

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RESPONDING TO DELINQUENCY: The Importance of the Community

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A gentle-looking elderly woman stands in front of a governor's task force that is considering changing the juvenile justice system. She calmly but convincingly speaks of the fear she and her contemporaries live in--fear of going out alone (now, even in the daytime), the anguish of helpless infirmity threatened by teenaged purse-snatchers, the crippling terror of becoming a victim of gratuitous violence. She offers a solution. Use the increasing number of vacant schools and state mental institutions to lock up more and more kids "so we can feel safe."

Politicans and the media sympathetically listen. But rather than evaluate the complex problems of heightened fear and this woman's demand to feel safe, many simply accept her suggested solution, and turn readily to locking up greater numbers of youths, without considering whether that will really solve the problems of fear and safety. The juvenile justice system is being reviewed in the light of current conservative trends in politics, the economy, and the public mood. Within the juvenile justice system, although the goals of individualized treatment and rehabilitation have not been discarded, the principles of "just deserts" and incapacitation have garnered increasing numbers of converts. One hears calls to get tough, and the policy proposed to deal with the juvenile crime wave, especially for "serious," "repeat," or "violent" offenders, is incarceration.

There is no solid empirical evidence of a juvenile crime wave. National Uniform Crime Report data for the past five years show no

significant increase in incidence or seriousness of juvenile crime. Independently gathered state and local criminal justice statistics, as well as self report and victimization data, support this "no change" interpretation. A report released last spring by the Research Division of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges estimates that the number of cases handled by the juvenile courts decreased each year from 1975-1978.[1]

In Massachusetts, youth arrests for serious crime actually declined slightly between 1977 and 1979, although there was some increase in the proportion of serious crimes that involved violence.[2] Between 1975 and 1980 the number of juveniles arrested in Boston declined by 36.2 percent.[3] Between 1979 and 1980, juvenile arraignments decreased approximately ten percent.[4]

What has grown dramatically all across the country is the vocal public concern about crime. This concern is reflected in the woman's testimony described above, in media coverage, and in the response of the criminal justice system--a response accepting the woman's suggestion while not considering carefully her problem. In Massachusetts, the special task force that heard her testimony called for an increase in secure beds from 75 to 250[5] at an estimated cost of $60 million in construction and operating costs.[6]

This "get tough" attitude has proliferated in response to the question, "If traditional treatment methods do not work, what else can we do but lock them up?" Indeed, the results of traditional treatment in corrections have been disappointing. Actually, treatment does appear to work, if it is pursued aggressively. The youth do well while in the program. But if they are then put back into a

family, neighborhood, or environment where many forces encourage the old delinquent behavior, where it's difficult to assert new, non-delinquent behavior, and there are no supports for the new behavior, the youth return to crime.[7] Increasing understanding of this problem of the temporary nature of treatment has led to another trend in juvenile justice, one using the least restrictive alternative, advocating deinstitutionalization, and trying out and increasingly adopting community-based services designed to produce long-term changes in the environment to which a youth returns.

This trend exists as a strongly contrasting alternative to the incapacitation strategy, which relies on secure confinement and has been found to be more expensive and no more protective of the community,[8] even in the short run.[9] In the long run, there are negative effects of incarceration that remain and are played out when the youth returns to the community.[10] Vinter, Downs and Hall report that 78% of a national sample of juvenile correctional agency directors indicated that "most adjudicated delinquents don't belong in an institution at all" and 54% felt that "community-based programs are intrinsically better than even the most effective institutions."[11]

Non-institutional services and supervision in a youth's community have been used for youth with varied levels of delinquent histories. The deinstitutionalization of status offenders and the diversion of first offenders have been widely accepted as responsible, humane, inexpensive, and more likely to prevent further delinquent identification and involvement than traditional processing in an institutional system.[12] The community-based system of youth corrections in Massachusetts has adequately handled most light and medium cases of delinquency with the mix of small group homes,

residential and non-residential alternative schools, foster care, counseling, intensive supervision, and Outward Bound-like programs.[13] The Department of Justice is replicating in several cities a community program for repeat serious juvenile offenders, the New Pride program that originated in Denver. In New Pride, offenders live with their parents, attend alternative schools, receive tutoring and individual and family counseling, and work through a job development and placement center.[14]

Our own research at the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice supports this community-based policy of handling youth as the best response to the problem raised by the woman testifying before the task force about crime on the streets. Over a period of twelve years, we have studied the Massachusetts juvenile justice system, at different times focusing on over-time follow-ups of youth, the politics of reform, the functioning of selected programs, courts, police, the closing of the institutions and establishment of community social control. Starting in 1970, the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice studied the changes as Commissioner Jerome Miller closed the training schools and replaced them with a regionalized system of community-based programs largely run by private agencies that responded to the state's call for diverse programs.[15] After the closing of the five institutions in the early 1970's, of those youth who were actively being serviced in programs, only 10% were in secure programs; 20% were in group homes; 20% were in foster homes; and 50% were serviced through non-residential programs. We followed about 500 of these youth through the system and out into the community. Then in 1978, the Center began a closer

examination of decisionmaking and conflict in placing youth in secure programs. How many youth should be locked up, which youth, and how long they should be incarcerated became a focus for the media and the public, as well as for members of the juvenile justice system. We interviewed policy makers and program administrators in the courts, DYS, and private agencies that had been contracted to run programs about the procedures and issues of secure placement. We studied 400 consecutive admissions to DYS and followed their cases for nine months to see how they were placed at varied levels of security.

All this work over the twelve year period, most particularly some of the earlier follow-up work, led us repeatedly back to the conclusion that the community influences to which a youth returns after time in a correctional program have much more to do with the youth's long-term success or failure than do the correctional programs themselves. Among the most compelling data driving us to these conclusions were the results of our analysis of longitudinal data on the cohort of nearly five hundred youth mentioned above who entered the Massachusetts youth correctional system in the mid-1970's. We interviewed these youth in detention prior to court, if they were detained then, and interviewed all the youth after court, at least once in each program they stayed in for as much as three months, and once after they returned to the community and either had been there for six months or had officially recidivated. The data included measures of many personal background characteristics and a few community characteristics, criminal history, both official and self-reported, extensive data on the social climate of programs and efforts in the programs to develop community linkages for the

youth, community experience after release, six-month self report recidivism data, and six month and one year official recidivism data.

The findings were dramatic.[16] Youth in programs that were more open to the community did better than youth in the more closed or secure programs. However, when the youth's background was controlled this difference disappeared, and it became clear that a youth's background was a better predictor of recidivism than program experience, in spite of the fact that programs varied over a great range from virtually unreformed custodial settings to a wide variety of innovative non-residential programs. Upon the introduction of a third set of variables, those describing post-program experience in the community, most of the effects of background were also washed out, and it became clear finally that the crucial factors actually determining whether a youth recidivated were the youth's experiences in the community after release. These experiences had to do with relationships with people in the community, including other youth. Thus changing the youth was not enough; the environment to which the youth returned had to be changed.

Other studies done in many parts of the country also tend to push us to this same conclusion. Evaluations of innovative programs, many of them with experimental designs, have frequently shown good effects while the youth was under the control of the program, only to have the effects wash out later when the youth are on their own in the community. Indeed this is the basis of the pessimism of such reviews as Martinson's.[17] Perhaps one of the most dramatic examples is provided by the thirty-year follow-up of the Cambridge-Somerville

Youth Program, where the treated youth, who got along well in the community while in the program, had, thirty years later, been in more trouble and had poorer health than those who had been left alone in a randomized control group.[18] The originally encouraging effects of the Community Treatment Program in California paled somewhat when it turned out that they reflected official lenience toward the treatment youth rather than less recidivist behavior.[19] The Denver New Pride program, whose positive evaluations seem more robust,[20] teaches key people in the community to take over the job of supporting and controlling the youth.

The importance of the youth's post-program experience in the community, even for youth who'd been in secure programs, convinced us of the need to learn more about the elements and expressions of social control in communities. Since 1981, we have begun to look at youth opportunities and services, day-to-day social control, and the political dynamics of community policy-making about youth in two Boston-area communities in the settings of schools, work, families, recreation, religion, social work, mental health, the police, and juvenile justice. All these systems are potential sources of social control that my exert varying force over a youth. As Cloward and Ohlin wrote twenty years ago in Delinquency and Opportunity, "delinquency is not, in the final analysis, a property of individuals or even of subcultures; it is a property of the social systems in which these individuals and groups are enmeshed."[21] A youth returned from the correctional system to the community is enmeshed in social control systems of the community, not in the correctional system. The crucial factor in recidivism is not the correctional placement, but the presence or absence of constructive linkages to these community social control

systems. The community social controls, including, among others, family, friends, neighborhood people and businesses, and schools, must be engaged to maintain the former delinquent's improved behavior.

Even within a community-based system, however, the issue of security for dangerous, difficult youth must be addressed. A viable secure component is needed for the few violent youth (in Massachusetts, about 10% of youth in the youth correctional system)[22] whose high visibility in the media may threaten a deinstitutionalized system if that system seems unable to cope with them. In general, however, if the system fails to provide community services and aftercare, more youth are likely to recidivate, resulting in more and stronger demands for greater numbers to be locked up longer.

For all youth, aftercare work in the community appears essential. Correctional programs must arrange for successors to their work, linking youth to supportive, responsive people in the community. They must contact, promote, (if necessary, establish) and, later, monitor and maintain a network of individuals and organizations responsive to the youth--parents, siblings, school teachers, guidance counselors, school disciplinary heads, employers, local police, organized recreational providers, etc. The aim of these efforts should not be "giving the kid another soft break," but should be instead a normalized system that includes sanctions in addition to supports. Effective limit-setting and disciplinary responses for inappropriate behaviors as well as rewarding responses for appropriate ones are essential. Correctional programs, to have long-term effects, must assist parents, teachers, employers, and others to provide both.

We turn now to how a correctional system can be redirected to do that. While this article focuses on correctional strategy, most of what we have to say also applies to prevention efforts. The aims and efforts of youth workers that we will be discussing that can contribute to controlling delinquency could be undertaken by any agency that deals with youth. Although we draw our examples primarily from the Massachusetts experience, we regard our findings and proposals for responding to delinquency as applicable to other states as well.

I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION-NORMALIZATION CONTINUUM

A. The Overall Continuum

As we have already said, one of the strongest findings regarding determinants of recidivism in our study of the reforms of the Massachusetts youth correctional system was the importance of the network of relationships in which the youth was enmeshed in the community. The importance of these networks extended beyond the traditionally obvious things, such as involvement in work, school, and community programs. Also important were supportive day-to-day relationships with family, friends, and the people one associated with on the street. In the face of poor relationships in general, good work and school relationships seemed insufficient.[23]

We have found it useful to think about these relationships in which youth are involved in terms of an Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum. With this continuum we describe the relationship among people in a specific setting. We define and measure it as an average of three constitutive dimensions: social climate, extent of community contact, and quality of community contact. Social climate reflects the nature of direct relationships among the

persons within the setting of a particular program. Extent and quality of community contact describe key features of the relationship of the youth in that setting to the larger, surrounding community.[24]

Because the conceptualization of this continuum and its constitutive dimensions is important to program planning and development, we will describe the dimensions in some detail, including general strategies for measurement, which a planner will need in order to assess the current state of a system before considering changes in it.

In the correctional literature the term institution is frequently used to refer to prison facilities isolated from the surrounding community by high walls, distance, or other physical barriers. As the community-based corrections movement has progressed, however, it has become increasingly recognized that group homes and other community programs can share with prisons the isolation characteristic of such institutions, even without the physical barriers. In general, the physical plant becomes less critical in identifying institution-like relationships among people when we observe that throughout society people are constantly excluded from self-development resources potentially available to them in other relationship networks or systems.[25] Such exclusion may or may not depend upon coercion or the threat of force. Instead it may arise from the application of such labels as "hard-core delinquent," "intractable," "slow learner," "minimal brain dysfunction," etc. and restrictive "tracking" actions taken in response to those labels.

While the maximum security prison remains the archetype of an institutional setting, other examples would be a family that has

turned inward to keep a retarded child isolated at home, a monastery, or a theocracy or utopian movement which is very isolated, depending on tight controls and the exclusion of disturbing outside influences in order to maintain the strong communal commitment necessary for the survival of the movement. Examples of the latter today would include the Hare Krishna movement and Synanon.

Examples at a slightly less obvious level would include tracking systems within a school system. Students who are not expected to accomplish much may be isolated in their own classes, with their own separate lunch hours and recesses, and less access to organized sports. Similarly, a family that discourages a child from attending school, severely restricts his social contacts and grossly neglects care for his health would be a good example. A child in such a setting will rapidly exhibit the effects of isolation from opportunities for social and physical development available to others.

The characteristics of a more normalized setting are somewhat easier to identify. The archetype is the family setting where youth are respected within the family and allowed open access to the larger community with supportive controls. Caring relationships within a normalized family are expected to extend concern well beyond the boundaries of the family, For example, if a youth is having problems at school, a parent in such a family would be expected to become involved, helping to work out the problem between the child and the teacher, or other school officials. Similarly, a normalized school setting would allow for easy flow into and out of specialized programs without labeling for various types of students, and would actively seek involvement of parents and other community people.

Clearly a normalized correctional setting will be much like such a family or school. The children will be treated with respect and will be allowed the freedom to develop different talents from one another. They will have access to a variety of correctional services, and will be aided in securing and maintaining extensive and qualitatively helpful access to the resources of the community at large.

In general it would be expected that a community based correctional system would have a large proportion of normalized settings, since normalization appears to be a key to success in the community after the correctional experience. However, because youth differ in relation to needs, problems, and stages of development, we would not expect such a youth correctional system to be made up exclusively of normalized settings. Rather, a range of settings should exist across the Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum to meet both the needs of youth and of society. We would also expect to see the more institutional settings used sparingly or as a last resort, while allowing youths to move progressively into more normalized settings before release where they may acquire more adequate support for their return to the community.

The conception of an Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum can be applied to immediate, short run, and long run consequences of programs. Immediate consequences are experiences of the youth while they are in the program, including both the social climate within the program and the extent and quality of linkages to the community. Short run consequences are frequently specific skills or new self images with which youth leave the program. These are meant to supply

a new element in the relationship or linkage of the youth with the larger community. Long run consequences are the ensuing actual relationship between the youth and the community--the bottom line on extent and quality of linkages to the community.

B. Extent and Quality of Community Linkages

Extent of community linkages is simply the frequency and duration of contact with the community. We hypothesize that more frequent and durable contacts with the community lead to more stable adjustments. The standard for what is frequent, or what is durable, will vary with the nature of the contact. For, example help with special problems in a work setting might not have to occur as frequently as general emotional support and encouragement, if problems at work are not a recurring source of difficulty.

Quality of community linkages can be specified by such indicators as:

1) the nature of the communication process between the youth and people in the community,
2) the youth's participation in decision making in the larger community,
3) the manner in which the community at large seeks to control the youth's behavior,
4) the youth's perception of the fairness with which the larger community treats him,
5) and the youth's overall access to the resources of the larger community.[26]

Measurement of extent and quality of community linkages presents a variety of choices. We can devise measurements of each of the

attributes we have mentioned: extent, duration, communication, decisionmaking, control, fairness, and access. Or we can devise more summary measures of overall effect and overall strategy. For example we could focus on youth behavior in the community and ask what opportunities to behave legitimately and illegitimately had been made available or possible to the youth. We could pursue this by asking what the correctional program had been doing to affect these possibilities in the community. If the system relies on institutional-type tactics such as having volunteers provide services in the institutions or arranging field trips to the outside community, we would expect the possibility of illegitimate acts to remain high, once the youth returned to the community, and the possibility of legitimate acts to be little improved. On the other hand, if the system attempts to provide more direct support through advocacy services to get youth into school, jobs, community programs, etc., and to keep them there, or even intervenes in more informal day-to-day relationships between the youth and his family, friends, and people he associates with on the street, then we might expect some decline in the perceived possibility of illegitimate acts and some increase in the possibility of legitimate behavior.[27]

Advocacy is a process that may take many forms,[28] but includes informing the youth and family about their rights and options, fighting for the youth's access to community resources, and providing ongoing personal and agency support. For example, a youth and his advocates might be able to develop the resources and particular supports this youth needs to stay in school and keep a job. Whether the work is done by a single person, perhaps a continuous case manager

who is in charge of following the youth and arranging for whatever resources are needed, or by a team of workers, the work of advocacy is detailed and continuous. Thus the advocates would have to make sure that the youth followed through and carried out his or her responsibilities, and also that the school and employer followed through on theirs. Much of the advocates' time may be spent in working to remove barriers to the desired activity--barriers in the path of the school or employer, as well as in the path of the youth. At the same time the youth's increased stake in the community may raise barriers to further delinquency; he may discover he has much to lose by getting in trouble.

It should be noted that what the youth perceive as possible is very much related to social factors of control, and is not just a matter of physical possibility. Physically, almost any youth can muster the resources to commit vandalism. Yet if one asks them, most youth do not see it as a possibility.

An alternative to this detailed measurement of process is to use a summary measure such as recidivism. Recidivism is a complicated measure to use, especially by itself, because it is so difficult to interpret. The difficulty is that it confounds the effects of many different influences and events in addition to the correctional program itself. For example, in our research on the Massachusetts system we discovered that recidivism results varied considerably when based on self report data, court appearance, or court disposition. Self report measures seemed to reflect more directly various social determinants of the youth's behavior, such as linkages to various social networks in the community, while court reappearance was related more to variables in decisionmaking by the police, such

as criminal behavior and social class, and court disposition was more related to the judge's knowledge of such matters as the youth's prior encounters with the court.[29] Both court reappearance and court disposition reflect idiosyncratic tendencies in decision making by police departments and courts. It seems that while recidivism is indeed an important measure, it is essential to have other kinds of data, such as we have been describing above, for evaluating what is happening in the correctional process.

C. Social Climate

Social climate reflects the relationships among youth, among staff, and between youth and staff within the correctional program. It can be thought of as made up of communication patterns (do the youth feel informed about what is happening in the program?), decision-making patterns (do the youth exercise some control over what happens to them?), nature of control (how are youth rewarded or punished for their behavior?), and fairness (what are the youth's assessments of the justice of relationships within the setting?)[30]

Two major strategies immediately suggest themselves for measuring social climate.[31] One is to measure directly the dimensions of communication, decision making, control, and fairness, and add them up. We could consider empirically and theoretically how the four dimensions cluster and thus produce types. We have found in working with several sets of data that three basic types generally emerge. One is the simple custody type where: 1) communication is severely restricted, 2) staff do the decisionmaking, 3) control is by punishment and illicit reward, and 4) fairness requires all to be treated alike in the continuing conflict between inmates and staff. The second is the therapy

type, as in therapeutic communities, where: 1) communication is intense, 2) youth are encouraged to share in decisionmaking, 3) control relies more on reward than punishment, and 4) fairness is judged differently by youth who have accepted the therapeutic subculture with its particularistic emphasis, as compared to newcomers who still equate universalism with fairness. The third type is in between where: 1) communication is free but not so compulsory as in the therapeutic community, 2) decision making is shared, but youth do not decide about each other, they do in the therapeutic community, 3) control is largely by reward as in the therapeutic community, and 4) fairness is more nearly universal than in the therapeutic community but more flexible than in custody.

The open type shares the sense of equality that one finds in the therapy type, but is not so intense. It is more like normal society than either the custody or therapy types since its social climate appears most compatible with strong community linkages. Both extreme custody and therapy tend to isolate the youth from the surrounding community. The in-between type does not. It might be called, therefore, the open type.[32]

The other strategy of measurement, not mutually exclusive with the first, would be to focus on the immediate effect these staff efforts produce on what the youth want to do when they get back out on the street. Since what happens within the program is on the sidelines of society, and does not change the actual situation on the streets, it is more relevant to what you want to do than to what they think they can do. So we could measure the youths' aspirations for legitimate and illegitimate activities once they

are back out in the community.[33] Since custody tends to produce an oppositional subculture,[34] a kind of latent rebelliousness, we might expect to find that under custodial conditions the youth were more likely to want to commit illegitimate acts than under therapeutic conditions which do not alienate the youth. In fact, however, we do not find much difference. Most forms of adult social control can decrease the desire to commit delinquent acts. The key differences among program types are therefore in the extent and quality of community linkages, which affect possibilities of different kinds of behavior.[35]

The relative unimportance of social climate, compared to extent and quality of community linkage, is further underscored by our studies of recidivism in a group of five hundred youth that we followed through the Massachusetts youth correctional system and out into the community after they were released. At the time of the study the system had a great variety of types of programs in operation simultaneously. We found that nothing that happened in these programs was as important as what happened when the youth went back into the community. The youth's friends and acquaintances, youth and adult, were much of the key.[36] There is a social control system in the community, just as there is within a correctional system, and when the youth is in the community, the community social control system is more important than the correctional one. To be effective in the long run, corrections must then affect the community social control system. That means it must advocate.

One way in which social climate is of major importance lies in the fact that social climates vary in their compatibility with

advocacy. The type of social climate most compatible with advocacy appears to be the open social climate. Therapy and custody are much less compatible.[37] It is possible, of course, to reap some benefit from therapy by following it with an open program featuring advocacy. But the bottom line seems to be that without the advocacy, all is lost when the youth leaves and returns to the community--the other social control system whose inadequacies brought him into trouble in the first place.

II. THE POLITICS OF THE SYSTEM

A. Interest Groups--The Three Sides of a Correctional Issue

The politics of a correctional system impinge on everything in the system. The Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum we have been discussing identifies the central issue to which other features of the system are adapted. But this is not to say that the Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum is capable of describing all of the goals of different groups that affect the correctional system. Indeed, one of the major distinctions among interest groups is whether their primary interest is substantive, i.e., having more to do with achieving and maintaining a correctional system of a certain type, such as custodial or open, as defined by the Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum and its three dimensions, or procedural, i.e., having more to do with the group's power in the decision making process regardless of the substantive result. The latter group may acquire considerable importance as a decisive ally in conflicts between more program-oriented groups. Thus we may broadly distinguish three general types of interest:

the first in favor of more therapy and/or linkages, the second in favor of more security and control and/or punishment, and the third in favor of making sure the right people's prerogatives are respected in the decisionmaking process, regardless of the outcome of the decisions.[38] Each of these three broad groups may be further split into factions. For example those interested in therapy may not always go along with those who want to promote advocacy.

The interplay and shifts of alliances among these groups are crucial for the viability of any program.[39] In general the groups that are interested in prerogatives in decisionmaking are crucial allies for the other two groups. Yet alliances obviously dilute the force of any one interest. We will not get far in designing new programs without taking this tangle of political interests into account.

B. Key Movers and Key People Who Must Be Moved.

The people who form the memberships of these interest groups include not only professional politicians but also staff of programs, administrators, parents, community groups, court personnel and police, teachers, employers, and the youth themselves--anyone, in fact, who is actively concerned with the issue of how adult social control over youth is carried out. The political actions of these interest groups range from the formal political process of the legislature to the attempts of a parents' group to influence how their children are disciplined in the schools. Actions consist of efforts to affect the strategies used by staff as they operate programs at various points on the Institutionalization-Normalization

Continuum. Thus we can measure these political efforts two ways. First we can directly examine what political actors (key movers) do. Second, we can proceed more indirectly and measure these efforts by their effects upon staff (key people who must be moved). The latter tells us more clearly what the political struggle adds up to--where we are. The former tells us more about the nuts and bolts that hold us where we are.[40]

The key ways in which political actions affect staff are by making staff want to do certain things, rather than others, and by making them more able to do certain things than others. Thus one way of assessing the political or policy making process is to find out what program staff think they can do and want to do, observing closely any signs of change in either of these two dimensions. We can readily place the possible and desired staff actions on the Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum, thus translating the dimensions of the political struggle into terms that make clear their implications for programming.

The other approach, focusing directly on what each political actor does and to whom, is also important for understanding how politics affect programs, since program developers need to know what specific actions they should take and what counteractions the opposition is likely to take. We might ask who all the concerned people and constituencies are, and what are they doing that could have affected what staff think they can do and want to do.

In the early 1970's we observed events in Massachusetts as one constituency decided to close the juvenile training schools entirely, rather than just promoting reforms within them. We saw that as one training school after another was completely emptied of youth, it

became increasingly impossible for staff to handle youth in the custodial ways characteristic of the training schools. Many of the staff from the institutions were moved into the new community based system that replaced the training schools, where they, along with new staff that came into the system at that point, found that they were provided with the necessary resources to practice advocacy with people and organizations in a youth's community--i.e., to move the programming dramatically toward the Normalization end of the Institutionalization-Normalization Continuum. They also found that the same constituency that had closed the training schools had also organized a new bureaucracy in which it was more rewarding to help youth to get into programs in the community than to try to supervise them directly. Thus the actions of the political constituency, attempting to reform the system, made it difficult for staff to continue in the old ways, and made it both possible and desirable to try new ways.[41]

III. A SYSTEM MODEL FOR DESIGNING AND RESEARCHING CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS

A. Scouting the System

If we are to approach seriously the reform of corrections we need a systematic way of bringing together all of the things we have been talking about. Woodcarvers sometimes talk about their work as an interaction between themselves and their materials. They say they are freeing something that is already in the wood, and they must learn to know the wood very well in order to free it. A social policy maker or program developer must think of her-

self or himself as making actual the potentialities that are there in society--freeing them from the restraint of older ways. Like the woodcarver, the carver in society must know the material, understanding that it is different each time he or she confronts it.

We can organize what we must know about the current state of a correctional program or a whole system of programs, with the help of the following set of seven questions.

1. Actual Behavior. What have the youth been doing recently in the community?
2. Anticipated Behavior. What do the youth think they are likely to do in the near future in the community? What is the distribution of responsibility, power, and reward among youth and staff within a correctional program that will affect these perceptions by youth?
3. Available Behavior. What do the youth think it would be possible for them to do in the near future in the community? What controls do the adult staff use to affect these possibilities?
4. Aspired Behavior. What do the youth want to do in the community? What controls do the adult staff use that would make youth want these things?
5. Anticipated Controls. What controls on the youth do the adult staff think they are likely to use in the near furture?
6. Available Controls. What controls do the adult staff think they could use in the near future if they wanted? What have the key movers been doing recently that might have affected these perceptions?
7. Aspired Controls. What controls do the adult staff want to use? What have the key movers been doing recently that might have affected what the staff want to do?[42]

Question one is of course the point of it all. We want to know whether the youth are doing illegal things. Question two asks whether any problems in what the youth are doing are continuing problems. Will they keep on doing illegal things? It also is a

simple way of measuring the relative power of those who would promote illegal activity and those who would promote legal activity. That side is more powerful whose will is more likely to be realized. Questions three and four assess what is happening at the key pressure points for changing youth in programs. We find out whether youth are being made to want and see as possible legal things and not illegal things, and how.

With questions five, six, and seven we turn to the political base of the system. In question five we find out whether the staff actions (controls) that we have uncovered in questions three and four are likely to continue. We also find out whether constituencies that want those controls are more powerful, or whether constituencies that want something else are more powerful. The more powerful constituency is the one whose preferred controls are more likely in the near future. In questions six and seven we examine what is happening at the key pressure points for change of the programs themselves, just as in questions three and four we found out about what was happening at the key pressure points for change in the youth within the programs. We find out what controls staff think they can use and want to use, and what the key movers have been doing to make the staff think that way.

As the answers to these seven questions change over time we have the seven variables that comprise our model. The variables describe a correctional system at successive times. Each variable is caused by some combination of the others. Thus it is not only that the political variables cause variation in the program variables; the program variables also cause change in the political variables.[43]

The seven variable model will enable us to analyze system-wide processes of change. We have used it to reproduce the history of reform in Massachusetts juvenile corrections since the late 1960's and to make projections into the future, which so far appear to be accurate. We may also find it sometimes convenient to extend the model by adding three more variables characterizing the likelihood, possibility, and perceived desirability of the key movers' actions.

8. Anticipated Mobilization. What are the key movers likely to do in the near future that might affect available and aspired controls?

9. Available Mobilization. What could the key movers do in the near future if they wanted that might affect available and aspired controls?

10. Aspired Mobilization. What do the key movers want to do that might affect available and aspired controls.[44]

Paralleling previously described sets of variables, this set also describes a social relationship. Anticipated mobilization measures whether the key movers' actions identified in questions six and seven are likely to continue, and reflects the power of people who try to get the key movers to move in a particular direction. The more powerful people are those whose will is more likely to be realized in the actions of the key movers. Available and aspired mobilization are the pressure points whereby the key movers (the political actors) are themselves moved.

This extension is useful for analyzing in more detail the dynamics of change within political components of the sytem, such as interest groups, the legislature, or a neighborhood struggling over whether to accept a group home in its midst. We can examine how successful and unsuccessful interest groups differ in the way

they mobilize and adapt to changing situations, ultimately affecting aspired and available controls.[45] We can analyze how an organizational unit; such as the legislature, comes over time to produce or not produce legislation affecting what programs want to and can do--i.e., aspired and available controls.[46] And we can follow a neighborhood political struggle that eventuates in the acceptance or rejection of a group home, ultimately affecting in that way aspired and available controls.[47] The extended, ten-variable model is capable of integrating the system-wide processes and the within-component processes into a single analysis, so that our understanding of each includes the influence of the other.

There are many ways to gather the answers to the seven (or ten) questions describing the state of the youth correctional system and its political base. During the last decade the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice has developed for this purpose special surveys of youth, staff, and key political participants. These surveys are described elsewhere.[48] Even without such surveys, however, the conceptual framework would prove useful in structuring whatever information is available. Any informed consideration of empirical answers to these questions will help the policy maker, program developer, or evaluator pinpoint opportunities, obstacles, and important pressure points.

B. Two Important Principles in "Freeing a New Design"

In addition to a clear view of the current political and programatic aspects of the situation (the raw material of the program developer's art) we need some clear principles concerning how to work the situation (the techniques of the program developer's art). We will present two.

1. What to Work For. What one should work for depends both on what one believes is best and on the situation, which changes in a cyclical manner.

There is a natural ordering of a succession of constituencies in the political base of corrections. Each constituency carries its program as far as it can, for example toward more therapy, or more control, and then begins to relax, leaving its position vulnerable to the next constituency. The next constituency will be one that likes something about what the previous constituency did, but thinks that it can do it better with a twist of its own. In Massachusetts in the 1970's a broad-based constituency consisting of an alliance of those concerned with therapy and those concerned with the prerogatives of decision making moved to reform the training schools. That constituency was followed by a more narrow-based one consisting only of those interested in therapy and advocacy. This second constituency thought it could accomplish more of what had already been accomplished. It proceeded by closing the training schools altogether and purchasing services from programs in the community as an alternative. It emphasized advocacy, which was new. The third constituency consisted of people who were concerned with the prerogatives of decisionmaking, but still leaned toward therapy and advocacy--

they thought they could administer the system better and replace a lot of the political confrontation that had been happening with more compromise, and more attention to security. The next constituency thought all that was fine, but that security should be emphasized still more, that more youth should be locked in secure settings, and that there should be less emphasis on advocacy.[49]

Thus the development through several stages of therapy and advocacy oriented reform and the development beyond that to custodially oriented counter reform was continuous and seamless, without sharp reversals. Each step built upon the previous one. The path of change is like a circle, with no end or beginning, no points of reversal. If we view movement around the circle from the side within the same plane, what we see is movement from side to side, much like a pendulum, with sharp changes of direction at each end of the trajectory. Viewed from above, the continuous nature of the circle becomes apparent. In the figure below we see the movement around the circle in a counterclockwise direction, passing through regions of custodial programming, therapeutic programming, and advocacy programming. We could fill in other regions consisting of mixed types, one representing the consolidation after the advocacy programming, and two others before and after the pure custody. The stick figure above is in a position to see the circle as a circle. To the stick figure at the side the movement appears only to be back and forth. To the reader, looking at an angle, the circle appears as an elipse.



What does this mean for a program developer? Let us take for example a program developer who wants to develop advocacy-type programs. Such an activist has a role at each stage as we move around the circle, but that role is different at each stage. His strategies must deal with the constituencies that are ascendent at each point. When those advocating custody are in control, his role is to try to limit the effectiveness of the custodially oriented reforms, probably in part by promoting investigation, airing of scandals that would discredit his opponents, and so on. The role, is, in other words, the familiar one of the politician who is "out." Attempts to act as if he were "in" would only be met with foolish defeat. On the other hand, when the broad-based constituency in favor of therapy

begins to rise, he should join that even though it falls far short of his own aims, because the work of that constituency will be the foundation of his own efforts to promote advocacy in the next stage. Thus this reformer tries to flatten the custodially oriented side of the circle a little, while extending as much as possible the therapy-advocacy side.



He never forgets that it <u>is</u> a circle, and that movement around it probably can not be stopped. However he also remembers that the path of the circle is not completely fixed, and he works hard to cut it short of the custodial region, and extend it further into the advocacy region.

Thus what a person works for is to maximize his gains according to his beliefs in good times, and cut his losses in bad times. He does not expect to be winning all the time.

Some people find all of this discouraging. They wonder if it is worthwhile to enter the struggle if one can not win once and for all. The modern history of our culture is a history of struggle with this issue. The literature of the Victorian Age began with the notion that there was truth, light, goodness, and understanding, and that life was a quest to find them. The age concluded in some disillusionment, with a feeling that the meaning of life was in the quest itself, not in the achievement of any imagined goal. Such disillusionment is perhaps not so terrible. In the Massachusetts reforms of the 1970's the best time for the youth was probably during the height of the process of reform, rather than after the reforms were in place. It was during the struggle that everyone was paying the most attention to the children. The children thrived on that.

2. <u>Where to Start</u>. Once we know what we are working for at a given time, we begin that work by attempting to change both available and aspired controls (what program staff feel they can and want to accomplish) in such a way that both available and aspired behaviors of the youth will be affected.

Whether we are trying to change youthful behavior or the behavior of social institutions like the correctional system, we have three choices of where to begin. We can try persuasion--getting people to want to do what we want them to do. Or we can focus on opportunities and obstacles--trying to make it more possible for them to

do what we want them to do and less possible to do what we don't want them to do. Or we can do both. Doing both is almost always best. Otherwise, if we work only on possibilities, what people want will work against us, and if we work only on what people want to do, people's perceptions of possibilities will work against us. We need both working for us if we want major changes.[50]

In Massachusetts, as we have already noted, the struggle to reform was a struggle to control both what staff could do and what they wanted to do. The culmination of that struggle, the closing of the institutions, was essentially a matter of taking the youth away from custodial staff and custodial settings, thus making custodial corrections something much more difficult to accomplish. At the same time, the youth were given to staff who wanted to do therapy and advocacy, and were placed in community settings where those things were more possible. The department was reorganized so that it became clear that there were career possibilities in therapy and advocacy, and not in custody. Custodially oriented superintendents of institutions found themselves on leave, while a former English teacher paid as a janitor, but interested in therapy and later in advocacy found himself as acting superintendent of an institution and later as the person in charge of the community-based program system for the whole state. Many staff decided it was desirable to work for the reforms.[51]

Within programs themselves, the traditional approach has been to focus on aspired behavior only--changing what the youth wants to do in the community. By providing an opportunity to contemplate one's sins, by making life unpleasant, by providing structure in

one's life during incarceration, by counselling, or by training in work or social skills during incarceration, we have sought to make the imprisoned youth so prefer a straight life that he or she would be able to hold a straight course even after return to the same, unchanged world that led him astray in the first place. The much cited Martinson review of research on rehabilitation[52] has held up to all of us our failures to make this strategy work. One strategy that Martinson did find effective was intensive probation--which is our combination strategy, with a very strong emphasis on changing available behavior by altering the situation that the youth confronts in the community. In Massachusetts a number of nonresidential programs featuring intensive supervision in the community have done well at controlling youth who, but for these programs, would have been locked up in secure facilities. In these programs a staff member might be responsible for being in touch with the youth, face to face or on the telephone, every few minutes through the entire day. Even these programs did not eliminate recidivism after the youth left intensive supervision, however. It is clear that even these programs need to make provision for their own replacement in the lives of the youth as they return to the community.

Three examples may serve to raise some of the issues of what might be involed and to indicate the measures the correctional system may be required to take to be effective. The first concerns families and neighborhoods, and the others concern work.

A caseworker found that one of her youthful clients was in good mental health, in an excellent school situation, and had very strong

and effective support from his family. He was still getting into trouble. The problem was that the neighborhood was one in which the youth could hardly help falling in with other youth who were regularly delinquent. The caseworker discussed with the family the best options available if the youth continued to get into trouble: the child could be placed out of the home or the family could move to a better neighborhood. The family moved, and the youth's behavior improved.

The caseworker's action raises a host of issues which are at the heart of what advocacy in community-based corrections is all about. Advocacy means actually changing the way key elements of a youth's community deal with the youth; a commitment to advocacy is a commitment to apply powerful pressure to the community's most sacred institutions. Yet obviously such power can not left unbridled and unaccountable to the community. These complex issues have yet to be confronted and dealt with either in our community forums or in professional councils. Yet they must be confronted and dealt with or we will be left with the far more destructive and intrusive exercise of power that is represented by continued reliance on the unnecessary use of secure lock-ups.

Turning to jobs, we found two job programs in the same court. One was a high volume program that used federal funds to pay employers to place the youth in make-work jobs for about six weeks. The employers and youth barely tolerated each other, the youth did not learn anything, and at the end of the six weeks the youth went back to whatever they had been doing before. In the other, a low volume program, a retired businessman would get to know a youth and seek out a small business in the community where the youth could be useful

and where the employer would take the youth under his or her wing and train the youth, not only in the work, but in living a straight life. The employer thus became more involved in what our society idealizes as parenting than most parents do, since these youth needed more attention than most youth do. The low volume program seemed to work much better than the high volume one.

Finally, we ran across a service station and auto body shop where all the employees were youth who had been in trouble. They were being trained in the business, including the handling of money. They were required to keep up their school work. They were gotten jobs in other service stations or body shops when they left. Again, the proprietors of the station took on the role of super-parents.

In all of these examples someone takes upon him or herself the responsibility of reducing both the desirability and the possibility of delinquent behavior to the youth, and at the sime time increasing the desirability and possibility of legitimate behavior. Intensive supervision by program staff appears to be an effective support, like a brick holding up a house with a crumbling foundation. But if more permanent repairs to the foundation are not made before the brick is taken away, our troubles return. The need for simultaneous attention to both aspired and available behavior is a continuing one.

CONCLUSION

These are difficult times for those who advocate developing diverse community services instead of building more juvenile

prisons, particularly as this is a period of shrinking public resources, with limited finances available for even the most basic educational and social services. Yet the impact of financial, political, and social policies may exacerbate the problems of delinquency; in Massachusetts jobs and job programs for youth are disappearing, leaving poor, idle, unemployed urban youth in their wake. The limited resources of money and personnel should be devoted to developing programs and linkages in the community that can help turn kids around now. The bleak alternative is too expensive: to have problems escalate, have more citizens become angry victims, and have more young people warehoused in institutions.

An optimal juvenile justice system would have a full range of alternative placements to handle youth, including a small number of secure placements and large numbers of local community-based services. There would be programs that variously emphasize working on different factors that led a youth to delinquencey: some after-school tutoring programs, some alternative schools for the more educationally needy, some programs dealing with alcohol abuse, others for multiple-drug abuse, some vocational training programs, other work programs that work with the private sector to generate jobs for youth, counseling programs that concentrate on family interactions, others focused on individual treatment. Diverse community-based projects such as these have been recently selected after a national competition and funded by Act Together, a non-profit intermediary channeling federal funding to local efforts to deal with "high-risk youth."[53]

The diversity is important for helping individual youth and

for maintaining a credible system with minimal recidivism rates; in the period after the Massachusetts reforms the recidivism rates in those regions that had the greatest diversity of local programs dropped, while those in other regions rose slightly.[54] The costs for such a diverse system of community programming are about the same as for a traditional institutional system, but they are distributed differently. In the institutional system the costs for each youth are about the same. A community-based system permits more differentiation in allocation of resources, since more can be spent on more difficult problems, and less on easier ones. Secure settings are, of course, most expensive.[55] In Massachusetts secure care averages $90 per day per youth.

As a juvenile justice system undertakes the implementation of these ideas, its planning should include dialogues with schools, families, neighborhood organizations and businesses, other community services, and the youth themselves. These people are often eager to be asked about their opinions and fears. They have suggestions; they can become strong allies of an individual program or of the entire community-based system. One federally sponsored prevention program has found schools eager to cooperate in a project involving considerable reorganization.[56] In addition to the potential political importance of this alliance, a neighborhood's involvement in "doing something about the crime problem" may lead to a reduction in the level of fear in that neighborhood.

There will be times when the major constituencies of the community help to produce better solutions, and times when they compel worse solutions. The program developer and policy maker must con-

sider what kind of linkages to the community and what kind of social climate will work best, and then adjust their goals and strategies to maximize progress within the give and take of community politics. They may be encouraged by the fact that the benefits to the youth and to society are sometimes as much in the concerned efforts to deal with the problems as in a final product. In any case they must remember that the problems of juvenile delinquency are unlikely to yield to anything short of community reorganization; every youth in the system will eventually return to the community, and if we fail to make it possible for the youth to gain a stake in legitimate community opportunities then the problems of delinquency and fear will remain.

Some will be discouraged by talk of a need to reorganize our communities, feeling that we can not plan community change. In fact, however, communities are changing constantly, sometimes advocating more for youth, sometimes less. The current movement to shift federal responsibilities back to local governments is certainly no less ambitious than taking responsible care of our children. If we can do one, we should do the other.

To summarize, consideration of the problem posed by the woman testifying before the task force on juvenile crime leads us to:

- Seek the development of community-based alternatives to state institutions.
- Establish a diversity of programs emphasizing individualized advocacy to develop community linkages for each youth, and open social climates compatible with such advocacy.

- Plan for those youth who must begin in closed custodial or therapeutic programs to be sequenced into more open, advocacy-oriented programs that will establish enduring linkages to the community.
- Consider the current stage of the political and policy making cycle when planning or attempting to implement more effective programs.
- Seek, when attempting to change anyone's behavior, to address both what that person thinks possible and what that person wants to do, whether it be a youth, a program staff member, or a politician.
- Regard all of the above as a continuing part of the job of rearing children--not something we as a society hope to finish any time soon.

FOOTNOTES

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