


INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL



HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

APRIL 20, 21, AND 22, 1982

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ACQUISITIONS

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: DOMESTIC IMPACT

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1982

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order. Today the Committee on Foreign Affairs holds the first of a series of hearings on the U.S. international narcotics control policy.

Each year this committee authorizes the appropriation for our international narcotic control program as implemented by the Department of State. Normally each executive branch witness appears routinely before the committee to explain the program in the course of the committee's hearing for markup of the annual assistance authorization bill. Last year we reauthorized a 2-year authorization bill.

This year the committee is taking a more thorough, indepth look at this program and the rationale behind it.

The reason for this is to take stock of the results of a decade or so of our international narcotics control programs and to respond to the cries for assistance from our constituents, health experts, police, educators, armed forces, employers, parents, and youth.

It is clear that our society is being hurt badly and changed for the worse by drugs.

According to our best estimate more than 90 percent of the list of narcotics consumed in the United States reaches our shores from foreign nations. We are beseiged with heroin from Pakistan, Mexico, Burma, Thailand, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Cocaine is shipped by air and sea from Colombia, having been refined from Bolivia and Peru. Colombia is the source of 80 percent of imported marihuana with 10 percent coming from Jamaica and 9 percent from Mexico.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs has fully recognized that the United States has a whole range of policy objectives in our diplomatic relations with each of these countries. But we will be interested to find out whether narcotics control objectives have been given sufficient weight by our policymakers in view of the damage brought upon our Nation by these drugs from abroad.

Let us consider these official estimates from the DEA. In 1980, the total value of illicit retail drug sales in the United States was

officially estimated to be in the range of \$68.5 billion to \$89.9 billion, approximately a 25-percent increase over 1979.

Preliminary estimates indicate no reduction in 1981. These dollar increases are not merely the reflection of inflation, I submit. While heroin and marihuana quantities showed modest increases, the quantities of cocaine have more than tripled since 1978, making this drug the single largest income producer for the illicit drug traffickers, replacing marihuana for that dubious honor.

We must take action against this threat to our security and well-being. These actions, however, must be intelligent and cost effective.

We cannot afford to throw large amounts of money and diplomatic leverage into programs which have no success.

At the same time we cannot afford to underfund worthwhile and effective narcotics control programs. The economic, sociological, and health impact on our country has been devastating.

We will hear about these effects from our distinguished panel of experts today and then proceed to examine our international programs and policies in hearings scheduled for tomorrow and Thursday.

Today we will proceed to hear from two panels of witnesses. The first panel includes the Honorable Jim Smith, attorney general of Florida; Mr. Maurice Turner, Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Daniel Courtenay, chief of organized crime control, New York City Police Department.

We would be very appreciative, gentlemen, if you would summarize your statements perhaps to 10 minutes and your entire statements will be made a part of the record.

Following your statements, the committee members will proceed with questions.

I will now call upon the gentleman from Florida to introduce our first witness. Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a few words of welcome to the distinguished attorney general of my home State of Florida, Mr. Jim Smith. The attorney general is no stranger to our committee having eloquently participated in our deliberations last year on the amendment to lift the ban on funding of overseas paramilitary operations.

We were successful in that important fight and I am hopeful that the 3 days of hearings we are beginning today will help emphasize the need to move on the Colombian negotiations as soon as the elections there are over.

I would add that the recent comprehensive report on the narcotics situation filed by the committee staff contains excellent recommendations and comments, not only on Colombia, but also Jamaica and other trouble spots in the battle against international narcotics smuggling.

I would be remiss if I did not also comment on the narcotics situation in my home State of Florida which continues to be a major social and economic problem.

As I testified last year, the multibillion-dollar marihuana and cocaine smuggling operations being run from and through Florida continue to disrupt our families and our legitimate business people

I welcome the high level commitment to combatting narcotics at home and overseas that the Vice President's task force now represents at its base in Miami. It is clear that if we are to be successful we must continue to enlarge the commitment of local, State, Federal officials and particularly the Department of State in coordinating for maximum effectiveness.

This year's efforts, I believe, are off to a good start with Jim Smith's testimony today and, Mr. Chairman, I am glad for this opportunity to welcome the attorney general.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Smith, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SMITH, FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Congressman Ireland, I appreciate the introduction and it is good to see our colleagues from Florida here this morning.

This is the fifth time in 2½ years I have had the opportunity to testify before Federal panels on Florida's problems with crime and drugs.

I am pleased to say that those missions were not a waste of time.

There is a marked difference in the testimony I will give today from what was said in 1979 when I came here to implore Congress and the administration to recognize the national implications in the torrent of illegal drugs entering the United States through Florida.

Congress has heeded those pleas and this hearing is evidence itself of the high priority now being given to international narcotics matters.

It has been gratifying to watch Florida's agenda for Federal assistance fall into place.

Largely through the work of this committee, the legal barrier to use of foreign aid money for drug eradication was repealed last year.

Congress amended the doctrine of posse comitatus to permit military cooperation with civil authorities in drug enforcement.

By appointing a Cabinet level task force to orchestrate the efforts of a host of Federal agencies at work in Florida and the Caribbean, the administration has provided the additional resources and unified command that we knew was essential to full-scale interdiction efforts.

Congress has supported the task force by appropriating millions of dollars to pay for the personnel, ships and aircraft that are required.

This is substantially what Florida, and other coastal States that have been invaded by the smugglers, had repeatedly petitioned the National Government to do.

Now the effectiveness of these measures is being validated every day by the reports coming out of South Florida.

The task force has demonstrated that an adequately funded military-style interdiction effort can stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

Its presence is making Florida's coastline a much more formidable obstacle to smugglers, changing the equation under which they have become accustomed to conducting business.

It promises to reverse a steadily worsening situation.

Despite Florida's tough drug sentencing laws and substantial new resources in law enforcement strength, the pace of smuggling had continued to quicken in 1981.

Compared to the previous year, seizures of marihuana by State officers rose 60 percent. Seizures of heroin were up 260 percent. Seizures of cocaine increased by nearly 1100 percent.

Arrests for marihuana and cocaine trafficking were up an average of 25 percent, and there was a 59-percent increase in property confiscated from smugglers.

This would appear to indicate that improved enforcement was curtailing smuggling operations in Florida. But I have to tell you this is not the case.

The higher seizure rate, in fact, signifies increased trafficking because there has been no change in official estimates that seizures represent about 10 percent of the contraband coming in.

We are confiscating a lot more simply because there is more to confiscate.

The Drug Enforcement Administration says cocaine importations are up sharply in response to strong demand and high prices. Cocaine by weight is currently four times more valuable than gold.

State drug officials report a noticeable shift toward cocaine because it is significantly more profitable and considerably easier to conceal in shipment.

The full impact of this illicit industry on Florida is as difficult to document today as it has always been. Commonsense tells us that the staggering profits of the trade have to be legitimized and that there are people in positions of power who are willing to facilitate smuggling operations for a share of those profits.

Any reasonable analysis suggests that if we could somehow come up with all the evidence of corrupt influence wielded by smuggling interests, the emerging pattern would be extensive and frightening.

We are hoping, now that the FBI's expertise in complex financial investigations is involved, that some of this evidence will surface, and we can begin toppling the syndicate heads and their accomplices. State law enforcement has neither the expertise nor resources to conduct such investigations.

Although the racketeering unit in my office has obtained several million dollars through civil forfeiture of money and property gained through smuggling, the paper trail has yet to lead us much beyond the nucleus of a single operation.

Frequently, the trail ends with a shell corporation or bank in the Bahamas, the Caymans, or Dutch Antilles. After being laundered this way, cash is returned to the United States to be invested.

Ownership of these offshore corporations is nearly impossible to discern. They are protected both by the policies of the foreign governments and Federal law, which requires the identities of officers, directors and shareholders of foreign corporations that purchase real estate in the United States, but holds them confidential. We can't get to it.

I would recommend that Congress amend confidentiality out of this law, or at least make the information that I discuss available for law enforcement officers.

The incentive in smuggling is the mountain of money that is so easily available. Aggressive Federal and State forfeiture prosecutions under racketeering laws, coupled with stiff prison terms, will kill that incentive, particularly if we continue full-scale interdiction efforts.

The presence of this vast illegal industry in Florida obviously intensifies all of our crime problems, from simple muggings for the money to buy readily available drugs to mass killings over territory, profits and to silence witnesses.

It has made personal danger a tangible concern in many of our communities. It has created a conscious fear of the long-term consequences of living in a society pervaded by drugs, a fear that I suggest is felt throughout the United States, particularly by parents.

Between May and October of last year, Dade County, Fla., which surrounds Miami, found itself with scores of arrests for drunken driving in which blood alcohol tests were negative.

But when they checked the blood of 200 volunteers for traces of drugs, 75 percent came in positive.

Since 1979, the medical examiner has been making such tests on bodies reaching his office for any reason. The number of positive tests doubled the first year.

And it doubled again in just 6 months of the second year.

This kind of evidence brings drugs out of the shadows and into the streets to confront decent citizens. It shows an expanding problem of drug use.

Dade County authorities linked 240 murders in 1981 directly to drugs.

I am a native Floridian and I have never seen a time when a single issue so dominated the public consciousness.

This is not a situation limited to Florida, of course. Our neighbors in Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia have identical concerns and these have been aggravated by the displacement of trafficking from Florida. Our tough minimum mandatory sentencing laws have led some smugglers to avoid Florida.

The concentration of enforcement in and around the State even prior to the Federal task force also sent smugglers in search of new destinations.

In the last 2 weeks, I read newspaper reports of a 15-percent drop in big cash deposits at the Federal Reserve in Miami and a coincident increase in Dallas and Houston.

According to DEA, smuggling vessels have been avoiding the heavily controlled Windward and Mona passages for the Yucatan channel route to Texas and Louisiana.

They are also sailing well east which aims them toward the upper Atlantic Coast States.

Drugs are now being stockpiled at remote staging points in the Caribbean, the Bahamas outer islands, the Turks, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and probably Mexico.

As you know, there is little government control in many of these areas and not much willingness to allocate the resources to secure them against such use. At the risk of returning to a worn script, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close with some recommendations for this committee, Congress and the administration. The two principal approaches emerging from our experience with drug smug-

gling have been a coordinated Federal-State and enforcement and interdiction effort and accompanying herbicide eradication in source countries.

Nothing has come to light in the past 3 years that changes any of that.

In fact, the dramatic impact of the task force validates the first approach and the success of the Mexican eradication program validates the second.

I frankly don't know any experienced drug enforcement official, State or Federal, who would disagree with what I have just said.

But we can't expect to make one brief pass over the beach and repel the invasion.

We can't prove our point and abandon the argument.

We can't run the smugglers out of Florida and into California and other Gulf and Atlantic States.

The task force, or something like it that carries the weight of the administration and demonstrates the same Federal commitment, must stay with us through the ninth inning to the end of the ball game.

I can tell you now that smugglers are drinking daiquiris on the balconies of resort hotels all over the place waiting for the radar planes and the Cobra helicopters to go home and the Coast Guard budget to dry up or for those resources to be transferred elsewhere.

Meanwhile, prices at the export dock are going down and prices on the street are going up by about \$10,000 a kilo for cocaine, our investigation indicates.

Sweeter deals lay ahead—and I assure you that the horizon will be dark with smuggling planes and ships the minute the Federal task force pulls out of South Florida.

The administration, the State Department and committees such as this must make it clear to source countries that we expect their cooperation in interdiction and eradication.

We must use both moral suasion and the benefits of good diplomatic relations with the United States—money, technical aid, equipment, crop substitution programs and law enforcement assistance.

These countries must receive a firm expression of the administration's policy on drugs and it must become a high priority in our bilateral relations with them.

I am not an expert on foreign relations but it seems clear that what best motivates our friends most is dollar resources. The economies of most of these countries lack funds for primary needs such as nutrition, education, and law enforcement.

To the degree that we want them to act on our behalf, we will simply have to pay for it. That is always the way that the game has been played, it seems to me.

As we get agreements to conduct aerial herbicide spraying operations, we must supply the equipment and the material to do it.

When we put the diplomatic pressure on them, using the stick, if you will, we must have a carrot handy at the same time to help those governments deal with domestic pressures.

On the subject of herbicide spraying, I want to add that Florida is now surveying appropriate sites for such operations.

We are prepared to spray. When we do, we will be glad to have representatives of Colombia or any other country there as witnesses when those operations take place.

Paraquat, the most likely agent, is used commercially across Florida in sugar cane, vegetable, and strawberry production. We have no hesitation in showing its usefulness on marihuana as well.

There can be no more important mission for Congress and the administration than doing away with this plague before a generation arrives so involved in the false escape of drugs that it is incapable of taking up its responsibility for carrying on the society that it inherits.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

[Mr. Smith's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SMITH, ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM THE STATE OF
FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman . . .

Members of the committee . . .

My name is Jim Smith. I am the attorney general of Florida . . . here to represent my state and its nine million citizens.

This is the fifth time in two and a half years that I've had the opportunity to testify before federal panels such as this on Florida's problems with crime and drugs.

I am pleased to say that those missions to Washington were not a waste of time.

There is a marked difference in the testimony I will give today from what was said in 1979 . . . when I came here to implore Congress and the Administration to recognize the national implications in the torrent of illegal drugs entering the United States through Florida.

Congress has heeded those pleas . . . and this hearing is evidence itself of the high priority now being given to international narcotics matters.

It has been gratifying to watch Florida's agenda for federal assistance fall into place.

Largely through the work of this committee, the legal barrier to use of foreign aid money for drug eradication was repealed.

Congress amended the Doctrine of Posse Comitatus to permit military cooperation with civil authorities in drug enforcement.

By appointing a Cabinet-level task force to orchestrate the efforts of a host of federal agencies at work in Florida and the Caribbean, the Administration has provided the additional resources and unified command that we knew was essential to fullscale interdiction efforts.

Congress has lent its support to the task force by appropriating millions of dollars to pay for the personnel, ships and aircraft that are required.

This is substantially what Florida . . . and other coastal states that have been invaded by the smugglers . . . had repeatedly petitioned the national government to do.

And the effectiveness of these measures is being demonstrated every day by the reports coming out of South Florida.

Within 90 days of the start of task force operation, Admiral Murphy announced that cocaine and marijuana trafficking in Miami . . . the hub of the international trade . . . had been brought to a virtual standstill.

During this time, agents working under the task force made the largest single cocaine seizure in U.S. history . . . worth nearly one billion dollars on the street.

These events tell us two things about the smuggling business in Florida.

First . . . the arrogance of smugglers in risking nearly two tons of cocaine in a single shipment shows the certainty and depth of the supply and a willingness to gamble huge amounts of capital.

Second . . . it demonstrates that an adequately funded, military-style interdiction effort can stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

The presence of the task force is making Florida's coastline a much more formidable obstacle to smugglers . . . changing the equation under which they have become accustomed to conducting business.

Despite Florida's tough drug sentencing laws and substantial new resources in law enforcement strength, the pace of smuggling had continued to quicken in 1981.

Compared to the previous year, seizures of marijuana by state officers rose 60 percent. Seizures of heroin were up 260 percent. Seizures of cocaine increased by nearly 11 hundred percent.

Arrests for marijuana and cocaine trafficking were up an average of 25 percent, and there was a 59 percent increase in property confiscated from smugglers . . . chiefly aircraft and vessels.

This would appear to indicate that improved enforcement was curtailing smuggling operations in Florida. However, I am told this is not the case.

The higher seizure rate, in fact, signifies increased trafficking because there has been no change in official estimates that seizures represent about 10 percent of the contraband coming in.

We are confiscating more simply because there is more to confiscate.

The Drug Enforcement Administration says cocaine importations are up sharply in response to strong demand and high prices. Cocaine by weight is currently four times more valuable than gold.

State drug officials report a noticeable shift toward cocaine because it is significantly more profitable and considerably easier to conceal in shipment.

We know . . . and D-E-A agrees . . . that Florida is the conduit through which 75 percent of the domestic supply of marijuana and cocaine gets into the country.

We would be foolhardy to expect that any short-term crusade will persuade the international traffickers to abandon the smuggling channels that have served them so well for so long.

D-E-A predicted at the close of 1980 that . . . based on its intelligence . . . Florida would retain its preeminent position in drug trafficking. As of last week, that prediction remained unchanged for the year ahead.

The full impact of this illicit industry on Florida is as difficult to document today as it has always been. Common sense tells us that the staggering profits of the trade have to be legitimized . . . and that there are people in positions of power who are willing to facilitate smuggling operations for a share of those profits.

Any reasonable analysis suggests that if we could somehow come up with all the evidence of corrupt influence wielded by smuggling interests, the emerging pattern would be extensive and frightening.

We are hoping . . . now that the FBI's expertise in complex financial investigations is involved . . . that some of this evidence will surface, and we can begin toppling the syndicate heads and their accomplices domino fashion. State law enforcement has neither the expertise nor resources to conduct such investigations.

Although the racketeering unit in my office has obtained several million dollars through civil forfeiture of money and property gained through smuggling, the paper trail has yet to lead us much beyond the nucleus of a single operation.

Frequently, the trail ends with a shell corporation or bank in the Bahamas, the Caymans or Dutch Antilles. After being laundered this way, cash is returned to the United States to be invested.

Unless we act with lightning speed, defendants quickly liquidate and funnel the proceeds overseas to avoid forfeiture. Ownership of these offshore corporations is nearly impossible to discern. They are protected both by the policies of the foreign governments and federal law, which requires the identities of officers, directors and shareholders of foreign corporations that purchase real estate in the United States . . . but holds them confidential,

I would recommend that Congress amend confidentiality out of this law.

The incentive in smuggling is the mountain of money that is so easily available. Aggressive federal and state forfeiture prosecutions under racketeering laws . . . coupled with stiff prison terms . . . will kill that incentive, particularly if we continue fullscale interdiction efforts.

The presence of this vast illegal industry in Florida obviously intensifies all of our crime problems . . . from simple muggings for the money to buy readily available drugs to mass killings over territory, profits and to silence witnesses.

It has made personal danger a tangible concern in many of our communities. It has created a conscious fear of the long-term consequences of living in a society pervaded by drugs . . . a fear that I suggest is felt throughout the United States, particularly by parents.

There can be no more important mission for Congress and the Administration than doing away with this plague before a generation arrives . . . so locked in dependency, addiction and mental torpor . . . that it is incapable of taking up its responsibility for carrying on the society it inherits.

I'm not philosophizing when I say this, Mr. Chairman.

Between May and October of last year, Dade County, Florida, which surrounds Miami, found itself with scores of arrests for drunken driving in which blood alcohol tests were negative.

But when they checked the blood of 200 volunteers for traces of drugs, 75 percent came in positive.

Since 1979, the medical examiner has been making such tests on bodies reaching his office for any reason. The number of positive tests doubled the first year.

And it doubled again in just six months of the second year.

This kind of evidence brings drugs out of the shadows and into the streets to confront decent citizens. It shows an expanding problem of drug use.

Dade County authorities linked 240 murders in 1981 directly to drugs.

I am a native Floridian and I have never seen a time when a single issue so dominated the public consciousness.

Floridians have expressed a nearly unanimous willingness to spend money for law enforcement and involve themselves in neighborhood programs of self protection.

Last year the Legislature allocated additional revenues to every component of Florida's criminal justice system, triggering a substantial increase in the number of criminal cases filed.

The number of sworn officers is up as well . . . by nearly 800 in the area between Palm Beach and Coral Gables alone.

These actions . . . together with the active participation of citizen crime watch groups . . . helped us decrease the rate of crime in Florida by 3.6 percent, the first drop since 1977.

I think the numbers prove that a criminal justice system works when it has the strong public support and the financial resources to do its job.

Two weeks ago, the annual survey of public priorities conducted by Florida State University reported that 81 percent of the respondents favored increased spending to combat crime.

That's spending above current levels.

Crime emerged as the Number 1 state problem for the first time.

Ninety percent of the respondents said spending for drug enforcement should remain at existing levels or increase; 66 percent favored an increase.

I have tried to convey to the committee some sense of the impact of drug smuggling on Florida and the depth of public fear and concern.

This is not a situation that is limited to Florida, of course. Our neighbors in Texas, Louisiana and Georgia have identical concerns . . . and these have been aggravated by the displacement of trafficking from Florida.

Our tough minimum mandatory sentencing laws have led some smugglers to avoid Florida. The recent concentration of enforcement in and around Florida . . . even before the task force was operating . . . also sent smugglers in search of new destinations.

Just in the past two weeks I have read newspaper reports of a plunge in big cash deposits in the federal reserve in Miami and a coincident increase in Dallas and Houston.

According to D-E-A, smuggling vessels have been steering clear of the Windward and Mona passages . . . the favored and shortest maritime routes . . . for the Yucatan channel route to Texas and Louisiana. They're also sailing well east to flank areas of intensified patrol, which aims them toward the Atlantic coast.

Drugs are now being stockpiled at remote staging points in the Caribbean . . . the Bahamas out islands, the Turks and Caicos, even Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

As you know, there is little government control in many of these areas and not much willingness to allocate the resources to secure them against such use.

At the risk of returning to a worn script, Mr. Chairman, I want to close with some recommendations for the work of this committee, the Congress and the Administration.

The two principal approaches that have emerged from our experience with drug smuggling have been a coordinated federal/state enforcement and interdiction effort and accompanying programs of herbicide eradication in source countries.

Nothing has come to light in the past three years that changes any of that.

In fact, the dramatic impact of the task force validates the first approach and the success of the Mexican eradication program validates the second.

I frankly don't know any experienced drug enforcement official . . . state or federal . . . who would disagree with what I've just said.

But we can't expect to make one brief pass over the beach and repel the invasion.

We can't prove our point and abandon the argument.

We can't run the smugglers out of Florida and into California and other Gulf and Atlantic states.

The task force . . . or something like it that carries the weight of the Administration and demonstrates the same federal commitment . . . must stay with us through the ninth inning.

The smugglers are drinking daiquiris on the verandas of resort hotels today . . . waiting for the radar planes and Cobra helicopters to go home and the Coast Guard budget to dry up.

Meanwhile, prices at the export dock are going down and prices on the street are going up . . . by about \$10,000 a kilo so far.

Sweeter deals lay ahead . . . and I assure you the horizon will be dark with smuggling planes and ships the minute you pull that task force away.

The Administration must commit to the long haul . . . and Congress must approve the funds needed to do it.

I have read estimates that \$5.5 billion has been spent in the United States in buy-and-bust law enforcement to net some 3.5 million marijuana hustlers.

The choice is to keep on doing that . . . futilely . . . or shut the trade down by cutting off the supply at the source and preventing it from crossing our borders.

At the same time, the Administration, the State Department and committees such as this must make it clear to source countries that we expect their cooperation.

We must use both moral suasion and the benefits of good diplomatic relations with the United States . . . money, technical aid, equipment, crop substitution programs and law enforcement assistance.

These countries must receive a firm expression of the Administration's policy on drugs. And it must become a high priority in our bilateral relations with them.

I'm not an expert in foreign relations, but it seems clear that what best motivates our friends is dollar resources. We have an opportunity in the President's new Caribbean initiatives to bring this point home.

Congress will determine the criteria of eligibility for these economic initiatives, and this committee can influence the shaping of those criteria.

The influence of this committee can also be expressed through the supplemental foreign aid bill, military sales and the Agency for International Development.

The economies of most of these countries lack funds for primary needs, such as nutrition, education and law enforcement.

To the degree that we want them to act in our behalf we will simply have to pay for it. That's always been the way the game has been played. As we get agreements to conduct aerial herbicide spraying operations, we must supply the equipment and material to do it.

I suggest that when we put the diplomatic pressure on . . . using the stick, if you will . . . that we ought to have a carrot handy at the same time to help those governments deal with domestic pressures.

On the subject of herbicide spraying I want to add that Florida is now surveying appropriate sites for such operations.

We are prepared to spray. When we do, we will be happy to have representatives of Colombia or any other government on hand as witnesses.

Paraquat, the most likely agent, is used commercially across much of Florida in sugar cane, vegetable and strawberry production. We have no hesitation in showing its usefulness on marijuana as well.

Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Turner.

**STATEMENT OF MAURICE T. TURNER, JR., CHIEF OF POLICE,
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

Chief TURNER. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today for the purpose of making a statement on the overall impact of narcotics on law enforcement and on the economy and society in general in Washington, D.C.

The local problems in drug enforcement are multifaceted. Today, drug abuse has reached epidemic proportions within the District of Columbia. There are nine active drug treatment clinics in our city and all are filled to maximum level.

According to our Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services Administration, there are an estimated 15,000 drug addicts, citywide. Narcotic-related "overdose deaths" have risen from a low of 7 in 1978, 41 in 1979, 62 in 1980, to 115 in 1981.

Heroin street purity has risen from less than 2 percent in 1978, to a level of more than 4 percent. Most alarming is the fact that during the same time period that the purity has doubled, heroin street prices dropped in half; thus indicating a ready supply of heroin.

In addition to heroin, other controlled substances have increased in availability throughout the city. In the past there were only several locations situated in particular areas of the city that were known as street marketplaces for drugs. Now we see street marketplaces cropping up at more and more locations.

Cocaine is readily available and extensively abused primarily as a recreational drug by abusers who can afford the expense.

Cocaine is becoming more and more popular and we are beginning to find violators now selling heroin and cocaine from the same locations.

Just this past month, our narcotics branch arrested 3 major cocaine dealers and seized 3 kilos of high purity cocaine having a street value of over \$2 million. This seizure was the largest seizure of cocaine recorded in the history of our Department.

Two of the violators were from Colorado and the third violator was from Florida; all came to our area for the sole purpose of distributing cocaine.

Marihuana is by far the most abused drug and is available throughout the city, and the drug of choice by youthful abusers. It is also the drug most commonly found in and around schools.

However, its abuse is not exclusively that of the youth. Contrary to the belief held by many citizens, the possession of small amounts of marihuana is a crime.

One impact of this is a significant increase in the rise of crime index offenses such as burglaries, larcenies, and robberies by heroin addicts.

Formation of a drug habit by an abuser progresses to a point where his normal financial resources cannot support his habit. The abuser must then depend on money from his family and his friends or resort to an assortment of various crimes to support his habit.

Another alarming impact is the continuous increase in the display of violence caused by the present drug situation. In 1981, 57, or 24.6 percent, of the 232 homicides occurring in the District of Columbia were identified as being drug related.

And I stand here today to tell you that that trend is continuing in 1982.

Although it is true that there are factors that have caused the rapid increase in violent crimes in our cities today, drug abuse, by all accounts, must be numbered as one of the most significant.

I would like to point out one simple fact to the committee while I am testifying. The caseload for the superior court in 1981, 30 percent of it was drug cases, and 70 percent of the cases in the U.S. district court were drug cases; 38 of the 46 cases on the court calendar in the U.S. district court are drug cases.

Our enforcement measures to combat the drug problems are multiphased and, in this day of dwindling resources, place a great demand on manpower and supportive equipment.

Our most effective enforcement program is a Drug Enforcement Administration and Metropolitan Police Department joint task force established for the purpose of cooperating in the investigation, institution, and prosecution of cases involving major drug violators and stemming the flow of drugs into the District of Columbia, as well as dealing with illicit drug traffickers who know no local or State boundaries.

This joint program greatly enhances law enforcement efforts in the areas of sufficient confidential funds, frequent rotation of undercover officers, necessary multijurisdictional arrest powers and coordinated regional approaches to drug enforcement.

In addition, locally, each of our seven police districts apply their drug enforcement efforts through their vice units and primarily move against obvious street deals.

The Morals Division investigates those persons identified as having a more significant role in drug trafficking than street dealers.

The Morals Division implements special investigative procedures such as the use of informants, surveillance operations, narcotics intelligence, undercover operations, conspiracy investigations, diversion cases, and clandestine laboratories.

Also, established within the Morals Division is a Pharmaceutical Drug Diversion Investigative Unit, established primarily to eliminate or significantly reduce the illegal diversion of drugs by health professionals licensed by the District of Columbia to dispense, prescribe, administer, or handle controlled drugs.

In September 1981, I found it necessary to establish a 40-member special narcotic task force for the sole purpose of attacking street-level drug trafficking, which, at times, created crowds numbering in the hundreds to assemble for the purpose of obtaining drugs.

From September 1981 through March 1982, the special narcotic task force alone has made 2,196 arrests, recovered 68 handguns, seized \$104,997, and seized 6 vehicles.

Through these enforcement measures, we apply pressure at all levels of the local illicit drug trade.

However, Mr. Chairman, these enforcement measures are simply not enough to exert any meaningful and long lasting deterrent or control over the illicit drug trade.

We must have a strong commitment on the part of the Federal Government to develop and implement programs that will stop opium poppies, marihuana plants, and coca plants from being harvested at their origin; primarily in the countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Bolivia, Colombia, and the Caribbean.

None of these plants grow at 14th and T Streets, NW., or Martin Luther King Avenue and Talbert Street, SE., or Condon Terrace, SE.

For example, our experience at the street level subsequent to Turkey's 1972 poppy ban and Mexico's 1975 poppy eradication campaign are real evidence that eradication programs at the source of the product have a dramatic impact on the purity percentage and ready availability of heroin in our communities.

International action by the U.S. Government is the only way we will be able to effectively control illicit drug trafficking.

Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
[Chief Turner's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAURICE T. TURNER, JR., CHIEF OF POLICE, METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

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Today, drug abuse has reached epidemic proportions within the District of Columbia. There are nine active drug treatment clinics in our City and all are filled to maximum level.

According to our Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services Administration, there are an estimated 15,000 drug addicts, City-wide.

Narcotic related "overdose deaths" have risen from a low of seven (7) in 1978, forty-one (41) in 1979, sixty-two (62) in 1980, to one hundred fifteen (115) in 1981. Heroin street purity has risen from less than two percent (2%) in 1978, to a level of more than four percent (4%). Most alarming is the fact that during the same time period that the purity has doubled, heroin street prices dropped in half; thus indicating a readily supply of heroin.

In addition to heroin, other controlled substances have increased in availability throughout the City. In the past there were only several locations situated in particular areas of the City that were known "street market places" for drugs. Now we see "street market places" cropping up at more and more locations.

Moreover, diversion by licensed practitioners of legitimate pharmaceutical drugs, such as Hydromorphone (Dilaudid) and Phenmetrazine (Preludin), into the illicit drug trafficking market contributes to the problem of drug availability. Dilaudid is used as a substitute for heroin by addicts and also used exclusively by other abusers. Preludin is also used by heroin addicts primarily to string out their high and to increase the effects of heroin. The profit realized by the illicit pharmaceutical drug dealer is enormous when you consider that a Preludin 75 mg. tablet's legitimate wholesale cost to a pharmacist is thirty-two cents (.32¢) per dosage unit, and the illicit retail price is \$12.00 to \$15.00 per dosage unit; and a Dilaudid 4 mg. tablet's legitimate wholesale cost to a pharmacist is twenty-two cents (.22¢) per dosage unit, and the illicit retail price is \$35.00 per dosage unit.

Cocaine is readily available and extensively abused primarily as a recreational drug and by abusers who can afford the expense. Cocaine is becoming more and more popular and we are beginning to find violators now selling heroin and cocaine from the same locations. Just this past month, our Narcotic Branch arrested three major cocaine dealers and seized three kilos of high purity cocaine having a street value of over \$2,000,000. This seizure was the largest seizure of cocaine recorded by our Department. Two of the violators were from Colorado and the third violator was from Florida; all came to our area for the sole purpose of distributing cocaine.

Marihuana is by far the most abused drug and is available throughout the City, and the drug of choice by youthful abusers. It is also the drug most commonly found in and around schools. However, its abuse is not exclusively that of the youth. Contrary to the belief held by many citizens, the possession of small amounts of marihuana is a crime.

One impact of this is a significant increase in the rise of crime index offenses such as burglaries, larcenies and robberies by heroin addicts. Formation of a drug habit by an abuser progresses to a point where his normal financial resources cannot support his habit. The abuser must then depend on money from his family and his friends or resort to an assortment of various crimes to support his habit.

A recent study called "The Criminality of Heroin Addicts When Addicted and When Off Opiates," completed by Dr. John C. Ball, Dr. Lawrence Rosen, Dr. John A. Flueck, and Dr. David Nurco, disclosed that 243 addicts living in Baltimore, Maryland were responsible for almost 500,000 crimes over an eleven (11) year period. Our professional judgement is that the crime rate and crime patterns in the District of Columbia are similar to that of Baltimore in terms of criminality committed by heroin addicts. I serve on the major chiefs committee on the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and my discussions with fellow Chiefs across the country indicate that they are also experiencing crime rises caused in large part by the

increase availability of illicit drugs.

Another alarming impact is the continuous increase in the display of violence caused by the present drug situation. In 1981, fifty-seven (57) or 24.6% of the 232 homicides occurring in the District of Columbia were identified as being drug related.

Although it is true that there are factors that have caused the rapid increase in violent crimes in our cities today, drug abuse, by all accounts, must be numbered as one of the most significant.

Our enforcement measures to combat the drug problem are multiphased and, in this day of dwindling resources, place a great demand on manpower and supportive equipment. Our most effective enforcement program is a Drug Enforcement Administration and Metropolitan Police Department Joint Task Force established for the purpose of cooperating in the investigation, institution and prosecution of cases involving major drug violators and stemming the flow of drugs into the District of Columbia, as well as dealing with illicit drug traffickers who know no local or state boundaries. This joint program greatly enhances law enforcement efforts in the areas of sufficient confidential funds, frequent rotation of undercover officers, necessary multi-jurisdictional arrest powers and coordinated regional approaches to drug enforcement.

In addition, locally, each of our seven police districts apply their drug enforcement efforts through their vice units and primarily enforce obvious "street deals."

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In September of 1981, I found it necessary to establish a forty (40) member Special Narcotic Task Force for the sole purpose of attacking street level drug trafficking, which, at times, created crowds numbering in the hundreds to assemble for the purpose of obtaining drugs. From September 1981 through March 1982, the Special Narcotic Task Force alone has made 2,196 arrests, recovered sixty-eight (68) handguns, seized \$104,997 and seized six (6) vehicles.

Through these enforcement measures, we apply pressure at all levels of the local illicit drug trade. However, Mr. Chairman,

these enforcement measures are simply not enough to exert any meaningful and long lasting deterrent or control over the illicit drug trade. We must have a strong commitment on the part of the Federal Government to develop and implement programs that will decrease opium poppies, marihuana plants and coca plants from being harvested at their origin; primarily in the countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. None of these plants grow at 14th and T Streets, N.W., or Martin Luther King Avenue and Talbert Street, S.E., or Condon Terrace, S.E. For example, our experience at the street level subsequent to Turkey's 1972 poppy ban and Mexico's 1975 poppy eradication campaign are real evidence that eradication programs at the source of the product have a dramatic impact on the purity percentage and ready availability of heroin in our communities. International action by the United States Government is the only way we will be able to effectively control illicit drug trafficking.

Mr. Chairman, our Mayor has designated me as his Commanding General in his "War on Crime." If we are to win our war on crime, we must win our battle against illicit drugs. To lose this battle in our urban communities, would be disastrous for all our citizens.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Courtenay.

**STATEMENT OF DANIEL J. COURTENAY, CHIEF, ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT**

Mr. COURTENAY. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to apologize for the absence of Mr. Robert J. McGuire. Unfortunately, he had prior commitments and asked me to substitute for him. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the committee for allowing a member of the New York City police to appear before them and give some insight into the drug problem as it surfaces within New York City.

The history of enforcement action in major cities throughout the United States, includes a long and serious commitment to combating the problem of drug abuse.

Nevertheless, despite various efforts and approaches, most authorities conclude that the strategies to control drug importation, trafficking and ultimate abuse of the product have failed.

Although numerous social programs, enforcement initiatives and legislative enactments have been undertaken during the past two decades, it can be conservatively stated that we are no better off today than we were 20 years ago. To put it mildly, abuse of drugs by our citizens, young and old alike, flourishes.

In 1981, New York City drug enforcement authorities seized drugs with an approximate street value of \$300 million. It is estimated that 10 percent of all drugs smuggled into the country are intercepted somewhere between importation and consumption.

If we apply this formula to New York seizures, we find a multi-billion dollar annual expenditure for drugs within the metropolitan area alone.

These dollars, when multiplied against seizures for the rest of the United States indicates a drain on our system which would intrigue even the most learned economist.

To counteract this huge expenditure of moneys in the illegal marketplace, it has become necessary to divert budgetary funds from medical research, education, training of the unskilled, care of the aged and other positive social programs, and into reactive law enforcement.

Also, narcotics addiction, particularly heroin, affects the lives of nonusers, in significant ways. In an indepth analysis of heroin addicts residing in Baltimore, Md., a study prepared by Doctors Ball, Rose, Flueck, and Nurco, in 1980, it was found that 243 individual addicts within the area studied were responsible for approximately one-half million crimes during an 11-year period.

If we project this study nationally, a situation for serious concern becomes clear.

For those who continue to believe that drug usage is primarily confined to the ghetto areas and does not impact on the everyday lives of the working middle class, I would like to advise you of undercover video tapes taken of street drug activities by the New York City Narcotics Division which show that white collar employees, including junior executives, comprise a significant portion of the illicit drug market operating in the financial district.

These are the same people we entrust with our savings, investments and, in many cases, our financial future.

For those who believe that drug usage is a harmless mode of recreation designed to provide a needed "up" or "down" as conditions dictate, I point to the 534 overdose deaths in New York City for the year 1980 and the tragic demise of several celebrities who serve as models for our society.

For those who downplay the effect of occasional cocaine usage, I point to the 11,350 cocaine-related hospital admissions experienced throughout the country in 1981.

In fact, according to results published in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration newsletter, cocaine-related admissions accounted for over 4 percent of the patients at the 2,100 federally funded clinics.

These admissions are directly related to a substance whose production is foreign to our soil and must be smuggled in.

I strongly remind you that none of the circumstances outlined are a consequence of a product developed within our country.

With the exception of a small percentage of marihuana, all of the drugs of choice utilized in the United States are brought in through clandestine and illegal operations.

We are, in essence, victims of those who inflict a virus on our society while escaping the ramifications of this social sickness.

In two speeches made in Miami on February 16 and March 16, 1982, Vice President George Bush vowed to increase Federal efforts in fighting the rampant crime and epidemic drug smuggling that have recently plagued south Florida.

I suggest that the comments of Vice President Bush, while encouraging, were too exclusive in their geographic scope and too mild in defining the problem.

Experience has taught us that local law enforcement cannot, by itself, eliminate illegal marketing in drugs. The vast profits involved, the expertise of those willing to risk apprehension, the seemingly inexhaustible source of supply, the worldwide nature of production, the almost infinite number of import points available, and the growing social acceptance of such drugs as cocaine and marihuana all add to the burden of already undermanned municipal police agencies faced with increasing crime rates and demands for service.

The problem is a pervasive one, from California to New York, from Mexico to Canada. Drug trafficking does not recognize State lines or international borders. It is not confined to one corner of our country or to one segment of our society.

The Federal Government, therefore, must accept a stronger leadership role if we are to stem the rising tide of drug abuse. The problem, to put it frankly, must be identified as a national disgrace.

It requires the Federal Government to exercise its full range of available economic and political sanctions against those producing and processing nations which would profit from our ills.

Both the executive and legislative branches of Government must become involved if we are to achieve and maintain a safe, drug-free society.

To begin, I recommend a complete review of the Government's policy concerning drug enforcement and a public recommitment to suppress narcotic importation.

We must clearly define the problem, set priorities for a coordinated response and avoid the temptation of reaping political gain through meaningless rhetoric.

U.S. economic assistance programs should also be carefully reevaluated. Countries profiting from or allowing open drug cultivation should be excluded.

In addition, treaties should be examined, renegotiated where appropriate, and pressure should be placed on Governments which express an unwillingness to deal with processing plants operating with virtual immunity within their borders.

A concentrated attempt should be undertaken to interdict illegal imports coming from source countries, such as Iran and Afghanistan, where crop/income substitution programs are politically infeasible.

In proposing a philosophy of complete involvement of resources, it is further recommended that all branches of the military become increasingly involved, in both supportive and operational functions, in the task of intercepting air and sea vessels suspected of carrying contraband.

The United States must also serve as an example to others and lead the way in healing ourselves by developing effective rehabilitative programs and by exterminating domestic marihuana crops.

It is unrealistic for us to seek assistance from our global partners if we cannot display a self-initiative worthy of imitation.

Finally, it is my contention that no discussion on narcotics abuse and control would be complete without comment on preventive programs.

If we are committed to making America a society free of drug abuse, we must start with the education of our children at the earliest age.

We all agree that the youth of our Nation is the future of America. It then necessarily follows that there must be a national effort to provide them with firsthand knowledge of the effects of drug abuse and the dangers that it presents to them.

Parents must be assisted in their guardianship roles through education of the symptoms and results of drug abuse by the young. This is not an easy task. Our commitment must be total. It will call for dedication, perseverance, and involvement by all of Government with coordination and assistance coming from existing Federal agencies.

Once a child reaches high school, he or she, in most cases, has already been exposed to drugs. Therefore, to provide the greatest impact, drug-prevention programs should be designed for and incorporated into the primary school education system.

As our children mature, they should be exposed to updated material selected for their age group. This will serve as a constant reinforcement of ideas and a reminder of the dangers present in our society.

Classroom teachers exercise a strong influence over their students and drug education material should be disseminated through

them. Educators can obtain the proper expertise through seminars conducted by law enforcement and health officials.

We in New York City have been totally supportive and involved in all efforts to eradicate the drug problem.

We are attacking it through law enforcement, rehabilitative programs, and education, but at best we are merely on a holding pattern.

Gentlemen, overall narcotics control is a Federal responsibility and help is long overdue.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Courtenay. Thank you, gentlemen.

In your testimony all three have emphasized the need to start to somehow curtail the importation of illicit drugs by using our muscle, so to speak, in our aid programs in countries that grow and export illicit drugs. However, there are those that feel there should be more done on our own as far as controlling the use of drugs in our own country.

In many of the exporting countries, they don't have a drug problem. It is here in this country where we do not grow the drugs that we have a drug problem. So I was very pleased, Mr. Courtenay, when you were one of the three that emphasized the need for education of our youth, our children, to control drugs that way.

But I must ask all three of you, since you are all three in the enforcement sector of that drug control, how do you view the efforts of the judicial system in our country? Some say there is a revolving door. When arrested the drug criminals come in and out. The judges are too lenient, too soft.

Would you care to comment on the situation in Florida, on the judicial system in the District of Columbia, where I think it is particularly charged that our courts are very soft and, sir, if you would then comment on the New York judicial system?

Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. In Florida, 3 years ago, we passed what is probably the toughest drug-sentencing law in the country—it has been copied by a number of other Southeastern States—where we can incarcerate up to 25 years with no hope of probation or parole. Obviously that law is challenged in court. It has been sustained and we now, in the last 6 months, are really seeing it implemented. Our State court judges have not been hesitant to use it.

We do have a situation in Florida, oftentimes, where people arrested beg law enforcement officials that they be turned over to Federal custody so that they can be tried in Federal court, because sentences there are, I think, somewhat more lenient. I believe that there is some legislation in the Congress to increase the penalties for drug trafficking, and I certainly would urge that that be considered.

We saw some of the drug operations move out of our State because of our tough sentencing law. In Florida now, after conviction on drug smuggling, we deny those individuals bail pending appeal. We keep them locked up. We think that will have some deterrent effect.

I think, also, there are some bills before the Congress dealing with bail or drug smugglers, and I would urge that that receive a very serious consideration.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Turner, how is the situation?

Chief TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I would strongly support and go on record as having some type of mandatory sentencing for major distributors of drugs. My experiences, on the other hand, have indicated that there are entrepreneurs willing to take the risk because the profits are so huge in dealing with the day-to-day operations and drug trafficking.

I can't think of an easy solution, but I would strongly endorse mandatory sentencing for those people who are major distributors of hard drugs in this society.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. In your opinion, Mr. Turner, is it just the system here in the District of Columbia that is lax?

Chief TURNER. There is criticism of the courts by certain factions of the community. I work hand in hand with the judiciary and with the chief judges of the superior court, and I have spoken with the U.S. attorney's office. It is a problem that they are trying to overcome to make sure that individuals receive sentences commensurate with the crimes that they are committing. I am satisfied in the drug area that those individuals are receiving sentences that are appropriate for their dealings in drugs.

The thing that we find that occurs most times is when we lock up a major drug dealer, somebody fills the void or some entrepreneur comes along and steps right in. So we are dealing with somebody different constantly, and it is pretty hard to get a handle on it. I don't think that one thing is going to be a deterrent as long as the profits are what they are now.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Courtenay, what is the situation in New York?

Mr. COURTENAY. I agree that the profits are astronomical, and this puts a lot of people in the system. And, of course, the deterrent effect in general is somewhat lacking. We have two levels of courts within New York City. We have a special narcotics court that deals with indictable narcotics offenses, and we find that the sentences are somewhat more meaningful. On the average, they run between 5 and 10 years.

The low level of narcotics arrests that we make that eventually wind up in the criminal court system indicates that there is absolutely no deterrent. For an individual who has been arrested for selling marijuana, and cocaine, you will find that the penalties may run up to \$200 for that sale. If the individual can turn \$1,000 or \$1,500 a day, \$200 becomes just a cost of doing business and that obviously is not a deterrent.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Smith, I will refer you to page 4 of your statement where you say: "The full impact of this illicit industry on Florida is difficult to document today as it has always been." You say further: "Commonsense tells us that the staggering profits of the trade have to be legitimized."

Would you care to amplify on that statement?

Mr. SMITH. Well, the staggering profits in the drug trade in our State resulted in corruption of police officers, and commissioners and people at high levels of government. You know, buying protection and that kind of thing. The amount of money available is so staggering that it has caused us tremendous corruption problems. We have had a number of police officers indicted.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The State of Florida has taken steps to correct that?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir, we do have a number of investigations. I am afraid it is so widespread it is just pervasive. We think that perhaps the drug business may be our biggest business. We think it might be a \$7 billion a year business activity within the State of Florida. That would make it probably our No. 1 business, an underground economy that is able to buy itself a lot of protection and is able to cause a lot of corruption.

I think if the DEA estimates are correct that illegal drug sales in this country are around the \$80 to \$90 billion a year mark annually, that is an underground economy that we cannot afford in terms of illegal activity, in terms of what it is doing to our young people. And I think it causes us to have to pause with concern.

Krushchev said many years ago that if this country is destroyed it will be from within. I think what we see with the drug trade and the pervasiveness of it, with the unbelievable amounts of money, indicates we may be on that path. That is why I have been up here so much begging so hard for the kind of concern on the national level that really has been lacking for so long.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. With the indulgence of my colleagues if I could ask one question that could be answered yes or no. Have you noticed legislation to legalize marihuana? I would like to ask the witnesses who have experience in this area would you support or would you agree that marihuana should be legalized?

Mr. SMITH. No, sir, never.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. No, sir.

Chief TURNER. No, sir.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Courtenay?

Mr. COURTENAY. Definitely not.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ireland.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I realize the thrust of each of you panel members has been directed toward what the Federal Government can do, should do, and that is the thrust of our discussion here. But as background for this, I think each of you have referred to the fact, particularly the gentleman from New York, of the need for education and rehabilitation at the local level.

I am sure we all are aware that there are many good people working in that regard, volunteer groups, people in the schools, and other State and local groups.

This local education to induce people and persuade people not to utilize drugs is really not a close problem for the Federal Government. And yet we see it as part of the solution.

My question, and I would appreciate it if each one of you would make a comment on it, is why does it seem that these programs, which seem to represent such great effort, involving many volunteers, people of good heart, State and local governments, why do these programs seem to have so little effect? They are aimed at persuading not only our young people but, as you say, our young adults on Wall Street; why are we not able to persuade so many people in this country not to use drugs?

Mr. SMITH. Well, I think they are having a good effect. Parent groups in Florida, programs like STRAIGHT and Parents for Drug Free Youth; I think, are being very effective. I have seen recently results of national polls that would indicate for the first time among particularly schoolage children a decline in the use of marihuana. I have said many times we are still trying to overcome the reinforcement that we had for years, and years, and years that marihuana is no more harmful than alcohol. I know you have some medical people coming and you are going to hear that that is just not correct.

My experience has been, and when I talk to school kids, which I do a lot, about this problem and leave with them some of the summarized studies on the impact of marihuana, cocaine, et cetera, is that when young people read for themselves the results of some of this drug use that they will make the right decision. It scares the hell out of them. But as parents of school children, teachers, we can talk until our gums are blue and the kids just won't believe it.

When they can read for themselves—I have been somewhat critical of the media not giving the prominence that it should to these studies that are coming out so that people can read it in the newspapers. They have been I think derelict somewhat in that responsibility to share that news with the public.

People make the right choice. For some reason in this country, though, we still seem to be hung up on glamorizing the "cocaine cowboys" and that kind of thing to people who are young and impressionable, that it is some kind of good trip and that kind of thing, and we pay for it. But I do think that parent groups are beginning to have a good impact, and that young people are beginning to make the right decisions based on what they themselves learn about the problem.

Mr. IRELAND. Chief Turner.

Chief TURNER. My experience in the Nation's Capital have indicated we do have viable, ongoing, educational programs where police officers, along with educators, the boards of trade, the chambers of commerce, are going into the schools trying to educate our youth, and we think it is beginning to have an effect.

Certainly our people in some of the high schools indicate we do not have the levels of especially heroin and not nearly as much marihuana as we had in the past.

I would like to point out the problem we have. If we could take an analysis of those overdose deaths we had in the city last year, most were around 29 years of age and they have a combination of abusing alcoholics and abusing drugs. We believe—it is our belief that if they did not have the eradication program from Turkey in 1972 and 1975, that the addicts went on some type of methadone maintenance program and as drugs become available and the purity becomes higher they began to convert or at least go back and use heroin. That is why we had the increase in the overdose deaths that we had.

But they were not young people. The average age of the overdose deaths were around 29 or 30 years of age, but we do have establishments with the board of education and other groups to educate in our programs, and we call upon some of our college students to assist us in this.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Courtenay?

Mr. COURTENAY. I think one of our problems in this country is that we are the drug-oriented culture. I think if you look at the television, they say to take a pill if we want to get thin. If we have a headache, we take a pill. If we are hungry, we take a pill. I think it is very difficult for an adult to tell a child "It is OK for me but it is not OK for you."

If a parent is smoking it is difficult to convince a child smoking is hazardous to one's health. I think that the parents themselves need a lot of education as to what are the dangers of drug abuse. Many cases, and it is always unfortunate when you bring a child home or you call a parent from the hospital and say: "Your child has just OD'd," they won't believe their child used drugs.

There are obvious signs over a long period of time. Either the parents are uninformed or unconcerned, and I would lean toward the fact that I think that most of them are uninformed. But the education is not only education of our young but education of our adults, too. To understand the kind of a role model they are playing for those children.

Mr. IRELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It seems there is an enormous increase in cocaine use in America. Has that been growing in the past?

Chief TURNER. Observations are entirely correct, Mr. Pritchard. To give you an idea last week we had to put up \$160,000 in show money to purchase 3 kilos of cocaine. It has become so prevalent now that we don't even have enough buy money to continue our investigations, because if we go into making a \$5,000 buy these people are making buys in the hundreds of thousands of dollars and cocaine is very prevalent in the city.

You find it in a lot of your better locations in the city, the Georgetown area of the city where we are having more problems with cocaine, and we are beginning to seize more cocaine than we have in the past.

Mr. PRITCHARD. What is the average use of cocaine for someone who is a cocaine user?

Chief TURNER. I was just conferring with the gentleman in charge of the Morals Division of the Police Department, and he informs me cocaine costs between \$80 and \$100 a gram and the average user uses about that much on a daily basis if he is a daily user, \$80 to \$100 a day. We really can't measure when the people are using cocaine.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Is it something people use once a week, for example?

Chief TURNER. You ask me a question I am not privy to answer. He says some people when we arrest them they use it once a month, some once a week, and some use it daily. There are no barometers that we have.

Mr. PRITCHARD. There is not a profile of people, these people, who are into cocaine?

Chief TURNER. I would say one of the profiles I have seen on cocaine, most of the people are employed; they have a better than average paying job, and few would say they would be middle class,

upper middle class as opposed to the people we see in the streets using heroin, PCP, and marihuana.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Is this something where they profile 100 users and find the use goes up or down, or does it stay about the same? To satisfy the habit, do they start taking more? How does that work?

Chief TURNER. The users—we arrest very few users of cocaine. We are normally dealing with dealers, individuals who are selling, so I don't think we have that type of profile that you are asking for.

Mr. PRITCHARD. These are the people causing crime and they get into your operation because there is criminal activity. I gather it is one of the pressures for them to go out and steal.

Chief TURNER. Most cocaine users, people we arrest for cocaine violations, have had no prior criminal record. We don't deal with them repetitiously, or as recidivists as we do with heroin addicts. I am told cocaine is not addictive, that people use it as a recreational drug or a pleasure drug. Most of them can support their habits. Most of them do not resort to crimes other than selling to support their habits.

It is not the same as the heroin addicts who go to crimes against property and some violent crimes of robbery to support their day-to-day addiction.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It seems we have had a great increase in cocaine users. It seems some people who are not criminal elements are using cocaine, and they could be more difficult to come down on. Is that correct?

Chief TURNER. That is correct, sir. Most of our information comes through informants in those type deals. Some of your local bars or places where individuals migrate for cocktails and so forth and cocaine is sold. We sometimes obtain that information but normally it is not the day-to-day criminal element we are dealing with who is the cocaine user.

Mr. PRITCHARD. About 20 years ago I went out with a narcotics agent for an evening. We were out on a stakeout, looking through a take window. We watched the street scene there for about 5 hours. At that time this fellow said if you get the penalty too high, then it is harder for us when we get into court, particularly the first offenders, it is hard to get a judge, or juror, or what have you to bring in a guilty verdict because of the severe penalties on first offenders. It is sometimes harder to get that sentence placed. Have you had that experience?

Chief TURNER. I have heard that argument. I have heard that opposed in mandatory sentences. There are crimes where the jury doesn't feel the penalty is commensurate with the crime, and they will find not guilty because they think the penalty is too great. Perhaps Mr. Smith could speak to that.

Mr. SMITH. In Dade County we have had some experience where juries have been not inclined to come in with guilty verdicts because of very stiff penalties that we have. That has not been true in other parts of the State. I think with the tremendous increase in crime in Dade County that we are seeing a reversal of that kind of jury attitude, but there is no question that, you know, different

parts of our State, in different parts people have different opinions. That is the problem.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. First let me commend the witnesses for the record for being on the firing line of this very difficult problem and trying to do their best to keep the society alive and well. I make particular reference to the attorney general from Florida, who I know, who has been fighting narcotics and crime generally.

It is quite clear to me that for over 20 years the use of drugs and crime generally is, and has been, a national epidemic. Unfortunately, it is a factor in crime. If we didn't have the use we wouldn't have the crime. It is also quite clear that the educational effort has to be strengthened at every level. The money incentive is so formidable that local law enforcement is absolutely overwhelming when you take into consideration both the international and interstate activity that comes about as a result of this multibillion dollar business.

There is absolutely no escaping the fact that a strong and continuing national commitment, both internationally and domestic is absolutely essential. Absolutely essential.

I would like to ask the attorney general what evidence you have about the diversion of legitimate business to the drug industry. I refer to sales and use.

Mr. SMITH. As you know, Congressman Fascell, that has been a tremendous problem in Florida. We have had economic studies in Broward County that indicate the average price for a home or a lot to build a home on is inflated some \$2,000 or \$2,500 per unit because of the availability of cash and the willingness of people with drug money just to pay a higher price with laundered money.

We have heard all kinds of testimony about the huge cash deposits made in banks in south Florida. I hope the Congress is on the road to closing some of the loopholes. I guess the Federal requirement is that cash deposits of \$10,000 or more are supposed to be reported. Unfortunately, we found so many exemptions in that statute that it made it easy for drug dealers to buy restaurants and all kinds of businesses which rely on cash flow and were exempted from the reporting requirement, and it was made easy for the dope dealers to engage in those types of business activity. The activity has been very pervasive.

Mr. FASCELL. How about strengthening the Federal law on the doing of business with illegal money?

Mr. SMITH. We have a State statute and we have had great success along those lines. I don't know whether Federal statutes could be more utilized or need to be beefed up. While we are talking about the laws, I understand the Congress may be on the verge of allowing Internal Revenue Service to share their information with law enforcement agencies at the Federal level that would lead to more prosecution of dope dealers. I understand that the State law enforcement agencies have been exempted out of that and I would urge this committee to help to the extent they can and let State law enforcement people in on that action, too. That restriction has caused State agencies a problem.

Mr. FASCELL. How about amending the Federal laws to make it easier for IRS to make money cases?

Mr. SMITH. It would seem if we are going to have a marriage of FBI, DEA, and maybe moving the Internal Revenue Service into that kind of activity would be a step in the right direction.

If I could, I would say the good news is we have seen with the task force that is in place in south Florida now, the military-type action that is being taken, there is almost a curtailment of the drug flow into south Florida. It indicates that with a national commitment and the resources in place we really can win that aspect of the war. I know that Congressmen from other parts of the country are concerned, as they pull resources out of New York, New Jersey, and places like that to help Florida.

I think the message is at the Federal level we have simply got to increase law enforcement personnel. We certainly found that to be true in Florida, and in 1981 our legislature increased funding for State law enforcement by about \$200 million. We increased that with another \$100 million this year. I am convinced that in this country, at the State level and Federal level, we simply are not spending enough money for basic law enforcement.

The operation in south Florida has so far done a superb job. I think it is possible to do that all over this Nation.

Mr. FASCELL. Do any of you have any statistics about how many slots are not filled for law enforcement officers at the local level? I remember 10 or 15 years ago when we asked that question there was something like 50,000 slots for police officers that were not filled for one reason or another. Either they didn't have the money or there was some other problem.

Chief TURNER. Congressman Fascell, in the District of Columbia we are about 130 men short of authorized strength. We just administered an entrance examination 2 Saturdays ago, and hopefully we will start doing background investigations within another 4 weeks so that we could bring aboard the fully authorized force. We are currently about 130 men short.

Mr. COURTENAY. In New York in 1975 we suffered a severe budget crunch. We are now down to 22,200 from 33,300 at this time. We do have 3,000 recruits in the police academy. They will graduate and be ready for full duty in June, but this will give us actually in numbers about 23,000, so we are down.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join in commending the witnesses for their strong efforts in this tough problem.

Mr. Smith, you mentioned the Federal task force, the military, and so forth. Could you give us more details on what the military is doing now? As you will recall when the legislation went through the Congress about this subject it was hotly debated and there were a number of people in the House who were opposed to the idea of the military becoming involved. I would like to have your ideas on this, on how effective it is and what more we should be doing.

Mr. SMITH. Right now the presence and activity of the so-called radar operation is most effective. They are able to precisely pinpoint small aircraft that can scoot under the traditional radar net around this country, you know, the point where they are not moving. They are not penetrating that border.

I read a newspaper report in the last few days pointing out that people at the Federal level were concerned that there have not been some major arrests made, because of the expense of the operation of these aircraft and perhaps they should be pulled out. I think that is tremendously shortsighted. Their presence has been a great deterrent. They are not even trying to get through because they know they will be caught. I hope the activity continues and that funding can be found so other parts of the country can have this protection.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I yield.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Is it possible if you tighten up down there we are going to get more activity in places like Seattle?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. PRITCHARD. We just had a big bust out there in Seattle.

Mr. SMITH. There is no question about it. Law enforcement intelligence tells us right now particularly marihuana is being stockpiled in the Bahama Islands and other islands, and in Mexico, to wait out the task force. They want to see how long the funding will last and when it will be cut off. I am just pleading with you gentlemen to not let that happen.

I understand the budget crunch but nothing is more important it seems to me at the national level or State level than this protection. We have a responsibility, I do in Florida and you do for this country, to provide the resources so that we can at least guarantee our people some reasonable degree of protection. We haven't done that. States haven't done it, and the National Government hasn't done it, and we have paid for it with a crime rate and our citizens are telling us they are not going to put up with it. We can get an eradication program going and with more protection like we have now we can win the drug war.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. You said the law has been changed so it is now possible to keep people in jail rather than release them on bail.

I would like to ask the Chief and Mr. Courtenay what the situation is with regard to bail for these types of offenses in the city of Washington and in the city of New York.

Chief TURNER. Well, Mr. Congressman we have had some success in pretrial detention for those individuals who we consider major traffickers but I would be remiss or at least I am not satisfied with the efforts that are current. I think high bail should be set, and some of these individuals have the capability of putting up millions of dollars in cash bond but they should be made to show where they got that money from. And I think we need to strengthen the laws along those lines.

Mr. COURTENAY. Unfortunately we do not have detention except in unusual cases. I think the judiciary does not realize the amounts of money available to these people to put up bail and actually walk out from under it. Amounts such as \$400,000 bail to walk away. Obviously the judiciary is not aware of this.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Smith, would you agree with Chief Turner's analysis of the way the users of cocaine are involved in crimes as compared to, say, heroin or marihuana?

Mr. SMITH. I think in Florida we probably do have more people who are committing robbery, burglary and that kind of crime to get money to buy marihuana or cocaine. I think it is not restricted to the middle income or upper income professional level, which is the case here in the Washington area. I think it is more widespread in Florida, probably because of the availability of the drug.

Mr. COURTENAY. With reference to cocaine we find cocaine is generally purchased by those people who have a legitimate job and they can afford to maintain that habit, or those incidents of purchasing cocaine without resorting to the sale of cocaine or committing crime.

In the area of heroin we find two out of three of the individuals who buy from the various locations the heroin will sell to maintain their habits. One out of three will be committing crimes, but two out of three will be low level dealers actually buying, and buying a sufficient supply so they can sell to maintain their own habits.

Marihuana is a little different. I think marihuana, as far as the young people are concerned, these are individuals who have reasonable jobs and they can pretty much support themselves. We don't see it as the same kind of problem.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Has the cocaine situation been going on long enough to be able to determine whether or not people using cocaine were previously users of some other illegal substances?

Mr. COURTENAY. We haven't developed that. I would suggest that the users of cocaine have not necessarily tested the criminal justice system prior to their using cocaine. They may have used marihuana and then graduated into cocaine, but I don't think it is the same type of people who are involved in the heroin traffic and heroin use.

Chief TURNER. I would again concur with the gentleman from New York. I would like to point out that 30 percent of the people going through the superior court as a condition for pretrial, where urine specimens are obtained, about 30 percent of them are on some type of drugs, mainly heroin. That is strictly voluntary. We don't try to test all of them. In fact, I expect those figures to rise. Again we don't deal with those people who are users of cocaine as we do with other drugs and, as I said previously, very few of them have had prior criminal records, or where we deal with them as a recidivist who are constantly on the treadmill. They are just able to purchase and buy the drugs they need. They have meaningful employment and more often than not they have better than average income.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Smith, your testimony refers to the stockpiling in various areas. What is our intelligence in this respect and what can be done through Interpol or some other international means to seize this stockpile?

Mr. SMITH. I have found the information we get from the State and DEA to be very good. I was in Miami yesterday for a briefing on the operations of the task force there. Finally, we are getting some reasonable cooperation from the Bahamian Government. They have put on extra police, and I think some efforts are underway to make some seizures. That was great news because the past attitude of that government, in cooperation with Federal agencies

working on the drug problem there, which is a staging area to get those drugs to Florida, has not been good.

Again, I think in the State Department drug problems have not had a high priority. Embassies have not had instructions to try to put pressure on governments to cooperate with Federal law enforcement, and I think we have to have a lot more of that.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Again, all three of you have recommended the curtailing of crops such as marihuana, poppies or whatever, that occur in the illicit drug traffic. I think, particularly, Mr. Smith, you have recommended that paraquat eradication be pressed further by the State Department in international efforts abroad where the drugs are grown.

You stated also that Florida is not prepared to use paraquat. Why is that?

Mr. SMITH. Last summer we ran an air surveillance program in Florida. Frankly we didn't know whether we had a domestic problem. We were shocked to find out we had more marihuana growing in Florida than we suspected. It was on quarter-acre and half-acre plots that really would not justify an aerial spraying program. Small amounts like that were removed by hand. We are starting our air surveillance program again this year. If we find an area that is large enough to justify an aerial spraying program, we will certainly do that.

I think it is important, again, for people at the national level to tell the Colombians or Jamaicans that, yes, we have sprayed domestically, and I can tell you that Florida is prepared to do that. And as soon as we can find a field big enough to justify that kind of operation, it will be done.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It is my understanding that marihuana grows everywhere in the States, even in Wisconsin where it survives the winters. Now the Florida half-acre plots, do you believe that is grown for so-called home consumption?

Mr. SMITH. We have made about 70 arrests, and I think it is people who are packaging and processing it to sell. No question a few individuals have a few plants for their own use but for the most parts some were very sophisticated with sprinkler operations and that kind of thing.

They are very clever; they mix them with a corn crop which makes it difficult to spot from the air, and that kind of thing, but most operations we uncovered were people growing it for sale.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. A few years back there was a picture in one of our District of Columbia newspapers of a marihuana plant grown near a police station for experimental purposes. That was the first time I had seen the marihuana plant, and I noted in my neighborhood there was marihuana growing. I talked to my neighbor and he didn't know his son was so interested in gardening, and he immediately destroyed the plants.

How much marihuana is grown today in the metropolitan area?

Chief TURNER. It would be hard for me to estimate. I am told that the biggest places where we find marihuana growing is outside of carwashes where people empty ash trays. We have found it there before. The only large plants of marihuana we found growing was at the old National Training School for Boys at Bladensburg Road in Northeast Washington. Other than that, I would imagine a

lot of people for their own consumption have house plants that are growing, but I don't think too much is grown on plots of land here in the city.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. How about the New York area?

Mr. COURTENAY. I agree. If there are any marihuana plants in New York, they are in windowboxes or flower pots. But there are no areas where they are actually cultivating marihuana.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Marihuana has displaced the flower boxes.

Mr. COURTENAY. In some cases.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen. You have given us an insight we needed in order to cope with this problem. Let me assure you, I know I speak for all my colleagues, that we are going to press for international control. If the State Department doesn't have this on the highest priority, we will certainly press them to put it under highest priority.

Thank you very much. Your testimony has been very helpful.

The second panel will please come to the table. Dr. William Pollin, Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Dr. Robert L. Dupont, former director of White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. Dr. Walter Potter, president, national association of secondary school principals.

Gentlemen, if you so desire, a verbal summary will be welcomed.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM POLLIN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE

Dr. POLLIN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the domestic impact of narcotics and other drugs. Before proceeding, I would like to commend the House Foreign Affairs Committee on its interest in this severe national problem. Hearings such as these are an important mechanism for focusing national attention on the insidious problem of drug abuse.

Drug abuse is in many respects analogous to the international spread of infectious disease. It respects no national boundaries, and produces untold human suffering afflicting both the rich and the poor. In all societies there exist susceptible, vulnerable individuals who are predisposed toward the disease process. These individuals may well live long, healthy, productive lives as long as they remain unexposed to the infectious agent.

However, the spread of drug abuse and addiction, like that of tuberculosis, or flu virus, occurs as these individuals come into contact with "infectious" substances. The availability of illegal drugs in the United States, in our communities, and in our schools can be equated with exposure to the most virulent bacteria.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse, [NIDA], is the lead Federal agency for research into the causes, and the health and social effects of drugs on our society. A principal aspect of this research effort is to define and describe the addictive process, to develop a basic understanding of vulnerability/predisposition, and to determine why some individuals are susceptible and others are not.

The Institute also carries the major responsibility for monitoring drug trends in this country. We cannot understand or deal effectively with the Nation's abuse problem unless we can define with

precision the extent of drug use; the characteristics of drug users; population groups at risk of drug abuse; changing patterns and trends in drugs being abused; and geographic distributions of the drug problem.

Without such information, the Federal Government is not in a position to evaluate containment efforts, to advise and forewarn cities and States of the potential spread of a serious new drug problem, or to support city and State action plans based upon a solid foundation of reliable information.

The need for a well-conceived and managed intelligence effort is particularly critical in the drug abuse area. This is necessary in part due to the essentially uncontrollable and illegal manner in which most abused drugs are produced and/or marketed and the apparent willingness on the part of segments of our population to experiment with and misuse almost any drug.

This situation is complicated by the fact that there is apparently no limit to the inventiveness of the drug subculture to find new substances or combinations of drugs to abuse. Once discovered, a new fad in drug abuse may be confined to a small area; all too often, however, these fads spread from one region of the country to another as evidenced by recent experience with PCP.

Historically, we have learned that drug use thought to be contained at an endemic level may suddenly experience a resurgence. Recent increases in heroin use in the northeast have demonstrated the dynamic nature of the drug abuse phenomenon and clearly underscores the need for timely data concerning its nature, extent, and changing trends.

Many of the same factors that contribute to the difficulties involved in combating drug abuse also hinder assessment of the problem. Nevertheless, reasonably accurate assessments of changing patterns and emerging trends can be made by analyzing data collected from a variety of sources.

In recent years, NIDA has developed and established a set of interlinked surveys and data systems which provides answers to many of these questions regarding the dimensions, demographics, and distribution of drug abuse within the population. Among the sources of data utilized by NIDA, four are national in scope. These are: the Drug Abuse Warning Network [DAWN], the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the High School Senior Survey, and the National Drug and Alcoholism Treatment Utilization Survey [NDATUS].

All of these sources contribute valuable information to the overall drug abuse picture. Refer to the appendix to my statement for examples of data generated by the NIDA data system.

DAWN represents an ongoing reporting system, while the National Survey on Drug Abuse, the High School Senior Survey, and NDATUS are periodic data collection efforts. The National Survey on Drug Abuse and NDATUS are biennial surveys conducted on alternating years, the High School Senior Survey is conducted by a grantee on an annual basis.

In addition to the differences in periods of time covered, surveys differ from reporting systems in the populations surveyed and the types of information collected. Thus, each represents a distinct component of a multifaceted framework which provides consider-

able insight into and knowledge about the epidemiology of drug abuse.

The epidemiological network I have just described allows NIDA to accurately track, and in many cases to predict, the spread of drug abuse in the United States. Survey data have been empirically shown to be valid and reliable for drug categories other than heroin; indicator data fill this gap. Most significant health problems are identified when deviations of plus or minus 20 percent of the norm occur. In the case of drug misuse, however, the magnitude of change is dramatically greater. Thus, in the past two decades, we had a twentyfold, rather than 20 percent, increase in drug use in this country.

Mr. Chairman, our national epidemiologic data collection and analysis system has generated substantial information about drug trends in this country. One significant trend is the rapidity of changes in drug abuse patterns in the last two decades. Before 1960, only 1 or 2 percent of our youth had ever tried an illicit drug. Now about two-thirds of our youth have used an illicit drug at some time before graduating from high school. For many, drug abuse is modal behavior.

In 1960, less than 7 percent of young adults, 18 to 25, had tried marihuana, whereas in 1979, more than 60 percent of young adults had used marihuana. There has been a four-fold increase in heroin abuse since 1960, and today the number of Americans who use heroin range between 450,000 and 500,000. At least 22 million people use marihuana, and over 4 million cocaine. We are pleased that our most recent data on high school seniors reflect a downward trend in the use of marihuana and most other categories of drugs. One of 16 categories is an exception: the same data has alerted us to an apparent rise in the use of stimulants. We are concerned because a further increase in the abuse of amphetamines and amphetamine-like substances has been observed in a number of countries, with some, such as Japan and Sweden, having reached epidemic proportions, at one time.

Mr. Chairman, the addictive disorders account for one quarter of all premature deaths in the United States. At least 2 million people in the United States currently suffer adverse effects from drug use. Major specific hazards include: chronic psychological change, especially important in adolescents for whom regular drug use can become a central way of life; sudden death from respiratory depression or seizures, infectious hepatitis, or subacute bacterial endocarditis (heroin, cocaine); lung or other tissue damage (marihuana); impaired memory, perception, and judgment which significantly increase the risk of accidental death (marihuana, methaqualone) or malfunction in critical defense or civilian occupations.

These health hazards are alarming, particularly when we think of our young people whose bodies and minds are not yet formed or fully developed. NIDA is particularly concerned about the chronic effects of drug use initiated at an early age. This, unfortunately, has been the pattern. Most marihuana use, for example, begins at the junior high school level.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment specifically about the hazards of marihuana and cocaine use. NIDA's interest in mari-

huana use in recent years has increased because of its tremendous growth in incidence and prevalence. It is the most widely used illicit drug in this country, and our research shows that it is not a benign substance.

Dozens of experimental studies consistently show that while marihuana's acute effects on memory and cognition vary with the task and the amounts of drug use, the impact invariably is detrimental.

There is solid evidence that marihuana use, at typical social levels, impairs driving ability.

The danger that marihuana may present to the lungs and to the respiratory system is linked to the fact that marihuana is typically smoked, often by individuals who also smoke tobacco cigarettes. It has been shown that cannabis produces 50 percent more tar than the same weight of standard tobacco cigarettes. Also, because most of a marihuana cigarette or "joint" is consumed by the smoker, more tar is inhaled than when an ordinary tobacco cigarette is smoked. In addition, cannabis tar contains more than 150 complex hydrocarbons, including carcinogens such as benzo(a)phrene.

In addition to possible cancer risk, marihuana smoke has been shown to seriously impair important pulmonary functions; vital capacity for example, is significantly decreased, more so by two or three typical joints than by one pack of tobacco cigarettes.

A variety of both animal and human studies suggest that marihuana used daily and in substantial amounts similar to those of a regular cigarette smoker may impair some aspects of the reproductive function.

There is a general consensus that we need to know more about the psychological/psychiatric effects of marihuana use on youthful drug users. Young people are believed to be especially at risk because of their ongoing physical and emotional maturation. It is possible that young, regular marihuana users may not be able to develop appropriate "life" skills on schedule, and that failing to do so, it may be difficult if not impossible for them to make up these developmental differences later in life.

The most commonly observed adverse clinical reaction of marihuana use is the acute anxiety reaction. More severe reactions occur more frequently, but not exclusively, in individuals with pre-existing psychiatric disorders. These range through paranoid states to psychotic decompensations.

An acute brain syndrome associated with cannabis intoxication which includes such features as clouding of mental processes, disorientation, confusion, and marked memory impairment, also has been reported. This acute brain syndrome appears to be linked closely to the dose and quality of the marihuana.

Mr. Chairman, the recently released institute of medicine study on marihuana confirms our research findings and indicates that marihuana is cause for "serious national concern." Our fiscal year 1983 budget, now before Congress, permits a marked increase for marihuana research, and although in all probability, more marihuana research has been done in the past two decades than in all previous history, much more is needed.

The goals of marihuana research during the 1980's vary somewhat from those of the 1970's. During the 1970's, although NIDA

supported a broad-based attempt to understand the problem of marihuana abuse, emphasis was placed on prevalence studies and on identifying and understanding the acute effects of marihuana. In the 1980's, though these interests continue, more attention is being paid to the issue of the chronic effects of marihuana use, particularly on women and adolescents. These populations have not been well represented in past research focused on health consequences. What effects, if any, are irreversible is another key question.

The Institute also would like to see more studies oriented towards identifying and developing successful prevention and treatment approaches to youthful marihuana use. Longitudinal studies of young people, particularly the heavy users, are needed. As mentioned, it is the daily user and the individual who begins marihuana use early who are most at risk for future general health, social, and psychiatric problems.

The President's budget for fiscal year 1983 will allow us to conduct future research on marihuana use and youth; we will emphasize: One, basic and clinical research with an emphasis on identifying chronic health and behavioral consequences; two, applied research with an emphasis on determining effective treatment modalities; and three, prevention research with an emphasis on identifying the mechanisms that prevent or inhibit young people from experimenting with marihuana.

Cocaine use also is of concern to us. Recent newspaper articles would have us believe that cocaine can be used with little harm to the user. The implication is that one can differentiate between light and heavy use, and that an individual can choose a pattern to follow. This is not so. The tragic fact is that an estimated 10 to 20 percent of cocaine users, who use with any regularity, go on to a pattern of heavy, compulsive, accelerating use. Such use is tremendously destructive, and individuals have little free choice as to their pattern of cocaine use.

Though we are rapidly increasing our knowledge of predictor factors which define vulnerability to heavy, uncontrolled drug use, not enough is known at this point to be able to identify prospectively who the vulnerable individuals may be. Very few, if any, heavy users voluntarily choose to become controlled by the drug. The percentage of users who do lose freedom of choice and find their life increasingly corrupted and ruined by heavy cocaine use may be as great as the percentage of smokers of one pack of cigarettes a day who go on to develop lung cancer.

We are still exploring the addictive properties of cocaine and more research is needed. It is likely that drugs such as cocaine, which are very powerfully habit forming, do not show current evidence of being physically addictive only because we have not yet learned enough about the relationship between brain, drugs, and behavior to be able to identify those physical symptoms which are at the basis of compulsive drug use patterns.

The important point which must be stressed in the discussion of psychoactive drugs is the relative degree of control over the behavior of some users which that drug is able to achieve. One measure of this for cocaine is that cocaine is one of the few drugs which when offered to animals in a self-administration study, where the

animals can choose between cocaine or food, will lead animals to starve themselves to death so that they obtain the maximum amount of the drug.

Along with the adverse health consequences of marihuana, cocaine, and drug abuse in general, numerous negative social consequences also result. The relationship between heroin addiction and crime has for a number of years received a great deal of attention both in the public media and in the research literature. A number of studies, funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, have provided some important new information on the subject.

One study shows that heroin users average approximately 337 offenses per user per year. Perhaps the most important finding to come out of the research reported in 1981 is that criminality among heroin addicts decreases significantly when drug use decreases. In one study, the average crime-days per year at risk when addicted was 248; when not addicted, the average number of crime-days was 40.8—an 84-percent decline in the crime rate. Another study indicates that many current addicts will resort to violence if there is an opportunity for financial gain. For example, James Inciardi found that 42.7 percent of the males he surveyed had used a weapon during the commission of all or some of their crimes.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse is aware of the significant drug trafficking activities that surround heroin, marihuana, cocaine, and methaqualone; however, this type of criminal activity can best be discussed by representatives from the law enforcement field. We do believe that exposure to marihuana and cocaine during the high school years increases the risk of youngsters not only using these illicit drugs, but also of their experiencing a greater risk of becoming involved in pushing and other illegal activities.

A number of estimates of social cost exist. A recent study by the Research Triangle Institute [RTI] on the economic cost to society of alcohol, drug, and mental disorders estimates that in 1977 more than \$16 billion was due to drug abuse. We believe this is a conservative estimate, by at least a factor of 10, since it does not include the criminal cost of drugs—some \$60 billion—nor did it have access to the latest criminal data, summarized above.

Information on the incidence, prevalence, and trends in drug use, research information on the health consequences of specific drugs, and data on social costs and linkage to crime have stimulated the Federal Government to respond to the spread of drug abuse through a demand/supply reduction strategy. Given that the spread of drug abuse knows neither boundaries nor borders, it is an international problem which requires the combined efforts of both national and international systems in pursuit of an overall long-term goal of worldwide demand reduction.

International cooperation has been a major key to efforts to reduce the worldwide supply of drugs. The herbicidal spraying of poppy fields in Mexico from 1976 to 1979 resulted in substantially reducing the available supply of illicit heroin in the United States. The United States supported this effort by supplying money for purchase of the herbicide, and by sending technicians, mechanics, and pilots to assist the Mexican Government. The spraying resulted in a decline in the availability of Mexican heroin. By 1979, it

was clear that the major supply of heroin introduced into the United States was coming from other parts of the world.


Among the Federal agencies, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIDA, plays a major role in implementing the Federal demand reduction strategy. Information based on research about health hazards caused by use of marihuana and other drugs has been disseminated widely to young people, parents, and community organizations and appears to have resulted in changes in public attitudes and perceptions. Information collected through the NIDA-sponsored high school senior survey documents a significant decrease in marihuana use among high school seniors over the past several years, along with an increase in their awareness of the negative health consequences of marihuana use.

I believe there is a link between awareness of negative health consequences and use of a particular drug. We are experiencing a downward trend in high school seniors' marihuana use which coincides with increased perceptions of negative effects. See chart 1.

[The chart referred to follows:]

CHART I

Demand Reduction of Marijuana Use



Dr. POLLIN. In contrast, stimulant use, which appears to be increasing, is perceived to have relatively few and minimal health dangers.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse is responsible for many programs and activities which serve to support the worldwide demand reduction strategy. As I said earlier, the research program of the Institute is designed to foster the development of knowledge needed to treat and prevent drug abuse. Through our National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information and our Office of Communications and Public Affairs, the Institute disseminates its research findings to lay and professional audiences. In addition, NIDA's public information and education program continues to increase public awareness of drug abuse and its negative consequences.

Through our international activities program, NIDA participates actively in the international exchange and spread of research information on health hazards, as well as treatment and prevention of drug abuse. The Institute collaborates with international organizations such as the World Health Organization and International Information Exchange, provides technical assistance to other countries, international training programs, research, and collaboration with other Federal agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, which also are involved in international activities concerned with drug abuse demand reduction.

The National Institute on Drug Abuse has provided technical assistance to a number of countries, including Mexico, Germany, Italy, and Thailand, as well as the World Health Organization in order to improve the data gathering capabilities of other countries. The ultimate thrust of these international activities is twofold. On the one hand, better information will enable other countries to monitor their own drug problems more effectively; on the other hand, data obtained from these countries will be more comparable to our own and ultimately more useful in making international narcotics control decisions.

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters has the lead role for the U.S. Government in international drug abuse matters and NIDA's international activities program works cooperatively with the State Department by providing information, training, and technical assistance to other countries to help them increase their capabilities to respond to their drug abuse problems.

Another focus of NIDA's primary Federal responsibility for drug abuse research is the assessment of abuse liability. Abuse liability is currently regarded as including both the potential for abuse and actual abuse. Basic research into the abuse potential of drugs is conducted at NIDA's intramural laboratory, the Addiction Research Center, and at three major research centers funded by NIDA. NIDA's assessment of the abuse liability of drugs is used by policymakers and decisionmakers to make recommendations about the appropriate scheduling of drugs under international treaties.

Two conventions have been drawn up to provide a multinational legal agreement and framework to prevent and curb the widespread distribution of dangerous drugs: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, deals mainly with the control of natural nar-

cotic/opiate substances such as heroin, cocaine, and cannabis; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, was created to provide control measures for substances which are not narcotics, such as hallucinogens, stimulants, and depressants.

The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978 directs the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to give a binding recommendation to the Department of State on international drug scheduling matters under the Psychotropic Convention. NIDA's abuse liability and epidemiological studies are used by the Secretary, DHHS, to develop the U.S. recommendation on scheduling under both the Single Convention of 1961, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

Under the provision of these conventions, NIDA's abuse liability assessments are reviewed by staff of the World Health Organization as they develop scheduling proposals which are submitted to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).

An example of our assessment responsibility was the 1981 proposed scheduling of 12 benzodiazepines by name. The potential for abuse and actual abuse of all benzodiazepines marketed or under investigation in the United States was examined and NIDA's recommendations on the medical and scientific aspects of benzodiazepine use and abuse in the United States were submitted by DHHS to the World Health Organization. The U.S. scheduling recommendations were reviewed by the CND and will be considered when a future final decision is made on scheduling of these drugs.

Mr. Chairman, in summary, although NIDA's and the Department's primary focus is demand reduction, we strongly support the joint strategy of supply and demand reduction. It is only through a combination of these activities that we will be able to combat the spread and the use of drugs in this country. We are fortunate that there exists in the White House a special focal point for drug abuse matters. As you know, no other categorical health or social problem is so represented at this level. I understand that later in the week you will hear from Dr. Carlton Turner, the President's senior policy advisor on drugs. NIDA is an integral part of the Federal response to the drug abuse problem and we stand ready to assist in any way we can.

Thank you. I would be glad to answer any questions you may have.


Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Doctor. Without objection, your appendix will be made a part of the record. Several of the charts are very interesting.

[The appendix to Dr. Pollin's statement follows:]

APPENDIX TO STATEMENT OF WILLIAM POLLIN, M.D., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE


RATE OF EMERGENCY ROOM MENTIONS PER 100,000 VISITS BY SMSA DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK - 1981
 ---HEROIN---

BLOCK CHART OF RATES



*****4 SEATTLE
 *****3 SAN FRANCISCO DENVER MINNEAPOLIS
 *****2 LOS ANGELES PHOENIX KANSAS CITY CHICAGO
 *****1 SAN DIEGO DALLAS SAN ANTONIO NEW ORLEANS CLEVELAND DETROIT INDIANAPOLIS BUFFALO PHILADELPHIA BOSTON
 ATLANTA BALTIMORE WASHINGTON D.C. MIAMI NEW YORK


Heroin Related Morbidity and Mortality and Treatment Program Admissions
1976 - 1981



Note: 1981 Emergency room data are provisional; 1981 treatment admission data are provisional for January - September 1981.


Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN DEC1981 tape) and Client Oriented Data Acquisition Process (CODAP).

RATE OF EMERGENCY ROOM MENTIONS PER 100,000 VISITS BY SMSA
DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK - 1981
---MARIJUANA---



SEATTLE MINNEAPOLIS DETROIT BUFFALO BOSTON
 ##### SAN FRANCISCO DENVER KANSAS CITY CHICAGO INDIANAPOLIS PHILADELPHIA NEW YORK
 ##### LOS ANGELES PHOENIX OKLAHOMA CITY ST. LOUIS CLEVELAND BALTIMORE WASHINGTON D.C.
 ##### SAN DIEGO DALLAS SAN ANTONIO NEW ORLEANS ATLANTA MIAMI

Rate Of Marijuana Emergency Room Mentions
Per 100,000 Visits *
Drug Abuse Warning Network: 1976 - 1981




* Includes All Visits To Emergency Rooms
For Any Reason

GRAPHIC SOURCE


RATE OF EMERGENCY ROOM MENTIONS PER 100,000 VISITS BY SMSA
 DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK -- 1981
 ---COCAINE---

BLOCK CHART OF RATE




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 *****1 SAN DIEGO DALLAS SAN ANTONIO NEW ORLEANS CLEVELAND BALTIMORE WASHINGTON D.C.
 ***** ATLANTA MIAMI

Percent Of Youth And Young Adult Population
Who Used Cocaine In Past Month
National Survey On Drug Abuse: 1972 -1979



Rates of Cocaine Related Morbidity
Mortality and Treatment Program Admissions for DAWN
and CODAP, 1975-1981 *




* Preliminary data for treatment program admissions in 1981

Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse Statistical Series D, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration.

Drug Abuse Warning Network, DECHIST 1981 Tape, National Institute on Drug Abuse, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration.


RATE OF EMERGENCY ROOM MENTIONS PER 100,000 VISITS BY SMSA
 DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK - 1981
 --- METHAQUALONE ---

BLOCK CHART OF RATES



***** SEATTLE ***** MINNEAPOLIS ***** DETROIT BUFFALO BOSTON
 *****3 SAN FRANCISCO DENVER KANSAS CITY CHICAGO INDIANAPOLIS PHILADELPHIA NEW YORK
 *****2 LOS ANGELES PHOENIX OKLAHOMA CITY ST. LOUIS CLEVELAND BALTIMORE WASHINGTON D.C.
 *****1 SAN DIEGO DALLAS SAN ANTONIO NEW ORLEANS ***** ATLANTA MIAMI
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Methaqualone Related Morbidity and Mortality
 Drug Abuse Warning Network
 1976 - 1981



Note: 1981 Emergency Room data are provisional.

Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, DAWN DEC1981 tape.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. DuPont.

**STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. DUPONT, FORMER DIRECTOR,
WHITE HOUSE SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE
PREVENTION**

Dr. DUPONT. I will submit my statement and also some supporting documents.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection, they will be made a part of the record.

Dr. DUPONT. I am greatly concerned with the need to focus our attention. Our drug problems can seem enormously complex. It is possible to derail needed efforts by getting lost in these complexities. I want to go back to a simple concept: most of our drug problems are the result of drugs that are derived from three plants, the marihuana plant, the opium poppy and the coca bush.

The marihuana plant and the opium poppy have to be grown in the sun, and relatively carefully cared for, for approximately 100 days between the time they are planted as seed and the time they are harvested. The coca bush, on the other hand, must grow for about 4 years before the plant can first be harvested.

The essential need particularly with respect to international efforts, is the eradication of these plants before they are harvested. Any act after the harvest of those plants is necessarily difficult and relatively ineffective. It is remarkable to me that our policies have, so far, failed to identify the simple, direct target of supply reduction activities as these three plants.

They are all grown out in the open, so that they can be easily seen by either satellite or air surveillance. It is relatively easy to identify the places these crops are grown. Eradication of these plants is easy from a technical point of view.

You will hear many experts testify, Mr. Chairman, telling you how difficult it is to find these plants and how difficult it is to eradicate them. I hope you will see through their excuses. The plain fact is that today we lack in this country not the knowledge of the source of the drug problem or the technology to achieve our goal. We lack a clear understanding and the political will to solve the problem.

I am going to focus on one of these plants to make my point, but the point is equally true for all three plants. Cocaine is a dangerous drug the use of which is now epidemic in our Nation. Virtually all the cocaine in this country comes from plants grown in two countries, Peru and Bolivia. Both of those countries have international treaty obligations to eradicate cultivation of those plants. I have visited both countries, I have seen the cultivation of the coca bush in these countries. I know that Peru and Bolivia could, with a relatively modest effort, even today with the problems in Bolivia, be persuaded to cease cultivation of the coca plant.

What we lack is the will, the clear commitment to achieve that goal. Eradication of the coca bush would be particularly easy because the overflight and eradication would only have to occur once in 4 years to completely eliminate the source of cocaine in the United States of America and throughout the world.

The U.S. Government, administration in and administration out has failed to grasp the potential for reduction of the supply of these drugs through eradication of crops at their source. The current administration is failing to grasp this central fact and it is not acting clearly.

We have not had the necessary leadership from the Department of State or the President, or for that matter from the Congress, to achieve these goals. I hope as this committee's hearing proceeds, you will keep a clear eye on those plants, where they are and what is being done about them and what could be done about them because that is the key to the greatest potential for solving this drug abuse problem.

It has been my privilege, Mr. Chairman, to address congressional committees on this subject for the last 13 years. I am not a stranger to this situation. To my knowledge this is the first time this committee has gotten involved. If you look back over the last 13 years, the greatest achievements in drug abuse prevention have come in the international area. They have come through both bilateral and multilateral programs focusing on crop eradication.

The elimination of the Turkish opium crop in 1972 and the substitution later of the straw method of harvesting for the earlier techniques of opium harvest, plus the disruption of the French connection in the early 1970's, led to a dramatic reduction in heroin deaths, heroin use, and serious crime in this country in the early 1970's. Later under the Ford and Carter administrations, efforts with Mexico to eradicate the opium poppy grown there produced similar success. We can look back on efforts over the last decade and identify areas of substantial success which give us direction for the future. If you find yourselves diverted by the complexities of this field and by the bureaucratic fancy footwork you will get lost. You will lose the possibility to make a major effort to solve this problem that exists in the identification of these three plants, where they are growing and the efforts needed to eradicate them.

Now, one final point, Mr. Chairman. These plants can all be grown in the United States. Opium poppies have been grown here and can essentially be grown here. Marihuana is now cultivated essentially as you heard from the previous panel and even theoretically the coca bush could be grown here.

We have an opportunity to demonstrate to the world our seriousness about eradication of these plants by our approach to domestic cultivation of marihuana. There has been inadequate Federal leadership in the eradication of the marihuana plant domestically. This is seriously handicapping our international activities. This administration has, I am happy to say, worked out with Congress, the removal of the ban on the use of paraquat in spraying the marihuana plant.

That is a step in the right direction. We have to go the next step, however, and get serious about domestic cultivation to make sure the growers of marihuana in the United States know that their plants will be eradicated and that they will not harvest profits from planting marihuana in the United States. That has not happened yet.

Mr. Chairman it was earlier stated that other countries, including those which grow these drug-producing plants do not have such

serious drug problems as we do. The fact of the matter is that other countries do have serious drug problems very much on the scale that we do in the United States. Many countries have drug problems that are substantially worse than the United States. The difference is that this country has, thanks to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, a much better understanding of the nature of our drug problems than do other countries.

Western Europe, for example, has more heroin overdose deaths each year than we do in the United States.

Bangkok, Thailand, has as many heroin addicts as does the entire United States. Iran has a serious heroin addiction problem at a much higher rate than we do. The countries of Colombia and Venezuela have about as much marihuana use in their countries as we do in this country, and the list goes on.

What we need as part of our international activity is to help these other countries clearly identify their own domestic drug-abuse problems so they can join with us in the multilateral efforts that are needed. We need to export our demand-reduction technology, our epidemiological skills to approach the international drug-abuse problem.

But our international drug-prevention efforts should not be based on the assumption that this is an American problem. This is a human, global problem, and it is going to require concerted action from many nations.

The United States has been, throughout the entire 20th century, the leader in the world's efforts to combat drug abuse. The potential in the 1980's is there for even greater international efforts.

In conclusion, we need to come back to these three plants. We need to hold our officials responsible for the eradication of these plants, both domestically and internationally. We need to have a very clear idea of what our purposes are. We can have spent success in those efforts as our experience over the last decade demonstrates.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Dr. DuPont's prepared statement and supporting documents follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. DUPONT, M.D., FORMER DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE
SPECIAL ACTION OFFICE FOR DRUG ABUSE

Mr. Chairman and the members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to appear here this morning. Drug problems are not new in America or any other country in the world. Neither are the facts that the United States has unusually high rates of drug problems and that, compared to other nations, the United States has given drug abuse prevention a high priority.

Having said this by way of background, I am saddened to say that the current U. S. Government effort appears to be inadequate, both by comparison to earlier efforts and by comparison to the potential for effective drug abuse prevention programs. Nowhere is this gap wider than in the international area.

Having worked in drug abuse prevention in several high level posts in three Administrations during the last 13 years, I have seen that the greatest success in American drug abuse prevention efforts has come from the international programs. The reduction of heroin supply which followed, first, the elimination of heroin from Turkey via the French Connection in 1971 and, then, the cut off of the supply of heroin from Mexico after 1976, led directly to dramatic drops in United States rates of heroin-related deaths and serious crime. The potential exists today for even greater success, not only in terms of heroin supply, but also in terms of marijuana and cocaine supply. To capitalize on these opportunities will require sustained personal commitment from the President and from the leaders of Congress. While there appears to be a sympathy in high places with the goals of drug abuse prevention, the necessary leadership is not now visible. I will be glad to discuss with the Committee some specific ideas for international programs, but before doing that let me emphasize that any action must be based on a careful analysis of the problems and an unmistakable national commitment to solve them. This must include multi-lateral, as well as bi-lateral, efforts to eradicate the drug-producing crops at their source. These crops are easily found and they are easily destroyed. The problem is not knowing where they are or how to destroy them; the problem is mustering the political will to do the job. Once the drug crop is harvested, it becomes highly concentrated and virtually disappears, going "underground." Once that happens, the potential for successful supply reduction falls dramatically.

One final point needs emphasis, even in so short a summary. Drugs cause problems in all countries of the world. By sharing our substantial technology for identification and treatment of drug problems, we can help other countries understand their own drug problems. This process can have a profound effect on all international supply reduction programs, because it is the only realistic basis for continuing international support for eradication of drug-producing plants. Like the effective use of crop eradication, the exporting of our epidemiological and treatment technology is not only under-exploited, it is today all but non-existent.

Some day, some Administration will fully face the human costs of drug abuse, and will develop the appropriate response to this problem. While the ideas are available today, the commitment is lacking. I am hopeful that this hearing today can help focus needed attention on the problem and the opportunities for success.

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ROBERT L. DUPONT, M. D.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Robert L. DuPont, M. D., is a practicing psychiatrist and President of the non-profit Institute for Behavior and Health, Inc. (IBH). As part of his practice of psychiatry, he directs Washington's first phobia treatment program. In addition, he is President of the American Council on Marijuana and contributes to local and national TV, radio, magazines and newspapers on a variety of health topics.

In addition to his work as a health commentator on ABC-TV's "Good Morning, America," Dr. DuPont has appeared on many network TV shows, including "The McNeil-Lehrer Report," the "Phil Donahue Show," "David Suskind," and the "Dick Cavett Show." He has been quoted in U. S. News and World Report, Time and Newsweek, and has appeared frequently on the evening network news, the "Today Show," and many TV documentaries.

Dr. DuPont was the Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse from its creation in September, 1973, until July, 1978. In June, 1973, he was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to direct the White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, a position he held until the office terminated in June, 1975.

Dr. DuPont has written more than 100 professional articles and one book on a variety of topics in the fields of health promotion, drug abuse prevention, criminal justice and phobias. He holds the faculty positions of Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University Medical School and Visiting Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School.

He is a diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, a fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, and a member of many professional organizations.

Born on March 25, 1936, in Toledo, Ohio, he attended public high school in Denver, Colorado; received a B. A. from Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1958; and an M. D. from Harvard Medical School in Boston, Massachusetts, 1963. His postgraduate training includes: Medical intern, Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital, Western Reserve Medical School (1963-64); psychiatric resident and teaching fellow, Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Harvard Medical School (1964-66); and Clinical Associate, National Institutes of Health (1966-68).

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"POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 20TH CENTURY RATES OF OPIATE DEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES," PAPER BY ROBERT L. DUPONT, M.D., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, PRESENTED AT PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 19, 1978

One deceptively simple line tells the story of this paper. It shows the rate of narcotic addiction in the United States during the 20th century. (Figure One) We can see the several fundamental trends in narcotic addiction clearly portrayed. I will describe these trends and then consider the implications of these changes for our current drug abuse policies. I wish to express my appreciation to Nick Kozel and other colleagues on the NIDA staff without whose help this paper could not have been written. I also want to express my indebtedness to several major scholars in this field, the most important being David Musto whose book The American Disease (published in 1973) is my major source document.

When I entered the field of heroin addiction treatment in the District of Columbia in 1969, the first question on everyone's lips was, "How many addicts are there in the city?" Among the most important activities in the early days of the Narcotics Treatment Administration (NTA) was our attempt to objectively estimate the number of heroin addicts in the city. Several techniques were developed which were later to prove useful in other communities and on the national scene.

Let me share one personal anecdote. I began to use the formula relating the number of overdose deaths in the

community to the total number of addicts. Some of you may be familiar with the technique. One simply multiplies 200 times the number of overdose deaths in a community during the preceding year to get an estimate of the number of addicts: I attributed this technique to Dr. Michael Baden, who was then the Deputy Medical Examiner in New York, because I heard him talk about it in 1969. The particular multiplier used was derived by summer students who worked with him in New York City. They found that one-half of 1 percent of the addicts on a list died of an overdose in a single year. Thus 200 times the overdose deaths equaled the number of addicts. It is interesting that Mike Baden never published the "Baden Formula." Whenever he has cited the source for the formula bearing his name, he has cited my 1971 paper, showing his ambivalence about that formula!

When I came to the Federal Government from the District of Columbia in 1973, the first question I was asked by the folks who ran the Government in the Office of Management and Budget was, "How many addicts are in the country?" I spent a great deal of time trying to answer that question. Last year the Wolff Committee, the Select Committee on Narcotics Control in the House of Representatives, held a hearing that again focused on this question. I have the feeling that when my Federal bureaucratic career comes to

an end, the final question that will be asked as I am being put on the railroad and run out of town is going to be, "Cut the rhetoric and just tell us how many addicts are there?"

Let me begin by admitting that there is an insurmountable problem with the definition of an "addict." We have learned a great deal more about this in recent years. There are several dimensions to this problem that need to be emphasized. First, a distinction needs to be made between those who are addicted to an opiate such as heroin and those who use it occasionally without current addiction. We have learned that there are far more people who use heroin in any community than there are people who are addicted to it at any point in time. So we have to think about the distinction between the addict and the user. In Figure One I mean "addicted individuals" and not "users." Further, I use as an operational definition of addiction, "daily users" of heroin. This eliminates the need to deal with the question of the presence or absence of a physiological habit. So operationally, I am talking about daily users of heroin at some point in time, or as the epidemiologists label this number, the point prevalence of daily heroin use.

The other major problem we have in definition has to do

with the distinction between daily users who are in trouble for one reason or another, and those who remain hidden and not "symptomatic." Some daily heroin users come into the criminal justice system, some come into treatment, and some die of overdoses. All the data that I am presenting include estimates of all these groups, plus those daily users who are "hidden."

You will note that the percentage of the population that was involved in opiate addiction was quite small over the last century--never more than one-half of 1 percent of the population. This means that one major technique for estimating the size of the problem in our population is not useful, and that is the survey technique. If less than 5 percent of the population is involved in some activity, it becomes difficult to measure through a survey. It also is clear that opiate use, in particular, is not as accurately reported as many other behaviors in surveys. In addition, many addicted individuals are not enumerated in the normal census or survey activities which are based on households. All these factors make the survey data less helpful in the opiate area than it is in many other areas.

I have worked for years with the motto that something beats nothing. I apply this principle even where there are great flaws in the data, as is the case for our understanding of heroin use rates.

With that as background, let me describe some of the changes in the opiate use rates over the last 80 years. Specific references for the data points I have used are listed on Figure One.

The graph shown in Figure One does not cover the 19th century, although until 1914 opium was legally imported into the United States. Opium is the root product for all the morphine, heroin, and smoking opium used in this country. Before the Harrison Act prohibited the use of heroin and restricted the use of morphine and opium in medical settings, we had data on the annual importation of opium. Virtually no opium was grown in this country, although it can be easily grown here. So for practical purposes, all opiates have come from outside the country. Because opium was not prohibited, our data on overall per capita use of opiates is quite good until 1914. Throughout the 19th century the per capita consumption of opium increased steadily. The hypodermic needle was invented and morphine was first developed around the middle of the 19th century. There is a widespread myth that the Civil War was associated with a big rise in the consumption of opiates. But the fact is that throughout the 19th century, there was a steady rise in the annual per capita consumption of opiates which peaked in the 1890's. Between 1890 and 1914 there were

progressively lighter laws restricting the use of opiates until national prohibition was enacted in 1914. This progressive tightening of laws, first at the State and local level, and later at the national level, led to a gradual downturn in per capita consumption between 1890 and 1914.

The first question about Figure One is what caused the long slide between 1914 and 1945. The total U.S. population is nearly three times as large in 1978 as it was in 1900. In terms of the actual number of addicts, there are now about as many as there were early in the century, even though the rate is now substantially less than it was at that time. Two official events occurred which contributed to the initial four-decade-long decline in this rate. One was the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906, and the other, the Harrison Act in 1914. These historical events were part of larger processes that were working their way through our society in the first decades of this century. The impact of the Harrison Act was not instantaneous. Its effects were progressively felt all through the 1920's, when there was a gradual unfolding of the prohibition against opiate drugs. This is reflected in the gradually declining use of opiates throughout this entire period. This change and these laws grew out of fundamental historical changes in our Nation. The same impulses in the society that led to these anti-narcotics laws led to the prohibition of alcohol under

the Volstead Act. They also led to the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906 and the many subsequent acts aimed at controlling the distribution of drugs. There was a general feeling of wanting to clean up the society, to eliminate some of the undesirable aspects of the earlier, more free-wheeling era. Prior to 1906, at the national level, heroin was not even a prescription drug. Many patent medicines at the turn of the century contained heroin. Coca Cola even contained cocaine prior to 1903. These casual uses of potent drugs were all brought under control, producing a gradual decline in opiate use.

You will notice a more precipitous drop in the rate of opiate addiction which occurred during the Second World War. At that point in the United States, there was a sharp drop in the supply of illegal opiates which were being supplied from Turkey via Europe. The North Atlantic became difficult to traverse, and the economics of Turkey and France were disrupted by the war. The supply of opiate drugs, including heroin, dropped off.

During the period of 1914 to 1945, there were many other changes taking place. In the patent medicine era and before prohibition, the typical addict in the United States was a middle-aged woman who was first addicted as a result of using an opiate drug, usually heroin or morphine, for the

treatment of a medical condition. A good example of that process today is what happened recently to Betty Ford. Betty Ford did not go out and seek a recreational drug. She became dependent upon drugs prescribed by her physicians for a medical condition. That was a characteristic of opiate dependence before prohibition. That profile of the typical addict gradually changed after 1914. Instead of the dominant opiate drug being opium or morphine, the dominant opiate became heroin. The shift to heroin had at least two bases. First, heroin is about three times as potent, milligram for milligram, as is morphine. When opiates were legal, this was not a major factor--one just took three milligrams of morphine instead of one milligram of heroin. But once opiates were illegal, the price skyrocketed. Both users and suppliers wanted the most potency per dollar instead. This tilted the scales toward heroin. A second factor, far less important in my view, is that heroin is slightly more rapid in onset than morphine--it produces a more dramatic high. This factor is often exaggerated by users. Controlled experiments have shown that heroin addicts cannot distinguish intravenous morphine from intravenous heroin when given in equipotent doses.

Instead of being a medical addict, the typical opiate addict began and continued use outside medical settings. Instead

of being female, the typical addict became male. Instead of being middle-aged, the typical opiate addict became a youth. But throughout this period, even with these changes, the typical opiate addict was really a nice fellow, comparatively. When we refer to the word most often used in describing this group, it is "Bohemian." We might today call this pattern an "alternative lifestyle." Basically, these opiate addicts in the 1920's and 1930's supported themselves through shoplifting and forged prescriptions. They were socially and economically marginal people--I don't want in any way to give the impression that they were conventional members of the stable middle class. However, they were relatively benign in their social impact. During this time, much methodology developed about the heroin addict. "You just leave him alone and let him do his thing and he won't bother you." This characterization of the addict emerged during this period of time, although it was not universally accepted even then. In fact, it is more characteristic of today's view of yesterday's addict than it ever was during the earlier era.

The Addiction Research Center (ARC) was started in Lexington, Kentucky, in 1936. It was the Federal Government's effort to deal with the addiction problem in terms of medical treatment and research. The entire period of addiction in this country, up to the late 1960's was dominated by law enforcement and

legal activities. ARC was not created primarily because of humanitarian concerns, but because prohibition made opiate use illegal and forced large numbers of opiate addicts into prisons. Most of those addicted prior to prohibition either found a sympathetic physician who supplied their habit (illegally) or stopped using opiates altogether. The few who continued their habit and turned to illegal means of acquiring the drug were often arrested. It was this group, plus those newly addicted to street heroin, who clogged the prisons. In the late 1920's a high percentage of the total population in Federal prisons was addicted to heroin. There was the desire on the part of prison officials to get these people out and put them somewhere else. They were viewed by prison officials as a different group from the more ordinary criminals in prison. The original idea for the Addiction Research Center, which was at first called the Narcotics Farm, was to remove the addict from the overcrowded prisons. ARC was first proposed in the late 1920's, but it was not until 1936 that it actually opened. The initial program idea was that if we could take these addicts out of their urban areas--because remember this was the period when addiction changed to become an urban phenomenon--and put them out in the fresh country air, they would stop using opiate drugs and come back to their communities free of drugs and healthy. Creation of the ARC also led to the

development of a nucleus of intellectual excellence which nourished the entire field of drug abuse through the next 40 years. We often talk about the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) growing out of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), but it is equally true that the National Institute of Mental Health, after the Second World War, grew out of the Addiction Research Center. The first mental health program of the Federal Government was the Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky. The first director of NIMH was Robert Felix who was a distinguished career member of the ARC staff.

The Second World War was the low point historically in our national addiction problem during the 20th century. I estimate the total opiate addicts to be something like 30,000 at that point, although I have no firm reference for that number.

There was an epidemic rise in the rate of opiate use following the Second World War. Why did that happen? There are a lot of hypotheses, but the most obvious one is the reestablishment of the connection with the supply system in Europe from Turkey. It was also apparent during the Korean War that many Americans got involved in Asian opiate connections. In addition, there was a general relaxing of social restraints following the suppression of deviant lifestyles--

the one-for-all and all-for-one credo--that characterized our society during the Second World War. This period just before, during, and after the Second World War also saw a large migration of blacks from the rural south to the urban cities in the north. For the first time after the Second World War, we started to see large numbers of minorities in the addict population.

The reaction of officials to this rise in addiction following the Second World War was alarm. There was a great deal of publicity about addiction. Narcotic addiction made big headlines all over the United States, but most especially in New York City which had become the Nation's addiction capital. Lots of programmatic and legal activity grew out of this alarm. This was the last gasp of the law-enforcement-alone approach to the drug abuse problem. This was the period when the Nation enacted tough penalties for drug abusers, heroin addicts, and heroin sellers, including life sentences for repeated convictions for possession of heroin.

When I came to work for the D.C. Department of Corrections in 1968, there were still many heroin users and sellers in prison serving sentences that they had received during the 1950's. This period saw long sentences, often longer than were received by the people who committed murder. There was no significant treatment response in prisons or in

communities during this period. The Nation followed a purely law enforcement, lock-them-up-and-throw-away-the-key approach during the 1950's. The leader of these activities was Harry Anslinger who headed the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from 1932 to 1960. The interesting thing for people today to realize is that this approach worked. This hard-line approach produced a downturn in the heroin use rates throughout the country. It also produced a decade of declining opiate addiction in the United States.

Overall, the period from 1890 to 1960 was characterized by progressive tightening of the supply of opiate drugs, resulting in progressively declining rates of use except for the transient epidemic rise following World War Two. Few people today realize how successful that era was and for how long the success was sustained. Rates of opiate dependence fell and stayed down throughout this period.

However, this clear-cut gain was bought at a substantial cost. The rates of opiate dependence dropped after nearly a century of progressively rising rates during the wide-open era which preceded the crackdown. However, the social costs did not drop so sharply. In fact, an argument can be made that they rose throughout this era of prohibition.

Recall that the typical addict in the open era was a

middle-aged rural woman who was medically addicted to opiates. After prohibition the typical addict became urban, young, and poor. After the final tightening in the 1950's, there was yet a further change: the typical addict became a criminal member of an urban minority group. Thus the social costs of addiction prior to 1900 were measured in terms of quality of life and lost productivity for medical addicts. After prohibition the social costs of addiction became primarily criminal. The costs in the earlier era were primarily borne by the addicted person and her family. The costs under prohibition were also borne by the victims of the addicts' crimes.

Beginning in about 1954, the typical addict of the country changed from being a relatively nice guy to being a criminal. The majority of people arrested for drug offenses after 1955 had criminal records which preceded their first use of opiates. The criminal profile of the typical heroin-addicted individual no longer revealed only check and prescription forgeries or shoplifting. The rap sheets now included armed robbery, assault, and many other serious crimes. Although this period saw a decline in overall addiction rates, it saw other changes in the character of the addict population, including an increase in the minority group membership and an involvement with serious criminal activity beyond that

which had occurred during the earlier era.

To me the most important part of this long line on Figure One, however, is what happened in the late 1960's. That was clearly unprecedented in terms of any other period in our history, although in retrospect, the epidemic of 1950 was a warning. In the 1960's we had the great epidemic of heroin addiction in the United States. Harry Anslinger saw the beginning of this epidemic. After he retired, he said that he knew his greatest achievement was the low point from the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's. He retired in 1963. What happened afterwards was unpredicted by him. In the late 1960's, although he would have liked to stiffen the sentences once again, he knew that we were dealing with a new problem that was unlike anything he had experienced before. He also knew that it was going to be handled by new people.

When John Kennedy was elected in 1960, one of the issues that he dealt with was the issue of narcotics addiction. By 1960, with these downward trends in use rates, there was a general feeling in the United States, particularly coming from the prison system, that the penalties enacted in the 1950's had been too harsh, that people were doing sentences which were too long. Addicts were again clogging the prisons. This was not only an intellectual or a moral problem, it

was then a practical matter. Kennedy established a commission in 1961 which reported its recommendations the same month that he was assassinated, November of 1963. The Report of the Prettyman Commission is one of the historic documents in the drug abuse field. It is generally a fairly sanguine document. It signaled many interesting developments, including the definition of the drug problem as being larger than the heroin problem, for example. It focused on the prescription drug problem in a brand-new way that was to prove important in the future. It also argued forcefully for civil commitment, which is interesting in terms of later political developments. It now seems ironic that the Kennedy commission argued strongly for civil commitment, but once you have the event in historical perspective, it does not seem so strange. Over the years the Addiction Research Center staff had become disillusioned by their dismal cure rate. There was a growing sense that addicts should be forced to stop using drugs through civil commitment and followup parole supervision. In 1961 this was a new and progressive idea based on the best thinking in the field.

In no way did the Prettyman Commission anticipate that there was trouble brewing, that a new epidemic loomed just ahead.

One has to begin by saying that we don't know even now what caused this epidemic. We can explain earlier declines

on the basis of laws; we can explain the dip in the early 1940's on the basis of the impact of the Second World War; we can begin to explain the rise from 1945 to 1950 as a result of the increase in heroin supply that occurred and the general loosening up in society. We can explain the decline after 1955 on the basis of the new tightening up of the antinarcotics laws. What happened in the mid-1960's is probably the most difficult part of this entire curve to explain.

One of the main occurrences at that point was a change in the age profile of the United States population: we had a sudden explosion of youth in the country. Literally, the demography of the country changed in an unprecedented way, and the modal cultural age in the country shifted from around 30 to around 19. Every institution associated with youth was in retreat, under attack, overwhelmed in the late 1960's. Whether it was the universities, the law enforcement agencies, or the schools--all institutions dealing with youth in the 1960's were overwhelmed by change. People were saying that the old ways do not work, we do not want the old ways, we want new ways, we are wide open to new experiences. This was a cultural expression of a primary demographic change in the United States. The baby boom which followed the Second World War produced a

population bulge which was entering its late teenage years in 1965. One thing that we do know about drug use, and this has been true all through the 20th century, is that most people begin nonmedical drug use in their mid-to-late teens, whether it is use of alcohol, tobacco, marihuana, or heroin. If an individual does not acquire a particular recreational drug habit by about the age of 25, he is relatively unlikely to acquire the habit thereafter. It was not surprising then that it was the young people who got involved in this 1960's epidemic of new use of heroin. The surprising thing was that so many of them got involved.

There were many factors contributing to this epidemic rise in heroin use. We had people traveling around as never before. This trend was expressed in the Peace Corps, but the phenomenon was far bigger than that new organization. Young people were on the move. Young people who would never see heroin or a heroin addict in their own local communities were exposed to heroin and other drug use, not only in this country but all over the world. We had communications in a way which we had never had before, so that something that went on in one part of the country or the world suddenly became known everywhere. This epidemic generation was also the first generation to grow up on TV. As the heroin epidemic got under way, it had a reinforcing quality in

defining what was going on, and television played an important role in that. Talk about drugs both resulted from the epidemic rise and contributed to it.

Those few people who were involved with drug abuse prevention in the late 1950's have emphasized that in the late 1950's and early 1960's, there was a tremendous interest in the use of LSD and the idea of altering or expanding one's consciousness through the use of drugs. This was the era of Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert who gave drugs to students as part of their social relations courses. For the first time ever, the idea got some currency that you could change the way you experienced the world through drugs in a way that opened up the world to you--a way of feeling, a way of being, that was new.

In the late 1960's, there was yet another happening which was related to but also independent of the epidemic rise in heroin use--the marihuana explosion. That did not start in 1958 or 1960. Marihuana use by the masses was a late 1960's phenomenon, and even more, a 1970's phenomenon. It, like the earlier LSD fad, reinforced the willingness to use drugs. Heroin use became closely tied with marihuana and LSD and other drug use in the late 1960's, although this is much less true today. Today drug users are much more discriminating about different drugs. During the late 1960's, there was a

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casualness, an openness, and a denial of any discrimination between the drugs. This all contributed to the heroin epidemic. It is hard to think of the turmoil and excitement, the love and the rage of the late 1960's, without thinking about drug use in general and heroin use in particular.

One last point about this era concerns the Viet Nam War and its relationship to this epidemic. The late 1960's rise in opiate use corresponded fairly well with the rise in the number of American troops in Viet Nam. We now have good data to demonstrate that there was an incredibly high rate of heroin addiction among American servicemen in Viet Nam, beginning in about 1970 and peaking in late 1971. It is also now clear that the heroin epidemic in Viet Nam followed rather than led the epidemic that occurred in American cities. It is also clear that the number of Americans addicted to heroin in Viet Nam was a tiny fraction of the total number addicted to heroin in the United States during that period. No large American sample of heroin addicts contained more than 5 percent who were first addicted in Viet Nam. Most people in the United States who got addicted to heroin in this epidemic did so right in their own hometowns, in fact, close to where they were born. However, there's more to be said about the Viet Nam War. The war did contribute by

shaping attitudes in terms of general unrest, general dissatisfaction with the establishment, and general rebelliousness. It did not, however, affect the epidemic primarily through people getting addicted in Viet Nam and bringing the addiction back to the United States.

The break in the curve in 1972 is interesting. That was the first time the opiate use rate curve started down after the epidemic began in the mid 1960's. It started down in the summer of 1972. The District of Columbia was on the cutting edge of the data used in that downturn. Literally, in the month of July 1972, there were so many addict clients lined up to come into NTA that we had to stop intake by 8:30 in the morning when we reached our maximum intake number. But by August and September of the same year--in other words, 2 months later--intake did not reach the 25 daily quota even though the clinic stayed open until 5 p.m. We systematically asked those entering treatment about the supply of heroin on the streets. Beginning in August of 1972, there was nearly universal testimony that heroin availability had dropped dramatically. This was one of the most dramatic changes of behavior in a community that I have ever seen. The experience was widespread in the United States at that time. In retrospect, we know it was not universal. The West Coast and the Southwest did not have

this downturn in heroin use rates in late 1972. It did, however, occur over most of the United States including San Francisco, but it did not involve Los Angeles, Phoenix, Dallas, and some other areas. I then thought that the 1960's epidemic was going to look like the 1950's epidemic. No one was more startled than I when the heroin indicators started back up in 1974. We are now able to piece together what led to that most recent rise.

During the Second World War heroin shortage, the American heroin market began to rely on Mexican heroin for the first time. Never before had that happened. America's supply had been solely from Europe. Stimulated by the shortage, large-scale heroin production began in Mexico during the Second World War. When Mexico built their railroads in the latter half of the 19th century, they imported many Chinese laborers, just as we did in this country. The Chinese brought with them their habit of growing and smoking opium. This opium growing became established in several Mexican-Chinese communities. Later, in a burst of chauvinism, the Mexicans threw out the Chinese. When this happened, there were a few Mexicans who began to grow opium. Cultivation remained sporadic. Nothing much became of it. With the stimulus during the Second World War, however, opium growing and heroin manufacture became substantial

activities with export lines to the United States. From the Second World War until 1974, law enforcement officials focused almost exclusively on the Turkish-French connection. They simply did not notice the growing activities in Mexico through this period.

The drop in heroin use rates in 1972 can be attributed to three factors. One was the epidemic curve, per se: you expect something like that drop to go on as part of the intrinsic nature of any epidemic. Two was the disruption of the Turkish-French connection and the great reduction of the heroin supply from Europe into the United States. Three was the rapid buildup in treatment of heroin addiction that occurred throughout the United States after 1970.

The rise in heroin use in 1974 was clearly the result of an increased supply of heroin from Mexico. Suddenly Mexican "brown" heroin appeared in all parts of the United States. Mexican heroin was relatively plentiful and relatively low in cost, thus leading directly to the rise in heroin use from 1974 to 1976.

The drop that began in 1976 and continues to the present is pronounced. This too is related to the same three factors I described earlier as causing the drop after 1972. I see this as the continuation of the decline which began in 1972

with an interruption from 1972 to 1974. The drop occurred because we worked out with Mexico much more efficient, although still incompletely successful, tactics for reducing the supply of heroin coming to this country from Mexico. Also, we continued to build up our national treatment capacity. By 1978 we had about 130,000 heroin addicts in treatment in the United States.

There are some lessons that need to be learned from watching that line snake across the page in Figure One. The total number of heroin addicts in the United States is estimated now at about 460,000. The evidence for this current downturn comes from a number of studies including emergency room visits, overdose deaths, the purity and the price of heroin, plus survey data. They all show the decline. We learned in 1974 that this curve can go up again very easily. A relatively modest change in the heroin supply--either from Southeast Asia; from the so-called silver triangle, Afghanistan and Pakistan; or from Mexico--could send that line right off the graph again within 6 months. We have no assurance that there is some intrinsic force that is going to bring the line down even further without additional vigorous antiheroin efforts.

What have we learned about all this? We have learned that over this period of time, the attitudes towards narcotics

policy in the United States have swung between two poles. The one pole is, "Okay, we can't keep them from getting their dope--let's give it to them. The reason we have the problems is because we try to prohibit it. Heroin is really not such a bad thing, give them their drugs." This pole is now being talked about as "legalizing heroin." This idea is still alive in the United States. It has been rediscovered and renamed every 5 to 10 years throughout this entire period of time. The second pole that we've swung to is "lock-them-up-and-throw-away-the-key." Or ultimately, "Kill them. These people are not doing right--we want to get rid of them--we don't want them in our society--get them the hell out. Whatever it takes to do that, we want to do it. We're going to get tough with the addicts." Lest there be any doubt, that idea too is alive today. Our policy has generally swung between those two extremes. The problem with both of them is that when you look at them closely, they become so unpleasant that you realize you cannot adopt either of those superficially attractive positions. At that point, you are left with all the marvelous ambiguity that constitutes the drug abuse prevention field. You are left with measures that have complexity, that do not promise the elimination of the heroin problem, that contain the idea of tolerance, acceptance, and making peace with some level of the addiction problem, and that involve restraint in whatever it is you

are doing about the problem. We must give up the seductive idea that we can eliminate the heroin problem. We have to support this very rich, complex policy firmly. To let up on it is to invite a much worse heroin situation.

Basically, 460,000 addicts are about two-tenths of 1 percent of the population of the United States. That's a small percentage. This means that when people talk about doing a better job of eliminating heroin use in the United States, they are talking about improving on that 99.8 percent of the population who are not now heroin addicted. We are already successful, even though we do have a serious heroin problem. When we talk about improving on our prevention techniques, it is hard to improve on 99.8 percent.

What is the potential threat of the heroin addiction problem in the United States? Some say it could never get much worse. Let me give you two figures--one observation and two figures which suggest that reassuring thought may be wrong. The observation: I have never talked to a heroin addict who did not feel that heroin was at least as good a drug as alcohol or tobacco. Once they have been exposed to it and used the drug and gotten the heroin high, many people like it. Whatever the problems are with the heroin lifestyle, the drug experience of heroin is itself positive for many people. We now have 60 million drinkers in the country and 40 million

tobacco smokers. If we treated heroin as we now treat alcohol and tobacco, we would probably have more than 20 million heroin-dependent individuals in the United States. The habit itself is easy to acquire; the reinforcing capacity of the drug is powerful. In Viet Nam in 1971 when heroin was widely available at low cost, 20 percent of the enlisted servicemen of the United States were addicted to heroin in 1 year of exposure. Forty-three percent used it at least once. The other data comes from the work at the Narcotics Treatment Administration in the District of Columbia. We found that of all the young men born in the District of Columbia in 1952 who reached the age of 17 at the peak year of the epidemic, 20 percent were not only addicted to heroin but were treated for heroin addiction by NTA by 1973. That is, of the birth cohort of 1952, 20 percent of the boys were treated for heroin addiction by the time they were 21. That figure reflects more than any other data the extent of the epidemic in the District of Columbia in the last decade. Our United States population is vulnerable to heroin addiction. The current number of addicts bears no relationship to the potential in the population for the levels of addiction to heroin.

How much does it cost today for these 460,000 addicts? About \$10 billion in social costs, plus about \$5 billion in

crime-related costs. So the social costs, even for a small number of addicts, are great. About \$1.1 billion of the social costs relate to the treatment and law enforcement activities--the rest of it has to do with lost employment, deaths, and hospital and medical costs.

What are the lessons to be learned from this? One of them is that there is no simple answer to the problem of heroin addiction. Anybody who is looking for a simple approach is not going to do well with this issue.

One can reach a few conclusions even from this overview of the Nation's opiate dependence rates. Supply reduction--tighter laws restricting access to heroin and other opiates--does reduce the levels of use. The techniques which can be used to achieve this goal are varied, ranging from restrictions in medical practice to diplomatic activities with countries which are the source of the opium for illicit heroin traffickers, with almost limitless additional options. However, as the total heroin use rate has dropped, the characteristics of those who continue use have changed from being relatively benign to downright predatory. It is not clear whether this represents an inevitable trade-off. For example, if there were no prohibition on heroin in this country--or if heroin prohibition had been repealed in 1933 when prohibition against alcohol was repealed--would

there have been fewer deaths, less crime, and less illness associated with heroin use (even though the overall rate of use would have obviously increased)? We cannot be certain, but the experience with alcohol suggests caution in reaching any such conclusions--ending prohibition did not end our national problems with alcohol, including its connection with crime. Repeal of the Volstead Act did virtually eliminate the use of alcohol trafficking as a source of income for organized crime (and create a large legal liquor industry in our country), but this did not put much of a dent in the impact of organized crime in our Nation. We have much to learn about the limits and the costs of our successful supply-reduction efforts, including a better understanding of precisely which components of this overall strategy produce what results at what costs. Perhaps some new mix of supply-reduction programs could raise the efficiency and lower the costs of this approach.

On the other side of the drug abuse prevention equation, it appears that adding treatment and prevention to the more traditional law enforcement approach to narcotics control has, during the last decade, produced clear-cut gains. Treated addicts do consume opiates less, thereby reducing demand for the drugs. But, as is the case with supply reduction, we are still uncertain about the limits of this


approach. Could an epidemic be "treated out of existence"? Is there any way to get the maximum effect for minimum cost? The preliminary data, especially from the District of Columbia, suggests that treatment is effective in curbing an epidemic of heroin addiction; but would it be successful in the absence of successful supply reduction? During the last decade, it has become clear that treatment and prevention can be combined with law enforcement in a comprehensive policy.

Where does this leave us? With more questions than answers. With the awareness that our national heroin problems could be a lot worse than they are today. With a sense that our efforts, while not eliminating the problem, have not failed either.

Finally, it is clear that heroin policy must remain near the center of the stage if we are not to lose the gains we have made. It is also clear that ambiguity, complexity, and uncertainty cannot be avoided.

FIGURE ONE

TREND IN NARCOTIC ADDICTION IN THE UNITED STATES



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Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. DuPont.
Dr. Potter.

STATEMENT OF J. WALTER POTTER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

Mr. POTTER. Mr. Chairman, I am J. Walter Potter, Principal of Aberdeen, Md., High School, as well as president of the National Association of Secondary School Principals.

It is a 35,000-member organization dedicated to the improvement of secondary education. We are grateful for the opportunity to present our viewpoint to the committee because we are very much opposed to these harmful substances.

We have been very steadfast in our opposition, especially for marihuana, since it has been so pervasive in the secondary school. The extent of its harm is for two reasons, one is the extensive use itself and the other is the inclination of young people to deny the ill effects of marihuana.

I am going to summarize orally my written statement. Additional data is in there as well as the supporting aspects, but I think I can hit the highlights orally.

As to the incidence of marihuana within the schools, 1 in 10 seniors smokes pot daily and they average about three and a half joints a day in this activity.

One in two smokes pot at some time, and one-half of these also use other drugs.

The pot used by the school-aged population is probably greater than these figures because the dropouts use more such substances than do the school students but we don't have quite the same count on that.

In Maryland, the marihuana use has declined by students between the years of 1978 and 1980 at all three age categories that they studied. That would be the 8th, 10th, and 12th grades.

This supports the comments that Dr. Pollin made. This was accompanied by a perceived increase in the danger of such substances. We don't know that they are tied together, but certainly the facts were related.

The age of the introduction of marihuana has lowered each year in Maryland since they have been doing the study through the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, called the Maryland adolescent survey.

It was interesting to note in one school system the marihuana cases for a given year, the middle school students accounted for 38 percent of those cases, and for all the drugs used or discovered in that school system during that year, middle school students accounted for 28 percent. I find those figures fairly striking. That is the middle school as compared to the senior high school.

Some of the characteristics and symptoms which show up among students, I think, are worth noting. The medical authorities have now identified a "pot personality." It is characterized by an emotional flatness and what we know as a dropout syndrome. They drop out of sports and activities, drop out of school, drop out of family, and almost drop out of organized society.

It is also characterized by diminished willpower, concentration, the ability to deal with complex problems. There is an increased confusion in thinking, impaired judgment, hostility. All of these are characteristics we find counter to the alert, bright, productive, motivated student that we would like to see in our secondary schools.

The effects upon the educational success are rather apparent and have been verified by scientific study. There is a deterioration in the perception of space. This automatically leads to hazardous situations in shops, labs, gymnasiums, swimming pools, and the like.

There is a drop in memory, thinking, comprehension, physical skills, reaction time, accuracy on tests. All these have been verified.

Symptoms develop faster in young users which makes it possible almost to identify a freshman as he comes into the senior high school who is probably habitually involved by that time.

Ability loss is greater among brighter users, and those in the most need of education are probably the ones who are the greatest users and therefore, benefiting least by their education.

All of this is supported in the written text.

There is a definite reduction of time on tasks, which is of great significance because that is one of the most important aspects of learning. This is coupled with a deterioration in grades by those who are known to be habitual marihuana or pot users.

Many of the chronic truants are of the drug culture and these are the ones who also seem to be beyond the influence of the parents to get into school and be serious about their educational activities.

The drug scene brings a bad image on schools, teachers, and administrators. It has caused, I think, a definite shift from the teacher or administrator being a friend and helper of the student to where he becomes, to some extent, the accuser and the punisher as he tries to ferret out the drugs within the school system.

Drugs cause a general diminished regard for school as a haven from illegal and unsafe influence because of the drug involvement. This surfaces in lots of different ways.

Just a few suggestions for consideration for improvement. Some of these probably don't apply at the Federal level. I think we must try harder to control supply at all levels, from the international scene and boundaries to the schoolhouse door.

Courts and institutions must do something to all offenders—perhaps small fines. Questions arose earlier when the law enforcement people were at the table about the courts. We know that courts often suspend sentences or give probation before a verdict in a lot of the drug cases.

I recommend that something happen in each case, a fine, an escalation system of penalty to distributors, eventually, I guess, prison.

I think another deficiency is that the record of offenses for juveniles and others is probably very poorly kept. We don't know a lot of times whether it is a second, third, or fourth offense and I think that such records could be kept. We do it with traffic violations for all ages whether juvenile or adults, and I think we could with drug offenses.

I certainly would want to avoid criminal records and labels for first offenders and young offenders, but I think we need to cut out the free ride for repeat offenders and those crossing over from the juvenile to adult levels as they continue to commit offenses.

We need to continue the educational process on effects of drugs. This is beginning to show results, Dr. Pollin pointed this out. I mention that in the Maryland study, as an encouraging sign. Eventually, I think we might have to involve some of the other things in our society such as the freedom to use vehicles as we give to persons. I think we can come nearer to eliminating or reducing the supplies.

I would like to conclude my part by reading the last paragraph or two from my prepared statement. Our Canadian secondary school colleagues are involved in a similar situation of trying to keep marihuana influence out of schools. They have taken a strong and successful position with their Federal Government to maintain a fair and firm stance against cannabis in all forms. We should do no less. Our goal is not simply to separate marihuana from basic teaching and learning procedures, but to salvage a large portion of the current maturing population from cheating themselves of the education, personality, and character development needed to become self-sustaining and contributing citizens.

Secondary school principals across the country, through the National Association of Secondary School Principals, offer their support and cooperation for a combined, all-out national effort to reduce the presence of harmful drugs in our schools and society.

I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to be heard and I would like to present Dr. Mel Riddile, who will extend my remarks to some extent on the availability and effects upon the school situation.

Dr. Riddile is the coordinator of substance abuse prevention with the Fairfax County schools.

[Mr. Potter's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. WALTER POTTER, PRESIDENT NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you representing the National Association of Secondary School Principals on the issue of narcotics in education. The NASSP, an organization of 35,000 administrators, has a long experience of opposition to ingestion of any health hazardous chemicals by young people. We have been especially active in alerting our members to the hazards of alcohol and marijuana which have become so pervasive among teenagers. In this limited presentation the concentration will be upon marijuana and its effects upon education because it is the most insidious narcotic-like substance affecting secondary school students today. This assertion is made because of the extent of use coupled with the complete denial of harmful effects by many users and promoters.

While school people were long naive in their understanding of the drug culture, they have been steadfast in their concerns about the effects upon learners. Whereas the general public and scientific community have been hesitant in attacking the evil effects of marijuana, the accord is largely uniform now except for the denial by users. For example, Dr. D.H.M. Powelson, University of California, was the psychiatrist who said initially in 1967 that cannabis was harmless but in 1974 that it was "the most dangerous drug we have to contend with." His view changed when he began counselling drop-outs and he found that "many of them seemed unable to deal with reality. They just couldn't function."

Dr. Carlton Turner, director of Federal Marijuana Project, after reviewing

5,000 studies declares, "There is not a single paper on the crude drug marijuana which gives it a clean bill of health, not a single paper to support it as an innocuous drug."²

Following will be information on how an educator comprehends the prevalence of marijuana among adolescents, its characteristics as evidenced by users, its effects upon the learner, and some generalizations about working with the problem.

Incidence of Marijuana Use Among School Students

Incidence of drug use has been reported by numerous studies in recent years. Figures cited range from a single experimental use to regular usage daily. Two studies that seem most helpful because they each have updated data over a period of years are the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, Student Drug Use in America: 1975-1980, which reports on high school seniors nationwide; and the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene study, Maryland Adolescent Survey, which reports on drug and alcohol use among Maryland eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders since 1973.

Some significant points of the national study of high school seniors are:

1. In 1979, one out of ten high school seniors smoked pot daily ...
Of these, daily users averaged 3½ joints a day.
2. Of the 50% of seniors who smoked pot at all during 1979, 37% said they "usually stay high seven hours or more."
3. 49% of all seniors who used pot "during the past 12 months" also used one or more other illegal drugs during that period.³
4. Drug use among drop-outs is notably higher than among those who finish high school.⁴

The Maryland survey generally corroborates the high school seniors study, but gives some other information which is both helpful and encouraging.

1. "The largest increases in perceived danger occurred with marijuana and quaaludes for each group. In the case of marijuana, this increase coincided with an appreciable decrease in its use between 1978 and 1980 for each age group, whereas quaaludes use increased for each age group."⁵
2. Non-users in the late adolescent category perceive substances to be dangerous at about a 2-1 ratio over frequent users. (Marijuana 79.0 - 31.6). The only substance scoring more than 50% harmful by frequent users was cigarettes at 66%.⁶
3. The percent of the population who frequently use drugs other than marijuana and alcohol is very small.⁷
4. There is an increase of youth who perceive marijuana to be dangerous (1978-80). Simultaneously there was a decrease in marijuana users.⁸
5. Table 6 shows current use of any drug (excluding alcohol and cigarettes) for three age groups:⁹

<u>Young Adolescents</u>		<u>Middle Adolescents</u>		<u>Late Adolescents</u>	
<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1980</u>
23.5	18.5	42.8	35.6	47.0	40.3

Even though the questions and time periods are somewhat different, these figures can be compared to the high school seniors nationwide

on use of marijuana alone during the same period.¹⁰

1978		1980	
Used in Last Year	Currently Using	Used in Last Year	Currently Using
50.0	37.0	49.0	34.0

(The Maryland figure for late adolescents making frequent use of any substance other than alcohol for the 1980 period was 31.7%.

¹¹
(Table 8)

The Maryland study and other studies have documented the steadily lowering age at which drugs are introduced to younger children. The Maryland report indicated a lowering age each year their study has been conducted. Dr. Richard Blum of California, after surveying 3,200 cases found some pot started by third grade and great pressure to "turn on" as early as fifth and sixth grades.¹²

Characteristics and Symptoms of Students Using Marijuana

Educators have built considerable experience over recent years in dealing with students labeled by their contemporaries as "pot heads" and "heads." Medical authorities have now delineated the "pot personality" which is often identifiable (if not provable) in the school setting. Dr. Dean Parmelee, director of adolescent in-patient services at the Charles River Hospital, indicates while it is not easy to pick up on all the symptoms, "gradually all users - youngsters and adults - compromise their potential, their activities and their life-style. And heavy young users eventually develop most, if not all, of the 'pot personality' symptoms."¹³

Dr. Harold Voth of the Menninger Foundation's School of Psychiatry further defines the pot personality: "The most obvious impairments caused by chronic mari-

Juana use are in the area of Organic Brain Syndrome (OBS). These include impaired short-term memory, emotional flatness, and a motivational - or dropout - syndrome. This can progress from dropping out of sports, to dropping out of school, to dropping out of family." Voth lists other symptoms of OBS as "diminished will power, concentration, attention span, ability to deal with abstract or complex problems, and tolerance for frustration; increased confusion in thinking, impaired judgment, hostility toward authority."¹⁴ Voth adds "one truly pernicious symptom...this is the extraordinary refusal to accept the hard scientific evidence about harmful effects of marijuana."¹⁵

Effects of Marijuana Upon Educational Success

The effect of marijuana upon learning has now been tested enough to indicate with some assurance the negative effects beyond the personality factors already mentioned. Fred Burford, et al, writing for the Ontario Secondary School Headmasters Council, concludes that students under the influence of cannabis, while not easily recognizable, are often "experiencing deterioration in perception of time and space" which can prove "hazardous in technical areas with machinery and tools, in the gymnasium, in the pool, or in a science laboratory." He also confirms a drop in academic performance and a decrease in self-motivation by users.¹⁶

"Various psychological tests in the U.S. and England showed a drop in analytical thinking, comprehension, and in any test requiring concentration or manual dexterity."¹⁷ This is confirmed by Herbert Moskowitz of the University of California on effects of marijuana on driving, e.g. impairment of reaction time, impairment of short-term memory function and information storage, and impairment of coordination skills. This report also gives information on the effects of alcohol and alcohol and marijuana combined on driving skills.¹⁸

Williams, et al, found "general lassitude and carelessness ... an adverse effect on accuracy in tests which require concentration ... Comprehension and analytical thinking were made more difficult."¹⁹ In Cairo, Soueif's works demonstrated that the brightest users of cannabis showed the greatest loss of ability.²⁰ Kolansky and Schwarz in separate testimony before a Congressional Committee "re-affirm that there is an impairment in logical thinking and recent memory; and also in the transfer of material from the 'temporary' memory to the 'permanent' memory."²¹

The effects of marijuana use upon students is both general and specific. It relates to broad personality aspects and general problems; it has direct bearing upon academic success. Drug related problems affecting late adolescents are reported in the Maryland study previously cited. Table 9 gives the picture:²²

Type of Problem	Percent
Absences from school	12.1
Health problems	8.0
School problems	10.6
Family problems	13.3
Legal problems	6.2
Any type of problem	24.1

(Over 60% of drug users admit to some of these problems.)

Absenteeism, including truancy, is one of the overt signs of possible drug use. The immediate consequence is loss of time on task, even if there was no serious detriments from drugs. Loss of time on task has been demonstrated repeatedly as one of the main contributors to decreased learning and lower test scores.

Knowledge of drugs (technical and street) became significant in the Maryland study when checked against student grades (excellent to failing). "Young and middle adolescent youth, who indicated they were receiving failing grades, showed the highest technical knowledge rates ... Correct response levels for street knowledge were inversely related to academic progress. Better grades were associated with lower street knowledge rates."²³

Where their drug knowledge may have been greater, apparently other knowledge was less:

1. Frequent users of marijuana and alcohol tended to have proportionately fewer "excellent" grades averages and more "failing" grade averages than non-marijuana/alcohol/drug users.²⁴
2. Over 50% of these students receiving failing grades fell into the "current use" category.²⁵
3. College-bound students are less apt to experience severe problems with drugs while still in high school than other young people who are not sure or do not intend to go to college.²⁶

A profile of students in disciplinary difficulty with a local school system because of drug use surfaced three strong indicators of possible drug involvement to parents and educators. Factors quite evident in the disciplinary cases reviewed showed a recent change in supervision at home (for whatever reason), a marked change in attendance at school, and an obvious decline in grades.²⁷

Dr. Robert DuPont summarizes this same concept, "The heavy (marijuana) user often finds less interest in work and school. He finds authorities and parents to be a 'hassle' and generally scales down goals. The A student becomes a C student.

The C student drops out of school."²⁸

Some of the secondary effects of drug use in schools are quite important to the successful operation of schools and the well-being of all students. First, those in greatest need of education are frequently the worse drug abusers, thus complicating the teaching process and lowering average progress results.

School public relations have been dealt many severe blows as the public perceives the school as the place an adolescent is getting or using drugs. Non-parents of current students quickly convert this to a general concept of all young people in school using drugs.

The concept of the role of teacher and administrator becomes tarnished as they must on occasion expose the drug user or distributor, participate in investigations and searches, mete out harsh discipline, withstand appeal procedures, and participate in juvenile law proceedings.

Our Canadian secondary school colleagues are involved in a similar situation of trying to keep marijuana influence out of schools. They have taken a strong and successful position with their federal government to maintain a fair and firm stance against cannabis in all forms. We should do no less. Our goal is not simply to separate marijuana from basic teaching and learning procedures but to salvage a large portion of the current maturing population from cheating themselves of the education, personality, and character development needed to become self-sustaining and contributing citizens.

Secondary school principals across this country, through the National Association of Secondary School Principals, offer their support and cooperation toward a combined all-out national effort to reduce the presence of harmful drugs in our schools and society.

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Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Potter. Dr. Riddile.

STATEMENT OF MEL J. RIDDILE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

Mr. RIDDILE. As educators we have seen drug use over the last decade become a normative behavior engaged in by a majority of the young people and that has been upheld by what Dr. Pollin has said.

The reality is that one of the most difficult decisions that a 12-year-old has to make in America today is whether to get involved with drugs or those who use drugs.

Two factors have contributed to this: One is a lack of adult awareness. Most adults know little or nothing about drugs, drug use, and the signs of drug abuse. The other factor is the increased availability of drugs. Parents and school administrators and other school personnel are relegated to the role of sweeping back the tide when it comes to trying to keep drugs out of the schools and the homes.

No matter how hard we try to educate young people and talk to them, the reality is that in this social scene of our young people, drugs are prevalent. Many young people describe to me and to other adults the fact that there is no social alternative to drug use. You either use drugs or get involved with drugs—and I am including alcohol as one of those—or you feel lonely, you are a social outcast.

That shocks most adults. It is a reality of growing up for young people today. I think we have to have a short- and long-term plan for preventing drug abuse. In the short run, I think we have to do everything we can to keep younger and younger children from using drugs.

In the short term that means eliminating the supply of drugs. As we have seen because of the supply increase we have seen younger and younger kids use drugs. That is the reality.

As the gentlemen have described, importation of drugs, marijuana particularly, have increased, we have seen younger, middle-school and upper elementary schoolchildren using drugs.

This is particularly distressing. It damages their whole academic and social development.

In the long term, I think we have to do everything we can to cut back on the demand and that means through effective education of parents and children about the health effects of drug use.

We have to couple this with a program for strong enforcement. Young people and older people need to know that there are consequences to using illicit drugs. At the present time, the attitude of young people is that there are no consequences, no legal consequences, no social, emotional, intellectual, no consequences to using illicit drugs, so there is no deterrent.

So we find numbers of young people who use drugs rapidly increasing.

I would like to say that as we find younger and younger children using illicit drugs, particularly marijuana, we find that they don't make it to their senior year and they don't appear in the NIDA surveys.

One study that we conducted in a local school found that 28 percent of the marijuana users dropped out of school in 1 year. They would not have made it to their senior year for that survey. So, I think we have to consider that.

In the last month, we talked to large groups of young people and asked them the question, do you think drug use is on the rise, it has leveled off or it is falling?

In both of those large groups and they range from 16 to 25, every one of them, 90 percent said that they felt it was rising. Those young people were particularly concerned about the fact that their younger brothers, and sisters, and the kids in intermediate and middle schools were now using drugs on a regular basis. That was shocking them.

These young people were admittedly experimenting themselves, but were particularly afraid for their younger brothers and sisters.

Cutting back on the demand, as I mentioned, we need to educate all people in our society and I emphasize all people. That means medical professionals, legal professionals, teachers, parents, everyone.

Effective drug education for young people means information about the effects of drugs coupled with activities designed to improve their decisionmaking and problem-solving skills.

Without those two coupled together, drug education has not been found to be effective.

The effects on the school environment of drug use is devastating, particularly marijuana, and marijuana is probably the No. 1 drug-use problem during the schoolday, alcohol being during school activities at night.

We find increased absenteeism, classroom disruption, vandalism, violence in the schools, lower teacher morale, diminished student performance and, again, school dropouts increasing among kids who use drugs.

In closing, I would like to say just to try to think what it is like to be a young person in our society today. If someone had told you at age 13 that you could press a button and eliminate all the pains of adolescence, all the pains of being a teenager, that all your friends were doing it, and you would be accepted socially for doing

it, it would be very difficult for you to resist. That is a reality for young people today.

That is how easy it is for them to obtain illicit drugs. Many young people tell me that it is easier for them to obtain marihuana than it is alcohol. The younger they are, the easier it is to obtain marihuana because they have to find somebody to buy the alcohol for them.

They have to find a middleman.

Unless we can do something with the supply, we are, again, relegated to the role of sweeping back the tide and it is just not working.

Thank you.

[Mr. Riddile's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MEL J. RIDDILE, REPRESENTING THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

I welcome this opportunity to speak before you regarding a serious problem shared by all Americans, a problem that threatens the health and productivity of a whole generation of young Americans. I am referring to the epidemic of drug use among our young people. This national disease spares no one. Every young American, indeed every American, is feeling the direct or indirect effects of drug use. This disease has no respect for socioeconomic, ethnic, or racial lines. Drug use is killing or seriously injuring, destroying family unity, impairing performance, and undermining the school environments of hundreds of thousands of young Americans.

Figures from the most recent national surveys indicate that drug use is a normative behavior engaged in by a significant majority of our young people. One must conclude that growing up in America today means being exposed to drugs and drug use. The reality of the present situation is that one of the most difficult decisions that a twelve year old has to make today is whether or not to get involved with drugs or those

who use drugs.

Those young people who have chosen to abstain from the use of drugs or alcohol indicate that they are forced to lead a rather lonely existence. Many young people today feel that there are no social alternatives to drug or alcohol use, because socializing or "partying" has become synonymous with drug or alcohol use. Thus, a whole generation of Americans is growing up with the attitude that to have fun, to relate to their peers, and to be socially accepted, one must use drugs, alcohol, or some mood altering chemical.

The prevailing attitudes of today's young people reflects a distinct change from those of just a decade ago when those who used drugs were looked down upon and ostracized from the mainstream of the youth culture. What factors have contributed to this dramatic change?

One factor certainly has been the lack of knowledge of most adults in regards to the workings of the whole youth culture, particularly the drug scene. Our lack of awareness has made it possible for young people to deceive their parents and other adults on a regular basis. This "game of deception" actually reinforces drug using behavior. The drug scene is probably the first aspect of a child's life in which they are the experts. They no longer must rely upon their parents or their teachers to show them how. Their friends know how, and they are quite willing to share their knowledge. In this way

both parental influence and authority are seriously undermined.

In just a few years the drug scene has "trickled down" from colleges to high schools and to junior high schools. Drugs which were available to adults and students on college campuses in the late 60's and early 70's were transported to the high schools by former students employed in the work force and by alumni returning from college. While adults were trying to decide where they stood on the issue, the numbers of adolescent drug users grew to astronomical proportions. By failing to both recognize the problem and to become informed about the hazards of drug use, we, as adults, have unintentionally enabled hundreds of thousands of young people to become involved with mind-altering chemicals and to subsequently damage, to some degree, their growth and development.

A major factor contributing to these changes, particularly in regards to the large number of younger and younger users of illegal drugs, has been the increased availability of most street drugs, including marijuana. As illicit drugs have become more and more available, younger and younger children have gained access to them. Curtail the supply and raise the price, and these drugs become unavailable to young children.

School officials began to encounter drug related problems on a large scale in the late 70's during a time when the

supplies of illicit drugs were plentiful. When drugs were initially introduced into the social scene of the school-aged population only a few students had access to them. These students tended to be those who associated on a regular basis with older friends. They tended to have more money than the average student and were "street-wise" or had the social skills required to obtain drugs. This situation changed dramatically as the supplies increased. Currently, students indicate that marijuana is easily or readily available to them and in some cases is easier to obtain than alcohol. This is particularly true in the case of many twelve and thirteen year old junior high school students. Students who are rarely in contact with older individuals, who have limited funds, who are not "street-wise" and who have poor social skills now have ready access to illicit drugs.

This has made the jobs of parents and school personnel particularly difficult. Students who previously would not have been exposed to drugs and drug use until they were much older, now are using drugs on a regular basis. That means that upper elementary and junior high students, as well as those older children who are less mature than their peers are experiencing the devastating effects of psychoactive drugs on their school performance, their family relationships, and the overall process of growing up.

Parents and educators are relegated to the role of "sweeping back the tide". They are conscientiously attempting to

prepare these children for entry into the adult world in hopes that they can remain drug-free and develop into mature responsible individuals. But in thousands of homes and schools these hopes are being frustrated due to the impossible task of competing with the flood of psychoactive drugs in the youth culture.

Something must be done about this situation. Something must be done about the availability of illicit drugs being imported from foreign countries, and grown or manufactured domestically.

If someone had told you at age twelve or thirteen that you could get rid of the pains of those difficult teenage years and be accepted by your peers any time you wished by simply pressing a button, it would have been very difficult to resist, particularly when most of your friends were doing the same thing. This is the very situation in which our young people currently find themselves. It is no wonder that many are finding it impossible to resist pressing that button. For that is just about how simple it is for most young people to obtain inexpensive, mind-altering drugs such as marijuana. Even those who are not involved know where to buy drugs, what they look like, and how much they cost. To them, that is a normal part of in America today.

We really do not know what the consequences are for a society in which a whole generation of its youth grow to maturity

using psychoactive drugs, and where drug use is considered "normal" and abstention is considered abnormal. Because parents and school personnel are currently dealing with these twelve to eighteen year olds, perhaps their experiences can shed some light on our future by relating their observations regarding the effects of drug use on the developing adolescent.

Just as adult job performance is generally the last aspect of a person's life to feel the effects of drug use by adults, so to a child's school performance may be the last aspect of the child's life to see the effects of drug use. Although schools may be the last to see the effects of drug use on a student's behavior and performance, they are often the first to identify the problem as drug use. In virtually every case parents had already observed a noticeable deterioration of their child's behavior at home, but because changes are often gradual, and because of their lack of knowledge about drugs and drug use, the parents had failed to relate those changes to drug use.

Families and schools all over the U.S. are being disrupted by the negative impact of "drugged behavior". Young people who begin to use drugs on a regular basis exhibit behaviors such as a loss of energy, drive, and motivation, social withdrawal, passivity, short attention span, poor memory, frequent mood swings, open defiance of authority, and repeated instances of inappropriate behavior. The consequences of these behaviors

are classroom disruption, vandalism, violence, lower teacher morale, and most certainly, diminished student performance. Rather than becoming more independent, adaptable individuals, these young people become more dependent, and unsocialized. Drug use severely reduces the productivity of these youth, and has an undermining and divisive effect upon both the home and the school. What hope does our nation have of improving the quality of life through increased productivity when we face the prospect of having a whole generation of marginally or severely drug impaired young people enter the work force? We are already witnessing a preview of some of these effects, and the picture is frightening.

We as a nation may be facing our most difficult challenge. Each of us must do our part to prevent the use of mind-altering drugs by our youth. This prevention effort must include the education of all adults and young people as to the harmful effects of drugs on personal health, as well as a concerted effort by the criminal justice system to enforce existing laws governing the sale and possession of illicit drugs. Finally, the supply of these drugs must be curtailed so that they are so scarce, and thus so expensive, that they are not available to school-aged children.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Riddile.

I thank all of you for very informative comments on the hazards of drugs. I think this has not been dramatized to the extent that it could be by education through various publications such as those on how damaging cigarette smoking can be and the incidence of cancer in later life by smoking cigarettes, not cigars.

I am trying to justify my smoking of a pipe. I did smoke cigarettes once, but that was 20 years ago. The underlying problem that Dr. Riddile and all of you indicated was not only the supply but the acceptability of drug use, that we are in a certain lifestyle and you have got to be within it if you are going to belong.

I think this is very, very dangerous. Dr. Potter indicated the complexity of the problem while you want to punish users, you don't want to make them criminals, to have a criminal record. But there must be some type of loss of privileges to the user if he continues to use drugs.

I believe the question about the legalization of marihuana that I have asked the other panel need not be asked of you because I think I know your answer. But maybe I shouldn't be so positive about it. There are some medical experts who say legalizing marihuana, like legalizing alcohol, would be one way of controlling it. So I nevertheless will ask the question. Do you believe legalizing marihuana should be recommended?

Should the Federal Government, as some legislation pending urges, legalize marihuana, Dr. Pollin?

Dr. POLLIN. I think it would be a tragic mistake, Mr. Chairman. Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. DuPont?

Dr. DUPONT. I agree. I do not know of any legislation to propose legalizing marihuana use. The politics of legalization are going the other direction. The support in the United States peaked in 1978 and has been declining consistently since then. Even decriminalization, a watered down concept, now enjoys no political support in any legislature in the United States.

No State has decriminalized marihuana since 1978. The politics of marihuana are going in the other direction because marihuana use has become a truly national epidemic. We need to take steps to end the epidemic and not to promote it.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I am glad that situation has changed, because the pressures were quite great to legalize it.

Dr. DUPONT. There were years when it looked as if it was just a matter of inevitability until marihuana use was legalized. It was just a question of when. But the trend turned around very dramatically in 1978. It is going strongly against both legalization and decriminalization everywhere in the United States today.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Potter?

Mr. POTTER. There is a quote in my paper:

Dr. Turner evaluated 5,000 studies and declares there is not a single paper on the crude drug marihuana which gives it a clean bill of health, not a single paper that supports it as an innocuous drug.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Riddile.

Mr. RIDDILE. Any softening of our attitude on marihuana would have a particularly devastating effect on our society. I think we should in no way soften our attitude on that drug.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I am glad the panel is unanimous. Of course, there are some even today that say every person has a right to his own choice. If he wants to smoke cigarettes, if he wants to smoke marihuana, that should be his choice. But coming back to punishment, I agree that certain criminal punishment for youthful first offenders would be unfortunate, but there should be some loss of privilege. For example, couldn't a juvenile court deny the marihuana- or drug-using youngster a driver's license? This is something every teenager cherishes, the right to drive a car. This is one way of punishing him without a criminal record, to deny his license for a period of time.

What do you think about that proposal, Dr. Potter?

Mr. POTTER. I think that would be acceptable in a series of penalties.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Would a graduated denial of the privileges, depending on the defense, be appropriate?

Mr. POTTER. Yes, sir; but with the juvenile authorities in our State, and probably most States, the offenses are handled somewhat independently. In school, you take an action because it was an infraction of school rules or State laws related to schools.

The infraction may not become a juvenile offense, depending on whether the evidence and substance were available. The actions of the juvenile authorities are not known in the schools. You participate at the beginning, but you don't participate at the end. You know what you did, but not what they did. This is a weakness.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. In your junior high schools and high schools in Maryland or in Fairfax County, what happens to a student who is smoking marihuana in violation of the school rules? Do you refer that to some higher authority?

Mr. POTTER. Yes, sir. In our system it is a rather rigid arrangement where they would be suspended, the parents notified and they would be referred to the superintendent for some final action. Typically, that is a 20-day suspension for possession or use and more if it is distribution.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. You mentioned in your paper as far as the educational process, what cooperation do you receive from the parents?

Mr. POTTER. It varies. In the early stages, there was denial also as you heard from the last panel. Parents couldn't believe that their child was involved even if they OD. Now, I think they believe it is fairly prevalent, but they don't know what to do about it.

Their response would probably be: "I don't know what to do with him. I suspect he is smoking pot."

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What percentage of parents do you find in your studies who say that: "You teach and I will take care of my kid at home?"

Mr. POTTER. Very few now on that. The problem is so severe that that is not the reaction that I see very often.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I would like to ask if any of you have the answer to this. Are synthetic drugs the best method of treatment or, as in alcohol, is there any drug that would make a user of illicit drugs very ill and very likely not to use it as is the case in alcohol treatment?

Dr. POLLIN. That varies with the problem drug, Mr. Chairman. In the case of narcotic abuse, heroin, and other opiates, there is a category of drugs that are being developed for treatment purposes which don't make the user ill as antabuse does an alcoholic, but which totally remove all the effects of the narcotic.

These so-called narcotic antagonists represent a model which we are attempting in our research to try to duplicate with regard to other abused drugs. How effective this kind of antagonist will be in actual community treatment situations still remains to be seen since it is a relatively new type of treatment approach.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But is there no research for a drug that would cause a person to get ill if he used illicit drugs?

Dr. POLLIN. There are a variety of research studies which investigate the principle of negative or aversive conditioning. Thus far, it has not proven to be an effective approach for very widespread use. There are very specialized kinds of treatment situations where it might have some promise, but there is no widespread use of that kind of aversive or negative conditioning in the field of drug abuse such as exists in alcoholism.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. My time has run out. I have some questions on source. Dr. DuPont, you had made a very strong indictment of the U.S. Government policy, present and past, in dealing with international growth of illicit plants that cause illicit traffic in drugs.

Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a frightening picture that you present to us. It is apparently new to us, but when you get at the problems of trying to keep these things out, and the profit that is made, and you clean up a crew there will be another gang that will come along and be willing, because of the tremendous profits, to take these risks.

Every place we turn here it seems this problem is so pervasive and so difficult to stop. I noticed, Dr. Potter, you used the word "he" several times. Most of the users of marihuana in schools, are they boys?

Mr. POTTER. I would say they are the majority, but I used it as a generic term.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You said there is sort of a pattern here of dull dropouts. Are they dull because they use marihuana or are they marihuana users who lean toward being dull?

Mr. POTTER. I think people who get into drug use habitually are somewhat disenchanted with their place in society even at a young age.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It reinforces the loser pattern?

Mr. POTTER. Reinforces it considerably.

Mr. PRITCHARD. It is very hard to see how, when there is susceptibility to alcohol as there is in our society, certainly alcohol fits right in this pattern. How do they finance the buying of marihuana?

Mr. RIDDILE. That is one of the problems and one of the reasons we have to cut down on the supply, and that is that marihuana is relatively inexpensive. That young people by saving their lunch money for 1 week can buy enough marihuana to keep them intoxicated for 2 weeks. It is relatively inexpensive.

With cocaine it is a different story. It is much more expensive, and that is why we don't see as many younger children, junior high or middle schoolchildren using cocaine. But because marihuana is so inexpensive we see a lot of use among that age group.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You indicated marihuana during the week and alcohol on weekends.

Mr. RIDDILE. Marihuana during the day because it is easily concealed. The effects of intoxication are not as pronounced as intoxication with alcohol. It is more subtle, I might say. Alcohol is a major problem at night activities and activities on weekends.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I realize we are not a draconian society but if we wanted to be very tough, we could go into the high schools and take urine tests for everybody to determine who is and who isn't. At that point you call in all the parents and say:

This is what your kid is doing, he is on this, you ought to know it. If you want to do anything, fine, here is a program. If you don't want to do it, we will put you in another category and if we have any more trouble with him, he is out. This school will be run to educate people who are willing to be educated and parents who are willing to stand up.

You put a terrible premium on children who have parents who don't seem to care.

Dr. DUPONT. There is a school that has done that.

Mr. PRITCHARD. A public school?

Dr. DUPONT. It is the American School in Djakarta, Indonesia. It has done regular urine testing for over a decade, for all students. Students having any problems, disciplinary or others, are automatically tested, plus all the students are at risk of random tests simply on the basis of a random number coming up in the superintendent's office. The students give urine samples routinely. A young teacher there did his Ph. D. dissertation on the effects of this program at the school. He found that the program enjoys a 99-percent support from the teachers and the parents. More surprisingly, about 70 percent of the students thought urine testing was a good idea. It reduced dramatically drug and discipline problems in the school. It was a universal success. It has been operating for over a decade now.

Mr. PRITCHARD. What would happen in our schools today if we tried to do that in a Maryland high school?

Mr. POTTER. We couldn't get away with it. There are court cases that prohibit the use of dogs to smell out marihuana in the lockers.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Could you do it in a private school?

Mr. POTTER. I don't have an opinion on that. I would think so.

Dr. DUPONT. It could be done in this country. It could be done in the public schools, too. I do not agree that there is any privacy issue about drug use whatsoever. One of the saddest things in this field is the preemption of the vital language of civil rights by pro-drug forces in the society. What Martin Luther King, Jr., was fighting for and what many civil rights leaders continue to fight for had nothing whatsoever to do with the use of drugs. Now the simple way to get a child's urine tested is to ask the parent to take the responsibility and to refer the family to a pediatrician. I have no doubt that were a school, either public or private, prepared to say that this is going to be a school where nobody is going to be

using drugs and that urine testing will be used to identify drug use, it would work.

Mr. PRITCHARD. You would get everybody's attention on the subject wouldn't you. If this is as big a problem as you say, I would think somebody would be advocating some really tough measures, and the only tough measure can be right on the student and the parent.

Dr. POLLIN. I wanted to comment, Mr. Pritchard, on your introductory remark when you said how discouraging and massive the whole problem seems. It is my opinion that it is very important that we try to maintain a balance between recognizing how truly serious and extensive the problem is and recognizing the degree of achievement and success that we have been making. There was a time in the late 1960's and early 1970's when I think large elements in our society tended to depreciate the problem.

With regard to heroin we think there may be some 400,000 or 500,000 addicts. With regard to cocaine we think there may be somewhere between 4 and 5 million regular users. Use of these illicit drugs we are concentrating on today has reached levels which are truly astounding and tragic, particularly by young age groups. The other side of that coin that I think we have to keep in mind is that our present system of controls, though they are dramatically imperfect, nonetheless keep the level of users down to a level very, very substantially less than the level of users that we find for substances that have been legalized.

There is no reason to believe that there wouldn't be a tenfold, and probably even a hundredfold, increase in the level of use of cocaine, given what we know about the reinforcement properties, if it weren't for the system of controls which now makes it such an expensive drug and, therefore, contributes very substantially to a reduction in potential users.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Personally I can see where things could be worse, but I wouldn't want to sit here and be very satisfied with the results. I think it is the case of the bottle being half empty or half full.

Dr. Riddile tells us the percentage of young people using marihuana in middle schools, in high schools, and people who are 12, 13, and 14, have to, if they are going to get along socially, in many ways, they have to kind of join in, in either alcohol, marihuana, or something. It seems to me that has a major effect.

We spend an enormous amount of money in educating people and in one fell swoop you make it almost impossible to deal with the 15 or 20 percent who are not going to be able to get normal public education.

I am not trying to paint a bad picture but it does seem to me that some kind of shock treatment is necessary.

The other thing is we have to offer students, parents and schools some very tough answers and say: this is a bad situation. This is where we are, this is where we want to go down the road. Now if you really think it is as bad as you say, here are some things you can do. You may not want to do it, but here are some things you can do. You know, if you are concerned about your child, there isn't any reason why a parent can't give his child a urine test. But

I will bet you a large percentage of parents haven't the guts to do it, to be truthful.

In some ways they would be afraid of what the results would be. I think if you want to be really tough, the situation calls for some very hard action.

Dr. POLLIN. Mr. Pritchard, I think there has been some beginning improvement—and I would agree with Dr. Riddile we have to be very cautious in how we describe the dimensions and the future possibilities of that improvement. One reason for the fact there is a beginning of improvement is that parents in this country, who went through a period in the 1960's and 1970's of confusion and great discouragement, have been willing to adopt a kind of tough love. And one reason they have been willing to adopt that is because they have been helped to overcome some excessive discouragement and have come to believe that they have not only the responsibility but the right to intervene forcibly, and also that if they do, it can and will have desirable effects.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I would agree on that trend. You have another trend going, and that is an enormous number of single parents where women are raising two or three children by themselves, who have jobs, and they are right up to here with problems of life and their ability to deal with that child and giving normal parental attention is almost impossible, so you have almost two forces going at one time.

I didn't mean to take so much time but I do feel very strongly about that.

Mr. RIDDILE. I would like to respond to that. I think our biggest problem is the lack of knowledge about drug and drug use among the adult population. I think we are trying to do a good job in educating parents, but I really believe that most parents, if given the knowledge would act upon it, that they wouldn't be afraid of their children. I really believe that.

But look at the dual messages we give kids by allowing "head shops" to sell drug paraphernalia, by having a magazine that is the most widely read magazine among young teenagers, Seventeen magazine, has on the front cover an ad that says: "Use these eye-drops after partying."

Now any teenager can tell you partying is synonymous with drug use. That is what partying means. That is a message to kids. That is a dual message. It is very difficult for young people to understand how we can sell drug paraphernalia, how we can have ads on TV, radio, magazines, extolling drug use and then have the parents and school officials turn around and say you shouldn't use drugs. It is very difficult for us to understand that. For a 13-year-old it is almost impossible for them to understand.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all the members of the panel for taking your time to appear before this committee to give us the benefit of your thinking on this extremely serious problem.

Personally, I think it is so serious that rather than have one committee with such broad jurisdiction as this Foreign Affairs and others, we ought to have one committee which concentrates all of its attention on the field of narcotics or in the broad field which

covers cocaine and all of these drugs that are becoming a problem everywhere. In every small town in America, and in the rural communities I come from we run into it. Somehow nobody seems to know what to do about it.

The police go up and catch the young people who congregate and smoke marihuana and scatter them, and they go find some other place.

I think all of you have to some extent emphasized the necessity of a greater commitment both on the international and the domestic levels, on the part of the Congress, on the part of the President, on the part of others in responsible positions.

What do you think is really needed to be done by the President in terms of policy, by any of the agencies and by the Congress to give emphasis to the importance of doing something about this problem?

May I make this additional observation? Personally, I think education is the answer to most of our problems. If, in our public schools and our private school systems, we allocated more time to discussing the dangers and some of the things that can happen to people who use these drugs, particularly to excess, a useful purpose would be served. The same is true of other areas where we already have things that are legal that are abused like cigarette smoking, drinking, things of that kind. I think we have gotten away from the long existing Sunday school process of teaching moderation in all things.

In other words, people are going to do it, and you know they are going to do it. Those things that are already legalized it seems to me some kind of full-scale educational process from the White House to the courthouse, as we say sometimes in political campaigns, is essential. Would you agree?

Dr. DUPONT. Education in the broadest sense is precisely what we do need. We need to understand what is the nature of the drug problem and what needs to be done about it. Unfortunately, the implications, including the political implications, in this area have diverted this necessary commitment to action. We need to reestablish some basic principles and to go after them in a serious way.

I believe that particularly for this committee, it is vital provide leadership in the international arena because that is where the greatest payoffs can be found. The greatest gap today between what could be and what is in the international arena. In the international arena there is a lack of adequate leadership from the executive branch and the legislative branch. The potential is there for enormous progress to be made. We can look back and see that the greatest achievements in drug abuse prevention in the last decade have come in the international area. That is what I hope we can focus on.

Now with respect to the issue of education more narrowly defined, Dr. Pollin has spoken about this most eloquently both here and elsewhere. The greatest achievement in this country in drug-abuse prevention has come in the area of cigarette smoking among teenagers where we have seen a drop in the daily smoking rate of high school seniors from 29 percent in 1977 to 20 percent in 1981. That drop in 4 years of nearly a third is one of the greatest achievements in drug abuse education that one could imagine. It

has come because we have given children a reason not to smoke cigarettes. We now have to do the same for other drugs.

Thank you very much.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I think everything you have said is a part of the solution.

Mr. POTTER. Where we have had problems in the military, we throw large sums of money at the problem, where we have problems in education, we seem to be taking money away which complicates the job considerably.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Dr. Dupont just made reference to the fact that we have been convincing our youth that tobacco, cigarettes are more harmful and seem to be convincing them that marihuana cigarettes are harmful—we are doing a better job in convincing them about cigarettes. Does that mean you have had a greater campaign against tobacco than against marihuana?

Dr. POLLIN. We have known about the dangers of cigarettes for a considerably longer period of time. The great bulk of research has been done on marihuana and the health hazard has only occurred within the past decade and certainly it is only within the past 4 or 5 years that there has begun to be a consistent and convincing repetitive message getting across successfully to the country and to the young people in the country that marihuana is not a benign substance.

The percentage decrease in terms of young people smoking marihuana daily is approximately the same as the percentage increase in high school seniors smoking cigarettes daily. So there has been really substantial progress made in this area.

Mr. RIDDILE. One reason for that progress has been in changing young people's attitudes, has been their own observation of their peers, the effects marihuana has had on their peers and their behavior. We find most of our teachers are sometimes as illinformed or not informed as any other adult. We need to inform everyone. We need to do a better job of informing and training our teachers in drug use and drug abuse and, in turn, to help them in giving students information.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. What do you think the media might be able to do? We have a tremendously powerful media. Radio, television—television in particular—and the newspapers. They allocate a lot of their time to useless things. Not just in the late hours of the night now but in the early hours of the night, they show movies and other displays indicating the beauty of sex whether through the marital process or otherwise.

Do you think there is some way we could encourage the media to demonstrate the harmful effects and just what can happen, what's happening. Maybe another "60 Minutes" or a portion of it, dealing with this subject. Not only here but all over the world. Might that not have a tendency to serve as a restraining impact upon the use of marihuana, cocaine and other harmful drugs?

Mr. RIDDILE. Yes.

Mr. POTTER. I have a reaction to that. I think the media could be a whole lot more responsive. There might well be a conference about the uses of drugs during which time 99 percent talked about the harmful substance but someone there might say, "Well, there is the opinion it is not all harmful, or that there is a restricted use

of marihuana for glaucoma or something like that." That is more likely to get the headline than the 99-percent negative reactions that went on through the length of the Conference. I consider that irresponsible on the part of the media.

Mr. RIDDILE. There is a TV show this very night on NBC called "pleasure drugs," which is a 1-hour program starting at 10 o'clock which will deal with that subject. We try to inform all our teachers and people throughout the county by that program.

The other night I had the occasion to stay up and watch a late movie that you talked about and during that late movie, they showed about four or five public service announcements about alcohol and cigarettes, particularly about alcohol, 3 o'clock in the morning. Now, my wife made the comment if they could show those on prime time they were excellent public service messages so if there is anything we could do to encourage them to show effective existing public service messages during prime time, I think that would have an effect.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. You mentioned, Dr. Potter, that our Canadian neighbors have successfully maintained a firm stance against marihuana in all of its forms. How does that differ from ours?

Mr. POTTER. There seemed to be a trend to liberalize our legalize, which caused this response to come about, during which they tried to propose a lot of helpful steps along the way. I am not able to tell you how many of those have been effective. It did stop the trend toward legalizing outright and brought about a more reasonable approach.

One of the suggestions the school people had for the Canadian legislators was to take marihuana from the narcotics control and put it under Food and Drug Administration where the penalties would be there but would be less for violations of it and it would be less likely to involve young people in criminal records and things of that sort. I don't know whether that came about to that extent or not, but that was the kind of analyses they were giving the problem which I thought made some sense.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I note in the memorandum from our staff to those of us on this subject—and it is a very detailed memorandum, with a summary of some of the general conclusions, one of which includes things you have already pointed out—that we in this country for the most part do not seem to be making a strong effort overseas against narcotic traffic—that international control seems to have a relatively low priority within the present administration and the Department of State.

And a 9-month delay in filling the key positions of Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters and the President's Adviser on Drug Policy in the White House have seemed to contribute to a sense of drift and low priority of the narcotics policy.

That is the conclusion of staff. Would you agree with that? Any one or all of you?

Mr. POTTER. Yes.

Dr. POLLIN. I think there were some inevitable delays. On the other hand, since the positions have been filled, I think it is very important to note that there have been major or new initiatives which had not occurred in previous years and that the south Flor-

ida task force, the momentum and support for repeal of the limitation on the use of herbicides, the initiative to solve in an appropriately limited way the use of DOD resources, all of these I think are indicative of and confirm the fact that there is a very high level of interest, I would say in this administration in the problem of drug abuse and I think when you hear witnesses who will speak to the programs that are interstate, in the Justice Department and from the White House, you will find that there is a new level of not only interest but of initiative and commitment to successful action.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Dupont in his testimony, Mr. Fountain, had really indicted past and present administrations for a lack of interest. I am very happy to hear Dr. Pollin say there is a revitalized interest that is long overdue.

Dr. POLLIN, as Director of NIDA, are you involved in the administration's policy process with regard to international control policy and how do you enter into the decisionmaking? You have given us your assessment that the situation is improving, but could you comment on Dr. Dupont's assertions as well as speak to your role with the administration policy?

Dr. POLLIN. Again, I would prefer that Dr. Turner, when he appears before you on Thursday, outline the structure and the operation of the overall administration process. Let me just say that we have found that there is very active and useful interchange between the various components of the Federal Government achieved under Dr. Turner's leadership in the White House oversight group and the newly formed Cabinet council to deal with this problem.

I would very much agree with the thrust, the central core of the point Dr. Dupont was trying to make. Namely, that there is a major opportunity, a major responsibility to more actively pursue the effort to reduce within source countries the production and distribution of these illicit substances.

It is my own perception that the commitment to do that, and the renewed and revitalized efforts to accomplish just that purpose is present and in place, and, again, I think when Mr. DeCarlo and the other witnesses from the State Department appear before you later in the week, you will find there has been really substantial progress that has been made within the past 6 months in terms of our relationship to those source countries, in our dealings, for example, with Bolivia which he will be able to spell out in detail.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We will pursue that, Dr. Pollin, because the committee is very interested in the redirection of some of the funds, if not the majority of the funds, toward the attack of the supply at the source.

It was very interesting to hear Dr. Dupont—unfortunately, he had to leave—his summation on this matter. Our committee has been told that there is not enough inducement or incentive in crop-substitution schemes but with a crop like coca that takes 4 years to harvest there should be some feasible substitution for the coca plant.

As you well know, Dr. Pollin, the administration is asking \$40 million. The question of whether \$40 million is enough is a question we probably should ask Dr. Turner.

But if I may ask a final question of Dr. Potter. You cite the University of Michigan Institution for Social Research Studies on Student Drugs in the United States for 1975 and 1980. This study has been criticized as understating the dimensions of our problem.

Would you agree or disagree with this criticism?

Mr. POTTER. I think it may understate to the effect that the dropouts are not in it. It is a study of seniors. It is what they have done each year and I think that is why you have a longitudinal study as Maryland has done every 2 years.

The fact that the dropouts are not there as seniors and they are known to be heavier users, I would say that the data would probably be a little more discouraging if the total age population were in there. That is a guess.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Pollin.

Dr. POLLIN. Mr. Chairman, that particular study is one that NIDA has initiated and funded since its inception in 1975. We are aware of the problems introduced by the fact that dropouts and absentees do show higher levels of drug use and there are currently underway a set of initiatives which would enable us to rather precisely define just what the difference in use levels would be if those missing students were included.

We already have preliminary data which does suggest that indeed the absolute figures would be elevated in some cases but in no case would the elevation be a major elevation and most important, it is clear that none of the trends and the significant trend change that has occurred since 1978, would be any different than it shows.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Do you wish to comment, Dr. Riddile?

Mr. RIDDILE. I think the survey is a very responsible survey and if you look at the data it is alarming enough. I think we have to be careful about the conclusions we make from that data.

I also suggest that we begin to survey younger children. I think it is sad but it is a reality that we need to survey them before they reach the 12th grade. Why not survey them at grade 10?

We are asking a child in the 12th grade what they did in 8 grade. It is very difficult for them to remember.

In addition, the social scene, as I mentioned, changed considerably since today's 12th graders were 8th graders 5 years ago.

As I said, those young people were alarmed at what was going on in the social scene in the seventh, eighth and ninth grade so I think we might want to look at surveying younger children.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Pollin.

Dr. POLLIN. I agree with Dr. Riddile, that is an initiative which we plan to undertake dependent upon resource availability in the coming year.

I would also like to reinforce his point about how disturbing the statistics are even given the improvement that we have seen and I think the best way to make that point is to note that despite the improvement this past year there were more high school seniors who were current users of marijuana than are current smokers of cigarettes and that I think is a very, very disturbing statistic indeed.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. In closing and summarizing the purpose of this meeting, obviously we must attack the source of the problem,

to try to see that the illicit drugs do not come to our shores to be made available to our people at whatever age level, whatever the type of drug.

At the same time, we have a current problem on how to deal with those who are addicted at the present time and we had best attack this problem by studying the efforts of other countries because it is not only a United States problem as has been repeatedly pointed out throughout this morning's hearing.

Therefore, I would like to ask Dr. Pollin; the British have adopted a different approach to the heroin addiction problem in Great Britain whereby heroin was made available to addicts at treatment centers.

What has been the result of this approach? Was heroin thereby actually legalized?

Dr. POLLIN. The British experience has shown that that approach did not work effectively and the British have been moving away from it quite rapidly. They found that it led to an increase in the number of narcotic addicts and in recent years there has been a rapid reduction in the percentage of British addicts who have been given heroin and they have been following our lead in terms of the use of substitute drugs such as methadone in their efforts to treat their narcotic addict problem.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. So you would submit that methadone is preferable to heroin for treatment?

Dr. POLLIN. Very clearly so.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Narcotics Commissioner Peter Lee of Hong Kong is increasing the number of methadone treatment centers claiming that they keep 70 percent of the registrants in useful employment.

Is this true and what are your comments so far as the United States experience is concerned with methadone?

Dr. POLLIN. I think that the Hong Kong experience is in some ways somewhat specialized but basically we would agree that for a small select subgroup of narcotic addicts it has been demonstrated in this country as well that the use of methadone enables these people to regularize their lives and to function effectively and productively and is an important step toward their becoming completely drug free. So we have used methadone extensively in this country.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But has methadone been a successful eradicator or treatment for addicts?

Dr. POLLIN. Basically, when the addict treatment population is appropriately selected and the methadone is seen as just one part of a larger treatment system, I would say, yes, it has been successful.

We clearly need newer and more effective treatment modalities and those are being developed. There maybe more effective therapeutic drugs that we think we will be able to use in the years to come.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It may have been a Freudian slip but is there a difference between methadone and methadine?

Dr. POLLIN. I think that methadone is the drug that you are referring to, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. There is no drug methadine?

Dr. POLLIN. I don't think so.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It must have been a misspelling in the paper.

Dr. POLLIN. I think so.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I think your presentation was very helpful. Thank you very much for your time you have given so generously to the committee.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: U.S. PROGRAMS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1982.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:20 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order. Today the Committee on Foreign Affairs continues its hearings on international narcotics control. For the benefit of those who were not here yesterday, I would like to explain the rationale behind these hearings. Each year this committee authorizes the appropriation for our international narcotics control program as implemented by the Department of State.

Formerly, executive branch witnesses appeared routinely before the committee to explain the program in the course of the committee's hearing and mark up of the annual foreign assistance authorization bill. Last year, as you all recall, we had passed a two year authorization bill. This gives the committee an opportunity for a more thorough, indepth look at this program and the rationale behind it.

The reason for this is to take stock of the results of the decade or so of the United States international narcotics control programs and to respond to the cries for help from our constituents, the health experts, police, educators, armed forces, employers, parents, and youth.

It is clear that our society is being hurt badly and is changed for the worse by drugs. Today we will examine the strategy and programs of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the Drug Enforcement Administration in their efforts to stem the flow at the sources—those countries whose production and refining resources account for the flood of illicit drugs entering this country.

The committee hopes to obtain some explanation of why we have not been able to more effectively reduce the flow of narcotics from abroad as well as to learn more of our successes on this effort.

For example, yesterday we were told that it would be very easy to have eradication of the coca plant. It takes 4 years for a harvest. Why this has not been done is something that leaves a big question mark in the mind of the Chair. Some of the other testimony we

have raises the important question of whether our effort has been serious enough.

We welcome our witnesses today, Mr. Dominick L. DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters; the Honorable Thomas Boyatt, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia; Mr. Francis M. Mullen, Acting Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and Mr. Wheeler, who is representing the Agency for International Development since the Honorable M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator, is not able to be here. In addition, Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., who is not able to appear today to testify, has asked to submit a statement for the record. Without objection his statement will be included at this point.

[Mr. Stoessel's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

MR. CHAIRMAN:

As requested by the Committee, I will address policy issues related to international narcotics control. This testimony will complete the review of State Department activities, begun April 21, when Assistant Secretary DiCarlo discussed the programs and strategies conducted by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. At that time, Ambassador Boyatt discussed specific policies and programs with respect to Colombia, and, we note that Administrator Mullen discussed the diverse assistance rendered by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

The Committee also took testimony from officials of the Justice Department, Treasury, Health and Human Services, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office -- who provided information on domestic consumption, trafficking, enforcement and prosecution efforts, and other international policy aspects. I will therefore confine my remarks to the responsibilities and policies of the Department of State, although I will note our numerous collaborations with these other U.S. agencies.

Last September, President Reagan said he would establish "a foreign policy that vigorously seeks to interdict and eradicate illicit drugs, wherever cultivated, processed or transported."

The authority for our efforts, which Secretary Haig has affirmed as a high priority for the Department, is Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which established an international narcotics control function under the direction of the President and the Department of State, on the basis that effective international cooperation is required to eliminate illicit production, trafficking in and consumption of dangerous drugs.

No nation can cope with drug abuse by relying only on treatment, prevention and domestic enforcement. The supply of heroin, cocaine, marijuana and other drugs is so great that we simply must reduce production before we can substantially reduce availability. We must break the grower-to-user chains which stretch across five continents. To do this, we must have a comprehensive program of international control.

The international control function was conferred upon the President, and has been delegated through the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters. I note that the Department of State is the only foreign ministry in which narcotics control has been elevated to the level of a senior policy branch. This function was assigned to the Department of State because the United States believes that other governments should understand that we regard drug abuse as not just a health problem, or an enforcement issue, but as a matter properly integrated into our foreign

policy as an issue of government responsibility under international treaties -- that should be dealt with as a matter of international obligation and concern.

Policy

Accordingly, as the first tenet of its international narcotics control policy, the Department has stressed, through diplomatic and program channels, that each country has the responsibility for demand and supply reduction within its borders.

By virtue of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signatory nations are required to establish controls limiting the production, manufacture and distribution of scheduled drugs to recognized, legitimate purposes. The Single Convention requires each signatory nation to declare and enforce prohibitions on the cultivation, production and distribution of opium, cocaine, cannabis and their derivatives. All of the major producer nations are signatories to the Single Convention.

This Administration rejects the contention that drug abuse is particularly an American problem, or a problem of Western civilization, and rejects the contention that the United States has the primary responsibility for solving this problem.

We recognize that, because of political and economic considerations, some countries cannot do the job alone, and the second tenet of our narcotics policy is that the international community has an obligation to assist those nations which require help.

As a concerned member of the world community, and as a severely impacted nation, the United States Government supports a program of bilateral and multilateral assistance for crop control, interdiction and demand reduction programs, and we encourage other governments, especially the governments of other industrialized nations, to participate fully in these international control efforts.

As the third tenet of our international control policy, the Bureau is applying more emphasis on crop control at the source in both our bilateral programs and in programs conducted in both our bilateral programs and in programs conducted by international organizations which we fund. Current production capability and stockpiles of heroin, cocaine and marijuana or their base materials, well exceed known consumption. Interdiction through various law enforcement activities is simply not sufficient by itself to reduce availability, given current levels of production.

The fourth tenet of our international policy is that narcotics-related economic assistance, whether rendered by the United States Government or an international organization, should be conditioned on concurrent agreements on control of narcotics production.

Strategic Consideration

There are a number of strategic considerations which link our principal policy positions and our program strategy.

1. While there have been notable achievements in control efforts, success in recent years has been marginal in terms of reducing worldwide availability of heroin, cocaine and marijuana.

2. Interdiction efforts are not adequate in terms of worldwide effort, given current levels of production and profitability.

3. Comprehensive control programs are not now politically negotiable or operationally feasible in every producer country.

4. Both producer and transit nations are increasingly impacted by domestic drug abuse problems, as are the major industrialized, consumer nations, factors which present improved opportunities for both control agreements and increased international support.

We believe our four fundamental policies -- acceptance by governments of producer and transit countries of their national responsibilities under treaties; the need for international assistance from more of the wealthy and industrialized nations; the increased emphasis on crop control; and the insistence on linkage between narcotics-related economic assistance and agreements on reducing production -- respond correctly to these strategic considerations.

Let me put these considerations into context.

Our ultimate objective is that production be controlled in all geographic areas, simultaneously.

Our first priority, for both our direct assistance programs and for the projects of international agencies which we fund, is on reducing cultivation and production. Trafficking or interdiction is our second priority, because we are convinced that crop control at the source is the most effective and economical method of reducing supply.

As United States enforcement agencies can confirm, the problems of interdicting drugs in transit are such that only a small fraction is interrupted. Production facilities, financial assets and drug products are highly mobile and cross many national frontiers. Experience has shown that when production declines in one area, drugs from other areas are moved into the market -- as has happened with both heroin and marijuana.

However, reductions in cultivation and production through crop control -- which can take the form of government bans on cultivation, as in Turkey, or manual destruction as carried out in Peru, or chemical eradication as conducted by the Mexican Government -- are very different propositions, country to country, and present different degrees of complexity.

While there have been notable successes in crop control, like Turkey and Mexico, and there are promising control efforts in Peru, Pakistan and Burma, which we are assisting, the first hand reality is that worldwide crop control is a long-term objective. The conditions which are considered ideal for

mounting and sustaining an effective crop control program include: (1) an awareness of and acceptance by the central government of the national and international impacts of their domestic cultivation and production; (2) a strong central government which has the political will to enforce control and (3) the capability to achieve control of the growing areas; and (4) adequate resources.

With their own material inputs and our resource assistance, Turkey and Mexico met these conditions. But, one or more limitations have to be overcome in other countries. For example, major opium producers like Iran, Afghanistan and Laos are currently inaccessible politically to the United States. In other instances, like Burma and Pakistan, the central governments do not now have complete control over all the key growing areas. In certain countries, considerations of local economic and political impacts of crop control are such that alternative financial incentives, or control disincentives that create risk for the growers, producers and traffickers, or both, must be offered before an effective control program can be negotiated or implemented.

Therefore, while the Department believes that crop control should be the end objective sought in all negotiations with producer countries -- and we actively seek to assist them in overcoming these limitations, directly or through multi-lateral assistance, such as United Nations projects -- the

second reality is that we must have a balanced program of crop control and interdiction.

The third reality that must be considered in any assessment of our effort is that the international narcotic control program of the United States -- whether the focus be on crop control or interdiction -- can only be as effective and comprehensive as are the programs of the governments with whom we negotiate.

The fourth reality is that we face a variety of problems which must be overcome before the problem can be brought under control. I have already mentioned such problems as: the political inaccessibility of certain producer nations; the lack of central government control over growing areas; the political and economic problems encountered by producer and transit nations attempting to exercise control over production and trafficking; and the difficulties inherent in interdiction.

Let me add to our problem list.

First, market profiles change. In just a decade, Turkey, Mexico and Pakistan have been the major sources, in succession, for heroin entering the United States. While agreements must be negotiated country by country, the control effort must be truly international in scope.

Second, we encounter in dealing with some foreign governments not only a reluctance to accept responsibility for production

and trafficking, but we are also challenged by statements that drug abuse is an American problem.

Third, this "American responsibility" syndrome is reflected in international support. It is disturbing to read the list of contributors to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control and realize that some industrialized and wealthy nations contribute little or nothing to the support of the multilateral international projects sponsored by UNFDAC in critical producer and transit nations.

Fourth, the economics of drug abuse currently favor illicit drug cultivation and production, and present us with some of the most challenging problems. Not only do the profits from the drug trade provide incentives to growers, producers and traffickers, but they impact heavily on local economies in producer and transit nations, as well as the United States, such as in South Florida.

Program Strategy

With those realities and problems in mind, I will explain how our principal policies translate into program strategies.

Our diplomatic challenge is to raise international consciousness of the illicit narcotics issue to a level where heightened acceptance of national responsibility becomes an international reality, seen in increased action by affected governments -- producer nations, transit nations and consumer nations.

President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Haig, the senior officers of the Department, and our Ambassadors are pressing the narcotics issue. They have communicated to the leaders and ministries of key nations the genuine intention of this Administration to reduce drug abuse impacts upon the American people. This activity takes many forms -- the personal communications by Ambassador Dean to the King and Prime Minister of Thailand; the private talks between Vice President Bush and President Turbay of Colombia; the discussions between Ambassador Corr and Bolivian President Torrelío, the talks Ambassador Boyatt has described with the Colombian Government, and the very recent discussions between the Deputy Secretary and the Jamaican Government. At another level, there are activities such as the recent meetings inaugurated by our Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan with key Ambassadors accredited to Pakistan to share information and develop cooperation with the Government of Pakistan on narcotics control.

Assistant Secretary DiCarlo maintains an active continuing dialogue with the leadership of key producer and transit countries. In March, Mr. DiCarlo and Ambassador Corr obtained a commitment from President Torrelío for a coca leaf eradication project in Bolivia which is being developed now. Earlier this year, Mr. DiCarlo met with major donors to UNFAC to discuss funding priorities and to make explicit the United States position that

economic assistance to narcotics producers should be linked to crop reductions. And, the Assistant Secretary and other U.S. officials this year communicated to the members of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs that we have every intention of urging governments to live up to their commitments -- both for their domestic production and trafficking responsibilities and for their support of the international program. There are indications that foreign impacts of drug abuse, human, economic and political, are improving the climate for increased responsiveness by certain governments on both counts.

Because of the diversity of the problems we face, the international effort which State coordinates is a program of many parts. Through our Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, the Department is responsible for coordinating international narcotics activities of the United States Government; for coordinating the Government's international with its domestic activities; for negotiating international agreements; and for ensuring cooperation with the activities of international organizations and foreign governments.

As Dominick DiCarlo and Peter McPherson explained, the Bureau collaborates with the Agency for International Development on economic development projects in such producer nations as Peru, Pakistan and Thailand. The Bureau works quite closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration on

technical assistance and training of foreign professionals -- a function in which Customs also participates. The Bureau cooperates with our Bureau of International Organization Affairs in our dealings with United Nations drug control agencies and other international organizations. And, still within the Department, INM's programs are integrated in country policies through close collaboration with our regional bureaus, and with the narcotics coordinators in U.S. embassies.

Secretary Haig is a member of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy which is addressing the objectives of drug supply reduction. The Secretary is also a member of the South Florida Task Force, chaired by Vice President Bush, which is focused on reducing problems caused by Latin American production and trafficking in cocaine and marijuana.

State and Justice work together on obtaining bilateral agreements on the gathering of information and evidence and rendering it admissible in courts of law in other nations. These two departments are also negotiating treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Italy, similar to the extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with Colombia and the Netherlands, which the Senate ratified in December. And, agreements have been negotiated permitting flag vessels of other nations to be searched if these ships are suspected of transporting drugs to the United States.

Obviously, this diversity of program activity requires close policy coordination. State interacts on narcotics policy development with Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other departments through standing and ad hoc committees.

Similarly, State meets regularly with the Oversight Working Group assembled by the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office; these meetings are designed to coordinate the activities of State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and other agencies involved in both international and domestic drug programs.

Conclusion

In closing, I want to stress certain points.

We have a policy -- and we have a strategy, with both short and long-range programs. It is a policy that is designed to ensure that the United States is focusing upon all aspects of the problem internationally -- the cultivation, production, and distribution of drugs, the flow of profits, the impacts upon other countries as well as our own, and the development of broad-based, multinationally supported control programs.

Recent events in several countries, including both new agreements, reductions in crops, and major interdictions, give reason to be optimistic -- not that we are solving or eliminating drug abuse -- but that we are making significant progress in our more realistic objective of establishing the base for potential control of the production and distribution of major illicit substances. I choose these words carefully; we do not have control, but we have improved the possibility that the world community can gain control.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, we ask that your verbal summaries be, if possible, limited to no more than 10 minutes. Of course, your complete statement, without objection, will be entered in the record.

Following the statements we will proceed with members' questions addressed to you individually or as a panel. We hope that this format will permit the maximum time for a fruitful dialog that will contribute to the committee's better knowledge of the problem and how you are attempting to resolve it.

We will begin with Mr. Dominick DiCarlo.

STATEMENT OF HON. DOMINICK L. DiCARLO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DiCARLO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I have submitted a detailed statement on the policies, strategies, and programs of the Bureau of International Narcotic Matters. My oral statement will summarize how our programs carry out those fundamental policies.

The basic policies which govern our program strategy are: That the major narcotics producer nations are all signatories to the single convention on narcotic drugs, under which each country has responsibility for controlling the production of narcotics to licit needs; that the international community should assist those nations which need help in controlling production and distribution of illicit substances; that crop control, which can be achieved through Government bans, chemical or manual eradication at the source, or controlled reductions to legitimate quotas, is the most effective, efficient, and economical means of reducing the availability of opium, cocaine, cannabis, and their derivatives. Our corollary policy for the psychotropic drugs, which are controlled by a separate international convention, is to seek limits on imports and exports; and, that narcotics-related economic assistance, by the U.S. Government or international organizations, should be conditioned on concurrent agreements on the control of narcotics production.

There are four principal considerations which influence program strategy:

First, while there have been notable achievements in crop control and interdiction efforts, these successes in recent years have been marginal in terms of reducing worldwide availability of heroin, cocaine, and marihuana.

Second, interdiction efforts, which include arrests, seizures of drugs in transit, and capturing of financial assets, are not adequate in terms of worldwide effort, given current levels of production and profitability.

Third, comprehensive crop control programs are not now politically negotiable or operationally feasible in every producer country.

Fourth, both producer and transit nations are increasingly impacted by domestic drug abuse problems—as are the major industrialized, consumer nations—factors which present improved opportunities for both control agreements and increased international support.

Our first priority is on crop control, and our second priority is on interdiction. But, given the considerations just stated, the Bureau must pursue a program strategy that features both crop control—which is a long-term objective—and interdiction. Each strategy has proven potential—and each has obvious limitations. Our strategies are tailored to the problems encountered in each country.

In developing Bureau strategy, and in negotiating with the governments of producer nations, we are well aware that the financial incentives favor illicit drug cultivation. Our strategy must therefore include either alternative financial incentives such as economic development programs, or, disincentives, such as arrests, seizures, forceful eradication, and other control measures that increase the risks for the farmer and producer—or, both incentives and disincentives.

Our Bureau's bilateral assistance program is directed toward controlling production and distribution of illicit drugs exported to the United States. Production and distribution in other countries, as well as in some of the U.S. target countries, are addressed through our multilateral assistance program—including the projects sponsored by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control—and through our diplomatic initiatives.

We are supporting opium eradication programs in Mexico, Burma, and Thailand, and the extension of the ban on opium cultivation in Pakistan. We are supporting coca eradication projects in Colombia and Peru, and a new pilot program in Bolivia.

The Bureau is not currently engaged in herbicidal eradication of cannabis. Before we can exercise the program authority of the recent congressional amendment, we must satisfy provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act and Executive Order 12114. A draft programmatic environmental impact statement is now being prepared, following the March 30 scoping session.

This action seeks to meet the statutory preconditions of determining potential health impacts upon the American people, just as the concise environmental reviews satisfy the question of impacts on any country which might undertake such a project with our assistance. If these conditions are met satisfactorily, we will be prepared to negotiate herbicidal eradication programs with the governments of cannabis-producing nations.

We are supporting interdiction programs in Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, and in the Caribbean. The targets include heroin, cocaine, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs.

The Bureau is collaborating with the Agency for International Development on a combined economic and enforcement assistance program for the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru, where approximately 25 percent of cocaine transhipped to the United States originates, and, we are completing plans for a project in the merged areas of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, where about 80 percent of that country's opium originates.

We are moving toward our priority of concluding agreements on crop control, such as the discussions we held in March with the Government of Bolivia, on coca eradication. I received today a draft proposal of an agreement that we will be discussing with Bolivia.

And, progress has been made in crop control and interdiction. In addition to the continuing success of the Mexican eradication program, we note the actions of the Pakistani Government which, in 1981, conducted its first-ever eradication of opium poppy by forceful action on the merged area of Buner, and for the first time since 1978, raided a laboratory in a tribal area.

Other actions included the raid by the Thai Government on the base camp of the Shan United Army, which controls 70 percent of the Golden Triangle's heroin trade; and the increased manual destruction of coca leaf by the Peruvian and Colombia Governments; and the major seizures of marihuana by the Colombians.

But, these joint activities with foreign governments have not yet succeeded in gaining control over production or distribution of narcotics. In certain instances, the central governments, like Burma and Pakistan, do not have full control over key growing areas. In others, like Iran and Afghanistan, the United States has no political access for cooperation. The Peruvian program is in its infancy, while the Thai Government has not yet fulfilled its commitments on crop control.

Our efforts are not limited to these bilateral assistance projects. President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Haig, the senior officers of the Department, and our Ambassadors are pressing the narcotics issue. Our diplomatic initiative has twin emphases: One, the responsibility of individual nations for the drug problems they transport to the world community, and two, the need for a greater sharing of the support for the international control effort.

We are disappointed with the level of contributions to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, our most important vehicle for the multilateral programs, such as those in Thailand, Burma, Turkey, and Pakistan—and with the lack of support for narcotics control programs in the Western Hemisphere.

We are actively encouraging other governments to invest in bilateral and multilateral programs, especially the wealthy and industrialized nations, so as to ensure that there are adequate programs in all major producer and transit nations.

There are indications that foreign impacts of drug abuse—human, economical, and political—in Western Europe and in producing and transit countries, are improving the climate for increasing responsiveness by governments on both control agreements and increased support.

We sponsor international training, which is administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration and Customs. I was recently the commencement speaker at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, where we offer such training to enforcement officials from producer, transit, and consumer nations, and discussed with the graduates the need for an expanded interdiction effort.

Our Bureau supports technical assistance for demand reduction, because we believe that assisting the governments of producer and transit nations with their domestic drug abuse problems facilitates our efforts to have them undertake comprehensive control programs.

It should be understood that our efforts can only be as effective as the strategies and programs of the governments with whom we collaborate.

We have some reason to be optimistic that our international efforts are having an effect—not that we are solving or eliminating drug abuse—but that we are making progress in our more realistic objective of controlling the production and distribution of major illicit substances. We do not have control, but we have improved the possibility that we will gain control.

Thank you.

[Mr. DiCarlo's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DOMINICK L. DICARLO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

Mr. Chairman:

At the Committee's request, you will receive testimony from the Department which will discuss the specific of international narcotics policy, both in terms of how the narcotics issue is reflected in foreign policy, and, in terms of specific narcotics control policies pursued by our Bureau and other agencies.

The Committee is also receiving testimony from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Agency for International Development, the International Communications Agency, and from Ambassador Boyatt, among others.

I will therefore provide a brief summary of policy issues, as the context for a more detailed discussion of program strategies and our Bureau operations. I will make references to AID, DEA, ICA and other programs, mindful that detailed presentations have been provided by my colleagues.

POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION

Before addressing the specifics of policy or program, I will respond to the Committee's request in its invitation for an explanation of how we develop policy and program strategies.

The Foreign Assistance Act (Section 481) established the United States international narcotics control function.

The responsibility for these functions, conferred upon the President by law and upon the Secretary of State by Executive Order, has been delegated to the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters. Our Bureau of International Narcotics Matters develops policy; negotiates agreements relating to international narcotics control; coordinates the international narcotics activities of U.S. agencies; coordinates U.S. international efforts with domestic United States Government efforts; and is directly responsible for the effective use of Foreign Assistance funds authorized and appropriated for Bureau programs.

Within the Department of State, we cooperate closely with the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in our dealings with the United Nations drug control agencies and other international organizations. We collaborate with the Agency for International Development on economic assistance projects in narcotics producing countries. And, we integrate international narcotics control policies with global, regional and country policies through close collaboration with the Department's principal officers, the geographic bureaus and the narcotics coordinators in U.S. Embassies.

Other units within the Department of State are involved in negotiating extradition and legal mutual assistance treaties, with international financial controls as they relate to tracing financial assets used in or produced by drug trafficking, and with maritime and other international transport laws and

regulations that relate to drug trafficking. And, external to the Department, there are a number of program initiatives under the operational control of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Criminal Division of Justice; units within Treasury including Customs; units within Transportation including the Coast Guard; the Department of Defense and others.

Given this diversity of operational programs and agencies, there is need for policy and program coordination. There is considerable day-to-day interaction between our Bureau and other agencies, but there are also formal structures.

The newly-formed Cabinet Council on Legal Policy addresses legal policy issues involving interagency jurisdiction -- including narcotics, immigration and other issues. Secretary Haig is a member of the Council, which is chaired by the Attorney General.

Our Bureau is also a member of the Oversight Working Group, chaired by Dr. Carlton Turner, the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office in the White House. These meetings bring together our Bureau, Defense, Justice (DEA and the Criminal Division), Treasury (Customs and enforcement sections), the Coast Guard and the National Institute on Drug Abuse to discuss policy issues and strategies.

Secretary Haig is a member of the South Florida Task Force on Crime, chaired by Vice President Bush. I am a member of the Working Group focusing on narcotics source countries in Latin America using transit routes through the Caribbean, the drugs and drug trafficking which impact upon South Florida.

Internally, our Bureau (INM) holds monthly working meet-

ings with our counterpart agencies, such as DEA, NIDA, Defense, Customs, AID, the International Communications Agency, the Coast Guard and the CIA, to discuss ongoing projects, future activities, and the latest drug intelligence.

Cooperation also occurs at the program level. There are projects involving our Bureau and AID underway or being planned in Thailand, Peru, Pakistan and Bolivia. INM funds training programs administered by DEA, and Customs, and also interact with NIDA and the Coast Guard on training and technical assistance. We cooperate on technical assistance with DEA in the field. And, we are cooperating with ICA on narcotics information dissemination activities involving Peru, Jamaica, Colombia, Pakistan and Thailand.

In sum, the Department of State, our Bureau and our colleagues in the Federal Government, are attempting to ensure policy consistency, program efficiency and cooperation, and, to the extent possible, to ensure that we are addressing all aspects of the drug problem.

MAJOR POLICIES

There are four basic policies which govern our program strategy:

1. Under international treaty, to which the major producer nations are signatory, each country has responsibility for control of narcotics to licit needs within its borders.
2. The international community should assist those nations which need help in controlling production and distribution of illicit substances.
3. Crop control through government bans, chemical or manual eradication at the source, or reduction to legitimate quotas, is the most effective, efficient and economical means of reducing the availability of opium, cocaine, cannabis and their derivatives. (With respect to the psychotropics, which

are limited by a separate international treaty to the amounts needed for legitimate medical and/or scientific purposes, the corollary policy is to seek control of exports and imports.)

4. Narcotics-related economic assistance to producer countries should be conditioned on concurrent agreements on the control of narcotics production.

Our program strategy is based upon these policies and related strategic considerations. The principal considerations influencing program strategy are:

-- While there have been notable achievements in crop control and interdiction efforts, these successes in recent years have been marginal in terms of reducing worldwide availability of heroin, cocaine and marijuana.

-- Interdiction efforts, which include arrests, seizures of drugs in transit, the capturing of financial assets, etc. are not adequate in terms of worldwide effort, given current levels of production and profitability.

-- Comprehensive crop control programs are not now politically negotiable or operationally feasible in every producer country.

-- Both producer and transit nations are increasingly impacted by domestic drug abuse problems, as are the major industrialized, consumer nations -- factors which present improved opportunities for both control agreements and increased international support.

PROGRAM STRATEGY

The Bureau's program strategy is predicated on the ultimate objective of controlling production in all key geographic sectors, worldwide, of illicit drugs exported to the United States,

so that significant and lasting reductions in availability are achieved. Our first priority is on crop control, i.e., the elimination of drugs at the source (or reduction to legitimate quotas). Our second priority is on interdiction, i.e., trafficking enforcement. These priorities reflect the realities of worldwide production of target drugs, and the realities of attempting to seize drugs in transit.

INM is focusing increasingly upon control of drugs at the source, because the problems of interdicting drugs in transit are such that only a small fraction of the traffic can be seized. Producing facilities, financial assets, and drug products are highly mobile and cross many national boundaries. Experience has shown that when production declines in one area, drugs from other areas are moved into the market -- as was the experience with heroin three times in a decade.

But, however important the other strategic considerations, the critical strategic consideration is that we cannot achieve worldwide control of cultivation and production in all key sectors on a near-term basis.

We are confronted by the need to negotiate control agreements on a country by country basis -- and by the reality that, not only do each of the producer countries present different sets of complex issues to be resolved before crop control can be implemented and achieved, but, also that some key producer countries are not politically accessible to the United States, including Iran, Laos and Afghanistan. The opium production

areas in Burma and in the tribal areas of Pakistan are presently outside the effective control of the central governments.

There is also the reality that progress will be achieved in stages. There is first the requirement to negotiate a collaborative assistance agreement with the producer nation, and we are still at that stage in some countries, such as Pakistan and Bolivia. Second, there is the need for the foreign government to implement the agreement, and we are still at that early program stage in other countries, such as Peru. Third, there is the containment stage, where the focus is upon ensuring that the problem does not recur or is at least held in check, and we are really at that stage only in Turkey and Mexico.

In developing our strategy as well as in our negotiations with producer nations, we are well aware that the financial incentives favor illicit drug cultivation -- and our strategy must include either alternative financial incentives, such as economic development programs, or, disincentives, such as arrests, seizures, forceful eradication and other control measures that increase the risks for the farmer and producer, or both incentives and disincentives.

The Bureau therefore pursues a program strategy that features both crop control and interdiction -- each strategy has proven potential -- and has obvious limitations -- with the priority given to crop control. Strategies are tailored to each country.

DRUG OVERVIEW

Our program strategy is of course a reflection of the problems which we confront, most especially the cultivation, production, and trafficking in substances destined for the United States illicit drug markets. As a background for the discussion we are about to provide regarding our specific programs, we present this brief discussion of the supply reduction problem.

Heroin. Following a decline several years ago in the amount of heroin entering the United States, due in part to the successful Mexican opium poppy eradication program, cultivation appears to be increasing. By mid-1981, the success of a five-year poppy eradication and heroin interdiction program in Mexico cut the crop from 65 tons to less than 15, and reduced Mexico's share of the U.S. heroin market by 71 percent. There are now aerial reconnaissance reports of increased poppy production in Mexico, and growers have made eradication more difficult by shifting to smaller, widely scattered, and well-hidden fields. The Government of Mexico, however, has expanded its control program.

Two successive droughts significantly lowered Southeast Asia production in 1979 and 1980, resulting in steep price increases and the displacement of Southeast Asia heroin in both European and American markets. However, intelligence reports estimate that Golden Triangle production may have reached a record harvest of 600-700 tons in 1981, with estimates of an equally large harvest this year. Resource problems

and the inaccessibility of much of the poppy cultivation area due to insurgency limit the effective scope of the Burmese narcotics control program. Although the commitment of the Government to eradication is sincere, the Burmese were able to destroy less than 10 percent of the crop.

Opium stocks in Southwest Asia continue to provide a relatively cheap source of heroin for U.S. and European markets. Drought, low prices and the government ban on cultivation reduced Pakistani production in 1980 and 1981 to a maximum of 125 tons. However, surplus stocks from a 1979 Pakistani harvest of 800 tons are considerable. Pakistani opium is refined in laboratories in the tribal areas of Pakistan and in areas along the Iran-Turkey border. Southwest Asian heroin fed the 1979 epidemic of narcotics abuse in Western Europe and then flowed into major U.S. cities, where it accounted for 60 percent of U.S. heroin abuse in 1980. Afghanistan's contribution to Southwest Asian opium production, while unknown precisely due to Soviet occupation, is significant. One estimate places Afghan opium production at 200 tons in 1980. Although severe opium laws have been enacted in Iran, it is questionable whether the present government can control opium production within its territory. Iranian opium production is estimated at 400 to 600 tons.

Turks, Pakistanis, Iranians and Lebanese control the bulk of heroin shipments from the Middle East to Western Europe. Except for Turks, the same nationalities are also involved in

exporting to the United States, although they are less dominant than the Franco-Italian syndicates. Turkey continues to be a major transit country for heroin but successfully controls diversion from its own licit opium cultivation.

Cocaine. The market profile for cocaine is undergoing some changes. Coca plants are still raised principally in Peru and Bolivia. But, Bolivia has emerged in recent months as an alternative center to Colombia for cocaine refining and trafficking. On the other hand, an estimated 3,000 hectares of coca leaf are now being cultivated in Colombia, which enhances Colombia's predominance in the world cocaine trade. Colombia supplies at least 50 percent of the finished cocaine imported into the United States. Colombian traffickers appear to be the best organized in terms of cocaine laboratory facilities, smuggling capability and distribution networks.

The value to the Colombia economy of cocaine trafficking and marijuana production is estimated to be in the range of \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion, and drug money is beginning to undermine the legitimate economy. The Peruvian Government is attempting to control coca production and interdict trafficking, but success is offset by the easy accessibility of traffickers working out of or through Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil and Colombia. Stocks of coca leaf in Bolivia and Peru are ample to produce cocaine for the U.S. and European markets into the foreseeable future without the competitive threat of Colombian coca cultivation. South Florida and

Colombia are likely to remain the financial hubs of the cocaine trade.

Marijuana and Hashish. An estimated 9,500 to 14,000 metric tons of marijuana were imported into the United States in 1980. Colombia supplied 80 percent of this imported marijuana; however, major stocks of Colombian marijuana remain unsold and prices have fallen. Marijuana (especially sinsemilla) has become a major export crop of Jamaica. Domestic production in the United States accounted for about 7 percent of the total market.

Lebanon produced 650 tons of hashish in 1980, making that country the world's leading source; Lebanon and Pakistan accounted for 90 percent of world production and exports of an estimated 970 tons. An estimated 200 tons of hashish entered the United States in 1980, and another 200 tons were exported to Egypt.

In summary, the need for a constant effort is evident in recent developments. Peru has agreed to a program of coca eradication, but the prospects for a net reduction in cocaine production from this region could be partially offset by new coca leaf production in Colombia. Southwest Asian heroin moved into U.S. markets to replace heroin reductions resulting from the successful Mexican program and the decline in Southeast Asian production. Now, after two years of drought, Southeast Asia has produced bumper crops and we could see the market profile change again. The market for

Colombian marijuana is softening, but there are not only major stockpiles that could be directed to our country, there is also an apparent preference for the high-grade sinsemilla.

PROGRAM COMMITMENT AND METHODS

As a concerned member of the world community, and as a nation which has been severely impacted by drug abuse, the U.S. Government has maintained a program of bilateral and multi-lateral support and assistance in crop control, interdiction and demand reduction.

The Bureau's program objective is to assist foreign governments in meeting their treaty obligations. This objective is achieved through:

- Bilateral assistance to support local initiatives by foreign governments
- Diplomatic efforts to develop international support for multilateral activities in drug producing and transit nations, and, where possible, development of bilateral assistance programs by other countries
- Participation in international organizations
- Training programs which strengthen the enforcement capabilities of personnel in producer, transit and consumer nations
- Guidance, coordination and support of other U.S. agencies engaged in international narcotics control
- Coordination of international activities with domestic demand/supply reduction programs

- Technical assistance in support of international demand reduction programs

The Bureau's proposed budget for FY 1983 is \$40 million, of which 75 percent is targetted for in-country programs. Almost half of our resources support activities in Latin America, with about a third in Asia. The balance supports inter-regional and international organization programs.

BILATERAL PROGRAMS

Latin American Regional Strategy

The Bureau's strategy in Latin America is to assist producing and transit countries in stopping the flow of heroin, cocaine and marijuana, as well as other dangerous drugs. Beyond its continuing concern about the impacts these illicit drugs have on the American people, INM is especially sensitive to the fact that trafficking in marijuana and cocaine into the South Florida area has resulted in serious social and economic disruptions throughout that region.

(Bolivia)

Intelligence sources estimate that Bolivia, which has an estimated 25,000 to 33,000 hectares under coca leaf cultivation, supplies approximately half of the cocaine consumed in the United States. Our activities in Bolivia have been minimal since the July 1980, coup which brought to power a military government with close ties to international cocaine traffickers. However, our activities in Bolivia may be expanded as the result of recent discussions with the Torrelío Government which assumed power in September, 1981.

I met with President Torrelío and other Bolivian leaders in March, and obtained from the President a commitment to move rapidly on a coca eradication program. Bolivian officials, assisted by U.S. Embassy personnel, are preparing a plan for a systematic eradication program. If adopted and successfully implemented, this action would over time reduce Bolivia's enormous coca cultivation to levels needed for legal production. The discussions in La Paz emphasized our willingness to support Bolivia in coca eradication, and we have agreed to provide funding for an experimental herbicide eradication program. The Government of Bolivia is aware that an effective narcotics control effort is the prime requisite for a resumption of U.S. economic assistance.

(Peru)

Peru is the other major source of coca leaf for the international cocaine market. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers' Committee reported in January that the estimate of Peruvian coca leaf cultivation has been increased to 40,000 to 60,000 hectares. The Government of Peru has cooperated in narcotics interdiction efforts, but, like other producer countries, faces the obstacles of corruption and inadequate resources.

While the Bureau's initial emphasis was on supporting enforcement activities, the major share of the current and proposed program is targetted on eradication. The major share of our 1983 program request is to support an eradication program in the Upper Huallaga Valley, which is purposefully complemented by a five-year AID-funded rural development project.

The Upper Huallaga Valley is the country's single largest source of illicit coca, with an estimated 17,000 hectares of coca cultivation. Our project therefore targets on the source for approximately 25 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. The AID rural development project is the first in which the long-advocated strategy of coordinating the Bureau's support for enforcement with AID's development assistance is being implemented. The five-year AID project committed \$18 million to finance a program of agricultural research and extension credits, and other developmental activities. Contingent upon budgetary considerations, INM plans to spend roughly \$15 million on enforcement and eradication of illicit coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley and other areas of Peru over the same five-year period.

Traditional enforcement assistance is provided for the Peruvian Investigative Police, which concentrates on investigations in urban areas, and for the interdiction efforts of the Guardia Civil and Peruvian Customs. We are also supporting the development of the Mobile Rural Police (UMOPAR), headquartered in the Upper Huallaga. The objective is to have UMOPAR obtain the size and mobility, by 1983, to mount interdiction missions into other coca-producing and trafficking areas of the country.

The most recent reports from our Embassy in Lima show seizures in 1981 of 5,930 kilograms of coca paste, 44 kilograms of base, 122 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride, and 26,807 kilograms of coca leaves. The Peruvian Investigative

Police were reportedly responsible for 50 percent of the paste seizures, 75 percent of the base seizures, and 80 percent of the hydrochloride seizures. Enforcement by the Guardia Civil increased, with UMOPAR reportedly accounting for 30 percent of the paste seizures and 55 percent of the seizures of coca leaf.

Our assessment is that the Peruvian Government is attempting to control coca production and interdict trafficking and that this is a promising effort.

(Colombia)

Although coca plants are principally raised in Peru and Bolivia, and Bolivia has emerged in recent months as an alternative center for cocaine refining and trafficking, Colombia remains predominant in the world cocaine trade. Coca paste refined in Peru and Bolivia is primarily smuggled directly or through Ecuador to Colombia, where it is refined into cocaine, and transshipped to markets in the U.S., Latin America and Europe. Colombia supplied at least 50 percent of the finished cocaine imported into the U.S. in 1980. Moreover, an estimated 3,000 hectares of coca leaf are now being cultivated in Colombia. This source of raw material enhances Colombia's ranking position as leading supplier. Colombian traffickers appear to be the best organized in terms of cocaine laboratory facilities, smuggling capability and distribution networks.

The value to the Colombian economy of cocaine trafficking and marijuana production -- Colombia also supplies an estimated 80 percent of the marijuana imported into the United States -- is estimated to be in the range of \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion, and drug money is unquestionably undermining the legitimate economy.

The Bureau has provided \$32 million through FY 1981 in narcotics control assistance to Colombia, including continuing assistance to the Colombian National Police, the Customs Service, and the Armed Forces in their coordinated support of cocaine, marijuana, and dangerous drug interdictions.

The Turbay Government has demonstrated a commitment to interdiction and to the manual eradication of coca in successful campaigns conducted by the Judicial and National Police (which has deployed more than 1,000 men throughout the country in new anti-narcotics units since January 1981), and supported by the Attorney General's air wing and the armed forces.

In the last year, the Colombian Navy, Coast Guard and National Police seized an estimated 4.7 million pounds of marijuana. The special narcotics units of the National Police are stationed throughout the country, including keypoints in coca cultivation areas. With the mobility provided by U.S.-supported helicopters they have been moving effectively in recent months against coca cultivation, including the manual eradication of coca plants and the raiding of laboratories. Information received in INM indicates that, in a 25-month

period, these units of the Colombian Government destroyed 125 cocaine laboratories. And, the information we have is that the Government destroyed 106,665 coca plants in all of 1980, but destroyed 237,000 plants in just seven months of 1981, and destroyed 608,000 plants in a single month, January of 1982.

In FY 1983, INM will continue to support these campaigns as well as interdiction activity by the Colombian Customs Service. In addition to commodities and support equipment, the training component of the project is designed to complete the objective of making the Customs Service self-sufficient in effective narcotics interdiction.

The Bureau recognizes that, when consideration is given to countries wherein we might make use of the renewed opportunity for herbicidal spraying of cannabis with paraquat, mention is usually made of Colombia. We discuss the issue of herbicidal spraying in another section; suffice for the immediate discussion of Colombia to note that the Bureau is especially sensitive to opportunities to assist governments in herbicidal spraying projects. However, before such assistance is given, the Bureau must satisfy certain legal requirements, including an assessment of environmental impact on the health of Americans as well as on any country taking this action.

(Ecuador)

The country is important as a trafficking link for coca derivatives and cocaine moving from Bolivia and Peru to

Colombia. INM has provided commodity and training support to the Customs Military Police and the National Police. In September, 1980, a program agreement was signed with the newly-formed National Directorate for the Control of Illicit Narcotics (DINACTIE) in the Attorney General's Office. Whereas the assistance to the police is for coca interdiction programs, the funds provided to DINACTIE include both drug abuse education support funds as well as interdiction support.

(Brazil)

Since 1979, Brazil has shown evidence of becoming an important cocaine transit country and is the principal source for acetone and ether used in cocaine refinement in Bolivia. Rather sophisticated drug distribution networks move coca derivatives from Bolivia to Colombia or cocaine through Brazil for ultimate sale in the U.S. and Europe. INM signed an agreement with the Federal Police in September, 1981, which provides relatively modest support for interdiction operations aimed at disrupting trafficking at selected key border areas, areas not otherwise receiving adequate enforcement attention and where trafficking directly affects U.S. markets. The agreement provides the Federal Police with updated communications equipment and operational support for their border patrols.

(Mexico)

The narcotics eradication program undertaken in cooperation with the Mexican Attorney General's office has been the

Department's largest international narcotics control initiative. Over a 10-year period, the United States invested more than \$95 million of international narcotics control funds in this joint venture, but the Mexican Government increasingly spent more -- and last year was spending four dollars to every U.S. dollar.

The key to the success of the campaign was the decision of the Mexican Government to use aerial crop dusting techniques employing herbicides (manual eradication had proven inadequate). At the high point in the effort, some 10,000 hectares of opium, which could have produced 10 tons of heroin, were destroyed. The program reduced the Mexican share of the U.S. heroin market from a high of 87 percent to 25 percent by 1980, when the NNICC estimate was that about one metric ton of heroin was entering the United States. Recently, when there were indications of expanded cultivation in Mexico, the Government increased its eradication effort.

With the exception of a pilot safety training program, the bulk of U.S. support for the Mexican program is for the opium eradication airfleet (87 aircraft).

(The Caribbean)

Trafficking routes for at least 75 percent of the cocaine and marijuana, and a major portion of the illicitly produced dangerous drugs entering the United States pass through the Caribbean. INM seeks to encourage and support interdiction efforts by Caribbean governments through diplomatic initiatives,

direct assistance or training, and an improved environment for activity by U.S. enforcement agencies.

The Bureau is planning to develop a system of real time communication among the narcotics enforcement organizations in the Caribbean and Central America. The system, using either satellite-connected telephone circuit or shortwave radios, will operate in both Spanish and English to allow a rapid exchange of intelligence.

An opportunity developed this year to assist the Haitian Government in developing an effective maritime narcotics interdiction capability. U.S. support has included assistance by the U.S. Coast Guard in rehabilitation of Haiti's patrol fleet, training of boat maintenance personnel, and operational support of sea interdiction patrols. Information developed by these patrols is provided to U.S. Coast Guard vessels in the area. The ongoing program in the Caribbean will seek to provide patrol and other craft for the cooperating police and enforcement authorities in other key transit countries.

Jamaica is important to the developing strategy in the Caribbean because it is not only a major stopover for traffickers, but is the only significant narcotics producer in the area -- approximately 10 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States is estimated to be of Jamaican origin. The Deputy Secretary of State recently discussed with Jamaican authorities U.S. interests in Jamaica narcotics control and our Ambassador seeks to identify the proper timing for an eradication and interdiction project.

Southeast Asian Regional Strategy

As a result of the excellent growing conditions for poppies in 1981, the production of opium from the three countries of the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Burma and Laos) rose from an estimated 200 metric tons in 1980 to an estimated 600-700 metric tons in 1981, with 1982 production equal to or exceeding 1981. Southeast Asian heroin accounted for an estimated 15 percent of heroin entering the United States in 1980. Since most of the producing areas in Burma are not accessible to that Government, and collaboration with Laos is not feasible, U.S. resources are concentrated on eradication and interdiction of opium and heroin -- chiefly on the Thai-Burma border.

(Thailand)

Virtually all of the Golden Triangle's heroin passes through Thailand en route to world markets. Thailand is not only the major transit country, but a producer as well, and, with its large addict population, its domestic consumption also sustains trafficking organizations.

The Bureau's strategy is (1) to support Thai actions against the refining and trafficking organizations; (2) assist in opium cultivation control; (3) enhance overall Thai narcotics enforcement; and (4) develop a Thai consciousness and response to its own narcotics abuse problem.

The assessment of the Thai program is mixed. In January, the Royal Thai Government took forceful action against the

dominant opium refining and trafficking organization, the Shan United Army led by Chang Chi-Fu. And, there has been a decline in the availability of precursor chemicals (e.g., acetic anhydride) used to refine opium into heroin, as a result of Government efforts. The reports indicate that the amount of acetic anhydride reaching the northwest border refineries has dropped significantly while prices have increased. Refineries are reportedly having more difficulty in converting their bumper stocks of raw opium into heroin, and some refining activities have reportedly moved to the Thai/Malaysia border.

On the other hand, the Thai have failed to enforce the opium poppy ban even in areas which have benefitted adequately from the United Nations crop substitution program. And, while we applauded the Government's raid in January, actions are needed to consolidate and expand this disruption of trafficking.

INM assistance will continue to focus on controlling the entry of opiates from Burma (particularly through support of the interdiction efforts of the Border Patrol Police) and on opium eradication in Thailand. In the former instance, our assistance supports and will continue to support Thai efforts to sustain control on entry from Burma, principally by destabilizing trafficking organizations. U.S. assistance will also support drug education projects to alert the Thai people to the dangers that drug trafficking and drug abuse pose to them.

(Burma)

Burma has been a traditional source of illicit opium, producing an estimated average annual yield of 300 tons over the five-year period 1976 through 1980. The 1979 and 1980 harvests were estimated at only 125 tons and 179 tons respectively, attributable in part to suppression activities of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (SRUB), but chiefly the result of a prolonged drought in the growing areas. However, good weather in the 1980-81 growing season resulted in a bumper opium harvest estimated at 550 tons, with prospects for at least as much from the 1982 harvest.

Political insurgent and bandit organizations such as the Burmese Communist Party and the Shan United Army, operating principally in the Shan, Kachin, and Kayah States, are largely responsible for production of and trafficking in illicit narcotics. The principal enforcement agencies are the People's Police Force and the Burma Army, supported by the Air Force.

Burma is slowly emerging from its self-imposed isolation and cooperation on narcotics control issues has been a major aspect of our improved relationship with the SRUB. The Government places great importance on achieving long-term success in reducing the production of opium and heroin, through a combination of rural development and crop substitution with enforcement and eradication. The SRUB reports that sizeable amounts of poppies are manually eradicated each year; however

the Government at present is unable to exercise effective control over most of the opium-producing areas. U.S. support has provided and will continue assistance to the security forces, as well as for programs of opium eradication and interdiction of opium trafficking -- through provisions of both equipment, other resources, and training.

Although we are frustrated by the Government's inability to do more, we are satisfied that progress is being made and that the trend is upward.

(Other East Asia Regional)

In addition to major country-specific projects, the Bureau supports other ongoing country-specific projects, or initiates such programs, through its regional cooperation assistance program. A specific goal is to support regional projects among ASEAN member nations, designed to impede illicit narcotics production, processing, trafficking and consumption. The regional program includes law enforcement, prevention education, and technical assistance in addict treatment and rehabilitation.

Southwest Asian Strategy

According to DEA, Southwest Asia (principally Pakistan) is currently the principal source of heroin entering the United States. The lack of diplomatic relations with Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan preclude any cooperative narcotics control efforts. INM's regional strategy centers therefore on Pakistan as a major opium and heroin

producer and on Turkey as a principal conduit of opiates moving from Southwest Asia to Western Europe and eventually the United States.

(Pakistan)

Opium production in Pakistan for the past two years has been in the 100-125 ton range, down from the record 700-800 ton 1979 crop. Three factors account for this (1) a Government ban on poppy cultivation which was totally effective in the Government-controlled "settled" areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), which produced 300 tons of the 1979 crop; (2) production disincentives, due to depressed prices because of larger stocks remaining from previous crops; and (3) adverse weather conditions.

Pakistani cooperation to control opium production and heroin trafficking is improving as the Government becomes increasingly aware of the potential threat to its own social, economic and political stability, and foreign assistance becomes available.

The ban on poppy cultivation was enacted in 1979, and all cultivation in areas under firm Government control (the settled areas) has apparently ceased. In contrast to the "settled" areas, enforcement of the ban has not been politically feasible in the tribal areas of the NWFP, which still enjoy considerable autonomy. However, the Government has indicated that it is prepared to act forcefully against heroin or morphine laboratories; in February, the Government shut down, for the first time since 1978, a heroin processing laboratory in the tribal areas.

Enforcement of the poppy cultivation ban did occur in 1981 in a U.N. assistance project within the "merged" areas of the NWFP which were (as recently as 1971) tribal or princely states autonomous of central government control, and which are still in initial stages of political integration into the central government administration. U.S. narcotics control programs focus on these "merged" areas of the NWFP, which produce 80 percent of Pakistani opium (versus 20 percent for the tribal areas). A developmental project sponsored by the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) is in place in the merged areas. The Government maintains that the traditional opium trade cannot be forcibly suppressed without a political back-lash unless some developmental assistance, including alternate income possibilities, is provided.

INM's assistance to Pakistan over the next several years will continue support of crop control in the "merged" areas, through a combination of enforcement of the poppy ban and appropriate economic development projects. Our assistance agreements with Pakistan are negotiated with the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) as the coordinating agency within the Government of Pakistan. The programs themselves may be implemented by federal or provincial authorities.

At the present time, we have programs in two categories: crop control and law enforcement (there is a small program in demand reduction). The PNCB is currently establishing,

with DEA's advisory assistance, narcotic task forces in provincial capitals. Crop control activity is currently limited to introducing agricultural alternatives. However, INM, with AID support, anticipates agreements with Pakistan beginning in 1982 which link enforcement of the poppy ban with developmental assistance. Pakistan has agreed to invoke the poppy ban in the area of a developmental assistance project from the time the project agreement is signed.

(Turkey)

The Turkish Government has demonstrated that it has both the will and the capability for effective licit opium crop control and interdiction. Since the early 1970's, Turkey has used its own resources to prevent illicit diversions from its licit poppy cultivation. But, because of its strategic location between Asia and Europe, Turkey has been a traditional opium smuggling route as well as a base for illegal heroin and morphine laboratories. At present, most opiates moving by land from the producing countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran) transit Turkey en route to the United States and Europe with some refining in Turkey before shipment. INM is assisting the Turkish National Police and the Jandarma with needed commodities.

MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS

The United States promotes awareness of the international narcotics problem through the United Nations General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and other UN agencies. Through the Single Convention on Narcotics and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the UN initiates controls on the flow and use of the narcotics and psychotropic substances and, through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, seeks to stimulate multilateral efforts to deal with narcotics production, trafficking and abuse. At our urging, the CND adopted a global five-year strategy in 1981. The United States has been the strongest financial supporter of UNFDAC. Recently, the Bureau initiated a meeting of major donors to UNFDAC, which produced a better understanding of the need to link crop control with economic development and of UNFDAC priorities.

In addition to urging other industrialized nations to assist in narcotics control, the United States has also urged international financial institutions to target developmental projects in narcotics-producing areas. To achieve its various international objectives, the United States also works with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian

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Nations, the Colombo Plan and international public banks.

Colombo Plan Regional Drug Program. To assist Colombo Plan members (which include many of the world's illicit and licit opium producers) to suppress illicit production, processing and trafficking in opium and its derivatives, INM contributes to the Colombo Plan Regional Drug Program, which provides fellowships, seminars, workshops and multi-national conferences for its members, as a means of providing training, technical assistance, and ensuring cooperation/non-duplication. The FY 1983 contribution is budgeted at \$150,000.

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL. UNFDAC has been able to work with countries whose cooperation is vital to US narcotics control interests, but where political circumstances inhibit US bilateral assistance. In other areas its programs complement US activities. UNFDAC's program supports projects seeking opium control through crop substitution, as well as enforcement and demand reduction assistance. Its activity focuses on Burma, Thailand, Turkey, and Pakistan. The US contribution to UNFDAC for FY 1983 is budgeted at \$2,000,000.

TRAINING. Increasing the effectiveness of foreign drug enforcement personnel in drug producing countries and/or transit nations is important to the international narcotics control program. Training support is provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the United States Customs Service and the Department of State, and in some instances,

by NIDA and the Coast Guard. Approximately 22,000 foreign personnel have been trained by the US since 1971; many have assumed key positions which are instrumental in the development and implementation of more effective drug control policies and programs. For several years, training in the United States and overseas of foreign nationals by US agencies was focused on the basic techniques of drug enforcement. Since 1977, as many participant countries began to develop some degree of training capability, emphasis has gradually shifted to more specialized types of instruction and expansion of operational capabilities through the utilization of more sophisticated investigative methods. Recognizing that international narcotics control training can provide channels of communication and cooperation among countries, added emphasis is being focused on regional training programs designed to improve multilateral intelligence and information exchange. Training is budgeted at \$4,200,000 for FY 1983.

DEMAND REDUCTION. The long-term goals of this inter-regional activity are specialized for both Asian and Latin American countries. For Asia, the goal is to assist countries in coordinating policies and programs to implement large-scale demand reduction programs which can significantly erode the local heroin consumer base that supports local production and the exporting of narcotics.

For Latin America, the goal is to assist organizations which can mobilize popular and governmental support for strong narcotic control programs. Raising the consciousness or awareness of both governments and societies to the impacts of drug abuse is an objective of the preventive efforts.

The inter-regional demand reduction program includes:

(1) activities which alert and inform policymakers of the social, crime and health costs of drug abuse; (2) technical assistance in development of local treatment and prevention programs; (3) specialized internships; (4) development of training cadre; and (5) distribution of technical assistance material. INM has budgeted \$600,000 for this activity in FY 1983.

DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

As I indicated earlier, there are three strategic objectives which we pursue through diplomatic channels:

First, there is the need to impress upon the governments of all producer and transit nations their national responsibilities for the problems they contribute to the world community..

Second, there is the need for the industrialized and wealthy nations to make larger contributions to bilateral and multilateral programs.

Third, there is the challenge of ensuring that there are adequate programs in all major producer and transit nations.

As the Department's policy document will highlight with several examples, President Reagan, Secretary Haig,

our ambassadors and embassy specialists, our Bureau personnel and other US officials are stressing these points in their dialogues with the leaders and ministries of other nations.

And, these diplomatic initiatives with respect to increased national acceptance of responsibility are having an effect. In addition to the examples which will be noted by the Deputy Secretary, I would like to note that, when Prime Minister Prim of Thailand came to the US to meet with President Reagan, he was accompanied by the Deputy Prime Minister and a senior narcotics specialist -- a recognition of the Royal Thai Government's understanding that we are unequivocally serious, in our dealings with all such governments, in reducing the impacts of drug abuse on the American people.

Similarly, our recent discussions with the Bolivian government, the actions of the Thai and Pakistani governments, the increased destruction of crops reported from several countries and other activities are encouraging.

Our third diplomatic objective -- ensuring a comprehensive program network -- is linked closely with our objective of increasing support for international programs -- and, our insistence on this point is rivalled only by our disappointment.

Anyone reading the data on drug abuse around the world must conclude that it is in the self-interest of

all nations to control production and trafficking in their territory and to share in the international responsibility for supporting demand and supply reduction programs.

The importation of heroin into Europe rivals US imports levels; there are an estimated 225,000 to 350,000 heroin addicts in Western Europe compared to a US estimate of 450,000; and overdose death rates in countries such as Italy, Denmark and Germany are comparatively equal to or greater than in the US. The incidence of heroin addiction in countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and ^{HONG KONG} ~~Sumatra~~ is considerably higher than in the US.

In sum, these and other examples confirm that drug abuse is a problem that affects both industrialized and developing nations, including producer and transit countries. Drug abuse is not just an American problem.

There are indications that this spreading misery has made a number of producer and transit nations more conscious of the impacts of drug abuse on their people, and conditions have improved for initiating projects.

But, international support has not kept pace with the rhetoric; the response of the world community does not match the problem.

Only the United States, the Federal Republic

of Germany, Sweden, Norway and Australia contribute \$500,000 or more a year to UNFIDAC.

CONCLUSION

Any assessment of the United States' international strategy and program just described must consider, as a central condition, that our efforts can only be as effective as the strategies and programs of the governments with whom we collaborate.

Yet, while we candidly acknowledge our continuing problems, the Department and our Bureau remain confident of our policies and direction.

We share the conviction of our colleagues that we must continue the strategy of applying pressure at all points in the grower-to-user chain -- through effective treatment and prevention; through intensified investigation and prosecution; through increased seizures of both drug products and financial assets; and through crop control.

We need a more balanced narcotics control program, not only in terms of the balance between crop control and interdiction, but also in terms of the number of countries supporting the international effort. We must ensure that there are adequate programs involving the major producer and transit nations. There is need, not only for the industrialized and other donor nations to make a larger contribution to bilateral and multilateral projects, but for these nations to focus on other drugs as well as heroin, and for their efforts to be extended

to all geographic spheres of production. And, again, there is the need to impress upon the governments of all producer and transit nations their national responsibilities.

In conclusion, we have some reason to be optimistic that our international efforts are having an effect -- not that we are solving or eliminating drug abuse -- but that we are making progress in our more realistic objective of controlling the production and distribution of major illicit substances. We do not have control, but we have improved the possibility that we will gain control.

We have made narcotics control a foreign policy priority. We have accepted the challenge.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. DiCarlo. Does the gentleman from New York desire to be recognized?
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, it is with a great deal of honor that I would like to interrupt the proceedings for just a moment to introduce two distinguished visitors, Dr. Giuseppe DiGennaro, the executive director of the U.S. Fund for Drug Abuse and his deputy director, Don Sohlin, who are with us today.
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman ZABLOCKI. Welcome, gentlemen.
Ambassador Boyatt, if you will proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS D. BOYATT, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO COLOMBIA

Ambassador BOYATT. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure for me to be with you here again; I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity today to discuss the efforts between the Governments of Colombia and the United States to reduce the production of narcotics and other dangerous drugs and their flow from and through Colombia to the United States. The recent seizure by the U.S. Customs Service in Miami last month of almost 2 tons of cocaine hydrochloride, worth about \$1 billion on the street, symbolizes again that the United States is the world's largest market for illegal drugs and Colombia is a major supplier of that market.

Colombia is the processor and distributor of up to 70 percent of the cocaine hydrochloride entering the United States. The DEA estimates that about 30 to 31 metric tons of cocaine successfully entered the United States from Colombia in 1981. Traditionally, Colombia has processed and distributed cocaine paste or base produced in Bolivia and Peru. Recently, however, extensive areas in the eastern plains and other areas in Colombia have been dedi-

cated to the cultivation of coca plants which are converted into paste in simple laboratories close to the fields. Colombia has thus become a producer as well as a processor.

Our estimate is that Colombia also provides about 80 percent of the marihuana imported into the United States. DEA estimates that production in 1981 totaled about 50,000 tons, not all of which actually entered the United States. Exports to the United States are down from Colombia apparently at least in part because of increased production of high quality marihuana in the United States.

Our explanation for this reduction is based primarily on anecdotal evidence; that is, firsthand reports that the price of marihuana per pound on the beach in Colombia has fallen sharply in the last 18 months. While the price is down, we do not know yet by exactly how much, and we can only guess and conjecture at the reasons for that phenomena.

Colombia is also a major source of illegal U.S. imports of methaqualone or quaaludes. Our best estimate is that possibly as much as 90 percent of the U.S. illicit market is supplied by European methaqualone processed into dosage units in Colombia. If the estimate is correct, Colombia is exporting about 36 metric tons of pills to the United States annually.

Obviously, this trade damages both countries. Drugs from Colombia damage the health of Americans, generate millions of dollars of illegal revenue for criminal organizations, and contribute to violent crime, particularly in areas such as southern Florida. The profits Colombian drug traffickers earn from the vast United States market finance powerful criminal networks which corrupt Colombian institutions like cancer, even undermining the Government's monetary policies. The Colombia drug network is reputedly the best-organized, best-financed and most ruthless in Latin America.

Measures to deal with these explosive problems effectively must be taken in the context of close cooperation between the United States and Colombian Governments. In our Embassy in Bogota, 11 United States Government agencies are represented and one of my most important responsibilities and challenges is to coordinate and manage our overall antinarcotics effort in Colombia. Obviously, we cannot act alone, of course. We can only support Colombian efforts, and our programs in Colombia can only be as effective as Colombian programs and that's a very important point. Basically the degree to which we achieve our goals depends upon Colombia institutions.

Well, what are we doing? Basically, we are attacking the problem at two points: One, the operational front, interdiction by police activity. Essentially, what we are talking about here are joint endeavors between the Drug Enforcement Administration and Colombian law enforcement agencies designed to disrupt major narcotics trafficking networks and seize their personnel, funds and drugs. We have had a contingent from DEA or its predecessor in Colombia for 10 years.

Recently, our joint interdiction efforts have been quite successful. The 2-ton cocaine seizure is one example. Another is the increase in marihuana and methaqualone seizures by Colombian law enforcement agencies; seizures of marihuana were up 345 percent and those of methaqualone 377 percent in 1981 over 1980.

Operation Tiburon to interdict drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean was yet another example of successful interdiction based on cooperation. In this regard, the United States received the full cooperation of the Colombian Government. For instance, the Colombians authorized U.S. Coast Guard cutters to seize—including when necessary to use disabling fire—Colombian boats heading to the United States laden with marihuana.

Complementing this operational effort is what I refer to as our development effort. This is, essentially, an effort to help Colombian institutions so that they can develop and eventually manage the problem themselves.

From 1973 through fiscal year 1981, the United States obligated approximately \$32 million for projects in Colombia. The objective of these projects has been to assist in the upgrading of Colombian capabilities in intelligence collection, drug abuse prevention, judicial processing, interdiction, and eradication. About 75 percent of the U.S. assistance has been in commodities, trucks, tents, planes, whatever might be useful in the drug effort. The remainder has gone for technical assistance and training.

Significant as our contributions have been, those of Colombia—chiefly personnel and equipment—have been greater, particularly in the context of Colombia's limited resources. The administration of President Turbay, which will end up in August, has been especially cooperative in the antinarcotics fight. The Colombian National Police has assumed primary responsibility for narcotics control, deploying more than 1,000 men to the field in special antinarcotics units.

Five tactical areas have been identified—the north coast, the Gulf of Uraba a little further west near the Panamanian border, the Eastern Plains or Llanos, the southwestern area, and the Peruvian/Ecuadorean border. The Ministry of Defense remains the chief coordinator for narcotics enforcement measures and provides support to the police, especially in the form of fixed-wing and helicopter airlift. The Attorney General's air wing provides additional air support and his special judicial police initiated a campaign in 1981 to destroy coca plants and processing labs in the Llanos, and also for drug units on the north coast.

The Coast Guard and Navy roam offshore waters looking for drug runners. Over the years, coordination among the various Colombian agencies has been impressive, as has been their cooperation with United States agencies.

Well, where do we go from here? While we must continue and even increase our cooperative interdiction efforts, I am convinced that in the end, in Colombia and elsewhere, such as Bolivia and Peru—eradication is the real success in interdiction. We estimate that currently only about 10 percent of the marihuana destroyed in the United States from Colombia is seized. The figures for cocaine and quaaludes are probably in the same range.

I believe that the most successful and cost-effective way to end the drug scourge is to eradicate the raw materials from which drugs are fashioned. Plants in the ground are easier to find and destroy than smuggled drugs; bulk quantities of chemicals are easier to detect and destroy than tiny pills.

The experience of Mexico in eradicating marihuana and poppy cultivation by herbicidal spraying demonstrates the effectiveness of such an approach. As I have noted, the Government of Colombia has begun a manual coca eradication program and some in Colombia believe that a marihuana eradication program relying chiefly on herbicidal spraying would be the best approach. Others in Colombia disagree with this judgment.

In any case, several preconditions must be met before the U.S. Government can propose a full-scale marihuana and coca eradication campaign to the Government of Colombia with any hope of success. These prerequisites are: First, all legal requirements must be addressed. I understand that the Percy amendment has been modified, lifting previous impediments to herbicidal spraying. I understand that the Department of State is currently in the process of satisfying requirements established by the National Environmental Policy Act and Executive Order 12114. I understand that these requirements will take approximately 5 months to complete.

Second, the United States must be willing to provide significant resources to support any Colombian effort to eradicate. The recent modification of the Percy amendment will help in this regard.

Third, and most important, the Colombian Government and people must be convinced that the United States is as serious about curbing marihuana production within its own borders as it is in eradicating Colombian marihuana and coca cultivation.

This means stronger legal measures against drugs and drug traffickers in the United States, and above all the United States must spray its considerable domestic marihuana crops in several States before it can credibly ask others to do so. If these conditions are met, I believe we can have an effective, cooperative, eradication program in Colombia.

Mr. Chairman, since my last congressional testimony on the narcotics situation in Colombia, there has been a very startling development which seriously threatens both the United States and Colombia. It is a matter with which this committee should be fully seized in the national interest.

The United States now has detailed and reliable evidence, as Ambassador Enders underlined in his March 12 testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, that intelligence officers of the Cuban Government have been assisting Colombian narcotics traffickers in transporting drugs to the United States and using these same traffickers; their same infrastructure, their boats, planes and personnel to smuggle arms and guerrillas to Marxist terrorist groups dedicated to overthrowing Colombia's freely elected government.

I realize that this statement will generate a strong reaction from apologists for totalitarian Cuba and from those romantics who, as an act of faith, believe that every group of terrorists in Latin America somehow represent the downtrodden masses against oppression by an oligarchy.

In Colombia, this construct is nonsense. There is nothing romantic about the killing, the robbing, and the kidnaping perpetrated on a daily basis by Colombian terrorists, so-called revolutionary groups. There is nothing romantic about threats made against myself and my wife and children on a frequent basis. And there is

nothing romantic about efforts by Cuban officials to use drug traffickers to send guns to Colombian terrorists dedicated to overthrowing a government which has been freely elected by its people and which is dedicated to progressive reform in that country.

The Cuban connection with drug traffickers as a vehicle for harming the United States and shipping arms clandestinely to Colombia and elsewhere to help terrorists destabilize democratic governments must be exposed, understood, admitted, and countered.

In conclusion, the U.S. Government needs to reinvigorate its war on drugs. There is already an important example of this since the President created the Task Force on the Problems of Southern Florida headed by Vice President Bush. Although it will require hard work and patience, I am confident that with a serious, sincere, reciprocal, and cooperative effort, we and the Colombians can dramatically reduce the drug trade between the two countries.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, we set up a screen here and I have 12 slides on the theory that a picture is worth 1,000 words. If someone will turn the lights out, we can show you in graphic detail some of the things we are doing in Colombia. [A slide was shown.]

In the first picture, Mr. Chairman, several tons of marihuana are being burned on the north coast. The buttoned up fellow with the tie there is Assistant Secretary DiCarlo practicing what he preaches. [A slide was shown.]

Eighty metric tons of marihuana seized by the Colombian National Police being destroyed. [A slide was shown.]

In this picture, you see a helicopter offloading a group of national police troopers in a very remote area of Colombia. The important thing here is that we have two or three different agencies of the Colombian Government cooperating in an antinarcotics effort. [A slide was shown.]

This same group of troopers is counting the bales of cash that they found in this operation. [A slide was shown.]

Here you see two 50-ton manually operated hydraulic presses used to compress and bale the marihuana. The incredible thing is that these two machines are in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in the middle of nowhere. What the police units did was pick up both machines on the helicopters on a hook and drop them into a big ravine from which they will never be recovered. [A slide was shown.]

This is another storage area in the Santa Maria Mountains going up in flames. [A slide was shown.]

This is the same operation from another perspective. You will notice the clouds there. A lot of this activity takes place above 5,000 feet in very broken terrain which adds to the problems of a successful operation.

The next slide, please? This is bulk methaqualone, seized in the north coast during an interdiction operation by the Colombian National Police. [A slide was shown.]

This is a Colombian police trooper cutting a mature coca plant down to the ground level. Once he's finished with that, the stump will be sprayed with 2,4-D to assure that the root system is killed. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that while it is possible to eradicate cocaine, it is a very time-consuming process because each

plant has to be chopped. It's a manual operation. [A slide was shown.]

This is a cocaine processing operation out in the Llanos area. The lab is being destroyed. Processing labs are fairly simple, cheap things to set up and they can be done in very wild and inaccessible places. [A slide was shown.]

This is a marihuana storage hut going up in flames. [A slide was shown.]

This group is composed of Colombian antidrug officials, some people from the Embassy and some members of the congressional delegation that visited us. The gentleman standing furthest back is the Honorable Christopher Dodd, Senator from Connecticut. Most government agencies, Mr. Chairman, have their dog and pony shows or their show and tell shows, but we in Colombia have what we call burn and pull, burn the marihuana and pull the cocaine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Is the coca plant only eradicated by pulling it, do you know? Or are there chemical processes that could be employed?

Ambassador BOYATT. I don't believe that any successful procedure other than the manual destruction of the plant has been developed. I suppose it depends on how old they are. Essentially, it is manual. You can't fly over a cocaine field and spray it. You have got to go out there and destroy the plants.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Mr. Mullen, acting administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

STATEMENT OF FRANCIS M. MULLEN, JR., ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. MULLEN. Chairman Zablocki and members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Drug Enforcement Administration's international narcotics control program. I welcome this chance to endorse the need for a strong, coordinated U.S. Government approach to dealing with the worldwide drug problem.

I have a statement, which I will submit for the record, and I would like to make a very brief oral presentation.

The statement submitted for the record sets forth information relating to the international availability of illicit drugs and the efforts of U.S. and foreign governments to control the flow of drugs, as well as DEA's role in these efforts. There are currently 276 DEA personnel serving overseas, 177 of whom are agents. These DEA employees are assigned to 63 cities in 43 different countries.

Since becoming acting administrator of the DEA on July 13, 1981, I have met personally with 28 foreign officials and have visited 4 foreign countries to discuss drug enforcement efforts. When our reorganization is completed, I intend to visit additional countries, especially in Latin America and Southeast Asia.

In fiscal year 1981, DEA afforded training to 1,236 foreign police officials and thus far in 1982, 396 foreign police officials have been trained by DEA. In addition, 1,345 foreign drug enforcement offi-

cials representing 71 countries are members of the International Drug Enforcement Association, a group whose purpose is to strengthen the ties and working relationships previously established through DEA training schools.

This insures that our relationships do not end upon completion of the training and that there is a continuing relationship at the operational level involving exchange of information, discussion of developing trafficking trends as well as enforcement methods.

The foregoing information is an indication of DEA's continuing international involvement in the drug enforcement effort. We fully realize at DEA that this problem cannot be solved by one agency alone; the support and involvement of foreign governments and all branches of our own government are essential.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Your prepared statement will be made a part of the record, of course.

[Mr. Mullen's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCIS M. MULLEN, JR., ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Zablocki and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) international narcotics control program. I welcome this chance to endorse the need for a strong, coordinated United States Government approach to dealing with the worldwide drug problem.

Illicit drugs and narcotics profits have a devastating effect on our society and economy. Illicit drugs generated an estimated \$79 billion in retail sales in the United States during 1980, up 22% from 1979*; the enormous profits available make drug trafficking an attractive venture, which some people believe is worth the risks inherent in such an illegal enterprise. We must increase those risks. It is time for drug traffickers to face stiffer penalties for their actions.

The United States has worked in cooperation with foreign countries to bring about a reduction in drug cultivation, processing and trafficking. We have had numerous successes

*Unless otherwise indicated, the data contained herein is from the Narcotics Intelligence Estimate published by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee.

ranging from the recent curtailment of methaqualone production in Western Europe to Colombia's recent operation to interdict large shipments of marihuana and cocaine destined for the Southeastern United States.

The Administration is committed to a strong drug control program. However, because the vast majority of the drugs abused in the United States emanate from foreign sources, our problem will be insurmountable without the support of other governments. We must now convince the leadership of drug-source nations that the United States is firmly and irrevocably supportive of drug control abroad and at home. The diplomatic efforts of the State Department are crucial to our success.

A pillar of DEA's effort is the interdiction of drugs at their source rather than as they approach or cross United States borders. This results in a greater impact being made, because quantities seized at the source are much larger and purer than when seized on the streets of United States cities. Consequently, DEA personnel are stationed in foreign countries to support host countries' efforts to eliminate cultivation, production and conversion of drugs and to stop shipments of drugs destined for the United States. These efforts include the provision of technical assistance through training and the exchange of intelligence in cooperative investigations. Stopping drugs within the source country or as close to the source as possible has proven to be a highly effective approach to reducing the supply of illegal drugs.

All of the heroin and cocaine available in the United States is cultivated and produced in other countries. Over 90 percent of the marihuana consumed in the United States is grown in Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico. Additionally, a substantial amount of licit drugs are diverted from foreign sources. DEA has Special Agents assigned to 63 cities in 43 countries along major drug production and trafficking routes. Our priorities in each of these locales depend on which controlled substance is produced or trafficked there.

Opium production is a major problem in three diverse parts of the world: Southwest Asia (Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan), Southeast Asia (Thailand, Laos, Burma), and Mexico. The fact that there are three parts of the world involved contributes to the complexity of the problem. Three diverse sets of growing conditions, political situations and economies affect the annual production of opium and subsequent availability of heroin. Successes in controlling the production or trafficking in drugs from one country or region can be offset by new sources or increased supplies from another area.

In 1975 over 85 percent of the heroin abused in the United States originated in Mexico. A very successful Mexican eradication and enforcement program resulted in significant decreases in Mexican heroin availability, but another source was ready to fill the void. Although the volume of heroin

entering the United States continued to decrease, heroin from Southeast Asia began to represent a significant proportion of the heroin available in the United States. That trend continued for several years (1976-1979) until a severe drought in the Golden Triangle over two growing seasons greatly diminished that region's heroin production. Again, however, another source was ready to make up for the shortfall in heroin availability. Today, Southwest Asia produces the majority of the heroin abused in the United States.

The major producers of opium in Southwest Asia are Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Historically, Turkey had been an opium producer, but the Government implemented a program of strict controls based on a total ban of opium poppy cultivation except on licensed plots and a prohibition on incisement of pods to obtain opium gum. Coupled with an eradication program, these controls have effectively eliminated illicit production or diversion in Turkey. For the past decade, there have been only occasional reports of illicit Turkish opium production.

Although the Government of Iran has banned opium cultivation and use, cultivation in Iran continues probably at levels which exceed the 300 metric ton ceiling imposed by the former Shah. However, Iran's addict population is the highest in the world, making Iran a net consumer rather than a supplier.

In Afghanistan, there has been very little reporting on matters relating to opium cultivation since the Soviet move into the country in early 1980. The disruption caused both by military operations and the flight of refugees makes it unlikely that opium exports have continued at levels comparable to those experienced in 1979. Even though Afghanistan had approximately 100,000 opium addicts, the Afghanistan Government did not have a program to control poppy cultivation prior to the Soviet occupation. Unsubstantiated sources have estimated the possibility of a 1981 Afghan opium crop as high as 200-250 tons. However, given the present political climate, it is impossible to verify this estimate. If this is accurate, Afghanistan will certainly be in a position to make significant exports.

Pakistan is the only opium producing country in the region to remain largely unaffected by changes in government during the past three years. Although opium poppy cultivation prohibitions have been implemented in "merged areas", this ban does not extend to the semi-autonomous tribal areas; therefore, this ban cannot yet be considered a total success. The prohibition of production, unfavorable weather conditions and deflated prices for opium will result in a relatively small 1982 harvest, estimated to be between 75 and 125 tons. However, large opium stockpiles exist in the tribal areas, and opium is now being converted into heroin in clandestine

laboratories. Pakistan is currently the center for the export of opium used in the production of Southwest Asian heroin.

India is the world's primary source for licit opium. It has been extremely difficult for India to dispose of the surplus licit opium supplies; as a result, stockpiles have increased. There have been sporadic reports of diversion from this source and it is possible that we will see additional diversion.

The potential threat posed by Southwest Asian heroin was, however, much worse than was eventually realized in the United States. The severe negative consequences of increased supplies of Southwest Asian heroin were experienced in several Western European nations. DEA worked with these countries and responded to this problem which enabled us, with the active support of European nations, to prevent the influx from reaching its potential and seriously affecting the United States population. Today, heroin availability and abuse are at relatively low levels compared to record highs experienced as recently as 1976. Together with the international enforcement community, especially in Italy, we have had unprecedented success in penetrating drug trafficking networks and disabling heroin conversion laboratories in Italy and the Middle East, thus preventing the converted heroin from reaching the United States population. This could not have been done without support and assistance from many nations.

The cultivation of the opium poppy is a long-standing tradition in Southeast Asia among the hill tribes of Burma, Laos and

Northern Thailand. It is estimated that in the 1980-1981 season Burma produced 500 tons of opium, Laos 50 tons, and Thailand 50 tons. There are at least nine and possibly as many as 15 heroin refineries located along the Thai/Burma border, several of which belong to the Shan United Army (SUA) which controls about 70% of the narcotics activity in the area. Recently, however, the SUA suffered a temporary setback. In January, units of Thailand's Border Patrol Police (BPP) attacked the headquarters of the Shan United Army, led by Chang Chi-Fu. During the battle, many members of the BPP and the SUA were killed or wounded. While no opiates were seized, a considerable array of modern weaponry and ammunition were confiscated. The attack might have caused some considerable financial losses to Chang Chi-Fu and a temporary disruption to SUA, but the SUA's narcotic production and marketing operations suffered no permanent setback.

Several political factors exist in the Golden Triangle which hinder the narcotics suppression efforts of the Thai and Burmese Governments. The Burmese Government has had difficulty exercising authority in the Shan State, the major opium producing and refining area of the Golden Triangle. This mountainous area is largely under the control of the Burmese Communist Party.

The Royal Thai Government also has unique political problems in controlling trafficking by the hill tribes, who grow the

opium poppy. These tribes are of special interest to the Thai King and he encourages eradication only in conjunction with crop substitution efforts in which the tribes are assured an adequate income.

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In the area of licit drugs, we have recently had more dramatic successes through international cooperation. Relatively speaking, only a small amount of the licit drugs abused in the United States are produced elsewhere. Methaqualone, a powerful sedative-hypnotic drug, is the chief exception. Methaqualone is encountered in hospital emergency rooms as often as heroin and is a popular drug of choice among young Americans. We estimate that approximately 85% of the methaqualone available in the illicit market was legally produced outside the United States and subsequently diverted for illicit use. Until intensive efforts were made to combat this problem, it was the United States' fastest growing drug problem.

DEA and the State Department initiated diplomatic, regulatory and enforcement initiatives in cooperation with nearly a dozen foreign governments. With increased cooperation, the international enforcement efforts proved to be very fruitful. In a single case involving an elaborate international conspiracy,

10 tons of Austrian methaqualone were diverted through the Netherlands into Canada disguised as a shipment of "soda ash." This resulted in a six and one-half ton seizure and several important arrests. In another case, two and one-half tons were diverted from Hamburg to Aruba and from there to a Colombia port where seizures and numerous arrests occurred. In a third case, nine tons were seized in Panama after the drug was traced from Hamburg. All of these cases, and many others, required the cooperation of the enforcement authorities of several countries.

As successful as these enforcement efforts have been, diplomatic and regulatory efforts have been even more effective. In response to our initiatives, the Federal Republic of Germany, a major source and transit country of psychotropic substances, imposed stringent import and export control measures. During this period, Hungary, another leading source country, voluntarily curtailed the production and exporting of methaqualone. More recently, Austria, a third producing country, curtailed methaqualone production. These actions alone removed an additional 36 tons of methaqualone that were available for diversion to the United States illicit market and resulted in a long-range solution by eliminating availability at the source.

We have already received reports that there is a scarcity of methaqualone powder in South America destined for clandestine tableting operations and that there are no pending shipments of methaqualone from the primary shipping port of Hamburg. More importantly, reports of injuries due to abuse of methaqualone in the United States show a decline of one-third in the third quarter of 1981 when compared with the same quarter in 1980. This decline follows a steady increase of injuries reported over the last two decades.

While we appear to have turned the corner on the problem of international diversion of methaqualone, we can not relax our vigilance. Recently, we have seen substantial evidence of widespread diversion and abuse of other legitimately produced controlled substances, such as amphetamine, methamphetamine, diazepam and others, diverted from international commerce. They are in some cases substituted from international commerce. They are in some cases substituted for now hard to obtain methaqualone in counterfeit "Quaalude" tablets. We are in the process of initiating parallel actions regarding these additional drugs.

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We have witnessed growing concern about the serious health consequences associated with use of heroin, and diverted licit drugs, cocaine and marijuana. The vast amounts of

income generated by cocaine and marijuana bring an added dimension to these drugs. During 1980 cocaine transaction at the retail level continued to account for the greatest share of drug money in the United States. Cocaine abuse spread rapidly throughout the United States.

Coca leaf is cultivated primarily in Peru and Bolivia, which are the largest suppliers of coca base, the first product in the cocaine refining process. Ecuador serves as an important transit point for coca base and paste shipments from Peru to Colombia. Although Peru and Bolivia have increased their production capabilities, Colombia is still South America's principal processor and staging area for shipment of cocaine hydrochloride.

It is estimated that in 1980 between 40-48 metric tons of cocaine were imported into the United States; at least 50 percent was supplied by Colombia. That country has retained its dominant position in cocaine trafficking through well-established organizations and contacts, ruthlessness and penetration of strategic points in the United States market.

The instability and inconsistency of some Latin American Governments (particularly Bolivia) have been major deterrents to successful joint interdiction programs. Coca eradication in Colombia has begun. A coca eradication campaign conducted in Peru in early 1980 was encouraging, but follow-up has not yet been accomplished. The Bolivian Government did not appear

ready to undertake eradication measures; however, earlier this month the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotic Matters, Dominick DiCarlo, returned from Bolivia with a commitment from President Torrelío that his country would move rapidly on the eradication program. Our Government has agreed to provide funding for a pilot program which is expected to commence in the near future. Crop substitution programs have had very limited success, and depend on ancillary enforcement operations for favorable results.

A number of initiatives have been undertaken against chemicals such as ether and acetone, which are used in the cocaine conversion process, but these efforts are difficult to sustain from year to year. Brazil has instituted administrative controls on the production of both ether and acetone, which simplifies the process of tracing the chemicals to the users. Determinations of the quantities of chemicals used assists in preparing estimates on the volume of cocaine production. Political influences, the economy, and long-standing ties between enforcement personnel and traffickers, all serve to thwart enforcement and crop control efforts within these countries.

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Marihuana is the second largest income producing drug and is the most widely abused drug in the United States. Recent

reports continue to reflect the serious health consequences of marihuana, especially to the youth of the United States. Colombia, Mexico and Jamaica are the principal suppliers of marihuana to the United States, but the overall significance of domestically produced marihuana is increasing.

Colombia continues to be our largest marihuana supplier -- between 7,700 and 11,300 metric tons were brought to the United States in 1980. In October 1978, the Colombian Government began an aggressive campaign to suppress the production and trafficking of marihuana and other illicit drugs in the northeastern part of the country. Reporting indicates that the government presence in the Guajira Peninsula forced some Colombian traffickers to scale down their marihuana activities. There have been reports of periodic marihuana scarcities along the North Coast, but there have also been reports of a glutted market with huge stockpiles of surplus marihuana, far exceeding the buyers' needs. Until recently, it did not appear that the government operations, despite major interdiction successes, had seriously hurt the marihuana trade. However, since the most recent interdiction operations, the tide may be changing.

Although Mexico is still a major source country for marihuana destined for the United States, its share of the overall illicit United States market has declined rapidly in the past three or four years because of the use of paraquat in the

Mexican eradication program. Mexican marihuana made up eight percent of the total United States in 1980.

Since the supply in the mid-1970's, Jamaica has also been an important source country for the illicit United States marihuana market. During the past three years, there have been indications of increasing demand for Jamaican marihuana in the United States, and it is estimated that in 1980 Jamaica was the source of 10% of imported marihuana, about 1,000 - 1,400 metric tons. A rise in air smuggling seizure incidents indicates that the supply is on the increase, although shipments also reach the United States by sea.

All of the current major marihuana source countries have shown some degree of willingness and ability to eradicate marihuana. However, they are often hesitant to initiate drug crop eradication programs unless we are willing to undertake the same effort in the United States. It is important that we in the United States continue to seek to eliminate marihuana production in the United States. Our Ambassadors in Colombia and Peru and our Charge in the Bahamas all note that the enforcement actions being carried out in the United States are having a motivating effect in those nations. Mexico is currently the only country using herbicides and appears to be the only country committed to this approach as a matter of national policy.

Since marihuana production far exceeds demand, the market will not be affected until a major portion of the supply is eliminated. To combat Colombia's major role in the production and distribution of methaqualone, cocaine and marihuana, DEA has undertaken several concentrated interdiction programs in cooperation with other agencies. Operation TIBURON, which was recently concluded, resulted in the arrest of 369 persons and seizure of nearly one million pounds of marihuana and 70 vessels. Active enforcement efforts of the Government of Colombia resulted in the seizure of an additional 4 million pounds of marihuana. There is no doubt that there were additional losses in terms of lost contraband and delayed.

The capability of the United States military will be an important asset in future operations of this nature. The recent removal of the amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which will enable our Government to provide assistance to foreign eradication efforts, will provide additional weapons with which to combat the problem. The President's South Florida Task Force has only been in operation for a month, but already is having an impact on cocaine and marihuana availability in Florida. This is a tremendous start, and the future is promising.

In conclusion, I believe it is readily apparent that the drug enforcement task is enormous and complex. It is a problem

that cannot be solved by one agency alone; the support of foreign governments and all branches of our own government is a necessity. It is important that we do all that can be done and that we are communicating the appropriate message to foreign governments, to drug traffickers and last, but not least, to the American people. Our message is that we intend to aggressively combat the drug problem.

Recently, the Attorney General chaired the first meeting of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. The Council was created to address the problems associated with narcotics, immigration and other legal policy issues which will require interdepartmental and interagency action. This initial meeting was devoted solely to drug supply reduction issues and was a positive step toward ensuring that the Federal Government has a coordinated and comprehensive program dedicated to controlling drug trafficking.

Recently, we have re-examined DEA's operations, reorganized many programs and with the support of the FBI are targeting additional resources against drug trafficking. But to effectively persuade foreign governments to act on drug control, the Federal Government must combine a convincing domestic program with a consistent diplomatic program. Strong coordination must be enhanced to ensure that all aspects of United States policy support our drug control interests overseas and we are aggressively moving forward in this area.

I am optimistic that with your support significant inroads are being made and will continue in the year ahead. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our activities and for your assistance and support.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Wheeler?

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH C. WHEELER, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here this morning to represent Peter McPherson, who was unable to be here because of an injury from which he is still recovering. Mr. McPherson's full statement will be included in the record with your permission?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Without objection.
[Mr. McPherson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER MCPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS DISTINGUISHED COMMITTEE TODAY TO DISCUSS AID'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT. THE PERVASIVE PROBLEM OF DRUG ABUSE IN THIS NATION HAS BEEN AND REMAINS A SERIOUS CONCERN OF MINE. I SEE THE IMPACT OF DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY AS HAVING NOT ONLY A PHYSICALLY DEBILITATING EFFECT ON OUR YOUTH BUT ALSO AS THE SOURCE OF MUCH OF THE CRIME WAVE WE ARE WITNESSING IN THIS COUNTRY. I BELIEVE IT IS INCUMBENT UPON ALL OF US IN GOVERNMENT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO DISCOURAGE DRUG ABUSE. ALONG THESE LINES I WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE SOME OF THE STEPS AID IS TAKING IN ORDER TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN THIS ENDEAVOR AND CONFORM WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE.

ON OCTOBER 1, 1978, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSUMED ALL OF AID'S FORMER FUNCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM. HOWEVER, THIS PAST YEAR AID REVIEWED IN DEPTH ITS EXISTING POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NARCOTICS AND A DECISION WAS MADE TO STEP UP OUR EFFORTS TO HELP CONTROL NARCOTICS PRODUCTION OVERSEAS BY FOCUSING GREATER EFFORT ON THE DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM WHICH IS AID'S AREA OF EXPERTISE. IN THIS EFFORT WE HAVE RECEIVED VALUABLE ASSISTANCE FROM THE CONGRESS IN THE FORM OF THE GILMAN AMENDMENT. THIS STATUTE INSTRUCTS AID TO "... GIVE PRIORITY CONSIDERATION TO PROGRAMS WHICH WOULD

HELP REDUCE ILLICIT NARCOTICS CULTIVATION BY STIMULATING BROADER DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES." WE ARE CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING A NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT THE INTENT OF THIS LEGISLATION; FIRST, I AM INSTRUCTING AID MISSIONS IN NARCOTICS GROWING COUNTRIES TO INCLUDE A REVIEW OF THE NARCOTICS SITUATION IN THEIR COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENTS (CDSS). THE CDSS IS A BROAD OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT NEEDS AND GOALS OF US AID RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND HOW U.S. ASSISTED STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS CONTRIBUTE TO THESE GOALS; IT IS SUBMITTED TO WASHINGTON FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION AT VARIOUS TIME INTERVALS.

SECOND, I AM CABLING ALL OF OUR AID MISSIONS WORLDWIDE AND MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I VIEW OUR CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN NARCOTICS GROWING AREAS, WHERE FEASIBLE, AS A PRIORITY ITEM.

THIRD, I HAVE APPOINTED AN AGENCY NARCOTICS COORDINATOR TO ENSURE THAT ALL POLICY ASPECTS RELATED TO ILLICIT NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IS COORDINATED WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND RECEIVES ADEQUATE REVIEW BY MY SENIOR STAFF AND ME.

FINALLY, AS AN INDICATION OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM, AID WILL JOIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, JUSTICE,

TREASURY AND AGRICULTURE IN REAFFIRMING AN EXPANDED INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AMONG VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES CONCERNED WITH THE NARCOTICS SITUATION OVERSEAS. THESE ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN ACCOMPLISH TWO THINGS: (1) PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FROM WHICH TO ACQUIRE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NARCOTICS SITUATION IN COUNTRIES WHICH PRODUCE THESE ILLICIT SUBSTANCES; AND (2) SIGNAL OUR DETERMINATION TO ADDRESS THE NARCOTICS DILEMMA FROM A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE WHEN IT MAKES SENSE TO DO SO.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO RAISE THE PRIORITY OF NARCOTICS AS A FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE I THINK IS APTLY REFLECTED BY SECRETARY HAIG, WHEN IN HIS MARCH 2 TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE FY 1983 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT HE SPOKE OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN U.S. ASSISTANCE PLANNING, "... MORE GENERALLY, U.S. PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EACH COUNTRY'S OWN DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, ITS POLICIES TOWARDS THE U.S., ITS RECORD OF SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL ILLEGAL NARCOTICS AND, OF COURSE, AVAILABLE U.S. RESOURCES." (EMPHASIS ADDED.)

I BELIEVE THAT NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IS IN PART A DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT NARCOTICS FARMERS ARE USUALLY EXTREMELY POOR AND LARGE SCALE NARCOTICS CULTIVATION TAKES PLACE ONLY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. NONETHELESS I THINK IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES IN TRYING TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES TO THESE FARMERS. THE GEOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACCESS TO PEOPLE WHO ARE FREQUENTLY OUTSIDE OF THE SOCIETAL MAINSTREAM OF THESE PRODUCER COUNTRIES MAKE OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN REMOTE GROWING AREAS OFTEN QUITE DIFFICULT. THERE IS OFTEN NO SINGLE CROP WHICH PROVIDES A VIABLE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVE FOR TRADITIONAL DRUG PRODUCERS. THE SITUATION IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRADITIONS IN SOME NARCOTICS PRODUCING NATIONS BASED ON THE LEGAL CONSUMPTION OF PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM THE SAME SOURCE AS THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS. THIS SITUATION IS QUITE APPARENT AMONG CONSUMERS OF THE COCA LEAF IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA.

WHILE PROVIDING ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES TO NARCOTICS FARMERS MAY BE NO PANACEA IN TERMS OF ADDRESSING THE SUPPLY OF NARCOTICS, I STILL FEEL THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CAN MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE GOAL WE ALL SEEK -- A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE AVAILABILITY OF ILLICIT DRUGS HERE AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. FOR EXAMPLE, OPIUM CULTI-

VATION AND MARKETING IS DEPENDENT UPON PROPER CLIMATE AND IT REPRESENTS AN UNSTABLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE. WHAT MANY POOR FARMERS SEEK IS ECONOMIC STABILITY AND SECURITY. THUS, WHILE WE MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE ABLE TO GUARANTEE PRICE EQUIVALENCY FOR FARMERS WE CERTAINLY SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE THEM A BETTER CHANCE AT ACHIEVING A STABLE INCOME FROM OTHER CROPS. ALSO, TEACHING FARMERS IN NORTHERN THAILAND, THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE IN PAKISTAN, OR THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY IN PERU HOW TO RAISE STRAWBERRIES, ORANGES, OR OTHER VIABLE ALTERNATIVE CROPS WILL HAVE LITTLE MEANING IF THEY HAVE NO WAY TO MARKET THEIR PRODUCTS. WE MUST, THEREFORE, ADDRESS THE FULL RANGE OF DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THESE AREAS. THIS INCLUDES FINDING A SUITABLE MIX OF CROPS, SOUND INCENTIVE PRICING POLICIES, RESEARCH, EXTENSION, CREDIT, AND SUPPORTING EFFICIENT IRRIGATION SYSTEMS. IT IS ALSO LIKELY TO REQUIRE OTHER NECESSARY ELEMENTS, SUCH AS MARKETING DISTRIBUTION AND ANCILLARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES THAT CREATE EMPLOYMENT SUCH AS RURAL INDUSTRY, AND SERVICES THAT ENHANCE PRODUCTIVITY AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE, SUCH AS RURAL HEALTH CARE DELIVER. IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO A GIVEN AREA AND ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES AND A BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE TO NARCOTICS FARMERS, HOST GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL WILL BE EXTENDED OR IN SOME CASES ESTABLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME, THUS FACILITATING ENFORCEMENT IN THE AREA. PROGRAMS OF THIS NATURE MUST, OF COURSE,

BE GEARED TO THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. THE PLANNING AND DESIGN OF THESE PROGRAMS MUST BE DONE WITH CARE AND WITH THE FULL INVOLVEMENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT IF ANY MEASURE OF SUCCESS IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

ONE VERY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN PROCEEDING WITH AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP ANY AREA, MUCH LESS A NARCOTICS GROWING AREA, IS THAT THIS IS A LONG TERM ENDEAVOR. CHANGING ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF NARCOTICS PRODUCING REGIONS CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED OVER NIGHT AND REQUIRES NOT ONLY COMMITMENT BUT REALIZATION OF THAT FACT.

THE ENFORCEMENT QUESTION IS SINE QUA NON AS IT RELATES TO INCOME SUBSTITUTION. WITHOUT THE FIRM COMMITMENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO SUPPRESS NARCOTICS CULTIVATION THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT U.S. ASSISTANCE WILL RESULT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF ILLICIT DRUG PRODUCTION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY. THUS FAR, SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS IN NARCOTICS PRODUCING COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN AWARE AND RESPONSIVE TO U.S. GOVERNMENT CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS NARCOTICS. FURTHERMORE, ALL NARCOTICS SOURCE COUNTRIES ARE SIGNATORIES TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTICS A MULTILATERAL TREATY SIGNED IN 1961, WHICH CONVEYS AN OBLIGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPRESS ILLICIT NARCOTICS.

ONE MEANS OF ENCOURAGING HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATION TO CONTROL NARCOTICS PRODUCTION IS BY ATTACHING POPPY/COCA CLAUSES TO PROJECT AGREEMENTS AS THE CIRCUMSTANCE MAY DICTATE. THESE CLAUSES, DECIDED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS, REQUIRE THE SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE TO PROJECTS IN WHICH OUR AID IS USED FOR NARCOTICS CULTIVATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF AID IS FUNDING AN IRRIGATION PROJECT AND IF POPPIES ARE PRODUCED ON THAT IRRIGATED LAND, THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE TERMINATION OF THE PROJECT. THUS, WE EXPECT THE HOST GOVERNMENT WITH WHOM WE ARE COORDINATING TO ENFORCE THE LAW IN A PROJECT AREA. OF COURSE, THIS IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO PROJECTS OR PARTS OF PROJECTS, WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY ABET NARCOTICS PRODUCTION. PROJECTS WHICH ARE NOT RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE CULTIVATION OF NARCOTICS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED.

WE NEED, HOWEVER, TO BE REALISTIC IN WHAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, WE ARE SPEAKING OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH ARE FACING, IN VARYING DEGREES, THE FULL RANGE OF DEVELOPMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH WHICH WE ARE SO FAMILIAR. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THEIR POPULATION LIVES OUTSIDE THE DRUG PRODUCING AREA. EVEN IF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE AN INCREASING DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM OF THEIR OWN, AND SOME DO, CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF ILLICIT NARCOTICS WILL NOT BE AT THE TOP OF THEIR PRIORITIES FOR THE

UTILIZATION OF THEIR SCARCE FINANCIAL AND TRAINED MANPOWER RESOURCES WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE MANY PROBLEMS FACING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR PEOPLE.

AID, IN AN EFFORT TO ADDRESS THE COMPLEXITIES OF ILLEGAL NARCOTICS PRODUCTION HAS EXISTING OR PLANNED PROGRAMS OF AN INCOME SUBSTITUTION NATURE IN FOUR COUNTRIES: THAILAND, PAKISTAN, PERU, AND BOLIVIA. EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES PRESENT VARIOUS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND TOPOGRAPHICAL DIFFICULTIES. THAILAND AND PAKISTAN PRODUCE LARGE AMOUNTS OF ILLICIT OPIUM THAT IS OFTEN REFINED INTO HEROIN AND SUBSEQUENTLY REACHES OUR SHORES. PERU AND BOLIVIA ARE MAJOR PRODUCERS OF THE COCA LEAF THAT IS ILLEGALLY REFINED INTO COCAINE AND SOLD ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS.

THAILAND

NORTHERN THAILAND FORMS PART OF THE NOTORIOUS GOLDEN TRIANGLE AND HAS LONG BEEN A SOURCE OF ILLICIT OPIUM AND HEROIN. ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES BY THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE (NNICC) BETWEEN 50 TO 60 METRIC TONS OF OPIUM WERE HARVESTED IN 1980. IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES TO FARMERS ENGAGED IN AN AREA WHERE THERE IS SOME OPIUM PRODUCTION IN THAILAND, AID AUTHORIZED A \$10 MILLION SEVEN-YEAR PROJECT IN THE MAE CHAEM WATERSHED OF NORTHERN THAILAND IN FY 1980 WHICH IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE REAL INCOMES AND ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES FOR

SOME 40,000 HILL TRIBESMEN AND ETHNIC THAIS. BECAUSE OF THE REMOTENESS OF THE LOCATION, THE PROJECT IS NO SMALL TASK. THIS IS AN AREA THAT HAS A CLEAR POTENTIAL FOR LARGE SCALE OPIUM FARMING. WHILE INDIRECT IN ITS EFFECT, THIS EFFORT TO PROVIDE LOCAL FARMERS WITH ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF EARNING A LIVING WITHOUT RESORTING TO GROWING POPPIES COULD BE A REPLICABLE MODEL ELSEWHERE IN THAILAND IF SUCCESSFUL IN MAE CHAEM. A CLAUSE IS ATTACHED TO THE PROJECT AGREEMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE FUNDS PROVIDED DO NOT SUPPORT OPIUM PRODUCTION. OTHER DONORS, INCLUDING THE UN AND THE IBRD ARE ENGAGED IN PROJECTS INTENDED TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE INCOMES FOR FARMERS IN THE REGION AS WELL.

PAKISTAN

IN 1980, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT BETWEEN 75 AND 150 TONS OF OPIUM WERE PRODUCED IN PAKISTAN. ESTIMATES FOR THE CURRENT CROP AMOUNT TO 50 TO 80 TONS, THE REDUCTION DUE TO DEPRESSED PRICES, POOR WEATHER, AND THE OPIUM PRODUCTION BAN PROMULGATED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN 1979. THE PRINCIPAL AREAS UNDER CULTIVATION ARE LOCATED IN THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP) PARTICULARLY IN THE MERGED AND TRIBAL AREAS (THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE CENTRAL CONTROL OVER THE LATTER) AND TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT, IN BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE.

LAST YEAR, AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES NEGOTIATED, AND THE CONGRESS AUTHORIZED A MAJOR AID PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THAT COUNTRY'S ABILITY TO FEND OFF SOVIET AND AFGHAN MILITARY INTRUSIONS AND IMPROVE ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY. A PORTION OF THIS PACKAGE IS BEING DESIGNED TO MAXIMIZE ITS EFFECT ON DISCOURAGING THE PRODUCTION OF OPIUM. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT IN PAKISTAN:

1.) IN OUR DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS IN THE DESIGN OF THE NEW AID PROGRAM, THE MISSION HAS ENCOURAGED THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT TO SUPPRESS NARCOTICS PRODUCTION ON BOTH THE DEVELOPMENT AND ENFORCEMENT FRONTS. IN THIS WAY A MAJOR PART OF THE NEW AID PROGRAM SERVES AS A FORUM IN WHICH WAYS TO ATTACK THE ILLEGAL NARCOTICS ISSUE IS BEING DISCUSSED;

2.) THREE OF OUR NEW AID PROJECTS ARE SPECIFICALLY BEING DESIGNED FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE POPPY GROWING AREAS. THESE ARE: THE TRIBAL AREA DEVELOPMENT (\$15 MILLION, LIFE OF PROJECT); THE BALUCHISTAN AREA DEVELOPMENT (\$30 MILLION, LIFE OF PROJECT); AND THE INTEGRATED VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (FINANCED BY U.S. OWNED EXCESS RUPEES). IN ADDITION, SOME OF THE RUPEES BEING GENERATED BY OUR COMMODITY PROCUREMENT SUPPORT E.G., FOR FERTILIZER IMPORTS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION TO FUND SPECIFIC NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION ACTIVITIES.

3.) IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT NONE OF OUR ASSISTANCE IN ANY WAY ASSISTS POPPY CULTIVATION WE ARE ATTACHING POPPY CLAUSES TO ALL RELEVANT NEW PROGRAM AND PROJECT AGREEMENTS;

4.) AID IS PREPARED TO ASSIST WHEREVER DESIRABLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS (B/INM) MALAKAND AGENCY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT WHICH WILL RECEIVE \$3 MILLION OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, AID WILL PROVIDE TECHNICAL FUNDING ASSISTANCE AND IF REQUESTED BY INM, ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR THE PROJECT IN FY 1983 AND BEYOND IF THE PROJECT IS DEVELOPMENTALLY VIABLE.

5.) FINALLY, AID IS ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING OTHER BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS WITH PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN TO DIRECT SOME OF THEIR PROJECTS TO THE NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION EFFORTS;

A RECENT DEMONSTRATION OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO NARCOTICS CONTROL IS REFLECTED IN A LETTER FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PLANNING AND COORDINATION TO OUR MISSION DIRECTOR IN PAKISTAN, IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT ADVISED THAT THEY "SHARE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AN AWARENESS OF AND CONCERN FOR THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH RESULT FROM THE ILLICIT GROWING AND PROCESSING OF OPIUM POPPY INTO HEROIN." THUS, THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT HAS SIGNALLED THAT IT FULLY SUPPORTS OUR EFFORTS AGAINST NARCOTICS. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE FULL TEXT OF THE LETTER IS ATTACHED TO MY STATEMENT;

I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT THE GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE IS CURRENTLY IN THE U.S. IN RECENT

DISCUSSIONS WITH AID OFFICIALS HERE, HE INDICATED HIS FULL COMMITMENT TO THE SUPPRESSION OF WHAT HE CALLED "THIS EVIL." HE NOTED THAT THE USE OF NARCOTICS WAS ON THE UPSWING IN PAKISTAN ITSELF, PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, AND THIS HAS BECOME AN ADDED SPUR TO THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S ACTION. WHILE I FEEL THAT THE STEPS WE ARE TAKING ARE POSITIVE AND WHILE I AM PLEASED BY THE COOPERATION WE ARE RECEIVING FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN I BELIEVE WE MUST BE REALISTIC ABOUT HOW QUICKLY PROGRESS WILL BE MADE. GIVEN THE INACCESSIBILITY OF THE POPPY GROWING AREAS, THE RUGGED TERRAIN, AND VIRTUAL LACK OF ROADS--COMPOUNDED BY THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL CONTROL IN THESE AREAS BY THE GOVERNMENT--IT IS TOO MUCH TO EXPECT OVERNIGHT RESULTS FROM OUR EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES TO FARMERS IN THESE POPPY GROWING AREAS. NONETHELESS, WE ARE COMMITTED AND WITH THE CONTINUED COOPERATION BY THE GOVERNMENT, AND BETTER ACCESS TO THESE REMOTE AREAS I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT IN THE LONG TERM.

PERU

IN 1980, THE NNICC ESTIMATED THAT 40,000 METRIC TONS OF COCA LEAVES WERE PRODUCED IN PERU. OF THIS AMOUNT A SUBSTANTIAL PERCENTAGE ORIGINATED IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY.

IN ORDER TO REDUCE COCA PRODUCTION WHILE PROVIDING SUBSTITUTE INCOME FOR SMALL FARMERS NOW GROWING COCA IN THE

VALLEY, AID AND INM HAVE BOTH SIGNED PROJECT AGREEMENTS WITH THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FOR A COORDINATED UNDERTAKING. IN SEPTEMBER 1981, AID EXECUTED AN AGREEMENT IN LIMA FOR \$18 MILLION OF AID LOAN AND GRANT FUNDS AND \$8.5 MILLION OF PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FUNDS FOR AN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WHICH WILL INCLUDE CROP DIVERSIFICATION, IMPROVED EXTENSION SERVICES AND FARM CREDIT. IN THE SAME MONTH, INM AGREED WITH THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT ON A JOINT EFFORT TO ERADICATE COCA PRODUCTION IN THE VALLEY. INM HAS BUDGETED \$15 MILLION OVER FIVE YEARS FOR ITS ERADICATION EFFORT. INM AND AID ARE CLOSELY COORDINATING THEIR PROJECTS IN WASHINGTON AND IN THE FIELD TO ASSURE OPTIMUM RESULTS. ALSO, AN APPROPRIATE COCA CLAUSE HAS BEEN INCORPORATED INTO THE PROJECT AGREEMENT. AS SPECIFIED IN THE PROJECT AGREEMENT, THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL PROJECT OFFICE TO ADMINISTER THE PROJECT, AND PERUVIAN PERSONNEL ARE AT WORK PREPARING A DETAILED WORK PLAN FOR THE LIFE OF THE PROJECT.

I AM PLEASED ABOUT THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY PROJECT FOR ANOTHER REASON AS WELL. THIS PRECEDENT SETTING COOPERATION BETWEEN INM AND AID REPRESENTS THE FIRST REAL "MARRIAGE" BETWEEN OUR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS TO COMBAT NARCOTICS PRODUCTION WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY WORKING WITHIN THE POOR MAJORITY CONCEPT AS MANDATED BY CONGRESS. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THIS COOPERATION WILL BE DUPLICATED ELSEWHERE WHEN APPROPRIATE.

BOLIVIA

BOLIVIA IS ANOTHER MAJOR SOURCE OF ILLEGAL COCAINE IN THE WORLD AND A KEY U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN BOLIVIA IS IMPROVED NARCOTICS CONTROL. THUS, ONE OF THE BASES FOR NORMALIZATION AND CONTINUED IMPROVEMENT OF U.S.-BOLIVIAN RELATIONS LIES WITH THE INITIATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA OF MEASURES TO CONTROL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. THE MAJORITY OF U.S. ASSISTANCE IS BEING WITHHELD PENDING SPECIFIC ACTIONS BY THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE PROBLEM. WE WILL NOT GO FORWARD WITH ANY NEW PROJECTS, RELEASE \$49 MILLION OF SUSPENDED PROJECTS OR REESTABLISH A P.L. 480 TITLE III PROGRAM UNTIL: (1) AN EFFECTIVE COCA ERADICATION PROGRAM BE INITIATED; (A PILOT PROGRAM IS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE YAPACANI); (2) A SATISFACTORY GOVERNMENT WIDE COCA CONTROL PLAN BE DEVELOPED; AND (3) CRIMINAL ACTION BE TAKEN AGAINST MAJOR TRAFFICKERS.

THE AID MISSION IN BOLIVIA IS DOING A PRELIMINARY STUDY FOR A CROP SUBSTITUTION/REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IN THE CHAPARE, THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA WHERE MOST OF THE COCA USED FOR ILLEGAL COCAINE IS PRODUCED. IF THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT COMPLETES THE ACTIONS MENTIONED ABOVE WE WOULD THEN MOVE FORWARD WITH A SERIES OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AIMED AT THE CHAPARE.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE DRUG PROBLEM IS HARDLY AN EPHEMERAL PHENOMENON AND IT REQUIRES A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH. AID BELIEVES THAT BROAD BASED LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT SUPPORTS THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMS BY PROVIDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AGAINST THE PRODUCTION OF ILLICIT DRUGS AND VIABLE ALTERNATIVE INCOME SOURCES TO DRUG PRODUCTION.

THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL CONSTITUTES A BONA FIDE FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY ITEM AND I WANT TO ASSURE THIS COMMITTEE THAT I WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK WAYS IN WHICH AID CAN ASSIST IN THIS EFFORT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPMENT.

THANK YOU.

March 25, 1982

Government of Pakistan Opium Poppy Letter

Dr. D. Lion
Mission Director
USAID Mission to Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan

Dear Dr. Lion:

The Government of Pakistan shares with the Government of the United States an awareness of and concern for the serious consequences which result from the illicit growing and processing of opium poppy into heroin. The Government of Pakistan, working with the provincial authorities, has taken several steps to eradicate opium poppy cultivation and to curtail the processing of opium into heroin. The effort will continue.

The Government of Pakistan is fully cognizant of the U.S. congressional and public concern which is reflected in Section 126 of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act requiring U.S. assistance to quote...give priority consideration to programs which would help reduce illicit narcotics cultivation by stimulating broader development opportunities unquote. On behalf of the Government of Pakistan, may I assure you that assistance provided by the Agency for International Development will in no manner, directly or indirectly, be allowed to abet opium poppy cultivation, opium distribution or processing of opium into heroin.

The Government of Pakistan is in full accord with the position of the U.S. Government as set forth in its legislation, and further, acknowledges the desirability of, wherever appropriate, linking the provision of U.S. assistance to the efforts of the Government of Pakistan to discourage illicit poppy cultivation, opium distribution and the processing of opium into heroin.

Please be assured of the Government of Pakistan's continued best efforts in this area of mutual concern.

Ejaz Ahmad Naik
Secretary (Planning)
Ministry of Finance, Planning
and Coordination
Government of the Islamabad
Republic of Pakistan

Mr. WHEELER. I will just say a few words by way of a summary. The Administrator is very anxious to deepen AID's commitment to working on the narcotics question. He intends to symbolize this to the Agency in a number of ways. First, he is asking those country missions where narcotics is a special problem to develop a long-range plan for dealing with the issue as part of the country development strategy statement which is an overall policy for each country.

Second, he is cabling to each mission his statement of concern in this area and request for cooperation from all personnel.

Third, we are joining with other Government agencies in reaffirming and expanding an interagency agreement designed to facilitate the flow of information in this area.

And finally, he is appointing a narcotics coordinator carried within our Bureau for Policy, Planning and Coordination.

AID at the moment is planning to operate in a serious way in three countries and these are covered in the full statement. In Thailand, Pakistan, and Peru. In those countries we are able to develop economic development projects which will be supportive of narcotics control efforts. We are able to attach clauses and agreements regarding those projects to assure ourselves that the funds that we expend in the development of particular areas in the country will be used to support our overall efforts to eradicate narcotics production rather than do the opposite of actually abetting production if there was not an adequate coordination from the enforcement side and the development side.

In our statement we have gone into the details on the individual country programs. I would like to say from a personal point of view, Mr. Chairman, I ran our AID mission in Pakistan for 8 years, from 1969 to 1977. And during that period, we did undertake initial activities in the narcotics control area.

I am acquainted with the importance of the challenge ahead of us and of the difficulties that must be coped with if we are to achieve success. I want to end by saying that AID is deeply committed to cooperating in this area and we want to do whatever we can to play our full role in an overall coordinated U.S. Government effort, working with other countries to do what we can to eliminate the production of illicit narcotics production.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen, for your statements.

Your rhetoric is great and somewhat comforting, but I wonder what the action will be. As I said in my opening statement, yesterday, we heard compelling testimony of various officials concerning the devastating effect on our society of narcotics abroad. We also heard an indictment of the current U.S. effort against narcotics as lacking really high level commitment and direction.

Judging from the lack of success and the low static level of funding, it appears we are drifting along with a low level, low priority international narcotic control effort.

The level of funding requested in the last 8 years has actually declined. So what you are telling us, about the efforts you are going to continue, but at the same time requesting less funds for the program, causes questions. For example, the Ford administration funding requested for international narcotics control for fiscal

year 1976 was \$42.5 million and now the Reagan administration request for fiscal year 1983 is \$40 million, for all of our worldwide narcotics programs.

To put this level of funding in perspective, I wish to point out that the United States spent \$30 million in fiscal 1981 for a screw-worm eradication program in Mexico alone in order to protect U.S. cattle herds. I'm not criticizing that program. I think it's very necessary. But if you compare it to what we are spending for the eradication of illicit drugs, I must ask the question, why this low level of funding for our international narcotics control program? How can AID or the State Department or DEA really do a job with less money, is the question. Are you asking for an amount sufficient to cope with the problem?

Mr. DiCarlo, do you care to answer?

Mr. DiCARLO. I can answer in several ways. First, if we compare what was spent in 1976 and the years immediately thereafter, it should be noted that the programs included heavy capital expenditures for aircraft in such places as Mexico—where there was a government which was willing and able to make a commitment. Having made that commitment, the United States provided them with the necessary tools to do it.

Second, I don't think the U.S. international commitment can be judged solely on the basis of the INM budget. As you know, the DEA has a budget of approximately \$37 million for its overseas operations. Also, I would like to point out that, with the new emphasis on collaboration by this administration, AID is spending moneys—in addition to funds in the INM budget. AID has made a commitment in the Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru, and consistent with congressional intent, AID moneys will be also used in the narcotics projects in Pakistan, and, prospectively, in other producer countries. So I don't think anyone can focus on just the INM budget and say that is all the United States is doing, or that \$40 million is all the money we are spending.

I was asked the question once: What would you do if you had \$100 million more? My answer basically was: If I had \$100 million more today and I was told to spend it today, my answer would be that I would waste it. As we have said in all our presentations: Before we can take real action that is going to have an impact upon the flow of traffic, we first have to have agreements with and commitments by foreign nations.

I can tell you this. I can take that \$100 million, and I will find countries out there who would be looking for the money. They all like to fight the traffickers. They all want helicopters. They all want to beef up their police forces. They all want communications equipment. And if requesting a huge budget and having that budget allocated is the criterion—if we are judged by the amount of money we spend—I can make tremendous progress in the fight on drugs. But I will say this: In reality, it would probably accomplish little or nothing.

What we are looking for in this administration is to get at the source of the drug. We don't want to supply a country with helicopters, and boats, and ships. We wish they could effectively trace the traffickers after the crop has left the growing area. Some countries love our interdiction aid because we are building up their infra-

structure. We are building up their commodities. We are building up their police forces. We support interdiction out of necessity. Our objective and unequivocal preference is crop control. What we are attempting to do is first get the agreement—to get the commitment to crop control—and we think we are making substantial progress in a relatively short period of time in that effort.

In Peru, which is an example of the Bureau's response to congressional directives, we now have an agreement with the Government which specifically says that the Peruvian Government has an obligation to perform certain acts when the United States gives assistance. We are targeting projects in individual countries. In Peru, the area that we target upon is the point of origin of 25 percent of the cocaine imported into the United States.

I just returned from a special trip to Bolivia, and I would disagree entirely that there is not a high-level U.S. effort. The State Department has stated to the Government of Bolivia that it would not give them any assistance—except humanitarian assistance—unless they did something about the control of narcotics.

Today, as I said, we have received a plan from Bolivia. We are negotiating a plan with them and, when we have a commitment from the Bolivian Government, we will come in with money requests.

When we have those agreements with the countries to do something about eradication, we will then come to the Congress—if more money is needed—and ask for the money at that time. I don't want the money in my budget now. I don't want the money allocated to certain countries as has been done in the past.

If we need additional money we will come in and ask for it. What we don't want is a large pot of money which is going to tempt other countries to think they have a right to it—it's theirs—and we, in turn, have lost our bargaining position and the ability to negotiate.

That might be a long answer, and it may not be long enough, but basically that is our feeling.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I understand the problem that you are faced with, especially with the lack of cooperation on the part of some governments. As a matter of fact, we have heard testimony that in some countries the government is involved, some of the officials are involved and really don't want to cooperate. Therefore, in an effort to be helpful to our State Department, and AID, what if we put language in our AID program or other funding for assistance other than humanitarian assistance to countries, conditioning the assistance on their effort in eradicating and controlling illicit drugs?

Mr. DiCARLO. I think we need a certain amount of flexibility. I think if it's an all-or-nothing proposition it does not leave us with the kind of room and bargaining power that we need.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We are trying to be helpful.

Mr. DiCARLO. You have done that, sir. You have been extremely helpful. We have used the efforts of the Congress. The Congress has been heard. In the question of Pakistan, I know that Congressmen have been extremely active. Their objections have been heard. There have been changes in the law. We now have the Gilman amendment where AID has to consider what they can do in the area of narcotics. The Congress has been extremely helpful. I

think, to say that the administration at a high level is not interested, is inaccurate because I know that the highest levels of our Government have been involved in the narcotics problem. I can't give you the exact conversations that go on—word for word—with leaders of other governments or say publicly what the arrangements are that have been discussed.

But I can say this, without fear of contradiction or any hesitation: I am willing to explain these discussions in executive session. The highest levels of this Government, the highest levels of the State Department have been actively engaged in this problem. We have made, in many cases, our assistance conditioned upon work in narcotics in certain areas of the world. And, I think whatever the case might have been in the past, and I was not here in prior administrations, this administration is taking an interest in the area of narcotics. The leaders, perhaps, don't come out in the newspapers, blasting away at another Government, because that may be counterproductive. But between governments, there is that interplay.

One instance I can point out is Thailand. The Prime Minister of Thailand came to the United States to visit the President of the United States. He brought with him—because he knew of the interest of the President of the United States and the State Department—a Deputy Prime Minister who is involved in the question of narcotics. He also brought with him the head of the organization that is directly charged with narcotics control.

These people came because they knew from the dealings they have had with our Government—the State Department and the executive branch—of our extreme interest in those problems and they came prepared to discuss some of the questions that were involved.

So I would like, in answer to one question, also to answer the prior statement. The administration is deeply involved in this problem. I think the task force on crime in south Florida—where the Vice President of the United States is in charge—is an example of that. One of the main focuses is on narcotics flooding the Southeast portion of the United States.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Is the Vice President also trying to eradicate marihuana grown in Florida?

Mr. DiCARLO. Yes, sir; the question now is whether or not we have reached the point where they can do it. It is a question of eradication of the crop. We receive assurances from the State of Florida that they will eliminate their crop. They are anxious to eliminate it and cooperate with the United States.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Ambassador Boyatt, you have mentioned that in the case of Colombia there is some concern that we are not doing enough in eradicating the illicit crops, particularly marihuana in the United States. You mentioned several States but you didn't identify them. Could you, or any of you gentlemen, if you do have that information or any of you gentlemen provide for the record what States are growing illicit marihuana?

Mr. MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, I believe I can answer that. We believe that we have a marihuana growing-problem in each of our 50 States. There are seven States that are specially predominant, however. These are Hawaii, California, Oregon, Arkansas, Florida, Mis-

souri, and Kentucky. We have developed a domestic eradication program.

For example, the chief of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the chief of its counterpart agency in California were in Washington last week. I met with DEA officials and we are going ahead with the eradication programs. We are tailoring these programs to the needs of the States involved.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Very good, because I agree with Ambassador Boyatt, if we do not do it in our own country, we cannot expect the others to do it. This is a worldwide problem. It is not only the United States that is suffering. Europe is probably in greater trouble. Maybe Mr. DiCarlo, you could provide for the record the contributions of all countries to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control for the record.

Mr. DiCARLO I will provide that, sir.

[The following was subsequently submitted:]

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL—PLEDGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1981

	Percent	Amount (U.S. dollars)
Contributors (46):		
Argentina.....	0.89	8,818
Australia.....	5.83	555,473
Austria.....	1.30	123,563
Barbados.....		250
Belgium.....	.26	24,988
Bolivia.....	.03	3,000
Brazil.....	.16	15,000
Cameroon.....	.02	1,767
Canada.....	2.16	285,931
Chile.....	.08	7,500
Denmark.....	.67	65,015
Egypt.....	.01	1,220
Finland.....	.45	43,203
France.....	1.98	188,496
Germany, Federal Republic of.....	23.07	2,197,674
Greece.....	.02	1,918
Holy See.....	.01	525
Hong Kong.....	.19	18,315
Iceland.....	.07	6,400
India.....	.15	14,000
Indonesia.....	.02	2,000
Iran.....	.05	4,773
Iraq.....	.05	5,022
Italy.....	2.52	240,259
Japan.....	3.19	303,852
Kenya.....	.07	6,400
Korea, Republic of.....	.02	2,000
Malawi.....	.01	540
Malaysia.....	.02	2,000
Malta.....		-251
Mauritius.....	.01	487
Mexico.....	.02	1,937
Morocco.....	.03	3,000
New Zealand.....	.31	29,778
Norway.....	15.55	1,481,006
Pakistan.....	.02	2,014
Portugal.....	.06	6,000
Saudi Arabia.....	.79	75,000
South Africa.....	.07	6,384
Sweden.....	7.25	690,332

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL—PLEDGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1981—
Continued

	Percent	Amount (U.S. dollars)
Switzerland	1.70	161,582
Togo.....		452
United Kingdom.....	.97	92,750
United States.....	22.57	2,150,000
Venezuela.....	.04	4,000
Yugoslavia.....	.19	18,000
Private Organizations:		
Japan Shipbuilding Industrial Foundation.....	2.10	200,000
Norwegian Church Aid.....	4.83	460,000
Others.....	.99	94,150
Total.....	100.00	9,527,025

Note.—No percentage shown for amounts of less than 0.01 percent.

Mr. DiCARLO. Only five countries contribute more than \$500,000. Chairman ZABLOCKI. Would you repeat that, sir?

Mr. DiCARLO. Only five countries contribute more than \$500,000. Chairman ZABLOCKI. Don't they understand their problem?

Mr. DiCARLO. They are beginning, I think, sir, to understand it and I think that's why we have a much better opportunity now than before. I believe it is coming home. In the last 2 years, it's really had a tremendous impact upon many of the European countries and we are hopeful that the funding situation will change.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Mullen, if you would also provide for the record the percentage of U. S. marihuana consumption that is estimated to be produced in the United States, in the 50 States?

Mr. MULLEN. I will provide that, Mr. Chairman.

[The following was subsequently submitted:]

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) estimates that in 1980 there were between 10,200 and 15,000 metric tons of marihuana consumed in the United States. Of this total amount, it is estimated that 7 percent (700-1,000 metric tons) was produced in the United States.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Let me say one word. I agree with you, Mr. DiCarlo, that perhaps we should not put conditions in law but at the very least we ought to include some language in the report to strengthen the hand of our Government in dealing with other governments.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to congratulate all of our witnesses this morning on their useful testimony. Because of our limitations of time, I am going to direct a few questions to Ambassador Boyatt. You refer in your testimony to DEA's estimate that some 30 to 31 metric tons of cocaine from Colombia entered the United States in 1981. Could you also tell us the approximate street value of that cocaine here?

Ambassador BOYATT. Well, let's see, if 4 tons is worth \$1 billion, then 31 is worth \$7 or \$8 billion, something like that, on the street in the United States. I would say \$8 billion. What do you think, Bud?

Mr. MULLEN. NNICC estimates show that the total value of the cocaine sold in the United States in 1980 was between \$26.8 and

\$32.2 billion. Of course, all of our cocaine comes from Latin America: Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. So I can't narrow that down for the record.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. You also indicated that 90 percent of cocaine in the United States came from Colombia?

Mr. MULLEN. No; 50 percent comes from Colombia, not 90.

Ambassador BOYATT. Sir, if I may say something, the whole question here of percentages and absolute amounts, we are all doing our best to come up with accurate data. But we should all realize that by its nature this industry is clandestine. Nobody is keeping statistics. So we are looking at secondary, tertiary evidence and trying to come up with solid figures.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. There is no question that there is a lot of money involved.

Ambassador BOYATT. That's right, enormous quantities of money.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. You mentioned also on page 11 that: "There is nothing romantic about efforts by Cuban officials to use drug traffickers to send guns to Colombian terrorists, dedicated to overthrowing a democratically elected and progressive government in that country."

Could you elaborate on what they are doing, working with Cuba in this drug trafficking?

Ambassador BOYATT. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Regarding the drug traffickers in Colombia who are working with Cuba, how does that operation affect the United States?

Ambassador BOYATT. Well, it has worked this way in specific cases: The Government of Cuba or officials of Cuba have made contact with known drug traffickers and this is not a question of allegation. This is a matter of fact. The contacts have occurred. The drug trafficker is permitted to use Cuban waters to shelter his large boats full of marihuana and the small boats run in from Cuba.

For that he pays a certain amount of money and for that certain things are expected of him. Among the things expected of him is to use the same infrastructure, the same boats, the same crooks to move illegal arms south, primarily to Colombia but it can just as easily be done to other countries as well.

That is essentially how it works. Drugs move north and guns move south.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I see.

Have any Cuban agents been apprehended or arms for Marxist terrorists in Colombia been seized by Colombian authorities?

Ambassador BOYATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. To what extent?

Ambassador BOYATT. Well, in March last year, 250 to 319 terrorists invaded Colombia from the Pacific, southwest side, which is a difficult jungle area. Over 100 of them were captured and another 100 were killed. Among those that were captured it was proved by virtue of testimony, after testimony, after testimony, by virtue of captured diaries and other documents, that they had all been trained in Cuba and transported from Cuba.

In my judgment they were also armed in Cuba although our evidence on that is not as solid.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Mullen, I wonder if you can tell us whether any Cuban diplomatic personnel have been used to smuggle Colombian cocaine into the United States?

Mr. MULLEN. Not to my knowledge.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gilman?

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to join my colleagues in welcoming this distinguished panel and I want to commend them for the efforts that they are undertaking. One of the problems concerning the narcotics issue that as we have examined over the years has been the lack of a national strategy consisting of a good comprehensive program and a sound coordinated effort with long-range planning. While we have done some great things in a band-aid approach to immediate crises, we have lacked a great deal that could be done in attempting to evolve a long-range effective plan.

I am pleased to hear our good Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. DiCarlo, talk about some of that long-range planning. I am just wondering how frequently the agency heads are now getting together to involve themselves in some long-range national and international planning that Mr. DiCarlo is talking about.

How frequently do you get together to discuss long-range planning, not just the month-to-month problems of a task force in Florida or what are we going to do about eradicating a crop in California. What are you doing about evolving an overall national, international strategy on a long-range basis? Can I first ask Mr. DiCarlo, who is involved in a number of these efforts, if he can tell us a little more about the overall national and international strategy? Are we going to evolve that kind of a strategy?

Mr. DiCARLO. Yes, sir, I believe we are. I know that Dr. Turner will be here tomorrow discussing the overall question of the strategy and fitting all these pieces together under an overall strategy. There is a Cabinet council that has been formed. I am a member of a subcommittee—a working group on supply reduction—on that Cabinet council.

Mr. GILMAN. When was that council formed, Mr. DiCarlo?

Mr. DiCARLO. The Cabinet Council on Legal Affairs was announced about a month or two ago.

Mr. MULLEN. It first met, I believe, on March 24. At that particular meeting the Attorney General briefed the President and entire Cabinet on a drug strategy. Also at that meeting each Cabinet member who had an interest or something to contribute was tasked within their agency's capabilities to assist in the drug effort.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Mullen, 3 weeks ago, then, is the first time we ever had a strategy council meeting of this nature in the new administration. Is that correct?

Mr. MULLEN. The President, the Cabinet, and Vice President, that was the initial meeting.

Mr. GILMAN. Did you all take part in that, Mr. Mullen and Mr. DiCarlo?

Mr. MULLEN. I expected to take part, Congressman. In fact, I was at five briefings with the Attorney General. The Attorney General had so familiarized himself with the topic that I managed to say good morning, Mr. President, and then the Attorney General handled the briefing but I did take part.

Mr. DiCARLO. We took part through our preparation of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State participated in that Cabinet council. But we don't want to indicate that the first time the various branches of the Government got together on this problem was at this Cabinet council meeting.

We have been meeting—since I have been in Washington—on a monthly basis. All interested agencies on this problem have met, and the meetings have been chaired by Dr. Turner.

Mr. GILMAN. Was that to evolve policy?

Mr. DiCARLO. Yes; to evolve policy and various strategies.

Mr. GILMAN. What were those monthly gatherings called?

Mr. DiCARLO. The Drug Oversight Committee.

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct.

Mr. GILMAN. Did that oversight committee make recommendations to the policy group at the Cabinet level?

Mr. DiCARLO. You know the President has set down his policy—an overall policy on the effort in the area of drugs as far as interdiction and the overseas effort are concerned.

But if you are asking me whether or not they—the Oversight Committee—reported to the group—Cabinet council—that had not formed—no. They certainly all reported to the people involved in the various agencies.

Mr. GILMAN. Who helped the administration come out with those policy statements? Who had input into those policy statements?

Mr. DiCARLO. I was asked for my recommendations on statements made by the President dealing with international control and those recommendations were made to the President.

Mr. GILMAN. You made recommendations after the statements were made?

Mr. DiCARLO. No, no, before.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Mullen, were you consulted?

Mr. MULLEN. I was. I meet with the Attorney General on a weekly basis and with Associate Attorney General Rudy Giuliani more often than that. I was consulted.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Wheeler, did your agency get involved in the Cabinet-level policymaking group?

Mr. WHEELER. Not as an agency, only as a part of the Department of State. Our input is on an informal basis. So far we have been in regular touch with both the White House and the Department of State but we are not a formal member of that committee.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, then, at this point, then, we are just beginning to scratch the surface on a national and international strategy. Is that correct?

Gentlemen, do any of you want to answer that?

Mr. MULLEN. I would say we have gone far beyond scratching the surface. We have many ongoing programs. For example, all of the meetings have taken place at the level of the one which you mentioned earlier, the Cabinet level, involving the President and Vice President; but you do have policy meetings going on on a continuing basis.

Mr. GILMAN. Has policy come out of that, Mr. Mullen?

Mr. MULLEN. Yes, it does. Of course, it involves multiagency recommendations to the agency heads.

Mr. GILMAN. Has strategic policy come out of it, a national or international strategy developed from those meetings?

Mr. MULLEN. Yes, it has. And I have with me and I will be pleased to make it available to the committee, the tasking of the policy considerations for the various agencies that did occur as a result of the meetings that have taken place.

Mr. GILMAN. Asking for input, you mean, or was there—

Mr. MULLEN. Active assignments, missions to perform, things that should be done as a matter of policy involving eradication, involving enforcement and all areas of drug control.

Mr. GILMAN. Have you seen any policy statement of this sort?

Mr. MULLEN. I believe that Dr. Carlton Turner is planning to address that issue tomorrow. I do not want to preempt his testimony.

Mr. GILMAN. But has any statement of that nature been circulated amongst you as department heads?

Mr. MULLEN. No, I do not have a statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. DiCarlo?

Mr. DiCARLO. We have submitted written statements to Dr. Turner.

Mr. GILMAN. Written recommendations?

Mr. DiCARLO. Yes, to be incorporated in the strategy.

Mr. GILMAN. But so far there has not been any formal national policy adopted?

Mr. DiCARLO. There has been no document presented in formal form. I would like to point out that under the law, section 481, most of that responsibility for policy development regarding international narcotics is given to the President and assigned to the Secretary of State and by order comes down to my bureau.

Mr. GILMAN. Has there been some policy statement informally circulated amongst you?

Mr. DiCARLO. You are speaking of a written document. We have exchanged written documents between us but when you say formal—is it a definitive statement of policy—the answer is “no.” We have formulated INM and department policy. We are working on the detailed total administration policy, and we have had many meetings and discussions since I have been in the Department—along with other interested agencies.

Mr. GILMAN. I see my time is running. I am pleased to see that you are working on formulating such a policy.

We hope that this committee can soon see the result of that product. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to extend my time.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, it is quite clear from the evidence there has been a mass of innumerable hearings in Congress on the issue of illicit drugs and similar substances since this has been a problem in this country for 20 years or longer.

It is now becoming a world problem certainly in the sense that developing countries have acquired the problem. The educational efforts that are necessary to combat the problem within each society are enormous. Because of the monetary incentives in this illegal traffic fighting the problem on any front is extremely difficult. Enforcement officials at local levels, State levels, have been

entirely overwhelmed because of the international and interstate aspects of the whole drug problem.

I have been convinced for a long time that without a massive, determined, directed effort by the U.S. Government to assist in this effort, we will never even begin to make a dent in it, either domestically or internationally. It takes long-term, continuous commitment to deal with this problem.

Do each of you on the panel agree generally with this statement?

Mr. DiCARLO. As far as the international aspect of it, I hesitate agreeing with one element of it and that is the statement that it requires a massive amount of assistance.

Mr. FASCELL. I did not mean just cash, Mr. DiCarlo, I meant all of the tools that can be brought to bear on the problem.

I know that you can't throw cash at every problem and solve it. It takes the efficient use of money.

Mr. DiCARLO. I think we need the efficient use of money on the problem, yes.

Mr. FASCELL. But generally, you agree that this is a massive problem that requires the highest level of concern of our national government? That is the main thing I was getting at.

Mr. DiCARLO. I would say it takes an entire Federal effort plus an effort at the State and local level as well.

Mr. FASCELL. Agreed.

Mr. Mullen?

Mr. MULLEN. I certainly agree with that.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Wheeler?

Mr. WHEELER. Yes, I do agree with that.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, Mr. Ambassador, it is nice to see you again. Ambassador BOYATT. Nice to see you, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You are in kind of a hot seat because you have one of the countries where the connection is particularly difficult in terms of the amount that is involved.

Mr. Chairman, let me interrupt and say that we have got some staff studies here that ought to be made a part of the record if they are not. One discusses dollars and drugs and another concerns the consumption retail value of drugs in the United States. The third has to do with the estimated supply of marihuana to the U.S. market.

If they are not in the record I would request permission to put them in the record at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

DOLLARS AND DRUGS

A farmer in Pakistan may be paid anywhere from \$350 to \$1,000 for 10 kilograms of opium. By the time it has been processed to 1 kilogram of morphine base and then to 1 kilogram of heroin, it is worth as much as \$250,000 or more to the American trafficker. Reaching major distributors in the United States, the value leaps to well over \$1,000,000. The same 1 kilogram is then divided and sold by street pushers to their customers for anywhere from \$1.6 million to \$2.2 million.

The 200 to 500 kg of coca leaves, for which a grower in Bolivia, Colombia or Peru may be paid anywhere from \$1,000 to as high as \$10,000, is refined to 1 kilogram of cocaine base and then 1 kilogram of cocaine hydrochloride sold in Colombia for as much as \$20,000. By the time it hits a port of entry such as Florida, it will be worth as much as \$55,000 at the wholesale level. And on the streets, at retail level, that same 1 kilogram will bring \$800,000.

One pound of marihuana is worth anywhere from \$3 to \$8 to a Colombian grower. In successive steps, through brokers, exporters, importers and distributors, its value jumps to as much as \$400 per pound. On the streets, the price usually more than doubles to as much as \$900 for that same 1 pound.

CONSUMPTION AND RETAIL VALUE OF DRUGS SUPPLIED TO THE ILLICIT U.S. MARKET, 1979-80

	1979		1980	
	Quantity (metric tons)	Retail value (million U.S. dollars)	Quantity (metric tons)	Retail value (million U.S. dollars)
Heroin	¹ 3.4-4.0	¹ \$7,790-9,160	3.6-4.3	\$7,960-9,500
Cocaine	25-31	19,500-24,180	40-48	26,800-32,160
Marihuana	10,000-13,600	15,480-21,930	10,200-15,000	18,300-26,800
Hashish	200	¹ 1,480	200	1,480
Dangerous drugs		12,000-17,000		14,000-20,000
Total		¹ \$6,250-73,750		68,540-89,940

¹ Revised estimates.

Source: National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC).

Note.—Although the findings summarized in this table reflect the best judgment of NNICC about the quantitative aspects of illegal drug trafficking in the United States, a methods review conducted by a private research organization led to an IRS position that the estimates of importation and consumption of drugs over the entire 1977-80 period may have been too high.

ESTIMATED SUPPLY OF MARIHUANA TO THE U.S. MARKET, 1979-80

Country of origin	Quantity (metric tons)	Percent of total imports	Percent of total supply
1979			
Colombia	7,450-10,100	80	75
Mexico	1,110- 1,500	12	11
Jamaica	740- 1,000	8	7
Domestic	700- 1,000	0	7
Total	10,000-13,600	100	100
1980			
Colombia	7,700-11,300	81	75
Jamaica	1,000- 1,400	10	10
Mexico	800- 1,300	9	8
Domestic	700- 1,000	0	7
Total	10,200-15,000	100	100

Mr. FASCELL. In dealing with coca as I have seen it, you have somebody out in the mountains where there is not even a road, the farmer puts a pack on his back which may weigh 6 pounds, walks it innumerable miles to some collection point, I gather, and then it goes from there to some shed where they begin to process it.

It is very difficult to track the traffickers. It is very difficult even to do the eradications on the side of the mountain, for example, where you can't even get in there with a burro, much less a helicopter or anything else.

It seems to me that one of the things that ought to be considered is the control of the acid that is required to convert the coca leaf. It takes a certain kind of acid. I don't know exactly what that is but it seems to me that is one of the key ingredients in the whole process and we might direct our attention to the supply of acid, because

a lab can be built anywhere, any time. You burn it down and it springs up over here. But acid is tough.

What consideration are we giving to the control and interdiction of the supply of acid?

Ambassador BOYATT. I think that is a very astute comment, Congressman. In fact, the DEA contingent in Bogota has just done a large case study of just that approach to the problem.

The two elements that are needed in great bulk are acetone and ether, as I understand it. And our studies indicate that the aggregates being imported in Colombia are grotesquely beyond legitimate commercial needs and that, therefore, we need and are, in fact, looking at ways of stopping the flows of the chemicals.

There are two ways to do it and we should attack both. One is stopping it at the point at which it is exported and also seeing what we can do about the importing mechanisms to make that a great deal more difficult for the traffickers.

I think that is a classic example of the kind of thing that we ought to be looking at to disrupt the MO of these organizations.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, if you have got labs in remote places that are inaccessible, that acid has to get there some way. I am wondering if we have determined in any way how the acid actually moves. Is it carried on back? Is it flown in?

Ambassador BOYATT. I think both.

Mr. MULLEN. Congressman, I can elaborate just a bit. The ingredient is the ethyl ether. The bulk of this is being obtained from the United States and from West Germany. DEA has undertaken a program recently to see if we can cut off that supply.

This is a necessary ingredient and we will try to limit that supply which is being sent to Colombia.

Mr. FASCELL. We have a lot of problems but there is one in particular I want to mention. I know it is raised with you every time you talk to officials but I have talked to high officials in several governments, Mexico, Colombia, and others, and every time you get to where they think you are pressing the point beyond their capability to accept the pressure they always say, well, you guys use it up there. If you did not use it we would not have the problem.

What do you tell them about that? That goes in connection with spraying. You are asking us to incarcerate our people and destroy our property. What are you doing?

What is our answer?

Ambassador BOYATT. I face that question once a week at least, if not more often, and my answer to it is this: First of all, the United States is doing a great deal in terms of demand reduction but the question of reducing the demand is a long-term factor that is involved in societal problems.

We are working on it. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars on it. That is point number one.

Point number two, and I think this is the telling one in my discussions, is that it is, to some extent, destructive for an official of the United States and an official of Colombia to argue about whose fault the problem is.

The fact is that there is a problem. And the fact is that the problem is destructive of both countries and both societies. It is destructive of the health of our youth and our social and economic fabric

and it is very destructive of the social and economic fabric in Colombia and also is affecting their youth.

Therefore, let us put behind us the argument as to whose fault it is and talk about the important thing which is how we are going to solve it.

I found that to be a fairly effective way of approaching it.

I do think, though, Mr. Fascell, that it is extremely important that we be able to demonstrate graphically to foreign governments that we are approaching the drug problem vigorously in terms of arrest and prosecution, police activity in the United States and in terms of eradication in the United States.

It is not enough to spray one field in some rural county in Georgia and nobody knows about it. What we need, in my judgment, is a massive spraying program in Florida. So what happens in Florida is known instantly by radio and press and other means in South America.

Mr. FASCELL. The attorney general of Florida testified before this committee yesterday, and as you know, we use Paraquat in Florida for other reasons. He said he was prepared to spray, was willing to spray, and that he was willing to have anybody observe who was willing to observe to help dramatize the effort.

Ambassador BOYATT. We ought to send a group up then.

Mr. FASCELL. Perhaps with Mr. Mullen's organization and the attorney general of Florida that could be worked out.

I agree with you, we need some dramatic event to indicate our good faith effort in trying to cope with this problem.

Ambassador BOYATT. I think we have made a lot of progress in this regard. The degree to which the military has been involved in the antidrug effort is all to the good in this sense.

The degree to which I believe our financial and banking laws have been changed make it possible for us to be more effective in attacking the financial dimension of the problem.

I would like to see stronger mandatory laws for drug traffickers in this country. There are a lot of things that could be done to show this good faith but every time some local jurisdiction or State decriminalizes the possession of marihuana that is a problem for us because they come right to me and say, look, you are not serious about it.

Mr. FASCELL. Of course, we have gone the other way in Florida, Mr. Chairman, as you know. We have made the laws more stringent and there are laws pending in Congress which you support as a general concept and I hope we can do what is necessary to buttress your efforts.

Ambassador BOYATT. Thank you, sir.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We are very pleased to have a guest Congressman with us, the Congressman from New York.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank you and the ranking member and the rest of the members for allowing me the courtesy of sharing in these hearings.

I know how jealously you guard your jurisdiction and I assure you that I will not abuse the privilege. I recognize the limitation of time and with the Chair's permission I would like to ask some questions for the record and preface this by lauding the efforts that are being made by the political appointees as well as the civil serv-

ants involved in fighting a domestic and international problem which, to many of us, sometimes appears to be frustrating.

What is most frustrating, however, is how in administration after administration we find the same frontline troops testifying in front of a variety of congressional committees, each saying that they are receiving the utmost cooperation from the host countries and that they can't use any more money without wasting it and that the highest possible political leadership is involved in dealing with these international questions. I have had a chance to review some of the testimony with members of this committee and members of the select committee. The last President that we ever heard who was involved in fighting international drugs was former President Nixon. President Ford came after him and he then appointed Vice President Rockefeller to write a paper on this subject. We then had President Carter and he did not appoint anybody.

Secretary Kissinger never made a priority about this matter and I doubt very much whether Secretary Haig is going to make any statement that would put it on the level of the Falkland Islands dispute.

I don't understand, Secretary DiCarlo, why we have to go into executive session to find out what our President believes our national policy should be. And I don't know why, with AID, that staff can't find a shread of evidence to see whether or not the contributions that we are making to developing countries, whether some of that development money is not improving the very road used for drug trafficking.

Are there nations, in fact, irrigating land for the growing of opium and how is it that this great Nation of ours could possibly enter into a \$3 billion economic and military agreement with Pakistan without drugs being even a secondary consideration in the negotiations?

I would like to ask all of you, with the DEA and the FBI, why is it that Members of Congress can't even explain to our constituents what the status of international negotiations vis-a-vis narcotics is? It is over a year and we don't know who is in charge. You are acting administrator. You come from the FBI. FBI people are being trained to understand DEA work. DEA agents are being trained to understand FBI work.

You have got 20 agents in Thailand, 5 agents in Pakistan. I come from New York. We have an increase in heroin. The district attorneys of five counties are saying that there is a lessening of Federal presence in law enforcement.

The U.S. attorney's office which, both you, Mr. Secretary, and I have been a part of, now don't even take narcotic cases. They determine which violations of the Federal law they would like to handle. We have got a 1,500-case backlog in New York City and they tell us we are lucky because I should take a trip to Florida and see what real problems are.

And you, Mr. Ambassador, have been the only ray of light that I have found because I have heard about your reputation in this area and I was trying to think of some handle that we could get to dramatize the serious nature of the problem and you have given it to me.

The Communist Cubans are the ones that are responsible. And I know that if anything can get the attention of this administration it would be what those Cubans can do in Africa, what they can do in Europe and, thank God, we can focus in now from the State Department on the initiatives.

Now, I have heard from staff that Colombia has one of the most corrupt governments in Latin America and here is the statement: "The corruption of Colombian officials, individuals and institutions, the corruption and addiction of growing numbers of Colombian youth, the Colombian traffic is considered the best organized, best financed." Then it goes into violent crimes, killing judges and even killing people in Miami.

Now, I don't know how these Cubans are able to do so much with so little.

But now, Secretary DiCarlo, that we have been able to focus in on the drug problem—

Ambassador BOYATT. Do you want to know how the Cubans can do it?

Mr. RANGEL. No, I want to get rid of it. If it means dealing directly with Cuba, let's do it, because we have not been able to find out anywhere the priority—I am not talking about executive session—the priority of this administration or previous administrations have given to this problem.

How can you tell me to wait for Dr. Carlton Turner's statement when he testified in front of the select committee saying, "We are going to have to learn how to do more with less." His approach to the problem is not encouraging.

Again, I want to congratulate you for what you have been able to do with so little and I assume that your budgets will even be cut even more as we determine priorities.

My statements are directed directly at the administration and I hope that we in the Congress will be able to focus on what we believe is lack of a priority in the administration's approach to the problem.

But until I hear from my President and until I hear from my Secretary of State and not in executive session, I would believe that we are still waiting for someone to do what Mr. Nixon has done, and that is to cut off military assistance to Turkey, threaten the French, and definitely make it abundantly clear to the Government of Mexico as to what we consider a national priority.

This was not done in executive session and it was not done with just oral communications and you can depend on me and any number of members to be able to strengthen the good job that you are doing by focusing more attention on what we are not doing as a country and as a nation.

Ambassador BOYATT. Congressman Rangel, I hope I can count on your support for taking seriously the fact that Cubans are shipping guns into Colombia. Because let me tell you something, guns kill people and I have seen people shot up by these guns and I have to live with it every day of my life and I can assure you, sir, that it is not a matter for humor. It is a very serious matter and I hope that you will take it as such.

Mr. RANGEL. What has that got to do with the corruption in Colombian institutions and government?

Ambassador BOYATT. That has to do with the statement that you made deprecating the facts that Cubans are shipping the guns down there.

Mr. RANGEL. They have problems in Colombia if they never see a Communist and bringing Communists in only aggravates the problem.

Ambassador BOYATT. I did not bring the Communists in, they came in.

Mr. RANGEL. I want to join with your effort. All I am saying is I could not get a handle on the corruption in Colombia until you gave it to me. I know the feelings of the Secretary of State about Cuban Communists whether we are dealing with independence in African countries or whatever we are talking about.

Their hand is felt there. We have to deal with them. I want to make certain that you know that you can depend on my support.

Mr. DICARLO. Congressman, I am happy to know that we have your support. I know the help you have given in the past. I know you worked many years ago, even before you came to the Congress, and it was a pleasure listening to you again. It brings back many memories.

You have made many points and I haven't the ability to take them down in shorthand, but I can perhaps respond to some of them.

First, let me say that, in talking about executive session, what I have reference to is not the commitment of the President of the United States or the Secretary or of the Vice President or of other people. They have spoken out and they have spoken openly about their commitment.

What I have specific reference to, sir, is getting into specific conversations between people in government when they are negotiating or speaking in private with each other.

If you were to ask me certain questions about my negotiations with people in other countries, I would take the position that, in order not to damage my ability to negotiate with them, I would prefer to give the information to you in executive session. There are certain things I don't think we should have set down in the public record while negotiations are in progress.

As for the statement that everyone says that every nation we deal with has been cooperative and every administration that comes before you has said that they are most cooperative, I never said that.

I have many times said the contrary. It is very difficult to get some countries to cooperate. That is why, in my statement, I made specific reference to the fact that, although we may speak here of certain things we would like to do and that we may be able to try to do certain things, we must remember that our programs will only be as strong as those nations with whom we work.

And I would like to note—as was pointed out, I believe, by one of your colleagues—that one of our problems is not only to get enthusiastic cooperation by some nations, but there has been a history where some leaders of these nations have actively been involved in the traffic themselves.

So I would like to disassociate myself from the generalization that was made, that is, that all of us came before this committee

and said that we have the greatest cooperation from nations. We don't. We don't have the needed cooperation from many nations. We are exercising pressure.

I would like to be diplomatic. I am now in the State Department so I can't say hit people over the head. Hopefully we are talking firmly.

I know of the things that were done successfully in Mexico. I know the things that were done successfully in Turkey. But I think we have to remember that Mexico and Turkey were initially difficult problems to deal with—although we look back now and say they were done but they were easy compared to some of the situations we now face.

I think we have to realize when we are talking about Mexico and Turkey, we were dealing with governments that had control over their territory—strong central governments. We have more problems today—which we pointed out in our statement.

Look at the problem of heroin. In many areas we are dealing with a situation where the United States Government does not have even relationships with the governments of some of these areas. I can point to Afghanistan and complications in Laos.

We have a representative here from Burma. They are very cooperative with the United States. They would like to do more. But simultaneously I have to point out to the Congress that I cannot come before this body and say we are going to solve that problem. We are going to work toward it.

What is the problem there? It did not exist in Mexico. It did not exist in Turkey. There is an insurgency problem in Burma.

The Burmese Communist party is holding and controlling tremendous areas where the bulk of the opium is growing. I would be less than candid if I came before this committee and said we are going to solve that problem in 1 year. It is a military action.

Mr. RANGEL. That was true in Mexico. We are not asking for solutions. We have not heard of any requests for further assistance.

All I am saying is that I was not asking you to share with Congress the sensitive negotiations with heads of sovereign nations. I must have misread or did not see the statements of concern from the President of the United States or from Secretary Haig.

It is my impression and the impression of many, many Members of Congress that our Secretaries of State and our President of the United States have not spoken out on this issue. Maybe I have not seen the documents.

I will ask Dr. Turner to show it to me.

Mr. DiCARLO. The President has spoken out publicly on it. I understand the problem.

Mr. RANGEL. Secretary Haig has had no problem in getting his name in the newspaper. I have not seen it. With the Drug Enforcement Administration we heard the speeches given from the Administration as to support that they should expect. I understand they are a little disappointed on the amount of Federal assistance that is being given to them in fighting narcotics on the local and State level.

I am not saying that you individually are not doing all that you can. I am saying that we are having difficulty associating your excellent efforts with the priorities of the President.

Mr. DiCARLO. One point I think has been mentioned that I think it would go a long way toward understanding the question of money. I have a problem with that.

One of the problems I found in going to certain countries is that they view their narcotic problem as an opportunity to lift their nation by the bootstraps.

They view—some of them view—the narcotic problem as an asset with which they can get money from the United States. To the extent that we indicate that we have huge amounts of money to take care of a problem—that they have an obligation to take care of—to that extent we can delay the solution of the problem.

If we start talking in terms of an entire redevelopment project for an area to reach some people who live on the top of a mountain, the trickle up theory—

Mr. RANGEL. I am not supporting that and believe me, coming from New York as you do, New York State has come to understand even our own economic crises that this administration is not going to pull us up out of our economic tragedies using narcotic law enforcement as a vehicle. So we are not asking you to waste money.

The only thing I am saying is that if you can encourage the President to give more public support to your efforts, you can depend on this Congress to be supportive. That is all I am saying.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MULLEN. Congressman, could I just address that one issue of the FBI/DEA relationship?

I am disappointed that you do not understand everything that is taking place. It is working and it is effective.

Mr. RANGEL. I thought you could not merge without congressional—

Mr. MULLEN. We are not merged.

Mr. RANGEL. You come from the FBI and you are the Acting Director of the DEA but it is not a merger?

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct.

Mr. RANGEL. You have FBI people doing drug work and drug agents doing FBI work?

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct.

I have been up before the Congress on at least half a dozen occasions. Director Webster, Associate Attorney General Giuliani and I appeared before Congressman Hughes' subcommittee and Congressman Edwards' subcommittee meeting in joint session. We have been up before Congressman Zeferettil's Committee on Narcotics to explain what we are doing.

We have given personal briefings, and I offer one to you to explain exactly what is taking place. We want the Congress to be involved and to understand that it is an effective, workable program where the FBI is supplementing the efforts of DEA.

Mr. RANGEL. I want a plan submitted to the Congress that is a legal plan that we can approve of what you guys are doing relying on your best professional judgment.

I don't believe the Congress should interfere in how you want to effectively deal with this national and international project.

I am saying that no matter how many hearings we have, you have to admit that it does sound a little bureaucratic to be saying that there is no merger under the situation which we describe.

I just want the program to come to the Congress so that we can approve and know who to hold accountable. I don't want you acting. I want you approved.

Mr. MULLEN. I have to go through Senate confirmation on that.

Mr. RANGEL. I know that. Let's try to give it a little priority so we can go ahead.

Mr. MULLEN. It has priority. I offered to come up and brief you.

Mr. RANGEL. It bothers me that for a year we have not had a Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Mr. MULLEN. It has been effectively directed, that I assure you.

Mr. RANGEL. We do not have a firm director. You are acting.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Rangel, thank you for coming.

If we can come back to the particular issue that is at hand in front of this committee.

Mr. DiCarlo, the staff study mission to the Golden Triangle area reports that perhaps the single most effective step we could take in Burma, in that area, is to provide FMS loan guarantees in the amount of \$50 million to Burma for the purchase of two C-138 aircraft. This would allow the Burmese to project their forces into the Shan state which they have so little control over.

Do you agree and would there be any problems?

Mr. DiCARLO. I really am not expert enough on how the FMS funds are utilized or on the legal requirements for FMS funds. I assume the purpose is primarily military objectives.

I would have to defer to the Department of Defense on that. Any time you can improve the ability of a country to move into an area it would be effective and helpful.

To what extent I would agree that it should be done, I think, would depend on the purpose of FMS funds and whether or not it is meeting the country's priority for that purpose.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Well, if we are going to authorize and appropriate FMS funds, I think we should have them available for particular purposes as I outlined in the case of Burma in order to cope with their security problems.

I would hope that we would be giving more priority to some of the very difficult questions of economic development in these countries as well as their military security purposes.

This administration seems to give more emphasis to FMS and military expenditures in some of the developing countries.

Mr. DiCARLO. I find it difficult to speak in terms of military expenditures.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The purpose of the question, therefore, would be that you explore that with those who are in a position to make a judgment on this particular issue.

Mr. DiCARLO. Within the Executive Branch, we will certainly review it on our end and make our recommendations.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Since we have discussed money, we did not mean that the amounts should be wasted. Congressman Fascell did not say that throwing money at the problem would solve it. But with your present budget, Secretary DiCarlo, are there any existing programs you consider marginal and could eliminate to strengthen other programs?

If so, would you give some examples?

Mr. DiCARLO. At the present time I cannot do that so let me answer the question in this way: Throughout the year—when different needs arise—we review our program and if it is necessary to transfer from one program to another we do come to Congress for that authorization.

Are there programs where, if something occurred, we would take money from, the answer to that would be yes. We just did that last year in a case where we had a problem in Mexico and we determined that while our programs were not marginal in the sense that they were not needed, we would move funds because of a change in circumstances.

At that time we did move funds from the training program in order to take care of the immediate problem of Mexico. Within that context, yes.

I would have a tough time knowing exactly what is meant by marginal. Marginal means that we could or could not do without them, or the programs are not worthwhile. I would say, hopefully, we have no marginal programs in that sense. In the sense that there are programs that could develop and might be more important, than those that we have to take money from, the answer to that would be yes.

But until we know the amount of money that is required and we review our programs, and review how much money we have not appropriated or expended as yet, or have not contracted for, it would be difficult for me to answer that question.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What is your evaluation of the Thai military action against Khun Sa so far?

Mr. DiCARLO. I think the Thai action is the most hopeful action that we have had in Thailand in many years. We are pursuing the question. The Thais are reviewing the question and we hope that they will follow it up. If there is no follow-up to that action, the action is basically one that is worthless. So we are interested in seeing what happens in Thailand on that issue and we are hopeful that they will follow through.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What are the possibilities of improved efforts on the part of the Thai and Burmese Governments?

Mr. DiCARLO. One of the most hopeful signs that came from the Thai action was the fact that the Thais and the Burmese seem to be getting closer and getting a greater trust of one for the other.

The Thai action is an important element. High representatives of the Thai Government have gone to Burma and people in the Burmese Government have gone to Thailand and we are hopeful for increased cooperation.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Shortly, we will be considering the authorization and funding for the President's CBI, the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

It is my understanding that the narcotics control issue has not been a part of the CBI negotiation and that is one of the issues we have a vital interest in, especially with Jamaica. Is there a possibility of a tie-in as far as some of the funds being used in the Caribbean Basin for narcotics control?

Mr. DiCARLO. I don't believe it is anticipated that specific funds from that initiative will be going to narcotics. We are working in the area on the problem of narcotics and, as these plans material-

ize, funds would be forthcoming but probably not from that particular source.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. My time has expired.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like, on behalf of Congressman Gilman, to ask the representative from AID to submit some answers to some questions regarding projects in Thailand, Pakistan and Peru. I will submit the questions to you at a later time.

Mr. WHEELER. Be glad to do that, Mr. Broomfield.

[The information referred to follows:]

NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION IN PAKISTAN

Question. On page 10 of your testimony you mention planned projects in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) with maximum impact on poppy growing areas. Since control of many parts of the Province by the Pakistani Government is not effective, how will "poppy clauses" be enforced? Can the Pakistan Government meet such commitments in areas it does not control?

Answer. A.I.D.'s approach to narcotics suppression in Pakistan recognizes that: (a) the poppy-growing problem is substantial, and exists in many areas of the NWFP (and, to a much less extent, in Baluchistan); (b) A.I.D. and the GOP can not take on anti-poppy growing activity in all areas simultaneously; and (c) there are several areas where the GOP now has authority and control, or where it could exercise more authority and control than now manifested.

Thus A.I.D. plans, at least initially, to provide its assistance in those areas mentioned in (c) above where effective GOP control now exists, or could readily exist. It would seem to make more sense to move first in those areas to maximize our results in the near and intermediate term. Progress in these areas will make it easier to move into more difficult (non-GOP-controlled) areas later.

In any case, no matter where A.I.D. development activities are undertaken, the poppy clause can be enforced irrespective of the extent of GOP and provincial authority. If poppies are found where A.I.D. is assisting, assistance would either be withdrawn or suspended until the situation is remedied. If the situation is not remedied, assistance would be terminated. In that sense, enforcement of the poppy clause does not depend upon the Pakistanis. It depends solely on the USG, which would act unilaterally.

PERU UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY PROJECT

Question. On page 12 and page 13 of your testimony, you paint a glowing picture of the Upper Huallaga Valley project as representing the first real "marriage" between INM and A.I.D. legitimate interests. Is the "marriage" still in the honeymoon phase, or are there any problems of which we should be aware? More specifically, can we count on the eradication efforts of the Peruvian Government?

Answer. The cooperation between A.I.D. and State's Bureau for International Narcotics Matters (INM), which led to the signing of separate agreements between them and the Peruvian government last September, was not an ad hoc activity. INM and A.I.D. are signatories of an inter-agency agreement on narcotics that requires continuing cooperation. Both in Washington and in the field, the implementation and monitoring of the Upper Huallaga undertaking is a joint responsibility.

We believe the Peruvian government has a firm long term commitment to coca eradication in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Peruvian government funds in the amount of \$8.5 million have been allotted to the Upper Huallaga project, which requires a continuing parallel eradication effort by Peru. INM is currently working in Lima to develop with the Peruvians an agreed multi-year timetable for eradication of coca in the project area.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to inquire about what percent of our international narcotics control funds we are spending annually against heroin, cocaine and marihuana? Our staff estimate is less than 10 percent. Can anybody deal with that? What percent of our international

narcotics control funds are we spending against heroin, cocaine and marihuana?

Mr. DiCARLO. It is a very difficult proposition to answer for this reason: Traditionally when we divided those funds by drugs we count all the funds used in Mexico as funds used for the control of opium. While we could not assist the Government of Mexico in the eradication of marihuana, as an example, because of the amendments restricting our ability to deal with them on the question of paraquat, the air fleet that basically was provided through U.S. funds was used by the Mexicans themselves in that marihuana control effort. We were spending about \$8 million in Mexico, including the dual purpose air fleet.

How much we give to marihuana or how much we give to heroin is rather difficult to calculate. I would say that, as a domestic problem the Mexicans view marihuana as more serious in their country than they do the problem of heroin.

So I would say, in that area, we have to take ratios of effort and apply them to heroin versus marihuana calculations.

Mr. FASCELL. How about on an overall basis?

Mr. DiCARLO. Overall basis, if we attribute the money that is spent in Mexico only to heroin, we come up with a figure of 64 percent for heroin versus 36 percent for cocaine, marihuana and other drugs.

That is very misleading, as I said. We calculate all of the money going to Mexico in that equation to heroin when it should not be.

Mr. FASCELL. Could you give us some kind of tabular form, the best of your estimates on this issue?

Mr. DiCARLO. On the issue I would say the majority of the funds probably still go for heroin and that is because of opportunities to do something. We don't allocate our funds based upon the drug.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand.

Mr. DiCARLO. We allocate based on where we find the best opportunity to do something. Where those opportunities exist that is where we spend the money. That is the reason for the breakdown.

Mr. FASCELL. So you are saying you are using all the money that is available?

Mr. DiCARLO. We are using all of the money that is available. At the end of the year, if we have not spent it as we did last year, some money could be returned because of the failure of some government to come through with an agreement.

But to the extent that we allocate our money we use it.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. DiCarlo or Mr. Mullen, from the testimony that I have heard, I see that there is cooperation between the various agencies, DEA, INM and AID. Should there be a written agreement on cooperation in this field between DEA and INM?

Mr. DiCARLO. I believe, sir, it is something we could look into but I believe the cooperation we now have is extremely good. We have these mechanisms for monthly meetings and when we have any problems we can adjust it at those meetings.

I believe this present plan gives a great deal of flexibility. We are working well with each other but certainly that would not preclude a written arrangement if we find out that it is necessary.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Mullen?

Mr. MULLEN. I feel much the same way. I do not at this time feel the need for an agreement, but it is something that we could explore.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire?

The Vice President's task force which has been assigned to the problem in Florida on drug interdiction generally has been able to muster additional forces, manpower, money and equipment into the struggle.

It has been extremely effective, widely publicized. It would seem to me that that effort would be of help to us, Mr. Ambassador, in Colombia if that is generally known.

Certainly the drug traffickers know it. As a matter of fact, the Vice President's efforts were unfortunately criticized from that point of view. That is, he had to make the announcement so, therefore, the announcement was known by the drug traffickers and they are sitting on their verandas sipping martinis waiting for the task force to go home.

But, nevertheless, I welcome the efforts of the task force and the additional manpower regardless of whether it was criticized in some quarters and I think unjustly.

The question is: Should not that be of definite help to you in Colombia?

Ambassador BOYATT. Yes, sir. It already has been. It was noticed immediately and through the International Communications Agency, the Public Affairs Officer in Bogota, who is part of my staff, we set about, via press releases and other contexts, to make this well known in Colombia and it is indeed well known in Colombia, both overtly in the sense that it is part of the public record and much appreciated and it helps me.

But also, we have reports and evidence that the druggers are complaining about it and that is a good sign.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it might have to be a roving task force. The thing that disturbs me, you see, is that if this focus of equipment and personnel and effort is on one locality for a given period of time and is effective and then is moved, then I think we are going to have a problem. We have got the problem already because we have a shortage around the country as I see it, in the enforcement effort.

So if we drive drug traffickers to Georgia, Louisiana and Alabama and Texas or wherever and spread them around we really haven't solved the problem in the final analysis, although I am glad to get the relief in Florida.

Mr. MULLEN. Congressman, we are prepared to shift the resources if this should happen. We are watching the movement from the West Coast and up the coast of the Carolinas to New England, so that is something we are flexible on.

Mr. FASCELL. But it is very important, don't you agree, Mr. Mullen, to disrupt the method of operation every chance you get?

Mr. MULLEN. That is correct. I was in total agreement with publicizing the effort.

Mr. FASCELL. So was I.

Ambassador BOYATT. So was I.

Mr. FASCELL. I think the criticism of the announcement was unjust, unfair and I thoroughly supported the idea.

Mr. MULLEN. It has given us a breather, a chance to marshall our resources and get the cases into the judicial system. They have got a perishable product there, too.

Ambassador BOYATT. As Assistant Secretary DiCarlo points out, it also makes it clear to governments that we are serious. It had an impact, I understand, on Bolivian policy.

Mr. DiCARLO. Concerning Bolivia, we went down to show the interest of this administration, pointing out that this problem was so important that the President wanted the Vice President to give impetus to drug control actions in this hemisphere. This conveyed to all the congressional members specifically that the Secretary of State had a direct interest in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia and that he assisted in us getting a program in Bolivia.

Mr. FASCELL. It was an important announcement at the highest level of our Government dealing with the problem of illicit drugs and crime in general and it was a highly publicized statement, I think, of tremendous value internationally and domestically.

I hope in following the general trend raised by the gentleman from New York, that that kind of effort continues because Ambassadors like Mr. Boyatt are going to need all the help they can get to dramatize and to demonstrate and to show our good faith efforts in the United States.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Related to the question we are discussing at the present time, Mr. Mullen, can you advise the committee of how the allocations of DEA agents abroad and at home are made, what is the rationale, and are you considering any changes in this allocation ratio?

Mr. MULLEN. We allocate the resources based on need and where they can be effective. This would include the importance of a particular nation to the overall drug problem. That is, is it a main source country and do we have cooperative law enforcement in that country so it can effectively use the people we send there.

We continually review the assignment of agents overseas. On occasion, we will send them on temporary duty if, for example, we find an upsurge of activity in a country.

In Bolivia, for example, we have two permanent agents now assigned and three are on temporary duty. We plan to increase that to four permanent and four temporary because of the upsurge in activity.

We assign them based on need and their ability to be effective.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Then how do you explain the allocation of more than 20 DEA personnel to Thailand and only 5 assigned to Pakistan since it is my understanding Pakistan is the greatest source country at present?

Mr. MULLEN. It is at present, and we are increasing the staff from five to seven. Again, the 20 we do have in Thailand are very effective because they have total cooperation and can be used effectively there.

We have had some difficulties in the northwest frontier area of Pakistan because the Government itself did not have total control over the situation.

So, when the Government really could not operate effectively, we certainly could not have operated effectively. I did meet this past

week with Governor Haq from the northwest frontier area. He is taking a more positive posture.

His troops recently seized a laboratory there and that is one of the reasons we are increasing our presence. If this continues, we will increase it even further.

Ambassador BOYATT. Mr. Chairman, could I say something about that point that you raised?

I am sure you understand it but we cannot unilaterally introduce DEA or other personnel of the U.S. Government into a country. We are there at the sufferance of the host country. It is possible to reach the saturation stage. You get to the point where it is politically unwise to increase a DEA contingent in a given country.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Politically for the politicians in the country?

Ambassador BOYATT. Yes. A foreign leader will make the judgment that we cannot absorb any more U.S. police agencies in our country. You have questions of nationalism, questions of national pride and a whole host of considerations that have to be judged when we make these moves.

We cannot unilaterally decide we are going to add x percent more agents in this or that country and then do it. We have to go to that country and get its permission in one form or another.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Rangel.

Mr. RANGEL. I just want to assure the individual witnesses that if they have problems that they can rely on us as Members in Congress to be of assistance. Please don't take my harsh criticism of our national policy as an interference in communication.

All of you have reputations as being dedicated, hard-working officials, and Dominick DiCarlo, with whom I served on the State Assembly in New York as well as a guy from Brooklyn, I don't have any problems.

I just want you to know, Mr. Ambassador, that many of us in the Congress believe that we are part of government and that it is not just a question of our Secretaries of State and Ambassadors to determine sensitivity and national pride of other governments. You are professionals but some of us are not.

We have the same kind of pride in our community and our country and believe that when something is a threat to our national security that we will use whatever legislative and political leverage we have.

We hope that you will give us direction so that we are not tearing down the work that you are building. But unless I can feel that there is a strong federal presence through the executive branch that is not restricted to the individual frontline troops, then many of us in Congress are going to do the best we can.

We hope that you have the ability to clean up after we do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Probably on that note we should conclude the hearing but I do have just one other question that bothers me, Mr. Ambassador.

It is rumored that there is a real prospect that marihuana will be legalized in the near future in Colombia. Is this true?

Ambassador BOYATT. I have been thinking about that question for several weeks, Mr. Chairman, because I knew it was coming

and let me answer it this way. Colombia, in the context of its democratic constitution and tradition is in the midst of a presidential election campaign.

There are three candidates in that campaign which will represent two different parties. One party is split between two candidates. I do not want to be in the position of being accused of interfering in the Colombian election process. How they do it and what they do is their business.

I do, however, have the responsibility as the American Ambassador there to make sure that all leadership elements in Colombia understand the seriousness with which the United States takes the drug problem and other aspects of our foreign policy as well and in that process I and members of my staff have been consulting, informally, with the candidates and with their advisers.

I think I can say to you that marihuana will not be legalized in Colombia by the next administration, whoever leads that administration.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Well, gentlemen, you have contributed to a much better understanding with your excellent testimony and your direct answers to our questions.

I think all of us are of the same opinion. We want to work together and cooperate and see if we can cope with this problem. Certainly we must conclude that dollars alone, the amount of dollars is not the answer. But the method and the sincerity, the zeal and the application of whatever funds are made available is the answer.

Thank you very much for appearing before the committee. We thank you for your testimony.

The committee stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: U.S. POLICIES

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 1982

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:25 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. The committee will please come to order.

Today, the Committee on Foreign Affairs concludes with its series of three hearings on international narcotics control.

On Tuesday we heard from a distinguished group of witnesses who described most vividly and forcefully the impact of the flow of illicit narcotic drugs from abroad on every aspect of our society, including violence and crime, economic dislocations, health effects, deleterious effects on our values and way of life.

They painted a painful and sobering picture underlining the need for concerned and concerted action to combat this threat to our security and well-being.

Yesterday, we heard testimony about the current strategy in programs of the Department of State, DEA, and AID in their efforts to stem the flow at the sources, those countries whose production and resources account for the flood of illicit drugs entering this country.

The committee sought to shed some light on why we have not been able to more effectively reduce the flow of narcotics from abroad as well as to learn more of our successes in this effort.

Today, we have before us representatives of the administration's policy level with regard to narcotics control. Representing the Attorney General who is the Chairman of the White House Cabinet Council on Legal Matters, which is charged with narcotics control policy, we have Mr. Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Attorney General of the Department of Justice.

Also, we have Dr. Carlton E. Turner, Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office, and Mr. Charles Z. Wick, Director of the International Communications Agency.

Gentlemen, we thank you for coming today and we will begin the testimony with Mr. Giuliani.

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STATEMENT OF RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. GIULIANI. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be here this morning.

I would just briefly summarize the statement that I have submitted and then proceed.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. We appreciate the summary and your prepared written statement will be made part of the record.

Mr. GIULIANI. Drug enforcement in both its domestic and international aspects has been one of the chief priorities of this administration since it came into office just over 1 year ago.

In our view, the people of this Nation face no crime problem more serious than that presented by drug trafficking and abuse.

Recent figures suggest that drug traffickers have created a criminal business with a gross income of nearly \$79 billion per year. This untaxed, underground enterprise is larger than all legitimate corporations in the world except Exxon.

Drug trafficking produces millionaires overnight and displaces entire State economies in the process.

Furthermore, it breeds substantial amounts of related crime, including public corruption on the part of officials who permit drug trafficking to thrive and violent crime by addicts and by groups competing for the lucrative drug trade.

Clearly the magnitude of the problem warrants the sustained efforts of concerned officials at all levels of government.

The past 12 months have been a year of internal changes and streamlining within the Department of Justice designed to improve our domestic drug enforcement effort. To that end we reorganized the Drug Enforcement Administration and developed a new and closer relationship between the DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

We became an integral part of the Vice President's task force on south Florida. We initiated a new task force program involving DEA and the U.S. Customs Service in south Florida.

These new domestic enforcement activities will yield impressive results in the months and years to come.

These hearings, however, come at an opportune moment, because we are now directing our attention at those aspects of the drug problem which cannot adequately be dealt with by the Department of Justice acting alone.

Just as 1981 was a year of improvement in our domestic enforcement capabilities, 1982 will be the year in which the Department of Justice seeks to expand its efforts to involve all executive branch departments and agencies which have a role to play in drug enforcement.

This, of course, will place a greater emphasis on the international aspects of drug enforcement.

Clearly, the drug problem is international in scope. As you well know, domestic drug enforcement, while critical, is not the complete answer. Drug crops and crops which are processed into drugs grow largely on foreign soil. Ships and planes carry drugs to our shores from those and other nations.

The drug problem—and drug enforcement—challenges us on at least two fronts in addition to the domestic front. Of course, I refer to supply reduction in source countries and interdiction at our borders and on the seas.

As the vehicle for sharing our concerns across the executive branch, the President has established a Cabinet Council on Legal Policy.

As you know, the President uses the Cabinet Council mechanism as a tool for making decisions which affect multiple agencies and as a forum for the debate of policy issues requiring his decision.

The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy is the sixth such council created by the President. It was created at the recommendation of Attorney General Smith. It will bring together the responsible officials in at least three areas: immigration, civil rights and, most important for present purposes, drug supply reduction and enforcement.

The Cabinet Council is chaired by the Attorney General. Its membership includes the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, Transportation, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services, Interior and Commerce, as well as the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

The Council has held its first meeting, which dealt solely with drug enforcement issues. At that meeting, the Attorney General outlined the nature and the scope of the drug problem in this Nation and discussed the ways in which the resources of all these departments and agencies can best be used to reduce drug supply.

We are now developing recommendations for Presidential action. To develop these recommendations, the Attorney General has appointed a Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction, of which I am the chairman. Every participating department and agency has, in turn, designated a representative to this Working Group.

The Working Group will develop recommendations for Presidential action on a variety of issues ranging from use of the exceptions to the posse comitatus act to the development of appropriate diplomatic initiatives overseas.

In short, this Working Group will be the focal point for the development of issues and the resolution of any controversies which may arise.

Those issues requiring decision by the Cabinet Council itself, and those issues on which accommodation cannot be reached in the Working Group, can be addressed by the full Cabinet Council or, if necessary, by the President.

We believe that the Cabinet Council, as presently structured, is the best mechanism for bringing together for discussion and decision the heads of all agencies with a role to play in drug enforcement.

I would like next to discuss the principal steps we will take in the international field. Our major goal, of course, is to diminish drug supply in this country by controlling and reducing production of the illicit substances at their foreign source, or as close to the source as possible.

To accomplish this, we must motivate officials in foreign source countries and in foreign transit countries, and assist them in devel-

oping their own drug law enforcement and ancillary programs. Through such efforts, we can in time reduce the supply of illicit drugs destined for consumption in the United States.

Both the Department of State and the Department of Justice have a crucial role to play in this effort. By coordinating the work of those two departments through the Cabinet Council, we hope to assign to drug enforcement a higher priority than ever before.

Through the Department of Justice—more specifically, through DEA's foreign operations—we will continue to encourage and support enforcement operations in source countries and transit countries.

In the course of our study last summer to develop the most effective relationship between the DEA and the FBI, we surveyed foreign officials in key drug-producing countries. They were unanimous in their support for DEA's overseas operations. DEA performs this function with great skill and success.

Together with diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Department of State, DEA's foreign operation will remain the focal point of our overseas efforts.

In foreign nations, DEA's personnel work closely with local authorities. They provide advice and expertise and they assist foreign officials in putting their resources to the best use possible.

DEA also collects and produces operational and strategic intelligence and shares that with law enforcement agencies in this Nation. This information also enables DEA to recognize and forecast future drug-producing and trafficking trends, so as to facilitate better planning.

Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the Acting Administrator of DEA, has already outlined in some detail the activities of DEA overseas.

I will not repeat that testimony except to note once again that we regard DEA's overseas activities as essential to effective drug enforcement.

Mr. Chairman, I do not have to emphasize for you the importance of overseas work in combatting our nation's drug problem. The drug problem in this country has been compared to an overflowing sink. We can mop the overflow from the floor; we can bail out the water in the sink; but we must ultimately gain the ability to stop the flow, at least partially. In the case of drugs, this faucet is not within this country.

For this reason, we are devoting substantial time and resources to international narcotics control. The Cabinet Council and ultimately the Departments of State and Justice will do their share to reduce supplies of drugs which might otherwise reach our shores.

We will assist our drug enforcement colleagues in foreign nations by working with them in a cooperative way to achieve our mutual goals.

I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you very much.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Giuliani.

[Mr. Giuliani's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, ASSOCIATE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here this morning to discuss with you the subject of international narcotics control and the steps we are taking in the international arena.

Drug enforcement, in both its domestic and international aspects, has been one of the chief priorities of this administration since it came into office just over 1 year ago. In our view, the people of this Nation face to crime problem more serious than that presented by drug trafficking and abuse. Recent figures suggest that drug traffickers have created a criminal business with a gross income of nearly \$79 billion per year. This untaxed, underground enterprise is larger than all legitimate corporations in the world except Exxon. Drug trafficking produces millionaires overnight and displaces entire State economies in the process. Furthermore, it breeds substantial amounts of related crime, included public corruption on the part of officials who permit drug trafficking to thrive, and violent crime by addicts and by groups competing for the lucrative drug trade. Clearly, the magnitude of the problem warrants the sustained efforts of concerned officials at all levels of government.

The past 12 months have been a year of internal changes and streamlining within the Department of Justice, designed to improve our domestic drug enforcement effort. To that end, we reorganized the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and developed a new and closer relationship between the DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We became an integral part of the Vice President's Task Force on South Florida. We initiated a new task force program involving DEA and the U.S. Customs Service in south Florida. These new domestic enforcement activities will yield impressive results in the months and years to come.

These hearings, however, come at an opportune moment, because we are now directing our attention at those aspects of the drug problem which cannot adequately be dealt with by the Department of Justice acting alone. Just as 1981 was a year of improvement in our domestic enforcement capabilities, 1982 will be the year in which the Department of Justice seeks to expand its efforts to involve all executive branch departments and agencies which have a role to play in drug enforcement. This, of course, will place a greater emphasis on the international aspects of drug enforcement.

Clearly, the drug problem is international in scope. As you well know, domestic drug enforcement, while critical, is not the complete answer. Drug crops and crops which are processed into drugs grow largely on foreign soil. Ships and planes carry drugs to our shores from those and other nations. The drug problem—and drug enforcement—challenges us on at least two fronts in addition to the domestic front. Of course, I refer to supply reduction in source countries and interdiction at our borders and on the seas.

As the vehicle for sharing our concerns across the executive branch. The President has established a Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. As you know, the President uses the Cabinet Council mechanism as a tool for making decisions which affect multiple agencies and as a forum for the debate of policy issues requiring his decision. The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy is the sixth such council created by the President. It was created at the recommendation of Attorney General Smith. It will bring together the responsible officials in at least three areas: immigration, civil rights, and, most important for present purposes, drug supply reduction and enforcement.

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I would like next to discuss the principal steps we will take in the international field. Our major goal, of course, is to diminish drug supply in this country by controlling and reducing production of the illicit substances at their foreign source, or as close to the source as possible. To accomplish this, we must motivate officials in foreign source countries and in foreign transit countries, and assist them in developing their own drug law enforcement and ancillary programs. Through such efforts, we can in time reduce the supply of illicit drugs destined for consumption in the United States.

Both the Department of State and the Department of Justice have a crucial role to play in this effort. By coordinating the work of those two Departments through the Cabinet Council, we hope to assign to drug enforcement a higher priority than ever before.

Through the Department of Justice—more specifically, through DEA's foreign operations—we will continue to encourage and support enforcement operations in source countries and transit countries. In the course of our study last summer to develop the most effective relationship between the DEA and the FBI, we surveyed foreign officials in key drug producing countries. They were unanimous in their support for DEA's overseas operations. DEA performs this function with great skill and success. Together with diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the Department of State, DEA's foreign operation will remain the focal point of our overseas efforts.

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For this reason, we are devoting substantial time and resources to international narcotics control. The Cabinet Council and ultimately the Departments of State and Justice will do their share to reduce supplies of drugs which might otherwise reach our shores. We will assist our drug enforcement colleagues in foreign nations by working with them in a cooperative way to achieve our mutual goals.

I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Turner, if you will proceed.

STATEMENT OF DR. CARLTON E. TURNER, DIRECTOR, DRUG ABUSE POLICY OFFICE, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

Dr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to appear before you today.

I would also like to thank you for holding the hearing. I think it is complementary in that we need more people involved the international drug control. I appreciate this opportunity to meet with your committee.

As the President stated in New Orleans last September, part of his drug-abuse strategy would be a foreign policy that vigorously seeks to interdict and eradicate illicit drugs wherever cultivated, processed or transported.

He said this includes the responsible use of herbicides. In our overall view of the international issue we think the eradication of drugs in the source country is the one area in which we can do most with the fewest dollars.

We continue this approach by impressing upon our colleagues in the international area that narcotics considerations must be brought into international bilateral and multilateral agreements, I think we have an opportunity to do more than has been done in the past.

We also are going to call on the international banking community to consider use of narcotics clauses in areas located in, or adjacent to, areas producing illicit drugs.

We would like to encourage the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to look, now that they have a new director, at ways in which that organization can more effectively pursue the narcotics problem in source and transiting countries.

We want to communicate to other countries of the world the commitment made of the President and other members of this administration, to help solve the drug problems, both in our own country and in other parts of the world.

We would like to make available accurate information about our own program. Sometimes, as we travel internationally, we find that the things that we are doing here are not necessarily being communicated abroad.

I am talking about pro-drug statements in our newspapers which have a tendency to be spread all over newspapers in foreign countries, whereas the U.S. anti-drug efforts are not reported.

However, the international programs alone will not solve the drug problem. Other witnesses have given you details. The President's overall program is a five-prong approach taking the international initiatives and integrating them in with law enforcement, border interdiction and what we can do in this country with a detoxification and treatment program, along with the appropriate research and development, and a massive educational and preventive program. Our aim is to mount a coordinated effort including both supply reduction and demand reduction.

We think that both efforts are important and without a coordinated effort, we will not be able to do what we have set out to do.

Our approach is not to rediscover the wheel but to take the best of past administrations, combine those into a comprehensive program, add our own initiatives, and make certain that program is coordinated.

The President has set forth the Cabinet Council system as the primary policy mechanism. We have two Cabinet Councils which have been assigned the drug issue. One is the Cabinet Council on Human Resources. It has a Working Group on the Health Aspects of Drug Abuse, which I chair. It includes all of the agencies that have a responsibility in the health area. The Associate Attorney General chairs a working group under the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, which deals primarily with supply reduction.

The work of these two Cabinet Councils' will be coordinated to produce a strong strategy document that will be provided to you in the summer.

This, Mr. Chairman, is an overview. I am ready to answer any questions you may have at this time or later.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Turner.

[Mr. Turner's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. CARLTON E. TURNER, DIRECTOR, DRUG ABUSE POLICY OFFICE, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you today. Drug abuse is an important issue to many nations and is of great concern across the United States.

Both the President and the First Lady are actively involved in efforts to reduce drug abuse. The First Lady has been especially effective in calling attention to the dangers of drug abuse among school-age children. Through her visits to drug programs for adolescents, the First Lady is mobilizing families to fight drug abuse in their local communities. Dollar values cannot be placed on this type of effort.

The President has established a Task Force, headed by the Vice President, to address problems in South Florida caused by drug trafficking, violent crime, and immigration. The Task Force is focusing on increasing drug smuggling interdiction, strengthening the Federal investigation capability, establishing a Financial Law Enforcement Center, improving the prosecutorial system, and attempting to resolve the problem of overcrowding in Federal prisons.

These are examples of how the Administration is pursuing a comprehensive drug abuse program that incorporates international and domestic initiatives. I would like to share with you my observations on the key directions, major issues and objectives, and priorities of the program and the policy mechanism which is being used to develop and implement the program.

KEY DIRECTIONS

The Reagan Administration's overall approach to reducing the availability of illegal drugs involves expanding Federal drug law enforcement to include existing federal investigative and support resources not previously committed to this task.

The closer alignment of the DEA with the FBI and the enhanced participation of the U.S. Customs Service in collecting information overseas are two examples of increasing the use of available Federal resources.

We are moving the drug enforcement focus from the drug itself to the criminal activities associated with drug trafficking. The South Florida initiatives, managed by the Vice President, and the use of military intelligence and equipment are two examples.

Our primary international focus is on eradicating illicit drugs at their source. Specific initiatives include our negotiations with Colombia and Thailand.

Eradication of drugs at their source also includes domestic eradication. We are aware that successful international efforts to reduce the flow of drugs coming into the United States creates a greater demand for domestically-produced illegal drugs. We are designing Federal efforts to serve as a catalyst for State and local law enforcement efforts to tackle the problem of local drug production.

MAJOR ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES

The Reagan Administration's overall program focuses on stopping the flow of drugs from the source to the streets and reducing the demand for drugs. The program establishes a broad and balanced perspective which will take full advantage of Federal, State, and local resources.

The program is comprehensive, encompassing five major areas:

- * International Cooperation
- * Law Enforcement
- * Education and Prevention
- * Detoxification and Treatment
- * Research

The Federal involvement in drug abuse prevention and control amounts to almost \$1 billion in direct Federal support. To ensure that Federal efforts are compatible with and supportive of the efforts of State and local governments, Federal efforts are being reoriented to focus on specific needs of individual communities and priorities will be established on a local or regional basis.

The success of this national effort also depends on the dedication and the resources of private industry, public organizations and citizen volunteers -- especially in the area of education and prevention.

The national effort to prevent and control drug abuse cannot be restricted to the Federal government. It must involve the millions of families who ultimately suffer the consequences of drug abuse. Federal responsibilities will not be passed off to the private sector, but an important Federal role is to encourage the broad involvement of many individuals and organizations -- especially those who are most affected.

Drug abuse is a world wide problem requiring multinational initiatives. Since approximately 90% of illicit drugs come from other countries, the most effective place to control drugs is to stop them from reaching the United States. In the international area, the Administration is undertaking the development and implementation of a long-range, organized effort to eliminate illicit drugs at their source and to interdict illicit drugs in transit. Specific initiatives include:

- * Urging and assisting other countries to develop programs to eradicate illicit drugs grown or produced within their own borders and to develop programs to address their own drug problems.
- * Continuing our support to producing and transiting countries in the form of technical training, advice, and equipment.
- * Including drug considerations in international agreements.
- * Encouraging the international banking community to include drug considerations in their lending and operating protocols.
- * Participating in international drug control and enforcement organizations to gain greater international cooperation among all nations that produce, transit, and/or consume illicit drugs. This includes strong support of the United State's major involvement in the program planning activities of agencies such as the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). We also support worldwide drug control strategy objectives for all nations as put forth by the U.N.
- * Communicating to other countries our strong commitment to prevent and control drug abuse in the United States.
- * Making accurate information on drugs available to other countries in their own language.

In the area of law enforcement, our goals are to reduce the availability of illicit drugs, make the costs of drug trafficking prohibitive, and vigorously enforce our drug laws.

Specific initiatives include:

- * Improving cooperation and coordination among Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies.
- * Revising laws, regulations and operating priorities to strengthen the drug enforcement effort.
- * Emphasizing efforts to intercept drug traffic on the high seas and to interdict illicit drugs coming across our borders.
- * Making use of military information and equipment to assist Federal law enforcement activities, with emphasis on integrating drug enforcement needs into routine operational and training activities of the military services.
- * Proving encouragement and technical assistance to States to eradicate illicit drugs produced in this country.
- * Simplifying drug regulatory mechanisms without weakening controls.
- * Ensuring that major drug traffickers receive mandatory minimum prison sentences that cannot be circumvented through plea bargaining or mitigated through parole.

In the areas of education and prevention, the Administration is embarking upon a comprehensive, long-term campaign to discourage drug and alcohol use among school-age children and to reduce the demand for drugs by all of our citizens.

Education: Our goal is to educate parents about drugs and how to recognize and deal with drug abuse in their homes, schools and communities.

- * Government cannot do this job alone. By capitalizing on the tremendous potential of voluntary citizen efforts, of individuals and organized groups, from the religious to the business communities, we will tap the most important natural resource of this country -- the citizens themselves.
- * We will promote the family unit -- the primary socializing mechanism of society -- as the best vehicle for discouraging drug abuse by school-age children. Parents are especially effective against the use of marijuana and alcohol -- two of the most common drugs of introduction into regular drug use.
- * We will call on private business, labor organizations and the "influencers of youth" -- mass media, the entertainment industry, and the sports establishment -- to use their unique abilities to deglamorize the drug scene and raise concern about drug and alcohol abuse.
- * We will be asking State Governors to identify and use community leaders to play key roles in developing State drug prevention initiatives and to support volunteer activities in the private sector, in addition to providing advice on government programs.

Prevention: Our goal is to produce clear thinking young Americans capable of making complex decisions without having to concurrently deal with problems created by drug abuse.

- * Our education and prevention efforts for school-age children will concentrate on alcohol and marijuana. Students themselves admit that most of the drug problems in their lives are caused by these two drugs.
- * Prevention efforts must be geared to reversing the peer pressure to use drugs. According to youngsters in a drug treatment program in Florida, they said "no" to drug use from three to five times before their first drug experience. This is an area with great potential for real success and can affect other behaviors in addition to drug abuse.
- * Parents, local service groups, and business must play a positive role by providing wholesome recreational and community service activities as an alternative to drug use. Many young people claim that they took drugs because everyone else was doing it, they were bored, and there was "nothing to do".
- * Our prevention efforts must address the problem of drunk driving. Accident rates for young drivers have always been higher than for adults and marijuana and alcohol together in the young driver is a deadly combination.
- * The Administration will be working with physicians, pharmacists, and research organizations to find ways to reduce the abuse of prescription and over-the-counter drugs.

Specific goals for prevention are:

- * By 1984, reduce the daily use of drugs by 30% as reported in the NIDA annual survey.

- * To establish a Parent-Peer group in every high school, jr. high school and elementary school by 1984.
- * To have at least 15 States organized, based on the "Texas War-on-Drugs" model, by 1983 and 30 States by 1984.
- * Provide accurate information on drugs, written in plain English, to:
 - all pediatricians and family practice physicians for display in their offices by 1983;
 - all major retail pharmacy chains by 1983;
 - all school and public libraries by 1984.

The detoxification and treatment programs in the United States have grown from 183 in 1968 to 3,449 in 1980. Almost half of these operate without Federal funding. Total funding for the 3,449 programs was approximately two-thirds from State and local government and private sources and one-third from Federal funds. Federal funding through the 1970s has been used to promote the growth of this treatment capability. In 1982, we have incorporated the Federal share of the support of treatment into the State Block Grants. Facilities that have been receiving Federal funds may now ask their State for a share of the Block Grant funds or seek additional funding from other sources. The Federal Government will continue to meet the longer-term responsibility of conducting research into the causes and effects of drug abuse and providing information and guidance to help States design treatment responses to the drug problems of their local communities. Emphasis will be placed on:

- * Integrating drug treatment services into the general health care system, when appropriate.
- * Encouraging private industry, religious groups, private organizations, and State agencies to work together to support treatment programs.
- * Promoting drug-free treatment programs for adolescents which emphasize termination of drug use and entry into a drug-free environment.
- * Advocating greater selectivity in determining strict treatment approaches for hard-core heroin addicts who continue to have significant criminal involvement.

In the area of research, the Administration will promote the dissemination of information about drugs in a timely and understandable way for use by health care professionals, educators, and the public. Specific initiatives include:

- * Producing accurate and clearly written information about drugs and making this information widely available to parents and young people so that there will be a credible source of information to counteract the myths and errors that are perpetuated in pro-drug magazines and tabloids.
- * Continuing to support longitudinal and epidemiological research to expand our knowledge of drug use patterns and the long-term effects of drugs.
- * Emphasizing basic research into the biological and psychological determinants of drug abuse.

- * Giving priority to research into the development of chemical agents (called antagonists and/or mixed agonist/antagonists) that will block or change the expected action of a drug.
- * Evaluating drug urinalysis technology to ensure the accuracy and reliability of testing.
- * Making appropriate use of available methods to detect trends and monitor the potency levels of street drugs.
- * Developing standard measures to assess impairment of individuals who are using a variety of drugs.

Drug and alcohol abuse by members of the Armed Forces is a continuing concern. The Department of Defense has established a strong policy based on the conclusion that alcohol and drug abuse is incompatible with the maintenance of high performance standards, military discipline, and combat readiness. The military drug abuse budget has increased over 50% in 1983 and the program includes:

- * Increased emphasis against the use of drugs and alcohol in the military.
- * The continued development and refinement of drug monitoring and assessment efforts, including urine testing for cannabis use.
- * Using urinalysis results in disciplinary proceedings.

POLICY MECHANISMS

As the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office within the Office of Policy Development at the White House, I am responsible, by designation and statute, for the overall

coordination of drug abuse policies and overseeing Federal efforts to prevent drug abuse and control drug trafficking. My role as the drug abuse policy adviser includes fostering cooperation among the agencies, mediating problems, and seeking support for the President's drug program.

To assist in monitoring the agency activities, I have established an Oversight Working Group, composed of senior officials from the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Administration, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense. This group meets with me each month and provides a timely opportunity to keep each other informed about current operational concerns, and to discuss and anticipate future policy and management issues. For example, at the first meeting of the Oversight Working Group in October, we began reviewing the actions that could be taken to address the South Florida problem. The Oversight Working Group also has been addressing such issues as property seized and forfeited in connection with drug arrests, interdiction of foreign drug smugglers on the high seas, and the compatibility of data on drug use and drug production.

The principal policy mechanism in this Administration is the Cabinet Council system. Two of the Cabinet Councils are involved in drug policy: The Cabinet Council on Health and Human Resources and the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. The Cabinet Council on Health and Human Resources has established a working group, which I chair, on drug abuse health issues. A similar working group exists under the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, chaired by Associate Attorney General Rudolph Giuliani, to prepare policy recommendations and coordinate law enforcement activities aimed at reducing the supply of illegal drugs. I am a member of that working group and, additionally, am charged with ensuring that the efforts of the two Cabinet Council working groups are coordinated with each other.

Both working groups are engaged in reviewing the drug abuse issues and objectives in their areas of responsibility, and preparing policy recommendations. We will have a comprehensive 1982 Drug Abuse Strategy published this summer. The Strategy will incorporate the issues and objectives of our program.

PRIORITIES

The Administration does not attempt to dictate, from a national level, the relative priority for local responses to drug problems. We are concerned with the widespread health and social problems created by the abuse of a range of drugs.

The Administration continues to recognize the need for a strong response to heroin. But, we will not support a single priority drug for the whole nation. We will support a system of priorities which addresses the specific drug problems in differing geographic areas. We expect local priorities to also respond to the growing numbers of people and families who are suffering the direct and indirect effects of drug abuse involving marijuana and alcohol use by school-age children.

In the international area, setting priorities based on a single drug is appropriate and will be continued where the nature of the source or physical characteristics of the drug dictates a drug-specific effort. The international community is taking note of the commitment of the United States in reducing and preventing drug abuse and some are beginning to turn their attention to the advantages of international cooperation to reduce drug abuse among all nations of the world.

I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Wick, if you will proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES Z. WICK, DIRECTOR, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

Mr. Wick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I am pleased to be here to testify on behalf of the U.S. International Communication Agency in addressing the problems of drug trafficking and drug abuse. In preparing for these hearings I have been struck with the enormity of a problem that deserves the highest priority and involves our very survival.

USICA has, as its principal function, explaining U.S. policy, society, and values to foreign audiences. A key component of that policy is making foreign publics aware of this country's concern over the terrible price which individuals and society pay for the use of illicit drugs, and the steps we are taking to deal with these problems.

As the President has said, and I quote, "We need a foreign policy that vigorously seeks to interdict and eradicate illicit drugs, wherever cultivated, processed or transported." Not only has the President said it but Dr. Turner has said it here today.

Toward that end, President Reagan established, in January of this year, a Task Force on Drugs headed by the Vice President and designed to bring the full force of the Federal Government to bear on the problems of drug trafficking and drug abuse. This agency participates in the Cabinet Council Working Group on Narcotics and the Interagency Coordination Group on Narcotics chaired by the Bureau on International Narcotics Matters of the Department of State. Through these organizations, this Agency seeks to cooperate with the other agencies and departments of Government—the Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Agency for International Development and others—to implement a long-range, coordinated effort to address the related problems of drug production, drug trafficking, and drug abuse.

Both in Washington and in the field, we are organizing ourselves to participate in the new initiatives described to you by other witnesses in the course of these hearings.

The international narcotics problem is critically important to the United States. It poses a complex and very sensitive issue in international relations, requiring creative planning and close coordination of all activities undertaken. The problem poses many difficulties for our relations with other governments and peoples. These facts condition whatever informational activities are undertaken.

Furthermore, it should be clear to those familiar with the environments in which we work that information can only be a very small piece in the very complex puzzle the international narcotics problem creates. The principal means for tackling the problem rests with eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement. Information serves as a support and an occasional catalyst.

In evolving an informational strategy to treat drug issues with foreign audiences, ICA follows two basic positions.

One, our activities and materials are tailored to the particular bilateral context as defined and determined by our officers in the field.

Two, our programs derive from close cooperation and coordination—both within our mission overseas and, more importantly, with the government and local authorities in each country.

Finally, our position reflects the knowledge that public information cannot solve the problem—it can only be a support to the activities of other governments, undertaken on their own, in collaboration with the U.S. Government, or through other programs such as the United Nations.

The ICA position highlights that in drug questions we are confronted with a very difficult communications problem. Foreign audiences sincerely believe that drug abuse is a U.S. problem. Foreign opinion often holds that the United States is not doing enough at home to cure the problems in its own society. The recent news on John Lucas and John Belushi—to mention only the most recent examples of the ongoing sensationalized coverage of drug abuse among our entertainment and sport sectors—makes our job more difficult. This deeply embedded impression leads automatically to the accusation that the United States, instead of confronting the issue in the United States and closing down its extensive and lucrative market, is trying to force other governments and the small peasant farmers of these countries to solve the problem for us by drying up the source.

We reject this view and believe that this is the kind of issue that ICA can address most effectively. We are seeking to clarify the U.S. role in this regard and to make clear that we regard drug abuse and drug trafficking as universal and not just U.S. problems.

In several countries—Colombia, Bolivia, Thailand and most recently Pakistan and the Bahamas, for example—the drug issue has top priority at our posts. In others the issue receives a lower priority. In still other countries in which the problem is critical, the position has been taken that ICA should not treat the issue at all, because local governments maintain that the success of their efforts necessitates that their publics gain no impression of U.S. involvement. This policy recognizes that any public awareness of U.S. involvement in the local government's efforts would make continued progress extremely difficult.

Many countries remain unconvinced that they are experiencing a drug problem. Also, as this committee is fully aware, the drug question involves local officials, including government, policy, and military, and the international organized crime network. No amount of public relations campaigning, no matter how sophisticated or extensive, is likely to touch these people.

It is this picture that defines the environment in which an information program can be and is developed by ICA and its posts overseas. Let me highlight some of the activities which we have undertaken in support of United States and foreign government efforts in interdiction, eradication, and crop substitution.

The ICA programs combine different approaches and utilize a variety of communication tools. The VOA prepares special programs on various aspects which it either broadcasts directly or supplies to our posts for local radio placement.

Our overseas posts also draw heavily on Washington-supplied materials for local radio programs. ICA's Washington media elements frequently cooperate with field posts to produce materials. For example, VOA recently produced a five-part radio program, after several posts provided local interviews for inclusion in the series, which was aired extensively in Latin American countries, including broadcasts by 12 stations in Lima and the Todelar network in Colombia, among others.

Washington or post-produced films and video materials have been used for placement on local television and as visual support for special seminars and meetings with concerned foreign audiences. Several posts are involved in TV cooperatives with local channels, including Bolivia on crop substitution and Colombia on marihuana eradication. ICA Bangkok produced a 20-minute film, "The Narcotics War," illustrating U.S. assistance to the Thai Government in preventing and suppressing the use of drugs, which was shown on television during prime time. ICA Pakistan has cooperated in the widespread showing within that country of the film "Chasing the Dragon."

Our wireless file carries news items on U.S. efforts which posts use for local press placement or to prepare special information packets or pamphlets. I have provided the committee's staff with a sample of an information kit, which was prepared by ICA in Bogota, Colombia, as well as several pamphlets, one on marihuana from ICA Bogota and three from ICA Quito.

Much of ICA Lima's drug programing is comprised of locally produced material on local projects. These include a regular Sunday commentary broadcast on Radio Miraflores—Lima's No. 1 station among Peruvian youth—and narcotics-related materials are included in the post's weekly news and commentary program.

In close cooperation with DEA and Department of State officers in the field, special programs have been organized in the United States for participants in USICA's International Visitor Program. These are funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics Affairs at the Department of State, and usually focus on the area of enforcement. In addition, individual 30-day visitor programs have been arranged and funded by ICA for people specializing in health and legal aspects of the drug problem in their countries. Among such visitors in 1981 were a managing editor from Bogota, Colombia; a superior court judge from Lima, Peru; a public prosecutor from La Paz, Bolivia; a group of senior Thai policy officers and the Governor of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province. Presently, a psychiatrist from Bogota is here observing various drug treatment programs to study how the United States handles drug addiction problems.

Our American participants program, through which American specialists visit various countries to give lectures or seminars, TV, radio, and press interviews, and meet with their counterparts, also provides a forum through which these issues are being addressed. In 1981, two noted authorities visited Colombia: Dr. Carlton Turner, Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office at the White House, who is testifying here today on my right, and Dr. Robert G. Heath, Professor of Psychiatric Neurology at Tulane University Medical School, Dr. James Inciardi, director of the Department of

Criminal Justice at the University of Delaware, will be visiting Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in May and June this year. Our posts take advantage of these visits in several different ways. For example, Bogota produced a 50-minute videotape with Dr. Heath on the dangerous effects of marihuana on the human brain which was used by a Colombian psychiatrist in a series of ICA-sponsored seminars in a number of Colombian cities. Several segments were included in TV news programs on three Colombian TV channels. A second video tape was made by the post with Dr. Turner discussing marihuana.

As a supplement to the American participants program, ICA has recently inaugurated a TelePress conference program through which foreign media representatives interview U.S. officials and leading authorities via telephone. At present, ICA is working with INM and Dr. Turner, at the White House, to hold such a TelePress conference with leading journalists in Bogota and Lima.

Our overseas posts also take advantage of visiting U.S. officials as well as Members of Congress and staff. For example, ICA Lima arranged a press conference for Representative Zeferetti which received widespread coverage in the local press as well as news items on all three Lima TV channels. Both ICA Quito and ICA Bogota capitalized on the visit of Manuel Gallardo of INM in the State Department. In these two countries, Gallardo met with high level Government officials, gave several lectures and met with media representatives in Medellin, Bogota, Quito, and Guayaquil.

The mix and level of activities I have described reflects several factors: the needs expressed by our posts, the capabilities of ICA in this period of budgetary stringency, and most importantly, the priority this issue has in the complex of foreign relations issues ICA deals with daily. I need only mention the current level of anti-American sentiment in Europe over the El Salvador issue, arms reduction, and many other tensions to highlight the complexity of getting foreign audiences to understand U.S. foreign policy positions and understand our perceptions of the world we see.

Our efforts in treating the narcotics question are small when viewed in the totality of ICA. But the total mix of communication demands placed on ICA are heavy and multifaceted. This total mix plays a crucial role in advancing central and critical U.S. issues of which narcotics is one.

Mr. Chairman, this is general overview of ICA's role in treating the international narcotics issue. I will be pleased to answer any questions you or the committee may have.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Wick.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your statements.

In the course of our hearings the following question repeatedly was asked and, Mr. Giniliani, perhaps you or the others will be able to respond to it.

We are concerned that the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy has not, as yet, made any decisions regarding an international narcotics control policy and if there really is a policy we would be very happy to hear what it is. According to a recent staff mission, our narcotics officers in the field have not received a high level overall strategy and policy statement concerning international narcotics control since a 1978 White House directive.

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These are the narcotics officers who in most cases, plan country program initiatives. If, for example, this administration was to upgrade the low priority placed on marihuana control programs in the past as compared with heroin programs, then such policy guidance must descend to the field.

Do you expect to send new policy guidance, if there is any, to replace the 1978 policy guidance now regarded by some offices overseas as still in effect?

Mr. GIULIANI. The purpose of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, in particular the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction, is to develop, not so much develop as bring together, because there presently exists in all of these areas, international, at the border and domestic, any number of policies and initiatives that are going on, some of which are very effective, some of which probably need to be altered.

The purpose of the Cabinet Council and the Working Group in the area of drug enforcement is to pull together the efforts of the Department of Justice, the Department of State, all of the subunits within both and the other agencies that we have discussed before so that we can take a comprehensive look at an issue like this and if there is, in fact, conflicting directives or not enough direction being given to some of it in a sensible way rather than piecemeal as it had been done too often in the past.

So the simple answer to your question is yes, that is something we would look at, and the way in which it would get resolved is by discussions among the agency heads who all have one part or another in the entire drug effort.

Our hope is to put together an overall paper coordinated, as Dr. Turner mentioned, also with the other Cabinet Council and Working Group so that we have an overall policy to deal with the drug problem that would be both foreign and domestic and not geared to just one aspect of it or another. And we hope to be able to do that by the middle to the end of the summer.

That is the charge we have been given, so to speak, by the President and the Attorney General.

I think it will help in pulling together any number of things that are going on. I don't want to leave the impression that nothing is being done. That would be very, very far from the truth. A great deal is being done in all of these departments to deal with the drug problem.

What we need is to pull that effort together more effectively than has been done in the past.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I would like to ask Dr. Turner to comment on the same question because on page 2 of your testimony you referred to the Reagan administration's overall program and then proceed to describe the five major areas.

But as of today, are there any steps taken to inform the Government agencies, the U.S. personnel abroad, overseas, and foreign governments and officials of what our policy will be?

Dr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, the five point plan was delivered to the President last November and, subsequently, was presented to the Congress. Those five points include the one we are talking about today: international initiatives.

In order to develop a strategy under that umbrella, we have the Cabinet Council Working Group on Drug Issues which is meeting again tomorrow to further the chapters of the refined strategy dealing with health issues. It has been clearly stated to me that it is my job to coordinate the work of this group with the work of the supply reduction working group. We will pull together all five areas into a Federal strategy which will be published in the late summer.

Mr. Giuliani and I have discussed this. He feels we can work together and meet this schedule.

In addition, we have an oversight working group that meets monthly to discuss operational issues and how problems can be solved. They, in turn, distribute information to the field elements of their respective agencies.

Information is subsequently delivered through the people that are on that working group, and I think we are beginning to see some changes. For example, evidence of the ongoing activity in Thailand was described by Mr. DiCarlo yesterday. I think that even though we may not have a published strategy as of now, the prongs of that overall program have been initiated and are ongoing.

As another example, our education prevention program is going very strong. Our initiatives in the countries that Mr. DiCarlo mentioned are going on. The President has a strong commitment to dealing decisively with the drug problem.

And let me add here that I know of no administration in recent history where the President, the Vice President, the First Lady, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of HHS have been simultaneously active and involved in solving the drug problem.

We want to prepare, by the end of this summer, a comprehensive document that contains a comprehensive strategy and with your help, I think we can make that deadline.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. But, Dr. Turner, even in the comprehensive policy statement, of course, supposedly one of the primary focuses of our narcotics policy will be to eradicate illicit drugs at their source as the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime has recommended.

If so, why do we spend only about 10 percent of our narcotics control resources overseas? Why don't we have a Vice Presidential Task Force rather than only the Narcotic Bureau in the State Department working on how to induce Colombia, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Peru to curtail the production of cocaine and marihuana?

Dr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I think the eradication problem has been one that has been so confused and misunderstood that I would like to take just a moment, if I might, to discuss it. When we talk about eradication, we forget there are many different ways to eradicate. There is a mechanical way to eradicate; there is a chemical way to eradicate, and there is a biological way to eradicate.

In some parts of our Government, there is a preconceived idea that the only way to eradicate is to fly over an area in a helicopter or a fixed-wing aircraft and spray chemical.

We also allowed ourselves to get into the position where we are told by other countries that if we don't start drug eradication in the United States how can we expect other countries to start eradication programs? The best kept secret we ever had or maybe still

have in this country is the eradication programs that are underway in individual States. We are trying to promote these programs and to let others know that we are vigorously eradicating illicit drugs grown and produced in the United States.

Now, that brings us to the Colombian situation. I think perhaps that Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. DiCarlo, and the Ambassador may have addressed that but the feeling is that until after the presidential election in that country and the political situation is stabilized, we cannot start a massive eradication.

This does not mean that Colombia is not manually eradicating the coca plants. It does not mean that our eradication programs are not going forward in the meantime.

I think we are on track and I think other countries are beginning to realize that the President is concerned about this issue. I think we have seen good movement.

As I said previously, with your interest in this area, it brings a lot more pressure to bear, and with your assistance I think we can be successful.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. In our hearings, Mr. Wick, we were advised that a greater emphasis must be put into an education program for our own citizens as well as for use abroad. ICA would be the agency that would have to set a high priority to outline some of the efforts on the part of ICA.

You also implied that there are some difficulties in domestic politics and the acceptance of U.S. positions in this particular matter of the threat of illicit drugs and the harm it does and you state in your statement that many countries remain unconvinced that they are experiencing a drug problem.

I believe that you also imply that we must be very careful that we do not overemphasize it, but perhaps there are other sources that could add to the effort. For example, on Tuesday night the NBC network ran a program on the abuse of drugs featuring Edwin Newman.

What are the possibilities of securing tapes of this and other such effective programs for overseas use and would it be impossible, so it would not be identified solely with our own Government effort, would it be possible to enlist corporate funders such as Xerox in such activities to buy rebroadcast rights abroad?

In other words, it would be a U.S.-based company abroad that would sponsor the program. Is there such a possibility?

Mr. Wick. Well, there is that possibility, Mr. Chairman, regarding an earlier part of your question as to U.S. involvement in some of these countries. In many instances, it is not that they do not want to stress the problem, but that they do not want the appearance or the visibility of the U.S. Government in some of those nations whose citizens are very sensitive as to their own sovereignty. We can only do what we can in a given situation.

As to the use of video tapes, we have distributed hundreds of video tapes that are generated in this country by the commercial networks and other sources for which we obtain the rights. We will look into the possibility of obtaining the rights to the Edwin Newman broadcast through NBC if, indeed, we are not already doing that.

As I also mentioned to you, we have made video tape recordings, or VTR's on the drug problem in some of these countries and have found them very effective. They in fact, demonstrated the power of television.

Now, insofar as getting private or corporate sponsorship for these programs on overseas networks, the United States is almost unique, as is England and a relatively few other countries, in having commercially sponsored television where one can approach the television and buy time on the network. In many countries, or most countries, their television networks are state monopolies and access to them is very difficult.

Our public affairs officers in each country, in cooperation with the other officers in the Embassy, put together an annual country plan addressed to the needs and the peculiarities of that particular country. The dissemination of information on television is one of the many methodologies that routinely is employed in creating further awareness of United States issues and concerns.

I don't think we are doing as much as we can do in the area of drugs. I think that the influence of your committee, and of the wide-ranging testimony highlighting the problem, is the kind of focus that helps us all in trying to do a little bit more.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Wick, you have presumed your next question. I guess I could have a follow-up question with the indulgence of my colleague from Kansas.

We had a staff mission visiting many of the countries where illicit drugs are the source. According to our staff report the various embassies and foreign officials have expressed the need for more news and research information for foreign dissemination.

You said that we are not doing enough. What steps do you recommend to be taken in Washington to increase or how can we do more as to the flow of materials abroad?

What personnel in Washington is assigned to this task?

Mr. Wick. We have a variety of people who deal with this particular problem as part of the task of providing support to our 202 posts. Our mission, as you know, is communication and the utilization of materials for fulfilling that task. There are regular channels for distributing information on a multitude of issues involving this country and its goals, including its goals on the issue of drugs.

The acquisition of the materials is the key, and we have many people engaged in that effort. We already have the communications network in place which daily utilizes cables, various U.S. info, the mails. We print magazines at USICA involving many kinds of issues which are distributed in many countries throughout the world. Finding more sources and better material is the area where enhancement can be achieved. The dissemination methodologies are there.

However, we do not have a central person to develop intensive liaison with the groups which can provide information for dissemination in other countries on the drug issue. We do not normally have a central person for issues which are routinely dealt with in many areas of the agency's activities. But as a result of our awareness of what you are doing here, I think we will certainly identify one person in our agency to insure a greater emphasis on identify-

ing appropriate materials on drug problems and relaying them to the field.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. I call upon the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Winn.

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Mr. Broomfield asked me to relay his apologies to you gentlemen. He is very interested in this subject matter but had to make some remarks on the floor at the same time that these hearings are being held.

Dr. Turner, I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on how you hope the international banking community will take drug considerations into account in their lending operations? I don't quite understand what that means.

Dr. TURNER. Congressman, it has been proposed that in certain cases when some of our international lending organizations lend money to developing nations some of those areas may use the money in a way which expands the production of narcotic plants. We have asked our people to take into consideration that if they are funding an irrigation program, for example, would that irrigation program be used to produce more narcotic plants for the area or would that irrigation program be used to produce food crops for that particular area of the world.

And, since my job is oversight, I have not talked about the exact details but I certainly will look into that, what has been going on.

Mr. WINN. I wonder, after you find out what those details are, if you could submit those in writing and we would incorporate those as a part of your response to my question. I think the members of the full committee would be very interested in that information.

Dr. TURNER. All right.

[The information follows:]

The inclusion of so-called "poppy clauses" in project agreements, or through side letters, is one way to encourage governments to cooperate in controlling the production of illicit drugs. The Department of State and Treasury instruct U.S. representatives to pay special attention to the use of these clauses, where appropriate, in discussions and negotiations involving multilateral banks. The "poppy clauses" are used in areas located directly in, or adjacent to, growing areas for illicit drugs. It is reported that the Asian Development Bank is particularly active in this area.

Examples of specific areas where such clauses have been used are:

In Peru, a coca clause has been included in the AID project agreement for an agricultural development program in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

In northern Thailand, an AID project, which is designed to provide an alternative means of earning a living, has a clause attached to the project agreement to insure that the project does not support production of opium.

Mr. WINN. I wonder if you or maybe Mr. Giuliani would explain in more detail just what the new role of our Armed Forces is, what part they will play in the drug enforcement act?

I think it might have come up yesterday a little bit, but I am sorry I wasn't here then. What kind of additional training will they be given to prepare for this role?

Will any such additional training be funded from the DOD budget or from some other agency budget?

Mr. GIULIANI. The principal change that was made was made in December of last year when the posse comitatus act which had been interpreted by the Department of Defense to prohibit their turning over information about drug trafficking and domestic law

enforcement matters to civilian authorities, when that law was amended to make it clear that the Department of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy were barred by no such prohibition. That they could, and should, turn over such information about the flow of narcotics, both information gathered in foreign countries and information gathered in the air and on the sea.

That information is now turned over on a regular basis principally to the Drug Enforcement Administration and its intelligence center called EPIC, in El Paso, Tex., and becomes a part of our ability to track ships that are bringing in drugs, airplanes that might possibly be bringing in drugs as well as giving us a wealth of information about what is going on within foreign countries where we have a military presence or military intelligence presence.

That process began in December. It is not working yet the way we would like it to work because it has only been operational now for a few months and there were years of doing it another way.

It has, however, resulted in several major cases that have been attributed in some part to information that we now get that we did not get a year ago.

The training that is involved is really a question of working out guidelines between the Drug Enforcement Administration and law enforcement on the one hand, and the Department of Defense on the other, on how to request the information, how it should be turned over, just how much information is needed and that has been the subject of a number of discussions between both those groups as well as the attempt to set down guidelines on exactly what should be turned over and when.

It is, in our view, and I know in the view of the Attorney General, the Administrator of DEA and others on the domestic side of it, a major step and a very big improvement over the way things were done in the past that gives us access to information that not only will make cases that were not made before, but also will make us a lot more cost effective.

If you have information that zeroes in on a particular ship or a particular plane it can cut down an awful lot of the inspection and an awful lot of the wasted effort that goes on in trying to develop that information yourself.

So the real change is not in using the military which was a fear that was raised at the time this was being discussed, using the military in any way in law enforcement domestically. That is prohibited by the posse comitatus act. The administration never supported such a view of it but, rather, free up information that would come from the military so that we can use it and integrate it with the other information we have about drug flows and drug patterns. And it is working right now.

It is working well and a year from now it will work even better because of all of the operational experience we will have with it.

Mr. WINN. Along that same line, will some military equipment be loaned to Federal, State or local law enforcement agencies?

Mr. GIULIANI. This has been done already, in selected operations where a piece of equipment might be very useful that the military has, we have been able to borrow that. There may be some that have been used already where local law enforcement has on their own borrowed some equipment. That would be conceivable.

But in most of these operations the Federal Government is working already with State and local enforcement so that if we borrow the equipment, so to speak, so do they.

Mr. WINN. Dr. Turner, on page 2 of your testimony you say we are moving the enforcement focus from the drug itself to the criminal activities associated with drug trafficking.

I wonder if you would be more specific about this. I was always of the opinion that enforcement efforts are already being focused on drug trafficking.

Dr. TURNER. Congressman, what we mean there is that for many years we were concerned with the physical presence of the drug itself. If a man happened to be present with the drug, we arrested the man with the drug and we seized the car being used to transport the drug.

We are looking at this as a function; what is the crime involved? First of all, it is a smuggling act. Second of all, it involves great amounts of money generated illegally. Third, it involves firearms; and fourth, it involves some violence.

We are attempting to bring to bear all of the Federal resources that may not necessarily be concerned with a drug itself but may be concerned with these other crimes associated with the drug trafficking. It may be concerned with firearms, or the flow of money.

For example, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has jurisdiction which can be integrated into the drug enforcement effort. The transfer of money from one bank to another involves Treasury regulations, and by integrating all of these in we think we have a much more comprehensive and effective approach to reducing the overall supply of drugs.

Mr. WINN. Mr. Wick, how does the ICA—I think the chairman touched on this just briefly—how does the ICA keep up the data on U.S. drug abuse policy developments and programs in order to disseminate information about them to foreign audiences?

Mr. WICK. USICA has representatives who meet regularly with these various interagency groups and councils we keep up-to-date on the evolving policy and receive through on participation in these groups access to the various materials developed.

Also, through our wireless file and VOA, we obtain and provide to the field relevant news items and features about drugs.

Mr. WINN. Just one short final question.

I just wondered, Mr. Giuliani, has Secretary Haig attended any formal meetings of the Cabinet Council when international narcotics issues were the main subject of discussion?

Mr. GIULIANI. At the first meeting of the Cabinet Council that was held approximately 3 weeks ago, the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, he was present and there were a number of issues discussed but the principal part of the program was a presentation by the Attorney General of approximately 35 or 40 minutes on the full scope of this problem.

Mr. WINN. Well, he was present, so obviously, his presence would lend credibility to the programs and to the Council itself. Of course, he has been a little bit busy recently. He probably has not had much of a chance to participate in any subsequent meetings.

How many meetings has the Council had?

Mr. GIULIANI. It has had three meetings, only the first one devoted to drug enforcement. Other issues were discussed at the other two.

I can say that the cooperation that we received at the Department of Justice from the Department of State from the Secretary's office and Mr. DiCarlo has been exceptionally good and the working relationship with the Drug Enforcement Administration is also exceptional.

Mr. WINN. I would just like to say good luck in your endeavors. You have a tough problem there, and I know you are subject to constant criticism because people want more and quicker results.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we welcome having the opportunity of reviewing some of the policy considerations with regard to this very critical problem. We are confronted with an \$80 to \$90 billion illicit drug trade and in prior administrations we have found that there has been a lack of proper long-range planning, a development and international strategy and I am finding that once again in the present administration there has been a certain amount of laxity and quite a lag of time in getting the chairs in order.

It is encouraging to hear that there is now a Council at work at the Cabinet level. I am disturbed that it has taken this long a period of time to have its first meeting.

I would like to examine with you for a moment just where that policy will be made. Will it be made now at that Cabinet Council level?

How close will that Council work with the President and who will have the final decisionmaking within that Council?

Can any members of the panel address that issue for us? Dr. Turner, would you care to address that?

Dr. TURNER. Congressman, we had the first meeting of the Working Group of the Cabinet Council on Human Resources last February. That is the working group which I chair and which deals with the drug health issues. In that group we have been discussing what the organizations—represented by the 13 members of that group can contribute to the overall effort.

This group is addressing the three prongs of this five-pronged overall approach; research and development, detoxification and treatment, and education and prevention.

Then, my oversight capacity requires me to coordinate the total program. We had to have another group that would look at those prongs that we classically called supply reduction—the enforcement and the international initiatives.

Subsequently, the Cabinet Council on Legal Policies was formed and a working group that Mr. Giuliani chairs, deals with drug supply reduction.

These groups are designed to get the best possible input from all the member agencies, work this material into policy recommendations which will go from the Working Group to the full Cabinet Council. After the Cabinet Council considers the recommendations, it can go to the full Cabinet, and then to the President. The President has the ultimate authority on policy.

We are only recommending policy.

Mr. GILMAN. That is what I am concerned with, Dr. Turner. These layers of bureaucracy and this channel of communication becomes so involved and you are just now embarking on developing a national and international strategy.

How long is it going to take? Will it take the remainder of the President's term to evolve a policy? Hopefully not. How long would you anticipate that it would take to evolve a policy and get through this bureaucratic structure?

It sounds overly complex, frankly.

Dr. TURNER. I agree, sir, it sounds overly complex but we have set a deadline of having this strategy formulated. By June or July of this year and I can give you my word we will have a strategy completed by late summer.

And, I think Mr. Giuliani has made the same commitment for his Working Group to get their part through. Our Working Group meets again tomorrow. We think we will be able to consolidate these in a short period of time. Even though we do not have a published document, a lot of work is being done. A tremendous amount of work has been going on in the different agencies in working with the different coordinating groups and developing operating initiatives.

Because of the tremendous amount of work that already has been done, we should be able to complete the strategy in a short period of time.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Turner, you are coordinating this effort, are you not?

Dr. TURNER. It has been made very clear to me on numerous occasions that it is my responsibility to make certain that the Working Groups and the Cabinet Councils are coordinated with each other. It is my job in my oversight capacity; yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you sit in the final policy decisionmaking procedure?

Dr. TURNER. Mr. Congressman, I have been in on all of the Cabinet Council groups that dealt with narcotics. I am a member of the Vice President's Task Force; I chair the Oversight Working Group; and participate in the Cabinet Council activities. I sit in on all of those and give my advice; yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. How large a staff do you have, Dr. Turner?

Dr. TURNER. At the present time we have five people. I am fully convinced, using the Oversight Working Group, and the Cabinet Councils, this is sufficient to do the job.

Mr. GILMAN. What are the functions of those five people, and what are their titles?

Dr. TURNER. My title is Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office. The Deputy Director is Mr. Dan Leonard. Mr. Dick Williams is senior staff; Jody Forman is a writer and works on special projects; a full-time secretary and another secretary that fills in when needed.

Mr. GILMAN. And you have the wherewithal to fulfill the kind of responsibility that you have?

Dr. TURNER. With the organization set up as it is, I think we can have the wherewithal and I think we have done a pretty darn good job.

Mr. GILMAN. Who do you have to report to at the next layer of bureaucracy to get something done?

Dr. TURNER. The line responsibility is directly to Mr. Ed Harper.

Mr. GILMAN. What is Mr. Harper's title?

Dr. TURNER. Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy. Some matters then go to Mr. Meese. We also answer to those people involved with the Cabinet Council, such as the Executive Secretaries.

I have the latitude so that if we have a particular problem, I can go to the person needed to address the problem.

Mr. GILMAN. And do you feel that you have the adequate ear of the top echelon in order to get things done going through those channels of communication?

Dr. TURNER. I think we have adequate access. If you are asking me how often do I communicate with Mr. Meese, it is approximately once a week. With the other people it is as needed.

The last time we met with the President was when we had the Cabinet Council meeting that Mr. Giuliani mentioned.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you have access to the President if need be?

Dr. TURNER. I have been given access when I needed it; yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Giuliani, can you tell me is there a plan up the road to merge DEA and the FBI? I realize there is a parallel function going on. Is there an objective to merge the two agencies?

Mr. GIULIANI. No, sir; the decision with regard to the FBI and DEA was made by the Attorney General 2 or 3 months ago and the decision was to consolidate those two agencies and that was a final decision.

What that means is that DEA remains a separate law enforcement agency within the Justice Department to put single emphasis on drug enforcement as well as to preserve its foreign operation but its reporting relationship to the Justice Department has been changed so that it reports through the Director of the FBI and the FBI has been given concurrent jurisdiction to handle drug cases.

The FBI now, for example, can handle wiretaps in drug cases. That has meant we have been able to double the number of wiretaps in 4 months.

Mr. GILMAN. Does the Director of the FBI report to you on narcotics?

Mr. GIULIANI. He reports to the Attorney General and I coordinate all the work for the Justice Department in the narcotics area.

Mr. GILMAN. Are you responsible for the budget, then, for those two agencies in their work on narcotics?

Mr. GIULIANI. Yes; we are.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you feel that under the present budgetary proposals that we are adequately funding both agencies to fulfill the kind of work that we have requested of them?

Mr. GIULIANI. Certainly in the drug area the amount of resources available now as opposed to, let's say, a year ago, has increased dramatically because of this consolidation with the FBI. We have double the number of wiretaps. We have 521 FBI investigations of drug cases. We had less than 100 a year ago.

The resources devoted to the drug problem have increased substantially within the last 13 or 14 months.

Mr. GILMAN. What about the resources for the foreign operations?

Mr. GIULIANI. That has remained stable. That has not increased or decreased.

Mr. GILMAN. It has not been decreased at all?

Mr. GIULIANI. No.

Mr. GILMAN. There have been no cutbacks over the last year in DEA's foreign operations?

Mr. GIULIANI. It is remained at onboard level.

The question that remains for us and it is something that we will be able to assess better 6 months from now or 1 year from now are those other things that have to be sacrificed to drug enforcement. If you are involving many more FBI agents in drug enforcement necessarily there are other things they are not going to be doing.

There is no particular thing that is going to change depending on where the country is we are talking about. That is something the Attorney General and the FBI is very aware of and that is something we won't know the answer to for 6 or 8 months.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, to both Dr. Turner and Mr. Giuliani, I am sure you recognize the criticism we hear out there continually that as we attempt to encourage greater efforts with regard to narcotic interdiction and narcotic enforcement there seems to be a contradiction in our budgetary concerns in those same areas.

While we urge more enforcement, we are reducing the capability and the ability of these agencies to properly function with the kind of funding that they need.

I would hope that you would give proper attention to those requests. I recently returned from a Western European area and found that in a major distribution region, for example, in The Netherlands, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam we have only two agents functioning in that entire region. We have a lack of cooperation from some of the local governments and need a lot more attention there. This is the whole doorway into Western Europe and narcotics coming in by the tons in that area.

I would hope that you would examine what is really needed out there in the foreign operations to make certain that we are giving these people the kind of tools that they need to do the kind of job we are asking of them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, in reviewing the testimony, what I see and what concerns me more than anything else is not there isn't good intent but we just haven't seen action quick enough.

I will be the first to admit and I have seen it many times here, I am from Florida. We are inundated. There are public machine-gunnings going on in shopping centers, bodies turning up all over Miami and south Florida. It is a critical situation.

The President here back in September of last year said that we needed to have some action very quickly. In a speech that he made to the International Association of Police Chiefs, if I may quote, said, "Foreign policy must be vigorously pursued to interdict and eradicate illicit drugs wherever cultivated, processed, and transported."

He talked about that and then we have a commitment here that we are going to get policy to do this this summer. That was a year ago.

In the meantime, I hesitate to quote the drug-related homicides that we had in Miami that I just had the police chief give me last week. I don't represent that area. I am up in the Palm Beaches.

It was astounding. I think it was 272 so far this year, drug-related homicides.

The President back in August of last year made the same statement, almost a year ago, that we need to vigorously pursue this. We need to move. We need to do it immediately and we still don't see anything and we are talking about policies that will be announced and apparently published this summer.

If I read the President's statement correctly, in both of his speeches recently in the last year, he laid out very specifically some of the things we are going to do.

Are you going to be laying out some major new initiatives that we haven't heard about yet?

Mr. GIULIANI. No; Mr. Mica, that isn't correct. In fact, over the last year tremendous efforts have been made in the narcotics area. When you make this distinction between what has been done in policy maybe I should clarify. Any number of things have been done, are underway, have been ongoing over the last year.

If you look at the statistics for the number of drug cases pending in the Justice Department when we took office as opposed to now it has increased dramatically all over the country.

If you look at the efforts in south Florida, for example, over the last 8 months the Justice Department has increased its commitment of personnel to south Florida by 30, possibly 40 percent.

In the U.S. Attorney's Office, in the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration, in the Immigration and Naturalization Office, in the U.S. Marshal's Service, that has had some very concrete results.

The flow of undocumented Haitian aliens into the United States has virtually been stopped by the efforts of the Attorney General and the Coast Guard.

Mr. MICA. The Mica amendment which we passed in this committee.

Mr. GIULIANI. The flow of drugs has been substantially decreased over the last 7 or 8 months; it not only has the effect on south Florida but on the rest of the country because that is one of the major ways in which drugs come into this country.

Mr. MICA. But the policy group hasn't made any recommendation. We are very pleased to have that task force and it is doing a great job in south Florida.

I might add that we have just had reports this last weekend that while we are putting the damper on in south Florida we are seeing a massive flow of funds out of Miami over to Dallas.

So when you put the heat on one city you transfer some of the problems to another. There are great increases in other areas. That, I think, is one of the reasons why when we talk about international policy.

Mr. Bush was in Colombia in November. Our understanding of that conversation, one of the single largest sources to come into

this country and not one mention of narcotics. We are getting reports daily of large shipments from other countries.

Let me add, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, my subcommittee right up here is talking about that. I haven't had anybody come in and there has been no testimony, no policy to say maybe we ought to have a little string on some of this money with regard to cooperation on drug flow.

Where are you coming from on that? Have you reviewed the Caribbean Initiative? This is your golden opportunity to make it a priority.

I think that is the sum total of what I am saying here. I don't see any priority coming in the international. We are pleased to get that local help in Miami. We need it and we need a lot more but we are fighting a tidal wave here and we can go back to the source.

Dr. TURNER. If I may respond, there are two very important things which, through the help of the Congress, the administration can now proceed. We were prohibited by the Percy amendment from instituting programs in those countries for eradication. You repealed the Percy amendment.

Mr. MICA. That wasn't any program, was it? That was paraquat?

Mr. TURNER. That was using paraquat. We got repeal of that prohibition. We got an exemption to posse comitatus to allow us to obtain information available through the military. These changes have been sought for several years. This was a real accomplishment.

I think the notion that we may not be doing very much and that there may not be a commitment is because we have not been communicating our efforts.

In the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru there are roughly 42,000 acres available for coca production. If you look at one recent customs' seizure of cocaine, it required 7,500 acres to produce that single seizure. Seizures of that magnitude are certain to hurt the traffickers.

The President has discussed the drug issue on several occasions with leaders of other countries. The President's commitment is there. The Vice President's commitment is there and as I mentioned previously, the First Lady, the Attorney General and the Secretary HHS—are all involved in supporting our efforts.

Mr. MICA. Do you have any hesitancy in recommending that we raise these issues at any time with leaders of other nations?

Dr. TURNER. I have no hesitancy at all. In fact, I have raised these issues. I have talked to the Colombians and Peruvians. Mr. DiCarlo has done a fantastic job.

Mr. MICA. How about recommending that we add provisions on foreign assistance?

Dr. TURNER. I believe some of those have already been discussed.

Mr. MICA. We have worked on a number of these but the point that I am getting to right now is that I haven't seen any great initiative from really the folks who are supposed to be coming here.

It just appears, and I recognize there is some work being done but it appears that the work is being done but it is being done on a we-will-get-to-it basis and this really isn't a priority and that is the feeling we get.

We do have that priority feeling now with regard to the Task Force in Miami but that is domestic, not international.

Is there an international task force being considered?

Dr. TURNER. The south Florida Task Force aids the international program. If you look at our overall strategies. The first line of defense is destroying the crops at the source.

The second line is interdiction of the transported drugs. We have now 4½ Coast Guard cutters on duty, I don't know how they get the half, which is forcing the Colombians to keep the stuff in Colombia. The Colombian police are also destroying it on the ground. So there are different ways of looking at this.

As soon as the election is over, we will be working with them to start a massive eradication effort. We are eradicating the coca bush now and I think Secretary DiCarlo talked about Bolivia. Bolivia had legalized coca production. They have changed the laws.

Narcotics is a strong consideration in our dealings with the Bolivian Government now. I think that was discussed. If not, it was in his testimony, so we are doing things.

Mr. MICA. Of course, Bolivia has been a strong consideration for a number of years.

Dr. TURNER. That is no reason for us to drop it now.

Mr. MICA. I understand. I see I am out of time and I won't belabor the issue.

I just have had the feeling for some time now that we have finally gotten some attention, at least in our area, on the domestic scene but we haven't seen that kind of action or reaction or initiative or aggressiveness on the part of the administration.

Dr. TURNER. Congressman, I would like to come over and talk to you sometime and go over this whole program.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Gentlemen, I think your testimony was very helpful and encouraging. At least you are moving in the right direction. Of course, patience is one of the characteristics of Congress.

Let me just ask to follow up on the question since in your testimony, Mr. Giuliani, you stated our goal in 1982 will be to heighten the awareness of officials in other departments and agencies of Government who might not normally consider drug enforcement as a central part of their mission.

Would you advise us for the record who these officials are whose awareness you seek to heighten, what you expect them to do, and why have they have not been aware up until now of their responsibilities?

Mr. GIULIANI. As an institutional matter, the Attorney General of the United States has as his prime responsibility the enforcement of the law. It is not difficult to focus the attention of the Attorney General on a problem like drug enforcement since it is one of the most important law enforcement problems that he faces.

The success or failure of an Attorney General will and can often turn on how good a job he does of dealing with the criminal part, at least of the drug problem. It becomes a major priority of the Justice Department almost by a natural course of events. It has been for Attorney General Smith, almost since the day that he came into office.

The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime that he established, its recommendations, if you look at them closely, are geared very much toward drug enforcement. The emphasis within the Justice Department and all the agencies that I have talked about in the Justice Department on drug enforcement has been overwhelming.

I was a narcotics prosecutor for a number of years in New York City so I know the problem from the street level and from the prosecutorial level. The amount of emphasis within the Department now over the last year has been greater than it has ever been before, both with the FBI being involved, the Drug Enforcement Administration, all of the other agencies, the Federal prosecutors.

I believe Attorney General Smith, in the decisions that he has made with regard to the FBI, the Cabinet Council has done everything humanly possible for the Department of Justice to make drug enforcement a major priority without sacrificing some other areas that obviously are also very important.

What he has set as a goal for himself in this Cabinet Council as the mechanism for it is to do what he can to interest and make just as important for others in the Cabinet and in the Government who don't face drug enforcement as a major problem on their agenda necessarily.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. What are those agencies, State Department, Treasury?

Mr. GIULIANI. Basically, all of the rest of the agencies of Government that we are talking about in the Cabinet Council have other priorities and other important things that they have before them. It really is, in a way, and I know Attorney General Smith views it this way, in part the responsibility of the Attorney General to heighten their awareness of the contribution that they can make to drug enforcement and the Cabinet Council offers an ongoing mechanism for it.

It had been done before over the last year on an individual basis. For example, the posse comitatus amendments were supported eventually by the Department of Defense. That came from several discussions between the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General over the need for information and explanation of just what we intended to do and just what we were not intending to do because there was a lot of misunderstanding.

There have been a number of conversations between the Attorney General and Secretary of State. For example, with regard to a major drug case that had gone on with the Colombian Government called Operation Tiburon and other discussions like that.

There have been several discussions between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Transportation with regard to Coast Guard involvement in drug interdiction and immigration interdiction, particularly.

All those things happened in the past so that the impression that nothing has been done is really an unfair one. A great deal has been done to involve other departments of Government in these important areas. It had not been done, however, until a month ago. There had not been a coordination mechanism for the Attorney General to involve other departments and then where necessary to

raise those issues to the Presidential level if they can't be resolved at the Cabinet level.

That mechanism is now in place. It is going to make a lot of the things that were done 6 and 7 months ago on an ad hoc basis easier to do and more effective and we are very encouraged that it will give us an opportunity to try to place up the priority ladder, if you will, in some other departments, the drug problem.

When the Attorney General and those of us at the Justice Department have had the opportunity to talk to other departments of Government about the drug problem we have always gotten excellent cooperation and absolutely no resistance in dealing with the problem as a major problem but in some ways it is, in part, our responsibility, certainly Dr. Turner's responsibility, those of us who have the drug problem as our major responsibility to make that an important matter for their departments.

I am not saying that they have not done a great deal when asked but it is not the thing that faces them day in and day out. It does face us.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It would be erroneous to assume that in the past 5 or 10 or years nothing was done. But you are advising us that with this new working group and the resulting attention and priority it is quite obvious that you will be awakening the interest of all of the agencies involved.

It is the coordination that hopefully will result in a better attack on this problem that faces our country, and not only our country. It is just as much a problem in Europe as it is in the United States. It is not only a U.S. problem.

Well, we do wish you well.

But I do want to ask Mr. Wick, to what extent are you involved in this working group, as one who will disseminate the information or at least the policy?

Mr. WICK. We are not involved in the Council that Mr. Smith heads. We are involved in Dr. Turner's group and also other inter-agency groups.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Involved in what way?

Mr. WICK. We have a member of our agency which participates in their deliberations and their assessments and participates in the compilation of materials available for furthering the goal.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Does ICA have one person available to coordinate the ICA activities in this regard?

Mr. WICK. We have one person who participates in this Council but, yes, as I suggested earlier, we will have one person who will monitor whatever ICA does in these diverse areas involving our posts and the Washington support system.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Guiliani, you advised Mr. Winn as to the number of times you have met. Is it a pattern of regular meetings? And likewise, Dr. Turner, does your group meet at regular meetings or on an ad hoc basis?

Dr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, my working group will have a meeting tomorrow which will be a second meeting of the full group of 13 members. What we have elected to do is to communicate with them and get the materials back to them, let them work on it at their own agency and provide the work back to us. When we reach

a point where the whole group needs to get together to discuss the issues, then I call them together. It is not a set scheduling.

However, the Oversight Working Group is a regularly scheduled working group which meets the second Wednesday of each month. One group is on a regular schedule and the other group meets on call.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. It is safe to assume that these hearings will be part of the discussion in your group when you meet tomorrow?

Dr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, it is safe to assume that; yes, sir.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Well, thank you very much.

If that is the case we have made our little contribution, I hope.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a point of clarification?

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Yes.

Mr. MICA. Who coordinates the south Florida task force? Dr. Turner, is it your group?

Mr. GIULIANI. That is done by the Vice President's office. We both participate in it and are members of it and have made contributions to it, but it is coordinated by the Vice President's office.

In fact, the on-site coordinator is Charles Renkovich who is on loan from the Department of Justice to the Vice President's office.

Mr. MICA. But, you say you participate. Is that a sole, separate operating entity?

Mr. GIULIANI. It is a sole operating entity in the sense that it is concentrating just on that problem. Obviously, it affects us at the Department of Justice and it affects Dr. Turner and we have the burden of coordinating that with the other things that we are doing.

But, in order to put emphasis on that problem it operates solely on that problem.

Mr. MICA. But, is there input from either, both or coordination or two-way communication between all three?

Mr. GIULIANI. Yes, sir.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Congressman, the reason I think the Vice President's task force moved so fast is that Justice had been working on initiatives in south Florida. My office had been working on initiatives with the oversight working group which is a coordination effort. When the task force was set up, we all had the things that could be done rather quickly.

There are two groups. There is a task force and then there is the working group of the task force. Mr. Giuliani and I have been, I believe, at all the meetings, unless we have been out of town. There is good coordination and good communication.

Admiral Murphy, who is the Chief of Staff, and I get together once or twice a week and we discuss where we are and what we are doing.

The President set it up so it fits within the overall program.

Mr. MICA. In the initiative, the origin of your ideas and approaches comes first from the task force and you sign it over or give input?

Mr. GIULIANI. We are all part of the task force. So, when it first started we were all asked what could be done, the Department of Justice, FBI, DEA, et cetera. The U.S. attorneys contributed their ideas.

The same thing was true of Dr. Turner's office, the Department of Treasury had representatives from Customs, their agencies that

are affected by international narcotics. They contributed ideas. It was a joint operation, a pull-together by the Vice President and then we all signed off on basically the points that the Vice President originally had made and the commitments that he made.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen.

The committee stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

Mr. GIULIANI. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

Committee on Foreign Affairs

January 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: Honorable Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs

FROM: James T. Schollaert, Edward J. Palmer, Staff Consultants

SUBJ: Summary Report on Latin American Narcotics Survey

This memorandum is a summary report of our visits to Mexico City (October 22-28,) and Jamaica, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (November 29 - December 18) Specific findings and recommendations for each country program are included. Since many of the issues cut across country programs and involve basic questions on overall U.S. strategy, the summary begins with a concise list of the main points emerging from our study thus far.

SUMMARY OF GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. The United States does not appear, for the most part, to be making a strong effort overseas against the narcotics traffic. International narcotics control seems to have a relatively low priority within the present administration and the Department of State. A nine month delay in filling the key positions of Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters and the President's Advisor on Drug Policy in the White House contributed to a sense of drift and low priority in our narcotics policy.
2. A clear and coherent strategy and policy statement to the field is needed from a high level in Washington, beyond the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration. No cabinet-level group such as a Cabinet Council currently deals with narcotics policy on a regular basis.
3. A greater share of the federal funds devoted to the narcotics problem should be allocated overseas, through international narcotics control programs and related foreign assistance projects. Such redirection of funds would be consistent with the frequently stated strategy to attack the sources of supply abroad by eradication in the fields.
4. The Upper Huallaga in Peru and the Chapare in Bolivia are the two main illicit coca growing areas of South America and both were opened up by U.S. and other foreign aid. Any future development aid to similar areas should be scrutinized carefully to avoid the repetition of such consequences.
5. The U.S. should direct its crop eradication programs towards non-traditional growing areas, such as the Chapare and the Upper Huallaga. To gain the support of host governments, the U.S. should utilize more diplomatic pressure and linkage and fewer crop substitution projects until these have demonstrated cost effectiveness. (This is not intended to discourage additional support to important programs such as the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru.)

6. Drug Enforcement Administration efforts abroad have been weakened by uncertainty over its role and shortage of funds. A clear cut understanding between DEA and State (INM) is needed to promote more effective coordination and cooperation between the two agencies.

7. There is a low priority on gathering and analyzing narcotics intelligence within our intelligence community. More precise and verifiable information concerning all aspects of production, eradication and interdiction is needed to plan and evaluate programs effectively. A re-examination of intelligence agency roles, resources and capabilities with respect to narcotics is needed both in Washington and in the field.

8. The bad news about narcotics is not reaching the field and source countries. There is need for a vigorous and coordinated educational campaign, combining the communications expertise and resources of ICA, NIDA, DEA and State. This effort would disseminate news, research results and educational materials to opinion makers and the general public abroad.

9. The Committee should take a more active role in exercising its legislative jurisdiction over international narcotics control. As a domestic issue that involves foreign affairs, the Congress must insure that this legitimate interest is appropriately represented in our foreign policy.

MEXICO

FINDINGS

1. The Mexican eradication program is working. The Mexican government is in firm control of all areas of the country. They are destroying significant amounts of poppy as well as marijuana. NIDA and DEA statistics from the areas in the U.S. impacted by Mexican drugs bear this out. The Mexican eradication efforts which we saw were serious and competent operations and might serve in some respects as a model for eradication efforts elsewhere.

2. At the same time, growers are becoming more sophisticated, planting more and smaller fields in the new areas, camouflaging, etc. The aerial eradication program may be missing more than 50 percent of the opium fields this year according to latest U.S. estimates. There are preliminary indications from DEA that availability of Mexican heroin in the U.S. has risen slightly this year.

3. At this time the subject of narcotics does not appear to be very high on the Embassy's list of priority issues with the Mexicans. The fact that the program is working fairly well may be part of the reason for this. Nevertheless, the Mexican government's serious and high level commitment to the eradication program, which has been the key to its success, has not received any apparent nurturing by anyone beyond the Narcotics Assistance Unit of the Embassy.

4. The Mexican government does not see a need for crop substitution programs since large scale opium cultivation is a recent rather than a traditional phenomenon and there has been no long term dependence on opium for an income. There is little sympathy expressed for the opium grower and no evident political backlash from the eradication program.

5. To put in perspective the level of U.S. funding for narcotics control assistance, in fiscal year 1981, the U.S. spent \$30 million in Mexico for a screw worm eradication campaign to protect U.S. cattle herds and only \$9.3 million in Mexico for heroin eradication assistance.

6. As the heroin and marijuana fields become smaller and more remotely located the larger Bell 212 helicopters have become too large and inefficient for the aerial spraying program. Smaller Bell 206's are now the appropriate helicopter. The Mexicans thus have a number of Bell 212's which appear to be surplus to their present needs for aerial spraying.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is important during the transition stage before the new Mexican Administration takes over that U.S. Government should indicate the priority which we attach to the Mexican eradication program. This will assure policy continuity with the new Mexican Government at the outset. The Ambassador, Secretary or Assistant Secretary should personally convey this message to the Presidential nominee of the ruling party, PRI, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, as early as possible if this has not already been done.

2. The Mexican program, which is now pointed to as a success story, is too important to be allowed to languish because of insufficient funding. If crop eradication is to be the cornerstone of our international narcotics control strategy, then the successful example of the Mexican program has a significance beyond the dimensions of that single program itself. The opium growers and traffickers show tenacity and resourcefulness. Unless the eradication program in Mexico is aggressive, intelligent, adequately funded and backed as a high priority policy, opium production will continue to rise significantly every year, and the success story may turn sour.

3. We should continue to insist that the Mexican government fund as much of the program as they can afford. We have already provided 94 aircraft including 71 helicopters and established the only helicopter pilot school and maintenance facility in Mexico. This assistance has cost us over \$100 million. We should back up our insistence for more Mexican funding by making it clear that success or failure in fulfilling their obligation to stop the flow of narcotics from Mexico will have an important effect on overall U.S. Mexican relations.

4. The possibility of purchasing or somehow transferring some of the excess Bell 212 helicopters from Mexico to Colombia where they can be much better utilized, should be considered.

5. There is a priority need for improved intelligence concerning production and eradication in response to the growing sophistication of the growers in cultivating smaller camouflaged plots in inaccessible areas. Specifically, DEA contributes little ground intelligence concerning production and eradication. Also, CIA has a low priority on narcotics intelligence and could be doing more both on the ground and in the air concerning production and eradication. At the present time there are wide variations in estimates of eradication efficiency, ranging from 25-50% by U.S. specialists to 90% by the Mexican officials. Narcotics control in general should be given a higher priority within our intelligence policy.

6. As marijuana production continues to increase in Mexico, and the Percy Amendment has been repealed, marijuana eradication and interdiction in Mexico should receive increased support and attention from the U.S. It currently receives no support or attention.

JAMAICA

FINDINGS

1. Jamaica, because of its location, climate, poverty and poor enforcement capabilities, shows signs of becoming a much greater source of supply of marijuana and conduit for other drugs than it is now. Current rough estimates have Jamaica as the source of 10-20% of U.S. marijuana imports. To the extent that our marijuana interdiction policy in Colombia has any success, marijuana buyers will naturally gravitate toward Jamaica as an alternate source of supply.
2. The Minister of Security, Winston Spaulding, expressed to us grave concern over the threat posed to Jamaica's internal security and political stability by the marijuana traffic. He was chagrined at the growing social and health damage among Jamaicans from marijuana use. While he felt that the enforcement capabilities of Jamaica were insufficient at present to allow an all out crackdown and eradication effort, he called for more effort in the area of information to the public concerning the controversy over marijuana. He felt that such a campaign could be started immediately.
3. There is a lively debate going on in Jamaica over the pros and cons of marijuana use. But Jamaica does not receive informative materials from the United States regarding health and societal effects of marijuana use, or news about groups and individuals in the United States reacting against marijuana use. Rather the movies, television shows and news stories they do receive are generally more helpful to the marijuana traffickers than the government. For example, a recent 60 Minutes T.V. program on marijuana use in Jamaica was cited as biased in its selection of Jamaicans to be interviewed concerning an alleged beneficial effect of marijuana use. A Jamaican doctor from a ghetto hospital in Kingston, who has been treating emergency room patients there for over 20 years, was very emphatic in his conviction that Jamaican society does not receive adequate information about the ill effects of marijuana, which he sees daily in his work.
4. The Jamaican military is small but from most accounts is relatively free of corruption and is firmly opposed to marijuana use and trafficking. In particular, the Coast Guard could play a much more effective role in interdicting traffic by boat along the largely unpatrolled Jamaican coast, if they had more resources. The British trained leadership of the Coast Guard impressed us as capable and trustworthy.
5. There was some concern expressed privately to us that the Jamaican government may be overplaying the potential political and economic cost of cracking down on marijuana cultivation as an excuse to follow the line of least resistance. Some were skeptical of the claim that Seaga could not afford the political backlash coming from the marijuana growers and traffickers. Rather it was felt that Jamaican society in general would understand and support such a move. Concerning the economic cost of eliminating marijuana as a source of income, we were informed that the market for marijuana was already very depressed in Jamaica. The argument was made that much of the economic cost of eliminating marijuana has already been absorbed by Jamaica with no visible political or economic upheaval.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The State Department should be encouraged to make a concerted effort to supply more informational material about the health and societal effects of marijuana to the United States Embassy in Kingston. NIDA, DEA, and ICA should all be enlisted in this effort. Also more vigilant efforts should be made to search the U.S. press and other media for worthwhile news stories concerning marijuana and to make these available to the Embassy in Kingston.
2. Possibilities offered by our cultural and other exchange programs ought to be utilized to send relevant representatives from private organizations concerned about marijuana use, as well as educators, clinical psychologists and others with first hand experience on the effects of marijuana use on our youth. Also Jamaican doctors such as Doctor John Hall of the Kingston General Hospital, and other spokesmen whom we met in Jamaica could well be utilized in the U.S. to counter misperceptions about Jamaican customs, beliefs and experiences regarding marijuana use.
3. A full-time narcotics assistance officer should be assigned to the Embassy. The current situation with the DCM as narcotics coordinator and one of the junior political officers serving as a part-time assistance officer is not adequate to the requirement for full-time attention which the subject needs, in view of the growing importance of Jamaica as a source.
4. Jamaica deserves more of a narcotics assistance program than the \$500,000 we have offered. If this small amount is reflective of a low priority for marijuana in our narcotics control policy, then this priority should be upgraded.
5. In providing material assistance to the Jamaican government to improve enforcement capabilities, a priority at present should be to build up the sea interdiction capability of the Coast Guard with small spotter aircraft and more vessels. Beyond this, destruction of the clandestine air strips and stricter policing of the existing airports is needed, when the Jamaican government is ready to undertake such action.
6. We should continue to press for the ultimate enforcement solution, eradication of the marijuana fields by aerial spraying which would be a fairly simple operation at this stage. The fields, as we saw them, are larger and easier to find and spray than they are in Mexico. However, the Jamaicans claim that this would entail considerable political and economic cost to them. What is needed most to convince the Jamaicans to adopt this strategy, is for the highest levels of our government to press the need for eradication upon the Jamaican government.

COLOMBIA

FINDINGS

1. While our Ambassador in Colombia is very interested in the narcotics issue and personally places a high priority on the subject, there has been no clear message to the Colombian government from the highest levels in Washington that narcotics control is a top priority concern of this Administration. Vice President Bush visited Colombia in November for talks with the Colombian government and there is no indication that the subject of narcotics control was even mentioned during his visit.

2. There is some uncertainty on what our narcotics priorities are in Colombia with respect to cocaine, chemicals and marijuana. DEA sees their resources in Colombia allocated roughly in the following manner: Cocaine - 25%, Marijuana - 25%, Chemicals - 25% and Other - 25%. To support this allocation formula, they cite policy guidance documents from the previous Administration listing marijuana as the lowest priority. Even though DEA estimates that 80% of our imported marijuana is produced and exported from Colombia, marijuana does not appear to be the top priority target in our narcotics control efforts in Colombia.

3. The Special Colombian Police unit headed by Colonel Arbelaez, operating on the North Coast, appears to be doing a surprisingly good job of marijuana interdiction on the Guajira Peninsula, even without the use of helicopters. Marijuana seizures in 1981 are up 300% over 1980. They are not eradicating the crop in the field, but are seizing marijuana after it is harvested and collected. Colonel Arbelaez stated that his men have seized 2866 metric tons of marijuana since December 21, 1980. He estimated this as about 50% of the production and expected to improve this percentage to 70% in 1982 as his men became more familiar with the terrain. However, if marijuana production simply moves from the Guajira Peninsula the seizure rate may suffer. The marijuana market is depressed in Colombia with the current price down to less than half of its former high.

4. Eradication of the large marijuana fields by means of aerial spraying would be a relatively simple physical task at this stage. The Percy Amendment banning the herbicide paraquat was cited as the main reason why the Colombian government has not allowed an eradication program in the past. Now that the Percy Amendment has been repealed the Colombian government is still reluctant to spray the marijuana fields, citing the upcoming Presidential election campaign, and apparent U.S. reluctance to use paraquat against marijuana fields in the U.S.

5. Coca cultivation of lower grade coca is beginning in earnest in the Llanos and Cauca areas in Eastern and Southern Colombia. The Colombian government currently eradicates coca fields by physical means and expresses little political hesitancy to do so. The coca is grown in the newly opened development areas of the Amazon and Orinoco basins.

6. The \$16 million authorized by Congress specifically for Colombia in 1980 outside of the \$2 million budget request of the State Department has shown some positive results. However, opinions were expressed that much of that money which was allocated to the Colombian military services could have been more effectively utilized had it been planned and budgeted and spent more carefully over a longer period of time through the normal channels of the Executive Branch.

7. The Colombian government devotes much of its attention and limited resources to the insurgency problem with M-19 and FARC. There has been some recent and limited evidence of traffickers and insurgents working together in some southern areas of the country.

8. We are doing little to promote the dissemination of information in Colombia regarding the deleterious effects of narcotics production, trafficking and use both in Colombia and the United States. These effects in Colombia are considerable, including:

- The corruption of Colombian officials, individuals and institutions.
- The corruption and addiction of growing numbers of Colombian youth.
- Extensive ecological and environmental damage through soil erosion due to slash and burn agricultural practices in steep terrain.
- Growth of an underground economy undermining the regular economy.
- High rates of inflation with no increase in income for the law-abiding element of society.
- Promotion of a further breakdown in law and order.

9. The Colombian "narco-trafficante" network is considered the best organized, best financed and most ruthless in Latin America. For the most part fleets of marine vessels are used to smuggle marijuana; cocaine and methaqualone are transported by air. There is a record of violent crime, such as killing judges in the Guajira and gangland executions in Miami. Corruption of law enforcement officials is common, coupled with personal threats on their lives. Lax laws, weak enforcement, low bail and lenient judges are no deterrent to such an organized criminal force.

10. Varying Colombian attitudes towards anti-narcotics efforts are illustrated by different positions taken in relation to the scheduled elections in May 1982. While President Turbay, who cannot succeed himself, has at times taken a strong anti-narcotics stand, a leading candidate is supported by ANIF (Nat. Assoc. of Financial Institutions) which has called for consideration of legalization of marijuana exports. Opinions are voiced that the issue will be played down by all parties, since it represents a "no-win" situation for gaining votes. Thus, there is no assurance that the successor administration will follow Turbay's position.

11. The helicopters and aircraft supplied to the Judicial Police in the Attorney General's office in Colombia are not being shared adequately with the most effective and active enforcement unit which is under Colonel Arbelaez in the National Police. The Attorney General's Office is concerned more about cocaine than marijuana and the helicopters are thus frequently not available to Colonel Arbelaez although he has a genuine need for them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.. The President, the Secretary of State, or some high level administration spokesman should make clear to the Colombians that we attach high priority to more effective cooperation on narcotics control from the Colombian government and that there is high level commitment to this priority by the U.S. government which affects overall relations between our two countries.

2. Within our narcotics policy toward Colombia, marijuana deserves more priority than it is presently getting. Some way should be found to make helicopters and aircraft, presently utilized mainly by the Judicial Police for sporadic surveillance of coca cultivation, available on demand to the National Police Unit under Colonel Arbelaez. This unit has achieved impressive results against marijuana on the Guajira Peninsula.

3. A determined effort should be made to convince the current Colombian government to begin eradication of the large and vulnerable marijuana fields in the Guajira by the use of the herbicide paraquat, now that the Percy Amendment has been repealed. It is imperative that at least some aerial spraying of the largest fields be accomplished as soon as possible. The symbolic and psychological importance of this action will be considerable. At the least, it would establish the precedent and make it easier for the successor government to spray the marijuana.
4. A more active informational effort is needed from ICA, State, DEA, and NIDA to make available to the Colombian media and public the latest developments world wide which shed more light on the deleterious effects of these narcotics and illustrate counter efforts by the U.S. government, private organizations and individuals. For example, we found no one in the U.S. Embassy aware that the State of Georgia had actually used paraquat to eradicate illegal marijuana in November, even though the Colombians constantly cite the refusal of U.S. authorities to use paraquat as an excuse for their own reluctance. Also, health and societal effects of marijuana should be given more publicity.
5. The provision of the high speed 105 foot ship to the Colombian Customs Service for patrol duty on the North Coast of Colombia appears to be serving as a deterrent. A second ship could be used to advantage. However, first our naval and coast guard experts in such matters should make certain that the experience with the first vessel from Swiftships warrants purchase of another identical ship. The crew of the vessel made it clear to us that they would perhaps prefer a heavier vessel with a narrower bow that had a greater ability to cut the rough winter seas off the North Coast. A careful evaluation of the requirements for speed vs. durability and stability should be made.
6. Aerial surveillance and eradication of the new coca plantations in the Llanos should be done systematically with the help of a global navigational system, if it is not being done already.

PERU

FINDINGS

1. The Peruvian government may be wavering, in the face of political pressure from the coca growers and traffickers, on its prior commitment to declare as illegal and eradicate all coca growing in the Upper Huallaga Valley. A Congressional Commission is drafting an amendment to a tough coca law passed in 1980. It is reported to be considering softening its provisions for the coca growers to declare some coca in the Upper Huallaga as legal and to extend the time period during which coca may be voluntarily phased out rather than eradicated.
2. The enforcement capabilities of the Peruvian government are very limited and economic prospects are bleak. Therefore, enforcement assistance from the

the United States is necessary on a large scale if we hope to see laws against coca growing and trafficking enforced. The special UMOPAR interdiction unit of the Guardia Civil in Tingo Maria led by Commander Cano is almost completely supplied by U.S. assistance.

3. The P.I.P. (Peruvian Investigative Police) does not show much enforcement or interdiction capability at present. On the other hand, the special Guardia Civil unit in Tingo Maria has demonstrated that Peruvian authorities can mount an effective interdiction effort.
4. U.S. officials and Peruvians acknowledged the need for additional educational and communications material from the U.S. for dissemination to the Peruvian public. For example, Bishop Moran of Callao, a respected anti-narcotics advocate, was most articulate in voicing the need for more public education to counter the increased acceptance in the media of the drug culture. He believed that the top government officials were sincere in their concern about narcotics.
5. The Upper Huallaga Valley crop substitution project gives the prospect of slow delivery of visible benefit to the area. Most of the initial funding is allocated to long term agricultural research at the University of the Jungle in Tingo Maria. There is little short term tangible pay-off to the grower evident in this crop substitution project, to soften the economic impact and thus ease the political resistance.
6. The ecological damage to the Upper Huallaga basin caused by coca cultivation is extensive. According to the agricultural experts at the University of the Jungle, coca is the most destructive crop to the fertility of the land and the main cause of the extensive erosion on the steep hillsides where coca is grown in vertical rows to ensure better drainage. The heavily silted rivers have lost much of their fish population. After coca is grown on the hillsides for several years, little if any agricultural or forestry use of the land is possible.
7. ENACO, the organization which oversees the purchasing of registered coca production for licit purposes is woefully understaffed and inadequate to perform the job. Hence it must be assumed that considerable leakage occurs from the supposed licit sector of Peruvian coca production to the traffickers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The U.S. government at a high level should weigh in with the Peruvian government on the implications of the new coca law now being considered in the Peruvian Congress. This new law, if it represents a retreat by the Peruvian government on its commitment to crack down on illegal production of coca, could threaten the success of the Upper Huallaga Valley project before it gets started and therefore undermine our joint narcotics control efforts. Linkages with other aspects of our relationship such as coveted U.S. development assistance in the Piches-Palcazu area should be considered.
2. Material enforcement assistance should continue to be funneled mainly to those individuals and organizations such as UMOPAR which demonstrate the ability and willingness to use the equipment to good effect.

3. DEA expertise and experience in conducting drug investigations should be utilized to a greater extent by the Embassy's Narcotics Assistance Unit in disbursing funds for investigation expenses to the P.I.P. to help to ensure that the expenses claimed are bona fide investigation expenses and to provide another reason for P.I.P. to exchange information with D.E.A.

4. A Congressional delegation composed of members interested in the success of the Upper Huallaga Valley project should visit Peru in the spring of 1982. This would be helpful to focus high level attention on the project. It would underline U.S. and Congressional interest in the success of the pilot project to the Peruvian government, and to both the Department of State and A.I.D.

5. While we are looking for eradication and enforcement results from the Peruvian government, they still look back at our commitment to the originally discussed terms of the Upper Huallaga income substitution project which mentioned a U.S. AID contribution of \$56 million. The first stage of that agreement called for only \$18 million. The Peruvians were most interested to see if we have made any provisions for additions to this first stage in FY 1983. Therefore, the FY 1983 Authorization and Appropriation should include some additional funds for a possible second stage of this project.

BOLIVIA

FINDINGS

1. The Bolivian government has not yet established sufficient credibility in the enforcement of its narcotics control laws and international obligations. Suspicions of high level corruption in the military and other enforcement agencies have not been dispelled sufficiently. However, lack of enforcement resources and capabilities is a genuine problem. In addition, there does not seem to be an intelligent and coherent Bolivian strategy on enforcement. But the Bolivians do not appear to have any problem with allowing U.S. enforcement experts to work closely as advisors with their enforcement people.

2. All of the licit demand for coca in Bolivia could be more than satisfied by the current coca production of the Yungas region, a traditional growing area whose coca leaves have a preferred taste to native chewers. Coca growing in the Chapare region, on the other hand, is a recent phenomenon and produces over three times as much coca as the Yungas, almost all of it for the illicit market. Chapare coca leaves yield a higher cocaine hydrochloride content and are much preferred by the traffickers.

3. Foreign aid in the 1960's opened up the Chapare region to settlement and development by building bridges and roads. With no real markets for other agricultural products nearly all of the settlers in the Chapare are growing coca as their main, and in many instances, only cash crop. During our visit, the paved trunk highway through the Chapare and all of the bridges were in many spots confined to one lane traffic, with the other lane being used as a drying bed for coca leaves.

4. It is difficult to believe that the coca growers of the Chapare could constitute much of a political force as is claimed by the military junta. These new settlers of mostly Indian stock appear on the surface to be humble and passive subsistence farmers, and were known as such before the recent coca bonanza. It is more probable that the political pressure is coming from the traffickers.

5. PRODES, a crop substitution research and development organization set up largely with U.S. assistance and support, has done some impressive agricultural research and planning. They have established nine working nurseries, one in each of the 9 sub-regions of the Chapare, each of which has different agricultural characteristics. All of this work has been accomplished despite the very limited resources available especially following the Garcia Meza coup in July of 1980. Crop substitution research and development appears to be further along in the Chapare than at Peru's University of the Jungle in the Upper Huallaga Valley. There is in fact a limited opportunity in one of the micro regions of the Chapare to proceed immediately into actual crop substitution of pineapples for coca. An unsatisfied demand, in other words, a market, exists at present for pineapples at a Cochabamba cannery.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. More convincing evidence of a commitment to crack down on the narcotics traffickers is needed before there are any significant new infusions of U.S. aid or other expressions of U.S. approval. Verified progress in the area of narcotics control should play a major role in our overall relations with Bolivia. However, with an American Ambassador now in La Paz with proven expertise in the area of narcotics control, some modest U.S. initiatives aimed at sparking movement by the Bolivians towards effective enforcement actions might prove to be a good investment. The Ambassador should be allowed the flexibility to utilize some of the limited funds which are now in the pipeline but not yet obligated, as an incentive for progress in the area of narcotics control.

2. A large and active DEA presence in La Paz and elsewhere in Bolivia is clearly called for. The Bolivians themselves request it. U.S. expertise and advice on enforcement and investigation are needed as Bolivian resources and expertise in this area leave much to be desired. Also a larger DEA involvement is needed for verification of genuine Bolivian cooperation.

3. Assistance to PRODES is a good investment toward any eventual crop substitution program or development assistance. During the interim period, while awaiting evidence of Bolivian government commitment, funds should nevertheless be made available to permit PRODES to continue its program without interruption. Such support should also permit PRODES to proceed immediately into a pilot project of actual crop substitution of pineapples for coca in one of the micro-regions of the Chapare where pineapples are grown and a market exists.

4. Because of the difficulty of separating licit coca from illicit coca, a complete ban on coca production in certain areas, especially non-traditional areas such as the Chapare, should be the goal of U.S. policy. As Chapare coca is preferred by the traffickers and the region produces most of the illicit coca, the Chapare should also be the focus of our eradication and interdiction strategy.

5. A search should be made to identify trustworthy individuals in whom we can place our trust to lead the enforcement effort in Bolivia. Working closely with U.S. advisors, such individuals, heading up an institution with adequate resources and staffed by a rotating, largely uncorrupted crew such as we have seen in Colombia and Peru, should be able to mount an effective enforcement effort.

Committee on Foreign Affairs

TO: Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman
 FROM: James T. Schollaert, Edward J. Palmer, Staff Consultants
 SUBJ: Summary Report on Narcotics Trip to Pakistan
 DATE: March 11, 1982

This memorandum is a summary report of our visit to Pakistan, with a stop at UNFAC headquarters in Vienna, during the period February 9-19. Specific findings and recommendations are listed in numbered form. We traveled in the field for 3 days in the poppy growing areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, the Malakand Agency, Swat and the area around Peshawar and the Khyber Pass.

FINDINGS

1. Opium from Southwest Asia, the Golden Crescent countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, now constitutes the major opium source for the heroin flowing into the U.S. from abroad. This opium is processed into heroin in laboratories in Italy, Pakistan and other locations in the region. Latest DEA 1981 estimates place 51% of illicit opium stocks currently from Southwest Asia, 36% from Mexico and 13% from Southeast Asia (The Golden Triangle.)

2. Large stocks of opium remain stockpiled in the tribal areas of Northwest Frontier Province from the record 800 ton illicit opium harvest of 1978/79. Most of these opium stocks are still available to the market in identified locations in the tribal areas. The estimated opium harvest in Pakistan for 1981-82 is down to around 70 tons. Several reasons are cited for this decrease: drought conditions; a poor internal market for illicit opium, perhaps because of the huge supply of unsold stocks from the 1978-79 harvest and large supplies probably being smuggled in from Afghanistan; and Pakistani government eradication and enforcement efforts in merged and settled areas.

3. Recently Pakistan has emerged as a major heroin, as opposed to opium, producing nation for the first time. Heroin laboratories in the Northwest Frontier Province are flourishing. Previously Pakistan was noted more for the supply of opium base rather than heroin. But seizures of Pakistani origin heroin are at an all time high in Europe and the Middle East according to the DEA, surpassing for the first time all other source countries including Turkey.

4. The Government of Pakistan moved recently in February to raid one of these illicit heroin laboratories which are located in the town of Darra, in the Northwest Frontier Province. An armed confrontation occurred between the law enforcement officials and the local tribal people which caused the raid to be aborted and the law enforcement people to retreat for the time being. However, the Provincial government and the tribal leaders eventually agreed to a settlement whereby 6 individuals associated with the heroin lab were handed over to be arrested, a fine of 1 million rupees was exacted from the tribe and the frontier scouts were posted in the area for the first time. Whether the government's experience with this raid will cause them to step

up their efforts against the heroin laboratories or to become more hesitant to launch raids in tribal areas remains to be seen.

5. The Darra raid illustrates the difficulties faced by the Pakistani government in dealing with the tribes in the Northwest Frontier Province who claim some form of sovereignty. These tribes are spread on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border and feel free to move across the borders without restrictions except on the major transportation arteries. Thus, effective enforcement of narcotics laws in these areas is dependent to a great extent on acceptance of these laws by the tribal authorities, and the willingness of the Pakistani government to insist upon this acceptance. It was pointed out to us by a Pakistani official that the first heroin laboratory appeared in a tribal area in 1975 and the government promptly raided it as it did several others in 1976 and 1977 with little or no hesitation. Recently there has been more hesitation.

President Zia has some legitimate concern about the delicacy of the situation along the Afghan border and the possibility of insurgency among the tribes. However, this possibility should not be quickly and uncritically accepted as a justification for tolerating heroin laboratories anywhere in the Northwest Frontier Province.

6. Heroin abuse in Pakistan itself is increasing as might be expected. Some of the heroin being produced in Pakistani laboratories is now being consumed in Pakistan. Marijuana and hashish abuse is increasing according to the United Nations. Also, narcotics money is beginning to cause inflation in the price of land buildings, and luxury goods in the Peshawar area, according to some local observers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States needs to do more to impress upon the Pakistanis that narcotics control has to be given a higher priority. The time for movement on this issue is now. A combination of circumstances makes the present time not only propitious circumstances at present include: the present depressed market price for opium base; the professed anti-narcotics commitment of President Zia; and the availability of large amounts of U.S. assistance to Pakistan.

Our Ambassador is raising the issue more than ever in Islamabad but more could be done from Washington to let the Pakistanis know that our overall relations are affected by the damage inflicted upon the United States by Pakistani heroin. Unfortunately, the best opportunity to make this point was missed by the State Department last year during the negotiations on the foreign assistance package to Pakistan, conducted by Undersecretary Buckley.

2. Accordingly, U.S. policy should focus at present on the proliferation of heroin laboratories in the Northwest Frontier Province as our top priority. To allow heroin labs to flourish in the tribal areas is to stimulate illicit opium cultivation in Pakistan far more than crop substitution projects can be expected to overcome such opium cultivation.

3. Despite numerous assurances to the contrary, there is still no commitment of any of the \$1.6 billion in economic development funds to development projects which would also deter narcotics production as called for by the Gilman Amendment. A.I.D. points out that this large foreign assistance package for Pakistan was only enacted into law several months ago. However, Congressional supporters of the Gilman amendment should continue to press A.I.D. if they wish to see some of the economic assistance funds utilized for narcotics purposes. If this cannot be done in Pakistan where there is no scarcity of available A.I.D. funds, then it will be unlikely to happen anywhere.

4. At present, there is an imbalance in the types of narcotics control assistance provided to Pakistan by the international community, including the U.S. The most pressing current need is for law enforcement assistance to strengthen the fledgling narcotics police forces. Our strategy, should be to prod the GOP to enact stricter narcotics laws, enhance the authority of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) by pressing for the passage of a new draft of national drug control laws to provide the PNCB with the legal status which was envisaged for it when established in 1973, and to increase law enforcement capabilities through training and support programs. There is general agreement that crop substitution programs must be accompanied by strict enforcement measures in order to achieve success.

5. There is a risk that the large sums of U.S. development assistance pouring into Pakistan could have the effect of increasing opium production, unless appropriate safeguards such as effective poppy clauses or other measures are devised. All the U.S. agencies involved should consider carefully the reasons for the unfortunate experience of U.S. development assistance in Bolivia, in the Chapare, where the area thus developed used the infrastructure we provided primarily for coca cultivation and trafficking.

6. There is a need for ICA to assist with an educational and communications program as an integral part of the U.S. narcotics control effort in Pakistan. The target audiences should include Pakistan's government officials, opinion makers, farmers, students, and the general public. During our visit we encountered individuals working at the grass roots level with farmers as well as local officials, who testified to the effectiveness of such materials illustrating the ill effects of heroin on society.

7. As in other producing countries, there is a need for additional reliable and systematic intelligence on the extent of cultivation of opium poppy in Pakistan. At present, we are relying on less than complete information about the extent of opium cultivation. Such information would be especially important to ensure that production did not merely shift from an area receiving crop substitution assistance to another area previously free of opium cultivation. The full range of U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities should be considered.

8. DEA at present has five officers in Pakistan as compared to more than twenty in Thailand. This difference in personnel levels does not equate with the relative importance of these two countries as sources of illicit opium and heroin. Pakistan as a source of opium and heroin is clearly a much more important threat to the United States at present than Thailand. The Pakistani government is ready to accept and work with more DEA officials. The most immediate need for additional DEA presence and assistance is in the Northwest Frontier Province, at Peshawar.

Committee on Foreign Affairs

April 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman

FROM: James T. Schollaert, Edward J. Palmer, Staff Consultants

SUBJECT: Summary Report on Narcotics Survey of Southeast Asia: Thailand, Burma and Hong Kong

This memorandum is a summary report of staff visits to Thailand and Burma, with a stopover in Hong Kong, during the period of March 21 through April 3, 1982. In Thailand, in addition to two days in Bangkok, we spent three days in the Chiang Mai area and in Burma, we journeyed from Rangoon to the Taunggyi area of the Shan State for two days.

We come to the general conclusion that because of several recent actions undertaken by the Thai Government and signs that the Burmese are slowly opening up to increased international cooperation, there was some basis for cautious optimism that we might see joint and more effective action in the future against the flow of heroin coming from the Golden Triangle.

Specific findings and recommendations by country follow.

THAILANDFINDINGS

(1) Prime Minister Prem is personally committed to anti-narcotics action, as opposed to comparative lip service given by previous administrations. He is perceived as a strong leader with the ability to move the Thai bureaucracy to action and is deeply concerned with Thailand's domestic narcotics problem as well as its international image. He has been responsive to high U.S. government requests for action.

(2) The Thai operation in January 1982 directed against the village of Ban Hin Taek, the headquarters of Chang Chi-Fu (a.k.a. Khun Sa), is evaluated as a significant demonstration of the will and commitment of Prime Minister Prem to reduce narcotics traffic. While Chang Chi-Fu, (reputed to control 70% of the heroin production of the Golden Triangle) was not captured, his organization was scattered, large stores of military and communications equipment were captured and trafficking patterns were disrupted. An area plan is now in preparation to consolidate the gains of the engagement and to provide for future development.

(3) Another demonstration of Prem's will was his attempt in November 1981 to move the Thai government to eradicate poppy production in ten villages in Chiang Mai Province now aided by a U.N. crop replacement and agricultural development project. This action was stopped by the King, who maintains a personal interest and participation in Hill tribe projects. Upon re-examination, the King allowed opium eradication to be carried out in seven of the ten villages, while three were left untouched because of his concern for farmers' livelihoods.

(4) However, Thailand's primary role in narcotics is not as a producer of opium since it grows only approximately 50 tons as compared to the estimated 500 tons grown in Burma and 10 tons produced in Laos. It functions as an essential and critical link in the trafficking of heroin from the refineries of Burma to transshipment ports in Malaysia and Singapore. Heroin, primarily refined in the laboratories just across the Burmese border, eventually reaches Hong Kong, Australia the United States, and Europe.

(5) Thus, the basic problem that has plagued interdiction efforts is that the refineries are situated several kilometers inside Burma. There is a long history of mutual mistrust and recrimination between Burmese and Thai authorities and skepticism of each other's enforcement efforts. At the time of the staff visit, a high level Thai delegation visited Burma to discuss mutual cooperation and while the results were not announced beyond willingness to exchange intelligence, there were some indications that Prime Minister Prem's determined actions might trigger a Burmese response. There is general agreement that combined and well coordinated actions by both Burmese and Thai forces are needed to disrupt Chang Chi-Fu operations permanently, and to avoid emergence of any splinter successors.

(6) Opium production in Thailand (and the rest of the Golden Triangle) dropped significantly in 1979 and 1980 because of a severe drought, but 1981 produced a bumper crop as well as the 1982 crop recently harvested. Because of its rugged terrain, extensive river system, long seacoast, large numbers of fishing boats and well-established trafficking groups, it will be extremely difficult to reduce the flow of heroin unless additional initiatives are undertaken by the Prem government. In the past, narcotics control has been a secondary problem, since Thailand has faced domestic insurgency, the Vietnamese refugee influx, and the threat of Vietnamese military action. However, increased awareness of domestic addiction (there are an estimated 400,000 plus addicts, 80% in Bangkok), the recognition that insurgents may not be a buffer against Communist groups, and the commitment of the present government are factors that may raise the priorities of anti-narcotics efforts.

(7) A visit to several of the villages in Chiang Mai Province involved in the UNFAC crop substitution/integrated development project and detailed conversations with the U.N. and Thai personnel confirm a number of successes in developing alternate crops (such as kidney beans and coffee). However, it is conceded that while opium may have moved from the immediate areas, there is no measurable diminution in opium production in the region. Our conclusion was that such development projects might achieve other objectives, but reduction of opium production had not been demonstrated. U.N. projects contain no law enforcement provisions for the eradication of opium fields as a condition for development.

In addition, we learned that the United States Department of Agriculture provides about \$600,000 per year in separate funding for the so-called King's projects in the opium growing areas of Northern Thailand. These U.S. aid projects in an opium area do not appear to be coordinated with our international narcotics control programs.

(8) The most serious obstacle to successful crop substitution has been the absence of continual and consistent law enforcement support by the Thai government. Despite official pronouncements for several years that opium crops would be destroyed, nothing has been done with the exception of the action described in paragraph three. The Thai National Police headed by Police General Pow Sarasin has the primary narcotics suppression responsibility, augmented by Thai Border Police, Royal Thai Customs and various city units. The office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) is the coordinating agency and through the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) deals with grant assistance programs by donor countries.

The Thai government has historically justified its reluctance to eradicate opium fields on the grounds that it would deprive Hill tribes of their livelihood and might drive the tribal minorities into the arms of Communist insurgents who have operated in these areas for years.

(9) Official Thai government policy rejects the use of herbicides in spraying the poppy fields. It is not considered viable because opium plants are usually interspersed with a variety of other important crops. Thai officials have observed the Mexican spraying and remain reluctant to eradicate opium by aerial spraying.

(10) The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has maintained a strong presence in Thailand for years, working closely with five counterpart agencies in Bangkok and field locations, including Chiang Mai and Songkhla. Despite successes in upgrading Thai enforcement and interdiction capabilities, attitudes and inaction of Thai government have limited DEA opportunities in the past. The large number of DEA agents in Thailand would seem on the surface to be disproportionate to the opportunity to make a meaningful dent in the heroin traffic coming through Thailand, especially compared to the small numbers of DEA agents in other major producing countries such as Pakistan and Colombia.

(11) INM also funds a number of programs, including law enforcement commodities, customs training, crop substitution support, drug abuse prevention and assistance to ONCB. By personal visits and stated objectives, INM has emphasized that efforts directed at crop substitution must recognize the necessity for opium crop control.

(12) The Mae Chaem Watershed Development Project, an ambitious program in a poppy growing area to be funded jointly by AID and the Royal Thai Government and agreed to in August 1980, appeared to have operational problems at the time of our visit. Funded by a total grant to Thailand of \$10 million and counterpart funding by the Thai government of approximately \$12 million, this project is essentially an experimental demonstration effort, focused on the Mae Chaem Watershed, an area of approximately 4200 square miles containing a population of more than 40,000 Northern Thai and ethnic minorities, mostly Karen. Conditions of intense poverty and the absence of most basic government services characterize the area. The project is designed to upgrade all facilities and eventually provide alternate crops over an implementation period of seven years. Section (5.4) of the Agreement contains a poppy clause which provides that "assistance provided under the Project will not be used in any manner for cultivation of poppy crops or opium" and the Thai government "further covenants that it will effectively monitor and enforce such prohibition and take appropriate steps to terminate benefits to individuals using such assistance for the cultivation of poppy crops or opium". The implementation of this poppy clause will depend on the enforcement will and capabilities of the Thai government when the project is implemented.

The two immediate operational problems which appeared to require a Cabinet decision were (1) permission to clear some forest reserves in the area to add agricultural land and (2) a land transfer device to allow the inhabitants some form of nontransferable ownership of acreage. Opposition to both these measures exists in some Thai quarters and AID opinions were that unless this matter was resolved shortly, the project was in jeopardy.

(13) As is the pattern in other countries corruption of government officials, particularly at the lower levels, is a way of life. However, the present Prem Government and leading Thai narcotics enforcement figures are given high praise for their honesty and zealotry.

(14) The International Communications Agency (ICA) capitalizes on growing Thai interest and concern about narcotics and does an effective job in disseminating information. Varied programs are directed at opinion makers and a weekly radio program on the dangers of narcotics is disseminated to 64 stations nationwide. Additional materials are always welcome, including research and information material in the U.S., that can be adapted as appropriate for local use.

(15) Over the years, intelligence gathering on narcotics production and trafficking has been a strong point of the U.S. agencies in Thailand. In our conversations with personnel involved, they voiced a sense of frustration that action did not follow intelligence gathering as frequently as they wished. In the case of information given to the Burmese, there was little or no feedback to U.S. sources.

Recommendations

(1) The U.S. should continue, at the highest level, to encourage the continued actions of the Prem administration to move against traffickers and to enforce the existing laws against poppy cultivation. This should include support and participation, as appropriate, in implementing the development plan now being prepared for the Ban Hin Taek area.

(2) The U.S. should take steps to encourage active cooperation between Thailand and Burma, building on the recent meeting of Thai and Burmese officials in Rangoon. The U.S. should endeavor to allay Thai/Burmese suspicions and to encourage not only exchange of intelligence but planning of combined and coordinated operations on both sides of the border. Only such steps will deny the sanctuaries that the refiners and traffickers enjoy along the border areas.

(3) In view of the complicated nature and high risk associated with area development projects such as Mae Chaem, the U.S. should insist on spelling out enforcement provisions of the poppy clause more explicitly. If Mae Chaem is considered a narcotics related project, the benefits of opium reduction should be susceptible to definite evaluation based on active monitoring.

(4) To increase the chances of success in Mae Chaem, efforts should be made to streamline the number and nature of administrative bodies involved, both on the Thai and U.S. side.

(5) In conversation with U.S. and Thai individuals a number of reservations were expressed concerning the concept, design and scheduled implementation of the Mae Chaem project. For example, these included statements that it was an American imposed project not necessarily sensitive to Thai needs; that the track record of AID area development projects was poor at best; that direct reduction of opium cultivation

was doubtful since the initial development was directed at lowland areas where poppies are not cultivated and that it was needlessly complicated. We found it difficult to evaluate these objections, but were impressed with the forcefulness of the various positions taken. Accordingly, it is recommended that AID and INM undertake a review of the project to assess the validity of these viewpoints and if substantiated, to determine what corrective action can be taken at this stage. The Committee should request a report on this review.

(6) While recognizing the problems of insurgency and possible disaffection of the Hill tribes, the U.S. should continue to encourage law enforcement activities to comply with the strict laws of 1979 concerning the ban on opium production.

(7) Information gathering activities on opium production now conducted in Thailand should be considered for use in other countries. Thailand has the most reliable production estimates and the methodology should be considered for extension to other countries.

(8) Marijuana eradication and interdiction should be added to the objectives of our Thai assistance programs. The U.S. currently devotes no resources to combatting the flow of marijuana from Thailand to the U.S. and shows little interest in assisting the Thais combat their considerable marijuana problem. The Thais on the otherhand do eradicate marijuana fields, unlike their hesitancy to eradicate opium. There is an undetermined flow of Thai marijuana to the United States. A recent shipment of five tons of marijuana was discovered and seized. The American trafficker arrested had been operating out of Thailand allegedly for six years and averaging four shipments per year.

BURMA

FINDINGS

(1) Burma is the primary opium growing area in Southeast Asia, and is estimated to have produced a bumper crop of at least 500 tons in 1981 and in 1982, as compared to approximately 160 tons and 125 tons in the drought years of 1980 and 1979, respectively. Most of this cultivation takes place in the Shan State, an area of mountains and jungles which is largely inaccessible and inhabited by groups of well-armed insurgents who are outside the control of the Burmese Central government. In addition, Burma is the prime location for processing opium into heroin. Most of the "Golden Triangle" refineries are located in Burma within a few kilometers of the Thai border. The refineries are highly mobile and the area is rugged, remote and also beyond the effective control of the Burmese government. These twin obstacles of inaccessibility and lack of control are basic to an understanding of the limitations imposed on the Burmese government in its efforts to control narcotics, as well as to cope with its insurgency problems.

(2) Narcotics and insurgency are inextricably interwoven in the eyes of the Burmese government. Therefore, their strong anti-narcotics policy and eradication efforts are motivated by security considerations of a primary nature, as well as the desire to battle the recognized domestic addiction problems. The most serious insurgent threat comes from the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) which controls much of production and trafficking activities in the Shan State. With lessened support from the People's Republic of China, the BCP turns more and more to narcotics to finance its insurgent activities. In addition, there are numerous smaller insurgent groups, as well as the Shan United Army (SUA) led by Chang Chi-Fu, which operates both in Thailand and Burma.

(3) Since 1974, with the passage of a strict narcotics and dangerous drug law, Burma has given high priority to programs of law enforcement and crop eradication, augmented by educational and treatment programs. In 1980, a reward system for seizure of narcotics and other contraband was instituted. The Burmese government is firmly committed to action on every front against narcotics production and trafficking, while hampered severely by lack of enforcement capabilities and control in opium growing and trafficking areas.

(4) The most dramatic evidence of Burma's efforts to eradicate poppy cultivation are the yearly military police operations (Ngyapan) which started in 1975. These sweeps involve companies of police, army and local militia who manually eradicate poppy fields. At the time of our visit to Taunggyi, the police headquarters in the Shan State, operations had been largely completed to eradicate a reported 10,000 acres, with 3364 personnel involved. There are some doubts about the accuracy of this acreage figure. While there were only six insurgent skirmishes and two casualties this year, a helicopter tour dramatized the roughness of the terrain and the inaccessibility of much of the area where armed insurgent groups are located and have taken to planting plastic mines, which are extremely difficult to detect.

(5) Although our intelligence sources stated that they have pinpointed the laboratories on the Thai/Burma border, Burmese officials claimed that they needed independent verification. They also cited the difficulties of terrain and the inability to land troops close by to avoid giving forewarning of their presence to the lab operators.

(6) The United States has had an aviation program in Burma since 1974, providing Burma with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, communication equipment and maintenance support. The present program includes 29 aircraft and FY 1982 budget was almost \$6 million. Burmese officials indicate that the mobility provided by these aircraft has contributed to the success they have had on crop eradication and operation against traffickers. They are proud of their domestic aircraft maintenance capabilities. In conversation with Burmese and U.S. officials, the need for C 130 transport aircraft was cited, in order to ferry troops and equipment more rapidly for both eradication and interdiction operations. In spite of the rugged terrain, Burmese officials claim that numerous airstrips are available or could be constructed to reduce travel time to remote areas and thus multiply the effectiveness of their operations.

(7) The Burmese government has resisted suggestions that herbicidal spraying be used to eradicate opium crops. They are fearful that spraying would not only harm opium but other important crops as well, since such crops are frequently interspersed with poppies. Some Burmese officials visited Mexico to observe spraying operations and returned noncommittal, including the Director of the People's Police Force, with whom we met. However, he indicated a willingness to consider spraying if it could be proved that it did not hurt other crops.

(8) The interrelationship of Burma/Thai interests in the "Golden Triangle" are well-recognized by the Burmese government. Based on a series of incidents over the past five years, Burmese authorities are wary and skeptical of Thai enforcement efforts, including previous abortive efforts to capture Chang Chi-Fu. However, the recent action of the Prem administration against the traffickers, followed up by a Burmese/Thai high level conference in Rangoon immediately preceding our visit, offered some positive signs. Burmese officials indicated that they were prepared to exchange intelligence more actively with their Thai counterparts, but were understandably vague in giving out additional information concerning the conference since there had been no announcements by the conferees.

(9) The attitude of the Burmese government towards crop eradication is significantly different from that of the Thais. They consider poppy eradication to be the first step toward crop replacement and have so expressed themselves to U.S. State Department officials. After such action, the farmers will need help to replace the poppy crop with subsistence crops and alternative cash crops.

(10) In addition to the aviation and communications programs, INC has funded modest pilot projects in apiculture (bee-keeping) and poultry, as well as funds to bring Burmese officials to the United States to discuss crop substitution. Also, limited numbers of Burmese customs officers have attended U.S. sponsored training conferences and two police officers received management training at DEA during 1981. While small in numbers, these activities are considered a solid base on which to build additional programs to involve Burmese government officials and to improve technical capabilities in enforcement activities.

(11) With funding by the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), Burma has had a major crop substitution program totaling \$4 million from 1976 to 1981 and is planning to continue seven small projects during the next five years at a level of \$5.4 million. These include crop substitution, livestock, treatment, rehabilitation, preventive education, information and law enforcement. Recognizing the strong desires of the Burmese government for complete control, this is in reality a grant program, with administration in the hands of the Burmese. Assistance is given only in areas where poppies are grown, through townships and not the individual farmer, and there are twenty-one villages in the Shan State receiving crop substitution aid. This is coupled with strong enforcement and in the words of the U.N. director, "the drug eradication campaign drives the engine". However, this is not a requirement of the U.N. (mostly Norwegian money is earmarked but not for enforcement) but is the initiative of the Burmese government. Despite careful selection of locations, security for law enforcement operation is still a problem, according to U.N. officials.

(12) The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) returned to Burma several years ago after an absence of fifteen years and is presently involved in several projects in primary health care and nutrition, including training. Relations with the Agricultural Corporation are described as excellent and the Corporation is considered professionally outstanding by AID personnel. They constitute a strong base for future planning. In these projects, AID zeroes in on specific townships, as opposed to broader area strategy. FY 1982 AID funding levels are \$7.5 million, with the major share allocated to fertilizer (\$3.7 million) and equipment (\$2.5 million). Seven of the eight intensive township programs are in the Shan State, in areas considered comparatively safe under government control.

(13) The Burmese government conducts all cultural, educational and informational activities within the country, including government owned media, and exercises complete censorship. It mounts a strong anti-narcotics campaign through all media and the educational system in recognition of its domestic addictive problems. Consequently, informational activities by the U.S. International Communication Agency (ICA) are necessarily limited. The government media does subscribe to international wire services and ICA is able to disseminate to select audiences. The ICA representative confirmed the desirability for additional current information and research materials both for Embassy use and distribution to government officials and professionals in education and rehabilitation.

(14) The Embassy has an effective and active Narcotics Control Unit headed by the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). The Ambassador takes an active part in placing priority on narcotics control as one of the chief issues in U.S. relations with Burma. However, the current INM program is administered by a political officer, who finds that almost all his time is devoted to these activities. There appears to be a need for an INM designated officer, particularly in view not only of current workload, but future planning.

(15) As referred to previously, intelligence exchange is described as a frustrating experience by U.S. personnel both in Thailand and Burma. Information on trafficking activities is absorbed by the Burmese and there is no feedback. Occasionally, a successful interdiction operation will be announced, providing the clue that intelligence has been acted upon by Burmese authorities. Thus, while U.S. and Burmese objectives are identical, there is difficulty in securing the systematic interchange prevalent in other countries. Hopes were expressed that the situation could improve if the recent Burma/Thai conference agreement on intelligence exchange was implemented.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The U.S. government should encourage increased cooperation between Thailand and Burma in fighting narcotics. Using the Thai action against Chang Chi-Fu and the recent conference in Rangoon as building blocks, every effort should be made to overcome traditional mistrust and to develop plans for combined and coordinated operations on both sides of the border.

(2) To put support behind the persuasion, the U.S. government should provide concessional FMS loans to fund the purchase of two C-130 H transport aircraft, as the Embassy has recommended for the past two years. Congress may have to initiate legislation to this effect. Such equipment can directly increase the law enforcement capabilities of the Burmese agencies in the Shan State where Burmese control is presently lacking largely because of an inability to project their force and authority.

(3) Increased cooperation between Burma and Thailand will be dependent on effective use and interchange of intelligence. Continued efforts should be undertaken to point out the concrete advantages that can result from such intelligence coordination without compromising Burmese national interests and security.

(4) In view of the positive Burmese attitude on crop eradication, AID and INM should consider narcotics related projects in township areas of the Shan State when they become secure. The Agricultural Corporation appears to provide a professional base for such planning.

(5) Within the limitations of Burmese government restriction on communication, ICA in Washington should make available all current U.S. research information, current clippings, films and other materials that can be viewed by Embassy staff, Burmese government officials and other professionals (such as doctors and social workers) involved in the anti-narcotics effort.

(6) Addition of an INM officer to the Embassy should be considered because of the present workload and possible future enlargement of the program.

HONG KONG

(NOTE: The stopover in Hong Kong was brief, and conversations were limited to Consular and DEA personnel and Mr. Peter Lee, the Commissioner of Narcotics)

FINDINGS

(1) Hong Kong has achieved remarkable success since 1972 when four far reaching proposals were adopted that included establishment of an Action Committee Against Narcotics, (ACAN), a new Commissioner of Narcotics as the executive arm of ACAN, reorganization of the Narcotics Bureau of Police (which had never caught a major trafficker) and establishment of a Central Registry of Drug Addicts. From that time on, Hong Kong has developed successful programs in anti-corruption, interdiction, education and treatment which can serve as models for other nations (with the usual caveat that individual country conditions differ).

(2) Starting with the breakup of the Chinese triads and syndicates for heroin trafficking in 1973, authorities moved to eliminate Hong Kong as a trans-shipment point, and launched a number of sophisticated approaches which have included use of the conspiracy law against syndicates, tracing narcotics profits through financial institutions and seeking to track "laundered" money. These efforts have been pursued despite the fact that there is no central system of regulation for Hong Kong banks and because of Hong Kong's position as a financial center, there is only limited financial legislation and regulation.

(3) Concurrently, Hong Kong embarked on a drug educational and rehabilitation program which has reduced the number of addicts to 30-50,000, compared to the all time high of 250,000 reported in 1959 and as many as 80-100,000 by unofficial estimates in 1973. The educational program uses multi-media mass communications to enlist community support and targets its messages at several audiences, including young people, 15 to 24, the existing addict, and the international group. Commissioner Lee points to measurable success of this education effort based in periodic evaluation. It has been adopted in other countries, notably Thailand.

(4) The most alarming factor on the current scene is the 600 ton bumper crop of opium produced in the Golden Triangle which is reflected in increases of heroin entering Hong Kong. Practically all heroin and opium entering Hong Kong come via Thailand. The largest seizures have been made on Thai fishing trawlers. In 1981 Hong Kong experienced sharply increased flows over the previous drought years and expects further increases despite best efforts through improved intelligence.

(5) Hong Kong authorities are critical of Thai efforts to date in the areas of law enforcement and interdiction. Specifically, Thailand has never enforced its own laws on poppy bans, has done little to stem the flow of Thai trawlers carrying drugs and has not chosen to enforce its own strict currency laws which could attack the "laundering" of narcotics funds.

(6) Based on the above experience, Hong Kong is adopting a "wait and see" attitude to evaluate the recent attack on Chang Chi-Fu and eradication of crops in seven of ten U.N. villages. Additional actions on the law enforcement and interdiction front are required to convince Hong Kong authorities that Thailand has embarked on a comprehensive program that will reduce the flow of narcotics into Hong Kong. They are not counting on such action and are braced for a continued increase this year.

(7) DEA maintains an office in Hong Kong and enjoys a close working relationship with law enforcement agencies, particularly in the exchange of intelligence and operational techniques. Since Hong Kong is used to recruit couriers for the Golden Triangle trade, the DEA office is ideally situated to tap information sources. In addition, recognizing that Hong Kong is the corporate center of the narcotics trade, "Operation Schoolboy", tracing millions of dollars of narcotics profits in and out of Hong Kong, was undertaken in cooperation with the Hong Kong authorities. Thus, the DEA office serves as a listening post for all Golden Triangle activities and can contribute to efforts directed at the Golden Triangle.

(8) In another reaction to reverse the upward trend of narcotics flow, new legislation is being prepared to permit courts to impose greater penalties on drug traffickers, particularly those owners whose vessels were found to be repeatedly involved in the smuggling of heroin. Also, another Bill will extend to police officers the same powers enjoyed by customs officials to authorize a physical search on suspected traffickers. (Customs officers are protected from being accused of violating human rights by people who had undergone body searches and who were found innocent).

(9) The U.S. does not have any narcotics assistance programs in Hong Kong and maintains close and effective relationships through the Consulate General and DEA. This is particularly true in exchange of intelligence through DEA.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) While Hong Kong and the United States are not comparable in size, population, etc., many of the activities that reflect the determination and commitment of the authorities deserve study as possible models for adaptation and implementation in the United States.

This appears particularly applicable in the fields of education and use of mass communications media.

(2) The role of the Consulate General and DEA as "listening posts" and intelligence gatherers should be continued. If Thai law enforcement and interdiction efforts are stepped up and continued by the Prem government, intelligence passed to them will have increased importance, particularly so far as couriers and informers are concerned. If these intensified Thai actions do not materialize, Hong Kong and the United States will face the onslaught of the bumper crop from the "Golden Triangle". In that event, the functions in Hong Kong will assume even greater importance for interdiction. Either way, the Hong Kong operation pays off for the United States.

END