


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
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Raising the Stakes in Carnival Fraud

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN

SEPTEMBER 1984, VOLUME 53, NUMBER 9

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ACQUISITIONS

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William H. Webster, Director

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ANAPOL

A Method of Structure Analysis for Law Enforcement Agencies

The city of Basel, Switzerland, and two small towns form the smallest of the 26 Swiss states, with approximately 200,000 residents. Located in the northwestern part of Switzerland, where the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Switzerland meet, Basel was founded more than 2,000 years ago and is the second largest city in Switzerland. It is the center of a region covering areas of all three neighboring countries with about 700,000 residents.

Basel has played an important role in the European traffic system since 1225, when the first bridge over the Rhine was built. Most of the important international express trains run through Basel, where more than 4.5 million passengers enter Switzerland each year. The European super-highway from Hamburg to Naples runs through Basel as well, and the airport, located on French territory, is run by both French and Swiss authorities.

The Basel Police

The Basel police, a force of 800 sworn officers and 100 civilians, is divided into four divisions and a detachment of some 100 detectives who are assigned to the Attorney General's Office as criminal investigators. (See fig. 1.) Whereas the Command and Administrative Division supplies central services for the whole organization (staff services, personnel, training, communications, vehicles, weapons, administrative services), the Security Division with some 500 policemen and women assigned to 16

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police stations is considered the backbone of the Basel police force. Their main task is the usual daily police work (patrol, responding to calls, etc.). The Traffic Division is concerned with planning new or remodeling streets and intersections (including computerized traffic lights) and with the driver's and vehicle's license administration. It includes four groups of specialists (accidents, traffic supervision, highway patrol, and traffic education). The Special Division is a conglomerate of the border police and two services belonging basically to a criminal division (which does not exist as such because of the assignment of investigators to the Attorney General's Office).

Goals and Scope of Structure Analysis

In 1980, the newly appointed commander found an organization

lacking a clear system of inservice, promotion, and supervisory training, with an inconsistent leadership concept and few modern management methods. Since an organization analysis determined a command staff of only 9 managers for more than 800 officers was inadequate, the number of commissioned officers in supervisory positions was raised to 14. In a second phase, an organization development (OD) program was designed to improve the performance of the organization within 4 years and to start a permanent process emphasizing cost-effective thinking on all levels of the organization.

Three objectives for the organization development program were established:

- 1) Improve *individual performance* within the organization through the development of a new and coherent leadership concept and intensified leadership training, based mainly on management by objectives (MBO);
- 2) Improve the *effectiveness and flexibility* of the organization by tightening the organizational structure, concentrating on genuine police work, and by introducing new management tools and improved information processing devices; and
- 3) Improve the *efficiency* of the organization by minimizing paperwork, eliminating parallel performances and unnecessary perfection, and simplifying certain work procedures.

"The police culture should change from sheer rule conformity and formal obedience toward goal-oriented reliability and personal initiative."

To reach these goals, three steps were defined:

- 1) Structure analysis—the Analysis of the Police (ANAPOL) project,
- 2) Development of new leadership guidelines, and
- 3) Development of a training system.

Method

The idea of integrating structure analysis into a major organization development effort precludes the use of standardized instruments in cost cutting, like overhead value analysis (OVA). Organization development is based on careful considerations of the specific constraints and cultural situation within an organization, as well as on the full involvement of the organization's members. Therefore, standard procedures, as applied in industry, were not useful.

The output of a police agency, its "products" and performance criteria, is difficult to define and measure. To

use secondary indicators, e.g., the amount of fines collected, would distort in most cases the underlying objectives. Furthermore, safety, order, compliance to the laws, etc., are notions heavily bound to a variety of different value systems.


The method, therefore, had to ensure that appropriate criteria would be generated during the process, which could be used to measure actual and desired performance. Most existing methods using financial or market performance measures would be useless.

"Productive" work and administrative overhead are not easy to separate in police work. Furthermore, the OD program emphasized the improvement of total results, not only the reduction of administrative overhead. Any method analyzing overhead costs alone, therefore, was too limited.

The decision to develop a different method, however, was not taken because of these technicalities. What

mattered more was the fact that authoritarian methods, like overhead value analysis, aim at short term cost reduction effects in crisis situations and are used to raise efficiency by eliminating organizational slack. ANAPOL was aimed at raising effectiveness and efficiency. It was seen as a tool for reorienting and streamlining the organization, as well as an educational process for all members of the organization. They should be able to discriminate priorities in their daily work, understand their function, and question constantly bureaucratic routines. They should feel responsible about how things are done and develop a way of thinking consistent with the objectives of ANAPOL. The police culture should change from sheer rule conformity and formal obedience toward goal-oriented reliability and personal initiative. A high degree of identity between organizational and individual objectives should be achieved. Obviously, methods for cost-reduction programs would never allow such a process to happen—cost cutting leads to people defending their actual level of performance, rejecting innovative solutions, or ignoring new tasks that have to be fulfilled.

Finally, police work is very much in the public's eye and sensitive to political interventions. To evaluate the usefulness of any given performance, one has to differentiate carefully between legal necessities, political compromises, and bureaucratic tendencies, which are often disguised as legal constraints. To investigate the



“... the long range goal of ANAPOL [is] the sharpe



Dr. Mohler



Dr. Heuss

daily routine of a police force also means to get access to sometimes highly sensitive information protected by a traditionally strong "esprit de corps." Any method that can deal with these problems successfully has

to be accepted by the agency's members and has to ensure that bureaucratic tendencies can be overcome. Therefore, the method should:

- 1) Reveal inefficiencies as well as priorities and (maybe unnecessary) degrees of perfection in task fulfillment. Accordingly, the first focus was on doing the right thing and not on doing everything more efficiently;
- 2) Lead all members of the police force to think about their tasks and not about how to beat the method. It should induce problem-centered discussions and prevent politicking and bargaining as much as possible;
- 3) Produce not only momentary improvements of performance but also changes in attitude and work behavior. It, therefore, had to reflect high involvement of and backing by management;
- 4) Be easy to learn and handle and be transparent to everybody involved in order to prepare people for continuous organization development. The interviewing and analyzing, as well as the development of appropriate proposals, should essentially be done by members of the organization; and
- 5) Allow and sustain a completely open process. Every member of the organization should have access at any time to any information at any stage of the analysis.

Organization and Procedures

ANAPOL should be completed in a very short time. The daily routine of the police should not be disturbed over too long a period, and the interval between analysis and the first re-

sults should be as short as possible. It was, therefore, decided to form a project organization linked directly to the commander. (See fig. 2.)

Preliminary Steps


The whole police force was divided into 13 units of approximately the same size according to functional relationships. Analytical instruments were developed and tested in a pilot study in a unit of the Special Division. They basically consisted of three simple forms for collecting data (tasks, frequencies, manpower used, results, etc.). Police officers were carefully selected from different units to enlarge the horizon of the interview teams. They also had to be of different rank (with the exclusion of managers) and age to help achieve the long range goal of ANAPOL, the sharpening of cost-effective thinking within the organization. Every team member was then trained in a 2-day seminar organized by the SC.

Main Analysis

Each unit was informed of the precise starting date for the analysis and its time schedule. All members were called to a meeting on the departure date, where the commander again explained the purpose and guidelines of the whole project, informed them of the procedural details, answered all questions, and introduced the interviewing team.

The interview team explained in detail the first data-gathering round, which entailed completing specially designed forms by members of the unit. The unit had to provide systematic information about the number and rank of persons in that unit, all the functions and tasks of the unit, the results of each task, the recipients of these results, who worked on what

g of cost-effective thinking within the organization.”



Dr. Mueller




Dr. Fueg

task how many days a year, and the technical means and material used. These data-gathering forms showed how the time was allocated and where the unit set its priorities.

The interview teams then select-

Figure 2



normal organization _____
project organization - - - - -

- The head of the police department (member of the state government) and the commander as top decision body devised the general guidelines of the project, decided on politically sensitive issues, and were involved in the information on ANAPOL.
- The steering committee (SC) included the chief of staff and two external organizational consultants of the city university. The SC had the project management authority and was responsible for methods and procedures, time schedules, organization, and results.
- The coordination team's function was to disseminate information within the organization and to voice any problems the organization's members had with the project in progress. The team included all the senior officers, two representatives of the police union, and the accounting and personnel manager of the department (not members of the police force).
- The interview teams (consisting of three members each) had to investigate and analyze two units each and were responsible for an accurate picture of each unit, as well as proposals about how to improve the situation.

"The process of establishing core functions and defining targets proved to be the essential step of ANAPOL."

ed specific functions for further analysis, according to the prominence in time allocation or in cases where the relationship between quantities and effort seemed to be out of proportion. The results were presented in a intermediate report for each unit and supplemented by proposals of the teams, as well as of the unit's members, for improving performance or for reducing amount of time spent. This report was discussed with the unit and then challenged by the steering committee. The challenging centered on the guidelines and goals of the whole project and led to requests for further information, deeper probing, or substantiation of proposals.

Targets

In cooperation with the senior officers (division heads of the units), the steering committee determined the core functions of the unit and formulated future priorities and performance targets. To achieve these targets, concrete proposals were formulated for implementation and summarized in a final report covering all units analyzed, as well as the relationships between units. Some important issues of task or personnel administration, filing, etc., were pertinent for the whole organization.

Decisionmaking and Implementation

After the final report was submitted to the head of the police and military department and the commander, the proposals were sorted according to the appropriate decision level and according to the amount of time needed for implementation. For every given proposal, a period of 3 years at most had been set, during which the proposal either had to be implemented or abandoned.

Results

The objectives of ANAPOL and the overall results from the analysis of the various units led to four general principles for the new organization:

- 1) *Maximize* primary police tasks, *design* all supportive functions accordingly and *rationalize* them wherever possible, *shift off* any other task;
- 2) *Do* work at its origin and thus *minimize* coordination;
- 3) *Use* generalists instead of specialists; *do* things as well as necessary and not as well as possible; *simplify* procedures and *cut down* perfection; and
- 4) *Develop* leaders instead of administrators.

Every single proposal in the final report can be traced back to one of these principles which form the basic guidelines of police work within the new organization.

With respect to the goals, a very clear view of the actual state of the police has been gained and the basic steps to reorient the organization have been taken. Furthermore, a certain cost awareness is implanted, and many members of the agency experienced the possibility of inducing changes within a government organization as a positive stimulus for the future.

The final report specifies the core functions and objectives of each division, analyzes problems for the organization in general (mainly within the field of personnel administration, management, and reporting), and makes alternative propositions in these areas. Each division is analyzed and a total of 104 proposals for improvement are suggested. The most important proposals are:

- 1) Design of a new leadership structure for the Security (patrol)

Division, changing from a regional responsibility to a shift-wise responsibility on the third level of command in order to give more flexibility and better coordination of the forces.

- 2) Differentiation of the function of the 16 police stations by distinguishing *police centers* and *police stations*, the former working round the clock, the latter only during daytime. The number of policemen available for street work could be raised substantially without increasing the time between alert and arriving on the scene.
- 3) Shifting the priorities of police work from 60-percent desk work to 60-percent field work. This could be achieved by simplifying reporting forms, diminishing time used to control the reports, and simplifying or abolishing methods of registering events. At the same time, more responsibility was given to the individual policeman which formerly belonged to various "specialists."
- 4) Redimensioning the Traffic Division by combining services with common functions and by giving back the responsibility for many functions regarding traffic control and accident investigations to the Security Division.
- 5) Shifting most of the functions for road planning to the Department of Public Works, which did the same job anyway, and maintenance functions (cars, traffic lights, parking meters) to garages and workshops of that department.
- 6) Changing the information processing within the criminal

investigating system from the manual system to electronic processing, furnishing updated information to the Security Division more rapidly, and administrating traffic fines by electronic devices as well.

- 7) Abolishing the registration of incoming and outgoing mail and its recipients; streamlining existing forms in various fields of activity.

Quantitative Results

The analysis started in December 1981, and was finished in January 1983, with an investment of 4.7 man-years and 0.5 percent of the total annual manpower of the agency. If each of the 104 proposals are to be implemented, and several of them already have, approximately 30 percent of the entire manpower can be reallocated within the Basel police:

- 4 percent will be used for the same task, but in another unit;
- 18 percent will be used for other tasks, strengthening performance within the core functions; and
- 8 percent will be used to raise the total effectiveness of the department.

At this time, the achievements of ANAPOL cannot be evaluated in figures only, as too many important proposals are still in the process of implementation. What can be assessed is ANAPOL's achievement in defining fields of improvement and its contribution to the organization development goals. The method designed for ANAPOL has succeeded; five interrelated factors of success can be defined:

- 1) Acceptance of the project within the agency,
- 2) Information policy,
- 3) Combination of forces,

- 4) Omission of quantitative targets for the analysis, and
- 5) Commitment of top management.

Project Acceptance

The project (its goals, organization, and procedures) was well-accepted throughout the entire police force. More than 900 people were aware of the project since its inception, and copies of the final report were distributed to all police stations and made available to all employees.

Two major reasons can explain this acceptance. First, management personnel were not the only ones who were uneasy with the agency's performance and structure. Many of the newer members of the police force felt positive toward an analysis, too, as they were displeased with the present amount of paperwork and the inflexibility of the system. Second, the selection of agency members as interviewers and the well-functioning coordination team aided in building a climate of openness and trust. There was a certainty that no misunderstandings due to unfamiliarity of outsiders with the daily routine could happen and that hurt feelings would not result if anyone spoke freely.

Information Policy

The information policy followed the principle of continuous and open information on every aspect of the project. Goals, organization, and procedures of ANAPOL were made clear to every policeman by the commander personally and in writing before the analysis started. The interview teams, too, started the analysis in every unit with another information session with the project leader, the head of the unit, and the commander present. While the analysis took place, one of

the members of the SC was always available at police headquarters for anyone having additional information, questions, or complaints. At the end of the analysis and again after the final report was written, the entire police force was informed of the major results. As soon as the final report had been delivered to the head of the police department, any member of the police force had access to it.

This constant flow of information prevented false rumors about what was happening. In addition, almost everybody within the agency knew one of the members of the project organization personally, as all policemen passed through the same police school and had started their careers in the same division. The amount of information flowing through these informal channels can not be measured; however, its positive effects on the whole project should not be underestimated.

Combination of Forces

A combination of talents and experiences was achieved by sharing the responsibility for the project among members of various units and ranks of the agency and external consultants. ANAPOL intended to combine as closely as possible the intimate knowledge of tasks and procedures of as many members of the police force as possible, the open-mindedness and "naive" questions of agency members working in other units than the one they were analyzing, the general expertise and knowledge of the political surroundings of the senior officers, and the experience in analyzing and designing organizations of external consultants. This combination of internal and external forces developed considerably while the project progressed.

"ANAPOL has been successful because its method has been specially designed for the organization analyzed."

At the beginning, the consultants' roles had been seen as designing the method, training the interview teams, challenging economic aspects of proposals as members of the coordinating team, and controlling the systematic and correct use of the methods and the time used. Very soon, the necessities of supporting and directing the interview teams led to a redefinition of this function and to the formation of the steering committee together with the project leader. The senior officers, too, got more involved than previously expected, defining targets and core functions for their units and evaluating alternative courses of action.

The cooperation between SC and interview teams proved very fruitful. Members of the interview teams had too much advance knowledge of a unit's task to be fooled by the unit. The SC, on the other hand, questioned a number of "sacred cows," which the interview teams didn't dare approach at first, and supported the interview teams. This resulted in a tremendous creativity of the interview teams and provoked many proposals that found their way into the final report.

Omission of Quantitative Targets

While other methods, such as OVA, specify targets which have to be met (e.g., 40 percent less input while maintaining all critical output) in order to force both analyzers and management to find creative solutions, ANAPOL omitted purposely any pre-defined quantitative targets. In the given political and economic surroundings, it was evident that any propositions to cut expenditures would be welcome. The state of Basel has the highest per capita deficit of all Swiss states, and several big compa-

nies in the area were going through major OVA exercises at the time. Yet, no pressure was put on the interview teams or management to concentrate on this issue.

The most important step after the analysis, therefore, was to establish the core functions of each unit and to define the standards of performance for every function. The standards being set and translated into quantitative goals (e.g., amount of time to be spent on field work, number of traffic controls to be made per year, manpower needed, etc.) had to be defined. If the necessary manpower surpassed the present number, areas of activity had to be defined where additional manpower could be obtained. In several cases, the desired performance standards were already exceeded, e.g., quality of paperwork, investigation of accidents, planning of traffic signals, etc. Therefore, within the whole organization, more than enough manpower could be found to meet the established goals within the core functions. The process of establishing core functions and defining targets proved to be the essential step of ANAPOL. The SC's intimate knowledge of what had been analyzed in every single unit was a very important asset when evaluating alternative courses of action. For many of the senior officers, this step was the most fascinating, although often the most painful one as well.

Commitment of Top Management

Contrary to many similar projects started in various government agencies, ANAPOL was not ordered by an outside authority but originated within the police department itself and was carried out by its own forces. From the beginning, top management committed itself to the project. The fact

that more than 20 policemen were re-assigned to form a separate task force for more than a month and the strict time management during the whole project added weight to the project and its objectives.

Conclusion

ANAPOL has been successful because its method has been specially designed for the organization analyzed. Although certain factors of success may be the same for any structure analysis (e.g., acceptance, information policy), ANAPOL brought results because it fitted the needs of the Basel police at the given time, in the given political and economic surroundings, and on the background of the given development of the agency before the analysis. However, ANAPOL's success is not only measured by the 8-percent increase in productivity or 30-percent manpower reallocation, but also as a first step within the OD program.

From an OD point of view, though, one should not wait until the whole department needs a major reorganization. Analyzing performance and adapting structure to changes in the environment is a normal management task, and "weak signals" for dysfunctions are more evident on an operative level, where adjustments can be made without going through major exercises. ANAPOL has hopefully provided the tools, as well as the attitude, to fulfill this management task on all levels of the organization.

Structure analysis can be a major step of organization development within a government agency. The ANAPOL method is well-suited for analyzing police work, but success depends on a close fit to the particular circumstances of the organization that has to be analyzed.

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