


93582

National Criminal Justice Reference Service



This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

8/8/84

AGGRESSIVE PATROL: A SEARCH FOR SIDE-EFFECTS

Gordon P. Whitaker
Charles David Phillips
Alissa P. Worden

NCJRS

APR 18 1984

ACQUISITIONS

Department of Political Science
and
Institute for Research in Social Science

The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill

93582
copy 1

The authors thank Robert E. Worden, Stuart Rabinowitz, and Stephen Mastroski for their comments and assistance. The support of the Performance Measurement Program of the National Institute of Justice, through Grant No. 82-IJ-CX-0030 is gratefully acknowledged. The interpretations and opinions expressed herein are, of course, those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Institute of Justice. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1983 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, held in Denver, Colorado.

ABSTRACT

Recent interest in the possible deterrent effects of aggressive or proactive policing raises the issue of such strategies' consequences for individual liberties and police/community relations. This study examines the latter -- specifically, the effects of four neighborhood-level measures of an aggressive patrol style on citizens' evaluations of police and citizens' propensities to report crimes. The results suggest that, for most citizens, aggressive patrol has almost no effect on either evaluations or reporting behavior. Surprisingly, one form of proactive patrol, the neighborhood rate of suspicion stops, seems to have a positive effect on the evaluations of police made by young black men.

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by

Public Domain / LEAA

U.S. Department of Justice

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the copyright owner.

AGGRESSIVE PATROL: A SEARCH FOR SIDE-EFFECTS

As social scientists have become more sophisticated in their analyses of policy impacts, they have become more conscious of the unintended consequences that all too frequently accompany social interventions. Unfortunately, discovering the negative side effects of policies is usually an exercise in hindsight rather than foresight. Each substantive area of public policy has, one suspects, its own catalog of errors. This is, of course, one of the perennial pitfalls in the analysis of policy impacts: easily observable benefits may blind one to hidden costs.¹

Such a problem may have arisen in recent analyses of the effects of an aggressive or proactive police patrol strategy. Research reports suggest that certain aggressive patrol activities may deter some types of crime. James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland indicate that aggressive patrol can reduce the rate of reported robberies. Their work supports earlier findings in a San Diego field experiment that examined the effects of field interrogations (Boydston, 1975). In a more recent analysis using different types of data sources (victimization surveys and patrol observations), Gordon Whitaker and his associates reach similar conclusions: higher neighborhood rates of officer-initiated interventions with suspicious situations are associated with lower levels of several types of crime (1983). Although the

evidence supporting the usefulness of aggressive patrol is at best fragmentary, it is not too early to ask whether such policing may not entail hidden costs. In this paper we explore the possibility that aggressive patrol may adversely affect police-community relations.

We must emphasize that an aggressive patrol strategy does not imply that patrol officers behave in a hostile or unpleasant manner.² Such a strategy simply implies that officers initiate action rather than await demands for service. Our inquiry investigates the impact of a range of activities that might fall under the rubric of aggressive or proactive policing -- suspicion stops, residential security checks, order maintenance interventions, and officer-initiated investigations of reported crime.³ While Wilson and Boland (1978) seem to suggest that such activities are all different facets of a general aggressive or professional departmental ethic, others have found evidence that these actions may be relatively unrelated tactics (Whitaker *et al.*, 1983).

While we investigate a fairly wide range of patrol activities, our research does not include the full range of potentially negative side effects that aggressive patrol might generate. We do not, for example, evaluate the impact of field interrogations on citizens' constitutional liberties. While we consider such issues as important as the one on which we focus, we must leave their consideration to others. Our data only permit us to investigate the proposition that proactive or aggressive patrol behaviors are related to lower citizen

evaluations of police performance and less reporting of crimes to police.

CITIZEN RESPONSES TO AGGRESSIVE PATROL

Citizen satisfaction with police services is an important goal for most police departments. If a particular service delivery strategy alienates large or important segments of the populace, then that technology does not recommend itself to public agencies like the police. The use of such a delivery strategy would violate both public service values and ideals of democratic accountability. In addition, police administrators in most localities must depend on citizen support for the local tax levies that finance their budgets. There is, however, an even more direct reliance of police on citizen support. The goodwill and cooperation of the citizenry are exceedingly important crime-fighting resources for the police. As Bell puts it, "the police are more dependent upon public cooperation and goodwill than any other criminal justice agency" (Bell, 1979: 196).

A police department's ability to perform what is usually seen as its major function, crime control, depends heavily on citizens' cooperation. Citizens initially bring criminal behavior to police attention (Black, 1970); they almost invariably provide the information that leads to an arrest (Greenwood, *et al.*, 1975); they exercise considerable control in determining which arrests ultimately result in convictions (Vera Institute, 1977). The potentially harmful influence of aggressive police behavior on citizen satisfaction with the

police may in turn adversely affect citizen cooperation with the police, especially citizen initiation of police involvement. Victims of crimes, for example, have the option of reporting or not reporting their experiences. A wide array of factors determines this decision, but, as Harlan Hahn suggests, one predictor of non-reporting may be victims' evaluations of the local police (1971).

Citizens also play an important role in controlling the quality of police officers' work environment. The degree to which encounters are tension-filled episodes laden with overtones of fear and violence may depend as much on citizens' attitudes and actions as on those of the police. Favorable attitudes toward the police among the citizenry have important implications both for general police performance and for the quality of individual officers' worklives. Thus, each police technology should be evaluated on the basis of its effects on citizen attitudes and actions, as well as its deterrent effects.

For this reason James Q. Wilson, a long-time proponent of an active or aggressive police style, qualified his support for this strategy. He feared that some forms of proactive patrol -- field interrogations and order maintenance interventions -- might create problems in police-community relations. In his early work Wilson suggested that

'doing something' about rising crime rates means putting more patrolmen on the street and ordering them to be more alert. This, of course, increases the likelihood of the patrolmen coming into an adversarial relationship with citizens -- innocent people, to say nothing of guilty ones, who do not like being stopped, questioned, or frisked... (1968: 63).

He went on to add that within certain subgroups of the population, notably young men, blacks, and the poor, the highest costs in dissatisfaction might accrue. People in these groups may be subjected to interventions more frequently than will others, and they might also be more likely to hear of such incidents involving family, friends, or acquaintances (Wilson, 1968: 63-64).

More recently, Wilson has also presented an argument that suggests quite another unintended consequence of these types of aggressive policing. In reflecting on the Newark foot patrol experiment, he and George Kelling speculate that foot patrol reduced Newark residents' fear of crime (although not, apparently, the rate of crime) because officers on foot patrol were aggressive in making order maintenance interventions. They suggest that even in the poorest neighborhoods and even where white officers are intervening in the activities of black citizens in all-black neighborhoods, residents welcome police intervention in potentially disruptive activity (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). This argument suggests that the unintended effects of aggressive patrol might be to enhance citizen evaluations of policing and citizen cooperation with police. Perhaps the community relations side effects are generally beneficial rather than harmful. In fact, some officer-initiated activities -- especially residential security checks, and perhaps investigations -- might be expected to improve citizens' evaluations of their police. We note that possibility, but continue our focus on the search for unintended harmful

consequences -- those which can be costly to the communities with an aggressive patrol strategy.

Relative to the total population, the number of citizens involved in officer-initiated activity is very small. One need not, however, be a participant in such an encounter to be aware of the level of police aggressiveness in his or her neighborhood. Police proactivity might be perceived less directly. The more often, for example, one hears of acquaintances being stopped by police or sees officers involved in encounters, the more aggressive the police may appear. Thus, to the extent that actual levels of officer-initiated actions are apparent in citizens' random, day-to-day observations, they may influence the attitudes of those who have had no direct contact with police.

Despite the recent academic interest in the effects of proactive patrol on crime, only one study has rigorously examined its effects on citizens' attitudes. The author of the San Diego Field Interrogation Study not only presents data showing that the cessation of field interrogations results in an increase in certain types of crimes, but he also presents data indicating that no change in citizen satisfaction with police services resulted from changes in the level of field interrogations (Boydston, 1975). Interesting though they may be, these results are not entirely persuasive. The data were gathered in only three neighborhoods, and only two of these experienced even short-term changes in the level of field interrogations. The question could be better addressed with a larger sample of neighborhoods characterized by greater variation in the level of active patrol and more long-term stability in levels and types of

aggressive patrol. The analysis presented below is based on just such data.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF AGGRESSIVE PATROL ON CITIZENS

While our major interest lies in the relationship between aggressive policing and citizens' responses, we place our analysis of the effects of police style in a fuller model of citizen responses. The basic model that we use appears in Figure 1. As that figure indicates, our analysis assumes that both citizens' reporting of victimizations and their satisfaction with police services in the neighborhood depend on five sets of factors: police services to the neighborhood, individual attributes, individual attitudes, individual experiences with police, and neighborhood social characteristics. In our model, perceptions of specific aspects of police service transmit some of the effects of the independent variables to general evaluations of police performance, although we also posit direct effects for these variables. As Figure 1 indicates, we also expect that the effects of police action on reporting will be transmitted partly through perceptions and evaluations of police. We expect the reporting decision to be influenced by the same general factors that shape perceptions and evaluations of police, as well as the seriousness of the victimization.

'Figure 1 About Here'

Measuring Evaluations and Reporting

Our analysis of citizens' satisfaction with police services will be based on what, for rhetorical convenience, we will call evaluations and perceptions of police behavior. Evaluations are general impressions of the quality of police performance in one's neighborhood. Perceptions are assessments of more specific facets of policing in one's area -- tapped, in this instance, with questions relating to police honesty, courtesy, and equity.

We hypothesize that perceptions influence evaluations and that evaluations affect the decision to report victimizations. General evaluations are, we believe, abstracted from perceptions about less global qualities of the police and their behavior. Individuals do not observe, nor do they hear about, "police performance" in general: they observe, are the objects of, or hear about officers acting in certain specific ways -- intelligently, courteously, efficiently, legally, equitably. The aggregation of these perceptions is the basis for more general evaluations of the quality of police performance.⁴ We do not measure satisfaction directly. Rather, we measure the extent to which citizens believe their police to be honest, courteous, and equitable, as well as citizens' ratings of the general quality of police service in their neighborhood.

However, the process of attitude aggregation or development may differ significantly between two groups -- those who have personal experiences with the police and those whose knowledge is vicarious. Thus, we divide our population into two groups and perform separate analyses for "clients" and "nonclients." This is the same distinction that Brown and Coulter (1983) recognized

but characterized as the distinction between "clients" and "citizens." Our clients are individuals who, within the year preceding the survey, had direct contact with neighborhood police (i.e., as suspects, victims, traffic violators, or service recipients). Our nonclients are individuals who reported no direct experience of any kind with the police during the year preceding the survey.

Our discussion of the effects of police style on citizen cooperation with the police is based on citizens' decisions to report victimizations to local police. We focus our inquiry on the differences between those who reported victimizations and those who did not report because they felt that the police would not or could not help.

DETERMINANTS OF EVALUATIONS AND REPORTING

Police Services in the Neighborhood

We consider the effects of four distinct forms of officer-initiated activity or aggressive behavior (the exact operationalization for each variable appears in Appendix 2). The first of these, which previous research has linked to crime reduction (Boydston, 1975; Whitaker, *et al.*, 1983), is suspicion stops -- officers' propensities to investigate suspicious individuals, vehicles, or circumstances. The rate at which officers engage in proactive order maintenance interventions (e.g., with drunks, public nuisances, juveniles, loiterers) is our second indicator of aggressiveness. Our third category of aggressive behavior includes officer-initiated investigatory

activities such as warrantless searches, crime scene inspections, and the questioning of witnesses beyond the immediate crime scene. The rate of residential security checks is our fourth indicator. All of these measures are indicators of the type of police presence in a neighborhood, but the amount of presence may also affect citizens. The density of police patrol in a neighborhood is our indicator of the amount of patrol service delivered to an area. Despite the findings of the Kansas City study (Kelling, *et al.*, 1974), we expect that in areas with more patrol citizens will evaluate police performance more favorably.⁵

Individual Attributes

Of all factors receiving attention in the literature, race bears the most consistent relationship to citizens' evaluations of the quality of police services (Furstenberg and Wellford, 1973; Smith and Hawkins, 1973; Schuman and Gruenberg, 1972; Rossi and Berk, 1974; Bordua and Tifft, 1971). However, the mechanism by which race affects evaluations is unclear. Many studies suggest that being black entails a general alienation from police that surfaces as expressed dissatisfaction (e.g., Schuman and Gruenberg, 1972; Rossi and Berk, 1974). Increased police aggressiveness, if sufficiently perceptible, may deepen blacks' image of police as intrusive, authoritarian figures (Jacob, 1971; Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969). That members of other minorities also evaluate police more negatively than do whites may provide some support for this argument (Lovrich and Taylor, 1976; Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1969).

Individual attributes other than race are also thought to play a role in molding satisfaction with police service, but they

are not as important as minority status. Research consistently finds little or no relationship between individual income and dissatisfaction with the police (Schuman and Gruenberg, 1972; Brown and Coulter, 1983; Baker et al., 1979; Lovrich and Taylor, 1976). However, individual education level bears a weak negative relationship to dissatisfaction -- better educated individuals find less fault with police services (Brown and Coulter, 1983). The relationship between age and dissatisfaction seems more complex. While younger individuals may be more troubled by issues of equity and the manner of treatment, they are usually more satisfied with the level of neighborhood protection than are the elderly (Brown, 1981).

Individual Attitudes

We assume that an individual's perceptions of government influence evaluations of the police. One's view of government's concern for his or her plight or feelings may color an individual's evaluations of the police (Stipak, 1977). We also include in our analysis a variable indicating the degree to which a respondent feels it likely that he or she will be a crime victim. Such a perception reflects the level of threat that one sees oneself facing and may bear some relation to one's feelings about the police; after all, their performance may make the environment more, or less, threatening (Biderman, et al., 1972). The results for these variables must be evaluated with caution: for example, fear or perceptions of government may affect evaluations, but evaluations of police may also affect fear or perceptions of government (Baker, et al. 1983). Any such feedback would lead to an exaggeration of these attitudes'

effects on evaluations. This reciprocity should not interfere with our estimate of the effect of aggressive patrol unless attitudes and patrol activities are highly correlated. They are not in our data; none of these correlations exceeded .1.

Individual Experiences With the Police

We expect that unsatisfactory experiences with the police will strongly affect attitudes about police services (Walker, et al., 1972; Smith and Hawkins, 1973). Three variables in our analysis focus on the nature of the experience with local police: an encounter in which the citizen was dissatisfied with police action is expected to produce unfavorable perceptions and evaluations of police. Similar responses are expected from citizens who have heard about someone being mistreated by the police. In addition, those who report a victimization within the preceding year are expected to rate police less favorably. All three of these variables will be included in our analysis of clients' attitudes, but only the second and third can be included for nonclients. Roger Durand et al. (1976) found that negative contacts with police had deleterious effects on satisfaction that were independent of the citizen's race. We, however, also examine the hypothesis that unsatisfactory contact with police has a stronger effect on the dissatisfaction of blacks than of whites by including an interaction term for these variables.

In addition, our model for reporting also includes a variable indicating whether the respondent's household suffered a serious personal or a serious property victimization during the

study year. We expect that serious crimes are more likely to be reported to the police.

Neighborhood Social Characteristics

Neighborhood conditions and characteristics as well as individual attributes, experiences, and attitudes are expected to have an impact on citizens' satisfaction with police services (Stipak, 1974, 1979; Lovrich and Taylor, 1976; Schuman and Gruenberg, 1972). We include two contextual variables in our model: neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood victimization rate. As Schuman and Gruenberg (1972: 386) indicate in their discussion of race and dissatisfaction with services, "it is not the color of skin, but the color of area that is associated with dissatisfaction." While we include the race of each respondent in our model, we also include neighborhood racial composition because it may, as Schuman and Gruenberg argue, represent an indirect indicator of service quality or it may reflect a climate of expectations concerning the quality of police services. Residents of non-white neighborhoods may receive inferior services, or they may be socialized to believe that such a discrepancy exists. Although some research indicates that the crime rate may be relatively unimportant in forming citizens' evaluations of police services (Stipak, 1974: 40), we use this variable in our analysis. The research indicating its lack of effect is not so conclusive that it can be safely excluded. We also control for metropolitan area, using dummy variables to represent Tampa and St. Louis, with Rochester as the comparison group.

THE DATA AND ANALYSIS STRATEGY

The data for our analysis were taken from the 1977 Police Services Study. Information was collected on police services in sixty residential neighborhoods in twenty-four departmental jurisdictions in three metropolitan areas -- St. Louis, Missouri, Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida, and Rochester, New York. Two data sets are used in our analysis: encounter data coded by observers riding with police officers in the study neighborhoods and a telephone survey of a random sample of residents in each study neighborhood. For police activity variables and some demographic variables, data were aggregated to the neighborhood level; hence our police data correspond to the neighborhoods in which our survey respondents resided. A fuller description of the data set and the exact operationalizations for each of the variables discussed above can be found in Appendices 1 and 2. We employ ordinary-least-squares analysis to test the relationships sketched in Figure 1.⁶

We first examine the relationship of police services to citizen evaluations of police for two groups of respondents -- clients and nonclients. There are few overall differences between those who had contact with the police and those who had no such contact. Nonclients tend to be slightly older, but clients and nonclients are equally likely to be white. Both groups are also quite similar in terms of education. Though all of the attitudinal differences are quite small, they display a certain consistency; clients rate police performance somewhat lower, and are more critical of the police honesty and equality

of treatment. They also are a little more negative about government. Nineteen percent of the clients (people who had contact with local police in the year before the survey) felt dissatisfied with the police action during the encounter, and seven percent had heard of officers mistreating citizens. Two-fifths of the clients lived in a household in which there had been a victimization during the preceeding year. Only fourteen percent of the nonclients had any victimization experience, and only two percent had heard of police mistreatment of citizens.

Both clients and nonclients receive similar levels of police service. For each, the average respondent's neighborhood has a patrol density of roughly one car per square mile during each eight hour shift, and one and one-third suspicion stops per unit for each forty hours of patrol time. (Some neighborhoods had almost no suspicion stops, while officers in other neighborhoods averaged almost four such stops per forty hours.) Rates for the other forms of active patrol are also almost identical for clients and non-clients. Order maintenance interventions occurred roughly once every eighty hours of patrol, and residential security checks averaged about one every sixteen hours of patrol. Officer-initiated investigative activity was pursued in roughly one half of the crime encounters in the neighborhoods of both clients and non-clients.

The relationships of determinants to citizen satisfaction with police services will be estimated through a recursive path model (see Figure 1). Our independent variables affect citizens' perceptions of police characteristics, which in turn affect their general evaluations of police service. The independent variables

also directly affect general evaluations. For both clients and non-clients we expect to find that the characteristics of police service in the neighborhood (particularly the rate at which officers make suspicion stops) will influence both perceptions and evaluations of police.

Our analysis of the effects of aggressive patrol on citizens' willingness to report crimes focuses on two types of victimizations -- those reported and those not reported because the victim felt the police would not be responsive. For this analysis, we examine only those respondents who identified at least one victimization that could have been reported to the police. We coded victimized respondents into three ordinal categories: those who failed to report all victimizations; those who reported some, but failed to report others; and those who reported all reportable victimizations.⁷

The specific equations used in our analysis appear in Figure 2. For each of the independent variables, we are concerned with its direct, indirect, and total effects. Consider, for example, the effect of suspicion stops on evaluation. Its direct effect will be its standardized coefficient in the equation for evaluation (That is, B_6 in equation 2 of Figure 2.) Its indirect effects are all paths which can be traced from suspicion stops to evaluation through intermediate variables. For example, one indirect path passes through perception of honesty, and is the product of the standardized coefficient for honesty in equation 2 and the standardized coefficient for suspicion stops in equation 3 -- that is, the product of B_3 in equation 2 and B_6 in equation

3. The sum of the direct path and all indirect paths is the variable's total effect.

'Figure 2 About Here'

FINDINGS

Citizen Evaluations

For clients, as Table 1 indicates, higher rates of aggressive patrol do not appear to produce more negative evaluations of police. With the exception of suspicion stops, which unexpectedly has a positive sign, none of the measures of proactivity reaches a conventionally accepted level of statistical significance.⁸ Suspicion stops are positively related to evaluation of police, but the magnitude of the coefficient (.036) is so small as to be substantively unimportant.

For clients, attitudes about local government, perceptions of police, and experiences with local police are the factors most strongly related to evaluations of police performance. The most important single factor generating a negative evaluation of police performance is an unsatisfactory experience with police; it has the largest direct and the largest total effect (-.190 and -.239, respectively). Individuals' perceptions of various facets of policing and their general attitudes toward government also have notable impacts. Not surprisingly, those who have negative perceptions of the specifics of policing or who feel that government is unresponsive or ineffective also evaluate police performance more harshly. The effects of attitudes toward

government are predominantly direct; they do not work through the more specific perceptions.

'Table 1 About Here'

None of the other variables in our model plays a major role in determining client evaluations. Interestingly, none of the individual attributes that have received so much attention in previous research has any substantial direct or indirect effect on dissatisfaction among clients. There is one consistent exception to this pattern; race of respondent and having heard of police mistreatment of citizens have relatively substantial effects on perceptions, and hence exert indirect effects on evaluations.

Similarly, for nonclients, higher rates of aggressiveness have virtually no effect on evaluations of police. Again, suspicion stops exhibit a stable, positive, but substantively insignificant effect on evaluation (.057); other measures of proactivity fail to reach statistical significance. Nonclients lack the experiences important to clients' evaluations. Otherwise, the results of the analysis for nonclients are virtually identical to those for clients: specific perceptions of policing and general attitudes toward government are the major factors associated with negative evaluations of police. Individual attributes of clients, like those of nonclients, make little difference in evaluations of police. For clients and nonclients, all three perception measures have effects of similar

magnitude, although none of them is strong enough to generate large indirect effects.

The major difference between the two groups is in the degree to which the models capture the variance in dissatisfaction. While 32% of the variance in evaluation is explained for clients, only 13% of the variance in evaluation is explained for nonclients. Clients' experiences with police account for the difference.

To examine the possibility that aggressive behavior might be considered problematic only by certain population subgroups, we ran our model for minorities, for males, and for the young. For each of these groups, the effects of aggressive patrol were consistent with those for clients and nonclients. However, when a model was run only for young black males the results changed. The direction of the effect for suspicion stops did not change, but the magnitude of the effect increased dramatically (.199). The rest of the relationships were quite similar to those for the entire sample. Like other citizens, young black men who have had negative experiences with the police or who have negative perceptions of police evaluate them less favorably (see Table 2). Moreover, this subgroup is not equally moved by each of the three perception measures; perceptions of courtesy and equitable treatment are stronger predictors of evaluations than is a perception of police honesty.

'Table 2 About Here'

Why higher rates of suspicion stops should be related to more positive evaluations of police by those thought to be most disturbed by them is puzzling. Possibly, the result is in part an artifact of our sample. Using a telephone survey, we reached only those young men who were at home when our interviewer called. These are not "street people." We can offer only a tentative substantive explanation for this finding: young black men are a very vulnerable group, often living and working in the least safe neighborhoods; they also may be among the least protected groups in society. In a dangerous situation they may be far less likely than are other subgroups to be offered assistance by other citizens. For these citizens, an aggressive patrol force may indeed be a welcome reassurance, as well as the only protection society offers. Previous discussions of the expected effect of aggressive patrol on this subgroup presupposed that, because they are stopped most often by police, young black males will interpret every stop as a harrassing event. Yet it appears that the needs of this groups are of the same order but a different magnitude from those of other citizens.

Reporting Victimizations

We now turn to the factors that influence whether or not victims report crimes to the police. As Figures 1 and 2 suggest, the same complex of factors we expected to affect attitudes toward the police are expected to affect willingness to report victimizations.⁹ Recall that we exclude from our analysis all those victimizations that went unreported for other reasons.

Our path model does not describe the data at all well. It explains only 6.8 percent of the variance in reporting behavior

(see Table 3). Relationships of evaluations and perceptions of police to reporting behavior are very weak. Consequently, there are virtually no indirect effects. Contrary to expectations, victims in neighborhoods with high rates of aggressive patrol and high patrol density are, if anything, more likely to report victimizations to the police, although the relationships are extremely weak.

'Table 3 About Here'

SUMMARY

Our findings are consistently contrary to expectations: aggressive patrol does not appear to have negative consequences for citizens' evaluations of police. Among neither clients nor nonclients did we find that higher rates of aggressive behavior in a neighborhood generate negative evaluations of police performance. Nor did we find aggressive patrol associated with the failure to report crimes. In fact, if anything, suspicion stops may generate somewhat more positive evaluations of police. Surprisingly, suspicion stops have their most pronounced positive effect among young black men in our sample. These findings challenge conventional wisdom about the side effects of suspicion stops.

We must, however, recognize the limitations of our research. We can only discuss the impact of the ranges of behavior in our sample. We can reasonably be concerned, as have been others (Boydston, 1975), that much higher rates of aggressive patrol

might move some citizens past a threshold of tolerance and generate more negative evaluations. Alternatively, our results indicate that a decrease in or a cessation of such behavior might lower citizens' evaluations. Suspicion stops may, for example, be one of the more visible means that police have available for advertising their presence.

Our lack of data on citizens' perceptions of the rates of aggressive patrol in their neighborhood is also a problem. The neighborhoods have different rates of activity and the citizens display different perceptions of police performance. We assume those differences in perception are generated by some recognition of differences in police behavior. The assumption, since we control for the effects of so many potentially confounding factors, does not seem unreasonable. However, we do not have measures of citizens' perceptions of aggressiveness. We would be much more comfortable if we could explicitly track the "aggressiveness--perception of aggressiveness--evaluation" relationship.

As we review our findings we must also remember the characteristics of our sample. All of our neighborhoods are residential areas. We did not interview those citizens who had no telephones, who were not at home, or who perhaps had no homes. "Street people" or juveniles may be the most frequent targets of what they view as unnecessary or harrasing aggressive behavior. That these people are invisible to interviewers makes them no less deserving of protection from casual intrusions.

This brings us to a final point: order maintenance interventions and suspicion stops (or the ways in which they are

conducted) may systematically violate civil liberties. Even if our findings are an accurate representation of a broader generalization, viz., higher levels of proactivity generate higher evaluations, that generalization cannot be allowed to obscure the political and legal implications of carelessly executed interventions or unreasonable restrictions on individual privacy and freedom.

In deciding whether or not to endorse a policy of proactive patrol, police and public officials must again balance the needs of their communities for order maintenance and crime reduction against the protection of personal rights. Our findings offer little direction on this issue; we address only the empirical question of citizen evaluations of police. Our finding that some forms of proactive patrol may reassure most citizens is an unexpected contradiction of our expectations: future research must assess the generality of this finding and focus on less measurable, but perhaps equally important, potential side effects of this patrol strategy.

NOTES

¹See, for example, Green, 1980; Hudson, 1980; Jones, 1980; Getz and Walter, 1980; Yandle, 1980; Poole, Regoli, and Lotz, 1978.

²We adopt Wilson and Boland's definition of aggressive patrol: "By an aggressive strategy we do not mean that the officer is hostile or harsh but rather that he maximizes the number of interventions in and observations of the community" (Wilson and Boland, 1978: 370).

³We do not include traffic citations, the measure used by Wilson and Boland. In these data, traffic citations correlate highly with suspicion stops ($r=.67$).

⁴One could also argue that it is general evaluations that shape more specific perceptions. The literature on attitude formation offers us little guidance on the appropriate causal order, and we find the assumption that specific perceptions influence general evaluations the most intuitively appealing framework.

⁵While observations of police activities were made during the same summer citizens were interviewed, we think it reasonable to treat those observations as measures of the types of police activity carried out in the study neighborhoods during the year preceding the data collection. We base this decision on information from interviews with police supervisors and administrators in each department that no major changes in patrol strategies or procedures had been implemented in the study neighborhoods during that year.

⁶This plan of analysis lends itself readily to interpretation and a straightforward presentation. It does, however, involve violations of some of the assumptions of regression analysis and standard statistical inference. First, our dependent variables are ordinal, rather than interval, which may produce minor distortions in the magnitude of the coefficients and their standard errors (Labovitz, 1970). Second, the respondents are clustered in neighborhoods within various departments, which alters estimates of coefficients' statistical significance. Neither of these violations is of such consequence that it threatens the interpretability of our results.

⁷Cases were excluded from the analysis if the victim did not report because he considered the incident unimportant, because he risked incrimination of himself or a friend, because it was dealt with by someone other than the police or he handled it himself, because the matter was too inconvenient, because of fear of reprisals, or because there was lack of proof or the suspect was unknown.

⁸The probability value for suspicion stops is .031, two-tailed test: all others fall short of a .05 level. All of the substantively significant effects discussed in the text are statistically significant at .01.

⁹Potential problems with this approach are the assumptions mandated by the cross-sectional nature of the data; e.g., low evaluations of the police could be the result of rather than the cause of a decision to report. However, we also analyzed victimizations, controlling for temporal sequence of negative experiences and opportunities to report victimizations. The results were little different from those reported here.

REFERENCES

- Baker, M.B.; B. Nienstedt, R.S. Everett, and R. McCleary (1983) "The Impact of a Crime Wave: Perceptions, Fear, and Confidence in the Police." Law and Society Review 17 (2): 319-336.
- Baker, Ralph, Fred A. Meyer, Jr., and A.M. Corbett, and Dorothy Rudoni (1979) "Evaluations of Police Services in Medium Size Cities," Law and Policy Quarterly 1: 235-248.
- Bayley, David H. and Harold Mendelsohn (1969) Minorities and the Police: Confrontation in America. New York: The Free Press.
- Bell, Daniel J. (1979) "Police and Public Opinion." Journal of Police Science and Administration, 7 (2): 196-205.
- Biderman, Albert D., Susan S. Oldham, Sally K. Ward, and Maureen A. Eby (1972) An Inventory of Surveys of the Public on Crime, Justice, and Related Topics. Washington: U.S. Department of Justice.
- Black, Donald J. (1970) "Production of Crimes Rates." American Sociological Review 35: 733-748.
- Bordua, David J. and Larry L. Tifft (1971) "Citizen Interviews, Organizational Feedback, and Police-Community Relations Decisions." Law and Society Review 5: 155-187.
- Boydston, John E. (1975) Executive Summary: San Diego Field Interrogation Final Report. Washington: The Police Foundation.
- Brown, Karin and Philip Coulter (1983) "Subjective and Objective Measures of Police Service Delivery." Public Administration Review 43 (1): 50-58.
- Brown, Michael K. (1981) Working the Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Durand, Roger, Darlene Walker, and Charles Davis (1976) "Blacks' Attitudes Toward the Police: A Comparison of Alternative Theories." Presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting.
- Furstenberg, Frank P. Jr. and Charles F. Wellford (1973) "Calling the Police: The Evaluation of Police Service." Law and Society Review 7: 393-406.

- Getz, Malcolm and Benjamin Walter (1980) "Environmental Policy and Competitive Structure: Implications of the Hazardous Waste Management Program." Policy Studies Journal Winter: 404-413.
- Green, Phyllis Strong (1980) "Confronting Influences, Unintended Impact, and Growth Management Policies." Policy Studies Journal 8 (6): 893-899.
- Greenwood, Peter W., Jan M. Cnaiken, Joan Petersilla, and Linda Prusoff (1975) The Criminal Investigation Process, Vol. III. Observations and Analysis. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.
- Hahn, Harlan (1971) "Ghetto Assessments of Police Protection and Authority." Law and Society Review 5: 183-194.
- Hanushek, Eric A. and John E. Jackson (1977) Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. New York: Academic Press.
- Hudson, William E. (1980) "The New Federalism Paradox." Policy Studies Journal 8 (6): 900-905.
- Jacob, Herbert (1971) "Black and White Perspectives of Justice in the City." Law and Society 6: 69-7.
- Jones, E. Terrence (1980) "Implementation, Indirect Effects and Impacts: Block Grants and Urban Policies." Policy Studies Journal 8 (6): 906-971.
- Kelling, George, Tony Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles E. Brown (1974) The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. Washington: Police Foundation.
- Labovitz, S. (1970) "The Assignment of Numbers to Rank Order Categories." American Sociological Review 35: 515-524.
- Lovrich, Nicholas P. and G. Thomas Taylor, Jr. (1976) "Neighborhood Evaluations of Local Government Services: A Citizen Survey Approach." Urban Affairs Quarterly 12 (2): 197-222.
- Poole, Eric D., Robert M. Regoli, and Roy Lotz (1978) "Linkage Between Professionalism, Work Alienation, and Cynicism in Large and Small Police Departments." Social Science Quarterly 59 (3): 525-534.
- Rossi, Peter H. and Richard A. Berk (1974) "Local Roots of Black Alienation." Social Science Quarterly 54 (4): 741-758.
- Schuman, Howard and Barry Gruenberg (1972) "Dissatisfaction With City Services: Is Race an Important Factor?" from Harlan Hahn, editor, Urban Affairs Annual Review. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

- Smith, Paul E. and Richard Hawkins (1973) "Victimization, Types of Citizen-Police Contacts, and Attitudes Toward the Police." Law and Society Review 7: 135-152.
- Stipak, Brian (1979) "Citizen Satisfaction With Urban Services: Potential Misuse as Performance Indicator." Public Administration Review 39 (1).
- _____ (1977) "Attitudes and Belief Systems Concerning Urban Services." Public Opinion Quarterly 41: 41-55.
- _____ (1974) Citizen Evaluations of Municipal Services in Los Angeles County. Los Angeles: UCLA Institute of Government.
- Vera Institute of Justice (1977) Felony Arrests. New York: Vera Institute of Justice.
- Walker, Darlene, Richard J. Richardson, Oliver Williams, Thomas Denyer, and Skip McGaughey (1972) "Contact and Support: An Empirical Assessment of Public Attitudes Toward the Police and the Courts." North Carolina Law Review 51: 43-79.
- Whitaker, Gordon P., Charles David Phillips, Peter J. Haas, and Robert E. Worden (1983) "Police Proactive Strategies and Crime." Paper presented at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, San Antonio.
- Wilson, James Q. (1968) Varieties of Police Behavior. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Wilson, James Q. and Barbara Boland (1978) "The Effect of the Police on Crime." Law and Society Review 12 (3): 367.
- Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling (1982) "Broken Windows." The Atlantic Monthly 249 (March): 29-38.
- Yandle, Bruce (1980) "Fuel Efficiency by Government Mandate: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." Policy Analysis 6 (3): 291-304.

Appendix 1: The Data

The data used in this analysis were provided by the Police Services Study, a research project conducted by the Workshop in Polical Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington and the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill between 1974 and 1980. Part of the project consisted of intensive data collection in 24 local police departments. On-site data collection was conducted in the summer of 1977 by research teams assigned to three metropolitan areas in which the departments were located: Rochester, New York; St. Louis, Missouri; and Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida. Departments were selected to produce a sample which would reflect a cross-section of organizational arrangements and service conditions for urban policing and, hence, is not representative of all police departments in the United States.

Some data instruments relied upon agency records, but most techniques were researcher-intensive--conducted independently of agency-supplied data. Most research activities focused on service to the sample of 60 predominantly residential neighborhoods, which were selected to reflect a cross-section of the service conditions with which each department dealt. Ethnicity and family income of residents served as the principal selection criteria.

Two major data sets from the Police Services Study were used in the construction of variables for this study. The first, observation of patrol officers, involved 7200 hours of in-person observation by trained researchers of more than 500 patrol officers in a matched sample (for day of week and time of day) of 15 shifts for each of the 60 neighborhoods. During this time period, 5638 police-citizen encounters involving more than 10,000 citizens were observed. Coding of each encounter covered 650 variables, including how the encounter began. A summary of the non-encounter events on each shift was also coded. Our indicators of police aggressiveness are neighborhood-level aggregations of these data, representing rates of activities per forty hour shift in each neighborhood.

The source of our individual attitude, attribute, and experience variables was a telephone survey of 12,022 residents of the sixty neighborhoods, approximately 200 randomly selected residents per neighborhood. The survey included 172 items, including respondent characteristics and household victimizations in the preceding year.

Our analysis examines separately five subsets of the sample of citizens surveyed for whom there are no missing values on the variables in the analysis. Clients are identified as those respondents who report having had any contact with the police during the year preceding the survey, as the result of a traffic violation, a reported victimization, a call for assistance, and the like (n=4443). Nonclients (n=2490) are the remaining citizens--those who report no experience with the police. We also analyzed all black men under 35 in the sample (n=400) and contrasted them with the entire sample (n=6923) 5099 cases were excluded due to missing values. Our last slice of the sample consisted of victims (n=1601) either of reported or nonreported crimes. Descriptive statistics on most variables were very similar for all subsamples; moreover, descriptive statistics for each analysis group of excluded (missing value) cases were not perceptibly different from descriptions of those cases retained for analysis.

Appendix 2. Operationalizations

PROPENSITY TO REPORT:

- (0) Did not report any victimization because "police wouldn't want to be bothered, futile, wouldn't do any good, couldn't do anything" (no reportable victimizations reported)
- (1) Reported some but not all reportable victimizations
- (2) Reported all reportable victimizations

EVALUATION OF THE POLICE:

How would you rate the overall quality of police services in your neighborhood (the two or three blocks around your home)?

- (1) very poor (2) inadequate (3) adequate (4) good (5) outstanding

POLICE ARE HONEST:

Policemen in your neighborhood are basically honest.

- (1) disagree (2) neutral (3) agree

POLICE ARE COURTEOUS:

Policemen in your neighborhood are generally courteous.

- (1) disagree (2) neutral (3) agree

POLICE TREAT PEOPLE EQUALLY:

The police in your neighborhood treat all citizens equally according to the law.

- (1) disagree (2) neutral (3) agree

SUSPICION STOP RATE:

The average number of suspicion stops per forty-hour work week per unit in each neighborhood. Suspicion stops include encounters classed as suspicious persons, prowler, suspected violator, person wanted by police, unauthorized entry, trespassing (residential and commercial), suspicious motor vehicle, open door or window, and miscellaneous stops of juveniles.

ORDER MAINTENANCE INTERVENTION RATE:

The average number of order maintenance interventions per forty-hour work week per unit in each neighborhood. These interventions include encounters classed as public nuisance, drunk, vagrancy, loitering, obscene activity, noise disturbance, peddling, begging, gambling, prostitution, curfew violation, juvenile problem, harassment, missing person, juvenile runaway, and miscellaneous juvenile problems.

INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY RATE:

Percent of crime encounters in which police officer(s) initiated investigative actions--searched premises or car without a warrant, looked around crime area, looked around car, and questioned persons outside of the immediate scene.

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY CHECK RATE:

The average number of residential security checks per forty-hour work week per unit in each neighborhood.

PATROL DENSITY:

The average number of observed non-administrative patrol hours per eight hour shift multiplied by the number of units assigned to each neighborhood, divided by the size of the neighborhood (square miles).

WHITE:

(0) black, Latino, native American (1) white, non Latino

YEARS OF EDUCATION:

(0) through (21)

AGE:

Years

GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED:

The local government is concerned about your neighborhood

- (1) disagree (2) neutral (3) agree

YOU CAN GET SATISFACTION:

A person can't get any satisfaction out of talking to public officials in your community.

- (1) agree (2) neutral (3) disagree

PERCEIVED THREAT:

Sum of responses to the following three questions:

How likely do you think it is that your home will be burglarized in the next year?

How likely do you think it is that your home will be vandalized in the next year?

How likely do you think it is that you will be robbed by someone with a weapon in your neighborhood in the next year?

- (1) not at all likely (2) somewhat likely (3) very likely

HEARD OF MISTREATMENT:

Do you know of anyone who has been mistreated by the (local) police in the last year?

- (0) no (1) yes

UNSATISFACTORY CONTACT:

Citizen experienced an unsatisfactory or very unsatisfactory contact with the police involving a victimization report, call for information, assistance call, stop, or complaint in the past year.

- (0) no (1) yes

BLACK * UNSATISFACTORY CONTACT:

Respondent is non-white and experienced an unsatisfactory contact with the police.

- (0) no (1) yes

VICTIM OF CRIME:

Victim of reported or unreported crime in past year.
(0) no (1) yes

ANY SERIOUS VICTIMIZATION:

includes kidnapping, aggravated assault, robbery, attempted robbery, rape, attempted rape, attempted homicide, motor vehicle theft, burglary, arson, and attempted arson.
(0) no (1) yes

PERCENT NONWHITE:

Percentage of neighborhood that is nonwhite using neighborhood's sample on survey.

VICTIMIZATION RATE:

Number of reported and unreported victimizations per 100 persons in each neighborhood.

TAMPA:

(0) no (1) yes

ST. LOUIS:

(0) no (1) yes

Table 1. Clients' and Nonclients' Evaluations of Police Performance

	CLIENTS			NONCLIENTS		
	direct	indirect	total	direct	indirect	total
Police are honest	.137		.137	.107		.107
Police are courteous	.092		.092	.075		.075
Police treat people equally	.113		.113	.106		.106
Suspicion stop rate	.035	.001	.036	.059	-.002	.057
Order maintenance intervention rate	-.007	.000	-.007	-.030	-.012	-.042
Investigative activity rate	-.010	.002	-.008	-.038	-.006	-.044
Residential security check rate	.019	.000	.019	.030	-.004	.026
Patrol density	.002	-.011	-.009	-.013	.005	-.008
White	.025	.037	.062	.008	.029	.037
Years of education	.015	.008	.023	-.032	.003	-.029
Age	.020	.012	.032	.037	.012	.049
Government is concerned	.144	.023	.167	.122	.033	.155
You can get satisfaction from public officials	.106	.028	.134	.053	.014	.067
Perceived threat	-.061	-.017	-.078	-.039	-.009	-.048
Heard of mistreatment	-.018	-.068	-.086	-.031	-.047	-.078
Victim of crime	-.013	.000	-.013	-.014	-.004	-.018
Unsatisfactory contact	-.190	-.049	-.239			
Black * unsatisfactory contact	.012	-.023	-.011			
Percent nonwhite	-.041	-.001	-.042	.023	-.016	.007
Victimization rate	-.074	.004	-.070	-.090	-.008	-.098
Tampa	-.041	-.009	-.050	-.015	.000	-.015
St. Louis	.082	-.019	.063	.064	.010	.074
R ²	.317(n=4443)			.131(n=2490)		

Table 2. Young Black Men's Evaluations of Police Performance

	YOUNG BLACK MEN			POPULATION		
	direct	indirect	total	direct	indirect	total
Police are honest	.023		.023	.130		.130
Police are courteous	.200		.200	.089		.089
Police treat people equally	.169		.169	.112		.112
Suspicion stop rate	.163	.036	.199	.042	.000	.042
Order maintenance intervention rate	-.001	-.013	-.014	-.015	-.005	-.020
Investigative activity rate	.028	.017	.045	-.018	-.001	-.019
Residential security check rate	.067	-.029	.038	.024	-.001	.023
Patrol density	-.063	.014	-.049	-.001	-.007	-.008
White				.015	.034	.049
Years of education	-.099	.012	-.087	.000	.007	.007
Age	.041	.020	.061	.024	.012	.036
Government is concerned	.170	.030	.200	.139	.027	.166
You can get satisfaction from public officials	.106	.051	.157	.088	.023	.111
Perceived threat	.031	-.023	.008	-.054	-.013	-.067
Heard of mistreatment	-.045	-.079	-.124	-.020	-.065	-.085
Victim of crime	-.040	-.012	-.052	-.011	-.001	-.012
Unsatisfactory contact	-.113	-.072	-.185	-.164	-.043	-.207
Black * unsatisfactory contact				.000	-.023	-.023
Percent nonwhite	-.093	-.001	-.094	-.021	-.005	-.026
Victimization rate	-.051	.052	.001	-.079	.000	-.079
Tampa	-.110	.027	-.083	-.023	-.004	-.027
St. Louis	-.018	.013	-.005	.084	-.009	.075
R ²	.315(n=400)			.268(n=6923)		

Table 3. Victims' Reporting of Crime

	direct	indirect	total
Evaluation of police performance	.067		.067
Police are honest	.027	.011	.038
Police are courteous	.026	.006	.032
Police treat people equally	.038	.008	.046
Suspicion stop rate	.054	.003	.057
Order maintenance intervention rate	.011	.001	.012
Investigative activity rate	.012	.003	.015
Residential security check rate	-.031	.004	-.027
Patrol density	.081	-.002	.079
White	-.003	.013	.010
Years of education	-.003	.06	.003
Age	.026	.008	.034
Government is concerned	.066	.018	.084
You can get satisfaction from public officials	.049	.014	.063
Perceived threat	-.039	-.014	-.053
Heard of mistreatment	-.062	-.020	-.082
Unsatisfactory contact	.070	-.035	.035
Black * unsatisfactory contact	.041	-.004	.037
Any serious victimization	.120	.001	.121
Percent nonwhite	-.047	-.003	-.050
Victimization rate	-.073	-.004	-.077
Tampa	-.126	-.007	-.133
St. Louis	-.131	-.011	-.142
R ²	.068(n=1601)		

Figure 2. The Equations and Variables

1. $x_1 = B_2x_2 + B_3x_3 + \dots B_{17}x_{17} + B_{19}x_{19}x_{19} + \dots B_{25}x_{25} + e$
2. $x_2 = B_3x_3 + B_4x_4 + \dots B_{24}x_{24} + e$
3. $x_3 = B_6x_6 + B_7x_7 + \dots B_{24}x_{24} + e$
4. $x_4 = B_6x_6 + B_7x_7 + \dots B_{24}x_{24} + e$
5. $x_5 = B_6x_6 + B_7x_7 + \dots B_{24}x_{24} + e$

Where:

- | | |
|---|---|
| x_1 = propensity to report | x_{17} = heard of mistreatment |
| x_2 = evaluation of police | x_{18} = victim of crime |
| x_3 = police are honest | x_{19} = unsatisfactory contact |
| x_4 = police are courteous | x_{20} = black* unsatisfactory contact |
| x_5 = police treat people equally | x_{21} = percent nonwhite in neighborhood |
| x_6 = suspicion stop rate | x_{22} = victimization rate in neighborhood |
| x_7 = order maintenance intervention rate | x_{23} = Tampa |
| x_8 = investigative activity rate | x_{24} = St. Louis |
| x_9 = residential security check rate | x_{25} = any serious victimization |
| x_{10} = patrol density in neighborhood | |
| x_{11} = race of respondent | |
| x_{12} = years of education | |
| x_{13} = age of respondent | |
| x_{14} = government is concerned | |
| x_{15} = you can get satisfaction from public officials | |
| x_{16} = perceived threat | |

END