


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11/27/85

Federal Probation

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All phases of preventive and correctional activities in delinquency and crime come within the fields of interest of FEDERAL PROBATION. The Quarterly wishes to share with its readers all constructively worthwhile points of view and welcomes the contributions of those engaged in the study of juvenile and adult offenders. Federal, state, and local organizations, institutions, and agencies—both public and private—are invited to submit any significant experience and findings related to the prevention and control of delinquency and crime.

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Subscriptions may be ordered from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, at an annual rate of \$9.00 (domestic) and \$11.25 (foreign). Single copies are available at \$3.50 (domestic) and \$4.40 (foreign).

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FEDERAL PROBATION QUARTERLY

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C. 20544

SECOND-CLASS POSTAGE PAID AT WASHINGTON, D.C.
Publication Number: USPS 356-210

Federal Probation

A JOURNAL OF CORRECTIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE

Published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

VOLUME XLVIII

DECEMBER 1984

NUMBER 4

This Issue In Brief

The Evolution of Probation: University Settlement and Its Pioneering Role in Probation Work.—In the final article of a series of four on the evolution of probation, authors Charles Lindner and Margaret Savarese further explore the link between the settlement movement and the beginnings of probation in this country by focusing on one particular settlement, the University Settlement Society of New York City. Close examination of the University Settlement papers revealed that this settlement, during the late 1890's and early 1900's, expanded its programs and activities to meet the growing needs of the people of the Lower East Side and became very much involved in probation work at the same time. This involvement included experimentation with an informal version of probation prior to the passage of the first probation law in New York State, the appointment of a settlement resident as the first civilian probation officer immediately following passage of this law, the creation of a "probation fellowship" sponsored by one of the settlement benefactors, and the description of this probation work in various publications of the day.

Professionals or Judicial Civil Servants? An Examination of the Probation Officer's Role.—A major issue and question in the probation field is whether probation officers are professionals. In this study, Richard Lawrence examines whether probation officers see themselves as professionals and the extent to which they experience role conflict and job dissatisfaction. The study also looks at how probation officers perceive their roles in relation to the judicial process and the services provided to probationers. Three factors were found to make a difference in officers' role preference and whether they experience role conflict: size of their department (and city), age, and years of experience. A number of recommendations are offered to give probation of-

ficers equal professional status with judicial personnel and more autonomy to exercise their professional skills in the court organization.

Six Principles and One Precaution for Efficient Sentencing and Correction.—According to author Daniel Glaser, more crime prevention per dollar in sentencing and correction calls for: (1) an economy principle of maximizing fines and minimizing in-

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carceration; (2) noncriminalization of offenders who have strong stakes in conformity; (3) crime-sprees interruption; (4) selective incapacitation; (5) reducing inmate pressures from other inmates and increasing staff and outsider influences; (6) appropriate vocational training of offenders. These goals require avoidance of sentences based purely on just deserts.

The Juvenile Justice System: A Legacy of Failure?—In a follow-up to his previous article, "Juvenile Court: An Endangered Species" (*Federal Probation*, March 1983), author Roger B. McNally expands the notion that the juvenile justice system is on the brink of extinction. The author identifies five contemporary themes which are jeopardizing the very existence of juvenile justice and strongly suggests that if the present course of events goes unabated, this system—by the turn of the century—may be recorded in the annals of history as a legacy of failure and a system that self-destructed. The article identifies the need for a separate system of justice by citing examples of failure when the adversarial model is applied to juvenile matters. The author maintains that the juvenile justice system is at a crossroad which requires an affirmation rather than a condemnation of the notion that youth are more than "short adults" necessitating incapacitation until they "grow-up."

An Assessment of Treatment Effectiveness By Case Classifications.—Authors James M. Robertson and J. Vernon Blackburn studied the effects of treatment upon probationers by formulating three questions which asked if court-ordered treatment had any effect on the revocation percentage of probationers in the minimum, medium, and maximum supervision categories as established by four major base expectancy scales. Summarized, the treatment group had lower revocation percentages in 10 out of 12 supervision categories. These results led to positive conclusions regarding the effects of treatment in reducing probation failures.

Forecasting Federal Probation Statistics.—The procedures used in forecasting Federal probation population totals are explained with the intention of making these techniques available to the individual probation office. Author Steven C. Suddaby discusses long- and short-term projections and difficulties which are peculiar to probation forecasting.

The Armed Urban Bank Robber: A Profile.—An analysis of 500 armed bank robbers revealed that they do not fit the stereotype of sophisticated professional criminals, say authors James F. Haran and

John M. Martin. Rather, these robbers are a cohort of young adult, unattached, socially disorganized males, predominately black, poorly educated, and lacking vocational skills; most are unemployed, previously arrested property offenders. Twenty-five percent are drug addicts. They make little profit from their crimes, are swiftly arrested, and receive long jail sentences. A fourfold typology of offenders is developed based on career patterns of prior property crime offenses. The authors propose that selective sentencing, focused more on the career pattern rather than the crime, might render a more effective sentencing formula.

Female Employees in All-Male Correctional Facilities.—Court decisions have opened the doors for women to work in male corrections, but the real struggle to find acceptance and promotion within the system is just beginning. According to authors Rose Etheridge, Cynthia Hale, and Margaret Hambrick, this struggle takes place within the parameters established by inmate, staff, and community attitudes and the attitudes and motivations of the woman herself. Images of women developed long before the working relationships color her interactions with inmates and staff. The authors stress that the woman must understand what is happening and use specific coping strategies if she wants to succeed.

Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control in Israel.—The number of youth committing serious crimes in Israel is reaching alarming proportions. After discussing the scope and dimensions of the delinquency problem in Israel, author Gad J. Bensinger describes the Israeli juvenile justice system and explains the prevention and control strategies of the police, the courts, and the juvenile probation department. Although law enforcement and delinquency prevention was never a national priority in Israel, a reallocation of resources may be required to meet the new domestic needs.

I Didn't Know The Gun Was Loaded.—The judgment of criminal intent has become formalized in Western law as a way of appreciating more fully the nature and quality of an unlawful act and, implicitly, assessing the character and social fitness of the accused. However desirable in theory, the evidential determination of intent, a subjective phenomenon, may pose complex problems. Author James D. Stanfield proposes a revised concept of criminal intent, one less heavily dependent upon rational choice as a precondition of legal accountability.

The Evolution of Probation

University Settlement and its Pioneering Role in Probation Work*

BY CHARLES LINDNER AND MARGARET R. SAVARESE**

ALTHOUGH THE settlement movement originated in England with the founding of Toynbee hall in 1884, the underlying settlement idea was quickly appropriated by a small band of young, energetic Americans and transported to the United States. Here, it took hold and spread so rapidly that by the turn of the century, there were more than 100 settlement houses, of all types and descriptions, most of them located in the largest, most heavily populated urban centers.

There were many similarities between the English social settlement movement and its American cousin. Both had come about as a response to the ever-growing tide of urbanization and industrialization, and both were envisioned as one possible remedy for the social rifts and disorganization which inevitably accompanied these two processes. Thus, the settlement movement on both sides of the Atlantic attempted to repair these rifts and "sought to reconcile class to class, race to race, and religion to religion."¹ The English and American settlement movements were also very much alike in that both tended to attract clergymen, professors, writers, and, more than anyone else, young men and women eager to serve their fellow man in some socially useful way. In America, the pioneering settlement residents were, invariably, not only young but also well-educated, usually with some post-graduate training, from solidly middle or upper-class backgrounds, and of old, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant stock.

In addition to the similarities, there were also differences between the English and American versions of the settlement movement. Unlike their English counterparts which were often church-affiliated, most of the American settlements were deliberately nonsectarian and devoid of any formal adherence to doctrine or ritual, although the individual founders and leaders were often deeply

religious themselves. An even more significant difference was the involvement of many of the American settlements in a wide variety of reform measures designed to improve the lot of the thousands of impoverished immigrants who were pouring into the already congested, tenement neighborhoods. Their continuous day-to-day presence in these neighborhoods brought the early settlement residents face-to-face with a bewildering array of problems that cried out for attention and amelioration and turned many of them into political activists. Jane Addams, of Hull House, touched on just a few of the problems which galvanized settlement residents into fighting for social change when she wrote:

Insanity housing, poisonous sewage, contaminated water, infant mortality, the spread of contagion, adulterated food, impure milk, smoke-laden air, ill-ventilated factories, dangerous occupations, juvenile crime, unwholesome crowding, prostitution, and drunkenness are the enemies which the modern city must face and overcome would it survive.²

Thus, settlement workers became deeply involved in a broad range of reform activities aimed at eliminating these conditions, and one of the many reform measures which attracted their support was an innovation known as probation. The active role played by a number of very influential settlement leaders in helping probation become an accepted practice has been virtually ignored, although the part they played was a truly critical one. This article continues to explore the link between the settlement movement and the beginning probation movement by focusing on one particular settlement, University Settlement of New York City, and by examining its active involvement and support of probation during its infancy around the turn of the century.

The Early Years of University Settlement

University Settlement, which went on to become one of the most influential of all the settlements, began rather inauspiciously, as the Neighborhood Guild, in a dilapidated tenement on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The founder was Stanton Coit, a moody, idealistic intellectual who had spent some

*This is the final article in a series of four.

**Charles Lindner is associate professor, Department of Law, Police Science and Criminal Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City. Margaret R. Savarese is supervising probation officer, New York City Department of Probation, Bronx. The authors wish to thank Professor Eileen Rowland, Chief Librarian, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and her staff for their support and assistance.

¹ Clarke Chambers, *Seedtime of Reform: American Social Service and Social Action, 1918-1983*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963, p. 14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

tages frequently can be done with just a linear extrapolation (using the year as the predictor variable), and then the forecasts will probably have to be fiddled with to make them add up to exactly 100 percent.

The last matter which relates specifically to probation statistics forecasting is a comment about consulting with experts. We discussed earlier that you should be willing to completely discard forecasts which just don't make sense. If you are not completely familiar with the probation system, you should discuss the forecast with those who are. I always consult with the Administrative Office's Probation Division before releasing my forecast, and they are very willing to discuss them with me. If you are a probation officer who is forecasting his or her district's caseload, you probably don't need outside advice on whether a forecast is reasonable, but you would want to discuss your assumptions and results with your colleagues. A fresh perspective and the opportunity to have your ideas critiqued can be very helpful. If you aren't that familiar with the situation, then you should get assistance on the crucial question of whether the prediction defies common sense.

Getting Help: Textbooks and Consultants

A very readable introduction to regression and correlation can be found in John E. Freund's *Modern Elementary Statistics*, 6th edition, 1983, Chapters 14 and 15. A good source for formulas and methods of computing linear and parabolic regressions is Murray R. Spiegel's *Statistics*, part of the "Schaum's Outline Series." This book features worked-out examples of regression computations, and Chapter 13 is of particular interest. You may

also find Chapters 14 through 16 useful. Be careful not to confuse this with *Probability and Statistics* by the same author and publisher. *Statistics* has a blue cover.

More advanced textbooks which are also clearly written include *Applied Regression Analysis* by Norman Draper and Harry Smith. It is considered one of the classic textbooks on regression. Another text which is extremely good is *Econometrics*, by Ronald J. and Thomas H. Wonnacott. Its very clear style makes accessible many of the more difficult aspects of regression analysis.

Finally, you should not ignore the possibility of consulting and computer assistance from local colleges or universities. You may be able to get help from professors, graduate students, and even undergraduates in statistics, mathematics, economics, business, psychology or sociology departments. Sources of free assistance include student internships, programs to give statistics students an opportunity to have consulting experience, and professors who would exchange help for the right to publish the results. They would almost certainly have available for their use computers with statistical packages.

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The Armed Urban Bank Robber: A Profile

BY JAMES F. HARAN, PH.D. AND JOHN M. MARTIN, PH.D.*

BANK ROBBERY always receives media attention. Bank robbers frequently make the Federal Bureau of Investigation's most wanted list of criminals. Judges give bank robbers long sentences, and parole boards are reluctant to release these inmates who have been classified as violent criminals. The public in turn pictures bank robbers as carefully planning their "jobs" like the famous Willie Sutton; making their getaways heavily armed and in a blaze of gunfire, living up to the motion picture images of Dillinger, Ma Barker, Machine Gun Kelly and other infamous bank thieves of the thirties.

A study by the authors of 500 convicted armed bank robbers strips away much of this cinematic glamour from the bank robber and reveals a very different type of criminal personality compared to the usual stereotype. The study used detailed life history data and court and reported crime records to examine the careers of 500 convicted bank robbers predominantly from the highly urbanized area of New York City. The 500 robbers studied were all convicted armed bank robbers who appeared before the United States District Court in Brooklyn, New York between 1964 and 1976. These men were convicted of committing 281 separate bank robberies. Many were also involved in additional bank robberies with which they were not charged. The data, extending over a 12-year period (1964 to 1976), allowed an in-depth look at this particular form of violent crime and the people who engaged in this type of armed theft.

The Crime of Bank Robbery

Although bank robbery constitutes a relatively small portion (less than 2 percent) of robbery statistics, it is the fastest-growing type of robbery in the country. This growth rate gives little indication of halting. Bank robberies in the United States rose from 1,730 in 1967 to 6,597 in 1982, down slightly from the previous year 1981.¹ Analysis indicated that this crime was concentrated primarily in large urban areas.

Among the many categories of recorded crime, bank robbery is unique in several respects. First,

bank robbery is perhaps the most fully reported of any crime known to the police. This is due to the regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which insures over 95 percent of all banks. The FDIC regulations require the reporting of all bank losses by theft or burglary. This insures the reporting of bank robberies. Secondly, according to the FBI, over 80 percent of the bank robbers are identified and arrested. This is an exceptionally high rate of clearance by arrest in contrast to other types of crime and other types of robbery in particular.² Thirdly, the conviction rate of those arrested for this crime and prosecuted in the Federal courts is exceptionally high, averaging 88.8 percent for the 12-month period ending in June 1982.³ Finally, Federal court practice requires that defendants, prior to sentencing, be uniformly subjected to an extensive social and criminal background investigation. These presentence reports are prepared by the trained investigative staffs of the probation departments attached to each United States District Court. This practice collects and summarizes the vast amount of data these offenders generate in their passage through the various components of the criminal justice system. The gathering of this data from law enforcement, courts, probation, prison, and parole agency records makes bank robbers, as a class of offenders, identifiable and amenable to an in-depth analysis.

Who Are the Bank Robbers?

Analysis reveals that the perpetrators of the violent crime of armed bank robbery were not a homogenous group. Further, as a group, their composition in many respects had changed substantially over the 12-year span of the study. The first variable examined revealed no surprise. Ninety-six percent of the robbers were male. Of the 18 convicted female bank robbers, only two assumed a principal role in the crime and only one was known to be armed. The others drove getaway cars or provided other ancillary services. Ninety-six percent were native-born Americans, and 65 percent were born in New York State. Within the city itself the

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¹ Uniform Crime Reports, 1982, p. 155.

² Uniform Crime Reports, 1982, p. 18: only "25 percent of robbery offenses reported to law enforcement were cleared during 1982."

³ Federal Offenders in United States District Courts, 1982, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C., 1983, p. H-38, Table H-19.

majority of bank robbers (63 percent) were residents of the counties of Brooklyn or Queens where most of the robberies occurred.

TABLE 1. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF 500 ROBBERS

Age	Number	Percent
16-20	65	13.0
21-25	173	34.6
26-30	116	23.2
31-35	73	14.6
36-40	35	7.0
41-45	25	5.0
46-50	6	1.2
51-55	4	0.8
56+	3	0.6
Total	500	100.0

The bulk of the robbers (71 percent) were in the 16 to 30 year old age bracket, with 35 percent between the ages of 21 and 25 and 48 percent within the relatively young age bracket of 16 to 25 years of age (Table 1). Examining the age composition of the bank robbers lineally over the years 1964 to 1976 uncovered a dramatic change. In the years 1964-66, 37 percent of the robbers fell in the 16 to 25 year old group, with 63 percent in the over 26 year age bracket. By 1973-76, however, the younger 16 to 26 year old group had risen to 58 percent of the robbers, while the 26 year and older group had fallen to 42 percent of the robbers. Overall one could certainly conclude that bank robbery is a young person's crime.

Concurrent with this shift in the age composition of the robbers, the data revealed an even more dramatic shift in racial composition (Table 2). Overall, some 56 percent of the robbers were black, 43 percent were white, and 1 percent was Puerto Rican. Although this amounted to a disproportionate number of blacks compared to their ratio in the five-county New York metropolitan area studied, the ratio of black to white bank robbers was even more startling from the perspective of change over time.

TABLE 2. RACE BY YEARS 1964-1976

Race	1964-66		1967-68		1969-70		1971-72		1973-76	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
White	36	61.0	28	50.9	50	37.0	54	43.5	47	37.6
Black	23	39.0	25	45.5	85	63.0	67	54.0	77	61.6
Puerto Rican	0	0.0	2	3.6	0	0.0	3	2.4	1	0.8
Total	59	100.0	55	100.0	135	100.0	124	100.0	125	100.0

N=498*

*Two cases could not be classified by race.

In 1964-66, 61 percent of the robbers were white and mostly in the over 26 year age bracket. By the period 1973-76, however, 62 percent of the robbers were black, and 52 percent were under the 26 year old age bracket. This was an almost complete reversal of the racial and age composition of bank robbers in a 12-year period.

A consistent characteristic of the robbers was their overall low educational level (Table 3).

TABLE 3. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Education	Number	Percent
8th Grade or Less	89	17.8
High School Dropout	246	49.2
High School Graduate	91	18.2
High School Equivalency		
Diploma	42	8.4
Some College	29	5.8
College Graduate	2	0.4
Graduate Work	1	0.2
Total	500	100.0

Eighteen percent had an eighth grade education or less, and there was a 67 percent rate of high school dropouts. Further, there was little improvement in this rate of schooling over the time span studied. Those with eighth grade or less education rose from 16 percent in 1964-66 to only 19 percent in 1973-76. The high school dropouts, however, decreased from 58 percent to 42 percent over the same time span, and there was a rise from 5 percent to 16 percent of those obtaining high school equivalency diplomas. This low educational level could be expected to impact on legitimate employment opportunities for the population analyzed, and the data bore this out.

There was an astounding 69 percent unemployed rate at the time of robbery for the robbers in 1973-76, up from 57 percent in the period of 1964-66 (Table 4). The overall unemployment rate for the robbers was 66 percent at the time of robbery.

TABLE 4. INCOME-EMPLOYMENT SOURCE 1964-1976

Employment	1964-66		1967-68		1969-70		1971-72		1973-76	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Full-time	15	25.9	12	23.5	27	20.0	12	10.0	14	11.4
Part-time	6	10.3	2	3.9	8	6.2	10	8.3	13	10.6
Unemployed	33	56.9	31	60.8	84	65.1	87	72.5	85	69.1
Welfare	1	1.7	2	3.9	5	3.9	3	2.5	6	4.9
Other										
(Family/etc.)	3	5.2	4	7.9	5	3.9	8	6.7	5	4.0
Totals	58	100.0	51	100.0	129	100.0	120	100.0	123	100.0

Among the robbers, 71 percent were considered unskilled in any trade, a figure that varied little over

the 12-year span studied. The lack of education and employment skills on the part of the bank robbers was a well-documented characteristic in the study. None of the studied bank robbers were physically handicapped or considered psychologically disturbed.

Another important factor that undoubtedly added to the increased bank robbery rate was the growing number of opiate drug users that began to drift into the ranks of bank robbers over the years 1964 to 1976. Overall, 33 percent of the robbers were heroin addicts. Again, the time sequence of the collected data is revealing. In 1964-66 among the robbers there was a 9 percent participant level of opiate drug abusers. This rose by 1971-72 to 44 percent of the robbers, dropping slightly in the 1973-76 time bracket to 39 percent. Twenty-one percent of white bank robbers and 41 percent of the blacks were heroin addicts.

A case could be made for calling the majority of bank robbers "losers," born and raised. Their family backgrounds were overloaded with disorganized primary family relationships—lack of parental supervision, broken homes, poverty, alcoholism, promiscuity, general irresponsibility. The families of origin had a preponderance of one-parent, female-headed family structures that caused limited stability or role modeling for future family building. In the period 1973-76 unattached male robbers (single, separated or divorced) numbered 80 percent—representing certainly a normless and drifting group of relatively young men. Their relationships with women were predominantly transitory but not unfruitful, and they fathered many more children than they could or would support. They moved about frequently and changed menial seasonal type jobs frequently. Over the years studied, these unattached males rose from 44 percent of the robbers in 1964-66 to 80 percent in 1973-76. A further indicator of family disorganization was a 20 percent incidence of histories of crime, arrests, and convictions among the fathers and brothers in their families of origin. Although the vast majority claimed some religious affiliation, this agency of socialization played no significant role in their lives as far as the study could determine.

Are Bank Robbers Dangerous Recidivists?

Eighty-one percent of the 500 bank robbers had prior adult criminal records. Only 95 or 19 percent had no prior adult record. This percentage remained fairly constant over the 12-year span studied. The

* John E. Conklin, *Robbery and the Criminal Justice System*. Lippincott, 1972.

405 robbers with records had accumulated 2,873 arrests (misdemeanors and felonies were counted) before their conviction in the studied bank robbery, an average of seven arrests per offender. (One offender had 32 arrests). Seventy-nine of the robbers had nine or more adult arrests apiece. Three hundred and seventy of the 405 with records had accumulated 1,448 convictions for a variety of crimes. Seventy-five percent of the robbers could be considered serious repeat offenders based on their prior records. No effort was made to examine juvenile records, although 133 offenders had such records. Nevertheless there is represented here a truly enormous expenditure of criminal justice system manpower before these recidivists reached the bank robber convictions that brought them before the Federal court.

The Heist

The high percentage of bank robbers using weapons was undoubtedly a reflection of the need for this "tool" in bank robbery as well as a general increase of weapons in the present-day urban community. Conklin in his study, *Robbery and the Criminal Justice System*,⁴ remarked:

"Those offenders who use the most dangerous weapons, particularly firearms, are least likely to inflict bodily harm on the victim, since they are able to intimidate the victim enough to reduce the need for physical violence to complete the theft."

This was corroborated in the present study where, despite the heavy use of firearms (381 of 500 were armed), there were, in the 281 multiple victim robbery cases, but two fatalities and 19 instances of injury, some by gunfire.

When one begins to examine the actual bank robberies, the violence and threat of violence in these incidents becomes clear. Less than a quarter of the 500 bank robbers acted alone, without an accomplice. While the solo bank robber would approach and threaten one bank teller, the gangs by their manner of conducting the holdup would threaten all bank personnel and all customers within the bank or about to enter the bank. The means of menacing the victims of the robbery varied little over the years studied. Three hundred and eighty-one or 76 percent of the robbers used firearms which they clearly displayed to the robbery victims. The balance of the robbers either kept their guns concealed or simulated the possession of a firearm while participating with accomplices who did display firearms. Three hundred and twenty-three of the robbers (65 percent) possessed and showed handguns. Forty-nine of the robbers (10 percent) were armed with shotguns. Another nine robbers (2 per-

cent) were armed with automatic weapons. Written threats of shooting were used to menace bank personnel by 77 of the bank robbers, and there were 19 instances of strong-arm assaults including striking with a weapon and in one instance, cutting with a knife. Verbal threats by the armed men were used in almost every bank robbery. In one instance a bank manager was kidnapped, and there were 10 incidents of the taking of hostages by the robbers.

The handgun remained the weapon of preference among bank robbers. The number of shotgun users, while consistently small, declined from 16 percent in the years 1967-68 to a low of 6 percent in 1971-72. Automatic weapons were used least of all. There were only nine instances in the 12 years studied, and automatic weapons were not used at all from 1973 through 1976. In the 281 robberies there were 21 recorded cases of injuries to victims including two fatalities. Both fatalities were bank guards. It is interesting to note that despite the heavy armament of the bank robbers, only 36 or 7 percent actually fired their weapons in the bank. The narrative accounts of the robberies contained in the reports of the bank heists reflect that in most instances the weapons were fired apparently to intimidate bank personnel. There was no instance of direct firing at the bank personnel or the occupants of the bank. However, it should be noted that the robbers did not hesitate to use their weapons against interfering bank guards or pursuing police personnel. In one instance, both a bank guard and one of the robbers shot each other to death, and in another case, one of the robbers shot to death a bank guard and hit a police officer who interrupted the robbery. Twelve robbers did injure 12 people by gunfire, six with handguns, five with shotguns, and one with a machine-gun.

The traumatic effect of facing verbally aggressive, frequently masked, armed male perpetrators is difficult to measure, but beyond a doubt is a harrowing experience and could certainly be classified a psychological assault upon the victims. In the study of Canadian bank robbery professionals' career line bank robbers pointed out that they deliberately tried to create a heightened psychological fear in the bank personnel and customers during a robbery so that their theft would not be interfered with.

The bank robberies studied were predominantly urban or urban fringe incidents. This was a dramatic shift from a 54 percent suburban occurrence in 1964-68 to a 75 percent urban robbery rate in 1969-76.

⁵ Peter Letkemann, *Crime As Work*. Prentice-Hall, 1973. pp. 102-114.

The robberies were primarily a small group activity. Most robberies were committed by gangs numbering from two to as many as eight members. This could be expected since it would be difficult for a single individual to assume a commanding position in the relatively large open area of even a small bank. Only 22 percent of the robbers acted alone. A three-member gang was the most frequent constellation. The following table reflects the frequency of the use of accomplices by the bank robbers.

TABLE 5. ACCOMPLICE USE BY BANK ROBBERS

Number of Robbers Involved In Incident	Number of Robbers	Percentage of Robbers
One	111	22.3
Two	79	15.9
Three	116	23.3
Four	69	13.9
Five	56	11.5
Six	31	6.2
Seven	15	3.0
Eight or more	20	4.0
Totals	497	100.0

N = 497*

* It could not be established in the cases of three robbers whether or not they acted with an accomplice.

An examination of the modus operandi of the robbers in the 281 bank heists revealed the development of certain patterned roles. The principal role was that of the gunman and money grabber. This individual was expected to scoop up the money from the tellers' cages, leaping over the bank counter if necessary. Many of the robbers wore sneakers to make vaulting easier. Three hundred and three or 61 percent of the robbers assumed this role. The second most active role played in the bank robberies was that of the floorman. This individual held the more aggressive role, being armed; he openly brandished his weapon and shouted commands to the tellers, customers, and other members of his own robbery group. Obviously the one bandit would have to assume a combination of roles, and roles were often blurred or interchanged depending on the circumstances involved. While the floorman might shout threats to intimidate persons in the bank, he generally remained positioned during the heist at a strategic point commanding the entrance to the bank and the bank personnel. Lookouts were also frequently used to watch for police or to prevent customers from exiting the bank to sound an alarm while the robbery was in progress. There were also

"wheelmen" who drove the getaway cars for quick escapes.

The robbers were not Willie Sutton-like professionals. There was little preplanning. The robberies were basically hit and run affairs. A full 21 percent were "caught in the act" at the scene of the crime or later the same day (Table 6). Fifty-two percent were arrested within 30 days and only 7 percent remained free for over a year.

TABLE 6. APPREHENSION TIME OF BANK ROBBERS

Time	Number	Percent
In Act	104	20.8
2-7 days	69	13.8
2 weeks	26	5.2
3 weeks	20	4.0
30 days	44	8.8
60 days	68	13.6
90 days	35	7.0
180 days	46	9.2
1 year	52	10.4
Over 1 year	36	7.2

The largest number of perpetrators, 110, or 22 percent, were identified and ultimately arrested on information supplied by their codefendants. Willie Sutton, the vaunted master bank robber, stated, "Working with others, you are at the mercy of your crime partners, and honor among thieves is a myth."⁶

While people get involved in a variety of activities for different motives, there is no doubt that bank robbers engage in their particular crime "for the money." Interestingly, while bank robbers hope for a big "score" in their escapades, the facts revealed another story. Since the robberies showed little planning, the amount of money obtained was largely a matter of chance. Fifty percent of the robberies netted less than \$10,000 (Table 7). Seventy-five percent of the robberies netted less than \$25,000. Only four percent of the robbers participated in heists that netted over \$100,000.

The general practice was to share equally the loot after expenses. Thus, the share of loot ranged from nothing through \$17, \$26, \$36, \$65, and up to the

TABLE 7. ROBBERS' SHARE OF LOOT

Share	Robbers	Percent
Under \$1,499	126	25.2
\$1,500-\$3,999	142	28.4
\$4,000-\$7,999	106	21.2
\$8,000 plus	126	25.2
Totals	500	100.0

point of 12 percent of the robbers receiving less than \$500; less than \$1,500 for 25 percent of the robbers; less than \$3,500 for 50 percent; and less than \$8,000 for 75 percent of the robbers. Sixteen robbers received \$10,000 apiece and 14 (less than three percent) achieved a big score of \$40,000 apiece.⁷ While these sums are not insignificant, the risks involved considering the high percentage of arrests and convictions would not seem to balance the shared loot. Almost every robber quickly squandered his share of the loot on wine, women, and drugs. The robber who was drawn to steal to pay his bills was an extreme rarity.

Types of Bank Robbers

The data also leads to the conclusion that all bank robbers are not the same from another perspective. The perpetrators are not cut from the same cloth even within this specific type of crime. Career patterns are not only observable but significant. The data supports the growing realization among criminologists that criminal typing is not only possible, but has many valuable implications for policy and practical criminological logistics.

The criminologist Don Gibbons maintains that "criminological attention must turn away from the study of crime and criminals to the examination of various types of role careers in criminology."⁸ Clinard and Quinney⁹ as well as many other researchers have outlined a number of characteristics common to so-called career criminals. Letkemann, while discussing career patterns of crime, sums up this type of observation quite succinctly in the title of his book, *Crime as Work*. As this study progressed, examining in depth the backgrounds of the 500 bank robbers, one could not help but observe certain career patterns appearing in the case histories. From this examination and evaluation of background data on the 500 bank robbers, four typologies were constructed. These were based on the individual robber's degree of involvement in crime as a way of life.¹⁰ The measure was based primarily on the analysis of prior offense behavior with particular reference to property theft crimes, since bank robbery was a property theft first and

⁶ Willie Sutton with Edward Linn, *Where The Money Was*. New York: Viking Press, 1979, p. 11.

⁷ A Canadian career bank robber in Letkemann, *Crime As Work*, p. 107, stated the average bank robber received about \$3,000 after splitting with accomplices.

⁸ Don C. Gibbons, *Society, Crime and Criminal Careers* (2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 13.

⁹ M. B. Clinard and R. Quinney, eds., *Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. See also: James A. Inciardi, *Careers In Crime*. Rand McNally Co., 1975.

¹⁰ National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, *Criminal Careers of Habitual Offenders*. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

foremost. The result was four typologies: *Heavy-Career*, *Compulsive*, *Casual*, and *Amateur*. These categories brought a great deal of order to the mass of data collected.

The typologies developed in this study approximate Gibbons' constructs except that we did not base our Heavy-Career type so much on skills and planning as on exposure to repeated criminal activities. His "semi-professionals" approximate this study's Casual offenders and the "one time losers" the Amateurs. We feel the Compulsive typology adds a distinct category to contemporary property offenders.

There are no standardized criteria for the formulation of typological constructs. Gibbons¹¹ has made some efforts to bring order to this area of research. The criteria used in this study flowed primarily from the data itself, were not unduly complex, and resulted in a small number of types of criminal career patterns which serve to elucidate the gathered data. The Heavy-Career typology consisted of those bank robbers with four or more convictions for property crimes including bank robbery which brought them before the court. Into this typology, 143 or 29 percent of the bank robbers fell. This typology corresponded roughly to that of Gibbons' and Conklin's "professionals." The Casual typology consisted of those robbers with two or three property convictions. This group accounted for 126 or 25 percent of the bank robbers. The Casual typology corresponds to those called "semi-professionals" by Gibbons and "opportunists" by Conklin. The Compulsive group consisted of heroin and alcohol addicts whose thefts were related to their drug abuse histories. They numbered 122 or 24 percent of the robbers. This type of offender, although possessing a varied number of property crime convictions, was clearly dominated in his criminal activities by his compulsive need to satisfy his drug abuse problem. The Amateur typology consisted of 109 robbers or 22 percent. The Amateurs had none or one property crime conviction. This category would correspond to Gibbons' "one-time losers." There were more white Heavy-Career types (34 percent to 24 percent) as well as more white Amateur types (26 percent to 19 percent) than blacks. The blacks, however, dominated the Compulsive typology (30 percent to 17 percent) and the Casual typology (27 percent to 23 percent). The Heavy-Career types tended to be older men. That it would take some time to accumulate a serious criminal

record undoubtedly contributed to this factor. However, 16 or 11 percent of the Heavy-Career types were under 21 years of age. The Heavy-Career types also tended to have the least education and the least percentage of full-time legitimate employment, although 25 percent of their members had employable skills.

The fact that four distinctly different typologies of bank robbers should be constructed has a number of possible policy implications for the criminal justice system. Granting the validity of the typologies, all bank robbers are then not equal. It follows, at least ideally, that they should not be treated as equal by the courts in sentencing, the prisons in classification, and the parole authorities in evaluating release time. This is not to say that the various components of the criminal justice system do not distinguish between the Heavy-Career type and the Amateur. The difference in criminal involvement at that level is recognized. However, the Compulsives and Casuals are by and large not distinguished from the Heavy-Career types when it comes to sentencing. In other words, all these bank robbers are treated with a heavy hand in the Federal courts.

We might speculate that the range of imposed sentences for this basically property offense might be more realistically scaled downwards from the maximum 25-year sentence if one were to consider the career patterns of the defendants rather than the crime itself. This selective sentencing would still serve the community if the Heavy-Career type robber received a sentence upwards to the maximum level and was removed from the community. A scaling down to perhaps a 10-year maximum for a Casual career type offender would then be appropriate. No more than 3 to 5 years for the Compulsive bank robber and 2 to 3 years for the robber falling in the Amateur career type. This type of sentencing pattern would not denigrate the seriousness of an armed robbery, while aggravating circumstances—such as a long prior criminal record or convictions for other types of crimes, wounding or assaulting bank personnel, and so forth—could still be considered. Similarly mitigating circumstances, such as evidence of transformation since commission of the robbery, cooperation with the government, restitution, and so forth could still be factors considered in determining the final sentence.

Conclusion

In such an approach the Federal prisons would no longer be clogged with bank robbers (approximately

25 percent of present Federal prisoners) serving long sentences imposed across the board on the assumption that all robbers' career patterns were the same. The nonselective sentencing for bank robbers has currently a devastating impact on the Federal Bureau of Prisons. For example, in fiscal 1976, 1,917 persons were sent to jail for bank robbery, and 1,524 of them received average sentences of 136.7 months which even considering parole, insures that this number of incarcerated bank robbers will be in prison for the next 5 years. The 1976 commitment rate of 1,524 projected for 5 years results in 7,620 in prison for this crime alone.

Similarly, the Parole Commission, no longer boxed in by the long sentences across the board, could make more selective release determinations that would probably also be more equitable. Now the Parole Commission rates most bank robbers as high parole risks—potentially dangerous to the community—and in general will hold them in prison for a maximum allowable time ranging from one-half to two-thirds of the long sentence imposed. Additionally, the balance of the prison sentence will have to be "served" under parole supervision. The prisoners themselves would be less inclined to sense an injustice in their sentences because they themselves can see the disparity in the undifferentiated severe penalties now imposed when they look at and live with the individual perpetrators involved. An added, and perhaps the greatest, benefit would be the more rapid release of offenders not held beyond reasonable hope for reintegration into society if they are in fact not career criminals.

As for preventive measures in terms of reducing the number of bank robbers, there is little that can be done to reach the potential bank robber. They constitute such a random group as to be almost unreachable. Youthful males, unattached, blacks, lower social class, unemployed, high school dropouts, with no vocational skills, a third addicted to opiate drugs—as a group they have moved beyond the influence of such socializing agencies as family, school, and religion. They represent the offshoot of a structural societal problem which is far beyond the ability of the courts or the correctional components of the criminal justice system to handle. Locking bank robbers up for different periods of time, according to the career typology they fit, would allow for differential handling and efforts to treat the Compulsive offender's drug problem; educate vocationally the Casual offender; and deter and reorient the Amateur for their inevitable return to more socially acceptable living patterns in the community. The longer sentence would still be retained for the Heavy-Career type robber, thus selectively protecting the community from the type of criminal whose past record identifies him as the most predatory. The current practice of general long sentences does not appear too effective, since the latest development in the bank robbery scene is the trend of some paroled bank robbers to return to this same crime. It could be speculated that some held in prison beyond their redemption point are going over to the side of identification of themselves as Heavy-Career type criminals.

¹¹ See: Don C. Gibbons, *The Classification of Criminal Behavior*. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C., 1973.

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