


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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION		DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRESS REPORT	
GRANTEE Board of Trustees University of Illinois	LEAA GRANT NO. 80-MU-AX-K007	DATE OF REPORT 6/30/85	REPORT Final
IMPLEMENTING SUBGRANTEE NA	TYPE OF REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> REGULAR <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL REQUEST <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FINAL REPORT		
SHORT TITLE OF PROJECT National Program Coordinator Jail Removal Initiative		GRANT AMOUNT \$5,558,000	
REPORT IS SUBMITTED FOR THE PERIOD		THROUGH	
SIGNATURE OF PROJECT DIRECTOR <i>James W. Brown</i>		TYPED NAME & TITLE OF PROJECT DIRECTOR James W. Brown, Director Community Research Center	
COMMENCE REPORT HERE (Add continuation pages as required.) See attached report.			
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to briefly summarize and highlight the findings and implications of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's Jail Removal Initiative. The JRI was undertaken as a direct response to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. Section 223(a)(13) of the Act, as amended, provides that juveniles should not be detained or confined in any institution in which they have regular contact with adult incarcerated persons because such adults have been convicted of a crime or are awaiting trial on criminal charges.

The Act was amended by Congress because of increasing evidence that youths placed in adult settings are subject to physical and emotional trauma not associated with secure juvenile detention. For example, jails lack the services and staff necessary to adequately address the needs of juveniles in detention. Physical harassment and assault of juveniles by adult inmates has been documented. Oftentimes, the only recourse jailers have to prevent physical abuses is to place juveniles in solitary confinement. Unfortunately emotional abuse results from the sensory deprivation associated with isolated confinement. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the half million juveniles jailed annually are accused of committing property or minor offenses. Nearly one-fifth are jailed for status offenses--acts not considered crimes when committed by adults (Community Research Center, 1980). Mere separation of juveniles from adult offenders does not guarantee that children held in jails will receive the services essential to their well-being. Also, efforts to separate within an adult facility often result in costly renovation which still does not fulfill the needs of the court or the

child. Finally, with all these factors creating additional stress, the suicide rate for youths in adult jail has been documented to be at least eight times greater than for those placed in juvenile detention (CRC, 1980).

Many jurisdictions are aware of the need for jail removal, but are faced with serious obstacles which hinder complete success. State statutes and juvenile codes often allow juveniles to be held. It is particularly difficult for rural jurisdictions to accomplish removal because of a lack of existing alternatives to jail, lengthy travel times between cities, and relatively small economic bases. Recognizing this need, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention provided 5.58 million dollars to the National Jail Removal Initiative. The purpose of the Initiative was to offer both financial and technical resources to assist jurisdictions in planning and implementing viable alternatives to adult jails and lockups and alter policies and practices which allowed juvenile jailing. Beyond the major goal of jail removal, there also existed at least ten important objectives which all participants hoped to accomplish. The objectives include:

- one hundred percent removal of juveniles from adult jails;
- implementation of specific and objective local intake criteria;
- the development of viable alternatives to secure confinement;
- no significant increases in failures to appear for court and rearrest rates;
- no significant increase in waivers to adult courts;
- minimizing inappropriate widening of the system net;
- measuring the adequacy of the Initiative's program and service projection technique;

- obtaining local financial support for the continuation of jail removal plans;
- the implementation of policies and procedures to prohibit jailing juveniles.


Through this summary, program successes and failures will be reviewed as they pertain to the project objectives.

PARTICIPATING SITES

The Jail Removal Initiative began in January of 1981 and eventually involved 23 jurisdictions in 12 states, each funded at an average of \$200,000 (see Figure One). One hundred seventy county jails were involved, including all in the States of South Carolina and Hawaii. The types of agencies participating in the Initiative were varied—local juvenile courts, regional youth service and planning agencies, shelter programs, state Division of Youth Services agencies, and the juvenile courts of Native American tribal councils, were all interested in jail removal and heavily involved in JRI.

In 1980, the JRI sites combined to jail a total of 8,955 juveniles, the fewest being 11 at one Indian reservation, the greatest being 2,178 in the State of South Carolina. Jailing rates, as a percentage of all intakes or arrests, varied just as significantly, from less than three percent to 100 percent of the population. Of the juveniles jailed, 98 percent were not "serious crime" offenders as defined by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (section 103(14)). Status offenders comprised 33 percent of the population, and nonoffenders nearly six percent. Six percent were children age 12 or younger.

JAIL REMOVAL INITIATIVE SITES



Makah Tribal Council, Neah Bay*

Metro Criminal Justice Planning, Portland
The Boys and Girls Aid Society of Oregon, Portland

Blackfeet Law and Order Commission, Browning*

Division of Youth Services, Grand Junction**

Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted County Corrections System, Rochester

The Village of Bolingbrook, Bolingbrook

Greater Egypt Regional Planning and Development Commission, Carbondale

Gateway Area Development District, Owingsville**

South Carolina Division of Public Safety Programs, Columbia

Lee County Juvenile Court, Opelika +
Southeast Alabama Youth Services, Dothan

Western Arkansas County Judges, Ozark
Ozark Mountain Arkansas Rural Repton, Yellville

Samaritan House, Inc., Franklin

The Judiciary, Lihue**

Arizona Department of Corrections, Phoenix**
Tribal Councils
Fort Mohave
Fort Mojave
Navasupai
Hopi*
Hualapai
Salt River
San Carlos*
White Mountain*

*Sites eligible and accepted for the removal exception.
**Sites using a portion of their money for a project evaluation of jail removal.

The large number of jailings reported by each site are an indication of only a portion of their overall problem, since a majority of jails did not provide adequate sight and sound separation of juveniles from adult offenders. At the onset of the Initiative, three of the jails were condemned buildings and ten were under court order for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Furthermore, two facilities had recently experienced juvenile suicides.

Nearly all of the JRI sites were primarily rural in composition and characterized by physical, economic, and geographic obstacles not associated with large urban sites. To begin, few alternatives to jail existed. Services were limited basically to shelter care at selected sites and probation services. When available, secure detention served delinquent-type offenders and chronic status offenders. The nonsecure services were generally predisposed to serve only abused children. Only one site provided comprehensive intake screening while emergency foster care and transportation services were available but sporadically used.

The rural nature of most sites resulted in generally low tax bases, presenting economic obstacles difficult to overcome. Low average per capita income levels, and bonds and referendums aimed at other highly visible issues, made the task of convincing officials of the need for jail alternatives difficult, especially since the jailing option can appear cost effective. Geographic conditions also hindered removal efforts. Transportation to alternative services or placements was difficult because of lengthy travel distances (including mountainous conditions) between cities. In some jurisdictions legal obstacles impeded success. State juvenile codes were often

vague and open to interpretation while some state rules allowed the jailing of juveniles under certain conditions. Oftentimes legislated detention criteria were loose and not followed. Inappropriate perception of service needs also hindered removal. Many participants stressed detention construction as a viable and necessary solution even though such action is very expensive and usually not required.

The realization that each obstacle represented a major hurdle in accomplishing total jail removal, along with a desire to commit to the goals of the project, inspired the sites to participate in the Initiative. The amount of success achieved varied widely according to the number and quality of services eventually offered by each jurisdiction. Following is a presentation of the plan design and the findings associated with the participants' attempts to accomplish total jail removal.

PROJECT DESIGN

Program Strategy

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awarded funds to a National Program Coordinator for the purpose of administering the Jail Removal Initiative. The role of the NPC included acting as a conduit for funds to the appropriate planning agencies involved. Additional assistance was required in several areas of the project, i.e., data collection and analysis, training, designing survey instruments, facilitating community and citizen participation, developing alternative programs and services, and program implementation.

The NPC, while assisting jurisdictions in planning for removal, was guided by three basic precepts as factors in placement decision-making: (1) the decision to place a juvenile in a residential facility should be determined by objective and specific criteria; (2) a residential program must be viewed within the context of a network of alternative programs directed toward the use of the least restrictive setting for each youth; and (3) the development of residential programs should be viewed from the perspective of the young persons who will be housed there--the Act mandates an advocacy posture and consideration must be sought from citizens, advocates, and youths if workable alternatives are to be used.

To properly address these precepts, the NPC used a planning methodology which allowed each jurisdiction to arrive at its own solution for jail removal. The planning process involved six sequential steps:

1. Organize for planning. Identify problems, establish advisory boards, establish criteria, establish data collection methodology, and devise timetable.
2. Assess needs. Survey the juvenile justice system and determine its capabilities and deficiencies. Apply the proposed admission criteria to the intake population to identify bedspace needs.
3. Obtain public input. Publicize the needs assessment results to solicit citizen response and gain community support.
4. Establish policy and develop plan. Prepare a plan for action. Based on needs analysis and solicited comments.
5. Implement plan. Develop secure and nonsecure residential programs according to plan for removal of juveniles from adult jails.
6. Monitor system. Establish a monitoring mechanism to insure that the goals of the plan are achieved as intended and to identify program areas which may need adjustments.

At the heart of the plan was the development of equitable and objective detention criteria. Prior studies have shown that carefully constructed intake criteria, based on offense, legal history, and legal status, can reduce the use of secure detention without increasing the danger to public safety or the court process. Application of criteria at intake will remove individual worker biases and subjectivity by preventing nonlegal issues from entering the decision-making process.

In order to assess the impact which newly constructed detention criteria will have in a jurisdiction, a needs assessment was performed. Needs were determined by use of a survey in which the detention criteria developed earlier were applied to the intake population. The technique allowed the planning committee to determine the number of juveniles eligible for secure and nonsecure placement if the criteria were actually in use. When combined with information on average length-of-stay, the average daily population could be calculated. After adjusting for daily, weekly, and seasonal fluctuations in the size of the intake population, the total number of secure and nonsecure beds necessary to adequately fulfill a jurisdiction's detention needs was ascertained. The totals were examined in light of existing resources and additional bedspace was built or contracted for if required.

The NPC selected a two-phased approach to implement the six planning steps outlined above. It was during Phase I that the local jurisdictions, with the assistance of the state planning agencies and the NPC, accomplished Steps I through IV and developed a systematic strategy for accomplishing jail removal. Approximately six to eight months were allotted to complete the first phase. Phase II, which lasted 18 months, was used to complete Steps V

and VI of the planning process. It was here that plans were implemented for those jurisdictions whose planning process and survey results indicated the need for program and service alternatives. OJJDP allocated approximately \$200,000 per jurisdiction to assist in carrying out the plans devised during Phase I.

PHASE I FINDINGS

Phase I of the Initiative was conducted over approximately six months beginning in January of 1981. With technical assistance and other support from the NPC, each site undertook a process consisting of problem definition, assessment, and policy plan and development.

During Phase I participants set about to better understand the Initiative and address the problems associated with removal. Each site reviewed their local jailing situations, juvenile codes, pretrial placement practices, and available alternative programs, focusing on whether or their systems provided the following:

- Supervision programs in the home.
- Emergency foster care, shelter care and independent living arrangements.
- Crisis intervention services and conflict mediation.
- Objective and specific intake criteria for juveniles placed in secure and nonsecure facilities.
- Policies and procedures which presumed released to the home rather than custody, provided safeguards with due process, and were aimed at maintaining a juvenile's ties with the family.
- Some level of coordination and cooperation between law enforcement officials, the court sector, public and private service providers in dealing with juvenile offenders.

- A flexible network of services or programs to begin working with.
- Twenty-four hour intake screening services.
- Some option of secure detention other than adult jails.

Identifying the strengths was as important as finding system weaknesses since strengths provided a tangible basis from which to work. Phase I was also used to gauge actual versus perceived local commitment to jail removal and the broader issue of curtailing inappropriate secure confinement so that strategies to increase commitment could be devised in sites with low commitment.

Available Resources

The resource inventory conducted during Phase I indicated that services and placement options necessary for accomplishing jail removal were sparse. In the 23 participating jurisdictions only seven had a secure juvenile detention facility for eligible youths. Nonsecure emergency services were limited also--nine sites had shelter homes, seven had emergency foster care, and none supported home detention programs. Only one participating jurisdiction had a formal system for administering 24-hour intake criteria. Crisis intervention was available and used in only one jurisdiction. Transportation services, although available in eight jurisdictions, were used only sporadically. What the resource inventory showed, then, was that the jailing of youthful offenders was not due only to operational procedures, but was also influenced significantly by the lack of appropriate alternatives and services among the sites.

Perhaps the most important aspect in the initial phase of the JRI was the needs assessment. It was here that data were collected over a representative time period in order to obtain information on those juveniles arrested, referred to court, or both. Information was gathered on offense, legal history, and legal status at the time of intake. Not only did the data provide a profile of the juveniles in the local justice system, but when weighed against proposed detention criteria, a reliable estimate of secure and nonsecure detention needs was also obtained. Of course, a certain portion of the juveniles arrested were placed in out-of-home settings, and these placements had to be scrutinized to determine the appropriateness of the setting selected. The survey was the tool used to collect all the intake, court, and placement decision data during Phase I. This information was combined with the results of the resource inventory to identify gaps in the existing system and produce the subsequent plan.

Findings from the needs assessment indicated that nearly 9,000 juveniles were held in county jails and lockups among the 23 participating sites. Status offenders comprised 41 percent of the jailed population, charged usually with being a runaway or possessing alcohol. Three percent were charged with no crime at all. Serious crime offenders, as defined by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, represented only two percent of the jailings. The remainder were less serious felony-type offenders and those charged with a misdemeanor.

Interestingly, the aggregate age of the jailed population was younger than anticipated—ten percent were less than 13 years of age. Fifteen and 16 year olds made up the greatest proportion of those held. Males comprised 70

percent of the total. Because of the heavy involvement of Native American Tribal Reservations in the Initiative, a majority (59 percent) of detainees were Indian. Most of the remainder were white (36 percent). Blacks and other minorities comprised only five percent of the total.

Although a majority of juveniles placed outside of their parent's home preceding an adjudication hearing were jailed, there was still a significant number of youths detained in other settings. Seven jurisdictions placed 1,815 youths in detention centers. Nonsecure placements were rare, with only 707 juveniles detained in five jurisdictions. As a proportion of all law enforcement contacts, jail was the primary out-of-home placement option—the 8,955 juvenile jailings represented 32.5 percent of all intakes. Despite a propensity toward jailings, unconditional release to parents or guardians was the overwhelming pretrial option. There were 44 percent more releases recorded in Phase I than jailings. JRI participants hoped to make this difference even greater during Phase II of the project by increasing releases and decreasing jailings.

Application of proposed admissions criteria to the intake population allowed the sites to determine the appropriateness of the detention setting when weighing factors such as the severity of the offense and past record of delinquent behavior. Juveniles who were placed in a setting, but were not eligible for that setting, were recorded as a "criteria deviations." The measure allowed each site to examine the use of admissions criteria in their jurisdictions and determine where adjustments and additional training to reduce placement abuses need to occur.

Criteria deviation rates varied as greatly as did actual jailing rates-- from as low as zero percent of all detentions to greater than 90 percent. The overall deviation rate for Phase I was 59.7 percent. Care must be taken when interpreting these figures because there are actually two types of deviations. The first deviation type is that for placement type. Under this definition, a criteria deviation occurs whenever a youth is placed in an adult jail or lockup regardless of his or her eligibility for such security. The second deviation type occurs according to placement level--that is, the amount of security suggested for a juvenile according to the proposed intake criteria. The latter of these is presented here and referred to as a "criteria deviation." It is given that placement of a juvenile in an adult jail is contrary to the objectives of the Initiative, and measurement of deviations to placement type is a straightforward task; it is simply a tabulation of total jailings. However, the measurement of deviations to placement levels is more sophisticated and can only be accomplished by surveying the intake population. Identification of these deviation types is critical to project success, since it provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the criteria and intake personnels' use and understanding of it.

The JRI criteria deviation statistics show that not only were many youths placed in adult jails and lockups, but that their automatic transfer from the jails to secure juvenile detention centers was also not a suitable solution. The needs assessment indicated that not all jailed youths were eligible for such a strict level of security--only 40 percent of all secure detainees were eligible under locally developed intake criteria. The needs assessment proved that jail removal is not a one dimensional issue; it does not involve merely

reducing the number of youths placed in adult settings. Instead, it involved producing a plan which took into account the total juvenile system, using existing resources and creating new alternatives to improve detention practices. At the the conclusion of Phase I, Initiative participants had developed viable removal plans based not only on reducing jail placements, but also on the philosophy that a well-developed and integrated network of services and placement options was the key to project success. The individual planning strategies usually revolved around the development of an intake screening system and guidelines, access to secure and nonsecure residential care, supervision while on release, and transportation services.

PHASE II FINDINGS

In January of 1982, Phase II of the JRI began. Over the next 18 months, participating sites implemented the plans devised during Phase I and gradually developed the core of alternatives deemed necessary for reducing the number of juvenile jailings and subsequently improving all pretrial detention practices. During the last 12 months of Phase II, JRI jurisdictions were able to reduce the number of jailings by 55 percent (Table One). Even after adjusting for the reduced number of intakes between Phase I and Phase II, there was still nearly a 45 percent overall reduction in jailing rates. Though fewer youths were placed in jails, there was only a slight increase in secure juvenile detention placements. Figure One shows that only ten more juveniles were placed in secure detention during the last year of the JRI than were placed in the setting during the year prior to the Initiative. An adjustment for the reduction in the number of intakes still yields a net increase of only 20

TABLE ONE
CHANGE IN JAILING RATES

Setting	Preceding Initiative*		During Initiative**		Percentage Change	Adjusted Change***
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		
Adult Jail	8,955	32.5	4,029	18.0	-55.0	-44.6
Secure Juvenile Detention	1,815	6.6	1,825	8.1	+0.5	+19.5
Total Secure Placements	10,770	39.1	5,854	26.1	-45.6	-32.9
Nonsecure Detention	707	2.6	2,407	10.7	+240.4	+318.6
Release	16,040	58.3	14,118	63.1	-11.9	+8.2
Totals	27,517		22,379		-18.7	

*January 1, 1985-December 31, 1980.

**July 1, 1982-June 30, 1983--The last four reporting quarters of the JRI.

***Presents percentage increase or decrease after adjusting for the decrease in intakes.

percent in secure juvenile detentions. When jailings are combined with secure juvenile detentions, there remains an overall gross reduction of 45.6 percent and net reduction of nearly 33 percent in all secure placements. The findings of the Phase I needs assessment were verified during plan implementation--not all juveniles currently in jail warrant any type of secure detention. Apparently, judicious application of negotiated intake criteria, heightened awareness of the purpose of out-of-home preadjudicatory custody, and availability of less restrictive alternatives have contributed to this success.

Had practices and policies not been altered, many of the juveniles who would have been securely detained in Phase II were placed instead in nonsecure detention or released outright. In fact there was a substantial increase in the number of nonsecure placements, from about 700 in 1980 to about 2,400 in 1983. The 300 percent net increase was due primarily to increased use of emergency shelter care. The importance of the total systems planning approach is reflected in the number of releases recorded for Phase II. Even though the actual number of releases declined by approximately 2,000 youths, there was a net increase in releases of eight percent after accounting for the reduction in the number of total intakes. This finding can be attributed to the planning approach taken by Initiative participants. Had jail removal itself been their only objective, jailings might have been reduced without the added benefit of increased releases. The jurisdictions realized that not all of the youths previously jailed required such a high level of security, which is reflected in the increase in nonsecure placements and releases.

Reviewing each case for its appropriate detention setting and implementing a viable network of alternatives has produced a reduction in juvenile

jailings without an unacceptably large increase in secure juvenile detention placements. At the same time, there has been a decrease in the number of inappropriate placements. During the needs assessment phase of the JRI, it was found that of all youths placed in a secure setting (whether juvenile or adult), only 40 percent of those placements would have been legitimate under each site's proposed intake criteria. The criteria deviation rate ranged from none to greater than 90 percent. Eight of the 15 jurisdictions for which adequate needs assessment data were available had deviation rates greater than 50 percent. Conversely, by the completion of the JRI, the overall rate of deviations to criteria dropped in half to less than 29 percent of all intakes. Of those sites which reported using secure juvenile detention during the evaluation phase, 13 of 20 had deviation rates of less than 50 percent. Even of the remaining seven jurisdictions, there were fewer actual deviations since five of the seven had less than 15 secure detentions during Phase II.

Less restrictive nonsecure placements (mainly shelter care) served as the alternative placement for many juveniles previously jailed yet not held in secure detention during the Initiative. In the aggregate, nonsecure detention numbers increased by 240 percent between pre- and post-JRI figures. When the totals are adjusted for the decrease in the number of intakes, the net increase in nonsecure placements rises substantially to 319 percent. Although the increase observed for nonsecure placements is startling, the figure is somewhat misleading because of the limited use of such services prior to the JRI. In 1980, only five of the 23 participating sites used nonsecure placement as a pretrial option, accounting for only 2.6 percent of all intakes. By the end of the Initiative, 20 of the 23 jurisdictions had implemented

nonsecure alternatives, 15 percent of all cases were placed in the new option. Therefore, the 319 percent increase is due at least as much to the small number of placements prior to the Initiative as to the success the sites had in increasing nonsecure usage. It is interesting to note that prior to the JRI, secure placements in both adult and juvenile settings clearly outnumbered nonsecure (39.1 percent versus 2.6 percent of all intakes). In the last 12-month period of the evaluation phase, that gap had narrowed considerably (26.2 percent in secure settings versus 10.8 percent in nonsecure placement options--see Table One).

Despite fears that the removal of juveniles from adult jails and lockups would result in the transfer of serious juvenile offenders to less restrictive alternatives, it has generally not been the case. There was a surprisingly high deviation rate to locally developed criteria of 37.4 percent. However, this result is biased by the high deviation rate of one jurisdiction which reported 88 percent of all nonsecure placements were not within criteria guidelines. Examining each jurisdiction individually provides a more accurate description of nonsecure placements. Overall, 11 of the 17 sites with comparable data had inappropriate nonsecure detention in less than 50 percent of the placements. In fact, seven were able to keep nonsecure deviation rates at less than ten percent. Southeast Alabama Youth Services, one of two Alabama participants, had only one criteria deviation in 130 nonsecure placements. Just as with secure detention placements, there was a wide variety of deviation rates, from zero to 88 percent. Those sites with the lowest deviation rates owe it to strict adherence to the nonsecure admissions criteria developed for use in their jurisdictions.

Another highlight of the JRI is the change in rates of release between the period preceding the Initiative and during it. Although there was a slight decrease in the number of juveniles released to their parents at intake, an adjustment for the decrease in total intakes indicates a net increase in total releases. Prior to the Initiative, released rates ranged from zero (three sites) to greater than 90 percent (one site) with an average for the whole project of 58 percent. Less than half (12 of 23) of the participating jurisdictions released 50 percent or greater of all intakes. Conversely, the release rate increased to 63 percent during the Initiative. Even though release rates of greater than 50 percent were found again in 12 of 23 sites, the distribution moved upward--releases of greater than 90 percent occurred in three sites while no releases were found in one project site.

Comparing assessment data with monitoring evaluation data is interesting, but useful only to a limited degree. The aggregate figures can be misleading due to disparities in site characteristics. The size of a single JRI site can bias the aggregate results due simply to the number of cases involved. South Carolina, for example, had 19 percent of the Phase II intakes and 41 percent of the juvenile jailings. These numbers serve to hide the successes of other sites when all data are considered together. Removing South Carolina's figures from final tabulations decreases Phase II jailings to 2,390 and results in a reduction in jailings of 65 percent for the remaining sites. Therefore, in order to properly assess the outcome of the Initiative, it is important to examine the successes and failures of the jurisdictions individually.

By the final reporting quarter of Phase II, a total of eight jurisdictions had reduced the number of jailed juveniles to none. Conversely, only one site had a net increase in the number of jailings. Of the remaining jurisdictions, each was successful in reducing jailings to varying degrees, from 25 percent to 98 percent when compared to pre-JRI figures. (See Tables Two and Three for site comparisons.)

These reductions can be examined in another manner. Comparisons between data sets (needs assessment versus monitoring) are useful for analyzing improvements in placement decisions, but comparisons within the evaluation data over time provides additional insight. It is found, for example, that of the sites which did not complete total removal by the end of Phase II, a majority did reduce jailings as the Initiative progressed. Even though the Hopi Indian Reservation had a net increase in jailings of nearly 40 percent as measured in Phase II, they were still able to reduce jailings by 85 percent between the third reporting period of the monitoring phase and the final reporting period. Other jurisdictions had similar results: the Salt River Tribe reduced jailings during Phase II by 53 percent; the White Mountain Tribe reduced jailings by 78 percent over the same time period; and the Colorado Division of Youth Services Initiative, which appears initially to be only slightly successful at reducing jailings actually removed 58 percent by the end of the evaluation phase. These findings are a graphic indication that jail removal and detention improvements are not necessarily an instantaneous accomplishment. Instead, as alternative placements and services are implemented and system adjustments occur, project goals and objectives can be met gradually over time.

TABLE TWO
CHANGES IN JAILING RATES

	Total Jailings		Decrease in Jailings	
	Prior to Initiative	During Initiative	Percent	Adjusted Percent+
Lee County, Alabama	76	1*	98.7	98.6
Southeast Alabama Youth Services	109	0	100.0	100.0
Arizona:				
Fort Mojave	11	3*	72.7	31.8
Havasupai	12	5*	58.3	39.3
Hopi	55	78	+29.5	+39.0
Hualapai	60	31	48.3	19.0
Salt River/Fort McDowell	341	101	70.4	63.4
San Carlos	512	13	97.5	92.8
White Mountain	745	347	53.4	31.3
Western Arkansas County Judges	140	2	85.0	78.0
Ozark Mountain Arkansas Rural Region	92	14	84.8	77.3
Division of Youth Services, Colorado	802	393	51.0	37.6
The Judiciary, Hawaii	48	4*	91.7	89.0
Bolingbrook, Illinois	22	0	100.0	100.0
Greater Egypt Regional Planning and Development Commission, Illinois	234	146	37.6	33.0
Gateway Area Development District, Kentucky	420	173	59.0	46.0
Samaritan House, Louisiana	120	20	83.0	82.7
Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System, Minnesota	799	523	34.5	23.0
Blackfeet Tribal Council, Montana	696	502	28.0	7.7
Boys and Girls Aid Society of Oregon	629	0	100.0	100.0
Metro Criminal Justice Planning, Oregon	782	0	100.0	100.0
South Carolina Division of Public Safety Programs	2,178	1,639	24.7	23.6
Makah Tribal Council, Washington	72	15	79.0	2.0

TABLE THREE
USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO ADULT JAILS AND LOCKUPS
(In Percent of Total Arrests and Petitions)

	Secure Juvenile Detention		Nonsecure Detention		Releases	
	Pre-JRI	JRI	Pre-JRI	JRI	Pre-JRI	JRI
Lee County, Alabama	0.0	1.6	0.0	6.6	90.4	91.7
Southeast Alabama Youth Services	21.8	25.2	4.2	4.2	71.1	70.7
Arizona:						
Fort Mojave	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	45.0	62.5
Havasupai	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	85.0	72.7
Hopi	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	17.9
Hualapai	0.0	0.0	0.0	54.9	20.0	0.0
Salt River/Fort McDowell	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	37.1
San Carlos	0.0	0.0	0.0	72.1	45.3	23.9
White Mountain	0.0	0.6	0.0	23.2	0.0	7.5
Western Arkansas County Judges	0.0	4.4	34.0	23.1	31.0	64.8
Ozark Mountain Arkansas Rural Region	0.0	0.4	3.5	6.3	71.8	87.7
Division of Youth Services, Colorado	0.0	1.3	0.0	7.3	24.2	41.6
The Judiciary, Hawaii	41.7	41.1	47.5	23.6	0.0	34.2
Bolingbrook, Illinois	5.0	2.1	0.0	1.8	87.3	96.1
Greater Egypt Regional Planning and Development Commission, Illinois	3.0	0.1	0.0	1.1	77.3	88.2
Gateway Area Development District, Kentucky	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.8	84.4	89.4
Samaritan House, Louisiana	7.0	8.9	21.8	29.3	57.0	59.4
Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System, Minnesota	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.3	52.4	48.0
Blackfeet Tribal Council, Montana	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.7
Boys and Girls Aid Society of Oregon	0.0	4.3	0.0	3.8	87.2	91.8
Metro Criminal Justice Planning, Oregon	36.9	29.8	0.0	18.8	0.0	51.4
South Carolina Division of Public Safety Programs	5.2	4.9	0.0			

USE OF ALTERNATIVES

As highlighted earlier, a major obstacle to the decreased reliance on adult jail for juvenile pretrial custody was a severe lack of secure and nonsecure alternatives. Recall that continuous intake services, crisis intervention, transportation services, secure juvenile detention, and nonsecure emergency services were either unavailable or underused. The goal of reducing juvenile jailings could only be attained with increased reliance on these placement options and services. Based on the availability of existing resources, and the need expressed for those and additional resources, the 23 JRI jurisdictions used alternative services to varying degrees. Basically, those which employed a successful continuous intake services system and had secure juvenile detention available as needed were most successful in attaining project success.

Table Four presents the number of service and placement alternatives available to sites preceding the JRI and subsequent to plan implementation. Evident from the table is the significant increase in alternatives. Secure juvenile detention, which originally existed in only seven sites, was available in 17 jurisdictions during the Initiative. Similar increases in resource availability can be found for nonsecure placements. The most dramatic improvement occurred in areas of intake screening, crisis intervention, and transportation services, which were developed at varying levels in each jurisdiction.

The extent to which intake services were used was an important factor in dictating project success. Not all participating sites were able to fully screen all juveniles arrested or petitioned which had direct negative

TABLE FOUR
LOCAL PROGRAMS AND SERVICES AVAILABLE

Service	Number of Sites with Option	
	Pre-Initiative	Initiative
24 Hour Intake Screening and Criteria	1	23
Crisis Intervention	1	23
Secure Juvenile Detention:		
Facility	7	10
Intensive Supervision in Shelter	0	5
Attendee Program in Shelter	0	1
Attendee Program in Jail	0	1
Shelter Home	9	20
Emergency Foster Care	7	9
Home Detention	0	3
Multi-Service Center (intake, court, shelter, crisis hold)	0	8
Alcohol/Drug Program:		
Counseling	2	5
Detox	1	4
Transportation	8	23
Counselor Supervision	0	21

consequences. Those jurisdictions which made the least progress toward jail removal typically controlled less than half of the placement decisions at the intake location thereby allowing ample opportunity for unscreened jailings to occur. It was not merely the availability of intake services which was crucial, but also a mechanism to insure complete participation in the placement screening process. Those jurisdictions which more fully employed intake services were better able to control detention decisions and as a result enjoyed greater success.

Secure Juvenile Detention. The availability of secure juvenile detention, either on-site or arranged through purchase-of-care contracts, was an instrumental tool for reducing jailings. As Table Four shows, by Phase II plan implementation, the number of sites with secure juvenile capabilities increased from seven to 17. The arrangements for the placements are innovative and almost as varied as the number of sites.

Few jurisdictions had secure juvenile facilities available on-site. However, the needs assessment showed less demand than anticipated for secure bedspace and construction of such facilities would not be economically feasible. Therefore, purchase-of-care agreements were a common solution. For example, the Lee County Juvenile Court in Alabama coordinated with three out-of-county detention centers to assure available beds. The contractor requested per diem rates of 35 to 55 dollars per child. Bolingbrook, the Boys and Girls Aid Society, and the Metro Criminal Justice Planning Office all have developed similar networks. At the Gateway Juvenile Diversion Project in Kentucky, traditional secure facilities were bypassed entirely as a removal

strategy. Instead, an intensive supervision room in a group home was developed, separate from the remaining facility population.

The use of intake screening and the application of criteria were important tools in the effectiveness of purchase-of-care agreements. The criteria reduced the number of youths requiring security and increased the ease of management of the detention component. The development and appropriate use of secure juvenile options was highly correlated with success, since without this alternative, adult jail remained the only option for placing juveniles who represented a threat to themselves, the community, or the court process.

Nonsecure Detention. As Table Four shows, nonsecure options increased as well. The number of shelter home facilities more than doubled, emergency foster care increased by two, and home detention programs increased from none to three. Because of the increased capacity, the use of nonsecure facility services rose by nearly 71 percent. However, the implementation of intake screening services and crisis intervention resulted in reduction in nonsecure use in two facilities, and an additional site curtailed use of shelter care due to cutbacks in bedspace need. At least one site did not use shelter care at all. Despite the increase measured in nonsecure placements, these facilities and programs were still not used as extensively as anticipated. Projection on Phase I needs assessment data estimated nonsecure bedspace requirements would include 17 percent of all intakes. Plan implementation found a total known nonsecure rate of just under ten percent, nearly 44 percent fewer admissions than planned for. Thirteen of the 22 participating sites with adequate data either did not use the nonsecure options or did not

meet estimated demand. Still, the overall increased availability of nonsecure alternatives had a beneficial effect on the reduction of jailings.

Shelter care served as the main nonsecure alternative to jailing--its availability increasing from nine to 20 sites and its use increasing from five to at least 18 sites. The availability of shelter beds in privately owned settings within the community, and at additional locations outside the jurisdiction, allowed for purchase-of-care agreements within 14 of the JRI sites. Shelter care (and group homes) were used primarily for preadjudicatory placement of less serious offenders and in emergency custody situations where parents or guardians could not provide assurances of the child's safety. However, many sites also used shelter locations for related activities. Intensive supervision in the Gateway Juvenile Diversion Project group home provided a limited secure capacity for the jurisdiction. The Youth Service Center of the San Carlos Tribe housed the intake unit and the juvenile court along with a limited capacity shelter facility.

Unfortunately other nonsecure alternatives have not been as successfully implemented. The emergency foster care component was designed to provide emergency pretrial placement for youths requiring out-of-home attention without strict levels of security while maintaining the amenities of a family setting. Despite efforts to include it in many juvenile systems, the foster care alternatives have met with limited success. Several sites attempted to initiate foster programs, but did not succeed because of a lack of response from the community and/or hesitancy by officials to use the option. In fact, seven jurisdictions which attempted to implement emergency foster care networks either dropped the programs or simply did not use them. However,

certain sites, such as Oregon's Boys and Girls Aid Society, made significant use of the foster care network to reduce juvenile jailings. Foster care, in those jurisdictions which used it, was not a sole nonsecure alternative, but was instead a supplement to more intensive placements.

Home detention services were also rarely used. Only three jurisdictions implemented this alternative, despite its attractive format. Although home detention can take a variety of formats, within the context of the JRI, it usually involved placement of an accused juvenile offender back into the home of a parent or guardian. Supervision was provided by juvenile court representatives who maintained telephone or sight contact with the youth over the course of the day. Home detention offers many advantages over other nonsecure alternatives because it requires the active participation of the juvenile's parents, does not remove the youth from his or her school, and reduces the stigma associated with juvenile court involvement. More by choice than by programming failures, JRI participants infrequently used home detention. Local officials were apparently unconvinced that such a program could offer adequate supervision. When it was relied upon to reduce jailings, it served as a supplementary choice to shelter care and was not the primary nonsecure option.

Detoxification Units. Certain jurisdictions recognized a special detention population problem--the ability to adequately serve the intoxicated youth. As a result, detoxification units were established in four sites. The typical strategy for detox units was to provide a locked room in a shelter-type facility with intensive supervision provided until the crisis had passed. However, three of the sites which established detoxification

components did not use the units. Lack of demand was cited as the primary reason the detox units were discontinued. However, at the site which did continue detoxification placement (the San Carlos Apache Tribe), the unit did assist officials efforts to reduce juvenile jailings. It provided a mechanism for controlling intoxicated juveniles who required a secure level of supervision until they could be transferred to a more traditional setting.

Transportation System. Because of the intricate network of secure and nonsecure alternatives established in most jurisdictions, transportation systems were required to access those options. The Lee County, Alabama Juvenile Court contracted with three existing juvenile detention centers to acquire secure bedspace. In order to transfer youths to and from the contracted facilities when needed, the County established a transportation network. Trained porters are called as needed to drive youths between intake, the facility, and the court. Because of lengthy travel distances in other jurisdictions, similar systems were established. Both porters and law enforcement acted as attendants and drivers, and the mode of transportation included automobile and airplane. The transportation systems offered a cost-effective means for many sites to acquire necessary secure bedspace without burdensome capital expenditures.

The increased availability of nonsecure alternatives, although essential to a total systems jail removal plan, was a concern for another reason. If misused, emergency nonsecure placements could increase and outright release would decrease from pre-JRI levels. In other words, the rate of release would decrease because of the temptation of being able to detain offenders in newly created nonsecure settings. Table One indicates that this situation did not

occur. In fact, not only did nonsecure placements increase, but the rate of releases increased as well. The philosophy of the "least restrictive alternative" to adult jail was evidently a priority.

Appropriateness of Placements. The simple act of measuring the reduction in juvenile jailings provides a very accurate means of assessing JRI site progress. However, the substitution of secure and nonsecure alternatives for the jailing option does not guarantee a total reduction in inappropriate placements. Accused juvenile offenders, who under pre-JRI practices might have been placed in adult jail could still be held in secure or nonsecure juvenile detention, yet not require such custody according to strict adherence to intake criteria. These decisions, described earlier as criteria deviations, are an overall improvement in system placement practices since adult jail is no longer an option. However, some "widening of the net" may occur because of continued unwarranted out-of-home placements (i.e., original system problems are reduced, yet contacted youths continue to be unnecessarily held, but at a different level of security).

A review of the Phase II assessment criteria reveals that despite significant reductions in juvenile jailings, inappropriate placements did continue at many sites. Overall, the JRI sites reduced jailings by 55 percent, in large part through increased use of secure and nonsecure detention. However, of the out-of-home placement decisions for which criteria information are available, approximately 29 percent of those held securely and 37 percent of nonsecure detentions were recorded as criteria deviations. The rates ranged from zero to greater than 90 percent in secure detention and from zero to greater than 80 percent in nonsecure detention among jurisdictions.

One factor which reduced the deviation rate, especially in the secure component, was the ability of the designated intake unit to make placement decisions. Southeast Alabama Youth Services (SAYS), for example, had 789 secure admissions during the 12 month JRI evaluation phase. Only two of those secure detentions were contrary to the admissions criteria. Due to numerous points of entry into the juvenile system, the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Correction System was able to make initial intake decisions on only a portion of all juvenile contacts leading to an 81 percent secure criteria deviation rate.

Nonsecure practices were successful largely because of intake's ability to control placement decisions, yet other factors were apparently involved as well. For example, SAYS continued a low deviation rate despite a significant number of nonsecure placements. DFO continued to have a high nonsecure deviation rate in addition to its secure rate. On the whole, however, most jurisdictions with complete data appeared to have greater nonsecure deviations than secure. This is probably the result of more casual attitudes regarding nonsecure holding with the highest priority being placed on jail removal. Other goals (such as reducing other placement abuses) would be considered secondary.

Despite the problems noted for secure and nonsecure holding rates, all sites have done an admirable job with a majority of their juvenile contacts. For those jurisdictions supplying adequate data, the 29 percent secure detention deviation rate, combined with the 37 percent nonsecure deviation rate, still represent only 11 percent of all intakes. In the aggregate, the

JRI participants were appropriately placing (in terms of level of security) nearly 89 percent of all arrested and petitioned youths.

In summary, if widening of the net can be measured as overall criteria deviations, then it occurred at about 11 percent of total intake screenings. Typically, misdemeanors, status, drug and alcohol, traffic, and some federal (game and fish) offenders were involved in decisions of secure confinement deviation. The holding of nonviolent offenders and nonoffenders in nonsecure facilities primarily for convenience and for rehabilitative purposes were also involved. The reasons for deviations to intake criteria are attributed to initial misunderstandings about the purpose and use of criteria as they related to placement decisions outside the home, haphazard use of intake criteria as well as poor monitoring of their use, disregard of criteria for certain offender types, and lack of commitment to written policies and procedures implemented to preserve the vigorous use of intake criteria.

However, despite these problems, most jurisdictions made significant strides toward improving pretrial placement practices. The deviations to criteria decreased over time and 22 of 23 sites either eliminated or reduced the number of youths held in adult jails and lockups.

JAIL REMOVAL INITIATIVE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Those jurisdictions which participated in the JRI viewed jail removal as a total systems planning process, designed to encompass all the issues which effect pretrial detention. If, for example, juveniles are removed from adult jails, yet rearrests between original contact and disposition increase, or other placement abuses continue, then jail removal cannot be considered a

complete success. As such, 100 percent removal of juveniles in adult jails was the program priority, but it was recognized that other facets of the juvenile justice system also effect success. Therefore, sites were committed not only to reducing juvenile jailings, but to other goals as well. They including the following.

- A substantial decrease in the number of juveniles held securely.
- One hundred percent implementation of specific and objective local intake criteria.
- The development of viable alternatives to secure confinement.
- No endangerment of the community or the court process as a result of increased releases.
- No significant increase in waivers to adult courts as a means of bypassing jail removal technicalities.
- The implementation of policies and procedures to prohibit juvenile jailing.

The final results of the Jail Removal Initiative and the amount of success toward each of the above goals are summarized in the following questions and answers.

Juveniles in Adult Jails

1. Has the actual number of juveniles entering adult jails and lockups decreased?

Yes. A 55 percent decrease in admissions has been experienced.

During the 12 month reporting period of the Initiative, 8,955 juveniles were placed in jail. In the one year period preceding the Initiative, only 4,029 youths were placed in jail--a reduction of 55 percent. Eight of the 23 participating jurisdictions were able to

halt jailings by the conclusion of the JRI. An additional 14 sites reduced overall jailings anywhere from 23 to 98 percent. Only one site had an increase in juvenile jailings.

2. Has the rate of jailing as a function of total court intakes decreased?

Yes. There was a decrease in court intakes during the Initiative of 19 percent over that figure for the preceding year. Even after controlling for the decrease in court intakes, there was still a 45 percent gross reduction in jailings. Prior to the Initiative, participating sites jailed 33 percent of all intakes compared to 18 percent during the reporting period. By the final reporting quarter, JRI sites reduced jailings to nine percent of all intakes (in 20 jurisdictions providing data).

3. Has an increase in the use of secure juvenile detention been experienced?

Yes, there has been a slight increase. The gross totals are virtually identical--1,815 preceding the Initiative compared to the JRI total of 1,825. When adjustments are made to control for the decrease in total intakes, there is a net increase of nearly 23 percent in secure juvenile detention. However, this increase has been offset by the decrease in adult jailings. Total secure placements (juvenile and adult settings) have decreased by 33 percent.

4. Are jurisdictions with existing detention centers still placing juveniles in adult jails?

Yes. Detention facilities exist in seven of the 23 Initiative sites. Some jurisdictions have designed their removal plans to use

the secure facility systemwide and have removed juveniles from adult jails. Other sites have access to detention centers through purchase-of-care arrangements with neighboring counties, but not all are using them. Consequently, jails are still used.

5. Are status offenders, nonoffenders, and less serious offenders entering adult jails?

Yes. In fact, status offenders were being held at virtually identical rates across all jurisdictions--41 percent preceding and during the Initiative. However, 14 of 18 jurisdictions with comparable data were able to reduce the jailing of status offenders. Nonoffenders were virtually eliminated from jail placements (less than one percent). Within each offense category, the numbers of juveniles jailed decreased, implying that no single type of offender was targeted by the sites for removal, and that efforts were made to remove all youths. It was assumed that when juveniles continued to be jailed, it would occur only under exceptional circumstances, including acts of serious personal offenses. As evidenced here, this assumption was not always accurate.

6. Where are juveniles held when they are being jailed?

Juveniles are still being placed in isolation and are not always separated from adult offenders. In a few instances, juveniles are being held in condemned facilities.

7. What are the reasons given for holding juveniles in adult jails?

The predominant reasons given are for intoxication, holding of runaways, and traffic offenses. Juveniles under the influence of

alcohol or drugs were often apprehended while driving or were assaultive at time of apprehension. Runaways are typically held for "their own protection," and traffic offenders because they could not pay a fine. It should be remembered that all jurisdictions now have appropriate alternatives for handling these types of juveniles. It is therefore hoped that these types of jailings will decline as the sites independently continue their removal plan.

8. Are jurisdictions which qualified for the "removal exception" the only ones holding juveniles in jail?

No. Of the 15 sites still detaining youths in jail, only seven were eligible and accepted for the low population density exception. Of the eight successful sites, only one had been approved for the population exception. The JRI has shown that removal success is tied into acceptance of policies by police and the courts, the availability of alternative placement options, and the use of written detention criteria on all intakes. Low population sites have special needs, but the rural/urban nature of these jurisdictions is not correlated with achieving project goals.

9. What type of juvenile offenders are entering secure juvenile detention?

The majority of those placed in secure juvenile detention are less serious delinquent-type (misdemeanor) offenders. Only 15 percent of the total are status offenders, and nonoffenders comprise only two percent. There were 63 percent fewer status offenders held in secure detention than in adult jails (15 versus 41 percent). This is because the major users of secure detention in the Initiative also

had a variety of nonsecure options to use for nondelinquent offenders. Generally, those sites which continued to jail a large proportion of intakes also had under-developed nonsecure systems.

10. Are youths entering secure facilities receiving the treatment they need?

Juveniles admitted to secure detention facilities receive the services directed at meeting their basic physical needs. Adult jails are not able to respond to the needs of juveniles since staffing, facilities, and programs are directed at the adult population. In those JRI sites where intake representatives are not initially consulted, youths can be placed directly in adult jail without the opportunity to be assessed for special needs. As a result, jailed youths usually receive only meals and bedspace.

Financial Cost of Removal

11. How much more costly is it to use alternatives to jails rather than the jails themselves?

Admittedly, more costly when compared. On the other hand, such a comparison is not valid since the services provided, staffing, security, and administration are significantly different, almost distinct. Jails operate with low staff to inmate ratios; audio and televised security hardware is abundant; inmates spend a majority of the day in their cells; and few programs exist. Juvenile alternatives generally provide two to three times the staff ratio of jails, and rely on this ratio, and a large variety of programs and activities, to maintain security and provide short-term treatment. The

only valid comparison is the security hardware involved, and that is limited to comparisons between adult jails and secure juvenile detention centers.

12. Does decreased reliance on secure juvenile detention as an alternative to adult jail, and increased use of nonsecure options, result in significant cost savings?

Yes. Including all necessary services to fulfill the solicitous care requirements implied in the juvenile justice system, shelter care can represent a cost savings of one-third over secure juvenile detention. Typical program costs, in 1983 dollars, are presented below:

JRI Daily Program Costs Per Child

	<u>Service Offered by Jurisdiction</u>	<u>Purchase-of-Care Contract Arrangements</u>
Twenty-four hour intake screening	\$25-60	NA
Emergency foster care	\$17	\$12.50
Shelter care	NA	\$45
Secure juvenile detention	NA	\$70
Transportation (air)	\$80/trip	NA
Transportation (auto)	\$20-\$25/trip	\$5/hour
Shelter holdover, attendee	\$82.50	\$8/hour
Group home	NA	\$35
Station adjustment	\$53	NA
Home detention	\$32.50/day	NA

("NA" means "not available.")

Use of Intake Criteria

13. Do JRI sites ascribe to the philosophy of using written intake criteria as detention guidelines and applying those criteria through 24 hour intake services?

Yes. All of the participating sites implemented written detention criteria designed to objectively and equitably guide placement decisions. The goal of criteria use was to guarantee the protection of the child, the community, and the court process. Prior to the Initiative, only one site had detention criteria. All jurisdictions also created continuous intake screening to provide a method for applying their criteria. When combined with an operational set of alternatives, initial intake control over placement decisions can be an instrumental component of project success.

14. What are the guiding principles for developing specific and objective intake criteria?

The approach under the Initiative has been to develop intake criteria stemming from a comparative analysis of state codes and national standards. The final product carries the definition and specificity of national standards, and the full intent of state statutes. The guiding principles for developing intake criteria for secure facilities are based upon facts concerning a juvenile's current legal status and legal history. Generally, four decision factors comprise the body of criteria, and they are:

- (1) offense severity (person or property),
- (2) risk of flight (demonstrable),
- (3) previous court jurisdiction,

- (4) protection of court process (demonstrable failures to appear).

These factors are used to objectively assess whether a juvenile presents a threat to the community or the court process and subsequently determine the appropriate level of security.

15. Have rates of failure to appear for court hearings increased (as a result of using specific release/detention criteria)?

No. In fact, failure to appear rates have remained virtually identical between pre-Initiative and Initiative intake populations (in those sites with comparable data--2.6 percent versus 3.0 percent). The failure to appear rate during the Phase II monitoring period was 1.2 percent. One site had a single incidence of a failure to appear even though intakes totalled more than 3,000 and jailings were halted. Judicious use of criteria and the availability of alternatives are credited for the low rate. If failure-to-appear rates can be used as a measurement of criteria's effect on protecting the court process, then it appears that the increased release rate and reduction in jailings are not jeopardizing the mission of the court. That is, the rate of accused offenders avoiding their adjudication hearings is not increasing. The Initiative's failure to appear rates compare favorably to rates found in other criteria investigation (from 1.9 percent to 12.3 percent).

16. Have rates of rearrest increased since the beginning of the Initiative (as a result of using specific release/detention criteria)?

No. In those JRI jurisdictions with comparable data, the rearrest rate declined nearly in half--from 3.9 percent to 2.1 percent. Among

all sites with Phase II rearrest information, the overall rate was 4.3 percent. No rearrests (between original point of contact and eventual disposition) were recorded in four jurisdictions, despite a combined total of more than 1,000 intakes. The two JRI sites characterized by large urban populations with rearrest data had a greater rearrest rate than strictly rural sites--1.6 versus 13.5 percent. It should be noted, however, that the urban rates also included all youths rearrested up to six months after original contact, not just up to disposition. It is assumed that rearrests between initial contact and disposition are less than 13.5 percent. Rearrests that occur after disposition do not reflect upon the ability of intake criteria to protect the community because of the intervening court decision. Rearrest figures are important as a means to measure the effectiveness of criteria. The JRI rates indicate that the goal of protecting the community is being upheld. This is demonstrated through (1) a decrease in rearrests over those found prior to the Initiative, and (2) in comparison to other studies of urban and rural sites without specific and objective criteria, which have shown that Initiative rates are lower. Apparently, the introduction of placement criteria has not unnecessarily endangered the safety of the community.

17. Has inappropriate widening of the juvenile justice net occurred as a result of intake criteria and the additional programs available?
- Slightly. A concern of local justice planners was that because of the increased availability of placement options, youths would be

- removed from adult jails and simply placed in those alternatives without regard for the appropriateness of out-of-home detention. Despite significant reductions in jailings, the numbers held inappropriately have not diminished completely. During the monitoring phase of the Initiative, only 11 percent of all intakes were held contrary to criteria findings. Even though inappropriate placements were reduced dramatically, the fact that they still did occur in the newly created alternatives indicates that "net widening" was not avoided.
18. Have rates of waivers to adult court increased during the Initiative?
- No. Concern was expressed prior to the Initiative that waiving a youth to adult court (and therefore make him/her eligible for adult placements) would be a useful mechanism for justifying the jailing of juveniles. Only three sites experienced ten or more waivers, of which two sites are subject to juvenile statutes that allow placement in the adult system without a hearing. Overall, less than three percent of all youths contacted were placed in the adult system. Apparently, JRI administrators, planners, and court personnel adhere to the philosophy of processing youths in the juvenile system and not using municipal/adult court as a jailing solution.

Viable Alternatives to Adult Jails

19. Is not a consequence of removing juveniles from jails the alternative of building costly juvenile detention centers?
- No. On the contrary, experiences of the Initiative indicate removal can be accomplished using nonsecure residential and service

alternatives. Overall, jurisdictions have found that only about 40 percent of all juveniles admitted to jails and detention centers may actually need this high level of security. The resulting rate of holding need be only 13.5 percent of all arrests. In most cases, agreements with existing detention centers and transportation services resolve the problem of jailing. Transfer of all youths being jailed into secure juvenile detention facilities would not be cost-effective and would result in continued placement abuses.

20. Has the Initiative produced viable alternatives to adult jails, and if so, what are they?

Yes, the Initiative is providing viable alternatives to jail. This has been substantiated through findings on the Initiative's impact on local juvenile justice systems: total secure admissions are down significantly, net widening is not a serious problem, the use of intake criteria has resulted in comparatively few deviations without increasing jeopardy to the court or the community. Initiative programs and alternatives to adult jail include:

- 24 hour intake screening,
- emergency foster homes,
- shelter care,
- purchase-of-care secure and nonsecure detention,
- transportation services,
- in-home supervision.

21. Has the availability of transportation services decreased the use of adult jails?

Yes. In many jurisdictions juveniles have been transported to alternatives or the home, whereas prior to the Initiative they would have been held in jail. Still, in some jurisdictions fewer juveniles than anticipated are receiving transportation services. They cite law enforcement's decision not to transport juveniles and the legal liability associated with inadequate counsel and access to family as reasons for underuse. Such reasons need not be a concern, however, as demonstrated by successful transportation service implementation in other JRI jurisdictions.

Removal Policies and Procedures

22. Have sites involved in the Initiative developed policies and procedures which prohibit the jailing of juveniles?

Yes. Among the jurisdictions participating in the Initiative, there is a strong relationship between success in removing juveniles from jail, and the level of acceptance and use of written policies and procedures. On the other hand, those few jurisdictions exhibiting little more than a cursory acceptance of policies and procedures, have struggled to keep jailing at pre-Initiative levels. Examples of policies developed as a result of the Initiative are listed below.

Policies and Procedures Developed for the JRI

Dothan, Alabama	Procedures of apprehension, referral, court intake and court appearance
Salt River/Fort McDowell, Arizona	Tribal Code revisions and court policies incorporating intake criteria
Yellville, Arkansas	Judicial Policy and Procedures Manual
Grand Junction, Colorado	Cooperative agreements among county agencies concerning intake procedures
Lihue, Hawaii	Minute order for law enforcement on intake criteria and intake services
Bolingbrook, Illinois	Station adjustment procedures on law enforcement intake services
Portland, Oregon (Metro Criminal Justice Planning)	Central intake procedures with an elaborate plan for monitoring progress
Hopi Tribe, Arizona	Law enforcement procedures manual

Project Continuation

23. Has commitment to jail removal by JRI participants continued after the expiration of Initiative funding?

Yes. Interest in the goals of the JRI has continued even after the conclusion of Phase II. Seventeen of the 23 sites have demonstrated major commitments to jail removal and, in some instances, have even increased the size of their projects. For example, five states have renewed or developed new interest in detention planning due to

Initiative programs. Several sites have sought continuation funding from their state's allocation of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act money as a means of providing uninterrupted alternative services and placements. Legislation has been introduced in three states for the purpose of implementing specific and objective intake criteria. Ten sites lacking complete juvenile justice programs (i.e., judges, intake, and probation services) prior to the Initiative have developed and maintained operational juvenile systems. It appears that the progress achieved while developing JRI programs has not declined since the completion of the project. Many of the Initiative alternatives have continued to provide effective placement options. Increased and continued cooperation between state and local government are largely responsible for providing opportunities for project continuation.

CONCLUSION

The National Jail Removal Initiative has shown conclusively that given adequate resources and an uncompromising level of commitment, a jurisdiction can accomplish jail removal and improve systemwide pretrial detention services.

There are, in essence, two major lessons which jurisdictions with similar planning goals would be wise to consider. The first involves the minimum requirements necessary to accomplish total jail removal. The JRI sites that attained project success by removing all youths from adult jails and lockups were well organized and managed. In addition, the following attributes were

common to all the successful sites, but were missing in part from those which did not achieve total removal.

- A core of secure and nonsecure alternatives to adult jails and lockups.
- Locally developed specific and objective intake criteria, designed with the intent of upholding the goals of national models and state statutes.
- An active commitment to the goals of the project by the entire juvenile justice sector, i.e., law enforcement, the juvenile court, and social services.
- Policies and procedures which prohibit the jailing of juvenile offenders and nonoffenders.
- The ability of intake personnel to obtain initial and total control over all juveniles arrested and petitioned.
- Total control by intake of any decisions to jail juveniles.
- An accessible secure juvenile detention facility or option (either locally or through a purchase-of-care agreement) as an alternative to jail.
- An active and effective monitoring system designed to continually evaluate the effectiveness of all programs and services in the removal plan.
- Extensive involvement of local funds and personnel in the plan.

Second is the recognition that jail removal is not merely reducing juvenile placements in secure adult facilities, but that it encompasses a total systems solution. As discussed previously, jail removal is not a one-dimensional problem. It involves efficient and appropriate use of secure and nonsecure residential placement options, intake and transportation services, and an active role by each decision-maker. Improving the entire preadjudicatory sector is the key to decreasing juvenile jailings and other placement abuses.

END