or models rather than suggest a theory of crime prevention. The traditional objectives of the criminal justice system and its agencies - individual and general deterrence, security and rehabilitation - are primarily repressive and concerned with the prevention of offences *after an offence has already occurred*. The concept of crime prevention, however, includes what is sometimes termed primary prevention which, by focussing on and intervening in social, economic and other areas of public policy, attempts to prevent crime before an offence has been committed.

Kaiser (1988) defines crime prevention as including: "...all those measures which have the specific intention of minimising the breadth and severity of offending, whether via a reduction in opportunities to commit crime or by influencing potential offenders and the general public." Following Brantingham and Faust (1976), he suggests dividing the main preventive strategies into three groups based on the public health model of prevention - (i) primary, (ii) secondary and (iii) tertiary prevention.

(i) Primary prevention

Primary prevention is defined as strategies which, through social, economic and other areas of public policy, specifically attempt to influence criminogenic situations and the root causes of crime. The prime objective is to create the most promising conditions for the successful socialisation of all members of society. Examples of relevant areas of pre-offence intervention include education, housing, employment, leisure and recreation.

(ii) Secondary prevention

The focal point of secondary prevention is to be found in criminal justice policy and its implementation in practice. In addition to general and special prevention, it covers the early identification of criminogenic conditions and the influences upon these

9

conditions. The preventive role of the police falls under secondary prevention, as do control of the media, urban planning and building design and construction. Private insurance against, for example, burglary and theft, also fall under the category of secondary prevention.

(iii) Tertiary prevention

Tertiary prevention is primarily concerned with the prevention of recidivism by the police and other agents of the criminal justice system. Measures range from informal judicial sanctions and bail conditions to victim/offender reparation and imprisonment. Due to the limitations of treatment oriented sanctions, tertiary prevention is all too often reduced to repressive measures.

Whilst the main target of primary prevention is the general public as a whole, secondary prevention targets those most likely to offend and tertiary prevention those who have already offended. The main focus of this model or classification is thus prejudicial intervention. Formal judicial sanctions and so-called alternative sanctions, such as Community Service or Intermediate Treatment, are only crudely and peripherally included in this model.

In practice, adapting the public health model of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention to the field of crime control presents at least three problems (see van Voorhis, 1986). Firstly, there is the problem of where to draw the boundaries, what to include, what to leave out. The public health model is very wide-ranging and there is the danger that by defining crime prevention so widely, it may dissolve into a meaningless catch-phrase.

Secondly, there is the problem of what should be included in one section as opposed to another. When is an activity secondary or primary? Is treatment secondary or tertiary prevention? In which section do diversion from court and custody initiatives

fit? Should the prevention of re-offending be in the same category as the prevention of first time offending? Which categories should measures targetted at the general population and groups "at risk" be in? And what about the work of the police? Some of their activities could be considered as primary prevention (e.g. conducting security surveys and setting up neighbourhood watch schemes) whilst others could be construed as secondary prevention (e.g. running self-defence courses) or even tertiary prevention (victim support).

Thirdly, and most importantly, the public health model is based on scientific principles and to adapt it to crime prevention implies that the causes of crime are as identifiable as the causes of medical problems. Social science is not an exact science. It deals largely with probabilities and correlates rather than certainties and causes. There are not only many competing theories about the causes of crime, but also inadequate or conflicting evidence as to the validity of these causes. Moreover, different explanations account for different offences, particulary violent as opposed to property offences. The diversity and severity of actions encompassed by the word crime alone makes definition virtually impossible - compare explanations of prostitution with fraud, or child abuse with shoplifting - and even individual offences are rarely attributable to single explanations. Criminals and potential criminals are a highly heterogenous group and need to be targetted in many different ways and at all levels of intervention - as individuals or as members of groups, in institutions, neighbourhoods and communities or simply as members of society.

This serves to illustrate not so much the inadequacy of the public health model for classifying crime prevention, but how extremely complex the process of defining and categorising such a broad concept as crime prevention is. The problem of crime is multi-causal and needs to be addressed at different levels and from different angles. Multiple problems require multiple solutions so that prevention programmes themselves often involve multiple service delivery systems. So although crime prevention has long been considered one of the main objectives of criminal policy, its

conceptualisation is still in its infancy. As Tuck (1987) has noted, crime prevention is not a definable set of techniques, but still a concept struggling to be born.

Bearing the above in mind and that the principal audience for the report was to be practitioners, it was decided to divide crime prevention into three broad approaches: the social approach, the situational approach and the community-based approach. The first chapter is concerned with social crime prevention - measures aimed at tackling the root causes of crime and the dispositions of individuals to offend. They may be targetted either on the general population or on specific groups at risk. The second chapter covers situational crime prevention, which is primarily concerned with reducing opportunities to offend.

The third chapter describes what is still an emerging approach to crime prevention, which draws on and combines the measures described in the previous two chapters and, by locating them within a community context, creates a whole greater than the sum of its two parts. Referred to as community-based crime prevention, it is concerned with measures which improve the capacity of communities to reduce crime by increasing their capacity to exert informal social control. The strategies described in these three chapters are not separate or discrete entities, but rather interconnected and complementary approaches. A fourth chapter describes the *process* of preventing crime, from the planning of initiatives through to their implementation and evaluation.

Scope of the study

Criminological research has made considerable advances during the latter half of this century and, in general terms, the factors which are strongly associated with either committing an offence or becoming an offender are, for most offences, becoming more firmly established. This has given criminal policy makers some scientific guidance for devising preventive measures and in recent years the results of

criminological endeavour have produced a leap forward. Thus in describing various preventive approaches and measures, the report uses the findings of research to support or refute their efficacy, where such information exists.

Many of the findings of research have now been tested in practice and evaluations of preventive initiatives have produced a much clearer picture of what works, under what conditions and why. Although the validity of many evaluations is questionable, the report tries wherever possible to support the advocacy of specific preventive measures with empirical evidence from specific projects and programmes. Thus examples of unsuccessful as well as successful initiatives are used to illustrate and assess the value of the measures described (see appendix 4 for complete list of initiatives).

Most existing experience and most of the successes so far achieved have been in relation to property offences (personal theft, burglaries of homes, commercial and public property, criminal damage etc.). The United Nations' surveys of crime trends, operations of criminal justice systems and crime prevention strategies have shown that in all countries, property offences form by far the majority of reported offences. Furthermore, the situations in which such offences as theft, burglary and robbery are committed do not differ significantly from one country to the next, regardless of the stage of development or the cultural, economic, legal or social system.

The whole range of criminal offences - from fare dodging to manslaughter, from prostitution to terrorism - could not possibly be covered by one study. The main focus of this report is accordingly on property offences, especially burglary, theft and auto-crime. The strategies outlined in the report are nevertheless applicable to other common types of offences, such as street crime, assaults and a wide range of juvenile offences. It does not cover the prevention of environmental and economic crime, organised crime, traffic offences, sexual offences and offences against the state. Several countries referred to the prevalence of drug and alcohol related of-

fences and some even provided examples of preventive initiatives. It was decided at an early stage, however, that the area of drug and alcohol related offending involves a complexity of issues which could not be dealt with satisfactorily in a general overview of crime prevention measures.

The report is not prescriptive: some measures apply only to certain types of offences that are not necessarily prevalent in all societies. Others may require considerable investment in financial and other resources, although many of the measures are neither costly nor highly technical. The report describes and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of established and emerging approaches to preventing crime, and offers the practitioner an opportunity to adopt the most appropriate measures for the particular situation he or she has to face. Where possible, some estimation of the probable financial costs of implementing specific programmes is given, but these should be treated with caution, particularly as they may not be transferable to other situations or countries. Indeed this also applies to the transfer of programmes and initiatives to other countries, particularly developing countries, although it is hoped that they in particular may be able to benefit from the measures outlined here.

Insofar as crime in developing countries can be explained by social and community disorganisation and economic disadvantage, the solutions must lie with efforts to ameliorate these conditions - i.e. with economic expansion, urban reconstruction and community rejuvenation. Some of the measures described in this report, particularly the social measures, may be able to assist developing countries in combatting these conditions, but such processes are highly complex and expensive and results are only likely to be achieved in the long term. In the meantime, unacceptable crime and victimisation rates still plague economically disadvantaged and socially disorganised communities. More immediate and pragmatic solutions which may alleviate crime rates in the short and medium term are also required. Here developments in Europe and North America in situational crime prevention may be of particular value to policy-makers and practitioners in developing countries. To the extent that

14

different kinds of community attract different solutions to their problems, developing countries may also be able to recognise features within these communities which are familiar to their own and adapt some of the community-based approaches to crime preventive described in this report to their own needs.

Finally, a decision had to be taken on whether to include the work of the criminal justice system and its agencies in the prevention of crime. Clearly the work of the police, the probation service, prisons, parole and the court can have a preventive effect on offending and in particular re-offending. Equally, however, contact with the criminal justice system and its agencies can be criminogenic, especially the labelling effects of conviction and imprisonment. By including the work of the criminal justice system, there would be problems in keeping cause and effect apart. Furthermore, it would widen the scope of the project beyond practical limits. The report therefore follows the tradition of other reviews of crime and delinquency prevention by excluding what amounts to tertiary prevention (see, for example, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1980). It should be emphasised, however, that this is not to say that the role of the criminal justice system in crime prevention is peripheral. On the contrary, links between the two, for example in the development of multi-agency responses to crime prevention, are important and need to be encouraged.

Sources of information

The information upon which this report is based comes from a range of different sources. Initially, a questionnaire was sent to experts in the field of criminal policy in every country in Europe and North America At the same time, a draft structure for the report was also enclosed, on which experts were asked for their comments. The response rate to the questionnaire was high - thirty countries provided some form of response. However, the quality and depth of the responses was, by and large, disappointing and very few countries opted to comment in any detail on the

draft structure. A few of the responses were followed up with visits, but it soon became clear that other sources of information would have to be tapped.

The most fruitful source of information consisted of a thorough search of the literature, including on-line computer searches such as ICPIN (International Crime Prevention Information Network) and a two week visit to the Max Planck Institute for International Criminal Law in Freiburg, West Germany.

The final source of information came from two conferences set up explicitly to bring together professionals in the field of crime prevention to provide a lengthy executive summary of the report with the benefit of their expertise. The first was a small and intensive two day conference held outside London at Woodlands Park, the second a much larger five day conference held in Moscow. (A list of the participants at both conferences is provided in appendices 2 and 3; opening statements to the Moscow conference by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Director of HEUNI are also reproduced in appendix 3). The comments received from participants at both conferences were invaluable in the construction of the final document, especially in terms of broadening the content to include experience from a wider range of countries, including countries outside Europe and North America. The conference in Moscow was particularly helpful in this respect.

The amount and quality of information available in, and thus collected from, different countries varied considerably. A choice had to be made early on whether the report should provide an overall description of crime prevention practice in as many countries as possible or reflect the most advanced elements of current practice. It was decided that, since the primary function of the report is to provide the most up-to-date information on approaches to and measures for preventing crime, the latter would be adopted. This has meant, however, that the report is a somewhat ethnocentric account of crime prevention practice - it draws most heavily on practice in five countries (the USA, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands and France)

- although this has been partly offset by the contributions from the participants at the London and Moscow conferences.

CHAPTER 1. SOCIAL CRIME PREVENTION

1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 The reasons why people offend are complex and wide ranging. Two important influences upon criminality are the degree of restraint on offending (i.e. controls externally imposed upon, or internalised by individuals, which deter them from committing offences) and the absence of incentives to be law-abiding (i.e. the lack of a personal stake in conforming). Both of these are central determinants of the dispositions of individuals towards offending.

1.1.2 The learning of norms and values and the provision of incentives to be law-abiding are generally transmitted through the major socio-economic structures and institutions of socialisation in society. Changes in the nature of these structures and institutions influence dispositions towards offending and ultimately crime rates. Social crime prevention therefore works by establishing how the nature of, and changes in, socio-economic structures and institutions of socialisation can promote dispositions towards offending and, where possible, altering them in such a way as to minimise or reduce such effects.

1.1.3 The negative impact of changes in the socio-economic structures and institutions of socialisation often falls disproportionately on specific sections within society, usually those least able to protect and insulate themselves from such changes - the young, the infirm, the immigrant, the poor, the unemployed, the homeless etc. Social crime prevention policies tend to focus on these groups, since they also tend to be the groups most at risk of offending. Social crime prevention policies therefore need to feed into a wide range of social policies, which have a bearing on crime. Six areas of social policy are cited most frequently in this connection:

- Policy on the planning of urban and rural areas and in particular policies on slum

clearance; housing management; homelessness; the design and provision of public facilities and shopping areas; the inter-relationships between the provision of housing and other services, especially transport and the location of employment;

- Employment policy and in particular policies relating to unemployment and the creation of employment opportunities;

- Education policy, including policies affecting pre-school children;

- Family policy;

- Youth policy, including policies on recreation, leisure and culture;

- Health policy and in particular policies on drug and alcohol abuse.

1.1.4 Policies on the design of the urban environment and housing management are covered in chapters 2 and 3. Homelessness is referred to in the section on families, but only with respect to young people. The larger question of how urban and rural planning policies impact upon crime is highly complex and has still to be explored; it is not considered here in any detail. Similarly health policy which, with the exception of drug and alcohol abuse, has at most only a marginal influence upon crime, is not covered in any detail.

1.1.5 The prevention of drug and alcohol abuse and related offending, which is a subject in its own right, is not explicitly covered here. However, many of the social crime prevention policies referred to in this chapter will also influence propensities towards drug and alcohol abuse and related crime. (For a comprehensive and up to date overview of drug policies in relation to crime in Western Europe, see Albrecht and Kalmthout, 1989). Policies on recreation and leisure are covered in the section on youth work, also in this chapter. The main focus of this chapter is on social poli-

cies in four areas - the family (including homelessness), the school, youth work and employment - plus small sections on health and urban planning policy.

1.1.6 It should be born in mind that social policy is and should be of value in its own right and should not be justified on the basis of its potential for preventing or reducing crime. Some may even question whether expending resources on, for example, supporting disadvantaged families, should be in any way dependent upon the prospect of future reductions in crime. Nevertheless, crime prevention through social policy is justifiable if the former is considered as just one of several competing priorities.

1.1.7 In some areas, social policies may be considered important enough to warrant support despite a potentially criminogenic effect. Policies which, for example, withdraw financial benefits from certain sectors of society may result in the poorest resorting to some form of subsistence crime; the benefits in terms of financial savings may still be considered to outweigh the costs.

1.1.8 In other instances, however, governments may not be aware of the potential criminogenic effects of their policies. To minimise such effects, governments should be encouraged to monitor social trends and anticipate and assess the likely impact of new social policies on crime. Where social policies are enshrined in legislation, crime impact statements could be set alongside the financial and manpower implications of the new law. The development of a system of crime impact statements should be seen, therefore, as a crime preventive policy in its own right.

1.1.9 Before discussing in more detail some of the measures which can be undertaken in the field of social crime prevention, it is important to point out how this approach differs from the other two approaches to crime prevention outlined in this report. The social crime prevention approach differs from situational and community-based crime prevention in at least three fundamental ways.

1.1.10 Firstly, social crime prevention inevitably focusses primarily on young people, including children, since they are the principle recipients of socialisation. Most adult offenders start committing offences as youngsters and so true prevention should start early to be of greatest benefit. This should not be limited to identifying young children at risk as early as possible in order to correct their behaviour before offending sets in. It should also focus on changing those organisational, institutional, structural and cultural arrangements in society which may adversely influence the socialisation of young people such that they are placed at a greater risk of becoming offenders later in life.

1.1.11 Secondly, different preventive approaches apply at different stages of social development. So, for example, family-based strategies will be very different for families with infants as opposed to teenagers and the kinds of preventive strategies which may be useful in primary schools may not be applicable in secondary schools. Similarly, employment and peer group based strategies will be more relevant to teenagers than to younger children, for whom the school and the family will constitute the most important areas of intervention.

1.1.12 Thirdly, social crime prevention cannot be so easily tested through project-based, short term initiatives. It is a more long term, programme-based approach and is very difficult to evaluate in terms of a direct impact upon crime levels. Evaluations of specific social crime prevention programmes which show a significant decline in area levels of crime are therefore few and far between. Since the relationships between offending and socio-economic structures and institutions of socialisation are highly complex, the effects of social crime prevention programmes may only be identifiable in terms of improvements in intervening variables, such as aggressive behaviour, educational performance and employment rates.

1.2 The family

1.2.1 The ability of families to function effectively is thought to be a crucial determinant in preventing delinquency. Research has shown that, along with good education and proper employment, stable and emotionally healthy families are powerful sources of effective socialisation and social integration (see, for example, Loeber and Dishion, 1983). The findings of longitudinal studies of child development have shown that early troublesome, dishonest and anti-social behaviour are important predictors of later offending and that the structure and functioning of families play a central role in determining the behaviour of children (West, 1982).

1.2.2 Whilst the nature of this notion of continuity between childhood troublesomeness and adult offending is still not clear - not all anti-social children become anti-social adults - an important way of preventing delinquency would nevertheless appear to be the development of measures for early childhood intervention within the family setting. It should, however, be stressed that there are limitations on the extent to which crime prevention policies based on supporting and working with families can be developed. Politicians and professionals are sometimes reluctant to interfere in what is a very personal and private area of life.

1.2.3 Those children who show signs of criminal behaviour at an early age are more likely to become serious, persistent offenders than those who begin offending in their mid-teens, who tend to grow out of crime (Farrington, 1987). Such children often come from families under severe stress characterised by multiple social and personal problems, discord and interpersonal conflict (Rutter and Giller, 1983). The parents are likely to be of low socio-economic status, to have a criminal record, to exercise harsh and erratic discipline, to neglect their children and to come themselves from similar families (Farrington, 1983). Where children have only one par-

22

ent, they are even more vulnerable to social maladjustment, especially if the parent is young, female, socially isolated and dependent on welfare (Loury, 1987).

1.2.4 Low socio-economic status, separation or the fact of having only one parent need not necessarily predispose children to anti-social and delinquent behaviour. It is not the absence of a parent, but the quality and endurance of the child's relationship with the remaining parent which is important (Rutter et al. 1983). An unstable family or inadequate parenting can be partly or wholly compensated by one good relationship outside the family or successful experiences in other areas of socialisation, particularly at school (Graham, 1988).

1.2.5 In practice, it is very difficult to measure the effects of early interventions on later behaviour, particularly criminal behaviour. Despite the appearance of strong associations between family variables and delinquency, there is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that the long term follow-up studies upon which these findings are largely based may be methodologically flawed (Rutter and Giller, 1983). Because of these difficulties, most early interventions therefore focus on improving factors related to later delinquency, such as school performance, social competence and cognitive skills.

1.2.6 Early family intervention

1.2.6.1 There are three main forms of early family intervention which can help to prevent crime: (i) providing support for families under economic and psychological stress; (ii) providing education and guidance for parenthood and (iii) providing pre-school education for the children of disadvantaged parents.

(i) Family support programmes.

1.2.6.2 A range of family support systems can be developed to assist parents who have to deal with difficult behavioural problems. In addition to financial and material support, families can receive child care services, emergency day-care, health care, family planning advice (especially for very young parents), crisis intervention, counselling and temporary respite, especially for single parents. The provision of child care by trained professionals can enable the identification of behavioural problems or child abuse at an early stage and provide an opportunity for offering informal child-rearing advice. Home support services using outreach workers based at drop-in or day-care centres can also provide informal advice on, for example, nutrition, parenting and home management skills. Family support programmes, especially if they can provide links to other social services and informal neighbourhood resources, can improve school behaviour and performance, both of which are associated with delinquency (Graham, 1988).

THE YALE CHILD STUDY CENTER PROGRAMME, USA

1.2.6.3 The Children's House programme of the Yale Child Study Center provides a wide range of services to small groups of low-income, urban families, including a high proportion of single parent families. Services are provided for two years from the birth of the first child and include paediatric care, visits by social workers to help mothers plan their budget, nutritional guidance, day care and assistance with links to other social services.

1.2.6.4 The programme was evaluated by matching 17 low-income families with control families selected on the basis of race, socio-economic status and the presence of a father in the the home. The results showed that at age 13, members of the

24

experimental groups performed and behaved better at school and were less likely to truant from school. Furthermore, mothers in the experimental groups reported fewer problems with the behaviour, discipline and supervision of their children than mothers in the control groups.

1.2.6.5 Given that school and family factors are potent predictors of delinquency, it would appear that the Yale programme reduced the risk of participants becoming involved in delinquency, although the number of participant families was too low for general conclusions to be drawn from it (Seitz et al., 1985). However, according to Zigler and Hall (1987), the money spent on services to each family has been more than matched by the money saved by schools in terms of poor performance and the provision of special remedial services.

(ii) Parental guidance and education.

1.2.6.6 The amelioration of childrens' troublesome and disruptive behaviour at an early age can be fostered through effective supervision and discipline. Research suggests that parents should avoid erratic and inconsistent use of discipline, which prevents children from learning which forms of behaviour are acceptable to their parents (Wilson, 1985). Parents need to be able to clearly indicate what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviour and the allocation of resources for parent education and improving parenting skills can be of value in this respect.

1.2.6.7 Parenting courses can be useful for helping parents to recognise and respond more appropriately to family behaviours which may adversely affect children. They can be taught to respond more constructively, use discipline less harshly and more consistently and avoid situations which can precipitate discord. In practice, initial participation rates are often low and drop-out rates high, although both can be im-

25

proved with financial incentives (i.e. larger family allowances).

1.2.6.8 Some evaluations of parent training programmes have shown limited success in reducing early disruptive and aggressive behaviour, such as the Oregon Social Learning Center programme (see below). But the question as to whether such reductions also result in reductions in later delinquency is more difficult to establish. Certainly there is no evidence that training programmes for foster parents reduce the subsequent rates of the problem children in their care (Loeber, 1987). On the whole, therefore, it would seem that the long term crime preventive effects of parent training programmes for younger children with conduct disorders has yet to be firmly established.

THE OREGON SOCIAL LEARNING CENTER, USA

1.2.6.9 One of the most meticulously evaluated parent training initiatives is the Oregon Social Learning programme, for parents of aggressive and delinquent children. Parents are trained to use positive, non-coercive methods of discipline, to deal consistently and decisively with anti-social behaviour, to negotiate acceptable standards of behaviour with their children rather than imposing such standards without consulting them, to develop problem-solving skills and improve communication and interaction within the family.

1.2.6.10 The Oregon programme resulted in reductions in aggressive behaviour by young children lasting up to one year and similar results have been recorded for stealing (Patterson et al. 1982), although again the effects were only short lived. Unfortunately, a quarter of participating parents dropped out before completing the programme and a further quarter dropped out during the one year follow-up period. The

short term improvements in the children's behaviour therefore have to be offset against the difficulties of maintaining parental motivation and the limited if not non-existent long term effects in terms of delinquency reduction.

(iii) Pre-school programmes.

1.2.6.11 Pre-school programmes focus on improving the educational achievement, social competence and behaviour of young children from immigrant families, socially and economically disadvantaged families, or children with various difficulties. Most pre-school programmes do not explicitly set out to prevent later delinquency but are concerned with the more immediate objectives of improving the social competence and cognitive performance of participants. A well known exception to this is the Perry pre-school programme, which explicitly attempts to prevent later delinquency.

THE PERRY PRE-SCHOOL PROJECT, USA

1.2.6.12 The Perry pre-school project, which started in 1962, is the best known example of a pre-school project set up with the explicit objective of reducing the risk of delinquency. The project randomly allocated 123 black children from low socio-economic families to a pre-school child development programme and a control group (58 to the former, 65 the to latter) for a period of, in most cases, two years at the age of 3. Nearly half of the families were one-parent families and overall parents had low I.Q.'s, low levels of education, poor employment records and lived in over-crowded dwellings. The pre-school programme itself consisted of involving the children in the planning of classroom activities to promote their intellectual and social development. Teams of teachers were employed on very high pupil:teacher ratios for 2.5 hours per day for 30 weeks in each year. In addition, each mother and child

received a home visit from a teacher once a week for approximately 1.5 hours.

1.2.6.13 Over a period of 16 years, information was collected for all children from the age of 3 to 11 and at the age of 15 and 19. The information included data on, for example, school performance, attitudes, employment record and self and police reported delinquency. The study, which was characterised by an unusually low attrition rate, found that those children who attended the pre-school programme performed better in school and adult education and were more likely to graduate and get employment. Teenage pregnancy rates were much lower - about half - and arrests rates were forty percent lower than for children in the control groups.

1.2.6.14 A cost-benefit analysis of the Perry pre-school project (Schweinhart, 1987) found that it costs in the region of $5,000 per child per year. A project run over one year will produce a sixfold return on the initial investment, whereas a two year project will be approximately half as profitable.

1.2.6.15 According to Schweinhart (1987) and the Canadian Council on Children and Youth (1989), the characteristics of effective pre-school programmes can be summarised as:

(i)   Well qualified staff with special training in early childhood development, including an emphasis on the ability to change to meet the needs of children and their families as they become apparent;

(ii) Child development based curriculum, with clearly stated goals, which allows children to plan their own activities; goals should include the encouragement of independence, the development of self esteem and the teaching of problem-solving

28

and task persistence skills;

(iii) Careful support, management and evaluation of the curriculum;

(iv) High teacher:pupil ratios (no more than 1:8), small classes (about 16 pupils) and preferably a two year minimum involvement for each child;

(v) Close collaboration of teachers with parents and the community, including close involvement at the programme design stage;

(vi) Integration with other local resources and services, especially health, housing, education, social welfare and employment;

1.2.6.16 Although short term effects are more likely than enduring effects, supplementing pre-school programmes with special socialisation and education programmes *during* the primary and secondary school years can help to enhance the possibility of long term crime preventive effects.

1.2.6.17 According to the Canadian Council on Children and Youth (1989), a US Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families found that for every $1 invested in pre-school programmes, the return is $4.75 as a result of savings on special education, public assistance and crime. Given the relatively expensive initial financial outlay required for pre-school programmes, it would appear to be sensible to selectively target those most in need and most likely to benefit, such as those on child abuse registers.

1.2.7 Other family-based interventions

1.2.7.1 There are certain developmental stages when families are naturally placed under greater strain (e.g. families with very young children or teenagers; families in the process of breaking up). Specific resources can be used to support families during such periods. Centres for providing counselling and advice for parents with teenagers and voluntary conciliation schemes for families in the process of breaking up are two examples. The former can help parents to understand and respond appropriately to the unique problems associated with adolescence, including how to help their offspring avoid negative peer group pressures. The latter can minimise the adverse effects of family break-up by helping all parties concerned to reach mutually acceptable agreements on access, custody and other complex family issues outside the sometimes damaging confines of divorce proceedings in court.

1.2.7.2 Difficulties in the family can cause teenagers to leave home prematurely. As a consequence, they may well become homeless and involved in crime, sometimes just to survive. Family and housing policies which minimise the risk and incidence of homelessness and policies which make provisions for those who become homeless are therefore important social crime prevention strategies.

1.2.7.3 Special youth centres with emergency shelter and access to longer term hostel accommodation as well as efforts to reunite runaways with their families and dissuade would-be runaways from leaving home, should form the main focus of a strategic response to runaways. Other services such as counselling, survival skills training and assistance with finding employment or alternative means of subsistence, should also be provided for runaways, preferably as part of a multi-agency response.

1.2.7.4 All too often runaways commit offences or come to the notice of the police in other ways and ultimately end up in court. The Prejop project represents an interesting attempt to divert runaways from court and care proceedings (see below). It is

30

important that, taking into account the child's right to protection from abusive parents, reasons for leaving home must be carefully examined prior to any decision being taken on his/her possible return to the family home. Equally, if and when a runaway is picked up by the authorities, parents should have the right to be informed that their child safe. Sensitive procedures for initiating and conducting parent/child reconciliation should be developed which ensure that neither parents nor runaways feel betrayed by those in authority.

THE PREJOP PROJECT, THE NETHERLANDS

1.2.7.5 Frequently, runaways and other young people at risk of offending are picked up by the police who, through no fault of their own, are limited in what they can do to help these youngsters. The Prejop project represents an attempt to overcome this difficulty by treating young offenders (other than recidivists) and children at risk of offending (especially runaways) as neglected and deprived and therefore in need of welfare assistance, rather than potential or actual offenders. The project consists of locating social workers in the immediate vicinity of local police stations so that they can provide immediate assistance in the form of crisis intervention. Internal case conferences are held every morning between the police and the social workers to establish appropriate referrals.

1.2.7.6 An evaluation of the project (see Junger-Tas, 1988) has shown that the scheme has improved parent/child and teacher/child relations in the short term, but has had no effects in terms of changing parental attitudes or improving levels of academic attainment. However, comparing juvenile shoplifters who were referred to the project with a similar group not referred, it was found that the former were less likely to return to the notice of the police than the latter. Unfortunately this finding was not found for other offences, although shoplifting represented by far the largest offence category. It should also be mentioned that the samples were quite small -

only about 7% of all juvenile cases were referred over a period of ten months - and the follow-up period of six months was too short for the results to be conclusive.

1.2.7.7 In all cases where children run away from home or where decisions are taken to remove children from their parents, those affected should have the right to be heard and to have their opinion taken seriously. Following this, efforts should be made to provide suitable alternatives, the most common of which is to provide foster care. Unfortunately, the findings of research on the effectiveness of foster care are complex and equivocal. Whilst foster care for children in danger of physical abuse is, on balance, likely to be beneficial, foster care for children from families experiencing emotional difficulties may or may not be beneficial, depending upon a wide range of circumstances (Besharov, 1987). Moving children through a series of foster placements is, however, quite damaging and should be avoided. With respect to delinquency prevention, again the findings of research are not clear cut (Hill, 1985).

1.2.7.8 It would appear that foster care is not ideal and, where possible, every effort should be made to help parents keep their children as far as possible. But where this is not feasible, alternatives should be found. For younger children, pre-school programmes represent a cost-equivalent method of avoiding foster placements (Besharov, 1987). For older children, including runaways, the concept of the extended family may provide an effective alternative to institutionalisation in a state-run home or a foster placement.

1.2.7.9 The provision of accomodation and other services for runaways cannot make up for the loss of a stable family environment, but may go some way to compensate for such a loss. The extended family, which may consist of surrogate parents and use peer group pressure to exert discipline and control, can provide a sanctuary in which members can build new relationships, acquire a sense of self esteem and develop

emotional and financial independence (see below). The essence of the extended family concept is to protect young people at risk by linking the stability of family life to the protective elements of education, training, employment and roots in the community, without the danger of institutionalisation or rejection by foster parents.

THE HOUSE OF UMOJA, USA

1.2.7.10 Set up in the late nineteen sixties, the House of Umoja is a residential facility for young black offenders and high risk youth from the local community. The home, or 'sanctuary', is run on the principles of the extended family. The couple who run the home act as parents to all members, all of whom are perceived as 'brothers'. Each youth signs a contract which requires adherence to a strict sense of house rules, involves them in all aspects of the operation of the house (including chores) and ensures their participation in school. Members can receive individual counselling, advice on their educational needs, health check-ups, and assistance in securing employment or vocational training. But the main feature of Umoja is the way in which it fosters a sense of togetherness and mutual trust, both amongst members and between members and their house parents, within the context of the values inherent in African culture.

1.2.7.11 Members are expected to live independently after six months to one year of residence if family re-union is not a realisable goal. Ex-residents become 'old heads' who, together with current residents, use peer group pressure to help build self-respect, a sense of control and a willingness to channel personal resources into a future which revolves around education, employment and family. Youths are encouraged to set up various enterprises and Umoja has a removals company, a printing company, a restaurant, a security institute and a driving instruction enterprise. They provide some employment, but the majority seek jobs outside.

33

1.2.7.12 Success is measured in terms of the re-offending rates of adjudicated offenders who have lived in Umoja, which are very low, rather than rates of crime in the local community. But without control groups, it is difficult to assess the real value of this programme.

1.2.7.13 Whilst the family constitutes the most important influence on a young person's likelihood of offending, there are limits to the extent to which parents can exercise effective supervision over their children's lives. Young males in particular, who spend considerable time with their peers and away from the supervision of their parents, are more likely to offend. Parent watch initiatives (see chapter 2) can help to increase the level of supervision, particularly if they are well organised on a local community basis. But supervision by other responsible adults can also help to reduce propensities to offend. Teachers and youth workers have an important contribution to make here, both of which are discussed in the next two sections.

1.3 The school

1.3.1 It is widely accepted that schools represent a powerful influence upon the young. Children spend a great deal of their formative years in various establishments designed specifically with their need for education and socialisation in mind. Schools therefore provide a promising focus of intervention and innovation and as institutions are more easily targetted than, for example, the family.

1.3.2 Schools offer opportunities for promoting social equality, cultural plurality and personal belonging, and help young people to acquire moral standards and social

skills and a sense of responsibility as citizens. More specifically, they can provide pupils with information and guidance on the nature of delinquency and the importance of respect for the law, the implications of committing a crime, the workings of the criminal justice system and ways of preventing crime. Curriculum material for courses on the above is not difficult to find (see, for example, Graham, 1988).

1.3.3 Overall, research does not provide conclusive evidence to support or refute the notion of a causal relationship between schools and delinquency. However, research does provide clear indications of how schools may inhibit or promote delinquency and hence how schools may be able to contribute to the prevention of crime. Through their capacity to motivate, to integrate and to offer pupils a sense of achievement regardless of ability, schools would appear to have a significant influence on whether or not pupils are drawn into the criminal justice system (Graham, 1988).

1.3.4 Pupils who fail or behave disruptively at school, or who persistently truant from school, are more likely to offend than those who do not. The causes of academic failure, disruptive behaviour and truancy are not entirely clear, but research suggests that schools themselves are largely responsible for these outcomes rather than the types of pupils who make up the school (Rutter et al. 1979). Therefore policies which influence the capacity of schools to minimise the occurrence of these three outcomes should form the central focus of school-based social crime prevention strategies.

1.3.5 School-based intervention

1.3.5.1 School-based prevention strategies which focus upon the treatment of indi-

vidual pupils (or single aspects of the educational process) have not been successful in reducing or preventing delinquency and can even be counter-productive. Introducing social learning and life skills courses into the school curriculum can increase the ability of pupils to anticipate and handle conflicts, including potentially criminal situations, but not on a permanent, long term basis. An innovative scheme to use unemployed school leavers as mediators and supervisors in school has, however, tried to reduce inter-pupil violence in schools in France.

THE SCHOOL SAFETY PROJECT, FRANCE

1.3.5.2 This project was set up to reduce bullying and violence in schools and increase road safety on the way to and from school. Unemployed youngsters without qualifications and with a somewhat jaundiced view of teachers and schooling are employed as mediators/supervisors. Recruits are given an eight day training programme on issues concerning children and adolescence, including drug taking, deviant behaviour and road safety. Recruits are contracted to schools for six month periods, during which they receive on-the-job training. Their work varied from helping teachers with their supervisory tasks during lunch breaks and after school, to mediating between pupils involved in fighting or bullying. Schools which employed recruits reported marked reductions in violence and improvements in teacher/pupil relations (King, 1988).

1.3.5.3 The most promising approach to school-based crime prevention are attempts to change the organisation and 'ethos' of schools, in other words the history, values, attitudes and practices which in combination, give it a unique atmosphere or climate. According to the US Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's comprehensive review of the effectiveness of a wide range of delinquency prevention programmes, school-based programmes which focus on selective organisational change were not only considered the most promising, but offered broad and lasting

benefits at a moderate, non-recurring cost (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1981a).

1.3.5.4 Social interaction within the school, the school's values and its organisational structure represent the focus of such change strategies. A number of features of schooling have been identified by research as important constituents of effective schools. In essence, it is what is taught, how it is taught, how pupils and teachers relate to one another and how pupils are rewarded and disciplined, which determines whether a school is effective or not.

(i) What is taught

1.3.5.5 The relevance of, the degree of academic content in, and the demands made on pupils by the school's curriculum all affect pupil motivation. The curriculum should be balanced in terms of academic and practical content so that it reflects the needs and abilities of the pupils. Low ability pupils should receive opportunities for developing their social skills, acquiring work experience and involvement in local community activities. The curriculum should be wide-ranging, flexible and, above all, stimulating.

(ii) How it is taught

1.3.5.6 Teachers should be well prepared for lessons, select their material in accordance with the cultural and academic diversity of their pupils and develop effective instructional and class management skills.

(iii) Teacher/pupil relations

1.3.5.7 As well as building up mutual trust and respect, teachers need to learn how

to correctly handle conflicts, both between pupils and between pupils and themselves. They should learn how to avoid confrontations, how to foster initiative and imagination and has to allow for the developing adult status of older pupils.

(iv) Rewarding and disciplining pupils

1.3.5.8 Just as bad behaviour needs to be punished, so good behaviour needs to be rewarded. But it is not so much what rewards and sanctions are used (although corporal punishment is generally considered to be ineffective if not counterproductive), but the overall style of rule enforcement. Rules need to be clear, predictable and immediately and consistently enforced, but within an overall context of tolerance. The process of disciplining pupils should not become the separate responsibility of specific teachers or the head teacher, but should be the responsibility of all teachers.

1.3.5.9 Effective schools are those with high levels of commitment and pupil participation, where all pupils succeed in some way or another, where teachers and pupils like and trust one another, where rules are clear and consistently and fairly enforced and where schools accept full responsibility for looking after as well as teaching their pupils. Schools which successfully motivate, integrate and reward their pupils, irrespective of social class, ethnic origin or academic ability, are likely to contribute the most to preventing crime.

1.3.5.10 Schools which are likely to have high rates of delinquency among pupils are those which, inadvertently or otherwise, segregate pupils according to academic ability, concentrate on academic success at the expense of practical and social skills, categorise pupils as deviants, inadequates and failures and refer responsibility for the behaviour and welfare of their pupils to outside agencies and institutions. Schools which permanently exclude their most difficult pupils or ignore those who

38

persistently fail to attend school, may themselves be contributing to the promotion of delinquency.

1.3.5.11 A range of additional measures can assist schools in their responsibility for fully integrating those most at risk of offending - the persistent truants, the failures, the most troublesome. Schools should be informed of known truants and special re-integration programmes should be devised to coax school refusers back into school. Locally based teams of peripatetic teachers skilled in work with difficult children should be made available to schools to help them resolve problems of disruptive be-haviour ^_within^_ the school or the classroom at the earliest possible stage. It is important that, as far as possible, disruptive behaviour is tackled without scapegoat-ing the child and within the context in which it arises. In some cases, schools may need to review their own organisation and 'ethos' with a view to changing internal conditions which give rise to truancy and disruptive behaviour.

THE PATHE PROJECT, USA

1.3.5.12 As part of a major initiative to combat delinquency, the US Office of Juve-nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention funded seventeen diverse, school-based programmes under their Alternative Education Initiative. This initiative sought to re-duce delinquency by, amongst other strategies, strengthening pupil commitment, in-creasing active participation in school activities, offering pupils a greater stake in their school, ensuring all pupils experience success at school and encouraging at-tachment to conforming members of the school community. The PATHE project (Positive Action Through Holistic Education), constituted one of these projects.

1.3.5.13 The PATHE project combined planned institutional change with

individually-based initiatives to increase educational attainment and reduce delinquent behaviour. It sought to reduce delinquency and school disorder by changing the school climate with a view to decreasing academic failure experiences, increasing social bonding and improving pupils' self concepts. These objectives were to be achieved by encouraging mutual respect and co-operation and a sense of belonging amongst all school members; improving communication and encouraging a high degree of pupil and staff participation in the planning and implementation of change; providing clear, fair and consistently enforced rules and improving teachers' class management skills.

1.3.5.14 The programme had five major components:

(i)   The setting up of teams of pupils, teachers, parents, school administrators and representatives from community organisations to review, revise and implement changes in the curriculum and disciplinary matters;

(ii) The introduction of academic innovations to improve attitudes to testing and study skills, including team learning, which enhances self concept and school attachment;

(iii) The introduction of measures to improve the school climate, such as running a School Pride Campaign and providing pupils with a forum to discuss issues of concern;

(iv) Making improvements to the transition from school to career and post-secondary education, including training in skills for finding and keeping jobs;

(v)   Providing special academic and counselling services to pupils with academic/behavioural problems.

1.3.5.15 The programme was conducted in eight, predominantly black, inner city schools, two of which acted as controls. With pre- and post-reorganisation tests, each school also acted as its own control. The fifth component was evaluated by true experiment (i.e. identified pupils were allocated on a random basis to treatment and control groups). Data on a wide range of indicators, including delinquency and school behaviour, were collected from official records and self-report surveys.

1.3.5.16 The results show that the institutional change elements of the project had a small but measurable effect on delinquency and school behaviour. Similar improvements were not recorded for academic performance, attendance and self-concept. However there were improvements in attachment to school, staff morale, school safety and rule enforcement. In contrast, the individual measures had no effect on delinquency, attachment to school or pupil self-concepts, but did produce small improvements in attendance and academic performance. Unfortunately, information was only collected *during the course of the project*, so no information is available on whether the identified improvements continued *beyond* the project's duration (for a detailed account of this and other projects funded under the Alternative Education Initiative, see Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1986).

1.3.5.17 The structures and processes which characterise large organisations are inherently complex. The difficulties involved in setting up and implementing organisational changes in schools are thus numerous and considerable. Factors which facilitate change will include: (i) the attitudes, especially the willingness to change, of school heads and senior staff; (ii) the policies of public education authorities; (iii) the capacity of teachers to work together as a team; (iv) direct involvement of staff,

41

pupils and parents; (v) the achievement of the correct balance between stability and change and (vi) setting and maintaining realistic expectations.

1.3.5.18 Changing schools to prevent crime cannot be justified on the grounds of delinquency prevention alone, but must be part of an initiative to improve the school in all respects. Sometimes school priorities for improvement may even conflict with the objective of preventing crime. Such questions of priority and competing interests can only be resolved within the broader domain of public and political discourses on precisely what is expected of schools. Integrating schools into a wider, community-based crime prevention programme may help to facilitate the resolution of some of these conflicts.

1.4 Youth work

1.4.1 Whilst the family is undoubtedly the most important influence on a young person's likelihood of offending, there are limits to the extent to which parents can exercise effective supervision over their children's lives. Riley and Shaw (1985) found that offending is associated with the amount of spare time boys spend away from home with their friends. This suggests that supervision in such circumstances by responsible adults (other than parents), might be able to make a valuable contribution to the prevention of male juvenile offending. Other than teachers, youth workers represent the most likely source of additional supervision, particularly in public places.

1.4.2 The main objective of youth work is to secure the personal development of the individual through social education, a crucial component of which is to encourage young people to take responsibility for their own lives. Young people should there-

fore be offered as much scope as possible to participate in and take responsibility for the activities they engage in. Whilst it can be difficult to maintain a balance between exercising a degree of restraint and allowing young people to manage their own affairs in their own way, it is important that they learn to take responsibility for their own actions, including those which amount to breaking the law.

1.4.3 With the greater exposure of young people to periods of under/unemployment during the transition to adulthood, the provision of cultural and leisure activities has become increasingly important. With limited opportunities for making decisions and taking responsibility in the world of work, young people need to be offered alternative ways of acquiring independence and maturity. Equally, if there are not adequately developed, directed and supervised play facilities, play may become distorted into vandalism, shoplifting and other forms of juvenile crime.

1.4.4 However, despite the common belief that diverting youthful energy into creative, constructive and legitimate activities reduces boredom and a tendency to engage in illegal or criminal activities, there is little empirical evidence in support of this belief. What evidence there is suggests that the impact, if any, is likely to be no more than quite minimal (Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group, 1983; Rutter and Giller, 1983). Furthermore, there is little systematic research on the potential influence of youth work in general on crime, whether in terms of overall levels of provision or specific interventions. Baldwin and Bottoms (1976), for example, found that inadequate youth club provision on public housing estates did not contribute to high rates of juvenile offending. Indeed it is not even known which kinds of provision are most likely to attract or repel those young people most at risk of offending.

1.4.5 Nevertheless, the importance of providing diverse and imaginative forms of leisure and cultural activity in a world which increasingly values and encourages

43

passive consumption and creates for many young people unattainable expectations, should not be underestimated. Young people need to feel they are useful, appreciated and of value. Special projects initiated and managed by young people themselves can help them gain a sense of self-esteem and independence. Activities such as sport, music, theatre, dance and literature, can all help young people to gain insights into themselves, their worth and their ability to relate to others. Such activities, which do help to divert young people from boredom, can also help to counter ethnic and racial ignorance and prejudice and to integrate young people into the wider community.

THE ETE-JEUNES PROGRAMME, FRANCE

1.4.6 Centred on the long summer holidays during which levels of formal supervision are at their lowest, this programme encompasses a wide range of activities for young people. The central principle which guides the ete-jeunes programme is that the activities, which range from sporting and outward bound activities to discos and open-air film shows, is that the activities should, as far as possible, represent the interests and wishes of the young people themselves rather than being imposed upon them. Special summer activities passports can be purchased for a nominal fee by those under 25 years of age to cover all the activities on offer. The use of passports enables programme organisers to monitor levels of participation and pinpoint areas where ete-jeunes has failed to penetrate. Animateurs are employed to stimulate and direct participation in some of the activities, such as camping holidays, and to integrate young offenders under supervision orders with other participants.

1.4.7 A central thrust of the ete-jeunes programme is to integrate marginalised and ethnic minority groups into 'main-stream' social and sporting activities. The aim is to penetrate and target immigrant populations without threatening or undermining

44

their cultural and religious identity. This has been assisted through the recruitment and incorporation of local ethnic minority gang leaders as animateurs and youth workers. There is no information on the extent to which the ete-jeunes activities are successful in targetting marginalised and disadvantaged young people.

1.4.8 Compared with previous years, levels of reported crime have fallen over the summer months in those cities in which ete-jeunes activities have been introduced. However, it is not known whether this is directly attributable to the activities or other factors. In many cases the activities are more concerned with improving social and racial integration and building self-confidence and a positive self-image rather than crime prevention. These are difficult to measure and are unlikely to reduce crime in the short term. But then the ete-jeunes programme is designed not so much to produce immediate effects in terms of reductions in crime, but rather to provide an appropriate environment within which young people can develop into fully re-sponsible citizens.

1.4.9 One traditional form of youth work is the organisation of youth clubs. Some youth clubs tend to experience difficulty in attracting older teenagers and those most at risk of offending or, in some cases, they may even become a breeding ground for delinquency. Other forms of youth work, such as information, counselling and advice centres, drop-in centres, skills centres and detached and outreach work, are also unlikely to prevent crime and indeed on their own, should not be expected to do so. However, detached work can be very successful in terms of contacting young people and developing relationships with them, including those most at risk of offending. Since research has shown that detached youth work can improve levels of social adjustment, it may have an important indirect influence on the propensities of some young people to offend.

THE WINCROFT PROJECT, ENGLAND

1.4.10 There are very few youth work initiatives which have been both systematically evaluated and effective in reducing delinquency. A review of early juvenile delinquency prevention experiments by the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1980) found only one effective project out of the ten considered. This was the Wincroft project, which ran during the mid-nineteen sixties and today still represents one of the few relatively successful examples of youth work oriented delinquency prevention initiatives.

1.4.11 The project consisted of detached/street workers whose main function was to contact and develop relationships with young offenders living in a working class, high crime neighbourhood. The project was evaluated in terms of the social adjustment and delinquent activities of the young people it reached. A target group of 54 boys with an average age of 15 were compared with a control group of 74 boys over the project period of 31 months. A follow-up study twelve months later offered an indication of whether any benefits the project may have had were sustained after it had ceased. The results are quite encouraging.

1.4.12 Comparisons between the target and control groups showed statistically significant differences between the two groups. The target group fared better than the control group in terms of the number of court appearances, convictions and self reported offences committed during the period of the project. From an examination of police records one year after the project had ceased, the target group still had less contact with the criminal justice system than the control group and were still committing fewer offences. However, they were committing more offences than before and the offences they committed tended to be of a more serious nature. This suggests that the project acted as a holding operation for some, but with behaviour tend-

ing to deteriorate after the project had ceased.

1.4.13 The evaluators found that the benefits of the project were greatest for the least disturbed boys. This might be taken to suggest that such initiatives should be targetted at those at risk of offending rather than convicted delinquents. This inference should, however, be treated with caution, since the Wincroft Project was only targetted at convicted offenders. (A similar study by O'Donnell et al.(1979), which included target and control groups of non delinquents as well as delinquents, found that whilst the delinquents benefitted more than the delinquent control group, the non delinquents did not. Indeed the non delinquent target group fared worse than the non delinquent control group).

1.4.14 Sometimes young people's leisure facilities are the streets and shopping centres of towns and cities. With nothing to do and nowhere to go, they often end up attracted by the bright lights, the lavish displays of consumer goods or just the prospect of shelter from the cold. In some shopping areas, this can lead to the potential for continuing, low level friction between the young people hanging around and those using the shopping centre for more legitimate purposes, including shopkeepers and security guards. Here too detached youth workers can prove useful in preventing crime.

THE ROTTERDAM SHOPPING CENTRE PROJECT, THE NETHERLANDS

1.4.15 A more recent detached youth work project, which is more focussed than the Wincroft project, targets young people who hang around shopping centres. A study of crime in two shopping centres showed that half of all crime reported to or registered by the police were committed on members of the public (Colder, 1987). The

most common offences were street robbery, pick-pocketing, theft from cars and of bicycles. The usual response to shopping centre crime is to use police patrols, security guards, store detectives and various forms of technical surveillance. But this project departs from this approach by attempting to integrate potential offenders rather than protect goods and property.

1.4.16 A crime prevention commission, with representatives from the municipality, the police, the public prosecution office, a youth organisation and the shopkeepers association, appointed a detached street worker to set up and co-ordinate the project. The police issues a special circular, which sets out the rules of behaviour governing conduct within the confines of the shopping centre. These rules are circulated to all secondary schools in the vicinity and the police hold discussions during which the rules, and the consequences of breaking them are explained.

1.4.17 The aim of the project is to promote harmony between shopkeepers, young people who hang around the shopping centre and the shoppers themselves. Rather than excluding young people from the shopping centre or moving them on, specific places are provided where young people can freely congregate and where the police rules do not apply. Funds are provided for organising sports and leisure activities, particularly during week-ends and the holiday periods, and the detached worker has negotiated employment in the shopping centre for a few young people. According to Junger-Tas (1988), damage from vandalism and losses from shoplifting have both declined, but no information is as yet available on whether juvenile crime overall has declined since the introduction of the project.

1.4.18 There are then at least five ways in which youth workers, in collaboration with young people, can make a contribution to crime prevention. They can: (i) identify peer group networks and patterns of behaviour which lead to conflicts and of-

fending; (ii) explore the relationships between these patterns and situations and the individual and collective needs and identities of the young people concerned; (iii) seek to encourage alternative sources of prestige and status; (iv) provide access to the services of local agencies; and (v) supervise young people on the streets and seek to divert them from crime-prone situations into legitimate, self-chosen activities.

1.4.19 Prior to embarking on these activities, youth workers may first need to conduct a survey of the needs and problems of young people in their neighbourhood and what services are available for meeting these needs and problems. The complex, inter-connecting network of services for young people - education, training, employment, accomodation, cultural and leisure activities, social security etc. - needs to be co-ordinated at the local level on the basis of local conditions. The provision of these services should therefore be located within a broader, multi-agency approach to servicing the requirements of young people (see below and chapter 3).

YOUTH ACTION, UK

1.4.20 The Youth Action project is based on the social action approach, the main principle of which is that youth workers support and assist young people at risk (as opposed to leading or directing them), in resolving problems and issues they themselves have identified. Young people are encouraged to think through their own problems and take responsibility for making decisions to resolve them. Youth Action's main aims and objectives can be summarised as follows:

(i)   To provide for young people whose needs are not being met by existing community based social work, school and youth work provision and are therefore at

49

risk of being removed from, or not being provided for within, the community.

(ii) To help those attending projects to develop the confidence to deal with the circumstances of their lives and develop a sense of responsibility in the community.

(iii) To encourage participation in the projects by adults, including agency representatives and parents, and to develop the capacity of the community to accept and support these young people.

1.4.21 An independent review of Youth Action found that the main aims and objectives were all only partially realised. Although the review was not able to evaluate the initiative in terms of the numbers of young people passing through the court process, it did conclude that Youth Action had prevented at least some young people from offending. The review suggests that the initiative fills a gap between local authority/voluntary provision for young people and the agencies set up to deal with young offenders.

1.4.22 An important dilemma identified in the implementation of Youth Action was how to work effectively with young people at risk without resorting to a referral system and risking stigmatisation. The principle of voluntarism had to be abandoned in some instances and modified in others, particularly where the work required substantial collaboration with statutory agencies, responding to court orders and working with schools during school time. A further difficulty concerned the degree to which youth workers were directive or merely supportive. It is difficult to maintain a balance between exercising control over a project whilst ensuring that the young people engaged on it are sufficiently involved in managing it.

1.4.23 The review concluded by suggesting that the inter-agency approach to work-
ing with young people at risk in the community was the most promising aspect, if
only because such an approach resulted in the effective mobilisation of agency re-
sources (see Chapter 3). This required, however, a flexible approach with a consid-
erable willingness to compromise on principles such as the restriction to working
only on a voluntary basis or only with natural peer groups.

1.4.24 Detached or street workers, or their equivalent, are often best placed to dis-
cover the precise needs of young people. They are able to contact groups of young
people where they naturally congregate and develop a basis of trust and confidence
before encouraging them to take part in small group work or specific activities. They
are often in a position to know better than any other agencies what the precise needs
are of the young people with whom they are in touch and are therefore well placed
for mediating between them and the network of local services. To assist in this proc-
ess, small local surveys can be carried out on the local social and economic situation
of young people prior to devising an overall strategic response to their needs and
problems.

1.4.25 As with all interventions with young people at risk, care must be taken to
avoid labelling and net-widening. The former may occur when normal behaviour is
re-defined as problematic behaviour requiring official intervention. Thus young peo-
ple who engage in petty acts of anti-social behaviour can be criminalised if such be-
haviour is legally classified as criminal rather than socially classified as a nuisance
or mildly deviant. Care must therefore be taken to ensure that the targetting of re-
sources on offenders does not inadvertently broaden to include youngsters who are
not criminal but, for example, come from criminogenic backgrounds or associate
with offenders.

1.4.26 To avoid net-widening and the negative consequences of singling out and stigmatising young people, whilst ensuring that those most in need of resources actually receive them, is a difficult and delicate task. One way of resolving this is to target people in groups in the areas in which they live rather than as individuals. Resources should be primarily targetted to areas with low provision of services, high crime and high unemployment, and during specific periods when levels of supervision are low, such as after school and during the school holidays. In addition, care should be taken to ensure that those groups most in need of resources, such as migrants, ethnic minorities, the socially and economically disadvantaged, should have easy access to these resources. In some cases, it may also be appropriate to target specific youth-related problems, such as drug-addiction, prostitution and homelessness.

1.4.27 Youth workers are, understandably, wary of becoming an extended arm of the law, if only because the effectiveness of their work with young people is largely dependent upon them being able to build up and maintain their trust and confidence. Although youth workers do work directly with young offenders and with representatives of the criminal justice system, it is important that they develop clear practices for working with law enforcement authorities without compromising their own working principles. The boundaries between police work and youth work need to be clearly defined and a code of practice should be drawn up outlining how they should work with one another. The police must recognise the youth worker's need to maintain the confidence and trust of young people and similarly, youth workers must respect the importance of the law. Thus youth workers will need to come to some understanding with the police about their response to offending by clients. They may prefer to act as advocates rather than intermediaries.

1.4.28 The emphasis of youth work should therefore be on *preventing* young people

from offending rather than helping the police to identify and bring to justice those who have offended. This need not be problematic insofar as crime prevention, like youth work, can consist of improving the socialisation and supervision of young people. Youth workers are well placed to do both.

1.5 Employment

1.5.1 The relationship between employment and crime is highly complex. The effects of unemployment on crime have not so far been successfully isolated from a wide range of other socio-economic factors, such as income distribution and inequality, urban deprivation and deficits in education (Tarling, 1982). What evidence there is suggests that relationship between unemployment and crime is equivocal.

1.5.2 There are, however, a number of reasons why unemployment *could* lead to crime, from lack of income to boredom, demoralisation and the de-stabilising of the family unit. It is known that unemployment can precipitate family break-up and that this in turn may increase the vulnerability of children within the family to become delinquent (Lenkowski, 1987). It is also known that criminals are more likely to be unemployed than non-offenders and that unemployed youth are more likely than those in work to hang around the streets and seek or succumb to opportunities to commit offences (Rutter and Giller, 1983). On balance, therefore, it would appear that while there is no evidence to support a causal relationship between unemployment and crime, they are likely to re-inforce one another.

1.5.3 Where economic changes lead to increases in migration, unemployment and social disorganisation, increases in crime may well follow. And the more an area or community is socially disorganised, the more vulnerable it is to economic changes

53

(McGahey, 1986). This suggests that different neighbourhoods will be more or less likely to experience increases in crime as a result of changes in economic circumstances, including increases in unemployment. The negative effects of economic changes in general and increases in unemployment rates in particular, will also tend to fall disproportionately on those least able to protect themselves from such changes - the economically and socially disadvantaged and in particular those suffering from severe multiple deprivation.

1.5.4 Generally, employment and training programmes set up with the explicit purpose of reducing crime are few and far between and even those which have had a crime preventive objective have been largely ineffective (McGahey, 1986). Projects which have physically and socially removed participants from high crime neighbourhoods and crime prone peer groups (in contrast to those which have to work within the participant's natural environment), have proved to be quite effective in reducing propensities to offend in the removed group (Taggart, 1981). However, such programmes are somewhat artificial and of little use if participants are ultimately returned to their original areas of residence.

1.5.5 Detailed descriptions of successful employment and training initiatives are rare (although the ete-jeunes project described earlier could reduce the risk of increases in juvenile crime during the summer holidays, when the rate of unemployment is swelled by the new wave of school leavers). This section, more than others, therefore relies more on general accounts of policy initiatives in the field of employment and training development, such as the U.S. Department of Justice's report on employment based strategies for delinquency prevention (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1981b).

1.5.6 Employment programmes which focus on providing long term, quality em-

ployment are more likely to be effective than those which attempt to change atti-
tudes and behaviour or only provide short-term employment. According to Beville
and Nickerson (1981), employment is only likely to reduce delinquency if it pro-
vides a sense of committment, attachment and belief. The employee should be suit-
ably equipped to do the job, both in terms of ability and training, be assisted in the
development of good relationships with other employees and learn the rules and
standards which govern the running of the organisation or enterprise.

1.5.7 More specifically, there are three main kinds of employment-based approaches
which may help to reduce or prevent crime: (i) the provision of training and work
experience; (ii) improving and expanding employment opportunities; and (iii) sup-
porting and encouraging employment networks.

(i) Training and work experience

1.5.7.1 Training and retraining should be linked to the requirements of the local
market in general and local employers in particular, taking into account changes in
patterns of employment, technological developments and career aspirations. Along
with work experience, it should provide formal qualifications in technical and voca-
tional skills, courses in life-skills and community service and, if necessary, remedial
courses in areas such as literacy and numeracy. It should also focus on improving
the readiness of individuals for the disciplines of the world of work, with its specific
rules and expectations. Some, particularly those who have been unemployed for a
prolonged period and those who have never had the opportunity to work, may need
on-the-job training, gradual exposure to work and various forms of social support.

1.5.7.2 Special sheltered groups can be formed consisting of about ten trainees, who

are either at risk of offending or who have offended. Each group has its own leader, preferably a mature, experienced, socially adept employee with the ability to empathise and earn the respect of the group. They are responsible for setting group standards of performance and behaviour and developing levels of motivation and conformity to the requirements of a normal working environment. The group then acts as a mechanism for instilling a sense of work discipline and gradually socialising members into the role of a full time employee.

1.5.7.3 Temporary placement strategies can also be used to effectively fit trainees to jobs and indeed vice versa. Where only short term, unskilled work is available, strategies for placing trainees in long-term, semi-skilled or skilled work with prospects should be developed. Ultimately, however, resources for training and work experience will be largely wasted without the development of employment opportunities.

(ii) Improving and expanding employment opportunities

1.5.7.4 Insofar as crime represents a rational response to limited or blocked opportunities, creating jobs and providing opportunities for advancement in existing jobs may help to reduce crime. Newly created jobs should be directed towards long term employment rather than be just stop-gaps, which may hardly differ from employees' experience to date and to which crime is more likely to represent an attractive alternative. Where possible, the creation of new employment opportunities should be based on developing the local economy. New employment opportunities should benefit the local community, since this is more likely to produce further employment opportunities which coincide with the needs and skills of local residents.

1.5.7.5 Often the health of local economies are heavily reliant on influences outside their control, including macro-economic policies and national trends in unemployment and economic growth. The relationship between national and local economies is highly complex, but where possible, attempts should be made to link and rationalise employment policies at different levels, even though this may be very difficult to achieve in practice. Similarly, some co-operation between the public and private sectors can help to maximise employment opportunities by, for example, offering specific incentives, including financial incentives, such as those used to persuade organisations to employ ex-offenders or re-locate in areas of economic decline.

1.5.7.6 In addition to the quantity of employment opportunities, the quality of existing employment should be enhanced so as to provide a greater incentive to apply for and keep jobs. As well as income, work should also provide a degree of satisfaction, a source of identity and status and long term prospects. A pleasant working atmosphere, a degree of independence, opportunities to learn and positive feedback can all help employees to feel committed to and involved in their work, and ultimately less disposed towards crime.

MISSION LOCALES, FRANCE

1.5.7.7 Mission Locales are youth training centres which provide a place for young people aged 16 to 25 to meet, discuss and resolve problems associated with employment, training, finance and, in some cases, accomodation with professional experts. Many of the clients are unemployed and/or unqualified school leavers. The Mission uses its local contacts to help to find places on training schemes, it offers courses in literacy and numeracy and it provides advice on applying for temporary and permanent employment.

1.5.7.8 An important principle of the Mission Locales is to help young people develop projects themselves. Grants are available for starting up enterprises and any young people, provided they are not in employment, can propose a project and apply for funding with the help of the Mission staff. Projects are discussed informally by a special committee, which will also try to make constructive suggestions for improvements and potential sources of finance. Once approved by the committee, the project will then be submitted to the local crime prevention council (CCPD) with a recommendation for partial or full financing (King, 1988). Projects such as a multi-racial theatre workshop, dance parties, sports clubs and camping and study holidays have been funded.

1.5.7.9 Mission Locales are locally based, with contacts to professional workers and employers and its own broadly based management committee. The latter includes among its membership local representatives from trade unions, government departments, trade councils and the voluntary sector. Half of the funding is generated locally, the other half comes from central government. However, while large numbers of young people use the services offered by Mission Locales and many employment and training places are created each year, it is not known what influence this has had on crime, whether at the individual or the community wide level.

(iii) Supporting and encouraging employment networks

1.5.7.10 In addition to providing adequate training and employment opportunities, networks providing basic information on the types of jobs available and the requirements for and daily content of different jobs should be developed. In addition to such formal networks, informal networks, which facilitate the procurement of jobs via personal contact with friends and relatives, can also be supported and enhanced. A healthy informal employment network is one which is based on a healthy adult

employment market, characterised by long term employment prospects in semi-skilled and skilled jobs. The creation of a stable, adult employment market should be the first priority insofar as this provides a sound basis for enhancing employment opportunities for the young.

1.5.7.11 In unstable, socially disorganised communities where economic development is most difficult, the public sector can be used to compensate for a lack of informal networks amongst the most marginalised groups, such as ethnic minorities and migrants. Contract compliance initiatives and the provision of special access centres are two strategies which can help to increase levels of access to employment opportunities for such groups.

1.6 Health policy

1.6.1 The most important aspects of health policy in relation to the prevention of crime are policies concerned with drug and alcohol abuse. As pointed out in the introduction, drug and alcohol related offending is complex and is not dealt with here, other than in a general sense (i.e. some of the social policies which have a bearing on crime may also have a bearing on drug and alcohol abuse and associated offending). However, the provision of comprehensive health care facilities for children, particularly those from at risk family backgrounds, may help to ease some of the burdens on multi-problem families and hence increase their ability to function more effectively. Information and advice on family planning may be of particular importance, given the high risk of children from single teenage mothers becoming involved in delinquency (Loury, 1987).

1.6.2 Barnum (1987) suggests that consistent and easy access to health services for

59

children, particularly from lower socio-economic classes, is an important precursor of effective preventive care. Health service delivery, he suggests, could be enhanced by focussing on the different health needs of different ages and delivering health services through schools, using outreach to involve families where necessary.

1.6.3 Whilst there is little evidence to suggest that those suffering from specific physical and mental handicaps are more predisposed to delinquency (Rutter and Giller, 1983), such disabilities may lead to a greater feeling of alienation and exclusion. Insofar as this leads to marginalisation, community-based policies for encouraging the social integration of the physically and mentally handicapped should be encouraged. Policies at the national level to promote better health, nutrition and psychological well-being need to be integrated and co-ordinated with health programmes targetted at those most in need at the local level.

1.7 Urban planning policy

1.7.1 As with health policy, urban planning policy is only briefly referred to here. The relationship between the physical environment of neighbourhoods and crime is covered in chapter 2 and housing policy and crime in chapter 3. With the exception of these two areas, there is little information on the relationship between urban planning policies and crime (but see Vahlenkamp, 1989).

1.7.2 Whilst it is readily acknowledged that large and overpopulated cities are more likely to suffer from high crime rates than planned, low density urban environments, it is difficult to suggest practical policies which might relieve the effects of overcrowding in such cities. However where possible, the size and population of urban communities and individual housing estates should be carefully controlled and

where possible, high concentrations of families with young children in residential blocks should be avoided.

CHAPTER 2. SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 This chapter is concerned with situational crime prevention (also referred to as 'opportunity reduction'). It comprises measures directed at specific forms of crime which involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in which these crimes occur in as systematic and permanent way as possible, so as to reduce the opportunities for these crimes and increase the risk of detection as perceived by a broad range of potential offenders (Hough et al. 1980).

2.1.2 Such measures include but go beyond the work of the police and can be contrasted with social measures concerned with changing people's dispositions to offend. Situational crime prevention assumes that, given the opportunity, most people are prone to committing offences, whereas the dispositional approach assumes that criminality can be explained by the personality of specific individuals who have either inherited such a disposition or acquired it from the socio-economic and cultural conditions in which they live and/or were brought up in. As Hope and Shaw (1988) explain, social crime prevention represents an effort to inculcate a permanent disposition against offending in general, whereas situational prevention concentrates on developing shorter-term measures to prevent specific offence behaviour.

2.1.3 Situational theory is therefore most useful for explaining crime committed by ordinary people acting rationally, but under specific pressures and in specific, usually "opportunistic" situations. It is generally applicable to petty and acquisitive crime, such as residential burglary, shoplifting and vandalism. It may also be applicable to violent offences committed under certain circumstances. Although there is

nothing intrinsically communal about situational crime prevention - measures can take many forms as long as they reduce opportunities as perceived by potential offenders - its implementation often demands a focus on residential communities (Hope and Shaw, 1988). However they apply equally in, for example, retail premises and transport undertakings.

2.1.4 The attraction of situational measures lies largely in their capacity to provide realistic, often simple and inexpensive solutions to specific kinds of offending in a variety of specific locations. Their success, however, depends upon the extent to which potential offenders perceive situational changes as adversely influencing the ease, the risks and the rewards of committing offences and whether these perceptions affect their decisions as to whether to commit an offence or not. Clearly some situational measures will affect the decision making of potential offenders more than others. Equally, certain potential offenders will be influenced more or less by changes in situations than others.

2.1.5 There are two main categories of situational measures: security measures which make it more difficult to commit a crime and measures which influence the costs and benefits of committing crimes. Frequently, and particularly more recently, crime prevention projects draw on a combination of these measures. Two examples of multi-measure projects which combine situational measures are described at the end of the chapter.

2.2 Security measures which hinder offending

2.2.1 There are three ways in which opportunities for committing crimes can be made physically more restrictive: (i) by hardening the target; (ii) by removing the

target and (iii) by removing the means of committing a crime.

(i) Hardening the target.

2.2.2. This by now well established and well known approach to reducing criminal opportunities simply amounts to increasing the physical security of targets by using locks, reinforced and unbreakable materials, immobilising devices and alarms and by placing vulnerable objects behind fences, grills or meshes or in safes. Vandalism to and thefts from telephone kiosks have been reduced by, for example, replacing aluminium coin boxes with steel ones (Mayhew et al. 1980) and thefts from retail and commercial premises have been reduced by the skilful deployment of intruder alarms. According to Rosenbaum (1988), there is also some limited evidence that target hardening measures have reduced levels of residential burglary in the USA.

2.2.3 The most frequently targeted offences which attract various hardening strategies are robberies, burglaries, shoplifting and thefts of and from vehicles. Four target hardening strategies are commonly adopted - security improvements, building and design codes, publicity campaigns and insurance incentives. The first two act directly on targets whilst the second two act more indirectly and largely through persuasion.

2.2.4 Security improvements

2.2.4.1 Security devices are commonly employed to protect various kinds of premises from outside intrusion. Locks, especially on doors, are the most common hardware used. Alarms are far less often installed - according to Whitaker (1986), alarms

are owned by less than 10% of households in the USA. Owners of dwellings under public ownership can be offered grants to improve the security of their houses or, alternatively, security improvements can be made a condition of grants for general property improvements. Evaluations of crime prevention projects have shown that those projects which have relied solely on using security devices have been only qualified successes.

2.2.4.2 In one project, for example, burglaries on four public housing estates declined considerably after the installation of a range of security devices, but the proportion of entries through unlocked doors and windows increased. In another, the fitting of locks to all ground-floor doors and windows in over 1,000 publicly owned houses, reduced fear of burglary but only managed to stabilise burglary rates for a year on the project estates, while burglary rates increased on neighbouring estates as did other crime on the target estates (Allat, 1984).

2.2.4.3 The decision to install security devices depends on various factors, including the perceived risk of victimisation and the cost of installing the hardware. Once installed, such devices are, however, of little value if they are not used and most attempts to increase the security of residential dwellings tend to revolve around encouraging property owners to be more cautious. To encourage this, security surveys may be undertaken by specialised police officers or others, such as insurance companies and community crime prevention agencies, who should tailor their advice to the security needs of individual property owners. The evidence, however, suggests that the scope for reducing burglaries in this way is limited by the difficulties associated with persuading people to take up the advice offered. There is also some evidence to suggest that burglary victims in receipt of security surveys become more fearful of crime than those who do not (Rosenbaum, 1988). To be most effective, therefore, security advice should advocate measures which fit in with the needs and

priorities of people's daily lives, without presenting undue obstacles or exacerbating fear of crime.

2.2.4.4 In some cases the introduction of locks can have dramatic effects. When steering column locks were made compulsory on all cars, both old and new, in the Federal Republic of Germany, car thefts were dramatically reduced. In other cases the effects have, however, been less marked. Mayhew et al. (1980), for example, reported no immediate benefit from the introduction of steering column locks to new cars in England and Wales. A clear lesson seems to be that, to derive any preventive effect, all cars must be simultaneously secured. Whilst more expensive, the comprehensive approach adopted by the West Germans was apparently shown to be cost-effective.

2.2.4.5 Overall, research suggests that security measures are generally outweighed in importance by other variables (Mayhew, 1984). Unless sophisticated and thus expensive, security measures are unlikely to deter most offenders. Research, for example, has shown that burglars are more likely to select targets on the basis of type of area, location, likely rewards, lack of occupancy, ease of access, whether overlooked or not and whether a dog is present. These factors are all assessable prior to attempting entry, which fits in with the findings of research on the decision-making of burglars - that they tend to seek opportunities rather than take advantage of presented ones (Maguire, 1982).

2.2.5 Building and design codes

2.2.5.1 A more comprehensive, long term approach to protecting dwellings from burglary can be developed by ensuring that new buildings, and indeed entire areas,

comply with specific security standards. National codes detailing the costs of installing different levels of security in various kinds of properties and guidelines for architects and builders on building security have been developed in some countries. For example, a working group on residential burglary has made recommendations with respect to local authority housing investment programmes in high risk areas (SCCP, 1986).

2.2.5.2 The report provides information on the costs of installing different levels of security in properties with various kinds of doors and windows, setting out standards for architects, builders etc. on building security, taking care to ensure that such standards do not conflict with fire-prevention and other safety requirements. However, an evaluation of a case study introduced to test the effectiveness of such a code, showed that security improvements to 750 houses had little direct effect on the level of burglary, although burglary levels were rather low for a really meaningful analysis (Poyner and Webb, 1987).

2.2.5.3 Developments in technology are producing increasingly more sophisticated ways of hardening targets through the use of increasingly sophisticated security devices. Southall and Ekblom (1985), for example, consider the feasibility of reducing thefts of and from cars through the introduction of a range of mechanical and electronic security devices at the design stage. In addition to steering column locks, the 'crime-free car' should, they suggest, have central locking systems, alarms, windows made of reinforced glass and registration numbers etched on windows to reduce their resaleability if stolen. Motor manufacturers need to be persuaded that they are responsible for producing secure vehicles. Insurance companies need to provide incentives to consumers to purchase vehicle security and the public need to be persuaded that they are ultimately responsible for the security of their vehicle themselves. If possible, security devices should be standardised and builders and

manufacturers should be obliged to conform to minimum security standards.

2.2.6 Publicity campaigns

2.2.6.1 Because certain crimes, such as thefts from homes and cars, are wide-spread and many of these crimes are facilitated by the negligence of owners, publicity campaigns aimed at raising the awareness of potential victims of the need to guard against such crimes have become commonplace. However the effects of such campaigns, whether conducted through radio, television broadcasts, advertising in the press or the distribution of leaflets, are difficult to measure. It appears that while they may increase levels of knowledge and concern, they rarely actually change behaviour or reduce crime rates, except perhaps in the short term (Mayhew, 1984). Care should also be taken, in the planning of such campaigns, to ensure that they do not inadvertently increase fear of crime. Where combined with other measures, such as increases in police patrols, publicity campaigns are more likely to increase the willingness of householders and vehicle owners to take precautions.

PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS IN THE NETHERLANDS

2.2.6.2 Three projects in the Netherlands which combine publicity campaigns with other measures have recorded some successes. The projects - in The Hague, Amsterdam and Hoogeveen - combined the provision of information and advice and increases in police foot and bicycle patrols with traditional investigative functions. The three project areas, each matched with control areas, produced different results, but all three showed an increased willingness of residents to take precautions. The project in The Hague resulted in a short term drop in burglary rates which, according to van Dijk and Steinmetz (1981), was not due to more widespread use of precautionary measures or patrols, but to the publicity campaign. Interestingly, the bur-

68

glary rate began to increase after the project disbanded. The other two projects did not result in a decline in burglaries, but since burglaries increased elsewhere, this can be considered a limited success.

2.2.7 Insurance incentives

2.2.7.1 The provision of insurance constitutes a potentially influential means through which financial incentives or disincentives can be offered to promote the adoption of crime prevention measures. Insurance companies, by insisting on the installation of security hardware as a condition of providing insurance cover, can increase the take-up of security measures, although care must be taken that the additional costs involved do not deter potential purchasers. Poorer areas tend to suffer more crime and consequently have a greater need both for security measures and for insurance against the effects of victimisation. Since insurance premiums in such areas tend to be very high, it may be necessary to provide the poorest with subsidies or those who install security devices with discounts. Incentives through the use of no-claims discounts should be avoided since they can act as a disincentive to report thefts and burglaries, especially where losses are small.

2.2.7.2 There is as yet little evidence on the effects of commercial insurance on the prevention of crime, although Litton and Pease (1984) suggest that the impact is likely to be minimal. The computerisation of insurance claims can increase the detection of insurance fraud, but is unlikely to eliminate it. It should also be stressed that, given that the costs of insurance claims, including fraudulent claims, are passed on to the consumer, and that the poor are most likely to be victimised by crime, insurance tends to discriminate against those least able to afford the protection it can provide.

(ii) Removing the target.

2.2.8 Some crimes can be prevented simply by removing access to the target or by designing the environment in such a way that opportunities for crime are minimised. So, for example, the removal of slot machines from public places and into locations where they can be under supervision prevents them being vandalised or broken into (Svensson, 1987) and the widespread replacement of cash with cheques, credit cards and other forms of 'plastic' money reduces opportunities for crimes such as security van robberies and thefts from telephone kiosks. Other examples include the prevention of robberies of takings on trams and buses through the widespread use of pre-paid tickets on public transport systems, or the prevention of thefts from gas and electricity meters by replacing them with billing systems (see Hill, 1986).

(iii) Removing the means of committing a crime.

2.2.9 Certain types of offences can be prevented if the means for committing them are made unavailable. Screening airline passengers for weapons and explosive devices has reduced the incidence of aircraft 'skyjacking' (Hough et al., 1980) and the potential for violence in pubs and football grounds has been reduced by replacing glasses with plastic containers. The potential for football violence can also be reduced through the systematic searching of football fans prior to matches and the removal of bricks, stones and other potential weapons around football grounds.

2.2.10 An important example of removing the means for committing a crime is gun control, i.e. the restriction and/or registration of firearms ownership. However, despite a strong belief that the availability and widespread ownership of firearms is linked to the incidence of violent crime, no conclusive research evidence exists to

substantiate this belief. Rosenbaum (1988), however, referring to the situation in the USA, states that:

"...an estimated 30,000 deaths occur each year because of criminal, accidental or suicidal uses of firearms; in another 900,000 incidents firearms are present, fired, or involved in some other capacity. One cannot help asking what the overall picture might be if the opportunities for using firearms were curtailed dramatically."

2.2.11 Wright et al. (1983) have reported covariations between increases in firearm ownership and increases in homicides, robberies and aggravated assaults in the USA, but no causal connections have been empirically established. But despite this lack of evidence, there is still a strong inclination to associate the free availability of firearms with violent crime and to take precautions accordingly. In some countries, for example, the law requires gun owners to keep gun catches separate from the rest of the weapon.

2.2.12 In addition to the above, there are also personal protective measures which may also hinder crime in a similar manner. Thus precautions such as keeping away from high crime areas or not going out at night and courses in self-defence or even owning a weapon, may also hinder the commission of a crime. Such precautions are, not surprisingly, quite effective; those who restrict their mobility are less likely to be victimised. But, as Rosenbaum (1988) points out, safety achieved by such means is safety purchased at a price, including less personal freedom, greater fear of crime and, most importantly, a long term detrimental effect on local crime rates. The withdrawal of significant numbers of persons from the streets can undermine the community's capacity to informally control and surveil its members, which in turn lowers the constraints against offending. (This is discussed further in Chapter 3).

2.2.13 In the Federal Republic of Germany, victim organisations distribute leaflets to women outlining what they can do to protect themselves. But there is little evidence that self defence courses for women actually reduce their vulnerability to attack, although they may reduce fear of crime. With respect to the ownership of firearms, Rosenbaum (1988) suggests that those who use guns to protect themselves and/or their property are more likely to incur additional risks of becoming involved in violence.

2.3 Measures influencing the costs and benefits of offending

2.3.1 The costs and benefits of offending can be influenced by either reducing the incentive to offend or increasing the real or perceived threat of apprehension and conviction. The former consists of decreasing the expected benefits from committing an offence, for example in the case of theft, reducing the value of whatever property is stolen, usually by marking the property. Such measures extend beyond prevention and into the realm of detection. Installing dye on bank notes, paint clamps on retail goods or using olfactory chemicals on carpets may act not only as a disincentive to offend, but also as a method for assisting in the detection of offenders.

2.3.2 The latter - increasing the real or perceived threat of apprehension - can be achieved by increasing various forms of surveillance and applies to most forms of crime. It is not capital intensive like other situational measures (and may therefore be particularly attractive to developing countries) but rather 'person intensive'. Surveillance can be divided into three main forms - technical, formal/informal and natural surveillance of the physical environment.

(i) Property marking

2.3.3 The durable marking of property such as cars, bicycles, valuable household goods, reduces its value by making the property easier to identify and thus both less marketable and usable. Names or identity numbers can be engraved on property with special engraving equipment or invisible ink. A novel, but extremely effective variation is the use of dye capsules in night deposit safes and cash dispensers. In the event of a robbery, the dye capsules are activated and the bank notes become value-less. But merely marking property rarely influences whether the property, if stolen, is recovered or prevented from being resold (Mayhew, 1984).

OPERATION IDENTIFICATION, SWEDEN AND UK

2.3.4 Two evaluations of property marking, or 'operation identification' projects, one in Sweden the other in the UK, have produced somewhat contrasting findings. In Sweden, the National Council for Crime Prevention set up a comprehensive prop-erty marking project, covering 3,500 houses in a residential area near Stockholm. Over a period of four years, participation more than doubled from 13% to nearly 30%, but the results were not encouraging. No reduction in burglaries, even for those participating, were recorded (Knutsson, 1984).

2.3.5 In the UK, a more recent scheme produced more promising results, largely be-cause of a change in emphasis and through achieving a very high participation rate. The scheme, which was set up in three rural villages, placed considerable emphasis on *advertising* the fact that goods were marked rather than just marking the goods. It was assumed that the stickers, rather than the marking of goods, would deter poten-tial burglars. Considerable efforts were made to achieve a high take-up rate includ-

ing extensive publicity, door-to-door visits to each household, free marking equipment and the use of post codes to reduce to a minimum the amount of effort required of participants. The eventual take-up rate averaged over 70%.

2.3.6 On the basis of a before and after evaluation, the number of burglaries declined by 40% and the burglary rate declined from just over 5% to 3% for the year after the introduction of the scheme. There was no reduction in the number of burglaries experienced by non-participants, but also no evidence of any displacement. However, no goods were recovered, marked or otherwise.

2.3.7 It should be pointed out that the above project was carried out in a carefully selected, isolated, close-knit, rural community. Some of the participants may well have been potential burglars themselves and the decline in burglaries may have been due to the considerable police attention the community attracted. However, other rural property marking schemes have also claimed positive results, especially a scheme in Canada to prevent the theft of farm chemicals from grain elevators.

THE PORTAGE LA PRAIRIE PROJECT, CANADA

2.3.8 In the Canadian province of Portage La Prairie the police, aware of the difficulties of detecting crime in isolated rural areas, have introduced a number of property marking schemes to reduce the number of thefts. One of these schemes involved the application of highly visible paint marks, with stickers announcing they were marked, to all containers of farm chemicals. The police simultaneously provided a publicity campaign to raise public awareness of the property marking campaign and subsequently thefts of farm chemicals were almost wiped out completely (Linden and Minch, 1985). No evidence is available as to whether thefts declined

because of the marking of the property, because of the use of stickers or because the scheme was so widely publicised.

2.3.9 Other goods, such as Christmas trees, mechanised farming equipment and live-stock, have also been subjected to various forms of marking, tagging or branding. Grain can be very inexpensively marked by mixing small pieces of numbered paper in with the grain. However, while positive results have been claimed for these initia-tives, the quality of the evaluations used to assess the effectiveness of these schemes have not been very sophisticated and have not assessed the amount of displacement to other forms of crime or other, unmarked goods.

2.3.10 So where schemes use stickers advertising that goods are marked (i.e. on the windows of cars or houses) and where high participation rates can be secured with a minimum amount of effort (which is rare), burglary and theft rates may decline. This suggests that the success of property marking schemes lies not only in their ca-pacity to reduce the value of stolen goods, but also in their capacity to suggest to potential offenders that owners are more wary of being victimised and the risk of apprehension is thus greater. However, some evaluations have identified evidence of displacement and it should be born in mind that any measure which attempts to re-duce the value of stolen goods may push offenders into committing a greater num-ber of offences to achieve the desired level of income.

2.3.11 Experience of theft prevention in rural areas in North America and Europe may be of particular relevance to developing countries faced with similar problems. However, given the evidence from North America and Sweden, it may be wise to reserve judgement on the general efficacy of property marking/sticker schemes, al-though some specific examples, such as the use of dye on bank notes, can be very successful. Combined with other preventive measures, such schemes are of course

75

more likely to be effective, but careful evaluation will always be required to ensure crime is not displaced and to identify the effect of property marking independently of the other measures introduced.

(ii) Technical surveillance.

2.3.12 With rising crime rates in most countries in Europe and North America over the last two decades, alternative methods of surveillance have received increasing prominence. Considerable advances have been made in the development of technological surveillance equipment, with the consequence that residential, retail, commercial, transport and recreational buildings are increasingly supplied with various devices for controlling access (such as entry phones), and improving surveillance (such as closed circuit television (CCTV)).

2.3.13 According to the rather limited research in this area, the use of entry phones may help to deter some non-resident offenders, especially if combined with TV links. Access control to underground parking using a variety of technical devices has also been found to be quite effective. Closed circuit television (CCTV) on its own, however, has not been found to have any deterrent effect in residential buildings (Mayhew, 1984), although it may be more effective elsewhere, such as in railway stations, football stadia and retail outlets.

2.3.14 Burrows (1980), in an evaluation of the effects os CCTV on thefts and robberies in four London Underground stations, found that in combination with special police patrols, thefts declined almost fourfold as measured on a before and after basis. Whilst robberies, of which there were far fewer, more than doubled in the nineteen stations in which special police patrols were introduced (for which no satisfac-

tory explanation is offered!), they declined slightly in the four stations in which CCTV was also installed.

2.3.15 Burrows suggests that the special police patrols were effective in reducing the number of thefts because their presence limited the opportunities for committing thefts without being seen. The more serious robberies, he contends, involve a greater degree of premeditation and planning and are therefore less likely to decline in response to increases in police surveillance. But the figures are far too small to draw any real conclusions. Furthermore, the follow-up was only for a period of twelve months and some displacement of thefts to other stations was discovered. Since the installation of CCTV was given considerable publicity, it is possible that this publicity might have accounted for its deterrent effect, rather than the actual existence and use of the CCTV system itself. (As with property marking schemes, where it is the use of stickers advertising the scheme which is important rather than the actual marking of property itself, so too with CCTV).

2.3.16 Burrows also attempted to assess the cost-effectiveness of CCTV, which is known to be expensive. Whilst his data was incomplete, he estimated that the cost per prevented theft was about £1,140. The London Underground Transport Authorities decided to expand the use of CCTV to other stations but, interestingly, not because of its crime preventive effects but because of its ability to facilitate crowd control and transport operations. In assessing its cost-effectiveness, these more important functions should also be included.

(iii) Formal/informal surveillance.

2.3.17 Formal surveillance refers to the activities of those, usually the police, whose

77

sole or primary function is to deter potential offenders by providing a constant threat of apprehension. The mere presence of the police or security personnel in certain places is enough to deter offending, although to what extent is not known. However the deployment of increasing numbers of police does not automatically lead to a reduction in offending and, according to the findings of research (see, for example, Clarke and Hough, 1984), can in fact induce net-widening and an increase in recorded crime. It is also of course both practically and financially inconceivable to suggest or expect the police to provide levels of manpower which would effectively deter crime merely by their presence. The role of the police in preventing crime is discussed further in chapter 3.

2.3.18 Surveillance, whether formal or informal, is carried out by various diverse groups in addition to the police. The degree of formality varies - more informal surveillance is often carried out by public service officials, company employees and ordinary citizens. It is difficult to draw the line between where formal surveillance ends and informal surveillance begins - they are merely opposite components of the same continuum. For purposes of clarity, it may be assumed that individuals who are specifically organised with the explicit objective of carrying out surveillance duties in mind, even if such duties are not their only duties, are considered here as carrying out formal, as opposed to informal, surveillance.

2.3.19 Part of the response to the growing crime problem has been the considerable expansion of the private security industry, both in terms of technical and personnel resources. Traditionally, companies have hired the services of private security firms to patrol and control access to mainly privately-owned premises. In recent years, security firms have become active in semi-public premises such as shopping centres, airports and holiday camps. In some countries, central and local governments have established their own security firms. Elsewhere, police forces have entered into part-

nerships with private security firms.

2.3.20 The expansion of the size and scope of surveillance by private security firms raises questions about their authority and their relationship with the police. The activities of private security officers need to be regulated by legislation. Common elements are requirements for the screening and training of security officers and arrangements for supervision by local police.

2.3.21 In contrast, informal surveillance is carried out by public service officials, company employees and ordinary citizens as part of a wider role or job. Employees in a position to assist in preventing crime include concierges, car park attendants, bus and tram drivers, ticket inspectors, shop assistants, teachers and stewards at sports stadia. Research by Sturman (1980) found that buses with conductors and drivers are less prone to vandalism than one man operated buses. Similarly Mayhew et al. (1980) found that public telephones in places which afford some supervision, such as in cinemas, cafes and launderettes, are less likely to be vandalised than those in kiosks.

2.3.22 Surveillance by caretakers on housing estates and concierges at the entrances to high-rise residential blocks and other premises, has been found to reduce levels of vandalism and burglary (and maintenance costs) and increase feelings of safety and social interaction amongst occupants. In an evaluation of the introduction of a reception service into a high-rise public housing block in London, England, it was found that, compared with other blocks, vandalism was considerably reduced, although this may also have been due to the general refurbishment of the foyer which coincided with the introduction of the concierge (Poyner and Webb, 1987). The effect on burglaries was less marked, but a slight reduction in burglaries compared with other blocks on the same estate was recorded for the daytime period (i.e. the period during

which the reception desk was manned). Since all the blocks already had entry phone systems, it would appear that the improvements were due to the addition of the receptionist rather than the use of technological surveillance equipment.

2.3.23 It was also found that having a receptionist at the door had various other positive effects, such as increasing feelings of safety and social interaction amongst tenants and substantially reducing the local authority's maintenance costs, including the cost of keeping the entry phone system in good repair. In this scheme, the concierge was also the caretaker's wife. This, along with tenant consultation, probably contributed to the scheme's success in creating a greater sense of community amongst tenants.

THE V.I.C. PROJECT, THE NETHERLANDS

2.3.24 In the Netherlands, an experimental project employing over 1,000 young people between the ages of 19 and 28, many of them unemployed, to tackle petty crime on public transport has been carried out. Following the disappearance of conductors on trams and buses for reasons of economy, the informal supervision carried out by such personnel also disappeared. Consequently, opportunities for fare-dodging and other offences, especially vandalism, increased. The introduction of these teams of young supervisors coincided with a change in boarding procedures such that tickets were now to be checked by the driver before a passenger could enter a bus or a tram. The project thus combines target hardening with an increase in supervision. The total budget for the experiment came to nearly 150 million Guilders over a period of three years.

2.3.25 The project was jointly evaluated by the Ministries of Transport and Justice

and the public transport companies of three cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. Recruits, including substantial numbers of women and ethnic minorities, were given short training courses in criminal law and ticket inspection and in one city, Amsterdam, they were authorised to impose fines. Some recruits carried random checks on trams and buses in groups of 2-4, whilst others were permanently deployed at metro stations not to check tickets, but specifically in a crime preventive capacity. In the Hague, a more user friendly approach was adopted and passengers caught without a ticket are given the choice of buying one from the driver or getting off the tram. In the event of problems with passengers, assistance from a special team on standby or the police can be requested via the driver's radiotelephone.

2.3.26 According to van Andel (1989), who reports the results of the before and after evaluation, fare-dodging declined in all three cities, but to varying degrees. The largest declines were in buses where the new system of ticket checking was introduced. The least impressive results were in The Hague where non-payment was not backed up by a fine. Since the levels of fare-dodging stabilised after the first year, the initial decline may also have been due, at least in part, to the publicity surrounding the introduction of the project.

2.3.27 The project seems to have reduced the number of reported violent incidents on public transport, but did not measurably affect the level of aggression by passengers against tram drivers or general levels of insecurity and fear of crime. The results with respect to vandalism are also minimal. With the exception of a reduction in the amount of graffiti inside metro stations in Rotterdam, there has been little measurable impact upon vandalism. Indeed there is some evidence of displacement, since the number of windows in bus and tram shelters which needed replacing during the experimental period doubled. Nevertheless, van Andel (1989) provides evidence to suggest that the project has, so far, proved to be cost effective and both

public transport employee and passenger satisfaction has improved.

2.3.28 The most informal kind of surveillance is that carried out by ordinary citizens in their places of residence and elsewhere. There are two main ways in which the potential for surveillance by ordinary citizens can be formally tapped - through organising citizen patrols and through neighbourhood watch schemes.

2.3.29 Citizen patrols

2.3.29.1 Where crime prevention is perceived as the task of every responsible member of society, ordinary citizens may form patrols to act as the "eyes and ears" of the police. Citizen patrols usually consist of groups of volunteers who assist the police by watching from particular vantage points, checking on strangers and patrolling areas, often at night. They check property and buildings and report deficiencies (e.g. open windows and unlocked car doors) back to the owners and suspicious incidents to the police.

2.3.29.2 In the USSR, where there are some 300,000 public order squads acting as the "eyes and ears" of the police, the function of crime prevention, including surveillance, is perceived as the task of every responsible member of society. Every large institution or factory has such a squad, whose main purpose is to prevent violations of public order, but no information is available on their effectiveness in reducing offences. Three further examples of very different kinds of citizen patrol are described below.

THE PECS PROJECT, HUNGARY

2.3.29.3 In Hungary, voluntary patrols have been introduced in combination with other crime prevention methods in a crime prevention experiment in a residential district of the city of Pecs. The principle aim of the project is to persuade residents to take better security precautions, although some offender based measures are also being introduced (e.g. recreational activities for children at risk of offending). The patrols, which operate twice a month, consist of checking property and buildings in the district, reporting any deficiencies back to the owners (e.g. unlocked car doors) and informing the police if any incident occurs. No information is available on its effects on levels of crime or fear.

RURAL CRIME WATCH, CANADA

2.3.29.4 In Canada, as part of a rural crime watch programme, local residents patrol rural areas both in the course of their normal work and as a separate activity. Farmers use their own vehicles, including light aircraft, to patrol quite substantial areas of land. Any vehicles which are not recognised as belonging to someone local are recorded and their owners are notified accordingly, usually by the placing of a card under the car's windscreen wipers. Local employees of telephone, milk delivery, logging, oil, power and postal services also view patrol as part of their normal work and report any suspicious vehicles, persons or incidents, usually with the assistance of two-way radios.

THE GUARDIAN ANGELS, USA AND CANADA

2.3.29.5 In the USA and Canada, groups of private citizens calling themselves "Guardian Angels" offer their services to residential areas and transport systems. They are different from ordinary citizen patrol groups insofar as they are specially trained, wear a uniform, physically intervene in criminal acts and make citizen arrests. Indeed their appearance and functions closely resemble those of the police, which has resulted in some criticism. So far, there has been little systematic assessment of their effectiveness, although Pennel et al. (1985), in a national evaluation, found little evidence of a reduction in violent crime but some evidence of a short term decline in property offences during certain periods of the day.

2.3.29.6 The main problem with groups like the Guardian Angels is that although they act within the law, they are not accountable for their actions in the way in which the police are. It is their physical intervention in criminal acts which is the cause of most concern. The dividing line between active public involvement and unacceptable interference is a thin one and citizen patrols may be accused of vigilantism, of unnecessarily intruding into areas of personal privacy, of usurping rather than assisting the police in their duty to uphold the law, of arousing suspicion amongst neighbours and of inadvertently undermining civil liberties. Constant vigilance should therefore accompany the expansion of surveillance in this form if human rights and freedoms are to remain intact.

2.3.29.7 Thus patrols vary according to location and area (individual buildings, estates, neighbourhoods, rural areas, transport systems, schools etc.), function (property protection, person protection, monitoring police behaviour and community safety issues such as fire prevention) and mode of transport (foot, vehicular). But while citizen patrols may alert potential offenders that a community is continually being watched, they have not yet convincingly demonstrated their independent ef-

fectiveness in reducing crime, but they may be more effective in reducing fear of crime (Rosenbaum, 1988). A variation of citizen patrols is parent patrols in areas where large numbers of adolescents gather and there is some evidence to suggest that the mere presence of adults can deter disturbances.

2.3.30 Neighbourhood Watch

2.3.30.1 The essence of neighbourhood watch is that citizens should be encouraged to become the "eyes and ears" of the police by watching out for and reporting suspicious incidents in their neighbourhood. The idea is that they should get to know each other, watch out for one another, intervene on behalf of one another in the event of witnessing something suspicious and report untoward behaviour to the police. Small groups of citizens come together to share information about local crime problems, exchange crime prevention tips and make plans for engaging in surveillance of their neighbourhood. Members keep an eye on each other's property, mark their goods, improve the security of their homes and in some programmes make suggestions for improving the physical environment. Other activities which can be included are victim/witness assistance schemes and block (or estate) parenting schemes, which provide safe havens for children in trouble. (See Garofalo and McLeod, (1988), for a full list of the diverse activities engaged in by neighbourhood watch programmes in the USA).

2.3.30.2 Typically, neighbourhood watch programmes are initiated by the police or a specialist crime prevention officer or, in some cases, on the initiative of residents themselves. Police departments and particularly crime prevention officers are often key resources in NW programmes. They can provide residents with access to other public agencies, help them resolve local disputes and provide them with a source of authority and expertise. A local co-ordinator is usually appointed and individual es-

tates within a neighbourhood may appoint representatives to act as intermediaries between residents and the local co-ordinator. Meetings and newsletters are used to keep members up to date and offer crime prevention advice, stickers are applied to the outside of dwellings to denote participation and street signs may be used to announce that an area is covered by a neighbourhood watch scheme.

2.3.30.3 Originating in the USA in the nineteen seventies, neighbourhood watch has rapidly spread to Canada, the UK and, most recently, the Netherlands. Schemes may cover only a few residences or extend to thousands, although most commonly schemes tend to be between 300 and 500 dwellings (Bennett, 1987). But despite considerable interest in the concept of neighbourhood watch in principal, participation rates are quite modest, either because of lack of opportunity or lack of committment. In the USA, 20% of families live in an area where a neighbourhood watch programme exists and of these, just over a third actually participate in a programme (Garofalo and McLeod, 1988). According to Nuttall (1988), some 25% of the population of Canada are covered by neighbourhood watch programmes and in the UK, 14% of households report being members of a programme (Mayhew, Elliot and Dowds, 1989). In the Netherlands, neighbourhood watch programmes have been introduced on an experimental basis in 8 towns (Lohman and van Dijk, 1988).

2.3.30.4 The US National Crime Prevention Council has produced a handbook on preventing crime in urban neighbourhoods, which provides a detailed, step-by-step account of how to set up neighbourhood watch programmes, what they should contain, how they should be run, who should be involved and how momentum can be sustained (NCPC, 1986). In general, neighbourhood watch is easiest to set up and sustain in homogenous, stable neighbourhoods where participation in voluntary and community organisations is common, residents tend to own their dwellings and where neighbourhood ties are strong and enduring. In more heterogeneous, unstable,

lower socio-economic neighbourhoods, participation rates will be lower even, it would seem, where extra efforts are made to organise and implement watch schemes (Rosenbaum, 1988). Husain (1988), in an assessment of the types of areas in which neighbourhood watch is most likely to flourish, discusses whether and how schemes can be successfully established in areas where crime prevention is most needed.

2.3.30.5 Where occupancy rates are low and dwellings suffer from poor visibility, the effectiveness of public surveillance is more limited. In areas with high resident turnover, the identification of strangers becomes more difficult, particularly since many communities are visited by outsiders who enter the area for legitimate reasons. Participation rates in such areas may also be low or difficult to sustain and it may be necessary to broaden schemes to cover other issues or attach schemes to other, pre-existing initiatives (Garofalo and McLeod, 1988).

2.3.30.6 The theory underpinning neighbourhood watch is that, by extending infor-mal surveillance, reporting to the police and the number of arrests increases, the number of offenders on the street declines and other potential offenders are deterred from committing offences in what is perceived as a more risky area. By coming to-gether to fight a common problem, the frequency and quality of social relations amongst residents improves, community bonds are enhanced and the community improves its capacity to defend the neighbourhood from predators. Furthermore, people's feelings of fear and powerlessness with respect to crime can be reduced and relations with the police may improve.

2.3.30.7 In practice, there is no conclusive evidence that potential offenders are sub-stantially deterred by the knowledge that an area is covered by a neighbourhood watch scheme. An accurate assessment of the effectiveness of neighbourhood watch in reducing crime is complicated by the considerable number of poorly evaluated

projects, many of which claim unequivocal success. Where sounder methods have been used, the results are usually more modest.

2.3.30.8 Research shows that fear of crime is greater in neighbourhoods where residents have little control over what happens in the area, where incivilities (i.e. acts of public nuisance) and disorder are common, and where neighbours are suspicious and unsupportive of one another. In such areas, neighbourhood watch is unlikely to get off the ground or, if it does, may even exacerbate conflicts between groups within the neighbourhood and raise levels of fear. Some projects, on the other hand, have shown reductions in fear levels (Rosenbaum, 1988).

2.3.30.9 Even in better off neighbourhoods, care should be taken to ensure that neighbourhood watch does not exacerbate fear levels. Exchanging information about the nature and incidence of local crime and personal victimisation experiences can heighten fear of crime, particularly given that, according to research, participants are more likely to fear crime in the first place than non-participants.

THE CHICAGO PROJECT, USA

2.3.30.10 The Chicago project represents a comprehensive attempt to introduce neighbourhood watch in combination with opportunity reduction and informal social control elements coupled with a sophisticated evaluation design. The project was initiated by local volunteers from established community organisations in four neighbourhoods. A number of objectives were specified, including increasing awareness of and participation in the project, improving residents sense of responsibility for and attachment to the neighbourhood, increasing social cohesion and reducing crime, incivilities and fear of crime.

2.3.30.11 The results of the evaluation are not particularly encouraging. Residents in those areas *with* neighbourhood watch, were no more likely to feel responsible for or more attached to their neighbourhood than residents in comparable areas where neighbourhood watch was not introduced. Areas covered by watch schemes did not differ from those which were not in terms of levels of interaction on the street, watching one another's homes whilst away, home or self protection behaviours and intervention behaviours (Rosenbaum, 1988). More importantly, levels of crime and disorder remained largely unaffected by the programme and fear of crime tended to worsen in those areas where neighbourhood watch was implemented. It has been suggested that since the evaluation designs were well constructed and the programme efficiently and effectively implemented, the apparent failure of the Chicago project reflects theoretical weaknesses in the concept of neighbourhood watch (Rosenbaum, 1988).

NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH, ENGLAND

2.3.30.12 In contrast, an evaluation of two neighbourhood watch schemes in England, which also found little evidence of reductions in crime, concluded that this was due to programme failure rather than theoretical flaws (Bennett, 1988). In this initiative, the effectiveness of two neighbourhood watch schemes in two different areas of London were compared with two control areas, one of which was adjacent to one of the experimental areas in order to test for possible displacement effects. No positive effects were found on crime and little change occured in either reporting levels or clear-up rates. A slight improvement was recorded in public attitudes and behaviour (although these may have occured for other reasons since no control groups were used in this part of the evaluation). One experimental area showed an increase in social cohesion and a decrease in fear of crime, while the other experimental area

showed an improvement in resident's involvement with others in home protection.

2.3.30.13 Bennett (1988) concludes that the effectiveness of public observation in small communities is probably very limited as many households are unoccupied for most of the day and many dwellings are poorly situated for maximising surveillance. Where there is a high turnover of residents, the identification of strangers becomes more difficult. The evaluation also established some doubt as to whether offenders were deterred by the knowledge that residents are supposedly looking out for suspicious activities.

2.3.30.13 The overall conclusion was that programme failure was the most likely cause of the scheme's limited success. In practice, the majority of residents did little more than display window stickers and watch out for suspicious activities and little attempt was made to encourage regular, well attended meetings. There was no formal organisational structure, no newsletter, no meetings (formal or informal), few security surveys and only a limited property marking service. There were just too many other pressures on home beat police officers to design and administer the schemes properly. Experience with neighbourhood watch therefore appears to vary in different areas and according to how it is organised and implemented. It would appear to be more likely to be effective in preventing the development of a crime problem as opposed to dealing with an existing one.

(iv) Natural surveillance of the physical environment

2.3.31 Some areas are naturally endowed with high visibility whilst others, such as those with poor street lighting or with pedestrian tunnels and blind alleys, may not be. Offences are less likely to occur if potential offenders think they are being over-

looked and greater surveillability can be achieved by manipulating the environment - the design, location and lay-out of buildings and the spaces around them - in a wide variety of ways. The following list provides some indication of the range and type of physical design features which have been cited as having some kind of potential crime preventive effect in residential areas:

- the privatisation and individualisation of public and semi-public spaces within and surrounding housing blocks by, for example, the partitioning of balconies, corridors and basement stores and the re-arrangement of public greenery into private gardens;

- the closing and locking of unused or unnecessary entrances to housing blocks and the removal of easy escape routes;

- the shortening or even demolition of internal corridors, access balconies and walkways;

- improving the extent to which entrances, corridors, walkways, car parks underground garages, play areas, communal facilities and paths are overlooked, including improving lighting, both inside and outside, if necessary;

- the designing of buildings and their grounds so that ways into and out of the estate are easily overlooked from windows and other vantage points;

- encouraging activity in little used areas; providing benches and play areas, and facilities for young people (e.g. workshops, sporting facilities etc.)
- the integration, not separation, of vehicular and pedestrian traffic; use of cul-de-

sacs, barriers, road signs, speed limits etc. to restrict through traffic; use of very low speed limits to favour use by pedestrians and cyclists and encourage "street life" and a feeling of security;

- improving the appearance and maintenance of the estate by colour variation, facade cleaning, modernisation of dwelling fittings and the use of maintenance-free and vandal resistant materials.

2.3.32 Generally premises and their surroundings should be easily overlooked from the street and neighbouring premises; opportunities for concealment near and inside dwellings should be minimised; cul-de-sacs and the careful placing of fences and other barriers should be used to ensure that access to, and escape from an area discourages strangers and land uses should be mixed to encourage "bustling activity" and increase the number of "eyes on the street".

2.3.33 But the above is not a comprehensive list and few, if any, are applicable in all circumstances. Each situation requires its own analysis of circulation patterns and the location of unsafe areas. Most items apply to high and medium rise housing estates, sometimes linked by pedestrian walkways at various levels. There is much less information on the design shortcomings of low rise housing estates with segregated vehicle and pedestrian routes or older housing in inner-city districts.

2.3.34 According to Bennett and Wright (1984), accumulated research evidence suggests that premises which are perceived to be either occupied or easily overlooked are least likely to be victimised. They suggest that burglary prevention programmes should therefore be based on ways of increasing the extent to which premises look occupied even if they are not, particularly in dormitory residential areas

with high proportions of childless families and working adults. The appearance of occupancy can be achieved by leaving a light on inside, or parking a vehicle outside, the premises. Other precautions like cancelling daily deliveries (e.g. newspapers, milk) and getting neighbours to mow the lawn, may also give the impression that the premises are occupied when its occupants are away on holiday.

2.3.35 Proper maintenance of property can also reduce opportunities for crime. Windows broken by vandalism need to be mended quickly and security devices to prevent unauthorised entry or to detect intruders require checking at regular intervals. Ideally, someone should be given explicit responsibility for security matters in all public and commercial buildings and it may be both logical and cost-effective if this task is combined with building maintenance duties.

2.3.36 The relationship between the built environment and crime is complex and the subject of considerable dispute. On the one hand, accessibility, visibility and physical appearance have all been found to influence criminal activity. Streets and dwellings which are easily accessible (i.e. near to car parks, main roads, street corners, recreation and commercial areas) or run-down, are more likely to experience crime. On the other hand, research also suggests that neither type of house nor type of area are, on their own, sufficient predictors of burglary risk (Bennett and Wright, 1984). However, studies of vandalism in residential areas suggest that impersonal, easily accessible, semi-public/communal areas are more likely to be vandalised than other areas. It would appear, therefore, that to sustain reductions in crime (other than vandalism) over a significant period of time, changes in the physical features of an environment are unlikely to be sufficient (Tien et al. 1979; Rosenbaum, 1988).

2.3.37 The complexity, the cost and the contradictions inherent in carrying out environmental improvements also limit their effectiveness in reducing or preventing

crime. Measures for increasing visibility and reducing accessibility can, for example, also reduce privacy; similarly, measures designed to instill or increase a sense of territoriality, by for example erecting fences around public spaces, can reduce surveillability.

2.3.38 The effectiveness or otherwise of natural surveillance in preventing crime is also contingent upon the preparedness (or perceived preparedness) of individuals to intervene in the event of witnessing a suspicious incident. Willingness to intervene is in turn dependent upon whether residents feel involved in their community and whether they feel their environment is worth protecting and taking responsibility for. If intervention is to lead to the reporting of an incident, residents must also feel positively predisposed towards the police. They should have no fear of retaliation and believe that in reporting an incident, the police will act promptly and constructively.

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN, CANADA

2.3.39 In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have developed an approach to crime prevention in the province of British Columbia which is centred on the relationship between environmental planning and crime. In addition to training courses on the relationship between architecture, town planning and crime, crime-prevention officers liaise closely with municipal planners, architects and administrators. Their approach to crime prevention centres around an assessment of how the physical environment facilitates offending and what interventions might be effective. So, for example, street networks and pedestrian paths are designed to reduce the movement of juveniles through private residential grounds, parking areas and shopping centres. The potential for displacement is also considered and if the assessment of a specific crime problem suggests a likelihood of spatial, temporal and/or type of crime displacements, crime-prevention officers may well refrain from

intervention, particularly if by so doing they can avoid a worsening of the crime problem or displacement to a more serious form of crime (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984).

2.3.40 Without empirical evidence, it is difficult to know how effective the work of the RCMP in British Columbia is in reducing crime. The degree to which the police can reverse neighbourhood decline through manipulation of the physical environment is of course very limited. Ultimately, the key to the influence of the physical environment on crime would seem to be the effects changes in the environment have on the social behaviour of residents and consequently potential offenders. If, as a result of redesigning a neighbourhood, residents begin to become more involved in their community and with one another, then some of the conditions for reversing neighbourhood decline and improving the capacity of the community to defend itself may be developed. But without changes in other, predominantly social factors (e.g. number of young people, one-parent families, welfare dependants), crime is unlikely to be much affected. Oscar Newman himself modified his earlier work, acknowledging the importance of social factors (Newman and Franck, 1980).

2.3.41 Recently, the trend towards consciously considering the crime preventive implications of urban planning policy has led to the development of a range of estate improvement initiatives which combines housing management policies with environmental design criteria, both in North America and Europe (McInnes et al. 1984; Hope and Shaw, 1988; Vahlenkamp, 1989). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

2.4 Multi-measure situational crime prevention

2.4.1 Experience in the field of situational crime prevention has shown that only under certain, specific circumstances do individual measures affect crime rates in the long term and without displacement. Experience has also shown that strategies need to be targetted on the basis of an assessment of local needs and problems (see chapter 4). Consequently, situational crime prevention has increasingly moved towards a more systematic application of multiple strategies, targetted locally and sometimes involving several agencies. The following examples in the areas of transport-related offending and offending in residential areas will help to illustrate this trend.

2.4.2 A multi-strategic approach to crime prevention and the reduction of passenger insecurity is now an increasingly common phenomenon in major transport systems. Strategies for reducing opportunities for committing offences are combined with specific measures for increasing detection rates, deterring potential offenders and re-assuring passengers. Strategies are developed following a systematic appraisal of the nature, scale and incidence of crime (usually robberies, thefts, assaults and sexual offences) and the perceptions of crime of both passengers and staff. Technical measures are combined with design alterations and measures for improving both formal and informal surveillance. Examples of measures which have been adopted include:

- improving staff visibility at high risk times and places;

- installing automatic entry and exit gates for reducing fare-dodging;

- providing staff and/or the police with radio systems for guiding them to the   scene of an incident or for summoning assistance (likewise alarm buttons);

- introducing travelcards to reduce ticket fraud;

- installing dot matrix indicators for warning passengers of the presence of pick-pockets;

- installing and publicising CCTV which, because of its expense, is only justifiable if it also contributes to other, non-crime related functions such as monitoring and regulating passenger flow and crowd control;

- improving the design and layout of stations, including making sure there are no areas where potential offenders can lurk;

- ensuring high standards of lighting, cleanliness, maintenance and state of repair, including the immediate removal of graffiti to minimise its impact;

- employment of specialist Crime Prevention Officers to provide advice to management, staff and passengers on crime prevention matters, conduct security surveys and publicity campaigns, inform staff of specific crime problems and advise architects and builders on the security aspects of new works.

2.4.3 A strategic, multi-measure approach to crime prevention on public transport systems requires careful planning and implementation. Four features stand out as particularly important:

(i) The targetting of measures on specific problems rather than crime in general and on specific, high risk stations and areas within them (e.g. concealed passageways, crowded or isolated platforms).

(ii) Ensuring that the information necessary for the design of preventive measures is properly recorded and easily accessible for crime analysis.

(iii) Involving local management and staff with the police in identifying problems, deciding on preventive measures and implementing them.

(iv) Establishing clear procedures for monitoring and evaluating measures or packages of measures, including evaluation of the extent to which crime is displaced onto the street or to other stations.

2.4.4 Whilst crime analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation are all covered in detail in Chapter 4, it is important to stress that multi-strategic approaches to crime prevention need to go beyond listing preventive measures and provide an overall framework within which these measures can be effectively planned and efficiently monitored and implemented as a routine part of general management. It is not yet known whether or to what extent such multi-strategic approaches are effective in reducing crime or whether they are necessarily cost-effective.

2.4.5 A multi-strategic approach to the prevention of crime and the reduction of fear of crime in residential areas is becoming increasingly common, particularly on high-rise, high density, public housing estates, where tenants tend to feel isolated and to have little personal stake in the property. This usually requires a more elaborate administrative structure, involving several local agencies in what is termed the multi-agency approach to crime prevention (see chapter 3). Less ambitious projects may rely on partnerships between local volunteers and the police. Two examples of projects of this kind are detailed below.

THE HERON GATE PROJECT, CANADA

2.4.6 In Ottawa, the capital of Canada, five volunteer task forces have been set up by the city's Crime Prevention Council to combat specific crime problems. One of these task forces has the task of reducing crime in rented high-rise housing blocks. The project in Ottawa is an example of bringing a range of predominantly situational measures together - target hardening, property marking, informal and natural surveillance - to reduce crime and fear of crime within a group of high-rise apartment blocks. The task force, whose function it was to develop, implement and assess the impact of these preventive measures, included tenants, apartment caretakers, representatives of the city police force and the executive director of the city crime prevention council.

2.4.7 Based on the knowledge that tenants of high-rise blocks tend to feel isolated from one another and lack any motivation to increase their stake in the property (simply because they do not own it), the task force firstly conducted a survey of the needs and problems of the tenants. Then it set about designing preventive strategies to meet the problems identified. The project was closely monitored and evaluated on a before and after basis.

2.4.8 In addition to a range of security improvements to individual apartments and the underground garage, tenants were persuaded to form apartment watch teams, engrave their valuables and display a sticker on their door indicating that their property was marked. As members of watch teams, tenants were encouraged to be aware of how to prevent crime in and around the building and watch out for one another. Considerable efforts were made to recruit and retain the involvement of as many tenants as possible, but with mixed results. Caretakers or building superintendents helped to identify opportunities for reducing crime in their blocks, such as checking

the functioning of external doors and watching out for loiterers in the hallways or lobbies of buildings. The managers of the apartment blocks improved the security of doors and windows, removed potential signs of non-occupancy, improved the access control to the underground garage and made environmental improvements outside the building (improved lighting, trimming of shrubs near windows etc.) to increase natural surveillance.

2.4.9 Twelve months after the project had been implemented, incidents of breaking and entering had fallen quite dramatically. However, the evaluation (see Meredith, 1988) did not extend beyond one year, so no information is available on whether these results were sustained in the long term. Furthermore, the evaluation failed to include an assessment of crime rates in neighbouring areas. There is therefore no knowing whether the reduction of opportunities to commit crimes in these apartment blocks led to a displacement of offending to neighbouring areas or other forms of instrumental crime. Furthermore, the number of vehicle related incidents (damage to and thefts from) remained virtually unchanged, largely because the measures to im- prove the security and surveillability of the underground garage were only partially implemented.

2.4.10 Since it was also not possible to determine the extent to which the decline in the number of incidents of breaking and entering was due to the target hardening, the property marking or the increased surveillance measures, this project offers little insight into the relative effectiveness of different situational measures. It does, how- ever, underline the importance of conducting careful evaluations, including an as- sessment of the possibility of displacement, and ensuring effective implementation. Both these issues - implementation and displacement - are dealt with more effec- tively in the next example, a burglary prevention project in England.

2.4.11 In England a project in the town of Rochdale to reduce burglary on a very high risk local authority housing estate, has combined target hardening measures with target removal, victim support, security surveys, property marking and measures to improve informal surveillance. This quite sophisticated project based its approach on data gathered from an in-depth crime, offender and victim survey. It was administered by a number of agencies working together, including the local authority housing department, the gas and electricity utilities, the local victim support organisation, the Manpower Services Commission and the local crime prevention group with representatives from the estate itself.

2.4.12 The information from the crime, offender and victim surveys proved invaluable for the subsequent design of appropriate preventive measures. Convicted burglars were interviewed about a range of factors including distance of the burglary from home, the reasons for choice of target, time and circumstance of the offence and the reasons and motives for the burglary. Burglary victims and their immediate neighbours were also interviewed and provided information on, for example, visibility of the burglar's point of entry, levels of security hardware and their use, occupancy and its signs at the time of the burglary and previous victimisations.

2.4.13 By contrasting the location and other characteristics of burgled and non-burgled houses within the same area (Winchester and Jackson, 1982) or, as in this project, victimised households with obvious alternative targets (i.e. those neighbouring victimised dwellings of similar physical appearance), preventive measures could be specifically targetted on dwellings and parts of dwellings of greatest vulnerability. Thus it was found, for example, that victim houses were more likely to be burgled again than neighbouring houses, which led to a deliberate focus on multi-

victimised dwellings. Similarly, it was discovered that more than two thirds of entry points were visible from the neighbour's dwelling, which led to the setting up of mini neighbourhood watch schemes (mini or 'cocoon' neighbourhood watch schemes differ from the standard neighbourhood watch scheme insofar as they are triggered by a specific event and form around small, close groupings of dwellings).

2.4.14 Other insights which informed the design of preventive measures included the fact that burglars tended to travel very short distances to commit crimes and tended to specialise in certain types of houses; and that signs of occupancy, highly visible entry points and visible burglar alarms all acted as deterents. On the basis of this quite considerable amount of information, preventive measures were designed, including measures to improve the security of individual dwellings, removing coin-operated fuel meters, introducing property marking and mini neighbourhood watch schemes.

2.4.15 Much of the work was carried out by police officers, but also community workers, who were specifically employed on the project. The project was closely monitored to ensure that preventive measures kept up with any changes in crime trends on the estate.

2.4.16 The initial results are impressive. Over a period of one year, burglaries declined by more than 50% and reductions in multiple victimisations were even greater. With little evidence of displacement, either in terms of place or type of crime, the project must be considered a success. The only crime to increase substantially on the estate during the post-implementation phase was vandalism. The project evaluators suggest this may have been due to increased reporting of vandalism, as a consequence of an increase in pride in the estate and confidence in police. Alternatively, it may reflect a higher number of failed attempted burglaries.

2.4.17 The initial interviews with convicted burglars found that unemployment, debt and involvement with drugs were frequently cited as the main reasons for committing burglaries. Without social measures to combat these underlying causes, no project could be considered fully preventive. A second phase has therefore begun, which addresses these motivational issues.

2.4.18 The use of situational measures on their own can lead to a kind of "fortress" mentality, as residents become increasingly security conscious and withdraw into the perceived safety of their homes. This is often accompanied by increased feelings of isolation and fear of crime. Individual protection should therefore not be at the expense of social interaction within the community. Initiatives like the Kirkholt project, which combine improvements in security and surveillance with community development and victim support work are more likely to improve overall levels of community safety. To increase social cohesion and generate greater feelings of safety, tenants need to be involved with other key participants, such as apartment caretakers, the police and representatives of the local authority, in the identification of needs, problems and preventive strategies. This broader, community-based approach to crime prevention is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3. COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Chapter three describes two broad approaches to community-based crime prevention, which have developed out of a recognition that physical measures to reduce opportunities for committing offences should be part of a broader, more systematic response to the problem of crime. The first approach consists of preventing crime through one aspect of urban planning, namely housing policy, the second through community development. Both are concerned in some way with influencing the behaviour of residents and potential offenders in order to reverse neighbourhood decline and increase the capacity of communities to exert a greater degree of control over their environment and their lives. In essence, community-based crime prevention encapsulates both social and situational measures and combines them to produce a whole greater than the sum of its parts.

3.2 Preventing crime through housing policy

3.2.1 Recent developments in the field of urban planning and in particular slum clearance and housing re-development, have led criminal policy makers towards identifying the effects of public housing allocation and management practices on crime and victimisation rates (Hope and Shaw, 1988; Vahlenkamp, 1989). The idea that decentralising housing management practice and improving housing allocation procedures might lead to reductions in crime is based on the premise that such practices will improve the physical appearance and structure of the estate, restore a sense of control to residents and reduce the neighbourhood's vulnerability. The actual or perceived vulnerability of an area is not determined merely by design factors, but by

housing policies and markets which influence the social mix of residential areas and the willingness and ability of residents to develop community bonds and exert informal control over their environment. But research on the relationship between crime and housing has shown that this area is both highly complex and equivocal.

3.2.2 Firstly, the problems which generally characterise public housing are often quite different from those which characterise private rented or owner-occupied housing areas. The former tend to be high offender as well as offence rate areas and usually have quite different social compositions and histories. Secondly, there are also variations between different areas of public housing. Tenants in the poorest public housing estates are, according to Hope (1986), five times more likely to be burgled at least once a year than tenants living in better-off public housing areas. Other research has found that areas of similar design with similar tenure and resident income levels can experience very different crime rates (Bottoms and Xanthos, 1981; Bottoms et al. 1987). So research into the relationship between crime and housing, which is still in its infancy, does not yet provide clear guidelines for policy makers. Indeed, as Rock (1988) has pointed out, there is a danger that the complexity of the relationship between crime and urban policy will be reduced and simplified for the purposes of expediency.

3.2.3 The lack of empirical evidence in this area, however, has not prevented the development of a range of improvement initiatives on run down, high crime public housing estates, which combine environmental design criteria with changes in housing policy. One, if not the main objective of such initiatives, is to improve community safety. Three of the most important mechanisms for promoting this objective are the decentralisation of housing management, including repair and maintenance, to individual estates, the speeding up of lettings and transfers to keep the number of vacant premises to a minimum and mobilising the involvement of residents in the

selection and implementation of measures. While essentially a housing rather than a crime preventive initiative, housing estates which have been targetted in this way appear to have experienced reductions in crime and improvements in community safety, although not always without some displacement of crime to neighbouring estates or areas (Power, 1988).

3.2.4 More sophisticated initiatives employ co-ordinators to galvanise demoralised residents on run down estates to act together with local agencies and the police to improve both the physical and social conditions on the estate and reduce its vulnerability to vandalism, burglary and other crimes. Resident's associations are formed and encouraged to liaise closely with local authority agencies and play a central role in improving relations with the police. Housing allocation policies are seen as another key area of intervention and resident's associations may play an important part in negotiating limits on the number of children in any one housing block, the provision of better recreational facilities for the young and, where possible, ensuring that families with children are allocated to low-rise blocks (Osborn and Bright, 1989). However, subsidised housing for low income, multi-problem families, if not carefully planned, can lead to some of the problems commonly associated with ghettos, including feelings of segregation. If multi-problem families are concentrated in one area, those prone to delinquency will meet with others similarly predisposed, thus amplifying the potential for delinquency. The integration of subsidised and non-subsidised housing can help to avoid such problems.

THE BREDA PUBLIC HOUSING INITIATIVE, THE NETHERLANDS

3.2.5 In the Netherlands, a scheme to redevelop a high-rise public housing estate in the city of Breda through physical and environmental improvements found that crime and fear of crime did not improve. On the contrary, it continued to worsen. As a result of persistent pressure from tenants, the authorities implemented a series of

changes to housing management and housing allocation procedures and introduced a range of social measures to improve living standards and create a stronger sense of social cohesion within the neighbourhood (Kalle, 1987). Caretaking and maintenance functions were decentralised to estate offices and the local authorities made sure that new tenants were "suited" to the neighbourhood. A social plan was drawn up by the tenants and the authorities working together, which included measures for tackling vandalism and crime and improving community safety.

3.2.6 Each block appointed contact persons with the tasks of introducing new tenants, explaining house rules, etc. and neighbourhood assistance committees were set up to facilitate complaints procedures and act as a forum for tenants to discuss potential improvements. These changes were further complemented by the introduction of procedures to ensure that the responsibility for putting right any damage caused to the buildings or the surrounding environment is passed on to the offender, whether a tenant of one of the blocks or not. More frequent police patrols were also instigated and the police agreed to react quicker to complaints. Finally, an information campaign was set up to keep tenants informed of developments, such as the way those who had committed damage made reparation and what the dangers and consequences of drug use and dealing are.

3.2.7 This Dutch initiative is run by a project group consisting of representatives of the local municipality, tenants and voluntary social/community development workers. Whilst the overall investment required amounted to approximately 1.75 million guilders (US$ 800,000), the authorities are convinced that this amounts to a much more cost-effective intervention than just improving the physical and environmental infrastructure.

3.2.8 The above example from the Netherlands serves to illustrate the importance of

not only monitoring neighbourhood crime and victimisation rates, but also of differentiating between different kinds of neighbourhood in various stages of decline. There are clearly some neighbourhoods which are so entrenched in a cycle of decline, that only a combination of physical, environmental, managerial and social measures are going to be effective in reversing the process. The difficulty arises in making accurate assessments of the precise state of the physical and social health of neighbourhoods in order to make correct investment decisions; not all declining neighbourhoods require the same level of investment to turn decline around. Even where crime and disorder are high, neighbourhoods may not slip into a cycle of decline - other factors, especially economic factors, also influence the desirability of an area (Skogan, 1988).

3.2.9 Since much of the crime prevention literature is rightly sceptical about the efficacy of *individual* measures, there is a danger that policy makers may resort to flooding neighbourhoods with every kind of crime prevention measure available. The art of cost-effective policy making is to develop solutions which match the ^bscale^b and the ^bnature^b of problems. Thus crime analysis (see chapter 4) needs to be accompanied by community analysis - an assessment of the needs, problems, socio-economic and cultural structure and resources of the community - if crime prevention programmes are to avoid becoming the public investment white elephants of the nineteen nineties.

3.3 Crime prevention through community development

3.3.1 The nature of the crime problem and thus strategies to combat it clearly vary from one estate, neighbourhood or local area to another. Some neighbourhoods comprise settled communities with established local institutions and informal networks of family, employment and friendship. Such communities are usually charac-

terised by a strong sense of consensus and cohesion, good access to local agencies and a co-operative and largely predictable relationship with the police. Since crime in such communities tends to be perceived as an external threat, preventive solutions tend to revolve around the mobilisation of existing resources, including volunteers, to strengthen and protect the community from outside threats.

3.3.2 Where neighbourhoods are characterised by highly transient, heterogeneous and unstable communities with high proportions of low-income, single-parent, and multi-problem families, residents feel threatened not only from outside but also from within. If the neighbourhood also consists of run-down, poorly managed, high-rise apartment blocks, both the risk and the fear of crime may be further exacerbated. In communities like this, existing resources are likely to be minimal and will need to be supplemented by incorporating the assistance of local agencies and tapping the resources of private as well as public institutions with a stake in the community. Where relations with local agencies are characterised by apathy and alienation, improving service delivery and access to the professionals who can provide solutions to some of the neighbourhood's problems will be an important pre-requisite of neighbourhood improvement.

3.3.3 Other factors which will also influence the capacity of a community to reduce crime are the strength of existing networks and organisations, the extent to which residents are involved in community issues upon which to build, the existence of 'natural' leaders and the nature and extent of economic opportunities. In some cases, particularly where little or no sense of "community" exists, crime prevention initiatives may need to be attached to existing community organisations if they are to have much chance of success (Skogan, 1986). Where such organisations are totally lacking or poorly supported, then some kind of community development must precede any concerted effort to tackle crime. Crime prevention programs alone are not

able to generate a sense of "community" where none exists.

3.3.4 Whilst the above description of two very different types of community by no means reflects the complexity and diversity of communities in the real world, it illustrates the importance of distinguishing at least two very different approaches to community-based crime prevention. (Others have distinguished *three* types of community at risk on the basis of different burglary patterns: transitional inner city districts, problem council estates and affluent neighbourhoods).

3.3.5 In better-off communities concerned with protecting themselves and their property from outside threats, crime prevention programmes can be developed by reassessing priorities in existing organisations within the community. Voluntary forces can be mobilised and, together with the police, a crime preventive strategy can be constructed which focusses on improving existing relations rather than changing social conditions. In such communities, measures for reducing fear of crime may be as important as those for reducing crime itself.

3.3.6 In poorer communities, resources from outside the community may well need to be mobilised. Potential community leaders may have to be identified and new community organisations nurtured in order to assist in reforming or re-structuring the neighbourhood. Crime prevention should focus on the "root causes" of crime and in particular the social and economic conditions which underpin the capacity of the prime socialising institutions to function effectively. Programmes to support families, improve employment opportunities and provide adequate schooling and housing will need to be initiated. Social, economic and community development are the cornerstones of this approach.

3.3.7 Preventing crime in the first kind of community is intellectually, practically and politically less problematic than in the second kind. Mobilising community support and co-operation in the poorer kinds of communities is often difficult. A very high proportion of local crime prevention schemes suffer from a falling off in enthusiasm and participation. Experience has shown that community-based crime prevention initiatives often drift into tackling other problems and Skogan (1986), suggests that it is therefore more productive to attach crime prevention initiatives to other community issues around which the community has already organised.

3.3.8 Where concern about crime reflects, if only in part, an expression of conflict between groups *within* the community, initiatives to prevent crime have to be handled sensitively. Where, for example, high crime areas contain high concentrations of ethnic minorities, measures to reinforce community cohesion may, in practice, turn out to be divisive where such areas also suffer from latent or actual racism. Neighbourhood watch, for example, can lead to vigilantism and a worsening of race relations if those involved associate particular ethnic minority groups and especially youths, with crime (Kinsey et al. 1986). Similarly, where high crime areas are characterised by strained or antagonistic relations with the police, mobilising community support and generating a greater sense of "community", which depends on building a basis of trust and co-operation between residents and the police, may be very difficult. In areas like this, where the consent of those being policed is absent, policing can even be counter-productive.

3.3.9 Thus unfortunately, the conditions for reducing or preventing crime tend to be least favourable in communities which suffer the most from crime and fear of crime. Given this dilemma, decisions concerning the targeting of crime prevention resources - whether, for example, to concentrate on those areas which need the resources most or those areas where efforts are most likely to succeed - must be taken

with care. The question of how to optimise the targetting of crime prevention resources is the subject of considerable debate (see, for example, Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1986; Currie, 1988).

3.3.10 If they can be made to work, programmes which are targetted on high crime communities and tackle the "root causes" of crime, promise to accomplish considerably more in the long term than those which merely aim to protect communities from outside predators and which run the risk of merely displacing crime from one community to another. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that, where anti-crime initiatives in poorer communities are showing signs of success, resources are not redistributed within the community in favour of those who are already better off.

3.3.11 To a large extent, the success of community-based crime prevention programmes based upon local policies which attempt to alter the social and economic fabric of neighbourhoods, will ultimately depend on the development of, or at least support for, the same policies at both national and regional levels. However, there is some room for local communities to manoeuvre within the overall constraints of national and regional socio-economic policies. Resources for combatting crime can be specifically targetted on those areas which need them most; residents in high crime areas can learn how to use existing resources more effectively; administrative arrangements can be re-organised in order to focus resources more closely on the needs and problems identified by local inhabitants; the democratisation of political power can empower local citizens to achieve their objectives more readily and effectively. Thus there is scope for developing local strategies for combatting crime which go beyond tinkering with the physical environment and influence the social, economic and cultural conditions associated with crime *in particular areas.*

3.4 Tackling the "root causes" of crime

3.4.1 The origins of crime prevention programmes which seek to tackle offending *within* particular communities by improving the capacity of its socialising institutions and changing the dispositions of residents towards offending, can be traced back to the theories of the Chicago school and in particular the work of Shaw and McKay (1942). They found that many American cities contained 'zones of transition' which were characterised by transient communities with high proportions of immigrants and high rates of delinquency and other intractable social problems. Community bonds were weak, social disorganisation prevalent and shared norms of behaviour largely absent. Since new immigrant groups simply replaced the older ones, community life remained unstable, disorganised and criminogenic.

3.4.2 Attempts to reduce crime in such unstable neighbourhoods require not just the mobilisation of community members, but also a re-assessment of how existing resources are allocated and managed. In some instances, particularly at the beginning of an initiative, additional outside resources (financial, organisational and personnel) may be required. The key institutions which can influence community crime rates include networks of families, peers and neighbours and local institutions such as schools and places of employment and, if they exist, voluntary and other community organisations. The differential contributions they can make need to be identified and their efforts systematically co-ordinated. However, it is recognised that the capacity of such communities to organise a collective response to crime and to socialise residents, especially immigrants and the young, into a community consensus of norms and values, is severely limited (Garofalo and McLeod, 1988).

3.4.3 Contemporary community-based crime prevention programmes, which have partly grown out of the legacy of the Chicago school, have benefitted from past mis-

takes. As a result, the need to incorporate at least three fundamental requirements has been recognised: the need to generate initiatives from the bottom up, with community groups being preferably financially self-sufficient rather than dependent; the need to integrate the young; and the need to organise programmes on a multi-agency basis. Subsequent initiatives in the USA and programmes in Europe have therefore focussed largely on expanding activities and services for youth, including employment opportunities, and developing multi-agency forums for delivering crime prevention services at the local level.

THE EISENHOWER NEIGHBOURHOOD PROGRAMME, USA

3.4.4 The original Eisenhower Neighbourhood Programme was based on ten urban neighbourhoods and produced rather indifferent results (Lavrakas and Bennett, 1988). Subsequent initiatives organised by the Eisenhower Foundation have been upon three "model" programmes - the Argus Community from the South Bronx in New York, the House of Umoja from Philadelphia (which was described in chapter 1) and El Centro from Puerto Rico. The first two are youth projects intended to protect those who participate in them from drifting into crime. Any positive results which accrue are unlikely, therefore, to influence community crime rates. El Centro, however, is a genuine community-based initiative, which not only focusses on the "root causes" of crime, but attempts to influence the overall level of crime in a specific neighbourhood.

3.4.5 Run by a Catholic nun in the city of Ponce, El Centro employs local residents to run a number of programmes in the community of La Playa. The programmes, which target delinquents as well as young people at risk of offending, include schools for dropouts, family counselling, vocational training, the creation of employment opportunities, counselling and temporary shelter for runaways and hous-

ing for young singles. It works on the basis that community disorganisation and the extent to which community members lack any control over their own lives, convinces the young members of the community that they will not be able to obtain a legitimate stake in society and that crime may represent a rewarding alternative.

3.4.6 Curtis (1987) reports that the number of adjudicated delinquents fell by 85% over a fifteen year period and that the delinquency rate in La Playa halved during the same period, despite an increase in the overall population of high-risk youth. The results appear impressive, but the evaluation was designed in such a way that it is not possible to say with any degree of certainty whether these reductions can be attributed to El Centro or other forces which may have been operating in the community over the same timespan.

3.4.7 On the basis of a review of American community-based crime prevention initiatives which focus on the "root causes" of crime, Rosenbaum (1988) concludes that there is little hard evidence to show that this approach is effective in reducing community crime rates or building community cohesion. This does not mean that the approach is ineffective, but that there is no evidence to show whether it is or not.

3.4.8 In practice, these initiatives appear to suffer from a range of implementation problems and either no, or inadequate, evaluations. Earlier community development initiatives to alleviate poverty and lack of employment opportunities in urban slum areas in the USA (e.g. Mobilisation for Youth, and 'War on Poverty') also ended up as failures. In the UK, the experience of major community development programmes in the early nineteen seventies also led to disillusionment with social engineering in the community. The Community Development Project, the aim of which was to meet the needs of people living in areas of high social deprivation by changing the social and economic conditions which structured their lives is now, with the

115

benefit of hindsight, acknowledged as having been politically, administratively and financially over-ambitious. Hope and Shaw (1988) succinctly sum up the reasons for the failure of grand scale social engineering programmes:

"The political conflict involved in these projects, their consumption of resources, their perceived lack of tangible effect, their grandiose designs and aims, and their raising of expectations within the community which could not be met, all fuelled a reaction against 'social engineering' for crime prevention purposes."

3.4.9 During the last decade, attempts at social engineering in North America and Europe, during a period in which the welfare state and the principles of welfarism have been in general decline, have generally given way to locally based, low-key and sometimes piecemeal initiatives, which are deliberately generated at the grass roots level rather than imposed upon local communities from above. The focus of these initiatives has, by and large, been on the need to integrate young people at risk of offending back into the community.

3.5 Integrating young people

3.5.1 The most common forms of community-based crime prevention are those which focus on reducing the dispositions of young people to offend rather than blocking opportunities or increasing surveillance and detection rates. National networks of youth centres are becoming increasingly common, like the French 'Mission Locales' described in chapter 1 and the 'Sosjale Joenits' in the Netherlands.

3.5.2 In the Netherlands, some 60 youth advisory centres (Sosjale Joenits) exist throughout the country. They offer advice and support to young people between 11 and 25 (most are between 16 and 20) on matters relating to housing, employment, education, training, social security and drugs and alcohol problems. They adopt a child-centred approach, work closely with the police and target their resources in particular on runaways, the unemployed, the homeless and other young people at risk. They are concerned with helping young people to help themselves so that, for example, runaways who come to the centres for accomodation are required to participate in a survival skills training course before they are accepted in hostels. The emphasis is on teaching young people how to make decisions for themselves and live with the consequences, how to gain self-confidence and self-esteem, and how they are worthy in spite of their limitations and the difficulties they may face. Like in France, the Dutch youth centres adopt the approach of trying to integrate young people into a society or community from which they feel estranged or rejected (Junger-Tas, 1988).

3.5.3 The provision of youth centres, however, may not be sufficient to reach and build up relationships with the most alienated young people and those most at risk of offending. Neither is the idea sufficient that young offenders and potential offenders can be deterred from crime by giving them something to do and keeping them off the streets. By identifying and working with natural peer groups at risk of offending and keeping in close touch with local schools, parents and a range of community and other agencies, including the police and representatives of the judiciary, youth workers and youth organisations can play a more central role in the integration of young people into the community. Increasingly work with young people is located within a locally based, multi-agency network, which provides access to a range of

resources which can alter the socio-economic conditions affecting their lives and their dispositions to offending.

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH INTEGRATION, FRANCE

3.5.4 One of the most ambitious attempts to reduce crime by tackling its "root causes" at the local level has been introduced in France. Based on the premise that investment in repressive measures produces diminishing returns and fails to reduce crime or enable people to feel more secure, the French have developed a social action approach to crime prevention, following the findings and recommendations of a series of inter-departmental reports (Peyrefitte, 1977; Dubedout, 1982; Bonnemaison, 1982).

3.5.5 The reasons for offending listed in the Bonnemaison report, the most influential of these reports, are not dissimilar to the causes of crime identified in studies of crime in developing countries. They include poverty, overcrowding, physical segregation and social and economic exclusion, the absence of social controls in people's relations with one another, the increased temptation resulting from the growth in consumer goods and lastly economic crisis (Bonnemaison, 1982). The report focusses on seeking local solutions to the causes of offending by mostly young people and immigrants in overpopulated, deteriorating, inner-city neighbourhoods. Thus crime prevention is placed within the context of reducing unemployment among the young, improving the urban environment, improving facilities for education and training, combatting racial discrimination and encouraging social integration.

3.5.6 To implement the new crime prevention policies, a three tier, decentralised administrative structure, involving local and national politicians, has been set up. At

118

the national level, a National Crime Prevention Council, consisting of representatives from diverse political parties, trade unions, industry and various Ministries, formulates policy. At the regional level, Departmental Crime Prevention Councils act as co-ordinators, but it is at the local level, through the Communal Crime Prevention Councils, where most of the work is accomplished. Consisting of a combination of elected representatives, members of the judiciary, the police, trade unions and the local administration, Communal Crime Prevention Councils have been set up on a voluntary basis in two thirds of towns exceeding a population of 30,000 and half of towns with populations between 9,000 and 30,000 (King, 1988). The French have thus gone some way towards the institutionalisation of crime prevention. (Some of the more important crime prevention initiatives in France, such as the Mission Locales and the ete-jeunes project, were described in chapter 1).

3.5.7 Key concepts in the French crime prevention programme are assimilation and integration. Marginalised groups, especially ethnic minorities and young people, are the focus of their efforts. According to Krikorian (1986), one of the strands of thinking behind this approach to assimilating marginalised groups of immigrants and young people is that both experience transitional problems of adaptation, albeit for different reasons. Immigrants (or migrants for that matter), have to adapt to strange cultural conditions and sometimes hostile social attitudes. Marginalised youngsters (or in some cases those who are not marginalised), have to adapt to the demanding expectations of adulthood, often without the necessary skills or resources for doing so. Both groups must find ways of successfully bridging a stage of transition not of their own making. The most difficult problem associated with integrating marginalised people is therefore firstly to reach them, secondly to build up a trusting relationship with them and thirdly to then do something about meeting their needs and resolving their problems - to help them cross the bridges they are confronted with. Failure to do so may result in some turning to crime as an alternative solution.

119

3.5.8 The French, it would seem, have recognised this problem and have introduced policies which aim to assist those who need it. For example youth workers, by closely linking up with other agencies, act as intermediaries between young people and the institutions in society from which they feel estranged. They can provide access to resources which can help to integrate marginalised young people by altering, if only slightly, the socio-economic conditions affecting their lives. But again whether or not they work in the sense that crime is actually prevented remains unknown. The only information available comes from the 1987 annual report of the National Council for the Prevention of Crime, which shows that those districts with Communal Crime Prevention Councils experienced slightly larger decreases in crime than those without. But since, for example, they may have had more crime to begin with, such figures need to be treated with considerable caution.

3.6 Crime prevention through multi-agency co-operation

3.6.1 The multi-agency approach is becoming increasingly common in efforts to initiate crime prevention programmes which require the input of wide-ranging resources for generating social, economic and community development. Local multi-agency committees comprising elected representatives, members of the judiciary, the police, trade unions, the local public administration, local residents and in some cases local business and industry, develop and implement their own policies based on local needs and conditions. They are usually responsible for identifying problem areas, encouraging a joint approach to devising strategies of intervention and prevention, co-ordinating preventive measures and targetting specific 'at risk' groups. Considerable emphasis is placed on empowering local communities to collectively determine the quality of their lives. Community facilities should be planned with local residents and attempts to develop or redevelop the community should proceed with the community's consent where possible. Local officials will need to be in-

volved in mobilising community participation, but once established, they should subsequently adopt a much lower profile.

3.6.2 Multi-agency crime prevention initiatives which are based on the principles of local decision-making and participatory democracy require national leadership and endorsement. A common form of national organisation is a Crime Prevention Council, consisting of representatives from political parties, trade unions, industry, Ministries and various organisations and is responsible for formulating policy. An alternative form of leadership can be provided by inter-ministerial committees, with representatives from various Government Departments (e.g. employment, housing, health and social services, education, transport and urban planning and local government, justice and interior). Such inter-ministerial committees are particularly well placed for monitoring and assessing the impact of social, economic and and educational policies upon crime. Whatever form national leadership takes, it should take responsibility for collecting and disseminating relevant information and provide at least initial funding for setting up, running and evaluating local projects. In carrying out its tasks it will benefit from strong links with the network of local multi-agency committees.

THE CORPORATE APPROACH IN WOLVERHAMPTON, UK

3.6.3 In the UK, community development initiatives aimed at curbing criminality have, until recently, been largely confined to ad hoc juvenile delinquency projects. These have tended to target young people at risk, but rarely impinge upon the social and economic conditions which shape their lives (see Blagg, 1988). A notable exception is the development of a corporate approach to meeting the social, cultural and economic needs of young people in the city of Wolverhampton.

3.6.4 Concern at the extent of youth unemployment led firstly to the commissioning of a comprehensive study of the social conditions of young people and how local services could best respond to their needs and problems (Wolverhampton Borough Council, 1985). This report laid the foundation for the development of policies and strategies for meeting young people's needs. Based on the principle that no single local department or agency can adequately respond to the needs of young people, the main strategy to emerge was the development of an integrated, multi-agency approach for resolving the problems faced by the young.

3.6.5 The City Council was subsequently (in 1987) awarded a grant by the Government for the funding of a project to promote social responsibility amongst the young. This government initiative, administered by the Department of Education and costing in excess of £1,000,000, involves some twenty projects, which vary considerably in their primary orientation. Some are located in schools, others within the remit of the Youth Service; some focus on reducing racism, some on social dissaffection and others on the prevention of vandalism and other forms of delinquency. Most projects are administered through multi-agency forums, involve the wider community and are being evaluated for their effectiveness in reducing juvenile crime.

3.6.6 In Wolverhampton, a range of specific strategies were identified for reducing delinquent behaviour, including:

- the identification of peer group networks and patterns of behaviour;

- the identification, with the co-operation of the young people themselves, of those situations which lead to crime;

- the exploration of the relationship between these patterns, individual needs and identities and the delinquent activities; and

- the provision of alternative sources of prestige and status, and diversion from crime-prone situations into self-chosen activities.

3.6.7 Throughout, the scheme emphasises the importance of increasing the extent to which young people take responsibility for choosing and to a large extent managing their own activities within the community. Youth workers are expected to identify and work with natural peer groups at risk and keep in close contact with local schools, parents and a range of community and other agencies, including the police. An evaluation is currently in progress.

3.6.8 An important part of crime prevention is the efficient delivery of services at the local level. In some circumstances, the decentralisation of local services, particularly housing services, may improve their efficiency. Special committees or other bodies can be set up to consider all local services in the context of crime and community safety. Such multi-agency committees can help to develop corporate expertise, assist in the resolution of conflicting departmental interests and disseminate good practice. Special training courses may need to be organised for departmental representatives on such committees to clarify how their work may have a bearing on crime prevention and community safety.

CRIME PREVENTION BY COMMITTEE, DENMARK

3.6.9 Crime prevention policy in Denmark is perceived as inextricably linked to

public, and especially social, policy and has been for more than a decade. Denmark has a National Crime Prevention Council which consists of representatives from some 50 different government and non-government organisations. The central basis of the National Crime Prevention Council's approach consists of combining environmental planning and social development. Crime prevention is perceived as a collective, communal enterprise involving considerable resources beyond those provided by the police and the judiciary. The activities of the Council are directed towards offences which create a sense of insecurity and are characterised by breaches of accepted social behaviour such as burglary, theft and vandalism. The Council develops crime prevention proposals within the wider socio-political context and presents its recommendations to decision makers operating within the socio-political arena at the local level.

3.6.10 As early as 1976, the NCPC designed a model of community-based crime prevention based on community development. The model is based on using a number of standing committees, each with responsibility for different aspects of community development. One such standing committee, the SSP committee, has the task of preventing crime committed by juveniles and young adults. SSP committees have been established in approximately 230 municipalities throughout Denmark. Headed by four local Department chiefs - Police, Education, Social Services and Cultural Affairs - it has responsibility for identifying local needs, devising strategies of prevention, targetting resources and co-ordinating the implementation of activities. Other committee members include representatives of sporting facilities, youth clubs and tenants' associations. The main focus of the committee's work is on creating a support network of parents, teachers, youth and community workers, social workers and police officers for young people 'at risk'.

3.6.11 From time to time, the SSP committee will set up project groups to deal with

specific community problems. In the city of Aarhus, for example, behaviour by a group of young adults, which was sometimes criminal, was causing considerable concern in one area of the city. Levels of fear were high and the group, feeling increasingly isolated from their own community, resorted increasingly to criminal and anti-social behaviour. Younger children were beginning to emulate their older peers and a self-fulfilling process of fear leading to isolation and increased crime and further fear was being established. The SSP committee made contact with the older group first, giving them the opportunity to set up their own youth club. Through this, they began to feel less isolated from the community and started behaving differently and the younger children began to receive a different and more constructive role model to emulate. Eventually, an inter-agency initiative was established to focus on the more important needs and problems of this group and gradually the conditions were created in which the conflicts facing these young adults could be confronted and resolved (Jensen, 1988).

3.6.12 This description of an approach - crisis intervention combined with the setting up of a more permanent structure to deal with the "root causes" of the crisis - is typical of the SSP approach. Unfortunately, there are no data available as to how successful this approach is in dealing with crime and fear of crime. Evaluation has rather tended to focus on the implementation process, which has experienced a range of conflicts. In Aarhus, initial mutual distrust between agencies - the police, the education authority and the social services - severely restricted their capacity to co-operate with one another and create a joint strategy. Expectations of one another were often unrealistic, agency representatives tended to work on the basis of very different principles and objectives and a general lack of consensus severly hampered the development of early initiatives.

3.6.13 To resolve some of these difficulties, a series of seminars were held and a

kind of steering or co-ordinating committee was set up to identify mutual problems, monitor and evaluate programmes of action and generally act as a resource for providing information on trends in crime and delinquency. The committee acts as a kind of catalyst to stimulate the work of local agencies and co-ordinate the efforts of voluntary bodies with that of the public sector. Where the interests of a particular target group are in conflict with those of the agencies involved, the committee has the task of identifying common ground and constructing some kind of working consensus through a process of consultation and compromise. In practice there is some dispute as to whether such a consensus exists. Jensen (1988) reports that imposed solutions are carefully avoided, but according to Koch (1988), since neither young people nor their parents are represented on SSP committees, initiatives cannot truly represent the interests of the community.

3.6.14 According to Jensen (1988), the strength of the Danish approach to community-based crime prevention is the extent to which the police are integrated into local service provision to the community. As a result, he concludes that both day-to-day and emergency policing have improved. But problems of reconciling short and long term objectives, targetting the most intransigent groups and overcoming hostility to what are sometimes perceived as police-led initiatives still need resolving. Furthermore, critics of the SSP committee point out the ambivalent position of police officers - social workers or educationalists one minute, enforcers of the law the next (Koch, 1988). Principles of trust and confidence, important requirements of effective social work, can conflict with principles of law enforcement and punishment. Unfortunately, without hard data on the outcome of some of the SSP's work in terms of reduced levels of offending and victimisation, it is difficult to assess its ultimate efficacy.

3.6.15 Fears have been expressed in Denmark about the power of multi-agency fo-

rums to collect and use large amounts of information without proper controls on the potential abuse of the power such access to information can facilitate (Johansen, 1988). This applies to multi-agency crime preventive work in any country. There are considerable benefits to be had from pooling professional resources and improving communications between local agencies, but the legal rights of the individual also have to be protected, particularly where multi-agency committees deal with individual cases.

3.6.16 There is little hard evidence to demonstrate whether or not the multi-agency approach to crime prevention is effective in targetting those most in need, building community cohesion, lessening fear of crime or reducing community crime rates. Those very few evaluations which have been completed are either flawed or have focussed on implementation issues. These have, however, produced interesting findings on the problems and conflicts associated with inter-agency co-operation (see, for example, Sampson et al. 1988).

3.6.17 Members of multi-agency committees should have sufficient authority with their own organisations to integrate the views of the committee into departmental policies and vice versa. They must be made fully aware that the initiative does not represent a response to exceptional circumstances. Procedures and areas of responsibility should be clearly delineated at the outset. Care should be taken to ensure that multi-agency networks do not become an end in themselves but remain a means to an end. This may mean acknowledging, facing up to and resolving any conflicts which arise, such as the sharing of confidential or personal information, particularly with the police. Agencies may feel reluctant to undermine a basis of trust which exists between themselves and other agencies or individual clients. Codes of practice can be constructed to balance the need for information exchange with the need for restraint and protection.

3.6.18 Power differentials between participating agencies are inevitable, but need to be tempered wherever possible. It is particularly important that the "police view" does not become the dominant view to the exclusion or partial exclusion of the views of other interested parties. Relations between multi-agency committees and local residents also require careful handling as they may also have conflicting priorities. It is particularly important to ensure that the views of minorities are not submerged under the views of more powerful groups since these minorities may well be the prime victims of crime.

3.6.19 Multi-agency networks can be quite complex. They need to be effectively directed and their work is best managed by a professional co-ordinator who should monitor progress and to stay abreast of developments and who can act as a catalyst, a negotiator and a motivator. Co-ordinators can be appointed from one of the agencies in question or externally. Both have advantages and disadvantages. Externally recruited co-ordinators may mean extra expense and they may antagonise agency workers who resent perceived interference. Co-ordinators appointed from one of the agencies, on the other hand, may upset the balance of power between agencies, particularly if a consensus on goals and ways of achieving them have not yet been settled.

SAFER CITIES, UK

3.6.20 Co-ordinators constitute a central mechanism in this initiative to reduce crime and fear of crime and promote economic enterprise and community safety in twenty cities. The initiative is intended to stimulate locally based projects in areas with high crime rates and other social and economic problems. A partnership between central government and local agencies combines the need for financial and professional support with the need to allow local projects the freedom and flexibility to evolve

according to local definitions of needs, problems and appropriate preventive strategies. Co-ordinators and their assistants, who are recruited locally but financed from central funds, act as catalysts in this central/local partnership and help to circumvent the problem of who has overall responsibility for crime prevention.

3.6.21 Each Safer City project also has a local steering committee, with representatives from voluntary organisations, statutory agencies (police, probation, local authority departments such as housing and education) and commercial and community interest groups. The committee sets priorities, facilitates communication between the various agencies involved and oversees the implementation of measures. Together with the co-ordinator and assistant co-ordinator, an initial action plan is prepared based on area crime profiles, a review of local social and economic data and other local sources of information.

3.6.22 Three main forms of preventive activity are being implemented; improving physical security and design to reduce opportunities for committing offences, introducing an awareness of crime and its implications into the management of local services and supporting opportunities for personal and social development, particularly amongst the young. Individual projects range from improving street lighting and re-designing individual housing estates to measures to improve the management of domestic disputes and the policing of shopping centres.

3.6.23 Each project will be locally monitored and centrally evaluated by a team of researchers concerned with finding the answers to four key questions:

- has the project led to a distinct fall in crime and fear of crime?

- if so, how much of this fall can be attributed to Safer Cities projects?

- what, if any, are the side-effects of the initiative (such as the   displacement of crime to other areas)?

- what are the overall costs and benefits of the initiative?

3.6.24 There is no information as yet on the effectiveness or otherwise of this quite sophisticated initiative. Early reports suggest that there are difficulties associated with the need to combine crime data with other kinds of local information. It remains to be seen how effective co-ordinators will be in anticipating and resolving local difficulties and in particular protecting projects from inter-agency rivalries.

3.6.25 Mutual distrust between agencies, particularly between the police and the education and social services departments, is not uncommon and can restrict the capacity of committees to co-operate with one another and develop a joint strategy. Expectations of one another are sometimes unrealistic and agency representatives may work on the basis of very different principles. One of the most important outcomes of these implementation studies is how important it is to integrate the police into the local decision-making and service provision machinery.

3.7 The role of the police

3.7.1 The idea that the police spend most of their time and energy enforcing the law has been undermined by the findings of research (see, for example, Clarke and Hough, 1984; Eck and Spelman, 1987). As a result, the traditional approach to po-

licing - responding to public calls for assistance, investigating incidents and arresting suspects - has been called into question and is beginning to change. Research on random police patrols, which constitute the most fundamental feature of policing, has shown that the police spend most of their time offering help and advice (Weatheritt, 1986). The rarity of criminal acts means that random patrols are highly unlikely to be present at the scene of a crime and increasing the number of patrols (with the costly exception of 'saturation' policing) is equally unlikely to make an impact on overall crime levels (Heal and Morris, 1985).

3.7.2 Car patrols have been found to be similarly ineffective, but with the added disadvantage that they stress the law enforcement aspects of policing at the expense of the community relations or peace keeping aspects (Kelling et al. 1974). Some even argue that car patrols increase crime insofar as committing resources to car patrols (and indeed other kinds of reactive work) means less resources for preventive work, which leads to more crime and disorder, which increases public demand for more car patrols and other forms of reactive policing (Weatheritt, 1986).

3.7.3 Directed patrolling appears to be more effective, particularly if integrated into an overall crime (and fear) reduction strategy. Where police patrols are deployed on the basis of risk analysis, cover small areas and establish productive relationships with community residents, their effectiveness can be greater. They need to be seen, known and valued, all of which can be enhanced by patrol officers spending as much time as possible in the community. Mini stations, manned by one police officer and several volunteers and located in the vicinity of other community organisations, can increase accessibility and awareness of policing issues, but do not reduce crime beyond the station's immediate catchment area.

COPS PROJECT, CANADA

3.7.4 The community police stations project (COPS) consists of the establishment of mini-police stations manned by one uniformed police and officer and between 15 and 20 volunteers. The stations provide a service to members of the local community on a walk-in basis. Stations are located near other community facilities and are open from 9.00 am to 9.00pm 7 days a week. Volunteers are specially trained, their functions being mainly related to assisting in the co-ordination of crime prevention activities in the area (such as property marking and neighbourhood watch) and referring local residents to other agencies where appropriate. (Volunteers are not involved in law enforcement activities). The main idea behind mini-stations is to improve the visibility and accessibility of police services which, it is anticipated, will result in an improved police response and reductions in crime. A process evaluation by Walker and Walker (1989) describes how the stations were set up, what difficulties were encountered in implementing the concept and how local residents value the stations, but unfortunately there is no data on the effects of the stations on crime rates. (In a similar project in Toronto, Canada, the crime rate fell in the immediate vicinity of the mini-station, but there were no changes in crime rates over the broader area covered by the mini-station (A.R.A. Consultants, 1985)).

3.7.5 Community policing

3.7.5.1 It is widely believed that by allaying local people's anxieties and fears and breeding security, trust in and contact with the police can be enhanced. This helps to improve co-operation with the police and increase the flow of information for the prevention and detection of crime. (The importance of sound police/public relations for mobilising support and generating a community-based response to crime was underlined in Chapter 2). The police are thus becoming increasingly aware of the im-

portance of having the consent of those they police and community policing attempts to obtain that consent by demonstrating a more permanent presence in the community. The essence of community policing is to improve the accessibility and visibility of the police and to develop closer, more caring relationships with citizens. Community police officers should be permanently assigned to small areas or 'mini stations' (see below) and learn to become a familiar local figure to whom residents can readily turn to without fear. The concept of community policing represents a significant shift away from traditional law enforcement models of policing and towards a model based on community consultation, participation and consent.

3.7.5.2 Research on the effects of community policing has been somewhat equivocal, both with respect to its effects on crime and police/public relations. The degree to which community policing has been implemented is itself questionable. Research has, however, identified at least four ways of improving the concept of community policing (see also Goldstein, 1987).

1) The nature and focus of crime prevention work within the police profession need to be clarified and enhanced, particularly amongst the lower ranks. The idea that the main function of the police is to detect mainly serious crime, irrespective of its frequency in, or impact on, local communities, needs to be qualified. To enhance the status of community policing in general and beat policing in particular, the advantages of proactive work and the disadvantages of reactive work need to be clarified.

2) To produce a sensible balance between reactive and proactive policing, it may be necessary to enhance proactive work. The introduction of other performance indicators in addition to arrest and process reports could assist in this. These could include the development of productive contacts with local groups and agencies and changes in reporting levels and clear up rates for those crimes of most concern to the public.

3) Police training should focus more on increasing professional skills relevant to community policing, especially the development of communicating and organising skills, on work with other agencies and on community relations work, especially with minority groups and work with the young and the elderly.

4) Insofar as police effectiveness depends upon public co-operation, the police should construct strategies to prevent those crimes and public nuisances which are of greatest concern to the community. The police should not and cannot "own" the crime problem, so strategies should be developed together with residents and local agencies. The police should keep the public informed about developments. Local surveys can be used to establish what the community's priorities are, what the community expects and demands of the police and which areas are most at risk of crime and victimisation.

3.7.5.3 In run down areas with high crime rates, the police task can be quite daunting. Under such circumstances, it may be necessary to provide a high level of service, within a community policing model, at least temporarily. Care should be taken to ensure that the work of different police units does not inadvertently act counter-productively. Local police officers should be consulted before outside police units are deployed for specific anti-crime actions. Policing in such areas must be part of a multi-agency network which, together with resident consultation and participation, is essential if the socio-economic conditions which underpin crime in such areas are to be improved.

3.7.6 Problem-oriented policing

3.7.6.1 In reality, the police are called upon to deal with a very wide range of prob-

lems in local communities, in addition to enforcing the law. A refinement of community policing is problem-oriented policing, which orientates the planning and implementation of policing to community problems, irrespective of whether they constitute breaches of the law, rather than incidents or offences. Law enforcement is thus viewed as one of a range of alternative ways of responding to the problems the police encounter, such as mediation, informal dispute settlement and diversion from prosecution. Problem-oriented policing therefore requires a more specific definition of problems than that offered by legal offence categories, with descriptions which include information gathered from a wide range of sources on, for example, the location and time of specific occurrences and the behaviour and motivation of the people involved (Goldstein, 1987).

THE NEWPORT NEWS INITIATIVE, USA

3.7.6.2 In Newport News, problem-oriented policing was introduced on a department wide basis to deal with a range of offences from minor disorders to street robbery. All police officers were responsible for identifying, defining, analysing and resolving problems. Officers collected information from a wide range of sources within and outside the police force itself and also developed solutions with the assistance of persons and organisations outside policing. To reduce thefts from vehicles, for example, police officers scrutinised offending patterns in their area over a period of three years before constructing a specific solution (in this case, increasing patrols on several car parks) (Eck and Spelman, 1987). The new approach was evaluated and following implementation, reported street robberies declined by nearly 40%, reported thefts from vehicles declined by over 50% and reported household burglaries on one estate declined by 35% (Rosenbaum, 1988).

3.7.6.3 Research on problem-oriented policing has found that while the amount and

relevance of information generated by such an approach improves, there are imple-
mentation difficulties (Hoare et al. 1984) and there may be problems of displace-
ment to neighbouring areas (Rosenbaum, 1988). There are also limitations to the ex-
tent to which the police can develop a problem-oriented approach in run down,
multi-problem neighbourhoods, where the solutions to the problems of crime, disor-
der, fear of crime and general incivilities may require the tackling of social and eco-
nomic conditions.

3.7.6.4 The problem-oriented approach to policing, where the specific and often lo-
cal nature of the crime problem determines in large part the nature of potential solu-
tions, has been developed to encompass the whole crime preventive process. Instead
of focussing resources on the overall crime picture in large geographical areas, or on
individual incidents taken in isolation, the preventive process allows resources to be
tailored to specific patterns of offending in their local contexts (Ekblom, 1988). The
crime preventive process, which consists largely of analysing patterns of crime in an
area, constructing and implementing measures to reduce such crime and evaluating
the effects of the intervention, is the subject of the next and final chapter.

CHAPTER 4. THE PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF CRIME PREVENTION.

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Chapters 1 to 3 described three approaches to preventing crime which focus on what can be done outside the criminal justice system to prevent crime. None of them are mutually exclusive or represent self contained blueprints for action, but all contain elements which can be borrowed, adapted and implemented according to the needs and problems faced by local communities. But whatever approaches are favoured, they must be properly planned and implemented if crime is to be reduced. This chapter focusses on the *process* of crime prevention - from an initial analysis of the problem, through the selection and implementation of appropriate measures, to an evaluation of the initiative's success. (For a fuller description of crime analysis and the preventive process, incorporating details on the methods and skills required and a step-by-step guide to carrying it out in practice, including examples, see Ek-blom, (1988)).

4.2 Analysis of the crime problem

4.2.1 The first task must be to conduct a systematic analysis of crime in, and the needs and problems of, the community. Crime does not occur randomly, but shows distinct patterns which can give important clues to prevention. Different types of crime tend to occur in specific places, usually around certain times. A study of shoplifting, for example, showed that three quarters of all offences observed by store detectives occured in 3 out of 40 sections of the store. This enabled management to concentrate preventive measures in one small part of the store, rather than across the

whole store (Ekblom, 1986). Similarly, studies of drinking and disorder have found that offences are most likely to occur near drinking establishments, particularly just after they close and on Friday and Saturday evenings. Consequently, the use of police and other preventive measures can be targetted to coincide with these high risk times and places (Hope, 1985; Tuck, 1989).

4.2.2 Crime also tends to focus on certain kinds of property and victims and is usually committed by specific kinds of people using a range of methods. Thus Bennett and Wright (1984), in a study of which houses burglars are most likely to consider breaking in to and why, were able to suggest specific preventive measures on the basis that certain houses would be more likely than others to be burgled (i.e those not overlooked by other premises; those furthest from the road; unoccupied premises etc).

4.2.3 In some cases, on closer inspection, crime may not be what it appears. Thus in a feasibility study to reduce school vandalism (see Gladstone, 1980), it was found that in nearly half the schools in the study, the main problem was accidental damage rather than vandalism and in these schools replacing windows with toughened glass was all that was required. It is therefore important to build up data bases, preferably computerised, of quantitative and qualitative information from a range of sources on prevailing crime patterns in order to devise the most cost-effective preventive solutions.

4.2.4 Police and other official records will provide much valuable information on where, when and how different kinds of incidents have occured. Information from different sources can be pooled to provide a fuller picture, taking care to ensure that data protection provisions are adhered to. Police and official records can be supplemented by crime, victim and offender surveys, which provide more accurate data.

Information on 'good practice' elsewhere, whilst not necessarily directly transferable, may also be useful. Special training in the basic techniques of data collection and analysis and greater organisational priority will need to be accorded if crime pattern analysis is to become an accepted and routine part of management. The following list, adapted from Ekblom (1988), gives some idea of the breadth and depth of information which can be collected:

1) Nature and location of offence, including legal categorisation and contextual information, such as motive and grounds for dispute, physical proximity (e.g. near railway station, in shopping precinct) and generic location (e.g. on platform, in subway).

2) Timing and method of offence such as date, day of week, time of day, point and means of gaining entry, switching price labels and using spray cans.

3) Target or victim of offence such as car, bicycle, domestic goods and age, sex and lifestyle of victim, including activity at time of offence (e.g. commuting, shopping, sightseeing).

4) Physical and social circumstances of offence (i.e. lighting, degree of crowding, presence of potential interveners etc.) and whether offence successful or not.

5) Cost (financial and social) of offence or associated damage and to whom, and type of goods stolen or damaged.

6) Offender characteristics (i.e. age, sex, class, race, whether alone or accompanied,

criminal record, criminal contacts, school and employment record, family status etc.)

7) Involvement of alcohol and drugs as motive and contributory victim behaviour, such as negligence or provocation.

4.2.5 Patterns identified from the above information should be supplemented with site visits to trouble spots and general information on the neighbourhood such as demographic characteristics, levels of unemployment and local employment opportunities, housing conditions, racial mix, local amenities, and migration patterns. Further information should also be collected on the public's definition of the crime problem, their priorities for action, their views of the police and the provision of services by other local agencies. Surveys can be repeated every so often to assess progress and chart the need to alter priorities. To interpret these patterns, it may be prudent to draw on the wider resources of criminological research as well as local knowledge.

4.2.6 Devising appropriate measures

4.2.6.1 Once patterns have been established and interpreted, situational, social and community-based measures can be devised and individual measures can be targetted on specific areas, situations, offenders and methods of offending. It is at this stage that impractical, expensive or politically unacceptable measures should be filtered out. Where agencies are working together, each department should assess its potential contribution to crime and its prevention. The determination of priorities as between measures, when it is necessary to make a choice on the allocation of funds, will pose problems. Issues to consider will include the relative practical benefit to

the community of different measures and the social and economic costs of the criminal activity under consideration. The question of priorities will need to be made in accordance with local circumstances, although where the analysis of crime and the allocation of preventive resources covers a large urban area or indeed a whole town, this may require the setting up of a special committee or commission.

THE ENQUETE COMMISSION, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

4.2.6.2 In 1979, a special independent Commission was set up to carry out a systematic analysis of crime and its causes in the city of Neumuenster and to present practical recommendations for the development of preventive measures. Referred to as the Enquete Commission, it worked closely with (although independent of) the town's authorities to develop a picture of the town's social and urban structure and crime problem. The commission used local police statistics, self-report data from a sample of local schools, a survey of offender characteristics and an analysis of the spatial distribution of offences as data bases. Their report provides a comprehensive list of social and situational measures for preventing and reducing crime, including the setting up of a city based inter-departmental committee for crime prevention and a pilot project for examining the effects of introducing 'community stations' in specific high crime neighbourhoods on a ratio of for every 250 residents. Their responsibilities would include increasing local involvement and participation, improving community relations, encouraging self help initiatives, resolving local conflicts, providing crisis intervention and legal, financial and personal advice on a 24 hour basis.

4.2.6.3 A crucial pre-condition for setting up 'community stations' was found to be the procurement of financial and political support from the local Mayor and his/her chief administrator. In Neumuenster, it proved difficult to convince local politicians and administrators of the financial benefits of preventing rather than reacting to

crime after the event. This occured partly because there was no evidence of the success or otherwise of 'community stations' in reducing crime. In practice the implementation of the Neumuenster project was also severely hampered by conflicting tensions between different agencies, and especially between the police and social workers with respect to the problem of juvenile crime. Simplified, the police tended to perceive young delinquents as 'being' a problem, whereas social workers tended to perceive them as 'having' a problem (Graham, 1988).

4.2.6.4 As the above example shows, sometimes inter-agency tensions and individual agency interests can influence not only which measures are selected but whether a programme even gets off the ground. The selection of measures should nevertheless be based on rational assessments of their likely effectiveness rather than their administrative or political convenience. Research and evaluation can assist agencies to select appropriate measures and methods of working which transcend such difficulties. If possible, crime and community analysis should also attempt to anticipate some of the constraints which may arise in the implementation of crime prevention initiatives.

4.3 Implementation.

4.3.1 While crime analysis is imperative for identifying the nature of the criminal problem, it does not ensure that anything effective is done about it. It is just as important to know how to effectively implement prevention strategies as to know what strategies to adopt in the first place. There are basically two approaches to implementation. Either a programme starts with a fixed agenda and implementation is designed to ensure that what is ultimately implemented corresponds as closely as possible to what was originally planned, or a flexible approach is adopted and a set of general measures are refined and reworked during the course of events. If the first

approach is adopted, preventive strategies must closely match the needs and prob-
lems of the local community and conform to existing social relations and political
priorities.

4.3.2 The second approach is probably more suitable to the implementation of crime
prevention initiatives, since it can accommodate unforeseen problems. Public agen-
cies need to respond to a wide range of competing pressures and are almost inevita-
bly subject to the common constraints of political processes and considerations. Fur-
thermore, as information is acquired on the effectiveness or otherwise of measures,
particularly displacement, so they can be changed to fit the new circumstances.

4.3.3 Four main strategies can be used for implementing crime prevention measures;
(i) the use of regulations to enforce norms of conduct, such as the passing of bye
laws to restrict the purchase and consumption of alcohol at certain times or in cer-
tain places; (ii) the provision of facilities and practical assistance to support desired
actions, such as the provision of computers for monitoring non-attendance levels in
schools; (iii) the use of incentives to encourage people to adopt measures, such as
lower home insurance premiums for those who install door and window locks and
(iv) negotiation to resolve differences of interest, particularly between agencies op-
erating at the local level and the people for whom they provide a service. Which
strategies are adopted will depend upon the nature of the problem and the particular
difficulties which need to be overcome to achieve effective implementation.

4.3.4 Unless crime prevention measures are successfully implemented, the theory
and validity of crime prevention cannot be tested. Even partial implementation can
be inadequate since failure to fully implement all measures in a crime prevention
scheme can undermine the effectiveness of those which are implemented. However,
little attention is usually given to the process of implementation and the associated

difficulties which can arise, although the following account of a demonstration project to reduce vandalism in schools is a notable exception.

SCHOOL VANDALISM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, ENGLAND

4.3.5 In a demonstration project to test the feasibility of a range of mostly situational measures to reduce vandalism in eleven primary and secondary schools, Hope (1985) describes the difficulties encountered once the project reached the stage where decisions were taken and action initiated. Prior to implementation, an analysis of the problem suggested two alternative solutions - physical measures to protect the buildings or social measures to divert children into legitimate, non-destructive activities. Groups consisting of school staff, local authority officials and the police, were given responsibility for deciding which measures to adopt at each school and they invariably chose physical measures. The reason for this choice was, however, not because such measures were necessarily thought to be more effective, but because they were thought to be administratively more convenient and acceptable and more closely fitted the preconceived beliefs of group members concerning the nature of the problem and appropriate preventive solutions.

4.3.6 In practice the measures chosen were never fully implemented. Only half of the thirty measures ultimately chosen had been implemented after two years and only two schools implemented all measures. In three schools none were put into practice. Interestingly, all the recommendations which were the responsibility of the buildings branch of the local education department were implemented, whereas none of those involving other departments or agencies were. Five main obstacles to implementation were identified:

(i) Technical difficulties and fire safety regulations prevented the installation of 'vandal proof' replacement windows;

(ii) Lack of supervision and control by headquarters officials over what happened at the local level led to misunderstandings and delays which in turn resulted in a failure to implement some measures;

(iii) Some measures needed to be implemented by more than one agency or group of people. In such cases, no one assumed overall responsibility for taking the lead, each party expecting someone else to take the initiative.

(iv) Other, higher priorities and bureaucratic inertia either prohibited or delayed the implementation of some measures;

(v) Some measures were victims of their own success. One of the few measures which had an immediate effect on vandalism in one school - security patrols during holiday periods - led to other schools demanding the same and not just during the school holidays. The cost became prohibitive and the patrols were stopped.

4.3.7 There are a number of ways of increasing the chances of securing effective implementation. Some are associated with programmes which are generally designed to implement public policy whilst others apply more specifically to multi-agency crime prevention initiatives.

4.3.8 Firstly, it is important to ensure from the outset that the community accepts joint responsibility for initiating and sustaining crime prevention programmes, oth-

145

erwise they are likely to falter. As already noted in chapter 3, initiatives are more likely to be supported if generated from the bottom up rather than imposed from the top down. To assist in this, a community-based participatory forum can be set up to underline and facilitate the sharing of responsibility. Such forums can increase public awareness, facilitate joint decision-making and support the initiation and co-ordination of action. Caution should be exercised to ensure that agreements reached during the decision-making stages are not progressively watered down or undone during implementation. Open forums can assist in this by bringing potential conflicts out into the open before implementation begins.

4.3.9 Secondly, programmes which are attempting to confront crime at its roots should establish a philosophical consensus on the major structural factors contributing to the causes of crime and the potential solutions. An articulate, charismatic and committed individual would be helpful for the successful introduction of such programmes, which may have to start by generating a sense of community before residents can be expected to participate in a crime prevention programme.

4.3.10 A major problem with such initiatives is that social measures are unlikely to be seen as an appropriate response by those who perceive the threat of crime as immediate, favour reactive policing and punitive responses to convicted offenders. Social crime prevention initiatives are inevitably long term and will require individuals with a strong and continuing sense of committment. Irrespective of whether charismatic leaders exist or not, overall leadership is important and a lead agency or group of people should have clear responsibility for initiating and sustaining action.

4.3.11 Programmes which adopt almost exclusively situational measures are easier to implement and maintain than social prevention programmes. They are less dependent on a consensus of values, are more likely to be seen as a direct response to

crime and offer solid incentives for maintaining participation. However, as described above, they can also be hampered by implementation difficulties and may even have the opposite effects of those intended. One of the most important potential side effects of situational crime prevention initiatives is that the careless, badly designed deployment of physical and surveillance measures can inadvertently lead to a "fortress" mentality, which increases fear of crime and can worsen a community's criminal reputation.

4.3.12 Finally, implementation can be made more effective if programmes are routinely monitored. By continuously assessing what is happening and making adjustments accordingly, monitoring allows those who manage programmes to stay abreast of developments rather than lag behind them. As far as possible, routine monitoring should be organised in such a way that the collection and collation of information is tailored to the requirements of evaluators.

4.4 Evaluation.

4.4.1 The next stage of the preventive process is the evaluation of the crime prevention initiative. (This is not the place for providing detailed, technical information on how to conduct evaluations, on which there is substantial literature (see, for example, Skogan, 1985; Hackler, 1987; Ekblom, 1988). The concern here is to explain the importance of evaluation and outline some of the basic principles, approaches and potential difficulties).

4.4.2 It is important to assess whether and to what extent crime has been reduced and whether reductions can be attributed to the preventive measures themselves as opposed to other events. It is also important to know whether crime has increased,

147

remained stable or declined relative to regional or national levels and whether, if crime has declined in the area in question, it has been displaced to neighbouring areas. All this information can help to build up a body of theoretical and practical knowledge to assist managers and funders of crime prevention initiatives to make better decisions about what to support at what cost and for how long.

4.4.3 Sources of information

4.4.3.1 Information for conducting evaluations can be acquired from official records, interview surveys and direct observation. All three are characterised by various advantages and limitations and need to be treated carefully. Police and other official records are very convenient, but can be misleading. Not all crimes are reported to the police and some of those which are may not be recorded. Because official records have not usually been prepared with the purposes of research in mind, they may sometimes lack continuity, reliability and objectivity.

4.4.3.2 Interview surveys with victims and residents usually provide more accurate data and are especially useful for assessing whether target groups have been reached. They can complement official sources of data and provide useful information on the contrasting perceptions of the different parties affected by the initiative. However, victim surveys require large samples to encompass enough crimes and therefore they tend to be time consuming and can be expensive.

4.4.3.3. Direct observation can provide valuable insights into actual behaviour, but can also be costly as well as open to criticisms of subjectivity. Teams of observers can counteract this tendency, but it may be difficult to ensure that individual assessments are comparable. Combining observation with other research methods should

nevertheless make a valuable contribution to interpreting changes.

4.4.4 Process and outcome evaluations

4.4.4.1 There are two main parts to an evaluation. The first part is called a process evaluation and consists of an assessment of what actually happened (not what was intended to happen) and how the programme was implemented in practice. As mentioned above, some programmes are only implemented in part, others are hardly implemented at all or are quite different from what was originally planned. Statements about the effectiveness of a programme will need to be qualified on the basis of what the process evaluation says about what actually happened and why.

4.4.4.2 Process evaluations often make use of qualitative data for describing and assessing not only the process of implementation but also the effects of the initiative on aspects other than the crime rate, such as social cohesion, levels of fear of crime and the ability of the community to organise itself around local issues and problems. The key role of process evaluation is not to determine whether an initiative reduces crime or not, but what the conditions are under which certain outcomes arise. Information from process evaluations is particularly useful for assessing whether the lack of impact of an initiative on crime is due to measurement failure (the evaluation was faulty), programme failure (the schemes were not properly or fully implemented) or theoretical failure (the idea that the preventive strategies chosen can reduce crime is itself false) (see Bennett, 1988). The following description of the process evaluation of a major social crime prevention initiative in the USA provides an interesting example of how important lessons can be learnt from such evaluations, even where programmes are hardly implemented.

THE ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMME, USA

4.4.4.3 In 1985, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's Anti-Crime Programme identified a wide range of factors as causing or facilitating crime, including poverty, relative deprivation, limited employment opportunities, institutional racism, poor education, inadequate housing, broken homes and reduced family functioning. Working in partnership with the Departments of Labour, Justice, Interior, Health and Human Services and Local Government, the programme was built around the premise that urban deterioration and crime go hand in hand and that crime-free and orderly neighbourhoods can only be secured through the social control activities of citizens supported by official agencies. To achieve this goal, a wide range of crime prevention measures were identified including housing management, tenant organisation, employment initiatives, programmes for youth, women, the elderly and victims of crime and better policing. These formed the basis of anti-crime initiatives in 16 cities, which were often similar in design but varied considerably according to local determinants (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1985).

4.4.4.4. The main objective of the process evaluation was to determine what happened in each project. How much activity was generated? What was its character? What factors determined the form, content and timing of various programmes? Kelling et al.(1986) have provided a detailed account of the findings of the process evaluation, the most important of which may be summarised as follows:

(i) There is no clear, linear progression from policy-making to implementation. The former was found to be an on-going process which overlapped with and sometimes grew out of the latter.

(ii) Implementation varied substantially between the sixteen cities. In some, activities were delayed, modified or re-defined altogether; in others, some activities were ignored in preference to others or only token efforts were undertaken.

(iii) The assumption that crime and fear of crime was both serious and prevailed equally in all sixteen projects was unfounded. This false assumption led to each project receiving the same funding without having regard to demand or scale. Consequently, the seriousness or otherwise of the problem overwhelmed a project in one area, but made it irrelevant in another. This underlines the importance of starting with a systematic analysis of crime and how it is perceived by local residents in each area, before making decisions on strategies, measures, funding and the targetting of resources.

(iv) The confusion as to whether the initiative was being financed on a temporary or more permanent basis led to different agencies viewing and using the programme in different ways. The former felt that limiting the programme to 12-18 months meant it could not be properly implemented and their level of committment and subsequent activities were influenced accordingly. Lack of skills in planning and co-ordinating the initiative also led to conflicts between participating agencies.

(v) The role of the police was found to be central to the success of the initiative. Police committment was viewed by many residents as an indication that the authorities were taking the problem of crime seriously and their involvement led to greater demands for a police presence, especially foot patrols and team policing.

(vi) Employment initiatives came out as by far the most successful elements of the programme, since creating training and employment opportunities was perceived as

important in its own right, not just because it might reduce crime.

4.4.4.5 The second part of evaluation is called an outcome evaluation and assesses whether a programme achieves what it sets out to achieve. Preventive measures can only be assessed in relative terms - either relative to other preventive measures or relative to an absence of preventive measures. The standard procedure for this is to compare an area or group which has been subjected to preventive measures with an area or group which has not. Clearly changes at the individual level are unlikely to have any measurable impact on area crime rates, but they may still be of relevance. Ideally, areas or groups should be randomly assigned to preventive/non-preventive categories. In practice, however, ethical and practical difficulties rarely allow this to occur. It is therefore necessary to ensure that output evaluations of this kind clearly show the differences between the target areas or groups and those chosen as controls.

4.4.4.6 One problem with outcome evaluations which are based on the principles of an experimental or quasi-experimental design as described above, is that they can be easily affected by extraneous events, such as the introduction of other programmes and initiatives, which may themselves influence crime rates. There are other methods which can be used to assess the outcome of a programme, such as "before and after" studies or attitude surveys, but these also have their advantages and limitations. In practice, the approach and methods adopted will vary according to a range of factors, including cost, timescales, the type of programme being evaluated and the skills and preferences of the researcher.

4.4.5.1 The process of evaluation is technically complicated and conceptually fraught with difficulties. In practice, most evaluations to date of crime prevention initiatives have been either over-simplistic and/or seriously flawed. It is often impossible to differentiate the independent effects of individual measures in multi-strategic initiatives and even where a positive effect is discernible, it is usually not possible to prove that the drop in crime was *caused* by the initiative or whether the reduction represented value for money. Rarely do crime prevention programmes go beyond influencing a handful of offenders or a small neighbourhood and claims that interventions have affected non-participants or the wider community should therefore be treated with caution. If the technical and financial resources for a rigorous, detailed evaluation are not available or forthcoming, it may be preferable to forego evaluation altogether since poor evaluations may only produce misinformation.

4.4.5.2 The task of gathering basic information about the level of crime can be time-consuming, disruptive, costly and even threatening. Research can expose deficiencies in management or unethical practices. Sometimes political and/or financial pressure to illustrate the effectiveness of an initiative can overrule the need for objective results. On the other hand researchers can benefit from close collaboration with practitioners, even though they may have conflicting interests. Practitioners can help researchers to keep their feet on the ground and apply a degree of healthy scepticism to the validity and certainty of their results. And they can help to put the success or failure of an initiative into a cost-related perspective. Evaluation need not be seen as a purely technical and scientific process and practitioners can play an important part in ensuring that it is seen as part of the overall social fabric surrounding the issues; indeed in some cases assessments by practitioners of changes that have been made, may usefully complement the more precise measurements made by independ-

ent evaluators.

4.4.5.3 A central problem in the evaluation of crime prevention initiatives is to ensure that any reductions in crime in a specific area are not at the expense of increases elsewhere or in other, more serious offences. Although displacement is difficult to identify and to measure, it is essential that an evaluation includes an assessment of whether it has occurred or not and if so to what extent and level of seriousness. Evaluations which fail to include an assessment of displacement are of little value.

4.4.5.4 Displacement is more likely in some circumstances than others. When the crime occurring in an area can be committed as readily in another area or when offenders can easily move to adjacent areas, displacement is more likely to occur. Professional criminals are more likely to persist than petty, opportunistic offenders. Where an offender has the deliberate intention of committing an offence and seeks out an opportunity to do so, displacement is more difficult to avoid. Efforts to prevent for example robberies, have in some cases even led to offenders using more dangerous methods to achieve their objectives. In contrast petty, opportunistic crimes, such as shoplifting, employee theft and vandalism, are less likely simply to be displaced.

4.4.5.5 The decision making process of offenders can help to assess the likelihood and extent of displacement. The decision whether to commit an offence or not and if so where and in what form is influenced by a number of factors of which the possibility of committing it elsewhere or in some other form or way are merely alternative considerations. Other considerations are, for example, the chances of being caught, the offender's overall value system and the likely benefits anticipated. Asking offenders about their choice of targets and modus operandi, including the condi-

tions which would persuade them to change their target area and acting on what they say, may help to reduce the likelihood of displacement occurring (Bennett and Wright, 1984). Similarly monitoring changes in crime patterns over time can help to identify the occurrence of displacement thus enabling practitioners to act accordingly.

APPENDIX 1. LIST OF NATIONAL EXPERTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROJECT

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159

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE AD HOC EXPERT MEETING ON THE DRAFT MANUAL ON CRIME PREVENTION, WOODLANDS PARK, November 25-26, 1989

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APPENDIX 3.

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON "PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME", MOSCOW, 28 February - 2 March 1990.

1) OPENING STATEMENT BY MINISTER VLADIMIR V. BAKATIN, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, USSR.

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen! Comrades!

On behalf of the Soviet government allow me to welcome all the participants of the International seminar on practical strategies for the prevention of crime, and wish you success in your work.

This is the first time that the USSR Ministry of Interior has organized such a representative international forum. We hope that this will not be an illustration of the Russian proverb: "the first pancake is always a failure".

In the social arena, the Soviet Union supports the promotion of the role of the United Nations which is increasingly demonstrating its unique ability to promote peace and security. The position of our state on these problems is expressed in detail in a speech delivered by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Gorbachev, before the United Nations at the end of 1988.

We seek active cooperation in the framework of this organization through practical actions, including prime prevention. With this aim in mind, the Assistant Secretary-General, Director-General of the UN Office at Vienna Ms. Margaret Anstee and I signed a Memorandum on mutual understanding on questions of cooperation in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. The Memorandum has envisaged the expansion and strengthening of contacts among the USSR and Ministry of Interior

162

and the UN office at Vienna, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI).

The present seminar marks the first step in the realization of these agreements. Both the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the UN Office at Vienna and HEUNI participated in its preparation.

I would like to thank, for its cooperation and assistance, our partner in the organization of the seminar, the Helsinki Institute, headed by Mr. Joutsen. We hope that this cooperation shall be further expanded and strengthened.

We also express our appreciation to the rapporteur of the seminar, Mr. John Graham, for the difficult task of drafting the manual on crime prevention strategies. It is on the basis of this manual that the seminar participants have a sound basis for discussions, the exchange of opinions and recommendations on important problems reflecting national and international experience in this field.

The idea of creating a common European home is winning a growing number of supporters. I believe that our seminar will have a modest contribution of its own to the preparation of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and also to the process of European cooperation in general.

Already during the early 1960s, the principle of the priority of crime control was officially recognized as being the main focus in the general concept of law enforcement activity in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, little was done in this respect. We now harvest the bitter fruits of our own inaction.

163

We must acknowledge quite openly that we are not satisfied with the system of organization, nor the effectiveness, of crime prevention, with its social, operative and service aspects. In this respect, many good decisions have been made and mobilizing slogans developed in general. However, it is not mere words, but only practical actions and the law that gives real substance and precision to the social and preventive system, and clear norms to regulate its activity in the interests of many and humanity, of social justice.

Now the times are changing. Perestroika determines changes. Deep processes are under way to develop humanitarian democratic socialism in our country. This is precisely the way the matter is expressed in the CPSU CC Platform to the XXVIII Party Congress. The democratic process of perestroika encompassing economic, political and social aspects is underway. Personal freedom is recognized to be the main value in life.

Legal guarantees of civil rights and freedoms are formed and strengthened. Any anachronisms and limitations on rights and freedoms resulting from executive and administrative systems are abolished.

Remnants of this system exist and may continue, because we are now at the revolutionary stage of perestroika in our social relations. This period is difficult for society. There are illnesses of growth and resistance from conservative forces. There are real shortcomings in the democratic culture.

I am not a person who uses military terminology in the sphere of law enforcement. Even so, I find it possible to say that in order to protect and guarantee personal rights and freedoms, we as law enforcement agencies badly need a united front with various cultural, religious and other public forces, as well as scientific knowledge. All these are needed for humane and effective prevention of crime.

The executive and administrative systems are loosening, weakening and destroying these connections and influences. We are restoring, renewing and reforming them as weapons to combat crime, and rehabilitate and reeducate convicted criminals.

We know of the democratic and humanitarian achievements of the home countries of many of the participants at the seminar, and their success in the fight to preserve rights and personal freedoms. We are ready to draw from the accumulated experience and the large arsenal of international legal norms as we renew our society.

This is why we attach special importance to the seminar and welcome the forthcoming exchange of experience, ideas, and opinions.

Together with this we value cooperation in the law enforcement sphere in two closely related aspects: the national and international levels. Without broad development of international cooperation in modern condition it is impossible to effectively control crime which is growing and acquiring a transnational nature, especially in such dangerous forms as terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. If we are to speak about mutual practical actions, cooperation within the framework of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) is of growing importance for us. Interpol has many merits as the organizer and coordinator of practical actions.

Such wide-ranging international cooperation is the reflection of the new way of thinking and of the practice of restructuring, especially at its initial stage.

A great amount of work is being carried out now in drafting new laws, and also in the fields of criminal procedure and corrective-labour legislation. This is being done in conformity with common international principles, norms and standards.

The process of restructuring has given rise to many negative phenomena and a considerable number of problems in our country. The period of transition to a qualita-

tively new state of economic and social development is accompanied by an aggravation of social tension, the growth of inflation and a shortage in consumer goods.

The crime rate is also on the rise. In 1988 the crime rate increased by 3,8%, and in 1989 it sky-rocketed by 31,8%. During a one-year period, the crime rate increased from 657 to 862 per 100,000 in population. The increase is especially high in the area of property and violent crimes.

The criminal situation in the country is such that we can not hope for a decrease in the crime rate in the near future. The problems of combatting crime were in the forefront of the minds of the USSR Peoples' deputies at the First and Second Congresses.

To implement the decisions of the 2nd Congress of Peoples' Deputies, "On the strengthening of crime control", the Ministry of Internal Affairs has developed a wide range of measures with a view toward strengthening law and order in the country, toward combatting crimes against persons, and organized crime.

In the field of crime control much is being done to raise the standards of social, state, and legal systems of crime prevention. The "Basis of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on Crime Prevention" is being worked on at present. It is very important to ensure (through cooperation of different agencies) the fulfilment of economic, social, legal and educational measures to determine and eliminate the root causes and conditions leading to crime. We must also encourage the population to take an active part in crime prevention, with measures for personal and property security.

The issues of top priority are juvenile and youth crime prevention, the prevention of repeat offences, violent, economic, professional, and organized crimes, as well as measures for controlling alcohol and drug addiction.

166

The wide range of activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs include the task of up-dating operational crime-prevention measures. The development and implementation of fundamental and applied research in these fields also fall within the scope of the function of the Ministry.

The aims and problems of crime prevention in our country are in complete accord with the agenda of the international seminar.

This theme is of actual importance for all nations. That is why it is rated first in the agenda of the Eighth United Nations Congress on crime prevention and treatment of offenders.

Once again I would like to emphasize our wish to strengthen and deepen international cooperation in the field of crime prevention at all possible levels: within the framework of the United Nations Organization, at intergovernmental and nongovernmental levels, bilaterally, and multilaterally.

We fully appreciate the importance and significance of international cooperation in the restructuring of Soviet law enforcement organs, including internal affairs bodies.

All of we scientists and practitioners working in the field of law enforcement in different countries can and shall show our mutual determination to actively combat crime in the world. I am deeply convinced that coordinated efforts can bring good results at the national, regional and international levels.

Scientists representing different international and national organizations and institutes are present here. Strategies of crime prevention have the common basis of humanitarian values and moral principles. I hope that the results and ideas of the discussions will make it possible to develop scientifically sound strategies for crime prevention.

Some heads and representatives of the national law enforcement bodies are also taking part in the seminar. The exchange of opinions will enrich their practical experience, thus permitting constructive coordination of their efforts in the complex and comprehensive activities of crime prevention.

I wish you, dear colleagues, success in your work. Accept my best wishes and welcome to our country.

Thank you for your attention.

2) OPENING STATEMENT BY DIRECTOR OF HEUNI, MATTI JOUTSEN.

Mr. Chairman, Your excellency Mr. Minister, Distinguished participants, Ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of one of the two co-organizers of this Seminar, the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI), I would like to begin by thanking Minister Vadim Victorovich Bakatin for his kind introductory remarks.

I would also wish to express the appreciation of HEUNI to the chairman of the Organization Committee, Deputy Minister Nikolai Ivanovich Demidov, under whose guidance we have succeeded in carrying out the complex arrangements for such a high-level international seminar as this. All the preparations have been carried out in a most constructive and warm atmosphere, at the highest levels of both expertise and friendship.

The fact that we have been able to cooperate with such knowledgeable and internationally recognized experts has ensured us that the arrangements in Moscow have been in good hands indeed. I am sure that all participants have already been impressed with the care and attention that has been paid to all arrangements.

Finally, in respect to the arrangements, I wish to express the gratitude of HEUNI to Mr. John Graham, General Victor Djumaievitch Rezvykh and Director Jan van Dijk for assuming the responsibility for substantive preparation of the major portions of the programme. In particular, as stressed already by Minister Bakatin, Mr. Graham's pioneering and expert work in preparing a draft manual on crime prevention measures provides a practical and constructive contribution to the work of the United Nations.

Historically, the United Nations has had a leading role in international crime prevention and control. However, the discussions have focused largely on the treatment of offenders. Although themes such as "the prevention of juvenile delinquency" and "community crime prevention" can be found on the agenda of the Congress and ancillary meetings, an examination of what was actually discussed shows that prevention has been understood as an offender-based activity focusing on rehabilitation and the development of social welfare and educational measures -- certainly important issues in themselves, but only part of crime prevention as we understand it today. The discussions have also been remarkably short of practical guidance to practitioners and policymakers when it comes to making decisions on specific features of community development, environmental design or victim assistance -- practical assistance which Minister Bakatin noted was needed in the USSR, but which is equally needed in all the countries.

The discussions at the Seventh United Nations Congress in Milan in 1985 showed that this narrow approach was beginning to widen. Environmental design and victim assistance received increasing attention. Even more encouraging was the increased attention paid to the need for the United Nations to provide practical assistance to Member States on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders. This was reflected in the specific request of the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control for an inventory of practical measures in crime prevention, and for guidelines on the prevention of juvenile crime. We shall be discussing the response to these requests this week.

Why, however, did the committee call for guidelines? The United Nations has been heavily involved in a number of forms of activities, including the development of international standards and norms, the development of model agreements, the provision of technical assistance, the production, the collection and dissemination of information, and the promotion of research and training.

The hesitancy of the United Nations to develop guidelines is understandable. The over 150 Member States of the United Nations represent a great number of different legal, economic, social, and cultural systems. Furthermore, the individual circumstances of the commission of crime and the flow of a criminal case through the system vary so greatly, that it is difficult to state in the space of brief guidelines how matters should be planned and decided. It is easier to provide, for example, minimum standards and norms.

However, experience and research have shown that, despite the great variety in systems and circumstances, certain patterns are repeated. For example, burglaries tend to be committed when the target building is deserted, entry is easy and there is a low perceived risk of apprehension. Much of this is common sense. However, much is learned only through experience and research. When this is pooled through international exchange -- as shall be occurring through the following week -- very useful guidelines can be worked out, to the benefit of all parties concerned.

The organizing committee has sought to invite the most eminent experts in practical crime prevention. Reviewing the list of participants, including not only the top level of crime prevention organizations from a number of countries but also distinguished members of the United Nations Committee, directors and representatives of the United Nations Institutes, the Council of Europe, INTERPOL and the major international organizations in crime prevention and control, it is clear that we have succeeded. I am looking forward to most fruitful and constructive discussions.

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179

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APPENDIX 4. LIST OF CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVES

The Yale Child Study Center Programme, USA

The Oregon Social Learning Center, USA

The Perry Pre-school Project, USA

The Prejop Project, the Netherlands

The House of Umoja, USA

The School Safety Project, France

The Pathe Project, USA

The Ete-Jeunes Programme, France

The Wincroft Project, England

The Rotterdam Shopping Centre Project, the Netherlands

Youth Action, UK

Mission Locales, France

Publicity Campaigns in the Netherlands

Operation Identification, Sweden and UK

The Portage La Prairie Project, Canada

The V.I.C. Project, the Netherlands

The Pecs Project, Hungary

Rural Crime Watch, Canada

The Guardian Angels, USA and Canada

The Chicago Project, USA

Neighbourhood Watch, England

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Canada

The Heron Gate Project, Canada

The Kirkholt Project, England

The Breda Public Housing Project, the Netherlands

The Eisenhower Neighbourhood Programme, USA

Sosjale Joenits, the Netherlands

Crime Prevention Through Integration, France

The Corporate Approach in Wolverhampton, UK

Crime Prevention By Committee, Denmark

Safer Cities, UK

Cops Project, Canada

The Newport News Initiative, USA

The Enquete Commission, Federal Republic of Germany

School Vandalism Demonstration Project, England

The Anti-Crime Programme, USA

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189

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