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Community Against Crime: Two Federal Initiatives

by

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with
an introduction by

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December 1983

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice by the American Institutes for Research, under grant numbers 79-NI-AX-0100 and 79-NI-AX-0109. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

This monograph is a synthesis of what was learned in two national evaluations conducted by the American Institutes for Research for the National Institute of Justice. The programs reviewed are the Community Anti-Crime (CAC) and the Comprehensive Crime Prevention (CCP) programs that were developed by the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs of the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminstration.

CAC funded some 150 community-based organizations to conduct projects in 96 cities; CCP funded agencies of local government in seven cities. The two programs were derived from the same general rationale: that effective prevention and control of crime requires a community-wide effort that involves law enforcement agencies, other elements of government, and the citizenry in a coordinated attack on agreed-upon problems of crime. The programs thus contrast a top-down versus a grassroots-up approach to community involvement in crime prevention.

In comparing the activities undertaken by the two programs, the similarities are more striking than the differences. Both programs were dominated by opportunity reduction activities such as target hardening, increased surveillance, property identification, and the like. CAC did give more attention than did CCP to cause reduction activities such as recreation and youth employment programs, tutoring, and inproving neighborhood amenities, but only about one-fourth of CAC activities were of this type. Neither program invested heavily in assistance to victims or in system assistance. The relatively narrow range of activities undertaken reflects the over-riding importance of feasibility as the criterion used by project managers in determining the activities to pursue. Innovation was rare in both programs; projects tended to do what their staff knew how to do.

Citizen involvement was an important goal in both programs. CAC was the more successful program in this regard, being far more likely to have citizens involved in decision-making. For both programs, the prior existence of a community network was a critical feature that distinguished between projects that were high in citizen involvement and those that were not. The coordinated attack on crime that was envisaged for both programs did not really materialize. Relatively little effort was spent in coordinating with other groups; the internal priorities of the projects dominated the effort.

The monograph concludes that the efforts represented by CAC and CCP were worthwhile, that there were no conspicuous design weaknesses, and that there are probably some lasting effects. It is argued that:

- neither program had any pronounced negative effect; neither was viewed by the participants as a failure, a waste of time and money, or as "another example of the Feds not knowing what they're doing;"

- while the call for coordination of effort may have been unrealistic, it is hardly a weakness in design; no funding agency can ask for an uncoordinated approach to anything; and

- both programs engaged the attention of some new players in the community crime prevention game; the CAC approach is tailor-made to produce this outcome.

F O R E W O R D

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This monograph is a synthesis of the findings and apparent implications of two national program evaluations. The evaluations were conducted and reported by the American Institutes for Research.* The draft reports were reviewed by staff of the National Institute of Justice and by external reviewers commissioned by the Institute. In addition to specific comments addressed to the particulars of the reports, a common theme of the reviewers was that one report that placed the two studies in their common context and then compared and contrasted the findings would be more useful than the two separate reports. It was suggested also that the single report should be a highly condensed rendering of the 370+ pages that constituted the two final reports.

By the time that the reviewers' comments were organized, the lead authors of the two reports (Robert E. Crew and Peter G. Hartjens) had either left AIR or were in the process of departing for an academic post. While both evaluation contracts had officially expired, AIR accepted the responsibility for producing a synthesis; at the request of NIJ staff, I accepted the task of preparing this monograph.

I was not involved in the conduct of either evaluation. In the drafting of this summary, I depended heavily on the two reports cited. I also made extensive use of the earlier reviews, particularly that of Dr. Floyd Fowler. At AIR, I was assisted greatly by Ms. Frances Gragg and Dr. Kristina Peterson, who constituted our institutional memory in regard to these two projects. At the National Institute of Justice, I am indebted to Dr. Richard Rau for his encouragement, his chapter by chapter reviews, for his authorship of the introductory chapter, and for his patience. I also profited by conversations with Dr. Lawrence Bennett, Director of NIJ's Office of Program Evaluation. A draft of the monograph was reviewed by Dr. Fred Heinzelmann of NIJ, and by two external reviewers: Drs. Floyd Fowler and James Tien. In acknowledging the usefulness of the reviews, I imply no responsibility on their parts for the final product.

Ms. Mary Medved was our super-capable production manager; she served also as AIR's principal needle in response to the author's procrastination.

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* Hartjens, Peter G., Robert E. Crew, with the assistance of Frances Gragg, Jan Greenspan, Karol Kerns, and Laura Malakoff. National Evaluation of the Community Anti-Crime Program. American Institutes for Research, Washington, D.C., March 1981.

Crew, Robert E. and Brian Perlman. National Evaluation of the Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program. American Institutes for Research, Washington, D.C., March 1981.

I. INTRODUCTION

When discussing crime and the fear of crime in communities across the country, one is reminded of a comment made over a decade ago by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence:

> To millions of Americans, few things are more pervasive, more frightening, more real today than violent crime and the fear of being assaulted, mugged, robbed or raped.1

Today this same fear exists in communities across the country. The latest pronouncement comes from the President's Task Force on Violent Crime:

> The spector of violent crime and the knowledge that, without warning, any person can be attacked or crippled, robbed, or killed, lurks at the fringes of consciousness.2

As a result, today, a great deal of neighborhood activity is in one way or another directed at reducing crime and the fear of crime. In fact, a recently completed study on Governmental Responses to Crime over a thirty-one year period (1948-1979) concluded that during this period "Crime became the leading item on the urban agendas."3

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1 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Staff report: Law and order reconsidered. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 271.

2 President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report, December, 1982.

3 Governmental Responses to Crime, Executive Summary: Crime and Governmental Responses in American Cities; Crime on the Urban Agendas; and Legislative Responses to Crime: The Changing Content of Criminal Law. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, June, 1982.

The government responded to this growing concern with crime by launching the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1969. LEAA provided direct assistance to state and local governments to reduce crime and improve the criminal justice system. During its life, (LEAA was terminated in 1981), LEAA supported community crime prevention projects indirectly through local criminal justice agencies and after 1978, directly through local community groups.

The need for the active participation of citizens and community groups in the prevention of crime has been raised by professionals and community organizations more and more in recent years. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1973 made the following observation:

> Criminal justice professionals readily and repeatedly admit that, in the absence of citizen assistance, neither more manpower, nor improved technology nor additional money will enable law enforcement to shoulder the monumental burden of combating crime in America.4

Support for the need to augment the police with citizen participation was dramatically found in the Responses to Crime Study. Although the number of police increased from 1.33 to 1.96 per 1,000 population over the thirty-one year period, the study found that the number of police officers per violent crime had dropped during this period from 3.22 to 0.5 and for property crimes from 0.11 to 0.03. 5 Congress responded to the growing need for citizen involvement by its 1976 amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, the act that created LEAA. One of the amendments established the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs in LEAA. The OCACP had the following purposes:

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4 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Report on Community Crime Prevention. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973.

5 Governmental Responses to Crime, Executive Summary: Crime and Governmental Responses in American Cities; Crime on the Urban Agendas; and Legislative Responses to Crime: The Changing Content of Criminal Law. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, June, 1982.

1. To provide appropriate technical assistance to community and citizen groups to enable such groups to apply for grants to encourage community and citizen participation in crime prevention and other law enforcement and criminal justice activites.

2. To coordinate its activities with other Federal agencies and programs (including the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice) designed to encourage and assist citizen participation in law enforcement and criminal justice activities.

3. To provide information on successful programs of citizen and community participation to citizen and community groups.6

From 1977 to 1981, this office developed three major crime prevention programs and distributed nearly 50 million dollars directly to agencies. All three now have substantially ended and have been evaluated under the supervision of the National Institute of Justice. This report compares the evaluations of two of these programs -- the Community Anti-Crime Program and the Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program. The substance of the three programs was as follows:

1. Community Anti-Crime Program. This program, which began in 1978, was designed to provide resources to on-going and newly created community groups for the purpose of organizing and implementing their anti-crime activities. This program, more than the others, tried to respond to the legislative call for assistance. It funded more than 150 projects and allocated over 30 million dollars. The activities funded were

6 Center for Community Change, Editorial: "The Community's Stake in Crime Prevention." Action Line, 1(1), February 1978, 3.

primarily reduction of criminal opportunity projects but there were some diversion projects.7

2. Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program. This program, which began in 1979 to complement the CAC Program, was designed to provide city-wide organizations (either public or private or both) with resources to coordinate anti-crime activities throughout the city, to develop sound crime analysis techniques, to identify problems and strategies for coping with them, and to bring about a cooperative program involving all aspects of the community, public and private, citywide and local, community and criminal justice. As a complement to the CAC Program, it was designed to reach down to the local groups to provide assistance while the CAC Projects were designed to reach up to provide assistance to the system. Seven city projects were funded at an allocation of over 10 million dollars.8

3. Urban Crime Prevention Program. This was a jointly managed LEAA and ACTION Office program focusing on four types of community crime prevention/volunteer activities: Arson Prevention, Dispute Resolution, Victim Assistance, and Security/Crime Prevention. It funded nine community organizations to implement these activities and provided more than 5 million dollars. Many of the grantees were former CAC Program organizations or ACTION Office clients. Half were monitored by ACTION and the rest by LEAA.9 The final evaluation report has been published.

7 Community Anti-Crime Program Guidelines, LEAA Manual M450.1F, December 21, 1977.

8 Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program, Program Guide, LEALA, U.S. Department of Justice, April 1980.

9 Urban Crime Prevention Guidelines Manual, LEAA and ACTION, January 31, 1980.

As required by the legislation, each of these programs provided planning and implementation knowledge via several Technical Assistance contractors. Many of these contractors are still providing assistance utilizing non-Federal resources.

The National Institute of Justice funded the first two program evaluations. The Evaluation of the Community Anti-Crime Program began in 1978 and was funded at one million dollars. The Evaluation of the CCP Program began a year later, was partly supported by LEAA, and cost over $600,000. The Evaluation of the Urban Crime Prevention Program began in 1981 and was wholly funded by LEAA at a cost of $250,000, but the final management was under the Institute's supervision.

Community Crime Prevention Background

One of the earliest persons to point out the success of neighborhoods in controlling themselves was Jane Jacobs in her 1961 book on the Death and Life of Great American Cities. She observed that:

> . . . for all the innate extroversion of city neighborhoods, it fails to follow that city people can therefore get along magically without neighborhoods. Even the most urban citizen does care about the atmosphere of the street and district where he lives, no matter how much choice he has of pursuits outside it; and the common run of city people do depend greatly on their neighborhoods for the kinds of everyday lives they lead.10

She then went on to point out that "certain neighborhoods were relatively immune to crime, despite being located in highly urban settings where crime rates were high all around."11 She concluded that there was "a

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10 Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs, Random House, 1961; p. 117.

11 Ibid., p. 76.

concern by the residents about the quality of their neighborhood and a willingness to watch out for one another."12

At this same time in California, John G. Kearns, a police sergeant in Oakland, was conducting security surveys and working with local businessmen to successfully secure their property from unlawful intrusion. He later was able to get an ordinance on burglary security passed by the city council. His success led to the adoption in 1968 of his Oakland Security Code by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Crime Against Small Business. Sergeant Kearns later (1971) helped the National Institute to develop Federal Security Guidelines that were used in the development of standards for the Federal Crime Insurance Program and the Door and Window Security Standards by the Bureau of Standards.13

Another target hardening strategy widely used today had its start in California in the early 1960's. A program named Operations Identification (Op.Id.) was tested by the Monterey Police Chief to learn whether by marking valuable property and by placing a sign on the house or apartment, which indicated that the property was marked, potential burglars would be deterred. As in the case of the Oakland Security Code, the Op.Id. crime statistics showed a marked decrease in those establishments where these signs were displayed. National evaluations of several major crime prevention strategies were undertaken in the mid-1970's including Operation Identification and Security Surveys.14 The assessments of these two strategies found similar effectiveness but the results were not conclusive. More recent studies of commercial and residential security have

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12 Ibid., p. 76.

13 Urban Design, Security and Crime, Proceedings of a National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Seminar, April 12 and 13, 1972, U.S. Department of Justice, January 1973.

14 National Evaluation Program Final Reports: Operation Identification Projects, N.B. Heller, 1975; Citizen Crime Reporting Projects, L. Bickman, et. al., 1976; Security Survey Projects, Koepsell and Girard, 1976; Citizen Patrol Projects, Robert Yin, 1976; Street Lighting Projects, James Tien, et. al., 1977. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

found that both strategies significantly affect fear of crime and that security surveys significantly reduce the incidence of crime.15

In addition to the test of improved street lighting on night street crime which showed its impact, national assessments were carried out on two other common citizen/community crime prevention strategies, crime reporting and citizen patrol. Although no firm evidence was found, the feelings of the participants and the law enforcement consultants were all positive that the crime reporting techniques, of course coupled with the target hardening strategies, do help improve citizen participation and hence, reduce fear of crime. Patrol of neighborhoods by citizens, on foot or in vehicles, is now very prevalent in the neighborhood watch programs. The national assessment of those programs not directly connected with such watch programs, as well as those which were in watch programs, concluded that resident patrols could be potentially effective deterrent (Bickman, et. al, 1976; Yin, 1976; Tien et. al, 1977).

All of this research and testing demonstrated the importance of gaining the support and involvement of local citizens in developing and carrying out crime prevention activities in both commercial and residential settings. Not overlooking the need for good technical advice and assistance, LEAA supported a police crime prevention training program in Louisville, Kentucky in 1971, called

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15 A Re-Evaluation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Program in Portland, Oregon, National Institute of Justice, Kushmuk and Wittemore, December 1981. See also CPTED Commercial Demonstration Evaluation Report, Lavrakas et. al., Westinghouse Electric Corporation, May 1978. Community Crime Prevention Program Seattle, Washington, an Exemplary Project, Paul Cirel, Patricia Evans, Daniel McGillis, Debra Whitcomb, National Institute of Justice, 1977.

Reducing Residential Crime and Fear, Floyd J. Fowler, et. al., National Institute of Justice, December 1979; Neighborhood Crime, Fear and Social Control, (A Second Look at the Hartford Program), Floyd J. Fowler and Thomas Mangione, National Institute of Justice, April 1982. Systematic Evaluation of the Commercial Security Field Test Program, Michael F. Cahn and James M. Tien, National Institute of Justice, 1983.

the National Crime Prevention Institute. Most of the current Crime Prevention Officers in police departments across the country were trained at NCPI or by similar programs in Texas and California.16 These programs initially focused on the hardware aspects of physical security but in time, developed tactics directed at social behavior to avoid crime and to increase citizen surveillance.

The Neighborhood Watch Program had its beginnings in the early 1970's, first in Minnesota and later nationwide through the National Sheriff's Association. The Neighborhood Watch Programs also were supported by LEAA.17 These watch programs brought crime prevention/security knowledge and assistance from the police to local neighborhood groups. The groups then organized to improve housing security, mark valuable property and report suspicious activities to the police. Some of programs later expanded to include citizen patrol of their neighborhoods both on foot and by vehicle and sometimes including the use of short wave radios to accelerate the reporting of crimes to police.18

Today, there are thousands of these programs in almost every corner of America. They have expanded in some cases to include non-criminal justice activities like fire and health security. Many if not all the projects funded by the three Programs included the Neighborhood Watch Program approach as one of several strategies. In addition to the watch type activities, the CAC, CCPP, and Urban projects included strategies to divert potential offenders, anti-arson projects, victim assistance projects, dispute resolution projects, court watching projects, etc. The major differences between the current Neighborhood Watch Programs and the CAC Programs is in the resources used to support them. The watch programs in general utilized volunteers and raised funds through community activities

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16 Citizen Crime Prevention Tactics, A Literature review and selected bibliography, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1980.

17 Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime Prevention, J.D. Feins, et.al., National Institute of Justice, January, 1983.

18 Ibid.

like bake sales. The CAC Programs all depended primarily on outside support from various government agencies or from foundations and other non-profit organizations.

Summary

In general, the Community Anti-Crime and Comprehensive Crime Prevention Programs had their origins in the neighborhood activities of groups of citizens or criminal justice practitioners attempting to remove or reduce criminal opportunities. The strategies and programs they were to implement had been developed from both research and practical experience in the area. The theme that best represents these programs can be stated as follows:

> The cooperation and involvement of the public in crime prevention activities together with expert advice and assistance from local law enforcement are necessary ingredients for a successful community crime prevention program.

The two community programs reflected this theme. The CAC Program supported local community crime prevention efforts to involve citizens in their activites and to gain the assistance and advice of local law enforcement. The CCP Programs sought the involvement of local citizens through the activities of local law enforcement agencies or some other citywide agency.

Although the reduction in crime is the goal of all citizens, recent research findings from the Hartford and the Reactions to Crime studies suggest that activities that can reduce fear of crime may be more important to the improvement in the quality of life than the more direct reduction of crime activites like target hardening and increased police patrol.19 Thus, strategies to increase citizen participation may have a greater effect on

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19 Reducing Residential Crime and Fear, Floyd J. Fowler, et. al., National Institute of Justice, December 1979; Neighborhood Crime, Fear and Social Control, (A Second Look at the Hartford Program), Floyd J. Fowler and Thomas Mangione, National Institute of Justice, April 1982.
The Reactions to Crime Project, Executive Summary, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, May 1982.

improving the quality of life since in the long run they probably reduce fear of crime. Strategies that addressed assistance or services to the community (victim assistance and dispute resolution projects) were frequently used since they served to increase citizen interaction.

Finally, what should we have expected from the CAC and CCP Program Evaluations? In the most general sense, we would want to know "what happened" at the local level in response to two Federal initiatives, both designed to stimulate local action. We would want to know the extent to which planning and coordination among local agencies and community organizations actually occurred. We would want to know what kinds of activities were undertaken, how well they were carried out, and whether citizen participation was a central feature.

The evaluations focused on process rather than on impact. There was no direct measurement of reduction in crime or in fear of crime; these longer-term, hoped-for outcomes would be no more than hypothesized consequences of the changes that were documented in local response to crime. In the final analysis, the evaluations should add to our understanding of what Federal initiatives can or cannot bring about at the local level.

II. GOALS OF THE PROGRAMS

In what is almost an aside in a book that is not devoted to the topic of evaluation, March comments:

> . . . we need to reconsider evaluation. As nearly as I can determine, there is nothing in a formal theory of evaluation that requires that the criterion function for evaluation be specified in advance. In particular, the evaluation of social experiments need not be in terms of the degree to which they have fulfilled our a priori expectations. Rather we can examine what they did in terms of what we now believe to be important . . . . Experience should be used explicitly as an occasion for evaluating our values as well as our actions.20

Such advice departs more from the dominant rhetoric of evaluation than it does from the actual practice of evaluation. In their report on the national evaluation of LEAA's Pilot Cities program, Murray and Krug note that the definitive statement of program objectives first appears when the first Pilot Cities project was nearing the end of its third year.21 And Chelimsky, writing at about the same time of the LEAA High Impact Anti-Crime Program, noted that the very explicit objectives announced at the inauguration of the program, were overlaid with an evolving set of political and locally-imposed objectives, some of which

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20 March, James G. The technology of foolishness. In: March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. Ambiguity and choice in organizations, Universitetforlaget. Oslo, Norway, 1976.

21 Murray, C.A. and Krug, R.E. The national evaluation of the Pilot Cities program. Summary report. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975.

were in conflict with the original set.22 In both of these programs (Pilot Cities and Impact Cities), the national evaluations adopted a process orientation. They gave only secondary attention to the attainment or non-attainment of the outcome objectives that were the primary foci of the "official" statements of objectives.

The realities implied in the above, realities affecting both programs and program evaluations, are in no sense peculiar to the law enforcement/criminal justice area. In the National Institute of Education (NIE) evaluation of the Cities in Schools program, there was extensive documentation of persistent disagreement among the many sets of players as to what the "real" objectives were. Some of these remained unresolved after three years of a highly interactive evaluation; the final report presents the views of the evaluators and, as a rejoinder, the contrasting views of the program managers.23 The divergence of views between the Federal sponsor and the program operators was even more pronounced in the PUSH/Excel program of the Reverend Jesse Jackson. The point is well made in the report of the evaluation; after documenting the absence of significant effects in the intended outcomes, the report concludes with the following paragraph.24

> By the standards to which the Federal government is accustomed when it funds demonstration programs, the effects of the PUSH-Excel movement were off the scale. Imagine that in 1975 NIE had received a grant application for support of a demonstration project to disseminate information, counseling, and encouragement to inner-city black students. Suppose that it listed under its "goals and objectives" that 1) it would conduct

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22 Chelimsky, Eleanor. High impact anti-crime program: Executive summary of the national level evaluation. MITRE Corporation, 1976.

23 Murray, C.A., Bourque, B.B., and Mileff, S.J. The national evaluation of the Cities in Schools program. American Institutes for Research, Washington, D.C., 1981.

24 Murray, S., et al. The national evaluation of the PUSH for Excellence project. American Institutes for Research, Washington, D.C., 1982.

assemblies at more than a hundred inner-city high schools (in front of wildly enthusiastic audiences), 2) receive multi-page feature coverage in a few dozen major newspapers and several hundred spot articles over the life of the grant, 3) be the subject of a few hundred local and national TV and radio talk shows, 4) have full-page articles (with photographs) about it in each of the national news magazines, 5) be the subject of a full segment on the top-rated network television show in the country, and for a finale, 6) put 65,000 people in the New Orleans Superdome. It is doubtful that, had the program made good on these goals, the question of the magnitude of impact would have come up. The contributions of PUSH-EXCEL the <u>movement</u> seem secure. (Emphasis added)

It is the rule rather than the exception to find that a program's goals

- represent a compromise between what a program operator wants to do and what can be sold to the sponsor,
- are viewed differently by different actors, and
- change over time.

As noted in Chapter I, a persistent problem in community crime prevention efforts appeared to be the lack of coordination between the several activities, organizations, and sectors that might be active in a given place at a given time. Both the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) and Community Anti-Crime Program (CAC) undertakings were designed in part to overcome this shortcoming. While they were quite different programs in several respects, there is considerable commonality in the official statements of purpose. According to the <u>CCPP Program Guide</u>, the specific objective was:

> To test the effect of establishing well-planned, comprehensive, multi-faceted crime prevention programs in medium-size local jurisdictions through:

- <u>Coordinating</u> available criminal justice and non-criminal justice governmental resources (e.g., social service agencies, housing agencies, employment services, juvenile advocacy programs and services) in a concentrated crime prevention effort; and
- Enlisting and <u>integrating</u> business, industry, citizen, civic and neighborhood organizations, and other private resources in a <u>coordinated</u> crime prevention effort with criminal justice and non-criminal justice governmental resources in a local jurisdiction. (Emphasis added)

A similar theme was apparent in the <u>Discretionary Grant Guidelines</u> for the CAC program.

- The formal criminal justice system by itself cannot control crime without help from neighborhood residents in fostering neighborhood-level social controls.
- The provision of financial and technical assistance to community and neighborhood groups will encourage and enable them to mobilize and involve residents in effective anti-crime programs which will prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime, and improve <u>cooperation</u> among residents and criminal justice officials.
- Crime and the fear of crime can be reduced at the community level through increased <u>coordination</u> of anti-crime programming with other neighborhood revitalization efforts, e.g., social services and physical rehabilitation measures. (Emphasis added)

The basic objective of CAC, according to the <u>Guidelines</u>, was

- to assist community organizations, neighborhood groups, and individual citizens to become actively involved in activities designed to prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime, and contribute to neighborhood revitalization.

Both programs were therefore directed towards

- involving private individuals and organizations in crime prevention activities,
- involving non-criminal justice governmental organizations in crime prevention activities,
- integrating the activities of such organizations with those of the formal criminal justice system, and
- reducing crime and fear of crime.

At the same time, some pronounced differences in both the structures and the processes of the two programs suggested that these common elements would be viewed differently by CAC and CCPP. Given within-program differences in perception of goals such as those that were cited earlier, one would expect to find differences between two programs, however similar the terminology of their goal statements. The CCPP projects operated in seven medium-sized cities and were lodged in some unit of city government, generally the Police or Public Safety Department. The CAC operated in 96 cities, through 146 action projects awarded to community-based organizations (CBOs). These CBOs were given the authority and the resources to create their own services and programs; thus, crime prevention policy and practice would not be the exclusive provinces of the criminal justice establishment. The top-down versus grassroots-up mechanisms seemed certain to influence the "real" objectives of the individual projects, and especially to shape the meaning and mechanisms of "coordination and cooperation."

Summary

The two programs were derived from the same general rationale: that effective prevention and control of crime requires a community-wide effort that involves law enforcement agencies, other elements of government, and the citizenry in a coordinated attack on agreed-upon problems of crime. Their formal goal statements are very similar, as one would expect. But one might also expect that the top-down approach of CCPP would produce priorities and implementing mechanisms that differed from those adopted by the CAC's grassroots-up philosophy. In the next chapter, we examine the influence of these differences on the organization of CAC and CCPP efforts.

III. ORGANIZATION OF THE EFFORTS

The Sites

It is difficult to compare the seven cities of CCPP (Atlanta, Jackson, Minneapolis, Newark, Oakland, Portland, and Salt Lake City) with the 96 cities in which CAC operated. The following statements nevertheless attempt to give the flavor of a comparison, without pretense of completeness.

1. CAC cities are larger on the average than CCP cities. (487,000 vs. 332,000). But the range in population is also much greater for CAC. The extremes for CCPP are 164,000 and 405,000; CAC sites vary from less than 50,000 to more than 10,000,000.

2. Unemployment tends to be higher in CAC cities. Only one of the seven CCPP cities had an unemployment rate higher than the national rate; about 80% of CAC sites had higher rates than the national average.

3. CAC cities tend to have larger minority populations. The range is very large for both programs; three of the seven CCPP sites have very small minority populations while three have minority populations exceeding 50%. About 70% of CAC sites exceed the national average with about half of the projects having target areas with more than 50% minority population. (CAC target areas are generally not whole communities, though some are; there were 10 CAC projects in New York City [Manhattan] for example.)

4. CAC cities had higher proportions of families below the poverty line than did CCP cities. The difference is greater when CAC target areas (rather than the entire cities) are compared to CCPP cities.

5. For both programs, about 70% of the cities had violent crime rates higher than the national urban average. They exceeded the urban average for property crime also. But in both programs, the range in crime rates again renders the comparison relatively weak.

In summary, none of these variables is likely to help us understand any observed differences between programs; the within-program variance is simply too great.

The Grantees

Comparisons are even more difficult here since the natural dimensions that one would use to describe CCPP grantees are fundamentally different from those relevant to CAC. We will begin by presenting brief descriptions of the CCPP grantees and then present some contrastive statements for CAC.

First, we consider prior crime prevention experience at the seven sites. Table 1 presents data on eight indicators. A terse summary is that some sites had been extremely active (Atlanta, Portland) and some had been inactive (Newark, Salt Lake City).

Next, we look at the history of citizen participation in civic activities generally and in crime prevention activities specifically. Table 2 presents data on six indicators, two of which are specific to the criminal justice/law enforcement system. While three sites (Oakland, Portland, Salt Lake City) had had strong city-wide involvement, only the first two had large numbers of functioning Police block clubs.

Finally, we consider how the projects fit into the local government. Table 3 shows the sponsorship, reporting channel, and staff size for each site. The police department is involved importantly in five of the seven. Staff size varies from 10 to 20 persons. The minority representation on staff closely paralleled minority representation in the community.

What can be said about CAC grantees on analogous dimensions? The CAC grantees were of three general types: established CBOs leading a coalition of smaller, less formal neighborhood groups; a coalition of neighborhood

Table 1 History of Crime Prevention at CCPP Sites

Site	ICAP Grant	High Impact Grant	Amount of LEAA Funds 1970-1980	Prior CPU in PD	Existing CP Block Clubs	Prior Target Hardening	Prior Volunteer Participation in CP	Prior Media Campaign	Other CP Efforts	Overall History of Crime Prevention
Atlanta	No	Yes	$5,800,000	Yes	Hundreds working	Full range	Minimal	Every medium	Officer Friendly, PAL, lectures	Large number of activities run through PD, relatively high level of activity.
Jackson	Yes	No	$600,000	Yes	Handful working	Moderate, Op. I.D., CPTED, sec. surveys	Minimal	Minimal	Officer Friendly, safety ed., community service centers	Moderate range of activity, fragmented. Some citizen involvement in patrols, crime watch, receiving services.
Minneapolis	Yes	No	$1,200,000	Yes	Handful working	Full range available, few carried out	Minimal	Extensive campaign state-wide		Large range of services offered, few requested. Citizens not very active in CP.
Newark	No	Yes	$5,800,000	None	Handful inactive	Operation I.D.	Youth ptrl., auxiliary ptrl., inactive	Minimal	Rape prevention, victim services	Some police service offered. Few requests. Previous activity had subsided prior to CCPP.
Oakland	Yes	No	$200,000		Hundreds working	Full range available	Moderate	City-wide all media	—	Wide range of services provided over long period.
Portland	Yes	Yes	$2,600,000		Hundreds working	Full range available	Moderate	City-wide all media	Rape prevention	Large number of activities. Much research on results.
Salt Lake City	Yes	No	$600,000	None	None	Failed survey program	Hands Up, little else	State-wide campaign	None	Little CP activity prior to CPP. Police hardware activities, moderate media exposure.

Table 2 Prior History of Citizen Participation at CCPP Sites

Sites	Local Citizen Groups	Precinct Councils	Police Block Clubs	Funded Groups	Advisory Groups	City-wide Citizen Groups	Total Level of Involvement
Atlanta	A large number	None	Several hundred working	Economic Opportunity Atlanta	Neighborhood Planning Units	Large areas organized, none city-wide	Strong local involvement, little city-wide involvement
Jackson	Two neighborhood associations, two business groups	None	A few working	None	None	None	Very low
Minneapolis	A large number	One or two, inactive	A few working	A large number, Federal, state, and local funds	Planning advisory committee of citizens	Major areas organized, none city-wide	Strong local influence on city government, little city-wide activity
Newark	Some	All precincts organized, 2 of 4 working	A few, mostly inactive	A few	Citizens advisory board	None	Low local involvement, some citizen influence, no city-wide group
Oakland	A large number	None	Several hundred working	A large number, Federal, state, and local funds	Office of Community Development represents 7 districts	OCCUR (citizens urban renewal) Oakland Community Organization	Strong local and city-wide involvement
Portland	A large number	One of three precinct councils working	Several hundred working	A large number, Federal, state and local funds	Office of Neighborhood Associations, represents 64 groups	Extensive neighborhood associations	Strong local and city-wide involvement
Salt Lake City	A large number, counting local branches of city-wide groups	None	None	A few large organizations, Federal, state and local funds	Office of Citizen Participation coordinates with SLACC	SLACC, major city-wide organization CO-OP represents minority areas	Strong local and city-wide involvement

Table 3 Position of CCP Project in Local Government

Site	Sponsor	Director	Reported to:	Staff Size
Atlanta	Department of Public Safety	Division Head	Commissioner	10
Jackson	Office of Mayor	Police Chief	Policy Board and Mayor	19
Minneapolis	City Coordinator	Assistant Coordinator	largely autonomous	20
Newark	Police Department	Police Chief	Office of Mayor's Policy and Development Council	11
Oakland	Police Department Project Council Office of Community Development	Police Sergeant	largely autonomous	14
Portland	Police Bureau	Commander, CPU	Police Chief	16
Salt Lake City	Police Department Citizen Participation Office	Assistant Head, Citizen Part.	Director, Office of Citizen Participation	16

groups that formed a new organization; and, an established CBO operating singly. For the 139 grantees, the breakdown is: 42 (30%) existing coalitions, 18 (13%) new coalitions, and 79 (57%) single CBOs. Many of these organizations were relatively young: seven percent had incorporated before 1950, 5% in the 1950s, 30% in the 1960s, and 58% formed after 1970. Many were relatively inexperienced in managing grants: 39% had received no prior Federal funding and only 15% had prior LEAA funding. About 8% of the grantees had no funds other than the CAC grant; 25% had budgets of $50,000 or less, in addition to the CAC funds; about half had budgets equal to or greater than the average CAC grant of $183,000.

The prior programmatic experience of the grantees is shown in Table 4. While many of these activities are relevant to community crime prevention activities, relatively few have crime prevention as a principal or exclusive focus.

When asked to evaluate their prior experience with the police, 21% of all grantees viewed the relationship as unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory; 49% of the grantees used these terms to describe the relationship between their communities and the police. In a sample of 36 more intensively studied sites, about 1/3 of the project directors reported that their pre-CAC relations with the police had been adversarial.

The CAC project staffs were likely to be residents of the project target area and to reflect the minority representation of the area. Tables 5 and 6 present the relevant data. As shown in Table 5, in nearly 70% of the projects, the majority of the staff resided in the target area. The correlations between the proportion of staff of one race and the proportion of that race in the target area were uniformly high (r = .80 for Blacks, .87 for Hispanics, and .82 for Whites). Table 6 shows the relevant data for Blacks.

Relatively few staff members had prior experience in crime prevention; most were recruited for CAC from the regular staff of the CBO and most had been involved in the delivery of social services. Project Directors were usually experienced in managing staffs of comparable size but few had adequate training or experience in fiscal management; careful accounting was not a feature of many CBO operations; this was especially true of the smaller

Table 4
CAC Grantee Organizations' Program Experience

Programs	Frequency*	(%)
Community Organizing	55	(43.7)
Employment/Training	36	(28.6)
Education	35	(27.8)
Youth Services	27	(21.4)
Senior Citizen Services	26	(20.6)
Counseling	24	(19.0)
Crime Prevention/Victim Assistance	21	(16.7)
Housing Assistance	21	(16.7)
Child Care	19	(15.1)
Advocacy	18	(14.3)
Information and Referral	16	(12.7)
Technical Assistance/Training	16	(12.7)
Social Services	14	(11.1)
Housing Rehabilitation	13	(10.3)
Health Care	12	(9.5)
Head Start	11	(8.7)

*Multiple response possible.

Table 5
Proportion of CAC Management Staff
Who Live in the Target Areas
(n = 123)

Proportion	Frequency	(%)
Less than .25	23	(18.7)
.25 – .49	16	(13.0)
.50 – .74	45	(36.6)
.75 – .99	10	(8.1)
1.00	29	(23.6)

Table 6
Percentage of Blacks in the CAC Target Area
Compared to Percentage of Blacks on the Staff
(n = 105)

Frequency Percent	% of Target Area Population Who Are Black Less than 6%	7-26%	30-62%	63-100%	
Less than 7%	18 66.7	8 29.6	1 3.8	1 4.0	28
8 - 27%	7 25.9	13 48.1	4 15.4	2 8.0	26
28 - 69%	2 7.4	5 18.5	14 53.8	3 12.0	24
70 - 100%	0 0.0	1 3.7	7 26.9	19 76.0	27
	27 100.0	27 100.0	26 100.0	25 100.0	

ones that had managed relatively small budgets and depended heavily on volunteer staff.

Summary

What can be said about the similarities and differences between CAC and CCPP with regard to their sites and organizations? On some dimensions, almost nothing; the variance within a program overwhelms the variance between programs. Thus, we can make no sensible comparative statements with regard to population size, proportion of minorities, or crime rates. We can say that the projects are similar with respect to their minority representation on staff; in both programs the proportion of minorities on the staffs reflected the proportion of minorities in the target area. As noted earlier, they also are similar with regard to purpose; reductions in crime and fear of crime through coordinated action of all sectors is a hallmark of both.

The differences were more numerous and seem to be more important.

1. CCPP was in and of the establishment; CAC was not. This difference was, of course, a feature of the program designs rather than an unexpected outcome.

2. Perhaps as a corollary of the above, "coordination" took on greater prominence in CCPP than in CAC. One cannot read the CCPP staff titles without being struck with the frequent use of the term "Coordinator." This frequent use may stem in part from the emphasis given to coordination in the grant announcement. But the fact remains that many CCPP staff were "Coordinators." Two Project Directors had the term as part of their titles.

3. CCPP sites had lower rates of unemployment and lower proportions of families below the poverty line than did CAC sites.

4. The CCPP grantees were more experienced in crime prevention than were their counterparts in CAC. Again, this was recognized in the

program design; CAC included provisions for technical assistance through four separate grants. But the range of needs for TA was probably underestimated.

In the following chapter we examine what the projects did and how they went about doing it. Both the form and the substance are affected by the organizational differences noted above.

IV. PROJECT ACTIVITIES

The basic descriptive data are lists of activities undertaken by each CAC and CCP project. When the lists are aggregated across all projects in a program, we can make descriptive statements such as:

- 37 CAC projects conducted home security surveys;
- 10 CAC projects conducted security training programs;
- 46 CAC projects carried out property identification programs; and
- 14 CAC projects conducted self-defense or rape prevention training programs.

Even at this simplest level, some classification has occurred; the evaluators had to decide, for example, that fourteen activities that went by various names, were of varying scope, and involved different numbers of people, could be fairly described as "self-defense or rape prevention training." At a higher level, all of the activities listed above could be classified as "target hardening" activities; this classificatory label would also subsume arson prevention activities, hardware installation, and direct deposit of social security checks. At a still higher level, sets of activities can be classified according to the general strategy that they represent, and it is this level that will receive primary attention in this chapter. We will classify the activities into four broad categories: opportunity reduction, cause reduction, system assistance, and victim assistance. As the following descriptions will indicate, these four classes can be conceptualized as ordinal elements of a dimension that extends from pure crime prevention to pure response to crime.

Opportunity reduction activities are generally directed toward some particular type of crime, such as residential burglary, purse-snatching, etc. Such programs often include an educational component designed to acquaint the populace with the nature of the threat and with steps that can be taken to avoid victimization. Target hardening and increased surveillance (through block watches or citizen patrols) are common examples. Opportunity reduction is a direct crime prevention strategy.

Cause reduction activities are directed toward social factors believed to produce criminal activity or to be concomitants of criminal behavior. Programs designed to increase employment, especially youth employment, are common examples of cause reduction activities; other examples are recreation programs, more effective and more attractive educational programs, the provision of tutoring, child abuse prevention, improved neighborhood amenities, and the like. Cause reduction is an indirect crime prevention approach.

System assistance includes all of the things that a community might do to help the criminal justice system work better. The range of possible activities is great. Lobbying for an increased budget for the Police Department, providing citizen volunteers to support the police, improving citizen reporting, forming advisory councils, or improving witness cooperation are examples. Some activities (e.g., increased patrolling) are of a crime prevention nature but most are directed toward improved response to crime. In general, system assistance deals with more effective management of crime and its outcomes.

Victim assistance activities attempt to minimize the effects of crime by providing immediate and longer-term aid to the victim and offering help in avoiding further victimization. Victim assistance activities deal almost entirely with ameliorating the effects of crime.

Given the background presented in the preceding chapter, it might be expected that CCPP would emphasize those approaches that most reflect the "establishment view" of crime: system assistance and opportunity reduction. CAC, being more a creature of the neighborhood, could be expected to emphasize cause reduction and victim assistance. These expectations are only partly confirmed by the data. Table 7 shows the percent of activities included in each category for the two programs.

Table 7
Percent of Activities Directed Toward:

	Opportunity Reduction	Cause Reduction	System Assistance	Victim Assistance
CCPP (N = 119)	62	14	12	12
CAC (N = 960)	59	26	6	9

Several qualifications should be noted in regard to these data. First, the method of counting activities (960 for CAC and 119 for CCPP) was not identical for the two programs; it is believed, nonetheless, that the numbers can be fairly compared. Second, the number of activities is not a perfect indicator of effort. A series of crime awareness lectures counts as one activity as does the organizing of 100 block watches. Third, an activity could have been underway prior to CAC or CCP; if the project continued something already started, the activity was included in the count. Nonetheless, the numbers show what the programs did in these four categories. What do the numbers show?

If we combine the first and third categories (on which CCPP was expected to focus) and compare that to the sum of the second and fourth (the expected emphasis for CAC), we get the result shown in Table 8.

Table 8
Comparison of Actual and Expected Emphases
(Percentages)

	Opportunity Reduction/ System Assistance	Cause Reduction/ Victim Assistance
CCPP	74	26
CAC	65	35

The italicized figures indicate the percentage of activities devoted to the "expected" categories. Since the number of observations is large (960 + 119 = 1079), the difference in emphasis between CCPP and CAC reaches statistical significance ($P < .05$). But this finding obscures rather than reveals. CAC did mount more activities in the cause reduction category, but we cannot ignore the practical significance of the similarity in emphasis for the two efforts:

- neither program invested heavily in system assistance or victim assistance, and
- both programs emphasized activities in the opportunity reduction category.

The most frequently mentioned activities in both programs were those directed toward citizen awareness, target hardening, and reducing neighborhood vulnerabilities through patrols, block watches, and other means. In each program these three subcategories accounted for more than 50% of all activities. The similarity in emphasis is more striking than the difference.

Why should the programs be so similar in regard to the activities undertaken? We can make no definitive answer but will offer several comments that we believe to be true in general and relevant to the particular case.

First, the notion that programs can or should be based on a careful analysis of local need followed by a formal and detailed plan addressed to those needs is a myth that has infected all social program areas. CCPP was initiated in accordance with this myth, despite the absence of any evidence that city agencies are capable of the crime analytic tasks implied. Activities are adopted because they are convenient (some are already in place), or seem sensible (as effective locking devices clearly are), or simply because they seem feasible.

Second, feasibility is the dominant requirement in the real world. City agencies and CBOs have lived long enough in the real world to have acquired a heavy layer of pragmatism. For example, media campaigns to make people more aware of crime problems are undertaken because we know how to organize media campaigns. Victim assistance programs, on the other hand, are far more difficult to initiate and maintain. Our knowledge of "how to do it" is

more limited and the requirements for organization and management are considerable.

Third, the mechanics of funding produce an artificial time pressure. A grant to a project is time-bound: it has a start-date and an end-date. The project manager feels under the gun to get things up and running; there is a clear perception that a continuation grant may depend on the level of activity in the first year. This environment is not conducive to the development of activities that have a lengthy start-up phase; the emphasis will be toward activities that can be initiated without a great deal of thought or planning. Activities that can be managed by on-board staff will be favored over activities that require specialized skills or knowledges that can be met only by recruiting new staff. The time pressure encourages the project to augment or "adopt" an activity that is already underway.

Finally, the range of feasible and sensible activities is rather narrow. There are no guaranteed-to-work strategies or activities; some block clubs persist over time and appear to be effective. Others disappear after short lives and some never get entirely off the ground. A great deal of energy is sometimes required simply to keep an activity going; as all managers know, staying in business takes precedence over making a profit. Once an activity is initiated, the city agency or the CBO has a serious stake in keeping it alive whether or not it seems to be effective. This is another reason for the "adoption mechanism" displayed by both programs; activities that were already underway were continued under CAC or CCP auspices. This inertial characteristic takes on added strength when a Federal sponsor is lurking in the background. It is an unfortunate truth that the mechanics of monitoring weigh against experimentation and changes in direction, and argue for the safety of continuity and common-place activities. The Federal bureaucracy has received most of the blame for this, and unfairly so, we believe. Had CCPP and CAC been sponsored by a private foundation, the monitoring function would have been carried out much as it was carried out by the Federal sponsor.

Not surprisingly then, innovation was rare in CCPP and CAC. Both programs organized and managed activities that are generally accepted as reasonable things to do. Neither program created waves. Why should we have expected otherwise; why do we continue to hope for bold new ideas

when we know that many bold new ideas fail and that our systems punish failure? Our society's admiration for risk-taking -- and to innovate is to take risks -- is actually quite restrained. We applaud only those risk-takers who overcome the odds and, by definition, most do not.

Summary

In comparing what the programs did, the similarities seem more noteworthy than the differences. There were differences: CAC gave more attention to cause reduction than did CCPP, and this difference was predictable. But one also might have predicted that CAC would emphasize assistance to victims of crime, and this prediction would have been wrong. One might have predicted that the CCP projects managed by the police would have given most attention to system assistance efforts, and this prediction also was not borne out. Both programs were dominated by opportunity reduction activities. With the benefit of hindsight, this might have been predicted on two grounds. First, opportunity reduction is directed toward reducing both the incidence and the fear of crime. For CCPP the primary goal of target hardening was to reduce the incidence of burglary; CAC could be energized more by citizens' fear of crime. There is no real inconsistency in these views. Second, opportunity reduction is something that we know how to do. A conservative assessment of feasibility is a prudent tactic for all real-world programs.

V. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND COORDINATION

As noted in Chapter II, both CCPP and CAC were to involve citizens in the planning and conduct of the programs. The Guidelines for CCPP made explicit that widespread citizen participation is a key to successful community crime prevention programming:

> The citizens of a community represent the single most important resource in any comprehensive crime prevention effort. In the past, the talent and skills of the people that make up our communities have been greatly underutilized in crime prevention programs. It is now recognized that tapping this resource is critical to the success of the programs. (CCPP Program Guide, pp.2-12)

The LEAA CAC program guidelines called for "evidence of substantial input from neighborhood residents in the identification of crime problems and assessment of needs."

The tenet of active citizen participation in Federal programs was first stated in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Title II of that act called for community action projects to be developed, conducted, and administered with the "maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served." The Act followed democratic theory in assuming that such participation would ensure that public decisions were sensitive to the needs of citizens and therefore that citizens would be more willing to accept such decisions. Some of those who supported citizen involvement in crime prevention had a further reason for doing so. As explained by Washnis (1976), "undermanned, over-taxed, and often non-community-oriented police forces" badly needed the assistance of the general public".

Further support came from Japan's experience with citizen participation and from research on the physical and social conditions that affect criminal activity. The Japanese have fewer police per capita than the U.S., and

their earlier history shows comparable levels of crime. But the Japaneses are ahead of the United States in developing an extensive network of neighborhood crime prevention associations to help the police in promoting crime prevention. According to David Bayley (1976), the result is much lower crime. The research of Oscar Newman (1972), Thomas Reppetto (1974), and Erving Goffman (1971) has shown that, in the proper environment, citizens can add substantially to surveillance of the community. This research and the Japanese experience indicate that, combined with the criminal justice system, citizen participation in crime prevention can have a strong deterrent effect on crime.

As the above citations indicate, the value of citizen participation seemed, in the 1960's and 70's, to be supported by a growing body of social science research. It was certainly supported by the growing number of social scientists who were becoming involved in the planning and implementation of Federally-initiated social programs. Increasingly, citizen participation came to be seen as a "good thing" to include in a program's design.

"Coordination" is also considered to be a good thing. It is, in fact, very difficult to martial support or develop a rationale for an "uncoordinated" attack on anything, be it an enemy tank platoon, urban poverty, or crime in the streets. So it is probably true that we have always held coordination in high regard. But the demand for it grew as we became more aware of the complexity of the systems that we had created. When one learns, as Mayor Lindsay did, that there were 22 agencies in his city's government that had some assigned function in regard to public housing, the temptation to call for "coordination" becomes irresistable. It is therefore not surprising to find, as we did in Chapter II, that coordination and its companion word "integration" were employed frequently in the goal statements of both programs.

For both of the above cases, the standard rationale stresses the improved product that is to result. A plan developed with citizen participation will be a better plan because it will be more synchronous with the needs and realities of its intended beneficiaries. A program that coordinates the delivery of related services by three agencies will lead to better services being delivered because inter-agency conflicts, ambiguities, and gaps in coverage will be eliminated. The rationale for

coordination also includes the argument that service delivery will be more efficient, since redundancies will be reduced. There are two points that must be made in regard to these rationales if we are to understand what actually happens when programs are implemented.

First, both coordination and citizen participation must have costs as well as benefits; but their rationales do not include explicit treatment of these costs. The obvious and direct costs stem from the time and resources that an agency must devote to coordinating with other agencies or to stimulating, organizing, and incorporating the participation of citizens. The total costs of these activities may be considerable, but they do not appear to be the major stumbling block in either case. The more serious obstacle is the often unacceptable cost of loss of power and control.

The potential loss is obvious in the case of citizen participation; the subject is treated at length by Moynihan (1969) in his account of the Community Action Program of OEO.25 He describes how the minimally denotative phrase "maximum feasible participation of the residents" was used to paper over the radically divergent positions held by the political establishment on the one hand and the social scientized advisors on the other. If participation meant that citizens were to be actively engaged in carrying out activities planned and organized by City Hall, mayors were all for it. But if citizens were to be involved in planning -- in deciding what activities would be carried out -- then the power of the executive would be seriously eroded. No mayor, liberal or conservative, wanted a CAP in his city that was not under his control.

Coordination always involves some loss of control. If two agencies agree to coordinate their schedules, for example, each agency loses some of the control over scheduling that it had enjoyed in the past. In even the most trivial cases, true coordination can be inconvenient, and overcoming inconvenience can require a great deal of effort. All roommates learn this rather quickly.

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25 Moynihan, Daniel P. Maximum feasible misunderstanding. New York, NY: The Free Press.

The threat of loss of power through coordination is more subtle but no less real. The threat derives from the efficiency argument: if services are not just coordinated, but fully "integrated," they can be delivered more economically. The power attached to a bureaucratic position is measured in part by the number of persons and the number of dollars controlled by that position. Suppose that two agency heads jointly and seriously explore the functions assigned to each, with the objective of eliminating all overlap or redundancies that come to light. Suppose further that they are successful: that by re-structuring the assignments and re-defining individual jobs, economies can be realized. All of the work accomplished previously by the two agencies can now be performed by fewer people, and hence with fewer dollars. The situation is a negative-sum game. One or both agencies may be reduced; if one agency gains, its increase should be less than the decrease suffered by the other. That's really what efficiency is about: increasing the ratio of output to input.

Events such as the above almost never occur because sensible people avoid negative-sum games. When Harold Ickes was Secretary of the Interior, he developed a compelling case for combining the National Park Service, which he controlled, with the National Forest Service, which he did not. His proposal, naturally, was to transfer the Forest Service from Agriculture to Interior; the non-occurrence of this union is generally attributed to the successful resistance of Henry Wallace, then Secretary of Agriculture. In reality, the proposal was as threatening to the senior staff of the Park Service as it was to their Forest Service counterparts. Everyone save Ickes was a potential loser.

How did these "good things" fare in CAC and CCPP? We first examine the extent to which citizens were involved in the initial planning process in the two programs. In two of the seven CCPP cities, citizens were involved in program planning from the outset; in both cases, a formal structure was already in place that made such participation a natural and expected occurrence. While the structures differed -- one was essentially a decentralized city government and the other was a confederation of neighborhood councils linked closely to city government -- the important points are that the structure existed and there was a history of joint decision-making. None of the cities without such formal structures and histories involved citizens in the early planning process.

The analogue for CAC was the existence or creation prior to the proposal submission of a network of citizens or community groups in the target area. Citizen involvement in project planning was very likely for coalitions and for organizations created in response to the CAC announcement. In the intensive-study sample of 36 CAC projects, there were eleven cases where citizens were significantly involved in writing the proposal. Of these eleven, nine were coalitions and one was an organization created for CAC. Citizens played an integral role in planning in 20 of the 36 projects; all projects reported some involvement, but for 16 of them, the activities were peripheral to the mainstream of planning.

But planning does not end with the initiation of a project; it is instead a continuous process. We must therefore examine the extent to which citizens were involved in the day-to-day decision-making after the projects were underway. For CCPP, the picture is quite clear: the two sites that involved citizens in the initial planning are both characterized by continued citizen participation in decision-making throughout the life of the project. In both cases, there was substantial participation in virtually all decisions about strategies, personnel and fund allocation. The record for the other five is:

- Site A had no citizen participation in decision-making for the first fifteen months; subsequently, a citizen's advisory committee of 35 members met once.
- Site B obtained a perfunctory review by citizens of an application for refunding; the citizen committee made no changes to the submission.
- Site C had no citizen committees or advisory board and made minimal attempts to involve citizens in any decision-making.
- Site D made almost no attempt to involve citizens. A committee formed to represent all segments of the community never met.
- Site E had no formal structure for citizen participation and there is no evidence of informal inputs.

The record is again quite different for CAC. In the sample of 36 intensively-studied projects, all had some kind of citizen advisory board; in the mail survey of all projects, 85 percent reported having a board with citizen representation, and some added boards later on. The decision-making authority of these boards varied, but most had considerable influence. In 20 (of 36) projects, the boards decided how CAC funds were to be allocated; in 14 of these 20, a board member had sign-off authority for all project expenditures. In 17 projects, the board reviewed applications for staff positions and made hiring decisions; project staff performance was evaluated by 17 boards. All in all, citizen participation in CAC projects was considerable, and in more than half of the intensive-study sample, citizens were esentially in control. There were CBOs whose staff controlled what the project would do and how it would be done, but these were exceptions to the rule.

In both CCPP and CAC, citizens were involved in carrying out project-initiated activities; citizens attended meetings, received training, patrolled streets, helped in clean-up campaigns and recreational programs, and volunteered their services for a variety of activities. One CCPP site organized 565 block clubs of 12 to 15 members each; another involved 1,350 citizens in 141 block clubs in its first year. Though there was more widespread and more intensive participation by citizens in CAC projects, the more significant difference is in the nature, not the amount.

The issue of coordination can be summarized rather briefly. In general, it didn't occur. In the CCPP program, the basis for coordination was to be the comprehensive plan derived from analyses of crime data. Only two of the seven projects attempted to assemble data beyond what was available in the Uniform Crime reports; both experienced severe difficulties in collecting and using such data. Neither effort produced useable data during the first year-and-a-half. There were, therefore, no comprehensive plans based on analyses of crime data.

The projects' efforts to involve non-criminal justice agencies in crime prevention activities was minimal and no mechanisms were established for on-going coordination. The projects did increase police department participation in crime prevention, but crime prevention remained outside the mainstream of police work. In none of the six sites that

also had CAC projects was there an effective coordinated effort between CAC and CCPP. There were disputes and/or active hostility between CAC and CCPP in two sites; in the other four, contacts were minimal. CCPP coordination with neighborhood groups ranged from minimal to moderate. At most sites, CCPP staff focused on developing their own activities; there was no adherence to involving other groups in comprehensive planning.

For CAC, the story is different, but it is not a story of uniform success. The first difference is that CAC projects had some internal coordination problems. Ten of 36 projects reported chronic problems in defining staff versus board roles; seven of these noted major disagreements between board and staff. Twelve of 36 reported expending a great deal of effort attempting to coordinate the activities of coalition member groups; this was particularly troublesome for new coalitions, where seven of thirteen reported problems. Fourteen of the 36 had difficulty initiating a working relationship with the police; eight reported problems with other agencies; and eight had continuing conflicts with other community organizations. Half of the projects were able to augment their efforts through the use of CETA funds and other local resources.

In common with CCPP, CAC spent most of its energy in developing and implementing its program; efforts to coordinate with others were minimal. In neither program did any integration of services occur.

Summary

1. In the initial planning phase, CAC was more likely to involve citizens than was CCPP. For both programs, the prior existence of a community network was the critical feature that distinguished between participation and non-participation.

2. In the conduct of the projects, citizens in CAC neighborhoods were far more likely to have day-to-day authority over project decisions than were their counterparts in CCPP communities. In a majority of the CAC projects that were studied intensively, citizen boards were in effective control; in two of the seven CCPP sites, citizens were involved significantly in the

decision-making, but it could not be said that it was their project.

3. Comprehensive planning based on analyses of crime data did not take place as intended in CCPP. In both programs, the coordinated attack on crime prevention that was desired, did not really materialize. In both cases, the internal priorities of the projects dominated the effort. Relatively little effort was spent on coordinating with other groups; managing the project-initiated activities kept staff occupied. The only exceptions were the projects that occupied a setting where the coordinating mechanisms were already in place.

VI. LASTING EFFECTS

All programs aim for some kind of residual effect, some legacy that will stand as evidence of the program's lasting value. As solid evidence, some things are better than others. A building is great as evidence: fifty years after its demise we know that once there was a program called WPA. For community crime prevention programs, physical traces might include new locking devices on doors and windows, window stickers announcing that possessions were marked for identification, or masonry-sealed vacant structures. Physical traces are visible and potentially countable. A new organizational unit -- as a crime prevention unit in a police department -- is also visible, but somehow it is less impressive as evidence. The question of what the unit really accomplishes is sure to arise; some will argue that the new unit detracts from "the real mission of the police" and therefore represents a loss, not a gain. The situation gets much worse -- possibly out of hand -- when a program is directed toward such intangibles as "increased awareness" or "new linkages" or "increased community involvement." And the programs under review were very much directed toward such effects. In the following sections we record our estimates of the residual effects of CAC and CCPP.

1. Physical traces. Both programs included target hardening activities; virtually every project had some activity of this type and for some projects it was the major activity. In addition to improved residential security, five of the seven CCPP projects conducted security surveys of commercial structures and all seven had some activity designed to reduce opportunity for crime against businesses. Commercial security was less prominent in CAC, but the total effect in target hardening was comparable to that of CCPP. Property identification also was prominent in both programs.

While these activities may seem unimaginative and mundane, they are perfectly sensible things to do. A great many dollars have been spent in evaluations seeking definitive proof that these interventions reduce the

incidence and/or fear of crime; as noted earlier, the results have been mixed. But there is a sense in which these evaluations miss the point. People believe that dead-bolts make it more difficult to gain entry through a doorway and that sophisticated locking devices complicate opening a window from the outside. There is physical evidence that door locks were in use 4,000 years ago and presumptive evidence that the practice was already widespread geographicallly at that time. The purpose of locks then as now was to protect property by limiting access. Locks are sometimes overcome by force and some locks are more effective than others for a given purpose. A very secure residence may have no effect on the neighborhood crime rate, if the neighborhood contains many residences that are not secure. Since locks are essentially an individual rather than a community investment, such programs may not be the most effective route to neighborhood improvement. But no one believes that locks make no difference; the target hardening activities of CAC and CCPP had, and will continue to have, a positive effect on the persons and structures that were directly affected.

Property identification also has a long history; the hot-iron branding of livestock was in practice by 2000 B.C. More recent, but still long-standing examples include name tags stitched into clothing, registration documents, serial numbers on manufactured items, and "Property of . . ." stencils. Most of these forms of identification probably have some deterrent effect on some kinds of theft. But property identification is not directed exclusively to prevention; a major purpose is to support a claim of ownership, especially in recovering property that has been lost or stolen. For either purpose -- prevention or recovery -- the average benefit to cost ratio must necessarily be very small, as it is also for most forms of insurance. But this also misses the point. It is sensible and beneficial, both generally and for CAC and CCPP as cases in point, to conduct property identification campaigns. They can do no harm, the investment is not prohibitive, and they do some good.

2. Increased attention to crime prevention. Both programs devoted a considerable effort to increasing their communities' awareness of crime and specifically of crime prevention procedures. These efforts were directed to police departments, to other public and private organizations, and to citizens, both as individuals and as members of groups.

Both programs increased, at least temporarily, the attention given to crime prevention by police departments. The mechanisms used to bring this about differed. In four of the seven CCPP sites, the project was a branch of the police department, and in a fifth, the project and the police were elements of a department of public safety. Even in these cases, however, the project was seen by most police officers as a separate unit with functions clearly separable from their own. In several cities, attitudes at the patrol officer level were initially quite negative; they were suspicious of the project and many believed that crime prevention was not a legitimate role for the police. It is very much to the credit of the CCPP projects that these "keep the project at arm's length" views were overcome; the police became very much involved in project-initiated crime prevention activities.

In CAC, the projects were independent of all city agencies, of course; as noted earlier, pre-project relations between the CBOs and police were seldom good and were publicly adversarial in some cases. A major achievement of CAC and the police departments with which they interacted was the marked improvement in relations. In the final survey, 90% of the projects reported improved relations, the other 10% saying that relations were "about the same." As in CCPP, the police departments became major providers of services in support of neighborhood crime prevention activities. In the final survey, 72% of the projects reported that the police were supportive or very supportive of their efforts; 78% reported that police involvement was important or very important to the success of their activities. Before considering the persistence of these changes in police department behavior, we will review the programs' success in increasing the attention given to crime prevention by other organizations and by citizens.

As noted in the preceding chapter, neither program made a major investment in involving other organizations in crime prevention activities. It was not that CAC and CCPP did not want other organizations to be involved; the voluntary participation of public and private sector agencies would have been received enthusiastically by both programs. Rather, in both cases, the day-to-day requirements to maintain and manage the activities that the projects initiated became the force that governed allocation of staff effort. The projects learned that it took a great deal of time to get other agencies involved; further, the involvement could lead to debate over details,

to modifications in planned activities, and to delays in implementation. To a considerable extent, projects become simply the set of activities that they initiate and maintain; whatever their initial goals and objectives, the functional, day-to-day objectives become defined as "success" on the activities underway. Allocating effort to undertakings not linked directly to those activites cannot seem productive to the project management. "Getting other agencies involved" is deferred until "things settle down," which, of course, they never quite do. This story is not unique to CAC and CCPP; it is a perfectly general phenomenon affecting projects of all kinds.

Both programs increased awareness of crime and crime prevention among groups of citizens, and, as documented in preceding sections, some citizens clearly devoted increased attention to crime prevention procedures. A large number of citizens attended meetings, listened to lectures, watched demonstrations, and participated in individual and collective activities designed to prevent crime. Without asserting that all or any of these activities were particularly effective, we do assert that they produced some increase in citizen awareness. Some people probably learned a great deal, some learned little, and perhaps some learned nothing at all. But there had to be a net increase in the community's collective knowledge of crime and crime prevention procedures. A summary of the police involvement in crime prevention would take much the same form. Some departments will continue or even expand their concern with prevention, some will drop it altogether, and some will see a reduction. But it is difficult to doubt a net increase.

3. Neighborhood organization and cohesiveness. CAC was directed explicitly toward neighborhood revitalization while CCPP was not. But both programs wanted collective, organized action by residents in the fight against crime, and both worked to build and/or strengthen neighborhood organizations. The efforts certainly had effect: block clubs were created, some CBOs gained management experience, organized activities were carried out. In speculating on the residual effects, it is important to note that not all of the project-related neighborhood activity was directed toward crime prevention or crime reduction. The evaluations naturally focused on activities related to crime; that is what the projects were about. But once again, there is less than perfect congruence between the local view and the views of the central program managers as to what the projects were really about.

A message that came through loud and clear from CAC project staff was: crime (and/or fear of crime) is a very effective stimulus for organizing a neighborhood; it is an insufficient basis for maintaining an organization. This was perhaps the most often repeated message from the CAC projects. In project after project, staff reported that activities other than crime prevention became necessary if citizen interest and participation were to be maintained. The neighborhood organizations became active in housing, in neighborhood clean-up, in education and social services, and in a variety of activities only peripherally related to crime.26

If we assume for the moment that the CAC project staff perceptions are accurate -- that broadening the range of neighborhood activities is necessary to the maintenance of organizational vitality -- we should ask why this should be the case. Two related facts come to mind as possible explanations. First, even in a high-crime environment, crime can be considered as a rare event, in a statistical sense. Most residents of a high crime environment are unaffected most of the time. Consider a block with 250 residents that has a crime rate (violent plus property) twice the national average for urban areas. The statistical expectation is that a criminal event will occur in this block once every eleven days. Second, to the extent that the block organization mounts crime prevention activities that are effective, criminal events will become even more rare. Given a visible block patrol, for example, a diminution of criminal activity in the short term may well occur (though it would almost certainly not be detected in the community's crime statistics). If crime event frequency were reduced to one event every twenty days (still above the national average) the task of vigilance would become less rewarding and less likely to be effective. Under such circumstance, it would be entirely reasonable to add other neighborhood tasks so that the initial enthusiasm of the resident participants would be maintained.

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26 Almost any neighborhood improvement can be arguably related to crime reduction. Fresh paint on houses can lead to greater neighborhood pride, to more clearly demarcated private space, to more cohesion among neighbors, to more property-protective behavior, and so forth. The point here is simply that a house-painting program is not primarily a crime prevention activity.

It is also possible, of course, that the reports of CAC project staff are not veridical representations of neighborhood reality. Staff perceptions may, in part, represent a self-fulfilling prophecy; a broadening of the range of activities may be seen as necessary because it is desirable in terms of the CBOs' larger agenda. Those agendas obviously include objectives not easily encompassed by an anti-crime project; the needs and goals of the neighborhoods also transcend the project boundaries. And, as noted earlier, almost any neighborhood improvement can be defended if "crime prevention" is defined broadly enough. What an outsider might see as a dilution of the anti-crime thrust will be defended by locals as a natural expansion of that thrust. The causal arrow is not clear: widespread participation of residents may lead to a broadened range of activities, or a broadened range may produce more widespread participation. What we know is that the most persistently active neighborhoods were those with the broadest interpretation of what constituted crime prevention.

Will the active neighborhoods remain active? Will one of the lasting effects of the community crime prevention programs be an increased organizational capability at the neighborhood level? The conventional wisdom, derived from two decades of experience with program evaluation, is that program effects disappear in a relatively short time. Consistent with this wisdom, the CCPP evaluation reported "a lack of residual effects" of the High Impact Grant program that had operated in three of the CCPP cities five years earlier. From the examples given in the report (of the things that were expected but not found), it seems that the search was for specific program components that could be linked easily and unambiguously to the High Impact program. And such traces simply were not visible. If some future evaluator searches for similar traces of CAC and CCPP, we would expect the search to be largely unsuccessful and the verdict to be, once again, a "lack of residual effects." The verdict might or might not be correct; we question the usefulness of the traditional search as a mechanism for arriving at the truth.

Program identification -- the labeling of a set of activities as elements of Program X -- is strongest at the funding source, markedly weaker at the organizational recipient level, and very weak indeed for the people who carry out the day-to-day work of the activities. Even while a program is active (receiving funds), identification

with the program will be very uneven and will in some cases be almost non-existent for the agency staffperson or neighborhood resident who is carrying out a particular piece of work. The activity is the reality, the program label is essentially irrelevant. To conduct an adequate search for the residual effects of programs such as CAC and CCPP would require historian/anthropologist methods applied by observers long in residence. Evaluations will never -- nor should they -- spend the resources required for this level of search.

The CAC evaluators made an extensive effort to predict the extent to which the neighborhood's increased capability was institutionalized. Using all information available on each project, they applied a formal rating procedure to produce estimates of continution for each activity. Their summary estimate was that about half of the CAC projects would continue a majority of their activities after Federal funding had ceased. Variables that predicted continuation were (a) baseline measure of community problems/ deterioration (the more problems, the more likely to continue), (b) success in meeting implementation goals, (c) a focus on collective versus individual action, and (d) absence of organizational problems. In other words, CBOs that operated in high-crime neighborhoods and were successful in developing collective action, had developed sufficient momentum to continue. Not everything is transitory.

VII. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

When measured against the rhetoric that hails their birth, all programs fail. Neither CAC nor CCPP could escape this harsh reality. The naysayers of both programs could thus argue that their dire predictions had been confirmed; that the programs "didn't work" as intended. But a global prediction of a sure thing is meaningless, as is its confirmation. We need to examine the negative predictions in more detail -- to consider the specific charges that a detractor of each program would have made -- and to then assess the extent to which these charges were confirmed.27

The sitting duck for the critics of CCPP (and to a lesser extent of CAC) was the expectation (on the part of the program designers) that the cities would conduct detailed analyses of local crime data and then construct a formal plan that would address the needs revealed by the analyses. In Chapter IV, we noted that this expectation ("hope" might be more accurate) was unrealistic; there was little reason to believe that city agencies would be both willing and able to carry out the analytic tasks required. History offered very few examples of a city making programmatic use of crime analyses and no such examples were added by CCPP; the hoped-for analytic work simply did not occur. The critics' prediction was confirmed; the

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27 In 1982, Dr. Floyd Fowler prepared a review of the draft final reports of CAC and CCPP. In a very insightful critique of the drafts, he suggested that, "It is important to understand, and to present, what potential critics of each of these programs would say." In adopting this frame of reference for this concluding chapter, I acknowledge my debt to Dr. Fowler's review. Some of the points made in the text that follows are made also in his review. While I believe these points to follow from the material presented in preceding chapters, it may well be that I see them more clearly having read Dr. Fowler's critique. I acknowledge his contribution without implying any responsibility on his part for the judgments here made.

parsimonious verdict would be that the program's designers had established unrealistic goals that were beyond the capabilities of the projects. And the Federal managers would collect another demerit.

If, however, the goal is to learn something from the exercise, the simple verdict of failure will not suffice. If formal planning based on crime analysis is a good thing -- and it is -- we need to know how it can be achieved in community crime prevention programs. Two instances of successful planning based on crime analysis come to mind and it may be instructive to compare these to the CCPP non-event. In the Hartford project, extensive crime analyses were conducted by a consortium of contractors. One set of analyses focused on residential burglary in a target neighborhood. It was shown that passers-through the neighborhood -- both pedestrian and vehicular -- were responsible for a high proportion of daytime burglaries. Interventions were designed to divert transient traffic to the periphery of the neighborhood, reducing the opportunity for would-be burglars to carry out unobtrusive searches for targets.28

In several of the successful Pilot Cities projects, crime analysis was conducted by the resident project staff, with results fed into the planning units (often one uniformed officer) that the staff had helped organize in the police departments. While the analytic capability of the departments was improved during the life of the program, the real analytic strength in San Jose, Rochester, and the Tidewater sites resided in the Pilot City team rather than in the local law enforcement agency. As in the

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28 Parenthetically, it has always seemed to the writer that the Hartford project was a "large" intervention, with a considerable expenditure of Federal and private funds plus in-kind contributions of city personnel, focused on relatively small target areas. Both CAC and CCPP were "small" interventions, comparatively. The social sciences have largely ignored "size of intervention" and have developed no useful measures that would permit two projects or programs to be compared fairly. "Strength of treatment" measures are badly needed for comparative studies of social progams. (See Sechrest, L., S.G. West, M.A. Phillips, R. Reder, and W. Yeaton. Some neglected problems in evaluation research: Strength and integrity of treatments. In: Evaluation Studys Review Annual, 1979.)

Hartford example, the analytic-planning effort was initiated and largely conducted by outsiders who represented an added resource, a "free good" available to the city agencies. In neither case was the city agency encumbered with a future obligation to maintain a unit or to support a staff member, nor did it have to resolve competing demands for the staff analyst's time. Even when Federal funds are provided to support some function, the work often turns out to be "in addition to" rather than "instead of" the staff member's regular duties. Locating the function in some outside organization avoids this problem: in this case, the function is the "regular" duty of the staff person.

Critics of CAC and CCPP would have pointed out that coordination is hard to come by and probably would not occur through either the top-down approach of CCPP or the bottom-up strategy of CAC. The critics would have been correct and any "lessons learned" from the experience are not obvious. I can offer no better generalization than that coordination does not occur in response to external exhortation; if it occurs at all, it is in response to internal pressures such as budget cuts, a new administration, or some such. Such pressures imply a top-down approach.

In regard to citizen involvement, the CCPP critic would predict that cities would give little more than lip service to the idea and would reserve all decision-making to the city bureacracy; the CAC critic might argue that citizens would indeed be involved, but their widespread involvement would interfere seriously with effective implementation. Neither critic was fully correct, though the CCP detractor could claim five hits out of seven. As noted earlier, in two of the CCPP cities, citizens were extensively involved in every aspect of the project. The CAC critic was largely wrong on this dimension: citizens were heavily involved in the projects and, in general, carried out the activities successfully. In more than half of the intensively studied CAC projects, citizens were in effective control. Two generalizations seem to be supported. First, the grass-roots strategy is an effective way to get heavy participation from neighborhood residents. Second, with a top-down approach, heavy citizen involvement can be expected <u>only</u> if a strong participatory neighborhood structure is already in place. If the goal is to <u>create</u> such structures, the grass-roots approach is the way to go.

CAC critics would have doubted the capability of community groups to manage funds and programs responsibly. Doubts of this kind are widely held. There is a strong and persistent distrust in our society of both the motives and the ability of the "organized disadvantaged." We expect that records will be poorly kept, that funds will be squandered, that there will be much wasted motion, and that nothing much will get done. And these expectations carry the hidden implication that none of these bad things would occur if the funds were managed by an agency of government or by an established business organization. I know of no body of evidence that supports either facet of this belief system; the CAC experience certainly offers no support. Recalling that 40% of the CAC grantees had never before received Federal funds, it is not surprising that some organizations experienced difficulty with grant management. Most of these problems were corrected early in the grant period, and the newly-established administrative structures generally worked as intended. There were also early problems in working out the roles of the partners in newly-formed coalitions, but these issues also were usually resolved in short order. In general, CAC projects carried out their planned activities; they were not less effective as implementers than the city agencies responsible for CCPP implementation. The CAC organizations did not just "take the money": they used the funds to carry out programs designed to make their neighborhoods better and safer places to live. The "radical" experiment of funding small neighborhood-based organizations that had little if any experience in either crime prevention or managing Federal grants, turned out to be far less risky than the critics feared it would be.

What else have we learned? Both programs provided additional evidence that innovation is rare and is not produced by guidelines that call for innovative behavior. For the most part, activities are undertaken because they appear to be reasonable and doable, and the perceived range of the doable is rather narrow. I do not view this as a negative outcome; improving the quality of neighborhood life is good, in and of itself. There is no necessary advantage in making the improvement through truly unique approaches.

Were the efforts worthwhile? Could either or both have been improved by some changes in design? Is any lasting benefit likely? My answers are "yes," "probably not," and "probably," respectively.

First of all, neither program had any pronounced negative effects; neither was viewed by the participants as a failure, a waste of time and money, or as "another example of the Feds not knowing what they're doing." Neither program was advertised as the solution to the problems of crime; both were seen appropriately as sensible, incremental steps toward solutions.

Second, there were no conspicuous design weaknesses. If the call for detailed crime analyses and coordination of effort was unrealistic, it is not obvious that the use of these terms did any damage. Perhaps they even did some good; someone, somewhere, may have been inspired to "coordinate" his or her effort with someone else. And as we noted earlier, no funding agency could suggest that its grantees follow an uncoordinated approach that ignored all data on crime.

Finally, CAC especially, and some CCPP sites, engaged the attention of new players in the community crime prevention game. This is a clear plus and the CAC approach is tailor-made to produce it. Fowler, in the review previously cited, saw the real benefit of CAC as "increased problem-solving capability of neighborhood organizations;" and believed that this capability would be of lasting value. Whether "problem-solving capability" is the correct term could be argued; what is not arguable is that CAC neighborhoods became better organized, carried out activities that were seen as valuable by the residents, and thereby took more control over their own and their neighborhood's destiny.

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