


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1981 LOS ANGELES COUNTY YOUTH SERVICES NETWORK EVALUATION

May, 1982

Claremont Graduate School Center for Applied Social Research

89203

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ACQUISITIONS

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## 1981 EVALUATION: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation study reported here is the second of a series of two conducted under contract with Los Angeles County and funded through the State Office of Criminal Justice Planning. The 1980 report assessed the program operations, service delivery, and community role of the thirteen delinquency prevention projects of the Los Angeles County Youth Services Network. The present report focuses on program outcome and impact with special attention to the issues of prevention, delinquency risk, recidivism, and client reaction.

## Major Evaluation Findings

Prevention

Juvenile delinquency was found to be sufficiently likely among male youth in Los Angeles County to justify a broad prevention effort. Cohort studies have shown that approximately one youth in every four is arrested at least once during the teenage years. In a single year there is one juvenile arrest in Los Angeles County for every seven juvenile males in the population. In addition, for every juvenile arrest there are likely to be five to thirty undetected delinquent acts.

Delinquency prevention is strongly cost-effective in comparison to the costs of responding to the delinquency after it occurs. Prevention services from the Youth Services Network cost, on average, less than \$250 per case. The average juvenile arrest in Los Angeles County represents about \$1754 in law enforcement and justice system costs. The prevention program must only prevent one arrest for every six cases it handles in order to produce an immediate net savings. If the cumulative effects of prevention on future arrests is also taken into account, the prevention program achieves a net savings by preventing only one arrest for every 12 cases it treats. If costs to victims in terms of personal injury and property damage for both detected and undetected juvenile acts are included along with the costs to the justice system, prevention of arrest for one juvenile out of every 35-50 treated is sufficient to produce a net savings to society. These very favorable ratios indicate that delinquency prevention is a concept with considerable potential in the fight against juvenile crime.

The cost-effective nature of prevention programs is particularly beneficial to the justice agencies supported by the Los Angeles County budget. The County bears almost two-thirds of the total cost of processing and disposing of each juvenile arrest. Every developing juvenile arrest history that is prevented at a cost of \$250 saves the Probation Department and Juvenile Courts approximately \$1890 of expense. Support for the Youth Services Network program by Los Angeles County (through the AB90 Subvention Program) thus seems justified, not because the prevention program has a direct effect on the CYA commitment rate, but because it has the capability of freeing substantial probation and court resources which, in turn, can be used to lower the commitment rate.

Delinquency Risk

The ability of the Youth Services Network program to actually prevent a significant amount of delinquency and, in the process, achieve substantial cost savings to the justice system depends crucially upon the delinquency risk level of the clients it serves. If those clients have little potential for delinquency, there is little to be gained in treating them.

About 46% of the Network's clients had an arrest record in the centrally maintained Juvenile Automated Index and as many as 58% may have had some official police contact. Though, overall, those figures only indicate moderate delinquency risk, there were sharp differences depending upon referral source.

Law enforcement and probation referrals to the Network constituted 46% of the total and showed a generally high level of delinquency risk. By definition, of course, all had at least some minimal police contact. In addition, their referral offenses were significant — 27% represented Part I crimes and 35% were reported as felonies.

Of particular importance, a special study showed that 47% of the law enforcement referrals would most likely have been non-detained petition referrals to the Probation Department if they had not been diverted to the Youth Services Network. This finding not only indicates a relatively high level of delinquency risk but shows that a significant portion of those referrals were "true diversions" from the juvenile justice system. Since 1979 the proportion of such true diversions among law enforcement referrals to the Youth Services Network has doubled. Each such case represents a direct savings of about \$1415 to Los Angeles County Probation and Juvenile Courts.

Referrals from sources other than law enforcement and probation, mostly schools, constituted 54% of the total Youth Services Network caseload. That group appears to represent little delinquency risk. Somewhere between two-thirds and three-fourths of them have had no official police contact either before or after referral. Among the school referrals, only 12% were referred subsequent to a delinquent act committed at school. Overall, non-law enforcement referrals were judged to have only one-third to one-half the delinquency risk of law enforcement referrals.

Recidivism

The services provided by the projects of the Youth Services Network continue to appear effective in reducing the recidivism of the clients served. A large study compared recently arrested juveniles who received treatment through the Network with those who received alternate dispositions. When statistical adjustments were made for the different characteristics of the groups, the group treated by the Network showed an 18% lower recidivism than the comparison group. Though not definitive, the results of this study were consistent with those of previous recidivism studies on clients of the Youth Services Network.

The recidivism rate at the various individual projects of the Youth Services Network varied considerably but in no case was it above the level expected on the basis of the severity of the clients served. Thus the overall recidivism reduction associated with treatment appears to be shared by all the projects of the Network rather than being the result of a few exceptionally successful projects.

Client and Counselor Evaluations

The youth workers and therapists who actually provided the service to the clients of the Youth Services Network reported that 51% of the clients completed treatment and most of the remainder received at least partial treatment. They also reported a favorable outcome of services in 73% of the cases and specifically identified delinquency as the problem area in which there was the most improvement.

A small survey of the juvenile clients themselves revealed that 84% thought that they had been helped by the service they received. Nearly three-quarters of them said specifically that they thought the service made it less likely that they would get in trouble and less likely that they would get arrested.

Cost

The total funding for the projects of the Youth Services Network was about five million dollars in fiscal year 1980-82, an average of about \$44 for each WIC 602 juvenile arrest in the areas served. That figure represents a notable decline from the previous year and is likely to decrease even more sharply as federal, state, and local budget cuts take effect. Some individual projects are already significantly underfunded and, even in the others, further cuts are likely to impair their effectiveness.

The average cost per client among the projects of the Youth Services Network was \$242. Of that, 53% went directly to service for the youth. The remainder supported the general functions that have characterized the regional service model adopted by the Network, e.g., facilitation of good referrals from law enforcement and probation, coordination of local services and public agencies, and case management of difficult clients.

Clients and Services

The typical Youth Services Network client was male, a member of an ethnic minority, and 12 to 18 years of age. Compared to the Los Angeles County juvenile arrest pool, the Network clientele contained proportionately fewer males, Blacks, and 15-17 year old juveniles.

Law enforcement and probation cases were referred primarily for property crimes, with theft or petty theft and burglary being the most frequent. About 20% of the referrals were for status offenses. Non-law enforcement referral sources most often cited family problems, behavior problems in school, and other school problems.

The most common services provided by the projects of the Youth Services Network were individual counseling, family counseling, and academic tutoring. Each case received 7.0 hours of service on average, though that average included many cases that dropped out of service prematurely.

## Recommendations

To Los Angeles County:

The substantial cost-effectiveness inherent in delinquency prevention strongly justifies its inclusion in the range of law enforcement and justice system activities supported in Los Angeles County. Since the greatest cost savings from prevention occur in probation and juvenile court operations which are supported on the County budget, it is fitting that the County provide funding to local prevention efforts. Nor is it inappropriate for that funding to come from the AB-90 Justice System Subvention Program. Though prevention efforts make little direct contribution to reducing the CYA commitment rate, they have the potential to free many times their cost in probation and juvenile court resources which can be used to affect the commitment rate. Continued County funding of delinquency prevention programs is therefore recommended.

On the other hand, to achieve significant delinquency prevention and the resulting cost savings to the justice system, the prevention program must deal with juveniles who have a relatively high level of delinquency risk. Only about half of those juveniles who already have one arrest will return with subsequent offenses even if they receive no treatment. That should provide a minimal risk level for prevention programs that are expected to have real impact on arrest rates. Law enforcement referrals, by definition, have that level of risk. Other program referrals may or may not have an arrest history. It is recommended that the County limit its support of delinquency prevention programs to those clients that are either law enforcement or probation referrals or for whom an arrest history can be demonstrated.

To the Delinquency Prevention Association:

The delinquency prevention concept and the operational model on which the Youth Services Network is founded appear to be eminently defensible. The overriding issue for the Network at the present time, of course, is maintenance of adequate funding. While funding should be pursued aggressively, it is recommended that the projects resist pressures to cut back substantially on their delinquency prevention activities even though funding may be more readily available for other activities.

The Projects of the Youth Services Network have diluted their delinquency prevention impact by accepting large numbers of clients with relatively low risk of delinquency, particularly from the schools. For some individual projects, the great preponderance of the clientele fell into that category. In times of restricted funding it is sensible to concentrate the effort where the greatest effects can be produced. That means working with juveniles who have clear delinquency risk and the best indication of that is at least one official police contact prior to referral. It is therefore recommended that the projects tighten their criteria for referral to include law enforcement and probation referrals and only those other cases with clear evidence of prior police contact or overt delinquent behavior.

It appears that a large percentage of Youth Services' clients are dropping out of service prematurely. Overall, only seven hours of service are being provided to the average client and in several projects the average is well below that. Though the Youth Services clients are often difficult cases, the records of some of the projects indicate that it is possible to maintain lower drop-out rates and provide more hours of service than the Network average. It is recommended that the Projects of the Youth Services Network work with their service providers to ensure that every reasonable effort is made to establish and maintain appropriate service once a referral is made.

## THE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ARGUMENT

The major goal of the Los Angeles County Youth Services Network is delinquency prevention. Its program operations are based on the belief that juveniles "at risk" of developing a pattern of delinquent behavior can be identified by school and law enforcement personnel and, through appropriate social services, diverted from that path. Success for a prevention program, therefore, is primarily measured in terms of the absence of something that has not yet occurred, namely delinquency. This necessarily puts such programs in a very awkward position when it comes time for them to "prove" that they are effective. The situation is rather like the one in the old story about the man standing on the corner snapping his fingers to keep the elephants away. When his sceptical friend says, "There aren't any elephants around here," the man replies, "See, it works!"

Before examining the available evidence about the effectiveness of the delinquency prevention program of the Youth Services Network in Los Angeles County, we want to take a hard look at the prevention argument on which that program is based. In particular, we want to carefully consider two fundamental questions:

Is there something to prevent? I.e., is delinquency sufficiently likely among the youth of a community to justify a broad prevention effort? If the probability of any given youth being delinquent is extremely small then there is not much to prevent in the first place.

Is the behavior worth preventing? If it is more costly to prevent the delinquency than it is to respond to it after it occurs, then prevention is a poor strategy. This issue has two separable parts. First, the cost of prevention can be compared with the direct cost to the juvenile justice system of dealing with an arrested offender. Secondly, it can be compared with the indirect cost to society of the juvenile's crimes, i.e., injury and loss to victims.

## What is there to prevent?

In simple terms, the thing to be prevented, of course, is juvenile delinquency. But if a program is to succeed, it must take juveniles who are not yet delinquents or, at least, not yet chronic delinquents and somehow keep them from becoming delinquents. If most juveniles have little likelihood of engaging in delinquent behavior then there is a problem. If the program takes groups of unselected youth there is not much to prevent and the prevention effort would be wasted on most of them. If, on the other hand, the program attempted to select only those youth with a reasonable risk of delinquency, it must find a way to identify them in the midst of large numbers of low risk youth, not an easy task. To assess the delinquency prevention strategy, we clearly need some idea of just how likely it is that the typical youth will engage in delinquent behavior.

Fortunately, there have been several relevant studies that looked at delinquency risk among normal youth populations. The best known was conducted by Wolfgang and his



collaborators in Philadelphia.<sup>1</sup> In that study, all recorded delinquent acts for a sample of 9945 male youth born in the same year were determined for the period between their tenth and their eighteenth birthday. A similar study was done more recently by the California Youth Authority using a sample of 8483 youth residing in Sacramento County.<sup>2</sup> Table 1, adapted from that study, shows the proportion of males among these representative youth population samples that had various levels of recorded police contact during their teenage years.

Table 1: Law Enforcement Contact Among the Sacramento and Philadelphia Youth Cohorts

|  | Sacramento<br>Males | Philadelphia<br>Males |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Males in Sample  | 4208                | 9945                  |
| At least one contact:  | 23%                 | 35%                   |
| Of those with one contact, % with two: (% of total sample):    | 56%<br>(13%)        | 54%<br>(19%)          |
| Of those with two contacts, % with three: (% of total sample): | 67%<br>(9%)         | 65%<br>(12%)          |

Note: For Sacramento, a contact was an official arrest; for Philadelphia, a contact was any recorded law enforcement contact.

Despite some differences in definition of a law enforcement contact, the Sacramento and Philadelphia studies agree very closely. Both show that among representative samples of male youth the likelihood of arrest or contact with police is moderately large. About one youth in every four of the Sacramento sample was arrested during the teenage years; one in every three of the Philadelphia sample had a police contact. In other words, if we simply scooped up a sample of male youth without any attempt to select them for delinquency risk, we would still find that one of every three or four was going to engage in sufficient delinquent behavior during the teenage years to call him to the attention of the local police. Approximately one of every ten would end up with three or more arrests during those years.

<sup>1</sup> Wolfgang, M.E., Figlio, R.M., and Sellin, T. Delinquency in a birth cohort. U. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972

<sup>2</sup> California Youth Authority. Delinquency in a Sacramento birth cohort. June, 1981

Though the figures in Table 1 show a non-trivial level of delinquency risk among teenage males, they underestimate the actual level in at least two ways. First, the studies represented were based on juveniles who lived in each respective city throughout their teenage years. Delinquency rates are likely to be higher among the more transitory youth who could not be tracked for eight years. In Los Angeles County, for example, the total male youth population age 10-17 can be estimated at about 455,645 youth in 1980.<sup>3</sup> During that same year 66,008 male juveniles were arrested in the County.<sup>4</sup> Thus in that year alone, there was one arrest for every seven male juveniles residing in the County. This is a rate three times the annual rate found in the Sacramento study.

Even more significant is the fact that recorded police arrests represent only a very small fraction of the total amount of delinquent behavior in which youth actually engage. Various studies in which juveniles confidentially report their actual behavior for comparison against official police records indicate that as few as 3% of their chargeable acts of delinquency result in an arrest.<sup>5</sup> In other words, for every three recorded police arrests there may be as many as 97 undetected delinquent acts. Even restricting the focus to more serious crimes (index offenses), the best available estimates indicate that only 10-20% of the actual offenses result in police apprehension.

It seems clear that, at least among male youth, the risk of delinquency is sizeable. In any given year, there will be one juvenile arrest for every seven male juveniles in Los Angeles County. At least one of every four males will be arrested during his teenage years and, for every arrest, there will be maybe dozens of undetected offenses of comparable seriousness. Even a delinquency prevention program working with randomly chosen juveniles would have a clientele at some moderate risk of developing a first offense contact with law enforcement.

The projects of the Los Angeles Youth Services Network generally receive juvenile clients of two sorts -- law enforcement and school referrals. School referrals are juveniles who have shown behavioral problems in school though they may not have gotten into any trouble with the police. These juveniles are believed to be at higher risk of delinquency than less troublesome youth and, based on the analyses presented above, it is reasonable to believe that they do have at least some moderate chance of participating in delinquent behavior. Their limitation as prevention clients is that in most cases the primary thing to be prevented for them is a first offense law enforcement contact. Three-fourths of the general youth population never has a first offense police contact and half of those who do never return for a second. Furthermore, school referrals are not always made at the beginning of the teenage years but frequently much later. The odds of establishing delinquency within that shorter time span are even less. Without extremely stringent selection, the chances

<sup>3</sup> California Youth Authority. 1980 Annual Report. Table 2, page 15 (males assumed to be one-half of total youth population).

<sup>4</sup> Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics. Criminal Justice Profile -- 1980. California Department of Justice.

<sup>5</sup> Gold and Williams. From delinquent behavior to official delinquency. Social Problems, No. 20, 1972.

of a juvenile with no first offense developing one during the years subsequent to the point of possible referral are not likely to be much higher than the base rate for all youth over all teenage years. We estimate, therefore, that only about one out of four referrals to a prevention program that have no arrest history prior to the point of referral would actually develop an arrest record in the absence of treatment.

The law enforcement referrals that come to the projects of the Youth Services Network, on the other hand, present a significantly higher risk level. They are generally referred after a first offense (or more). Without intervention, slightly more than half of them can be expected to go on to a second offense, two-thirds of those to a third offense, and so on. If the goal is to prevent the development of a pattern of delinquent behavior, evidenced by more than one police contact, two law enforcement clients must be taken to include one likely to repeat. With school referrals, eight or more must be taken to get one likely repeat offender.

It should be noted that this discussion has concerned only male juveniles. The delinquency rates of females are so much lower than those of males that it is difficult to define a female population that is significantly at risk. For example, whereas there was one arrest in L.A. County for every seven male juveniles in 1980, there was one arrest for every 35 female juveniles. If status offenses are excluded, the rate drops still lower. Furthermore, their offenses are much less serious, on average, than those of males -- mostly misdemeanors on the order of petty theft. The one exception is females already arrested at least once. The Sacramento study showed that for them the likelihood of subsequent arrests was the same as for comparable males.

Is the Delinquency Worth Preventing?

It is, of course, a humane value to wish to keep juveniles out of trouble with the law. Beyond that, however, we must ask whether it is worth the effort to attempt to prevent delinquency when it may be just as cost-effective to simply respond to it when it occurs. This is particularly true under circumstances where future delinquents cannot be positively identified. As the risk analyses above indicate, a prevention program may have to work with 2-8 or more juveniles in order to include one who would actually become a repeat offender. It might be more effective to simply wait until the offenses are committed and then work only with the one juvenile at issue. The question, then, is what an arrest costs and how that compares with the cost of preventing the arrest before it occurs.

The direct cost of an arrest can be figured in terms of the expenses required to handle the case within the juvenile justice system. To examine that we must first know how the juvenile justice system handles the typical arrest in Los Angeles County. By piecing together information from 1980 annual reports of the Probation Department, California Youth Authority, and Bureau of Criminal Statistics, it is possible to get an approximate picture of what happens to juvenile arrests in Los Angeles County. Table 2 depicts the statistical probabilities for the ultimate disposition of 1000 typical juvenile arrests.

Table 2: Ultimate Disposition of 1000 Typical Juvenile Arrests in Los Angeles County: 1980

|                 |      |   |
|-----------------|------|---|
| Initial Arrests | 1000 |   |
|                 | 450  | Released by Police (C&R)<br>(550 referred to Probation of which<br>192 detained in Juvenile Hall) |
|                 | 135  | Released by Probation   |
|                 | 78   | Put on Informal Probation (654)<br>(337 Petitioned to Court)                                      |
|                 | 119  | Dismissed by Court<br>(218 Petition Sustained)  |
|                 | 129  | Home on Probation   |
|                 | 41   | Suitable Placement - Probation  |
|                 | 30   | Probation Camp/School   |
|                 | 18   | California Youth Authority  |

As Table 2 shows, most arrested juveniles are released early in juvenile justice system processing. Some, however, receive quite a bit of expensive handling. To estimate the cost to the juvenile justice system we need an estimate of the cost per case at each step of the process, i.e., for the initial arrest, probation processing, detention in juvenile hall, court processing, probation camps, and CYA commitment. A rough estimate of gross costs per case can be made at each of these steps simply by taking the appropriate portion of the budget of the agency involved and dividing it by the number of cases handled in 1980. This is necessarily an approximate procedure but it is nonetheless useful in indicating the order of magnitude of the costs. Appendix A reports the specific figures and their sources for each calculation; an attempt was made to estimate on the low side whenever there was doubt. Table 3 lists the results -- estimated cost per case for each of the major steps in the juvenile justice system.

Table 3: Estimated Gross Cost Per Case for Each Major Step of Processing in the Juvenile Justice System: 1980

| Function             | Estimated Cost per Case |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Police Arrest        | \$ 153                  |
| Probation Service(a) | 673                     |
| Juvenile Hall        | 1,168                   |
| Juvenile Court       | 944                     |
| Probation Camp       | 6,704                   |
| CYA Commitment(b)    | 27,064                  |

(a) All functions averaged except camps.

(b) Includes cost of parole afterwards.

Appendix A reports the source of these figures.



With the summary figures of Table 3, we can estimate the gross costs to the law enforcement and juvenile justice system of the 1000 typical juvenile arrests depicted statistically in Table 2. Table 4 presents the calculations.

Table 4: Calculations of Gross Costs of 1000 Juvenile Arrests Using Dispositions of Table 2 and Costs of Table 3

|                                       |                    | Cost Supported by |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1000 Arrests X \$153                  | = \$153,000        | Cities            |
| 550 Probation Referrals X \$673       | = 370,150          | County            |
| 192 Juvenile Hall Detentions X \$1168 | = 224,256          | County            |
| 337 Court Cases X \$944               | = 318,128          | County            |
| 30 Probation Camp X \$6704            | = 201,120          | County            |
| 18 CYA Commitments X \$27064          | = 487,152          | State             |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                          | <b>\$1,753,806</b> |                   |

The gross cost of 1000 average 1980 juvenile arrests in Los Angeles County was \$1,753,806. This amounts to an average of \$1754 for each arrest. On a case by case basis, of course, the range is very broad. An arrest on a minor offense which the police counsel and release will have a gross cost for police action only -- about \$153. An arrest for a serious offense that results eventually in a CYA commitment will have gross costs reflecting police, probation, court, and CYA action -- about \$30,002.

It is interesting to note which governmental level absorbs the various costs associated with the typical juvenile arrest in Los Angeles County (Table 4). Arrest expenses generally are carried by the local cities (though L.A. County budgets the Sheriff's Department). Those amount to about 8.7% of the total. All probation, juvenile hall, court, and camp expenses are borne by the County. These represent the largest share of the total -- 63%. CYA expenses are carried primarily by the State, though the County does make a contribution. The State share in Table 4 is 28%. Clearly it is the County that has the greatest financial interest in preventing juvenile arrests and juvenile justice system processing of those arrests.

At this point we can make a preliminary assessment of the relative monetary value of preventing the typical arrest versus absorbing its costs once it occurs. As will be shown later in this report, the costs of the Youth Services Network in Los Angeles County averages less than \$250 per juvenile served. If the typical juvenile arrest costs the juvenile justice system \$1754, it follows that the YSN prevention program must prevent only one typical arrest for every six cases it handles (at a total cost of \$1500) in order to produce a net savings.

Cumulative Effects

So far we have been looking at the delinquency prevention program as an intervention that might prevent one arrest for a client successfully treated. The Sacramento and Philadelphia studies summarized in Table 1, however, found that one arrest often leads to another and another and so on. In some proportion of the cases, therefore, preventing one arrest will also prevent a certain number of subsequent arrests that would have occurred had the juvenile not been diverted from the pattern of delinquent behavior that was beginning. To give a full accounting of the results of a successful prevention effort, these subsequent arrests must be taken into account.

Table 1 showed that the probabilities of subsequent arrests were about the same in the Sacramento study as in the Philadelphia study. A U.C. Berkeley analyst has worked out the sequential arrest probabilities for the Philadelphia cohort for the subset of juveniles arrested the first time on a minor offense only (i.e., excluding first time arrests for serious offenses).<sup>6</sup> Table 5 presents the subsequent arrests, up through 10, that would be expected from 1000 minor first offenders.

Table 5: Statistical Expectation of Future Arrests for 1000 Minor First Offenders in L.A County

| First Offense Arrest    | Number of Juveniles |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| Recidivistic 2nd Arrest | 497                 |
| " " 3d " "              | 357                 |
| " " 4th " "             | 256                 |
| " " 5th " "             | 184                 |
| " " 6th " "             | 132                 |
| " " 7th " "             | 95                  |
| " " 8th " "             | 67                  |
| " " 9th " "             | 43                  |
| " " 10th " "            | 35                  |
| <b>Total</b>            | <b>2666</b>         |

Note: Taken from Higgins, 1977

If a delinquency prevention program diverts a juvenile from a developing pattern of delinquency, it prevents not only the next arrest that would have occurred but the

<sup>6</sup> Higgins, T. The crime costs of California early minor offenders: Implications for prevention. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 1977, 195-205.

subsequent arrests as well. Table 5 shows that 1000 minor first offenders can be expected to eventually commit 1666 additional recorded offenses for a total of 2666 arrests. To prevent one of those minor first arrests, therefore, should actually prevent 2.7 arrests, on average, not simply one. The financial value of the prevented arrest should reflect the full value of the whole sequence of arrests that was prevented.

We might conservatively assume that the minor first offense entails only law enforcement costs, approximately \$153 per case (see Table 3). The 1.7 subsequent arrests prevented, however, should be at least average in their severity and level of juvenile justice processing so their estimated cost each would be \$1754. The total savings to the law enforcement and juvenile justice system for each prevented minor first offense, therefore, would be about \$3135 (i.e.,  $1.7 \times \$1754 + \$153$ ). If we begin with juveniles who already have a minor first offense, and prevent their subsequent recidivistic offenses, the only cost savings is for the 1.7 expected subsequent arrests per case at the average cost of \$1754 each; that amount is \$2982.

We can now make a more complete assessment of the circumstances under which the prevention program of the Los Angeles County Youth Services Network will be cost effective. For school referrals and other such cases that generally have no law enforcement record, there is an opportunity to prevent the first minor arrest and all probable subsequent arrests for a total savings to the juvenile justice system of \$3135. With an average cost of \$250 for the prevention service, the program is cost effective if it prevents one minor arrest for at least every 12 juveniles treated. On the other hand, school referrals are low risk cases -- they have relatively little potential to be arrested so there is less available to prevent. Earlier it was estimated that no more than one of four might actually be likely to commit an offense. In this case, 12 school referrals might include only three juveniles with real delinquency prospects. It is with those three juveniles that one arrest must be prevented for the program to be cost effective.

Law enforcement referrals, on the other hand, already have a first arrest and one of every two of them are likely to commit a second. With a cost savings of \$2982 per recidivistic arrest prevented, one arrest per 11 cases treated at \$250 each must be prevented for the program to be cost effective. Six of those 11 cases have reasonable prospect of committing another offense. Thus one arrest must be prevented for every six law enforcement referrals that are truly at risk. With school referrals, recall, one arrest had to be prevented for every three juveniles truly at risk.

We can draw two conclusions from these analyses. First, there is every reason to believe that delinquency prevention is a cost effective strategy with regard to the direct costs that are incurred by the law enforcement and juvenile justice system for handling typical juvenile arrests. The Youth Services Network delinquency prevention program costs about \$250 per case; each prevented arrest saves approximately \$3000 for the juvenile justice system. On average, therefore, the prevention program is cost effective if it prevents one arrest for every eleven or twelve juveniles it treats, a goal that sounds attainable.

Secondly, even if we make some adjustment for the risk level of the juveniles handled by the delinquency prevention program, the prevention effect that must be produced is still within a range than appears attainable. For referrals with no

arrest history, every 12 clients will contain at least eight or nine who would not be arrested even without treatment. To be cost effective, however, the program needs only to prevent subsequent arrest for one of the remaining three or four juveniles. That is a high standard, but not one that sounds utterly impossible.

With referrals that already have an arrest, e.g., law enforcement referrals, five of eleven clients will not recidivate even if left untreated. To be cost effective with this type of client, the delinquency prevention program needs to prevent subsequent arrest for one of the remaining six juveniles. That level of accomplishment seems quite attainable.

#### Costs of Delinquency to the Community

To give a full accounting of the costs of the delinquent acts that a delinquency prevention program might prevent among its juvenile clients we should figure the costs to victims in terms of personal injury and property damage or loss as well as the costs to the juvenile justice system. Such accounting is difficult to do but, fortunately, it has already been done for us in the Higgins study.<sup>7</sup> Correcting Higgins' figures for inflation gives an estimate of \$756 average cost in damage and loss for each juvenile offense. As we saw earlier, when a minor first arrest is prevented it is also expected to prevent 1.7 recidivistic arrests in the typical case. Those recidivistic offenses contribute \$1285 for a total of \$2041 in victim damages or loss saved for every first offense prevented. Where only recidivistic offenses are prevented, as with law enforcement referrals, the savings are \$1285.

These calculations, of course, apply only to the cost of the offenses for which the juveniles are arrested. As was noted earlier in this report, there is considerable evidence that the great majority of a juvenile's chargeable delinquent acts are never detected or reported. Some estimates indicate that as few as 3% of all such acts result in an arrest. Even for serious crimes, the evidence is that only 10-20% result in arrest. Thus for every arrest, there are maybe five to 30 times as many actual delinquent acts. Those undetected offenses also exact a cost from victims. If we very conservatively assume that there are five undetected delinquent acts prevented for every arrest prevented, the total value of the victims' loss is at least five times the values reported in the paragraph above. That is, preventing a first offense saves victims at least \$10205 (five times \$2041), and preventing a recidivistic offense saves them at least \$6425 (five times \$1285).

Note that a prevention program could be cost effective on the basis of expenses to victims alone if it prevented arrest for roughly one of every 25-40 clients treated at \$250 treatment cost each. If we compute the total value of each prevented arrest, combining both the cost to the law enforcement and juvenile justice system and the cost to the victim, the cost effectiveness situation of delinquency prevention

<sup>7</sup> Higgins, T. The crime costs of California early minor offenders: Implications for prevention. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 1977, 195-205

programs looks very favorable.<sup>8</sup> Each first offense prevented has a value of \$13,340 and each recidivistic arrest prevented has a value of \$9407.<sup>9</sup> At a cost of \$250 per client for prevention treatment, it is only necessary for the program to prevent arrest for one juvenile out of every 35-50 that are treated in order to produce a net savings to society. The net savings increases to the extent that the prevention program's effectiveness exceeds that level. Clearly this is not a very demanding standard — it seems readily plausible that a good prevention program could divert 2-3% of its clients from subsequent arrest and that much would be sufficient to offset all the costs of the program.

#### A Note on AB-90 Funding in Los Angeles County

In recent years the delinquency prevention programs of the Youth Services Network have received a significant portion of their funding from allocations made by the Board of Supervisors under the Justice System Subvention Program (AB-90). One purpose of the subvention program is to reduce the number of juvenile commitments made from Los Angeles County to the California Youth Authority. It is therefore appropriate to ask if it is reasonable to fund delinquency prevention programs with the expectation that they will somehow assist in reducing the CYA commitment rate.

When a juvenile arrest history is prevented through the intervention of a service program, the probability of a future CYA commitment is in fact reduced. The reduction, however, is very slight. As Table 2 shows, out of 1000 typical juvenile arrests, only 18 eventuate in a CYA commitment. Even allowing for possible CYA commitments on subsequent recidivistic arrests, the total is still relatively small. The statistical probabilities are such that an enormous number of juvenile arrests must be prevented in order to substantially affect the CYA commitment rate. On this basis, therefore, delinquency prevention programs do not appear to offer an effective strategy for the direct reduction of commitments.

The potential indirect contribution of an effective delinquency prevention program to the reduction of CYA commitments, on the other hand, is clearly quite large. As described earlier, every first or second offense juvenile arrest that is prevented results in a savings to the juvenile justice system of about \$3000. The share of the juvenile justice system costs that is borne by L.A. County is 63% thus the County share of the savings is approximately \$1890. That savings represents expenditures that the Probation Department and the Juvenile Courts avoided as a result of not having to handle the "prevented" delinquent over his arrest history. Unlike the prevention program, the Probation Department and Juvenile Courts are in a position

<sup>8</sup> Note that the high level of cost effectiveness found in the present study for diversion and delinquency prevention programs is not a unique conclusion. Other researchers, using different analyses have made similar findings. See, for example, Falkin, G.P. Reducing delinquency: A strategic planning approach. Lexington Books, 1979.

<sup>9</sup> I.e., \$13,340 = \$3135 justice system + \$10,205 victim, cumulated over subsequent arrests; \$9407 = \$2982 justice system + \$6425 victim, cumulated over subsequent arrests.

to directly influence the CYA commitment rate. Since the prevention program lightens the probation and court caseload, they should have more resources available to devote to the CYA commitment problem.

L.A. County, therefore, potentially profits a great deal from the cost effective nature of delinquency prevention programs and it attains that benefit in just those agencies that have the most direct influence on CYA commitment rates. It does not seem at all unreasonable that the County would contribute to the funding of the prevention program nor that the funds would come from the Justice System Subvention monies.

In practice, the exact size of the contribution the delinquency prevention program makes to reduced probation and court costs depends on the "hit rate" of the prevention program itself. If one developing arrest history is prevented for every client treated, the County realizes roughly \$1890 in savings for \$250 spent -- a net return of 656% on their investment! It is unlikely, however, that any prevention program is capable of preventing arrest for every client. The nature of prevention is such that any targeted client group will inevitably include many youth who have no real potential for developing an arrest history and thus portend nothing that can be prevented. To illustrate the interplay between the amount of savings to L.A. County and the "hit rate" of a delinquency prevention program, consider the following cases based on the figures developed earlier in this chapter:

1. The prevention program works with male juveniles that have at least one arrest at the time of referral (e.g., law enforcement referrals). As noted earlier, such juveniles have roughly a 50% chance of rearrest sometime during their teenage years. One out of every two of the clients treated, therefore, has a developing arrest history that might be prevented.

If the prevention program is 100% successful (prevents all developing arrest histories), average costs will be \$500 spent on two clients for \$1890 in L.A. County savings for one prevented arrest history. Subtracting the cost of the program leaves \$1390 in net savings — a return of 278% on investment.

If the prevention program is 50% successful (prevents subsequent arrests for one of every two juveniles with arrest potential), \$1000 will be spent on four clients for \$1890 in savings. Subtracting the cost of the program leaves 890 net savings — an 89% return on investment.

If the prevention program is 25% successful (prevents subsequent arrests for one of every four juveniles with arrest potential), \$2000 will be spent on eight clients and there will be no net L.A. County savings. This is roughly the "break-even" point — programs must be more than 25% successful with previously arrested referrals to produce a net savings to L.A. County as a result of their prevention efforts. Note that in terms of the total savings produced by prevention, including savings to law enforcement, California state, and damages and loss to victims, the "break-even" point is much lower. Here we are only looking at the savings to Los Angeles County.

2. The prevention program works with male "predelinquents," that is, juveniles who have never been arrested by the police but show signs of potential delinquency such as behavior problems at school. Using the analysis presented earlier, we will assume that only about 25% of these clients will actually develop any arrest history in the absence of prevention services, i.e., they are lower risk cases than juveniles who already have at least one arrest. One out of every four clients treated, therefore, has a developing arrest history than can be prevented.

If the prevention program is 100% successful, \$1000 will be spent on four clients for \$890 in net L.A. County savings — an 89% return on investment.

If the prevention program is 50% successful, \$2000 will be spent on eight clients for no net County savings. This is the approximate "break even" point for clients with no prior arrests with regard to L.A. County savings.

3. The prevention program works with female juveniles. Females have considerably lower arrest rates than males in Los Angeles County as elsewhere. Those rates are so low that a delinquency prevention program with female clients who have no arrest history cannot expect many of them to develop arrest histories even in the absence of treatment. For such clients there is virtually no potential for savings to L.A. County as a result of prevented arrests. The Sacramento delinquency study cited earlier, however, found that females that were arrested once had about the same probabilities of subsequent rearrests as males who had been arrested once. Thus a delinquency program working with females who already have at least one prior arrest (excluding status offenses) can expect the same cost effectiveness ratios with them as are reported above for males with at least one prior arrest.

To summarize, we have shown that delinquency prevention programs have little ability to produce direct reductions in the CYA commitment rate since they work with juveniles well prior to the point of any likely commitment action. Direct influence on the commitment rate is primarily in the hands of the Probation Department and the Juvenile Courts. Probation and the courts, however, deal with a great volume of juveniles in addition to those that end up in CYA. By reducing the number of these other cases, an effective prevention program can free resources than can be directed to the commitment issue. The high cost effectiveness ratios inherent in prevention work to the advantage of L.A. County when prevention programs maintain a high "hit rate," that is, when they select clients with a high probability of developing future arrest histories and have a high rate of success in preventing those arrests. A prevention program that works with juveniles with at least one prior arrest and has a 50% success rate with them provides the County with an 89% return on every dollar spent on the prevention program.

Los Angeles County's policy of supporting delinquency prevention programs from the AB-90 subvention funds, therefore, appears to be a wise one. In light of the diminishing returns to the County as the delinquency programs' "hit rate" decreases, however, there is little likely benefit to the County if the prevention programs it funds do not deal almost exclusively with juveniles who already have at least one prior or current arrest at the time of referral.

#### DELINQUENCY RISK

If a delinquency prevention program is to have any possibility of impact on juvenile crime in Los Angeles County, two initial conditions must be met. First, the program must provide extensive coverage of the County and handle a sufficient volume of cases for its impact to be felt. A small program might be successful on a small scale but could hardly hope to affect the massive number of juvenile arrests that occur each year in Los Angeles County. Secondly, the program must handle juveniles who are in relatively high risk of delinquency. No program can have significant impact if it works only with clients who have a relatively small likelihood of engaging in delinquency. In such circumstances there is little to prevent in the first place hence little impact the program can have even if totally successful in treating the juveniles.

Previous evaluation reports on the Youth Services Network have documented the extent of its coverage of the communities and youth population of Los Angeles County. To summarize: The 13 projects of the Network provide services in approximately 165 defined communities and incorporated cities. They receive law enforcement referrals from virtually all the divisions of the Los Angeles Police Department, from all but a few of the stations of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and from an additional 38 municipal police departments. Viewed in terms of the juvenile arrest pool, the projects of the Youth Services Network cover jurisdictions representing roughly 83% of all the WIC 602 juvenile arrests reported in Los Angeles County. The total volume of referrals to the Youth Services Network is on the order of ten to twelve thousand per year, a number equivalent to over 20% of the size of the juvenile arrest pool in L.A. County. Clearly the size and coverage of the Youth Services Network is sufficient for it to have the potential for a significant impact on the juvenile delinquency levels in the communities served.

The overall level of delinquency risk among the juvenile clients of the Youth Services Network, however, has not been closely examined in previous studies. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will give more considered attention to that issue.

Delinquency "risk" refers to the likelihood that a juvenile will engage in delinquent behavior at some time in the future. As such, determining risk is an exercise in forecasting and speculation even under the best of circumstances. Some assessment of the level of delinquency risk of the clients of the Youth Services Network can be made by examining the record of prior and present contacts with the police. On one extreme, if none of the Network clients had any prior delinquency history, we would have to conclude that it served a low risk clientele. Evidence that a large majority of the clients had come to the attention of the police at one time or another would suggest a high risk clientele.

#### Arrest Histories of Youth Services Clients

Every juvenile arrest or significant police contact in L.A. County is recorded by the police officer involved and generally reported to the Juvenile Automated Index (JAI), maintained by the Probation Department. In practice, of course, a certain proportion of cases are never reported, particularly if they involve minor offenses or



limited official action. The records in the JAI were used to determine the extent to which the juvenile clients of the Youth Services Network had arrest histories.

All clients referred to each of the projects of the Youth Services Network during the period roughly from January through June of 1981 were looked up in the JAI six months after the date of referral. A tabulation was made of the full arrest history of each juvenile who was found to have a record there. Note that all project clients were examined irrespective of the original source of the referral. Naturally law enforcement referrals were expected, by and large, to have at least some record of arrest. Referrals from schools and other sources, however, were also looked up even if their records showed no indication of any contact with law enforcement. In this way it was possible to determine the extent of police contact for the full range of Youth Services clients.

The first matter to consider is simply whether or not the juveniles in question were found in the JAI. Juveniles with any listing at all have had at least some minimal police contact though it may well have been at an earlier or later date than the point of referral to the Youth Services Network. Table 6 summarizes the findings for each project and for the Network overall.

Table 6: Youth Services' Clients with Records Found in JAI

| Project           | Law Enf. Referrals(a) |         | Other Referrals(b) |         | Total Referrals |         |
|-------------------|-----------------------|---------|--------------------|---------|-----------------|---------|
|                   | Number                | % Found | Number             | % Found | Number          | % Found |
| Centinela         | (256)                 | 79%     | (141)              | 34%     | (397)           | 63%     |
| Cerritos Corridor | (240)                 | 62      | (386)              | 30      | (626)           | 42      |
| DAY               | (67)                  | 81      | (257)              | 31      | (324)           | 41      |
| Foothill          | (51)                  | 84      | (57)               | 39      | (108)           | 60      |
| HEAVY-Central     | (444)                 | 76      | (606)              | 28      | (1050)          | 48      |
| HEAVY-SFV         | (86)                  | 74      | (535)              | 24      | (621)           | 31      |
| HEAVY-West        | (241)                 | 84      | (480)              | 24      | (721)           | 44      |
| JADE              | (642)                 | 58      | (549)              | 21      | (1191)          | 41      |
| Mid Valley        | (106)                 | 66      | (64)               | 27      | (170)           | 51      |
| PAY               | (201)                 | 77      | (100)              | 27      | (301)           | 60      |
| Pomona Valley     | (164)                 | 63      | (375b)             | 26      | (539)           | 37      |
| SEED              | (391)                 | 77      | (337)              | 40      | (728)           | 60      |
| South Bay         | (104)                 | 70      | (231)              | 32      | (335)           | 44      |
| West San Gabriel  | (260)                 | 71      | (266)              | 20      | (526)           | 45      |
| TOTAL             | (3253)                | 71%     | (4384)             | 27%     | (7637)          | 46%     |

(a) Also includes probation and court referrals.

(b) Includes school referrals, self referrals, and all CETA cases. Only Pomona Valley had enough CETA cases (111) in the sample to tabulate; 34% were found in the JAI.

It is not surprising that Table 6 shows a JAI record for most law enforcement referrals (71%) to the projects of the the Youth Services Network. Typically, a juvenile is referred by the police subsequent to a recorded arrest. Some juveniles are also referred under circumstances where no formal arrest or contact is recorded, e.g., for a status offense or a very minor infraction. The largest number of referrals to most of the projects of the Network, however, came from sources other than law enforcement, particularly schools. Only about 27% of those referrals showed any evidence of police contact in the JAI. In other words, almost three-quarters of the non-law enforcement referrals to the projects of the Youth Services Network had no record of police contact in the JAI either prior, during, or after their referral.

It is likely, of course, that the law enforcement agencies that refer cases to the projects of the Youth Services Network do not faithfully report every juvenile contact to the centrally administered JAI. Many of them do not routinely report very minor offenses or status offenses. Some may occasionally neglect to report even more serious cases because of understaffing, internal inefficiency, etc.

To give what may perhaps be a more valid picture of the actual arrest histories of the clients of the Youth Services Network, we can adjust the figures in Table 6 to compensate for difference in reporting practices among the various law enforcement agencies. All law enforcement referrals obviously have had some police contact at the time of referral whether it was reported to the JAI or not. A certain portion of those contacts might have been for reasons other than reportable delinquency, e.g., family problems, but most -- we will estimate 90% -- should be reportable. Table 7 adjusts the figures of Table 6 by inflating all percentages by the amount necessary to bring the law enforcement referral percentage up to 90%. In other words, Table 7 estimates the proportion of the total Youth Services Project clientele that would have some arrest history if the local law enforcement stations reported 90% of all their juvenile contacts.

The adjusted figures in Table 7 estimate that almost 60% of the clients of the Youth Services Network probably had some police contact even if it was not reported to JAI. Overall, the delinquency risk level of this clientele appears to be reasonably high. In addition to the police contacts, these juveniles are also likely to be responsible for a substantial amount of delinquency for which they were not apprehended. Studies have shown that for every police contact there is an average of at least five to ten comparable undetected offenses and often many more.<sup>1</sup>

The relatively high levels of police contacts, both actual and estimated, among the clients of the Youth Services Network, however, result largely from the proportion of clients that are referred directly by law enforcement. Only one-quarter to one-third of the clients referred from other sources (primarily the schools) show any indication of police contacts. In other words, over two-thirds of those juveniles probably had no contact with local police at any time prior to, during, or after their referral to the Youth Services Network. These cases, taken alone, do not represent a very high level of delinquency risk.

<sup>1</sup> Gold and Williams. From delinquent behavior to official delinquency. Social Problems, No. 20, 1972.

Table 7: Estimates of the Proportion of Youth Services Clients Who Would Have JAI Records if Police Reported 90% of Their Juvenile Contacts

| Project           | Law Enf. Referrals(a) | Other Referrals(b) | Total Referrals |
|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Centinela         | 90%                   | 39%                | 72%             |
| Cerritos Corridor | 90                    | 44                 | 61              |
| DAY               | 90                    | 34                 | 46              |
| Foothill          | 90                    | 42                 | 64              |
| HEAVY-Central     | 90                    | 33                 | 57              |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 90                    | 29                 | 38              |
| HEAVY-West        | 90                    | 26                 | 47              |
| JADE              | 90                    | 33                 | 64              |
| Mid Valley        | 90                    | 37                 | 69              |
| PAY               | 90                    | 32                 | 70              |
| Pomona Valley     | 90                    | 37                 | 53              |
| SEED              | 90                    | 47                 | 70              |
| South Bay         | 90                    | 41                 | 57              |
| West San Gabriel  | 90                    | 25                 | 57              |
|                   | --                    | --                 | --              |
| TOTALS            | 90%                   | 34%                | 58%             |

(a) Also includes probation and court referrals.

(b) Includes school referrals, self referrals, and all CETA cases.

In addition, the individual projects of the Youth Services Network differed considerably among themselves with regard to the JAI records of their clientele. On the high end of the spectrum, four projects had nearly 70% or more of their referrals with some actual or estimated police contact. Those projects were Centinela, Mid Valley, PAY, and SEED. Three projects had police contacts estimated for fewer than half of their clients -- HEAVY-San Fernando Valley, HEAVY-West, and Project DAY.

#### Severity Level Among Law Enforcement Referrals

Over the years, the distinctive strength of the projects of the Youth Services Network has been their ability to work directly with law enforcement agencies to obtain referrals at the time of arrest or shortly thereafter. By definition, these are juveniles with some police contact, thus they are clearly at risk for delinquency and, in most cases, already overtly engaged in delinquency. Among such juveniles, however, the delinquent behavior at issue can range from very minor infractions to much more serious crimes that pose a threat to community property and safety.

There are two ways in which we can examine the severity level of the law enforcement referrals made to the projects of the Youth Services Network. The nature of the offenses for which the juveniles were arrested at the time of referral provides one very direct indicator. Secondly, an assessment can be made of the case disposition that the police might have made had diversion through the Youth Services Network not been available. Cases that would have gone to the Probation Department generally represent more serious delinquency circumstances than those that would have been counseled and released.

Referral Offenses. A listing of referral offenses, comparable from one project to another, is available for all Network projects with a significant amount of 1981 data in the Network's Management Information System. Unfortunately several projects were delayed in their entry into that system and cannot be well represented. For the remainder, however, two characteristics of offenses of law enforcement referrals give some indication of the risk level of the juveniles. First, the offense profile can be examined to determine the proportion of Part I offenses in comparison to all others. Part I offenses are those more serious and frequent offenses that are used in the FBI crime reports as index offenses for the purpose of establishing national crime levels. The specific offenses are homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny theft, auto theft, and arson. The higher the level of Part I crimes among the referral offenses for Youth Services Network clients, the higher their delinquency risk is likely to be.

A second indicator of offense severity and hence delinquency risk is the breakdown of referral offenses between those that are felonies and those that are misdemeanors. Felonies are generally more serious crimes and indicate a greater degree of delinquency. Table 8 shows the data available from the Network MIS regarding the nature of the referral offenses for each project.

Table 8 shows, for the Network overall, a relatively high proportion of cases referred from law enforcement subsequent to moderately serious offenses. More than one-fourth of the cases were Part I offenses; burglary was the single largest category in that group. Over one-third of the referral offenses were reported by the police as felonies. For some individual projects the proportions went even higher.

Thus the delinquency prevention projects of the Youth Services Network by and large are not receiving lightweight cases from law enforcement. A substantial proportion have referral offenses that are Part I crimes and/or felonies. Though it is not apparent from Table 8, very few violent offenders were included in these proportions. The offenses most heavily represented were burglary and theft. There were virtually no juveniles referred for such offenses as homicide and rape, and only a few for aggravated assault. Thus the Network dealt with a significant number of moderately serious offenders against property but few violent offenders against people.



Table 8: Proportion of Law Enforcement Referral Offenses that Were Part I Offenses and that Were Felony Offenses

| Project           | Number of Cases(a) | % Part I Offenses | % Felonies |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Centinela         | (294)              | 34%               | 37%        |
| Cerritos Corridor | (376)              | 30                | 47         |
| DAY               | (37)               | 23                | 49         |
| Foothill          | (255)              | 40                | 51         |
| HEAVY-Central     | (b)                | -                 | -          |
| HEAVY-SFV         | (62)               | 39                | 44         |
| HEAVY-West        | (b)                | -                 | -          |
| JADE              | (618)              | 16                | 22         |
| Mid Valley        | (125)              | 16                | 19         |
| PAY               | (182)              | 18                | 17         |
| Pomona Valley     | (63)               | 33                | 40         |
| SEED              | (344)              | 29                | 35         |
| South Bay         | (98)               | 34                | 53         |
| West San Gabriel  | (296)              | 29                | 36         |
| TOTALS            | (2750)             | 27%               | 35%        |

(a) Includes only law enforcement referrals and only cases entered on uniform forms into the Network MIS; does not include all 1981 L.E. referrals.

(b) Insufficient data available for this project.

Alternate Dispositions. Law enforcement officers have various dispositions available for handling a juvenile case once an arrest or apprehension has been made. They may counsel and release the juvenile to parental custody with no further action, make a referral to a diversion project, or send the case to the Probation Department for potential petition action. The decision among these alternatives is made primarily on the basis of the severity of the juvenile's crime, the prior delinquency record, and the juvenile's attitude.

If diversion through the projects of the Youth Services Network were not available, most of the project referrals would be either counseled and released or sent to probation for non-detained petition action. To the extent that the Youth Services' clientele mostly represents youth who would otherwise have been counseled and released, it is dealing with the less serious end of the law enforcement spectrum of cases. Moreover, with such cases there is no true "diversion" from the juvenile justice system -- the juveniles would not have been processed further even in the absence of the Youth Services' program.

Though it is not possible to determine definitively what would have happened to a case if it had not been referred to the Youth Services Network, there is a simple way to make a good estimate. Counsel and release (C&R) and non-detained petition (NDP) cases have distinctive profiles of characteristics particularly with regard to their prior record. Each diversion case can be compared to those profiles and categorized as either a likely C&R disposition or a likely NDP disposition depending on which profile it most closely resembles.

The statistical procedure for making the above comparison is called discriminant analysis. Data were collected for a sample of law enforcement arrests during January-June, 1981, at seven law enforcement stations in Los Angeles County. These particular law enforcement stations were chosen because of evidence that they were unusually faithful in reporting their juvenile arrests to the central Juvenile Automated Index (JAI).<sup>2</sup> Using the log sheets maintained in the police stations, random samples of the counsel and release, non-detained petition, and diversion dispositions were drawn. Each of those cases was then searched in the JAI and the full arrest history was recorded for those found there. Useable records were obtained for 2024 juveniles (704 C&R, 757 NDP, and 563 diversion).

A discriminant analysis was performed to contrast counsel and release dispositions from non-detained petition dispositions. The variables used for that contrast were number of prior offenses, age, sex, ethnicity, and police station of arrest. The resulting discriminant function was able to correctly classify 66% of the actual counsel and release and non-detained petition cases. Misclassified cases were evenly divided between C&R misclassified as NDP and vice versa. Thus the statistical procedure showed reasonable accuracy in classifying the actual C&R and NDP cases and, for the group results, was not biased toward either disposition.

When the same discriminant function was applied to the 563 diversion cases, 53% were classified as most closely resembling counsel and release cases and 47% were classified as most similar to non-detained petition cases. Since virtually all of those law enforcement diversions were referred to projects of the Youth Services Network, the finding should be representative of the composition of the typical law enforcement referral to the Network.

It is interesting to note that a similar examination of the alternate disposition issue in 1979 found only about 25% of the law enforcement referrals resembling non-detained petition dispositions.<sup>3</sup> The present results show almost half of such referrals resembling non-detained petitions. The "true diversion" rate, thus, has apparently doubled in the last four years.

There are two implications of this finding. First, with nearly half the law enforcement referrals being potential non-detained petition cases, it is clear that

<sup>2</sup> The law enforcement stations used in the study were East Los Angeles, Van Nuys, Lakewood, North Hollywood, Alhambra, Huntington Park, and Norwalk.

<sup>3</sup> Lipsey, M.W. and Johnston, J.E. The impact of juvenile diversion in Los Angeles County: A report to the Los Angeles County (AB-9090) Justice System Advisory Group. July, 1979.

the severity level of that portion of the Youth Services Network clientele is far from trivial. Indeed, throughout Los Angeles County only about 55% of all juvenile arrests are referred to the Probation Department. Thus the law enforcement referrals to the projects of the Youth Services Network are now fairly typical of the average arrest in Los Angeles County rather than being concentrated among the lower range counsel and release cases.

The second important implication of the finding from the discriminant analysis has to do with juvenile justice system costs. The first chapter of this report showed that each typical arrest in Los Angeles County cost the juvenile justice system, on average, about \$2051 of which \$1415 is borne by the County budget. Each "true diversion," i.e., a juvenile referred to Youth Services instead of the Probation Department, therefore, allows the justice system to avoid the costs that would otherwise have been incurred for that case. Even assuming that the diversion cases are less severe than the average arrest, the justice system would still save a considerable amount of money as a result of having so many potential non-detained petition cases diverted instead. To illustrate, if only \$1000 per case is saved for non-detained petition type cases constituting about half of the 5000 annual law enforcement referrals to the Youth Services Network, the total savings to the juvenile justice system is \$2.5 million per year.

Severity Level Among School Referrals

It is more difficult to assess the severity of school referrals to the Youth Services Network than it is for law enforcement referrals. One useful source of information is the report given by the school agent who actually makes the referral. For those cases referred on forms from the Network Management Information System, those persons are asked if the circumstances of referral involve a legal offense, i.e., the sort of action for which an arrest could conceivably be made. Table 9 reports the responses to that question for each Project with sufficient information available.

Table 9 shows that, to the extent that data is available, there appears to be a very small proportion of the school referrals to the Network that actually came as a result of some chargeable delinquent act occurring on the school campus. Foothill is the project with the highest proportion, roughly one-fourth of the referrals representing legal offenses, and the Network average is about 12%. If school referrals do represent cases with delinquent potential, it does not seem to be a result of much actual delinquent behavior known to the school authorities.

Table 9: School Referrals Reported to Result From a Legal Offense

| <u>Project</u>    | <u>Number of Cases</u> | <u>% Described as Legal Offense</u> |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Centinela         | (109)                  | 7%                                  |
| Cerritos Corridor | (208)                  | 14                                  |
| DAY               | (a)                    | -                                   |
| Foothill          | (127)                  | 26                                  |
| HEAVY-Central     | (219)                  | 9                                   |
| HEAVY-SFV         | (157)                  | 10                                  |
| HEAVY-West        | (a)                    | -                                   |
| JADE              | (222)                  | 9                                   |
| Mid Valley        | (a)                    | -                                   |
| PAY               | (a)                    | -                                   |
| Pomona Valley     | (a)                    | -                                   |
| SEED              | (95)                   | 12                                  |
| South Bay         | (66)                   | 6                                   |
| West San Gabriel  | (a)                    | -                                   |
| <b>TOTAL</b>      | <b>(1203)</b>          | <b>12%</b>                          |

(a) Insufficient information for this Project.

RECIDIVISM

In previous chapters of this report it has been shown that delinquency prevention is potentially very cost effective and that the law enforcement referrals to the projects of the Youth Services Network are moderately high risk delinquency cases. Under such circumstances, the Youth Services Network is in a position to have significant impact on both juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice system costs in Los Angeles County. In order to achieve such impact, however, the treatment offered by the projects of the Network must be effective in preventing subsequent delinquency among their juvenile clients. In particular, the projects must be successful in reducing recidivism — the rearrest of juveniles who already have had some police contact.

The evaluation study dealt with recidivism in two different ways. First, an overall recidivism impact study was designed to indicate whether diversion through the Youth Services Network was associated with lower recidivism than alternative dispositions. That study was conducted for the Network as a whole using samples from selected law enforcement stations and projects, thus no individual project breakdowns are available.

Secondly, all eligible cases at each project were searched in the JAI to determine both the prior arrest and the recidivistic arrest history. This information is available for each individual project. In addition, to adjust for the different levels of delinquency risk at the various projects, a "predicted" recidivism was determined based on the characteristics of the clientele at each project. Each project's actual recidivism rate can thus be compared with the rate that would be expected statistically for the type of clients it handles.

Recidivism Impact

Directly assessing the impact of service upon the recidivism of Youth Services Network clients and separating the treatment influence from the myriad of other factors than influence recidivism is a very difficult research task. To do it properly would require controlled experimentation in which large numbers of clients were randomly sorted into treatment conditions and control conditions, a design that is not very practical for the projects of the Youth Services Network. Consequently the research that was conducted for the present evaluation was designed along more manageable but, unfortunately, less rigorous lines.

As reported in the previous chapter, samples of juvenile arrests were drawn from the logsheets at seven law enforcement stations scattered throughout the county. Those samples were chosen to represent counsel and release, diversion, and non-detained petition dispositions in roughly equal numbers. The total sample size was 2869, representing juveniles handled between January and June, 1981. Many cases entered in the police logsheets represent very trivial offenses or, in some instances, no offense at all. To eliminate them, only those cases that had JAI entries showing an official police contact or arrest at the time of the logged incident date or within six months prior to the incident date were retained for analysis. That procedure resulted in 2024 cases known to involve some significant police contact.

The purpose of the study was to compare the recidivism of juveniles who were diverted through the Youth Services Network with the recidivism of those who received alternate dispositions (counsel and release and non-detained petition requests). The diversion and alternate disposition groups, however, differed considerably on such factors as frequency of prior offenses, which strongly influence recidivism, thus a direct comparison of recidivism rates is not very informative. Instead, a statistical adjustment procedure was used (multiple regression) to remove the effects of some of these contaminating factors before the comparison was made. In effect, the multiple regression predicted the recidivism level that was expected for each group based on their characteristics and then compared the actual recidivism with the expected recidivism. Recidivism was indexed simply as whether or not the juvenile had a recorded police contact within the six months subsequent to the logged contact at the time of sampling.

For the statistically minded, Table 10 presents the results of the hierarchical multiple regression which tested the difference between the recidivism of the diversion group (N=563) and that of the alternate disposition group (N=1461). The control variables, stepped into the analysis before the crucial disposition comparison, were sex, age, number of offenses within six months prior to the logged incident, number of offenses prior to that, ethnicity, and law enforcement station where the juvenile was arrested (ethnicity and law enforcement station were dummy-coded variables).

Table 10: Multiple Regression Results Comparing the Recidivism of Diversion Cases with That of Alternate Dispositions

| Variable      | Multiple R | R Square | R <sup>2</sup> Added | Beta     |
|---------------|------------|----------|----------------------|----------|
| Sex           | 0.13521    | 0.01828  | 0.01828              | -0.07905 |
| Age           | 0.15934    | 0.02539  | 0.00710              | -0.03333 |
| Early Priors  | 0.25149    | 0.06325  | 0.03786              | 0.11571  |
| 6 Mo. Priors  | 0.32944    | 0.10853  | 0.04528              | 0.20067  |
| Eth.-White    | 0.32959    | 0.10863  | 0.00010              | -0.08375 |
| Eth.-Black    | 0.33239    | 0.11048  | 0.00185              | -0.00167 |
| Eth.-Hispanic | 0.33310    | 0.11095  | 0.00047              | -0.09400 |
| Station-ELA   | 0.33319    | 0.11101  | 0.00006              | 0.04208  |
| Station-VN    | 0.33397    | 0.11153  | 0.00052              | 0.01641  |
| Station-LW    | 0.33550    | 0.11256  | 0.00103              | 0.05987  |
| Station-NH    | 0.33620    | 0.11303  | 0.00047              | 0.03339  |
| Station-AL    | 0.33646    | 0.11320  | 0.00017              | 0.00957  |
| Station-HP    | 0.34071    | 0.11608  | 0.00288              | 0.07214  |
| Disposition*  | 0.34261    | 0.11738  | 0.00130              | 0.00585  |

\* F(1,2009)=2.96 p < .10

To summarize the meaning of Table 10, diversion cases in this sample had a significantly lower recidivism rate than non-diversion cases once the effects of sex, age, priors, ethnicity, and law enforcement station had been adjusted out of the comparison. The effect was not very strong, however, and the  $p < .10$  level of statistical significance attained is less stringent than conventional research standards. On the other hand, the reliability of the recidivism measure was very low and we have good reason to believe that the treatment (diversion service) was not really received by all the juveniles in the diversion sample; many dropped out or never even established intake. Under such circumstances a slightly relaxed statistical significance criterion provides some compensation by increasing statistical power.

Table 11 presents a less complex version of the multiple regression results in this study. Listed there is the actual recidivism rate obtained for the diversion and the non-diversion groups, the recidivism rates predicted on the basis of the characteristics of each group, and the difference between actual and predicted recidivism rates.

Table 11: Actual Versus Predicted Recidivism Rates for the Diversion and the Non-Diversion Comparison Groups

| <u>Group</u>  | <u>Actual Recidivism</u> | <u>Predicted Recidivism</u> | <u>Difference</u> |
|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| Diversion     | 18%                      | 21%                         | -3                |
| Non-Diversion | 29%                      | 28%                         | +1                |
| Total Sample  | 26%                      | 26%                         |                   |

Table 11 shows that the diversion sample had a recidivism rate that was three percentage points below what was expected based on the characteristics of the juveniles. The recidivism rate of the non-diversion sample was one percentage point higher than expected. Thus comparing the two samples while adjusting each for its expected recidivism results in a difference of four percentage points between the performance of the diversion cases and that of the non-diversion cases. That is, when the two groups are statistically equated, those who received diversion services have a recidivism rate four points lower than those who did not receive diversion services. Four percentage points might not seem like much but on a base of about 22% (the expected recidivism), four points represents an 18% reduction in the recidivism level.

As noted earlier, the analysis reported here is not sufficiently rigorous to demonstrate the direct effects of diversion service on recidivism but it is consistent with the possibility that diversion service has impact and thus provides some encouragement. The study reported here, however, does not stand alone with regard to the recidivism impact of diversion service delivered through the projects of the Youth Services Network. A previous evaluation study included a series of small-scale but more rigorous research designs examining the recidivism impact of the Consolidated

Youth Services projects of the Network (SEED, Cerritos Corridor, and PAY).<sup>1</sup> Those studies also showed lower recidivism for the diversion group than for various untreated control groups. The results of the major designs from that study are worth repeating here:

1. A tie-breaking randomization (N=60) found that the diversion group had a recidivism rate of about 35% compared to 42% for an untreated control.
2. A regression-continuity or "cutting-point" design (N=557) found that the diversion cases had an actual recidivism of 24% compared to 37% expected on the basis of extrapolation from untreated comparison groups.
3. In a matching design comparing 43 pairs of juveniles matched on the basis of nine relevant variables the diversion cases had a recidivism rate of 21% while their matched controls had a recidivism of 35%.

The preponderance of evidence, therefore, supports the conclusion that the diversion service provided by the projects of the Youth Services Network does reduce the recidivism of their juvenile clients. The multiple regression study reported above provides the most general estimate of the effect -- roughly an 18% reduction in recidivism rate during the first six months subsequent to referral to the Youth Services Network.

Recidivism Rates for Individual Projects

Though the Network program as a whole does seem to be at least moderately effective in reducing the recidivism of its juvenile clients there are, of course, differences among the individual projects of the Network. To determine recidivism rates for the individual projects, all juvenile clients referred during the latter half of 1980 and the first half of 1981 were searched in the JAI. As was discussed in the chapter on "Delinquency Risk," this procedure differed from that of previous evaluation studies by including clients from all referral sources, not just those referred by law enforcement.

The total number of names checked in the JAI was 7637 of which 4131 were found to have no arrest history at all, i.e., records for them were not found in the JAI. The remaining 3506 juveniles did have at least one entry in the JAI but it was not necessarily for a police contact that had anything to do with referral to a project of the Youth Services Network. The concept of recidivism requires that there first be a delinquent act and an official police contact and then that the record be examined for subsequent (recidivistic) police contacts after treatment. Any juvenile whose record showed no police contact within the six months prior to referral (or intake) into a Youth Services Project was therefore removed from the sample. There were 2440 juveniles who remained in the sample after this exclusion.

<sup>1</sup> Lipsey, M.W. and Johnston, J.E. The Impact of Juvenile Diversion in Los Angeles County: A Report to the Los Angeles County (AB-9090) Justice System Advisory Group. July, 1979.

As in past years, recidivism was defined as an officially recorded police contact within six months subsequent to the date of enrollment in the Youth Services Project (referral date or, in some cases, intake date). The recidivism calculation, therefore, takes juveniles who have had at least one contact with the police at the time of referral or within the six months prior and tabulates the proportion who have at least one repeat contact during the six months subsequent to referral. Table 12 reports the recidivism rates for each project in the Youth Services Network.

Table 12: Six-month Recidivism Rates and Confidence Intervals for the Youth Services Projects

| Project           | Number of Cases | Percent Recidivating | Expected Recidivism Range |
|-------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Centinela         | (184)           | 31.0                 | 20.3 - 33.3               |
| Cerritos Corridor | (224)           | 23.2                 | 20.3 - 32.1               |
| DAY               | (72)            | 36.1                 | 17.1 - 38.1               |
| Foothill          | (53)            | 26.4                 | 13.2 - 37.0               |
| HEAVY-Central     | (395)           | 26.3                 | 20.8 - 29.6               |
| HEAVY-SFV         | (110)           | 22.7                 | 15.6 - 31.8               |
| HEAVY-West        | (207)           | 26.1                 | 24.5 - 37.3               |
| JADE              | (275)           | 29.1                 | 19.9 - 30.3               |
| Mid Valley        | (63)            | 19.1                 | 15.5 - 37.7               |
| PAY               | (149)           | 20.8                 | 17.3 - 31.3               |
| Pomona Valley     | (150)           | 22.0                 | 16.8 - 30.8               |
| SEED              | (292)           | 26.7                 | 19.1 - 29.1               |
| South Bay         | (101)           | 26.7                 | 14.3 - 30.9               |
| West San Gabriel  | (165)           | 13.9 *               | 20.1 - 33.9               |
|                   | (2440)          | 25.7                 |                           |

\* Recidivism rate falling outside the expected range.

The individual project recidivism rates in Table 12 vary from a low of 13.9% to a high of 36.1%. A great deal of that variation, however, results from different clientele at different projects. Projects that handle a large proportion of high risk delinquency cases naturally have higher recidivism rates than projects with a predominance of low risk cases. To provide a basis for judging when a project's recidivism rate was different from what would be expected for its clientele, we used a statistical procedure to "predict" the recidivism from the characteristics of the juveniles in the sample. First, a multiple regression function was fit to the entire sample of recidivism data using sex, age, number of prior offenses, ethnicity, and referral source as predictor variables. The resulting prediction function was then applied to the samples for each project and a determination was made of the expected recidivism.

Comparing the expected recidivism rate to the actual recidivism allows each project to be judged in terms of the nature of its client population. Because there is error associated with the predicted recidivism rates, we have expressed each as a range within which the actual recidivism would be expected to fall for each project.<sup>2</sup>

A project with an actual recidivism rate falling within the expected range is essentially achieving the Network average after adjusting for the nature of its clientele. Keep in mind that the recidivism impact study reported in the previous section indicated that the Network average was itself a reduction from the recidivism that would have occurred had these juveniles not been treated by the projects. Any project with a recidivism rate falling below the expected range would have a recidivism rate significantly below the Network average for its clients. Conversely, a project with a recidivism rate falling above the expected range would be significantly higher than the Network average.

Table 12 shows that only one project, South Bay, had a recidivism rate that fell outside the expected range. The recidivism at that project was lower than would be expected on the basis of the characteristics of the clients. All the remaining projects had recidivism rates within their expected ranges, i.e., they reflected the Network average adjusted for their clientele. Because of the small number of cases in some of the project samples, however, those results may not be stable. Small sample sizes produce large expected recidivism ranges and make it difficult to detect projects that may in fact have recidivism rates better or worse than the Network average.

<sup>2</sup> Confidence limits of  $\pm 2$  standard errors about the predicted values.



CLIENT AND COUNSELOR EVALUATIONS OF SERVICE

An important indicator of the effectiveness of treatment for the juveniles served through the Youth Services Network is the satisfaction expressed by those closest to the process. The counselors and youth workers, for example, are in a position to see first-hand whether any improvement results from the treatment for significant numbers of youth. Even granting that they may be overly optimistic in their portrayal, their point of view is nonetheless valuable. In addition, the youth themselves can express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the treatment they received and have their own judgment about whether it helps them stay out of trouble.

Counselors' Reports

All counselors and youth workers who participate with those projects of the Youth Services Network that use the standardized Network client forms make a variety of uniform reports about the status of each client at the time of termination. These reports give some indication of how successful the service arrangements were for the juvenile clients. Tables 13, 14, and 15 present the termination circumstances for the clients of each project that participated significantly in the 1981 Network Management Information System. Since the MIS was not operating during all of 1981, only a portion of each project's clients can be considered.

Table 13: Who Initiated the Action Leading to Termination

| Project           | Number of Cases | Juvenile or Parents | Mutually Agreed | Counselor or YS Project |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| Centinela         | (60)            | 23%                 | 30%             | 47%                     |
| Cerritos Corridor | (586)           | 35                  | 40              | 24                      |
| DAY               | (a)             | -                   | -               | -                       |
| Foothill          | (23)            | 35                  | 43              | 22                      |
| HEAVY-Central     | (a)             | -                   | -               | -                       |
| HEAVY-SFV         | (145)           | 6                   | 91              | 3                       |
| HEAVY-West        | (a)             | -                   | -               | -                       |
| JADE              | (143)           | 9                   | 78              | 13                      |
| Mid Valley        | (31)            | 68                  | 10              | 23                      |
| PAY               | (130)           | 31                  | 37              | 32                      |
| Pomona Valley     | (a)             | -                   | -               | -                       |
| SEED              | (225)           | 21                  | 50              | 30                      |
| South Bay         | (64)            | 39                  | 45              | 16                      |
| West San Gabriel  | (98)            | 15                  | 7               | 78                      |
| TOTALS            | (1505)          | 27%                 | 47%             | 26%                     |

(a) Insufficient information from this project.

The variability from project to project in Table 13 is quite large indicating differences in administrative procedure for handling terminations. Overall, however, the data indicates that about half the cases came to a close by mutual client-counselor agreement and another one-fourth were closed by the Youth Service Project or the counselor, usually because the prescribed term of service had ended. About one-fourth were terminated unilaterally by the juvenile clients or their parents.

Table 14: Reasons Reported for Termination

| Project           | Inappropriate or Refusal at Intake | Dropout or Premature Closing | Service Completed |
|-------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|
| Centinela         | 10%                                | 30%                          | 52%               |
| Cerritos Corridor | 18                                 | 25                           | 49                |
| DAY               | (a)                                | -                            | -                 |
| Foothill          | 35                                 | 22                           | 35                |
| HEAVY-Central     | (a)                                | -                            | -                 |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 6                                  | 26                           | 55                |
| HEAVY-West        | (a)                                | -                            | -                 |
| JADE              | 2                                  | 9                            | 90                |
| Mid Valley        | 10                                 | 71                           | 13                |
| PAY               | 15                                 | 26                           | 46                |
| Pomona Valley     | (a)                                | -                            | -                 |
| SEED              | 16                                 | 21                           | 45                |
| South Bay         | 29                                 | 32                           | 19                |
| West San Gabriel  | 15                                 | 9                            | 69                |
| TOTALS            | 15%                                | 23%                          | 51%               |

(a) Insufficient information for this project.

Table 14 reveals that over half of the Youth Services Projects' clients completed service. The remainder either did not establish intake (e.g., refused service or did not meet service criteria) or terminated prematurely either on their own action or because they moved out of the area, etc. Many of those who terminated prematurely did receive some amount of service prior to that termination though it fell short of the prescribed term.

The largest group of clients was judged by the service providers to reach a favorable outcome with no additional services needed (Table 15). The next largest group was also judged to have a favorable outcome but was thought to need additional service. Altogether 73% of the terminations were judged to be under favorable circumstances; only 27% were thought unfavorable.



Table 15: Service Providers' Assessment of Cases at Termination

| Project           | Favorable Outcome   |                         | Unfavorable Outcome |                         |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
|                   | More Service Needed | More Service Not Needed | More Service Needed | More Service Not Needed |
| Centinela         | 15%                 | 40%                     | 33%                 | 12%                     |
| Cerritos Corridor | 30                  | 42                      | 26                  | 3                       |
| DAY               | (a)                 | -                       | -                   | -                       |
| Foothill          | 21                  | 47                      | 26                  | 5                       |
| HEAVY-Central     | (a)                 | -                       | -                   | -                       |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 68                  | 26                      | 5                   | 0                       |
| HEAVY-West        | (a)                 | -                       | -                   | -                       |
| JADE              | 0                   | 89                      | 2                   | 9                       |
| Mid Valley        | 28                  | 21                      | 52                  | 0                       |
| PAY               | 40                  | 32                      | 23                  | 4                       |
| Pomona Valley     | (a)                 | -                       | -                   | -                       |
| SEED              | 37                  | 31                      | 29                  | 2                       |
| South Bay         | 51                  | 35                      | 5                   | 9                       |
| West San Gabriel  | 30                  | 52                      | 16                  | 2                       |
| TOTALS            | 29%                 | 44%                     | 23%                 | 4%                      |

(a) Insufficient information for this project.

Tables 13, 14, and 15 paint a picture that is generally positive considering the difficult nature of the clients served by the Youth Services Network. At the close of service, most cases had terminated by mutual client-counselor agreement, service had been completed, and the outcome was judged to be favorable. Another large group showed favorable improvement but for one reason or another stopped service before the counselor thought it was appropriate.

The most specific evidence regarding the status of the client at the time service was complete came from the counselors' detailed ratings of 12 problem areas for each client. All projects that participated in the Network MIS used an intake and a termination form that requested counselors to rate the severity of the 12 problem areas on a scale from 0 to 9. The same format was used for separate intake and termination ratings. Comparing those two sets of ratings for the terminated cases gave some indication of the amount of progress the clients made and the nature of their problems. Table 16 summarizes the data for the participating projects. Individual project results are not reported since some had limited numbers of terminated cases represented in the MIS data.

Table 16: Counselors' Ratings of Client Problems at Intake and Termination

| Problem Area        | Percent of Juveniles with Problem |             | Average Rating of Problem Severity |             |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------|
|                     | Intake                            | Termination | Intake                             | Termination |
| Substance Abuse     | 21%                               | 19%         | 1.0                                | 0.8         |
| Employment          | 17                                | 17          | 1.0                                | 0.9         |
| Medical             | 3                                 | 4           | 0.2                                | 0.2         |
| Victim              | 6                                 | 6           | 0.3                                | 0.2         |
| Learning Disability | 13                                | 13          | 0.5                                | 0.5         |
| Delinquency         | 39                                | 31          | 2.6                                | 1.3         |
| Psychological       | 26                                | 22          | 1.4                                | 1.1         |
| Family Relations    | 57                                | 54          | 3.2                                | 2.7         |
| Peer Relations      | 37                                | 34          | 1.9                                | 1.4         |
| School-Behavior     | 37                                | 32          | 1.9                                | 1.4         |
| School-Academic     | 43                                | 39          | 2.3                                | 1.9         |
| School-Attendance   | 32                                | 25          | 1.8                                | 1.2         |

Note: 1505 closed cases are represented in this Table. Severity ratings were made on a 0-9 scale.

We would expect counselors and youth workers to be relatively optimistic about the effects of their own services. Table 16 shows, however, that they were also rather realistic — they did not claim overwhelming improvement in all categories for their clients. Overall, they did report modest improvement in most categories, particularly those in which the greatest problems were identified.

The intake ratings show that the counselors and youth workers judged family relations, academic work in school, and delinquency to be the most serious problems facing the typical client. At termination, many juveniles were still judged to have those problems but the proportions were somewhat smaller and the level of severity was judged to be less. The greatest improvement was reported in the area of delinquency. This finding is encouraging though it is difficult to know if it represents real improvement or simply the counselors' awareness that improvement was expected in that area by the Youth Services Project.

Juvenile Clients' Reports

Names and phone numbers for terminated clients were drawn from the records of three of the Youth Services Projects and a telephone interview was attempted approximately six months subsequent to referral. Of 337 names initially drawn, 234 were not contacted because of erroneous or disconnected phone numbers, families no longer at the address, or other such problems. Interviews were completed with 103 youth and the results provided interesting information about the youths' view of the effectiveness of the treatment.

Table 17 reports the youths' responses to the various questions that asked for their rating of the help they received from the service provider to which they were assigned. All responses were included in Table 17 even though some of the youth withdrew from service before completing the usual term.

Table 17: Reports About Youth Services From Juveniles Surveyed  
Approximately Six Months After Referral (N=103)

Item and Response Categories

Do you think the service agency helped you?

|                 |     |
|-----------------|-----|
| Helped a lot    | 38% |
| Helped a little | 46% |
| Didn't help     | 13% |

Are your grades better, the same, or worse than last year?

|               |     |
|---------------|-----|
| Better        | 50% |
| The same      | 24% |
| Worse         | 11% |
| Not in School | 14% |

Are you getting along with your teachers better, the same, or worse than last year?

|          |     |
|----------|-----|
| Better   | 51% |
| The same | 24% |
| Worse    | 6%  |

Do you think that the program at [agency] will make any difference in your chances of getting in trouble in the next six months?

|            |     |
|------------|-----|
| Yes        | 72% |
| No         | 16% |
| Don't know | 12% |

Do you think that the program will make any difference in your chances of getting arrested in the next six months?

|            |     |
|------------|-----|
| Yes        | 71% |
| No         | 18% |
| Don't know | 10% |

Approximately three-fourths of the youth interviewed reported positive effects from their contact with the services provided by the Youth Services Project. They reported being helped, with over one-third saying they were helped "a lot," and they reported that they thought the program made a difference in the likelihood that they would get into trouble or get arrested. Half the youth reported that their grades in school had improved and that they were getting along better with their teachers. Fewer than 15% of the youth reported no effects or negative effects in any category. Though the youth may have been inclined to put a good face on their experience when talking to an interviewer on the telephone, the size of the majority making favorable reports suggests that many felt genuinely helped by the service.

COST AND COST EFFECTIVENESS

During the 1980-81 fiscal year the projects of the Youth Services Network were funded through a variety of grants, contracts, and contributions from state and local sources. The major categories were AB-90 funds, JJDP, and direct contributions from the local cities served. Some of the projects also received CETA funding for employment programs and the L.A. City projects received money through the DISCO program.

Table 18 summarizes the fiscal year 1980-81 funding level for each of the projects of the Youth Services Network. Funding for services that dealt primarily with adults or those that were not targeted on diversion and delinquency prevention are excluded from the summary. As Table 18 indicates, in 1980-81 the Youth Services Network administered programs with a total funding in excess of five million dollars. Of that, a little over two million was for the "diversion" program, i.e., youth counseling and related services. Most of the remaining amount represented CETA youth employment programs of various sorts and the HEAVY-Central Anti-Vandalism Program.

Table 18: 1980-81 Funding Level for Projects of the Youth Services Network

| Project           | Diversion Funding | Employment Funding | Other Youth Funding | Project Totals |
|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Centinela         | \$167,272         | —                  | —                   | \$167,272      |
| Cerritos Corridor | 197,799           | —                  | —                   | 197,799        |
| DAY               | 78,069            | —                  | —                   | 78,069         |
| Foothill          | 93,534            | —                  | —                   | 93,534         |
| HEAVY-Central     | 291,655           | 384,748            | 820,315             | 1,496,718      |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 400,419           | 567,205            | —                   | 967,624        |
| HEAVY-West        | 108,976           | 116,577            | —                   | 225,553        |
| JADE              | 192,312           | —                  | —                   | 192,312        |
| Mid Valley        | 129,304           | —                  | —                   | 129,304        |
| Pomona Valley     | 147,941           | 706,253            | —                   | 854,194        |
| SEED/PAY          | 307,516           | —                  | —                   | 307,516        |
| South Bay         | 85,518            | —                  | —                   | 85,518         |
| West San Gabriel  | 238,082           | 230,976            | —                   | 469,058        |
| Totals            | \$2,438,397       | \$2,005,759        | \$820,315           | \$5,264,471    |

The figures shown in Table 18 represent the gross costs of the programs; that is, they are the best estimates available of the actual total costs of running the programs. In some cases the figures include the value of donations such as office space and bookkeeping, as well as the value of any participating personnel charged to some account other than the major diversion funding sources (e.g., adult CETA). The gross costs for the diversion program at the individual projects ranges from about 80,000 dollars to over 400,000 dollars.

Table 18 also reflects the decline in service funding that all the projects have faced since the last evaluation report (which covered calendar year 1980). Even though Table 18 reports the fiscal year 1980-81 which partially overlaps last year's figures, the total funding for the Youth Service Network shows a decline from last year. The funding in the diversion category dropped almost 25%. CETA funding is expected to decrease drastically in the coming year which will further reduce the overall Youth Services Network budget.

Distribution of Funding Among Projects

Since the Youth Services Projects' primary commitment is to delinquency prevention, it would be ideal to have the money available to the projects be distributed in proportion to the extent of the delinquency problem in the project areas. One indicator of the extent of delinquency in each area is the WIC 602 juvenile arrest rate. Table 19 shows the size of the 1980 juvenile arrest pool in each project jurisdiction and the relative amount of funding.

Table 19 reports the average number of 1980-81 Youth Services dollars available in each project area for each juvenile arrest reported in that area. For the entire Network, the funding level of the diversion program was about \$44 for each juvenile arrest in the areas served. With youth employment and other youth funds included, the average rose to \$95 per arrest. Both these figures represent a decline from the 1980 calendar year reported in the previous evaluation study.

Based on the past history of these projects and previous evaluation studies, we judge about \$50 per juvenile arrest in an area to be a reasonable funding target for the project that serves that area. Six of the projects of the Network were below that level for fiscal year 1980-81 and, given current funding trends, it seems likely that others will fall below that point in the near future.

In addition, there continues to be some unevenness in the funding levels of the various individual projects. Looking only at diversion funds, West San Gabriel Valley, SEED/PAY, and Pomona Valley have been successful in bringing in significantly more funding, relative to local arrests, than the average for the Network. Centinela, HEAVY-Central, and HEAVY-West fell well below the Network average. HEAVY-Central and HEAVY-West had other sources of youth funding that compensated for the relatively low level of diversion funding but that was not true for Centinela. By any index, Centinela YSP was underfunded in 1980-81 given the size of the juvenile arrest pool in its area.

Table 19: Funding Level for Each Youth Services Project Relative to the WIC 602 Juvenile Arrest Pool in the Project Area

| Project           | 1980        | 1980-81           | 1980                  | Diversion          | Total              |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
|                   | Arrest Pool | Diversion Funding | Total Project Funding | Dollars per Arrest | Dollars per Arrest |
| Centinela         | 5,759       | \$ 167,272        | \$ 167,272            | \$ 29              | \$ 29              |
| Cerritos Corridor | 3,668       | 197,799           | 197,799               | 54                 | 54                 |
| DAY               | 2,192       | 78,069            | 78,069                | 36                 | 36                 |
| Foothill          | 2,357       | 93,534            | 93,534                | 40                 | 40                 |
| HEAVY-Central     | 13,582      | 291,655           | 1,496,718             | 21                 | 110                |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 6,824       | 400,419           | 967,624               | 59                 | 142                |
| HEAVY-West        | 5,278       | 108,976           | 225,553               | 21                 | 43                 |
| JADE              | 3,310       | 192,312           | 192,312               | 58                 | 58                 |
| Mid Valley        | 3,200       | 129,304           | 129,304               | 40                 | 40                 |
| Pomona Valley     | 2,141       | 147,941           | 854,194               | 69                 | 399                |
| SEED/PAY          | 4,335       | 307,516           | 307,516               | 71                 | 71                 |
| South Bay         | 2,064       | 85,518            | 85,518                | 41                 | 41                 |
| West San Gabriel  | 2,960       | 238,082           | 469,058               | 80                 | 158                |
| Totals            | 55,313      | \$2,438,397       | \$5,264,471           | \$ 44              | \$ 95              |

Cost Per Client

The evaluation study for the 1980 calendar year found that the average gross cost per diversion client for the projects of the Youth Services Network was \$303. As noted in the first chapter of the present report, the cost of delinquency prevention services compares very favorably with the cost to the juvenile justice system of processing a juvenile arrest. In addition, previous evaluation studies on the Youth Services Network have shown that its costs per case are low when compared with similar youth services projects in the state of California and in a neighboring county.<sup>1</sup>

To update last year's cost figures, the 1980-81 fiscal year diversion expenditures for the projects of the Youth Services Network were compared with their diversion client pools in order to determine the present cost rate for the various projects. The summary data for these comparisons are reported in Table 20.

Table 20 reports two cost per client figures for each project. The first is based on total or gross costs, that is, the cost of all contributions to the diversion

<sup>1</sup> Lipsey, M.W. and Johnston, J.E. "The impact of juvenile diversion in Los Angeles County: A report to the Los Angeles County (AB90) Justice System Advisory Group," July, 1979.

program irrespective of who paid for them. For example, gross cost would include the value of office space that was donated by a local city. The net cost per client reported in Table 20 represents the cost actually passed on to the grantors with a direct interest in service, e.g., AB90, JJDP. That is, these are the cost figures after removing the value of all donations and subsidies such as free office space, salaries paid by CETA grants, etc. A number of the projects of the Youth Services Network have taken advantage of various sources of supplementary support to stretch the dollars they receive from the service-oriented grantors.

Table 20: 1980-81 Cost Per Client for the Diversion Programs of the Youth Services Network Projects

| Project           | 1980-81                | 1980-81           | Average               | Average             |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
|                   | Diversion Expenditures | Diversion Clients | Gross Cost Per Client | Net Cost Per Client |
| Centinela         | \$167,272              | 482               | \$ 347                | \$ 315              |
| Cerritos Corridor | 197,799                | 997               | 198                   | 148                 |
| DAY               | 78,069                 | 346               | 226                   | 226                 |
| Foothill (a)      | 93,534                 | 263               | 356                   | 349                 |
| HEAVY-Central     | 291,655                | 1015              | 287                   | 270                 |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 400,419                | 2593              | 154                   | 148                 |
| HEAVY-West        | 108,976                | 294               | 371                   | 320                 |
| JADE              | 192,312                | 994               | 193                   | 190                 |
| Mid Valley        | 129,304                | 271               | 477                   | 477                 |
| Pomona Valley     | 147,941                | 415               | 356                   | 356                 |
| SEED/PAY          | 307,516                | 1376              | 223                   | 183                 |
| South Bay         | 85,518                 | 404               | 212                   | 197                 |
| West San Gabriel  | 238,082                | 615               | 387                   | 387                 |
| Totals            | \$2,438,397            | 10,065            | \$ 242                | \$ 224              |

(a) Project start-up year; expenses may be unrepresentative.

The average gross cost per client for the 10,065 diversion clients served by the Network in fiscal year 1980-81 was \$242. This figure represents a significant decrease from the average reported in the 1980 calendar year evaluation and probably reflects, in part, the belt-tightening that has been necessitated by increasingly short funds.

Table 20 shows that, on average, the projects of the Network received \$18 per client from supplementary sources leaving a net cost per client of only \$224 that was charged to the primary service sponsors. This represents a form of financial leverage that allows the projects to deliver more service for a fixed number of JJDP, AB90, local city or DISCO dollars.

Allocation of Expenses

Another dimension of a project's efficiency is the proportion of its funds it is able to put into direct service for the client in contrast to personnel and operating expenses for the Youth Services Project itself. Determining the proportion of the project budget that is expended on services is relatively easy for projects that purchase all their services on a contractual basis from outside vendors. Some projects, however, use their own personnel to provide service to part or all of their juvenile clients. In those cases, the salary and operating expenses budgets for the project must be divided into the portion representing direct service (i.e., "therapy") and the portion representing administration and support services.

Note that it is not desirable for a project to have an extremely high proportion of its funding converted into direct service for clients. That might reduce the administration and support services down to such a small amount that the project could not perform its other special functions. In the extreme case, a project might simply be a banker writing checks for purchase of service. Such a project would not be able to provide the planning, coordination, and development of community service agencies nor any of the important case management, referral, or advocacy services that are the unique contribution of the Youth Services Network. We would advocate that each project aspire to keep its administrative salaries and general operating expenses budget to around 40% of its expenses but that they not be reduced much below that. This allocation still leaves 60% of the project budget for direct service to youth while allowing for sufficient support services to properly maintain case management, referral networks, and community service provider relationships.

Table 21 breaks down the gross cost per diversion client for each project into the components that supported project personnel, project operating costs, and direct service to clients. The personnel category includes all salary, wage, and fringe benefit expenses for administrative, clerical, and case management personnel but excludes expenses for personnel who provided direct service, i.e., sustained therapeutic work with a juvenile. Operating costs cover such items as office rent, supplies, telephone, insurance, and so forth. Direct service expenses represent all purchase of service payments made to outside service providers plus project personnel costs expended in direct service to clients.

Table 21 shows that for the Network overall, 53% of the expenses per case went into direct service for the client. In other words, more than half of each dollar of funding that came to the projects in fiscal year 1980-81 went into service for the juvenile clients. Most of the individual Youth Services Projects are similar to the Network average on this factor.

Table 21: Breakdown of 1980-81 Diversion Costs Per Client for the Projects of the Youth Services Network

| Project           | Gross Cost Per Client | Personnel Expense | Operating Expense | Direct Service Expense |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Centinela         | \$ 347                | 39%               | 9%                | 52%                    |
| Cerritos Corridor | 198                   | 38                | 8                 | 54                     |
| DAY               | 226                   | 38                | 10                | 52                     |
| Foothill (a)      | 356                   | 53                | 10                | 37                     |
| HEAVY-Central     | 287                   | 49                | 4                 | 47                     |
| HEAVY-SFV         | 154                   | 19                | 6                 | 75                     |
| HEAVY-West        | 371                   | 23                | 17                | 60                     |
| JADE              | 193                   | 37                | 5                 | 58                     |
| Mid Valley (b)    | 477                   | 35                | 23                | 42                     |
| Pomona Valley     | 356                   | 26                | 11                | 63                     |
| SEED/PAY          | 223                   | 36                | 13                | 51                     |
| South Bay         | 212                   | 24                | 12                | 64                     |
| West San Gabriel  | 387                   | 19                | 24                | 57                     |
| Averages          | \$ 242                | 34%               | 13%               | 53%                    |

(a) Project start-up year; expenses may be unrepresentative.

(b) Community mental health center; all services provided internally.

CLIENT AND SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS

It is not the primary purpose of this report to examine the details of the routine flow of clients and services through the projects of the Youth Services Network. That information is reported separately through the Network's centralized Management Information System. For purposes of general summary, however, and to permit some comparison among the various projects, this section of the report will provide descriptive statistics for the most salient client and service characteristics. The data for these statistics have been drawn from the various referral, intake, service, and termination forms of the Network Management Information System.

Client Characteristics

The typical Youth Services Project client was male, from a minority ethnic group, and approximately fifteen years of age. Tables 22, 23, and 24 provide a more detailed description. For purposes of comparison, the distribution of characteristics for the 1979 juvenile arrest pool in all of Los Angeles County is shown at the bottom of each table.

Table 22: Sex Distribution of Youth Service Project Clients

| Project                          | Number of Cases | % Male | % Female |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|--------|----------|
| Centinela                        | (626)           | 72%    | 28%      |
| Cerritos Corridor                | (774)           | 68     | 32       |
| DAY                              | (255)           | 55     | 45       |
| Foothill                         | (332)           | 66     | 34       |
| HEAVY-Central                    | (611)           | 57     | 43       |
| HEAVY-SFV                        | (718)           | 59     | 41       |
| HEAVY-West                       | (608)           | 65     | 35       |
| JADE                             | (1252)          | 70     | 30       |
| Mid Valley                       | (170)           | 64     | 36       |
| PAY                              | (280)           | 65     | 35       |
| Pomona Valley                    | (210)           | 60     | 40       |
| SEED                             | (601)           | 69     | 31       |
| South Bay                        | (273)           | 66     | 34       |
| West San Gabriel                 | (492)           | 70     | 30       |
| NETWORK TOTALS                   | (7202)          | 66%    | 34%      |
| L.A. COUNTY JUVENILE ARREST POOL | (83209)         | 83%    | 17%      |

Table 23: Ethnic Distribution of Youth Service Project Clients

| Project                          | Number of Cases | % Anglo | % Black | % Hispanic | % Other |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------|---------|------------|---------|
| Centinela                        | (490)           | 29%     | 52%     | 14%        | 5%      |
| Cerritos Corridor                | (766)           | 77      | 4       | 17         | 3       |
| DAY                              | (238)           | 42      | 47      | 8          | 2       |
| Foothill                         | (332)           | 85      | 1       | 4          | 11      |
| HEAVY-Central                    | (589)           | 17      | 36      | 44         | 3       |
| HEAVY-SFV                        | (737)           | 48      | 7       | 42         | 3       |
| HEAVY-West                       | (622)           | 40      | 42      | 14         | 4       |
| JADE                             | (1258)          | 17      | 23      | 55         | 5       |
| Mid Valley                       | (171)           | 40      | 3       | 57         | 0       |
| PAY                              | (276)           | 9       | 1       | 88         | 1       |
| Pomona Valley                    | (182)           | 75      | 7       | 12         | 6       |
| SEED                             | (598)           | 56      | 0       | 42         | 2       |
| South Bay                        | (257)           | 90      | 1       | 4          | 5       |
| West San Gabriel                 | (489)           | 43      | 3       | 49         | 5       |
| NETWORK TOTALS                   | (7005)          | 43%     | 18%     | 35%        | 4%      |
| L.A. COUNTY JUVENILE ARREST POOL | (83209)         | 39%     | 26%     | 33%        | 2%      |

Table 24: Age Distribution of Youth Service Project Clients

| Project                          | Number of Cases | % At Each Age |     |     |     |     |     |            |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------|
|                                  |                 | 12 or Less    | 13  | 14  | 15  | 16  | 17  | 18 or More |
| Centinela                        | (581)           | 19%           | 14% | 17% | 17% | 15% | 13% | 6%         |
| Cerritos Corridor                | (761)           | 18            | 13  | 15  | 15  | 19  | 14  | 5          |
| DAY                              | (277)           | 14            | 20  | 23  | 9   | 16  | 13  | 5          |
| Foothill                         | (330)           | 9             | 12  | 18  | 23  | 19  | 14  | 5          |
| HEAVY-Central                    | (612)           | 20            | 12  | 16  | 18  | 19  | 13  | 1          |
| HEAVY-SFV                        | (743)           | 27            | 8   | 13  | 13  | 19  | 14  | 6          |
| HEAVY-West                       | (628)           | 5             | 7   | 15  | 17  | 25  | 23  | 9          |
| JADE                             | (1258)          | 27            | 11  | 16  | 15  | 17  | 9   | 5          |
| Mid Valley                       | (172)           | 12            | 10  | 12  | 17  | 27  | 16  | 6          |
| PAY                              | (276)           | 9             | 11  | 18  | 16  | 21  | 16  | 9          |
| Pomona Valley                    | (213)           | 5             | 6   | 14  | 21  | 21  | 20  | 14         |
| SEED                             | (592)           | 8             | 10  | 17  | 21  | 21  | 16  | 8          |
| South Bay                        | (279)           | 12            | 9   | 17  | 20  | 20  | 16  | 7          |
| West San Gabriel                 | (491)           | 14            | 6   | 11  | 18  | 16  | 19  | 16         |
| NETWORK TOTALS                   | (7213)          | 17%           | 11% | 15% | 17% | 19% | 15% | 7%         |
| L.A. COUNTY JUVENILE ARREST POOL | (83209)         | 6%            | 7%  | 13% | 20% | 25% | 29% |            |



By comparison with the juvenile arrest pool in Los Angeles County, the clients of the Youth Service Network have a considerably higher proportion of females and are notably younger. The ethnic breakdowns are more similar but the Network clients include proportionately more Anglo youth and fewer Black youth than the juvenile arrest population in Los Angeles County. It is understandable that a prevention program would deal with younger juveniles since it is attempting to intervene before an arrest history begins. It is not clear why the Network clients should overrepresent female and Anglo youth, however. The overrepresentation of females is particularly large in light of their relatively low level of delinquency risk.

Referral Circumstances

The two largest sources of referrals to the projects of the Youth Services Network were law enforcement stations and local schools. Overall, there were somewhat more law enforcement referrals than school referrals (39% vs. 35%) though neither constituted a majority of the cases. Probation referrals and law enforcement referrals combined accounted for almost half the total cases overall and accounted for the predominance of cases at Centinela, Foothill, Mid Valley, PAY and SEED. Table 25 reports additional details.

Table 25: Referral Sources for Youth Services Project Clients

| Project           | Number of Cases | % Referred From Each Source |           |            |            |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|
|                   |                 | Police                      | Probation | School     | Other      |
| Centinela         | (583)           | 49%                         | 10%       | 29%        | 11%        |
| Cerritos Corridor | (671)           | 39                          | 8         | 44         | 9          |
| DAY               | (274)           | 23                          | 1         | 68         | 8          |
| Foothill          | (335)           | 53                          | 7         | 37         | 3          |
| HEAVY-Central     | (566)           | 24                          | 4         | 24         | 48         |
| HEAVY-SFV         | (540)           | 22                          | 6         | 10         | 62         |
| HEAVY-West        | (186)           | 31                          | 3         | 60         | 6          |
| JADE              | (1250)          | 46                          | 4         | 45         | 4          |
| Mid Valley        | (167)           | 44                          | 16        | 7          | 34         |
| PAY               | (273)           | 63                          | 7         | 20         | 10         |
| Pomona Valley     | (188)           | 37                          | 3         | 55         | 5          |
| SEED              | (594)           | 40                          | 15        | 32         | 13         |
| South Bay         | (266)           | 43                          | 3         | 30         | 24         |
| West San Gabriel  | (485)           | 33                          | 13        | 27         | 27         |
| <b>TOTALS</b>     | <b>(6378)</b>   | <b>39%</b>                  | <b>7%</b> | <b>35%</b> | <b>19%</b> |

The reasons cited by the referral agents for making a referral varied considerably but the largest single category was police contact for a chargeable offense, the usual reason for referrals from law enforcement. Tables 26 and 27 summarize the referral reasons for law enforcement referrals and referrals from other sources.

Table 26: Referral Offense for Law Enforcement and Probation Referrals

| Project      | Number of Cases | Burglary; Robbery          | Theft; Petty Theft | Vandalism; Mal. Mischief | Other Property | Assault          | Other Person     | Poss. Marijuana   | Other Drug                 | Joyriding | Other Vehicle | Runaway   | Incorrigible | Truancy   | Other Status | All Other |
|--------------|-----------------|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
| Centinela    | (283)           | 25%                        | 22%                | 14%                      | 1%             | 6%               | 3%               | 3%                | 4%                         | 4%        | 2%            | 8%        | 0%           | 1%        | 0%           | 8%        |
| Cerritos     | (367)           | 21                         | 19                 | 7                        | 7              | 7                | 4                | 12                | 7                          | 1         | 2             | 4         | 3            | 0         | 4            | 4         |
| DAY          | (a)             | -                          | -                  | -                        | -              | -                | -                | -                 | -                          | -         | -             | -         | -            | -         | -            | -         |
| Foothill     | (152)           | 30                         | 13                 | 7                        | 3              | 2                | 0                | 11                | 8                          | 0         | 1             | 14        | 1            | 1         | 1            | 9         |
| H-Central    | (324)           | 12                         | 24                 | 3                        | 4              | 3                | 3                | 10                | 2                          | 3         | 0             | 3         | 14           | 16        | 1            | 2         |
| H-SFV        | (233)           | 10                         | 9                  | 4                        | 5              | 2                | 2                | 7                 | 7                          | 2         | 0             | 30        | 0            | 23        | 0            | 0         |
| H-West       | (a)             | -                          | -                  | -                        | -              | -                | -                | -                 | -                          | -         | -             | -         | -            | -         | -            | -         |
| JADE         | (581)           | 13                         | 19                 | 9                        | 3              | 3                | 3                | 8                 | 10                         | 1         | 1             | 7         | 2            | 8         | 8            | 4         |
| MidValley    | (98)            | 9                          | 28                 | 7                        | 5              | 4                | 5                | 8                 | 14                         | 1         | 0             | 8         | 0            | 2         | 3            | 5         |
| PAY          | (185)           | 13                         | 16                 | 6                        | 4              | 3                | 2                | 11                | 10                         | 3         | 1             | 18        | 6            | 0         | 1            | 6         |
| Pomona       | (117)           | 21                         | 35                 | 4                        | 0              | 3                | 1                | 8                 | 8                          | 2         | 0             | 6         | 0            | 1         | 0            | 11        |
| SEED         | (343)           | 18                         | 21                 | 7                        | 3              | 6                | 5                | 12                | 6                          | 0         | 2             | 8         | 4            | 0         | 1            | 5         |
| South Bay    | (102)           | 20                         | 18                 | 6                        | 8              | 6                | 2                | 18                | 3                          | 4         | 1             | 7         | 1            | 2         | 3            | 3         |
| WSGV         | (201)           | 28                         | 18                 | 11                       | 2              | 4                | 1                | 8                 | 6                          | 3         | 2             | 4         | 0            | 0         | 4            | 7         |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>(2996)</b>   | <b>18%</b>                 | <b>20%</b>         | <b>7%</b>                | <b>4%</b>      | <b>4%</b>        | <b>3%</b>        | <b>9%</b>         | <b>7%</b>                  | <b>2%</b> | <b>1%</b>     | <b>9%</b> | <b>3%</b>    | <b>5%</b> | <b>3%</b>    | <b>5%</b> |
|              |                 | <b>49% Property Crimes</b> |                    |                          |                | <b>7% Person</b> | <b>16% Drugs</b> | <b>3% Vehicle</b> | <b>20% Status Offenses</b> |           |               |           |              |           |              |           |

(a) Insufficient information for this Project.

The largest category of offenses for law enforcement referrals was that involving property crimes with theft and burglary the most frequent. Status offenses provided the next largest category with 20% of the total but most of those came from Projects HEAVY-Central and HEAVY-San Fernando Valley. Few of the law enforcement cases referred to the Youth Services Network represented crimes against persons, e.g., assault, or vehicle crimes, e.g., joyriding. Substance abuse offenses were the third largest category overall.

Table 27: Referral Reasons for Non-Law Enforcement Referrals

| Project   | Number of Cases | Substance Abuse | Employment | Medical | Victim | Learning Disab. | Delinquency | Psych. Problems | Family Problems | Peer Problems | School-Behavior | School-Academic | School-Truancy | Other |
|-----------|-----------------|-----------------|------------|---------|--------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-------|
| Centinela | (143)           | 2%              | 1%         | 1%      | 6%     | 4%              | 13%         | 22%             | 19%             | 5%            | 17%             | 1%              | 7%             | 0%    |
| Cerritos  | (353)           | 7               | 1          | 2       | 2      | 19              | 14          | 8               | 24              | 4             | 8               | 8               | 3              | 0     |
| DAY       | (97)            | 1               | 0          | 0       | 3      | 11              | 14          | 10              | 14              | 3             | 22              | 13              | 4              | 3     |
| Foothill  | (44)            | 7               | 2          | 0       | 0      | 2               | 11          | 27              | 36              | 2             | 7               | 2               | 2              | 0     |
| H-Central | (190)           | 4               | 0          | 0       | 2      | 1               | 4           | 3               | 20              | 1             | 5               | 31              | 11             | 7     |
| H-SFV     | (361)           | 5               | 12         | 0       | 0      | 1               | 4           | 3               | 20              | 4             | 31              | 4               | 14             | 0     |
| H-West    | (159)           | 6               | 4          | 0       | 1      | 9               | 2           | 1               | 25              | 4             | 31              | 4               | 14             | 0     |
| JADE      | (608)           | 1               | 0          | 0       | 0      | 0               | 15          | 0               | 16              | 0             | 39              | 9               | 19             | 0     |
| MidValley | (58)            | 36              | 0          | 0       | 16     | 2               | 0           | 3               | 38              | 0             | 5               | 0               | 0              | 0     |
| PAY       | (60)            | 7               | 2          | 2       | 3      | 18              | 13          | 20              | 22              | 3             | 7               | 2               | 2              | 0     |
| Pomona    | (209)           | 9               | 0          | 0       | 0      | 2               | 5           | 6               | 29              | 5             | 13              | 6               | 25             | 0     |
| SEED      | (161)           | 3               | 0          | 1       | 1      | 5               | 20          | 14              | 29              | 6             | 7               | 2               | 10             | 1     |
| South Bay | (51)            | 35              | 0          | 0       | 0      | 2               | 4           | 20              | 27              | 0             | 8               | 2               | 2              | 0     |
| WSGV      | (223)           | 1               | 24         | 0       | 0      | 14              | 0           | 21              | 15              | 4             | 10              | 4               | 5              | 0     |
| TOTAL     | (2717)          | 5%              | 4%         | 0%      | 1%     | 6%              | 9%          | 8%              | 21%             | 3%            | 19%             | 10%             | 12%            | 2%    |

Non-law enforcement referrals, constituted mostly of school referrals, were reported by the referral agents to have a variety of problems necessitating the referral. The most frequently cited referral reason was family problems followed closely by behavioral problems in school. Some individual projects of the Youth Services Network showed distinctive categories of referral reason. For example, Mid Valley and South Bay both reported large numbers of referrals for substance abuse. HEAVY-San Fernando Valley reported a large number of referrals for academic problems in school and West San Gabriel Valley had its largest number of cases referred for employment.

Services

By far the largest service category provided to clients of the Youth Services Projects was counseling of some form, particularly individual and/or family counseling. Table 28 reports the average number of hours per client for each type of service provided through the Youth Services Network. To ensure that cases in progress were not counted in those averages, only terminated cases were included.

Table 28: Average Hours Per Client For Each Type of Service (Closed Cases Only)

| Project   | N of Cases | Hours Individ. Couns. | Hours Family Couns. | Hours Group Couns. | Hours Acad. Tutor | Hours Recreat. | Hours All Other | Total Hours |
|-----------|------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Centinela | (164)      | 2.9                   | 1.5                 | 0.0                | 1.2               | 0.0            | 0.3             | 5.9         |
| Cerritos  | (656)      | 2.3                   | 2.9                 | 0.3                | 1.2               | 0.1            | 0.4             | 7.2         |
| DAY       | (a)        | -                     | -                   | -                  | -                 | -              | -               | -           |
| Foothill  | (80)       | 2.5                   | 1.2                 | 0.3                | 0.0               | 0.0            | 0.1             | 4.1         |
| H-Central | (a)        | -                     | -                   | -                  | -                 | -              | -               | -           |
| H-SFV     | (251)      | 0.4                   | 0.2                 | 0.3                | 7.4               | 0.0            | 0.5             | 8.8         |
| H-West    | (a)        | -                     | -                   | -                  | -                 | -              | -               | -           |
| JADE      | (143)      | 0.2                   | 0.6                 | 3.2                | 0.0               | 0.0            | 0.0             | 4.0         |
| MidValley | (61)       | 1.0                   | 1.6                 | 0.1                | 0.0               | 0.0            | 0.0             | 2.7         |
| PAY       | (135)      | 4.8                   | 1.9                 | 0.8                | 2.0               | 0.1            | 1.0             | 10.6        |
| Pomona    | (95)       | 4.3                   | 2.1                 | 0.1                | 0.3               | 0.0            | 0.0             | 6.8         |
| SEED      | (269)      | 3.6                   | 3.6                 | 0.5                | 0.1               | 0.0            | 0.3             | 8.1         |
| South Bay | (201)      | 1.4                   | 1.2                 | 0.4                | 0.5               | 0.1            | 0.9             | 4.5         |
| WSGV      | (189)      | 0.9                   | 0.2                 | 0.0                | 0.4               | 0.2            | 2.7             | 4.2         |
| TOTAL     | (2244)     | 2.1                   | 1.8                 | 0.5                | 1.4               | 0.1            | 1.1             | 7.0         |

(a) Insufficient information for this project.

Overall, the typical client of the projects of the Youth Services Network averaged 7.0 hours of service. Many, of course, received more and, as noted earlier, a number of clients dropped out of service prematurely. More than half the total service time was comprised of individual and family counseling. Some projects emphasized other sorts of service, however. The preponderance of service hours reported from HEAVY-San Fernando Valley were for academic tutoring. At project JADE the largest category was group counseling and at West San Gabriel Valley it was "other" services, primarily employment training. Total average service hours per client ranged from a high of 10.6 at Project PAY to 4.0 at Project JADE.

## PROJECT SUMMARIES

Much of this report has dealt with findings that pertain to the Youth Services Network as a whole rather than to individual Projects. There were four general factors, however, that permitted consideration of the characteristics and performance of each Project. Those were a) cost, b) delinquency risk level of clients, c) recidivism, and d) referral and service patterns. The primary data and discussion for each of those factors occurs in the appropriate chapter of the previous text. For convenience, the findings are summarized here for each Project.

## CENTINELA VALLEY JUVENILE DIVERSION PROJECT

Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for the Centinela Valley Project was equivalent to \$29 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was well below the Network average of \$44 and below the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area. Centinela was the most underfunded project in the Network.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$347, higher than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (52%) of the project funding went directly into service.

Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 63% and 72% of the referrals to the Centinela Valley Project had some history of police contact, the highest level among any of the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 34% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 37% were felonies, both above the Network averages (27% and 35%).

Relatively few of the Centinela referrals came from the schools (29%) and very few of those (7%) were described as having delinquent behavior. Centinela clients were younger than the Network average but more were male.

Taking all factors together, the Centinela Valley clients represented one of the highest levels of delinquency risk in the Youth Services Network.

Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the Centinela Valley Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of Centinela Valley clients recidivating within six months of referral was 31.0, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Centinela recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted over half of the referrals to the Centinela Valley Project (59%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with burglary being the single largest category. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for psychological problems, family problems, or behavioral problems in school.

The most frequent services provided to Centinela Valley clients were individual counseling, family counseling, and academic tutoring. Service providers reported that 52% of the cases completed service, a rate comparable to the Network average of 51%. The average case received 5.9 hours of service between intake and termination, somewhat below the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 55% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

#### CONSOLIDATED YOUTH SERVICES: CERRITOS CORRIDOR

##### Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for the Cerritos Corridor Project was equivalent to \$54 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was higher than the Network average of \$44 and above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$198, well below the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (54%) of the project funding went directly into service.

##### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 42% and 61% of the referrals to the Cerritos Corridor Project had some history of police contact, somewhat below the Network average. Among law enforcement referrals, 30% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 47% were felonies, both above the Network averages (27% and 35%).

A moderately large proportion of the Cerritos Corridor referrals came from the schools (44%) and few of those (14%) were described as having delinquent behavior. Cerritos Corridor clients had about the same age and sex distributions as the Network average.

Taking all factors together, the Cerritos Corridor clients represented a level of delinquency risk that was about average for the projects of the Youth Services Network.

##### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the Cerritos Corridor Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of Cerritos Corridor clients recidivating within six months of referral was 23.2, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Cerritos Corridor recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than half of the referrals to the Cerritos Corridor Project (47%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with burglary being the single largest category. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for family problems, learning disabilities, or delinquency in school.

The most frequent services provided to Cerritos Corridor clients were family counseling, individual counseling, and academic tutoring. Service providers reported that 49% of the cases completed service, a rate comparable to the Network average of 51%. The average case received 7.2 hours of service between intake and termination, somewhat above the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 72% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

#### PROJECT DAY

##### Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for the Project DAY was equivalent to \$36 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was below the Network average of \$44 and below the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$226, lower than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (52%) of the project funding went directly into service.

##### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 41% and 46% of the referrals to Project DAY had some history of police contact, a relatively low level among the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 23% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 49% were felonies, one figure being above the Network average (felonies, 35%) and one below (Part I offenses, 27%).

The preponderance of referrals to Project DAY came from the schools (68%) but the number referred for delinquent offenses was not reported. Project DAY clients were younger than the Network average and many more were female.

Taking all factors together, the Project DAY clients represented one of the lowest levels of delinquency risk in the Youth Services Network largely because of the predominance of low risk cases among the school referrals.

##### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project DAY but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of Project DAY clients recidivating within six months of referral was 36.1, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Project DAY recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than one-quarter of the referrals to Project DAY (24%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Client documentation was not sufficient to determine the referral reasons for law enforcement cases. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for behavioral problems in school, family problems, or delinquency.

Client documentation was not sufficient to determine the profile of services received by Project DAY clients nor the details of termination circumstances and hours of service.

#### FOOTHILL YOUTH SERVICES

##### Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for the Foothill Project was equivalent to \$40 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was only slightly below the Network average of \$44 and within the range judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$356, higher than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Only 37% of the project funding went directly into service. Since 1980-81 was essentially a start-up year for the Foothill Project, it is likely that the cost factors will improve as more clients come into the project.

##### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 60% and 74% of the referrals to the Foothill Project had some history of police contact, a moderately high level relative to other Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 40% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 51% were felonies, both well above the Network averages (27% and 35%).

The Foothill Project was fairly typical with regard to the proportion of referrals that came from the schools (37%) and about one-quarter of those were described as having delinquent behavior. Foothill clients were older than the Network average but had about the same sex distribution.

Taking all factors together, the Foothill Project clients represented a moderately high level of delinquency risk relative to the other projects of the Youth Services Network.

##### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.



Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the Foothill Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of Foothill clients recidivating within six months of referral was 26.4, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Foothill recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted over half of the referrals to the Foothill Project (60%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with burglary being the single largest category. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for family problems, psychological problems, or delinquency.

The most frequent services provided to Foothill clients were individual counseling and family counseling. Service providers reported that 35% of the cases completed service, a rate below the Network average of 51%. The average case received 4.1 hours of service between intake and termination, below the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 68% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

#### PROJECT HEAVY-CENTRAL CITY

#### Cost

The 1980-81 diversion funding level for Project HEAVY-Central was equivalent to \$21 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. If all funding sources are taken into account the total was \$110. The total was well above the Network total funding average though the diversion funding alone fell short of the \$44 Network diversion average. The total funding was well above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$287, higher than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Less than half (47%) of the project funding went directly into service.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 48% and 57% of the referrals to Project HEAVY-Central had some history of police contact, figures right on the Network averages. Project records were not capable of providing information regarding the severity of the referral offenses among law enforcement referrals.

Almost three-fourths of the Project HEAVY-Central referrals came from the schools or other non-law enforcement sources (72%); very few of the school cases (9%) were described as having delinquent behavior. HEAVY-Central clients were about the same age as the Network average but more were female.

Taking all factors together, the Project HEAVY-Central clients represented an average level of delinquency risk relative to the other projects in the Youth Services Network, lowered because of the large number of non-law enforcement referrals in the caseload.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project HEAVY-Central but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of HEAVY-Central clients recidivating within six months of referral was 26.3, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the HEAVY-Central recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than one-third of the referrals to Project HEAVY-Central (28%) with most of the remainder coming from sources other than the schools, e.g., self and parent referrals. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with petty theft being the single largest category. A large portion of the law enforcement referrals were for status offenses also (34%). Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for behavioral problems in school, family problems, school truancy, or academic problems in school.

Client data for Project HEAVY-Central were insufficient to document the types of services received, the average amount of service, or the circumstances of service termination.

#### PROJECT HEAVY-SAN FERNANDO VALLEY

##### Cost

The 1980-81 diversion funding level for Project HEAVY-San Fernando Valley was equivalent to \$59 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was above the Network average of \$44 and above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area. In addition, other funding sources raised the total level to \$142 per arrest, substantially above the Network average.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$154, well below the Network average of \$242 and, indeed the lowest in the Network. Three-quarters (75%) of the project funding went directly into service, the highest ratio in the Network.

##### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 31% and 38% of the referrals to Project HEAVY-San Fernando Valley had some history of police contact, the lowest level among any of the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 39% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 44% were felonies, both above the Network averages (27% and 35%).

The great majority of the HEAVY-San Fernando referrals came from the schools or other non-law enforcement sources (72%). Few of the school referrals (10%) were described as having delinquent behavior. HEAVY-San Fernando clients were younger than the Network average with 27% being twelve years old or less. Proportionately more clients at this project were female than the Network average.

Taking all factors together, the Project HEAVY-San Fernando clients represented the lowest level of delinquency risk in the Youth Services Network. This resulted from the large proportions of non-law enforcement referrals, their young age and overrepresentation of females, and their limited history of police contact.

Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project HEAVY-San Fernando but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of HEAVY-San Fernando clients recidivating within six months of referral was 22.7, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Project HEAVY-San Fernando recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than one-third of the referrals to the Project HEAVY-San Fernando (28%) with most of the remainder coming from sources other than the schools, e.g., self and parent referrals. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for status offenses (53%) with runaway and truancy being the largest categories. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for academic problems at school, family problems, employment problems, or attendance problems in school.

The services provided to HEAVY-San Fernando diversion clients consisted almost entirely of academic tutoring with some small amounts of individual, family, and group counseling. Service providers reported that 55% of the cases completed service, a rate comparable to the Network average of 51%. The average case received 8.8 hours of service between intake and termination, above the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 94% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

## PROJECT HEAVY-WEST

Cost

The 1980-81 diversion funding level for Project HEAVY-West was equivalent to \$21 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. Additional funding, however, brought the total up to \$43 per arrest. That was below the Network average of \$44 for diversion funding alone but within the range judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served by HEAVY-West in 1980-81 was \$371, higher than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (60%) of the project funding went directly into service.

Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 44% and 47% of the referrals to Project HEAVY-West had some history of police contact, a below average level compared to other Network projects. Project records were not adequate to determine the severity of the referral offenses for law enforcement referrals.

About two-thirds (66%) of the Project HEAVY-West referrals came from the schools or other non-law enforcement sources. It was not possible to determine what proportion of the school referrals showed evidence of delinquent behavior. Project HEAVY-West clients were older than the Network average and had about the same sex distribution as the average.

Taking all factors together, the Project HEAVY-West clients represented a below average level of delinquency risk in the Youth Services Network. This was largely due to the high proportion of non-law enforcement referrals and the limited history of police contacts of those referrals.

Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project HEAVY-West but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of HEAVY-West clients recidivating within six months of referral was 26.1, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the HEAVY-West recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted about one-third of the referrals to Project HEAVY-West (33%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Project data was not sufficient to determine the referral reasons for law enforcement cases. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for behavioral problems in school, family problems, and school attendance problems.

Project data were not sufficient to determine the profile of services provided to HEAVY-West clients, the amount of service, or the termination circumstances.

### PROJECT JADE

#### Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for Project JADE was equivalent to \$58 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was above the Network average of \$44 and above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$193, less than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (58%) of the project funding went directly into service.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 41% and 64% of the referrals to Project JADE had some history of police contact, an average level for the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 16% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 22% were felonies, both well below the Network averages (27% and 35%).

About half the JADE referrals came from the schools (45%) and very few of those (9%) were described as having delinquent behavior. JADE clients were younger than the Network average (27% were 12 years old or less) but proportionately more were male.

Taking all factors together, the Project JADE clients represented a level of delinquency risk that was somewhat below the average in the Youth Services Network.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project JADE but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of JADE clients recidivating within six months of referral was 29.1, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the JADE recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted half of the referrals to Project JADE (50%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with petty theft being the single largest category. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for behavior problems in school, school attendance, family problems, and delinquency.

The predominant service provided to JADE clients was group counseling, though there was some individual and family counseling. Service providers reported that 90% of the cases completed service, a rate greater than the Network average of 51%. The average case received 4.0 hours of service between intake and termination, below the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 89% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

#### MID VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH COUNCIL

#### Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for the Mid Valley Project was equivalent to \$40 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was somewhat below the Network average of \$44 but within the range judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$477, considerably higher than the Network average of \$242. Though Mid Valley had the highest per client cost in the Network, that is at least partially due to its unique organizational structure. Unlike the other projects, Mid Valley is a self-contained mental health clinic and does not contract out any of its services. Somewhat less than half (42%) of the project funding went directly into service personnel.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 51% and 69% of the referrals to the Mid Valley Project had some history of police contact, somewhat higher than the average for Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 16% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 19% were felonies, both well below the Network averages (27% and 35%).

Very few of the Mid Valley referrals came from the schools (7%) though a larger proportion came from other non-law enforcement sources (34%). It was not possible to determine what portion of the school referrals were cases exhibiting delinquent behavior. Mid Valley clients were older than the Network average but the sex distribution was near the average.

Taking all factors together, the Mid Valley clients represented an average level of delinquency risk relative to the other projects in the Youth Services Network.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.



Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the Mid Valley Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of Mid Valley clients recidivating within six months of referral was 19.1, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Mid Valley recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted over half of the referrals to the Mid Valley Project (60%) with most of the remainder coming from sources other than the schools, e.g., self and parent referrals. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with petty theft being the single largest category. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for family problems or substance abuse.

The most frequent services provided to Mid Valley clients were family counseling and individual counseling. Service providers reported that only 13% of the cases completed service, a rate well below the Network average of 51%. Moreover, the average case was reported to receive only 2.7 hours of service between intake and termination, far below the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 49% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

#### CONSOLIDATED YOUTH SERVICES: PROJECT PAY

#### Cost

Project PAY and Project SEED are administered together and it was not possible to disentangle their separate cost figures. The 1980-81 funding level for both these projects taken together was equivalent to \$71 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was well above the Network average of \$44 and above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 by Project PAY and SEED was \$223, somewhat lower than the Network average of \$242. Over half (51%) of the project funding went directly into service.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 60% and 70% of the referrals to Project PAY had some history of police contact, one of the highest levels for the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 18% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 17% were felonies, both well below the Network averages (27% and 35%).

Relatively few of the PAY referrals came from the schools (20%) and it could not be determined how many of those were referred for delinquent behavior. Project PAY clients were older than the Network average but their sex distribution was the same as the Network average.

Taking all factors together, the Project PAY clients represented a moderately high level of delinquency risk though their average offense severity was lower than the average in the Youth Services Network.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project PAY but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of PAY clients recidivating within six months of referral was 20.8, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Project PAY recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted almost three-quarters of the referrals to Project PAY (70%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with petty theft being the single largest category. A number of law enforcement referrals were also made for status offenses (25%), particularly runaway. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for family problems, psychological problems, or learning disabilities.

The predominant service provided to Project PAY clients was individual counseling along with some family counseling and academic tutoring. Service providers reported that 46% of the cases completed service, a rate comparable to the Network average of 51%. The average case received 10.6 hours of service between intake and termination, well above the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 72% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

### POMONA VALLEY YOUTH SERVICES PROJECT

#### Cost

The 1980-81 diversion funding level for the Pomona Valley Project was equivalent to \$69 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was well above the Network average of \$44 and above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area. Moreover, including the Project's CETA grants raised the total to \$399 per arrest, an exceptionally high level of funding.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$356, higher than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (63%) of the project funding went directly into service.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 37% and 53% of the referrals to the Pomona Valley Project had some history of police contact, a level below the average for the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 33% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 40% were felonies, both above the Network averages (27% and 35%).

The majority of the Pomona Valley referrals came from the schools (55%) but it was not possible to determine what proportion of them were referred for delinquent behavior. Pomona Valley clients were considerably older than the Network average but somewhat fewer were male.

Taking all factors together, the Pomona Valley clients represented a lower level of delinquency risk than the average in the Youth Services Network. Law enforcement cases were relatively high risk but the much larger numbers of school referrals were low risk cases.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the Pomona Valley Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of Pomona Valley clients recidivating within six months of referral was 22.0, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the Pomona Valley recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than half of the referrals to the Pomona Valley Project (40%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with petty theft and burglary being the largest categories. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for family problems, school truancy, or behavioral problems in school.

The most frequent services provided to Pomona Valley clients were individual counseling and family counseling. Project data was insufficient to determine the termination circumstances for clients. The average case received 6.8 hours of service between intake and termination, comparable to the Network average of 7.0 hours.

#### CONSOLIDATED YOUTH SERVICES: PROJECT SEED

##### Cost

Project SEED and Project PAY are administered together and it was not possible to disentangle their separate cost figures. The 1980-81 funding level for both these projects taken together was equivalent to \$71 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was well above the Network average of \$44 and above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 by Project SEED and PAY was \$223, somewhat lower than the Network average of \$242. Over half (51%) of the project funding went directly into service.

##### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 60% and 70% of the referrals to Project SEED had some history of police contact, one of the highest levels for the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 29% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 35% were felonies, both about at the Network averages (27% and 35%).

Only about one-third (32%) the Project SEED referrals came from the schools and few of those (12%) were described as exhibiting delinquent behavior. SEED clients were older than the Network average and had about the same sex distribution as the Network average.

Taking all factors together, the Project SEED clients represented one of the highest levels of delinquency risk in the Youth Services Network.

##### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in Project SEED but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of SEED clients recidivating within six months of referral was 26.7, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the SEED recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted over half of the referrals to Project SEED (55%) with most of the remainder coming from schools. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with petty theft and burglary being the largest categories. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for family problems, delinquency, or psychological problems.

The most frequent services provided to Project SEED clients were individual counseling and family counseling. Service providers reported that 45% of the cases completed service, a rate comparable to the Network average of 51%. The average case received 8.1 hours of service between intake and termination, above the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 68% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

### SOUTH BAY JUVENILE DIVERSION PROJECT

#### Cost

The 1980-81 funding level for the South Bay Project was equivalent to \$41 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served. That was only slightly below the Network average of \$44 and within the range judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$212, lower than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Well over half (64%) of the project funding went directly into service.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 44% and 57% of the referrals to the South Bay Project had some history of police contact, a level just below the average for the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 34% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 53% were felonies, both above the Network averages (27% and 35%).

Relatively few of the South Bay referrals came from the schools (30%) and very few of those (6%) were described as having delinquent behavior. South Bay clients were slightly older than the Network average and the sex distribution was right on the Network average.

Taking all factors together, the South Bay Project clients represented an average level of delinquency risk relative to the other projects in the Youth Services Network.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.

Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the South Bay Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of South Bay clients recidivating within six months of referral was 13.9, a rate that was actually below the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the South Bay recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated. Since the South Bay recidivism was even below the overall Network level, the reduction was most likely even larger than the four points attained overall.

#### Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than half of the referrals to the South Bay Project (46%) with the remainder divided between schools and other sources, e.g. self and parent referrals. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with burglary being the largest category. There were also quite a number of referrals on substance abuse charges. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for substance abuse, family problems, or psychological problems.

The most frequent services provided to South Bay clients were individual counseling and family counseling. Service providers reported that only 19% of the cases completed service, a rate well below the Network average of 51%. The average case received 4.5 hours of service between intake and termination, below the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 86% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

#### WEST SAN GABRIEL VALLEY YOUTH SERVICES PROJECT

#### Cost

The 1980-81 diversion funding level for the West San Gabriel Valley Project was equivalent to \$80 for each juvenile in the arrest population of the area served and other sources of funding brought the total up to \$158. That level was well above the Network average of \$44 in diversion funding and \$95 total. It was well above the point judged necessary for a program to have broad impact in its catchment area.

The average gross cost per client for those clients served in 1980-81 was \$387, higher than the Network average of \$242 but within the normal range for the various projects. Over half (57%) of the project funding went directly into service.

#### Delinquency Risk

The level of delinquency risk represented by the clients of each project was judged on the basis of the proportion with any history of recorded police contact, the severity of referral offenses among law enforcement referrals, and the proportion of school referrals who committed chargeable offenses. Age, sex, and referral source are also related to these factors.

It was estimated that between 45% and 57% of the referrals to the West San Gabriel Valley Project had some history of police contact, a level only slightly below the average for all the Network projects. Among law enforcement referrals, 29% of the referral offenses were Part I index crimes and 36% were felonies, both very close to the Network averages (27% and 35%).

Relatively few of the West San Gabriel referrals came from the schools (27%) and it could not be determined what proportion of those exhibited delinquent behavior. West San Gabriel clients were older than the Network average and more were male.

Taking all factors together, the West San Gabriel Valley clients represented a level of delinquency risk that was very close to the average for the Youth Services Network. The non-law enforcement referrals by themselves, however, had the lowest level of delinquency risk in the Network.

#### Recidivism

An overall recidivism impact study using a sample of seven police stations served by various of the Youth Services Network projects found that youth who received service had four percentage points lower recidivism than comparable youth who did not. Though that study was not definitive because of methodological limitations, when taken in conjunction with the previous recidivism impact studies that have been conducted on Network projects it provides a strong presumption that the treatment provided by the Youth Services Network is effective in reducing the recidivism of its youthful clients.



Recidivism impact was not studied separately in the West San Gabriel Project but the recidivism rate was determined for those clients who had been arrested prior to referral. That rate was compared with a statistical prediction that adjusted for the severity level of the clients -- more severe clients were expected to have higher recidivism rates even when receiving effective services.

The percentage of West San Gabriel clients recidivating within six months of referral was 27.9, a rate within the expected range given the severity level of the clients. Based on the findings of the overall Network recidivism impact study, the West San Gabriel recidivism rate can be assumed to reflect a reduction of approximately four percentage points from the rate that would have occurred had the juveniles not been treated.

Referral and Service

Police and probation cases constituted less than half of the referrals to the West San Gabriel Project (46%) with the remainder divided between schools and other sources, e.g., self and parent referrals. Law enforcement cases were referred primarily for property crimes with burglary being the largest category. Non-law enforcement cases were referred most often for employment, psychological problems, or family problems.

The most frequent services provided to West San Gabriel clients were employment and individual counseling. Service providers reported that 69% of the cases completed service, a rate higher than the Network average of 51%. The average case received 4.2 hours of service between intake and termination, below the Network average of 7.0 hours. Service providers judged that there was a favorable outcome to the service in 82% of the cases compared to 73% for the Network overall.

APPENDIX A: CALCULATIONS OF GROSS COST FOR VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

(1) Police Arrests

In 1979 total law enforcement expenditures in Los Angeles County were \$557,128,000 (Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice. 1979 Criminal Justice Profile, Los Angeles County).

During that year the total number of cases handled (reported incidents, not arrests) was approximately 1,216,847 (op. cit.).

The estimated gross cost per incident is thus:

$$\$557,128,000 / 1,216,847 = \$458$$

But, clearly the police have functions other than criminal investigation. The LAPD 1980 Statistical Digest shows only two-thirds of the budget allocated to "crime control." We assume that only half of that supports actual investigation and arrest. Thus the estimated cost per investigation, whether or not there is an arrest, is:

$$\$458/3 = \$153$$

We assume that most of the expense is the investigation, etc. and not the arrest per se and use this figure as the cost per arrest.

(2) Probation Service

The Los Angeles County Probation Department Budget, excluding detention facilities, was \$66,667,785 for 1979-80 and \$63,715,989 for 1980-81. Averaging these figures for an estimated 1980 calendar year cost gives \$65,191,886 (County of Los Angeles, California. County Budget: Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1982. Board of Supervisors, Los Angeles County, 1981).

Total 1980 referrals to probation were:

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| 50,416       | Juveniles  |
| 46,396       | Adults (1979 value; 1980 estimated as less but figure unavailable) |
| <hr/> 96,812 | Total  |

(Juvenile Fact Sheet, 1980. Administrative Services Bureau, Probation Department, County of Los Angeles; also Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice. 1979 Criminal Justice Profile, Los Angeles County).

The estimated gross cost per case is thus:

$$\$65,191,886 / 96,812 = \$673$$

(3) Detention in Juvenile Hall

The Los Angeles County Budget shows three juvenile halls separately budgeted:

|              | 1979-80     | 1980-81      | Average             |
|--------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|
| San Fernando | \$5,579,233 | \$ 7,653,193 | \$ 6,616,213        |
| Central      | 7,743,916   | 11,004,546   | 9,374,231           |
| Los Padrinos | 5,186,124   | 7,879,553    | 6,532,838           |
| <b>Total</b> |             |              | <b>\$22,523,282</b> |

Adding the three and averaging to estimate the calendar year 1980 cost gives a total of \$22,523,282 (County of Los Angeles, California. County Budget: Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1982. Board of Supervisors, Los Angeles County, 1981).

The 1980 admissions to juvenile hall were 19,282 (Juvenile Fact Sheet, 1980. Administrative Services Bureau, Probation Department, County of Los Angeles).

The estimated gross cost per juvenile hall detention is thus:

$$\text{\$ } 22,523,282 / 19,282 = \text{\$ } 1168$$

(4) Juvenile Court

The Los Angeles Superior Court costs exclusive of reporters, juries, marshalls, etc. were reported in 1979 to be \$30,659,000 (Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice. 1979 Criminal Justice Profile, Los Angeles County).

In that year juvenile dispositions through the court were estimated as:

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| 10,552        | Initial petitions  |
| 6,226         | Subsequent petitions (not reported but extrapolated from previous years) |
| <u>16,778</u> |  |

The number of adult felonies handled was 15,715 (mostly guilty pleas). Total adult and juvenile cases, therefore, was approximately 32,493 (Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California Department of Justice. 1979 Criminal Justice Profile, Los Angeles County).

The estimated gross cost per court case thus is:

$$\text{\$ } 30,659,000 / 32,493 = \text{\$ } 944$$

(5) Probation Camp

The probation camps and Dorothy Kirby Center costs from the L.A. County budget, averaged between 1979-80 and 1980-81 to give an estimated 1980 calendar year cost are:

|                      |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| \$ 16,231,049        | Camps                |
| 1,970,903            | Dorothy Kirby Center |
| <u>\$ 18,201,952</u> | <b>Total</b>         |

(County of Los Angeles, California. County Budget: Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1982. Board of Supervisors, Los Angeles County, 1981).

In 1980 there were 2566 admissions to the camps and 149 admissions to the Dorothy Kirby Center for a total of 2715 (Juvenile Fact Sheet, 1980. Administrative Services Bureau, Probation Department, County of Los Angeles).

The estimated gross cost per camp case thus is:

$$\text{\$ } 18,201,952 / 2715 = \text{\$ } 6704$$

(6) CYA Commitment

The total 1980 CYA budget was reported at \$230,115,681 with the institutions and camps share described as 50.6%, i.e., \$116,438,535. The parole share was 8.2%, i.e., \$18,869,486 (Department of the Youth Authority, State of California. Annual Report: 1980).

In that year the CYA institutions and camps received 3968 first commitments plus 1094 returned as parole violators for a total of 5062 (Department of the Youth Authority, State of California. Annual Report: 1980).

The estimated gross cost per admit to CYA institutions is thus:

$$\text{\$ } 116,438,535 / 5062 = \text{\$ } 23,002$$

Also, during that year 4645 cases were paroled out (op. cit.).

The estimated gross cost per parole is thus:

$$\text{\$ } 18,869,486 / 4645 = \text{\$ } 4062$$

Combining these two gives the estimated gross costs per case for commitment and subsequent parole: \$23,002 + 4,062 = \$27,064

**END**