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None

A Comprehensive Security Program for
Five Housing Developments in the
Park Hill/Fox Hills Area of Staten Island

William Brill Associates, Inc.
Annapolis, MD

Prepared for

Department of Housing and Urban Development
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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that this is crucial for ensuring the integrity of the financial system and for providing a clear audit trail.

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5. Finally, the document concludes by reiterating the need for a strong regulatory framework to oversee the financial system and to ensure that all participants are held to the highest standards of conduct.

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A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PROGRAM FOR
FIVE HOUSING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
PARK HILL/FOX HILLS AREA OF
STATEN ISLAND

Prepared for
United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development

Prepared by
William Brill Associates, Inc.
Annapolis, Maryland

August 1980

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
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
INTRODUCTION

This report presents a comprehensive security plan for five low-income housing developments located in the Park Hill/Fox Hills area on the north shore of Staten Island. The projects are Park Hill Apartments, Fox Hills Apartments, St. George Plaza, Seaview Arms, and Concord Court.

The work discussed in this report was undertaken by William Brill Associates, Inc. (WBA) under contract #H2249 between WBA and the Office of Policy Development and Research of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

This contract called for WBA to apply planning and research techniques that the firm had developed under previous HUD funding to selected multi-family housing projects in the New York area.

This report deals with the application of this planning approach to five housing projects in Staten Island. The report first presents an analysis of the security problems existing in these projects. The report then presents a comprehensive security plan for the five developments which is based on the analysis. The comprehensive plan indicates a range of social and physical improvements that operating together could be expected to substantially reduce crime and the fear of crime in the developments.



APPROACH

The approach used to develop the comprehensive security plan for the five developments was based upon two operating principles. These principles, which reflect the logic of the material presented in this report are presented below:


The need to understand the vulnerabilities of the sites

This component of the planning approach involves identifying the characteristics of the development's physical and social environment that (1) contribute to crime (2) contribute to tenant fear of crime, or (3) cause tenants to alter their behavior to such an extent that they limit their opportunities for interaction with their environment and fail to construct the social defenses against crime commonly found in strong cohesive neighborhoods.

The second operating principle addresses the fact that developments may be vulnerable on several levels. There may be physical features on the site that contribute to crime or fear of crime, or cause people to avoid interaction with each other and their environment. There may also be patterns of interaction among tenants or an absence of social structure that limit their ability to work together and look after one another, increasing the likelihood of their being victimized by crime or afraid of the possibility.

The need for a mutually reinforcing mix of improvements

To be effective, a security program must present a mutually reinforcing mix of improvements. Experience has shown that many efforts to improve security in housing have failed at least partly because they are one-dimensional approaches to a multi-dimensional problem. It is not enough to install any one improvement be it improved lighting, controlled entrances, more effective tenant organizations, or even guards. A coordinated program that involves a mix of reinforcing improvements is necessary.



These principles are reflected in the Site Security Analysis, the research and planning tool developed by WBA and applied as part of this study to analyze the security vulnerabilities of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area. Described in greater detail in Chapter III, the Site Security Analysis employs six criteria to identify the features of a site that contribute to tenant vulnerability to crime. The criteria that make up the analysis include: (1) PENETRABILITY - how the site can be entered and how access points are structured and controlled; (2) OPPORTUNITIES FOR SURVEILLANCE - the extent to which the site provides opportunities for people using the site to be observed in a formal manner by guards, or more casually and informally by tenants; (3) TERRITORIALITY - the extent to which the layout and design of a site encourages tenants to identify with and take control of their development; (4) UNASSIGNED-SPACE - the existence of space that no one uses or protects and which can easily be claimed by intruders; (5) DESIGN CONFLICTS - situations in which user groups are forced to compete over the use of the same facility or space; and (6) NEIGHBORHOOD INFLUENCES - how the location of the site and features of the surrounding area affect the security of a development.

The findings of this analysis along with the principles discussed earlier provide the basis for the recommendations presented in the comprehensive security plan for the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area provided in the last section of this report.



SCOPE OF THIS REPORT

The analysis and subsequently the comprehensive security plan for the five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area address a spectrum of security issues which range from improving the physical features of the site which make it vulnerable to crime, to improving security-related social and economic conditions within the study area, to increasing the ability of tenants to organize and work together to improve security.

The report first presents an overview of existing conditions within the study area, then a description of the criteria and methodology utilized in the analysis, then the findings of the site security analysis and finally, the comprehensive plan for the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area based on the analysis.



OVERVIEW

The site security analysis presented in the next section covers five low-income housing developments, whose sites and common streets make up a contiguous, approximately seven block area, which for the purpose of this analysis will be referred to as the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area. Located near Stapelton on the north shore of Staten Island, the study area is roughly bounded by Palma Drive to the north, Osgood Avenue to the south, a large piece of vacant land to the west and two angled streets, Vanderbuilt Avenue and Targee Avenue, to the east.

The five developments within the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area range in size from one to six buildings, all are mid-rise six story structures, and cumulatively house a primarily black, low-income tenant population. The design of the buildings and the racial composition within the developments contrast sharply with the surrounding neighborhoods which are composed of predominantly white middle-class populations living in single family homes.


The Park Hill/Fox Hills study area developments are in desperate need of services, programs and community facilities; over ninety percent of the population is minority, a disproportionate amount of whom are children and teenagers. The intensively used site and buildings are subjected to extraordinary wear and tear and experience a high incidence of crime and vandalism. These problems are com-




pounded by their location within an area of social and economic decline; according to police department statistics crime increased dramatically between 1970 and 1977. Economic surveys of the neighborhood covering the same period reveal that the main business district in Stapleton has deteriorated continuously since 1970. This deterioration has been caused by both the increase in crime and the inability of the low-income population to generate sufficient capital to support businesses in these areas.

THE FIVE DEVELOPMENTS

This section presents a general analysis of conditions in the study area. To begin, a site map and one page briefing sheets for each of the developments is provided. These briefing sheets provide basic information about the developments such as size, name of management agent, tenant demographic data and existing on site services, and are intended to serve as both an orientation and supplement to the site security analysis section.



PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA





BRIEFING SHEET
PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA

DEVELOPMENT: Fox Hills Apartments

HUD Project #: 012-55001

Owner: Department of Housing and Urban Development

Management Agent: Staten Community Corporation

No. of Buildings/Units: Three buildings/366 units

Address: 320, 350 Vanderbilt Avenue
141 Park Hill Avenue

TENANT PROFILE/SAMPLE POPULATION

Sample

50% of occupied units as of May 1980/180 households

Racial Composition

American Indian: 6%	Oriental: 1%	White: 6%
Black: 86.5%	Spanish American: 0%	Undetermined: 5%

Type of Income

Wages: 65% Welfare: 26% Benefits: 4% Other: 5%

Percentage/Female Heads of Household with Children

36% of sample households

Percentage of Youth/Ages 0-19 years

0-6 years: 48%	13-18 years: 14%
7-12 years: 35%	19 years +: 3%

SECURITY GUARD SERVICE

Type of Service: Contract Guard Service

Total Number of Guards/per 24 hours: Seven full-time guards

Shift Coverage: 8 a.m. - 4 p.m./1guard
4 p.m. - 12 a.m./3 guards
12 a.m. - 8 a.m./3 guards

ON-SITE SERVICES/PROGRAMS

Name or Type of Service

New Morning Daycare	Super Deli (small delicatessen)
Richboro Drug Program	Fox Hill Athletic Club
Taxi Stand	Staten Island Community Corporation
Private Dentist Office	Summer Recreation Program

BRIEFING SHEET
PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA

DEVELOPMENT: Park Hill Apartments I & II

HUD Project #: Section I - 012-55019
Section II- 012-55026

Owner: Section I: Higen Associates
Section II: Fairview Company

Management Agent: Carmon Realty Corporation

No. of Buildings/Units: Six buildings/804 units

Address: 140, 160, 180, 240, 260, 280 Park Hill Avenue

TENANT PROFILE/SAMPLE POPULATION

Sample

50% of occupied units as of May 1980/372 households

Racial Composition

American Indian: 1%	Oriental: 1%	White: 2%
Black: 82%	Spanish American: 2%	Undetermined: 12%

Type of Income

Wages: 61% Welfare: 24% Benefits: 13% Other: 2%

Percentage/Female Heads of Household with Children
48% of sample households

Percentage of Youth/Ages 0-19 years

0-6 years: 42%	13-18 years: 21%
7-12 years: 28%	19 years +: 9%

SECURITY GUARD SERVICE

Type of Service: Contract guard service

Total Number of Guards/Per 24 Hours: 10 full-time guards

Shift Coverage: 10 a.m. - 6 p.m./3 guards
6 p.m. - 2 a.m./5 guards
4 p.m. - 12 midnight/2 guards

ON-SITE SERVICES/PROGRAMS

Name of Type of Service: YMCA Indoor Recreation Program
Marine Cadet Training Corp (Youth)
Summer Food Program (Breakfast/lunch/snack)

BRIEFING SHEET
PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA

DEVELOPMENT: St. George Plaza Apartments

HUD Project #: 012-55072

Owner: Norman Schefer

Management Agent: Higgins Corporation

No. of Buildings/Units: Three buildings/299 units

Address: 185, 225 Park Hill Avenue

TENANT PROFILE/SAMPLE POPULATION

Sample

50% of occupied units as of May 1980/123 households

Racial Composition

American Indian: 0%	Oriental: 0%	White: 5.5%
Black: 84%	Spanish American: 10.5%	Undetermined: 0%

Type of Income

Wages: 39.5% Welfare: 50.5% Benefits: 9% Other: 1%

Percentage/Female Heads of Households with Children

38.5% of sample households

Percentage of Youth/Ages 0-19 years

0-6 years: 51.5%	13-18 years: 18.5%
7-13 years: 29%	19 years +: 1%

SECURITY GUARD SERVICE

Type of Service: In-house guard service run by management

Total Number of Guards/Per 20 Hours: 9 full-time guards

Shift Coverage:

10 a.m. - 6 p.m./1 guard
4 p.m. - 12 midnight/2 guards
6 a.m. - 2 p.m./3 guards
8 p.m. - 4 a.m./3 guards

ON-SITE SERVICES/PROGRAMS

Name or Type of Service: Youth Patrol Program
Occasional Management sponsored youth activities



BRIEFING SHEET
PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA

DEVELOPMENT: Seaview Arms

HUD Project #: 012-44101

Owner: Samuel Pompa Partnership

Management Agent: Samuel Pompa Partnership

No. of Buildings/Units: One building/84 units

Address: Osgood Avenue

TENANT PROFILE/SAMPLE POPULATION

Sample
50% of occupied units as of May 1980 #?

Racial Composition

American Indian: 4%	Oriental: 0%	White: 6%
Black: 90%	Spanish American: 0%	Undetermined: 0%

Type of Income

Wages: 57% Welfare: 23% Benefits: 18% Other: 2%

Percentage/Female Heads of Households with Children

26% of sample households

Percentage of Youth/Ages 0-19 years

0-6 years: 48%	13-18 years: 3%
7-13 years: 44%	19 years +: 5%

SECURITY GUARD SERVICE

Type of Service: none

Total Number of Guards/per 24 hours: none

Shift Coverage: none

ON-SITE SERVICES/PROGRAMS

Name or Type of Service: none

BRIEFING SHEET
PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA

DEVELOPMENT: Concord Court

HUD Project #: 012-44030

Owner: Concord Company Partnership

Management Agent: Concord Company Partnership

No. of Buildings/Units: One building/155 units

Address: 55 Bowen Street

TENANT PROFILE/SAMPLE POPULATION

Sample

50% of occupied units as of May 1980/68 households

Racial Composition

American Indian: 1.5%	Oriental: 1.5%	White: 19%
Black: 76.5%	Spanish American: 0%	Undetermined: 1.5%

Type of Income

Wages: 44% Welfare: 40% Benefits: 13% Other: 3%

Percentage/Female Heads of Households with Children

50% of sample households

Percentage of Youth/Ages 0-19 years

0-6 years: 45%	13-18 years: 16%
7-13 years: 32%	19 years +: 7%

SECURITY GUARD SERVICE

Type of Service: Contract guard service

Total Number of Guards/Per 16 hours: 2 full-time guards

Shift Coverage: 2 p.m. - 10 p.m./1 guard
10 p.m. - 6 a.m./1 guard

ON-SITE SERVICES/PROGRAMS

Name or Type of Service: none

The Tenant Population

In any site security analysis, an examination of the demographic composition, related social conditions and service needs provides valuable insight about tenant problems which impact negatively on security. Variables such as the age distribution, income status, range of lifestyles and extent of formal organization of a tenant population offer clues about tenant vulnerability to crime and victimization and their ability to work together to improve security.

As was indicated in the Tenant Profile portion of the briefing sheets, the tenant populations of the Park Hill/Fox Hills have demographic characteristics and unanswered service needs which have traditionally increased tenant vulnerability to crime.

These characteristics and the urgent need for social services dramatically illustrate the problems which have accompanied the change in tenant composition in recent years. Initially, the developments had a more balanced distribution of tenants by age, income, and race. However, the general economic and social decline experienced by the area since the late 1960's created conditions which altered the composition of tenants willing to live in the Park Hill/Fox Hills developments. The percentage of employed and non-minority tenants decreased, and the percentage of "lowest income" tenants who brought with them problems too complex for management to handle increased. The turnover rate for the developments also increased as many of the original tenants fled the general decline of the area and the threatening changes in tenant composition. Most recently, the

developments have experienced an increase in emergency relocation tenants from places outside Staten Island such as the Bronx and Manhattan who have no intention of staying, and who, because they are transient, do not identify with their fellow tenants or feel they have a vested interest in the security of the developments. The cumulative result of these changes is a tenant population whose varying levels of social adjustment, different value systems and multiple lifestyles make it extremely difficult to reach a consensus about acceptable behaviors and activities within the developments.

It is also important to note that within the current Park Hill/Fox Hills study area tenantry, are special populations whose problems and needs impact significantly on the security of the development. In the case of the Park Hill/Fox Hills developments, the two special populations which exert the greatest impact are the single female heads of households with children, and the youth between the ages of 0-18 years. The high percentage of families with single female heads of households increases the overall vulnerability of the developments because the women, and ultimately the entire family are forced to cope with serious problems such as feeding and clothing family members, child truancy from school, and adolescent confrontations with sex, drugs, or alcohol, without the assistance of a stable male partner. In addition, the women's need for normal social interaction draws men from outside the developments to the site, who because of their informal status, do not have any vested interest in the security of the development.

The high percentage of children in the development's impact on security because their large numbers and need for active play subject the sites and buildings to intensive wear and tear, particularly since there is little developed space and few on-site recreational programs. The lack of play facilities and planned recreational programs leaves the children and teenagers with nothing productive to do and increases the likelihood of their participation in vandalism and other kinds of anti-social activities. Finally the high percentage of teenagers within the tenant population may also serve to impede the development of positive social relations among tenants since the value systems of teenagers do not always coincide with those of the older adults. Special population problems and unanswered needs such as these must be resolved because they increase the vulnerability of the developments and weaken tenant sense of community and willingness to work together.

The last of the tenant population characteristics which increase their vulnerability by inhibiting the development of a social structure and tenant participation in formal organizations, is the tenant's extremely low image of their housing environment and their understandable cynicism about the possibility of changing the negative aspects of their housing environment. The tenants feel that the developments, and implicitly they themselves are racially, socially and economically isolated. They say that their developments have a reputation as both an easy target and haven for criminals, and are aware that they are viewed with fear and mistrust by the surrounding

neighborhoods. Most tenants feel that they are neglected by public service agencies and are extremely dissatisfied with the delivery of police, social, recreational, educational and job training services to the area. They say police coverage is grossly inadequate and has failed to confront the intense drug activities occurring in the study area. They bitterly resent their school system's apportionment plan which prevents the majority of the study area children from attending the nearby P.S. 57, and they are angered by the lack of attention (in the form of programs and facilities) paid to their youth.

These negative feelings of isolation and neglect extend to each other. Because the majority of tenants have no way of determining who is an intruder and because some portion of tenants from all of the developments victimize their neighbors, many tenants have withdrawn from their neighbors out of fear or distrust and exhibit high levels of fear.

Few of the tenants interviewed felt they individually or collectively possessed the ability to improve these conditions without some kind of special assistance. Many of the tenants perceived the existing tenant and community groups as weak or ineffectual, and as dominated by individuals or small groups who were not truly representative. They were cynical about the motivations of some groups and skeptical about the ability of the others to provide assistance or bring improvements to the area.

The Neighborhood Setting

The neighborhood setting of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area has an enormous impact on the security of the five developments. The study areas dense concentration of low-income, minority tenants housed in buildings conspicuous by their institutional design and six-story elevation all serve to heighten the social, racial and economic alienation of the tenants and emphasize the differences between the developments and the surrounding neighborhood.

The surrounding neighborhoods are composed of primarily white, middle-class people housed in low-rise single family or duplex homes. Perceived differences in life-styles, values, and economic status have increased the fear and mistrust of people in the neighborhood and heightened racial tension in the area. Racial tension is most overt between development and neighborhood youth and has led to verbal confrontations and some incidents of violence in the schools and on the streets. The bad relations between the surrounding neighborhoods and the developments have isolated the study area tenants and made them both a target and a scapegoat for the surrounding neighborhoods. As a consequence, many outsiders use the developments for behaviors and activities which would not be tolerated in their own neighborhood. In addition, despite the fact that a relatively small portion of the tenants participate in the negative activities which do occur, the tenants are blamed as a group by their neighbors.

There are also internal security problems (detailed later in the Site Security Analysis) which add to this dilemma by increasing the study area's vulnerability to these external neighborhood problems, ultimately increasing the probability of crime and victimization. The penetrability of the site and buildings, and the absence of tenant, security guard, or police controls, draw outsiders to the study area who take advantage of these vulnerabilities to commit crimes and victimize tenants.

The neighborhood setting affects the development in other ways as well. The ability of tenants to function effectively to resist crime is directly affected by the lack of support facilities in or around the study area. Currently there are no community facilities in the developments or surrounding neighborhoods capable of serving the social, recreational, counseling or training needs of the tenant population. Until recently, the nearby shopping center was virtually abandoned forcing tenants to take long bus rides or walks to distant commercial districts. The absence of support facilities limits the ability of tenants to develop the self-sufficiency they need in order to resist crime and victimization.

The last attribute of the neighborhood setting which affects the security of the Park Hill/Fox Hills developments is the fact that developments are adjacent to and part of two of the most criminally active sectors in the 120th police precinct. While much of the crime is generated by the study area, the proximity of Stapleton Houses, a large public housing project with a dense low-income population fraught with security problems, and the general

high levels of crime that have accompanied the social and economic decline of the north shore area have contributed significantly to the security problems of the five developments.

THE CRIME PROBLEM

The amount and type of crime occurring in and around the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area is one of the most revealing indicators of the severity of the security problems experienced by the tenants of the five developments. According to statistics obtained from the New York City Police Department's 120th Precinct on Staten Island's north shore, the Park Hill/Fox Hills neighborhoods and the adjacent neighborhood of Stapleton are two of the worst crime areas within the precinct. This is quite a distinction given the fact that between 1970 and 1977 the 120th Precinct as a whole experienced a total increase in crime of 60.6%. Precinct sectors C and E, which encompass the Stapleton and Park Hill/Fox Hills neighborhoods respectively, rank among the highest within the precinct. In particular, the Park Hill/Fox Hills neighborhood, Sector E, grew steadily worse, experiencing a 161.6% increase in crime over the same period. Put in relative terms, Sector E moved from the 9th worst sector out of 22 sectors to the 3rd worst by 1978.

Currently the five developments study area receives the limited protection of a patrol car manned by two policemen and one policeman on a motorcycle. WBA's interview with a representative of the 120th Precinct revealed that the police believe domestic disputes, illegal drug activities, break-in/burglary, and arson to be the worst problems.

Of great interest was the fact that the police attribute the increase in crime in the Park Hill/Fox Hills developments to the change in the composition of tenants in recent years. The police suspect that the tenant population has become increasingly transient due to high turnover and the greater proportion of displaced persons or families accepted by development management. The police believe that as a result, the study area has a greater number of tenants who do not relate to their fellow tenants, who do not feel they have a vested interest in the security of their development, and who have no compunction about committing crimes or victimizing tenants within their own building or across the street.

Tenant and management/maintenance staff perceptions of the crime problem were similar to those of the police. Tenants felt that illegal drug activities and break-in/burglaries posed the greatest problems for security, while management and maintenance staff cited vandalism, illegal drug activities and the stripping of stolen cars in parking lots as the worst security problems. As will be detailed in the individual site security analyses, each development had varying amounts and types of crime, depending on its location, design features, and style of management.

Delivery of Management and Maintenance Services

WBA's interviews with study area tenants and management staff revealed that the developments had a number of common management and maintenance problems, which although beyond the scope of this

report, merited further study because of their effect on security. Appendix A, page 86, presents a brief outline of these problems.

Impact of Existing Security Guard Services

Intrinsic to any discussion of the crime and security problems within the five developments, given the limited protection provided by the police, is an evaluation of the performance of the existing security guard services. The caliber of the guards, the number of guard personnel and the shift coverage are crucial indicators of the guard service's ability to deter crime and victimization in the developments.

Currently only four of the five developments - Park Hill, Fox Hills, St. George and Concord - retain security guard services, of these only one, Fox Hills has 24 hour coverage.* However, none of the developments are adequately staffed in relation to the size of the developments and the intensity of the crime problem.

The source and type of the security guard services vary; Park Hill, Fox Hills and Concord all retain contract guard services, but from different firms, while St. George has an in-house guard service hired and supervised by management. The training and abilities of the services vary considerably resulting in a fragmented security effort which provides limited service and does not address inter-development crime problems since guards retained by one development do not have the authority to pursue suspects who flee into another development. In addition, there is no coordinated effort between

*See briefing sheets for the individual developments for number of guards, shift coverage in each service.

the developments to share information on crime and other security related issues within the study area. This lack of coordination seriously limits the effectiveness of the guards and contributes to the study area's vulnerability to crime.

The effectiveness of these guard services regardless of the type is uniformly low. Most of the guards are poorly trained, poorly equipped, and lack adequate supervision. The effectiveness of the guards is further diminished by the lack of established policies and procedures. There are no formal security strategies such as changing patrol patterns to reduce patrol predictability or adjusting patrol patterns to meet changing seasonal security needs, and there are no consistent monitoring systems to check the performance of the guards on patrol. Guards do not routinely fill out report forms, and what forms do exist do not provide adequate information about the location, type of crime, or time of the incident, etc. for use by supervisors to develop patrol strategies. Currently supervision of the guard services is sporadic; the contract supervisors and the part-time supervisor of St. George are not present for complete shifts. As a result the guards are often confronted with security problems and emergencies which they are unable to handle due to the lack of formal training and/or established procedures, and the absence of supervision. Over time these operational problems cause guards to avoid situations and areas in the development which would bring them in contact with serious security problems requiring a response or action from them. Both tenants and intruders are

aware of this, and as a consequence the security guard services do not deter crime and are not viewed with confidence by tenants.

The caliber of guards supplied by the services is a final and important consideration. None of the services have rigorous recruitment standards or formal training programs. The services have a difficult time obtaining good personnel due to the low pay and high risk, given the lack of training and the inadequate equipment. The range of salaries for the services is as low as \$3.10 per hour at St. George Plaza to \$7.10 an hour at Fox Hills Apartments. Many guards receive minimum wages even though the contract agencies are paid a much higher hourly salary. The four developments together spent approximately \$430,393.60 for their security guard services, which combined, provided only 28 guards for the entire study area.

The performance of the contract guards may also be affected by the fact that most of them do not live on Staten Island and lack intimate knowledge of the geography and street life of the study area. Because the guards do not live in Staten Island, they lack a sense of vested interest in the security of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area that a locally recruited guard might have.

All of these security guard service problems must be resolved before the services can be relied upon to assume an active and effective role in the security of the study area.

THE SITE SECURITY ANALYSIS

To analyze the security problems of the five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area, WBA conducted a site security analysis. Developed and tested under previous HUD funding, the site security analysis has been published in manual form and distributed nationally by HUD. As designed the analysis serves several useful purposes; it identifies and documents security problems, provides a framework for developing and evaluating security-related improvements, and ultimately, generates specific objectives and recommendations for a comprehensive security plan. During the analysis, the features of the site that contribute to crime or otherwise jeopardize the safety and security of tenants are carefully examined. Particular attention is given to features that create dangerous conditions, expose tenants to risk, or inhibit the formation of supportive relationships among tenants which are necessary if they are to erect social defenses against crime.

THE CRITERIA

The following criteria were used to analyze the site security problems of the five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area.

Penetrability

This criteria examines how access to a site and its buildings is structured and controlled. Penetrability is often a problem in large low-income housing developments because unobserved and/or uncontrolled building access can occur through access points other than the main entrance such as garage or basement doors, stairwells, or fire exits. Penetrability also examines the extent to which architectural features such as flimsy door and window hardware, windows adjacent to fire escapes, or broken and unlocked doors etc., provide easy access for intruders.

Opportunities for Surveillance

Opportunities for surveillance refers to the extent to which the site and people using the site can be observed informally by tenants, and formally by security guards or police. Such opportunities are extremely important because they provide "eyes and ears" that can see or hear if help is needed, and because they reassure people that they are not alone and isolated. These kinds of surveillance also serve as a deterrent to criminal or anti-social behavior since few people will commit illegal or anti-social acts where they can be observed by others.

Territoriality

Territoriality refers to the extent to which a housing development's design and layout encourages tenants to identify with their housing environment and take control of the site. The amount of

territoriality experienced by tenants can be gauged by observing the extent to which tenants take an interest in the appearance of their buildings or outdoor spaces, and assume responsibility for the behaviors and activities which occur in their development.

Unassigned Space


Unassigned spaces are those which tenants have not claimed for their own use. Large amounts of unassigned space can be a major vulnerability if the unclaimed and unprotected appearance of these spaces encourage outsiders to encroach upon the spaces and use them for anti-social or criminal activities.

Design Conflicts


Design conflicts occur when two incompatible activities share the same or adjacent spaces, or when two user groups are forced to compete for the same space or facility, resulting in continued tension among tenants. Good site design should minimize such conflicts and establish an orderly, controlled and harmonious use of space and facilities.

Neighborhood Influences


Neighborhood influences refer to factors outside the housing development that affect its vulnerability. The location of bus stops, commercial strips, schools, liquor stores and vacant lots, often exert a strong influence on the way people move through a site and may encourage outsiders to take short-cuts through a



PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA SITE VULNERABILITIES MAP



- KEY**
- PENETRABILITY
 - OPPORTUNITY FOR SURVEILLANCE
 - UNASSIGNED SPACE
 - * DESIGN CONFLICTS



development. Activities held at adjacent facilities such as schools, shopping centers or parks which draw large crowds of people may "spill over" onto a site and cause security problems.

Developments located within or near crime-generating areas can have special security problems which must be recognized and dealt with. Sites which are isolated may compel tenants to move along routes both in the neighborhood or on the site, that expose them to crime or make them fearful.

METHODOLOGY

The Site Security Analysis for the five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area was conducted by WBA on numerous visits to the site during which the criteria discussed above were applied. As part of the analysis and subsequent development of the comprehensive security plan, WBA initiated the following activities:

On-Site Observation of the Site

WBA staff made over fifteen trips to the site to observe and map site vulnerabilities as well as activity and circulation patterns in all developments. During these trips the developments were observed at all hours, at night as well as in the daytime.

Data Collection

WBA staff compiled mini-profiles of each development containing pertinent information and demographic data obtained from a 50% sample of HUD certification forms for all occupied units as of May 1980.

At the request of HUD, WBA staff compiled data for all study area guard services pertaining to the number of guards, salary, training, shift coverage and on-the-job performance.

Meetings and Interviews with Management: All Developments

WBA interviewed the managers of each development. Topics covered in the interviews included security problems, perception of crime, management/tenant relationships, tenant screening procedures, adequacy of guard service, tenant organization, neighborhood influences, and the delivery of police and social services.

Meetings and Interviews with Tenant and Community Group Leaders

WBA made an exhaustive effort to contact and interview all of the major tenant and community leaders actively involved in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area. Over 10 leaders were interviewed in an effort to obtain tenant and community group input about security and security-related problems and improvement plan priorities.

In addition WBA attended evening community group meetings held on an average of once a month between March and July (1960), for the purpose of forming a Local Development Corporation (LDC) so that tenant and community groups would have a formal mechanism through which they could seek and receive funding and programs for security related improvements.

Assessment of Service Delivery to the Developments

WBA conducted a brief assessment of the delivery of the following services: management and maintenance services, security guard services, police service, social services, and recreational services. As part of this assessment WBA explored the issue of commercial revitalization of the vacant shopping center through the organization of a LDC, and the issue of developing a community center to house urgently needed services and programs.

Planning and Coordination with the New York HUD Area and Staten Island Office of the City Planning Department

WBA attended numerous meetings at HUD to discuss planning strategies and potential funding and program resources for proposed improvements. In addition, WBA staff met with the Staten Island office of the New York City Planning Department (CPD) to coordinate planning and funding strategies, and to assist in the development of community meetings. During these meetings WBA staff assisted in the development of strategies to bring together tenants and community groups to form a Local Development Corporation (LDC) so that they would have a formal mechanism through which funding and programs for security-related improvements could be obtained.

The findings of the Site Security Analysis, which are presented in the next section, provided the basis for the site improvement objectives, and subsequently, the recommendations of the comprehensive security plan for the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area.


ANALYSIS FINDINGS

PARK HILL APARTMENTS I AND II

Park Hill Apartments is an 804 unit housing development made up of six-story mid-rise brick buildings arranged linearly along the west side of Park Hill Avenue. The development is bounded to the north by Palma Drive, to the south by Osgood Avenue, to the east by Park Hill Avenue, and to the west by a large tract of vacant land. The buildings are almost identical in appearance and despite some minor variations in floor plans, share a number of common design features. All of the buildings are U-shaped in plan and have main entrances and lobbies oriented to the street. Open space for each building consists of a narrow strip of fenced lawn along the street and a small sitting and play area in the rear partially enclosed by the U-shape of the buildings on three sides. The sitting/play areas face and are adjacent to the parking lots which stretch linearly behind the buildings parallel to the street. The main parking lots are contiguous along each three building section, and are commonly bounded on the far perimeter by the large tract of vacant land which runs the length of the development. There are also small side parking lots between the buildings, however access to and from the street in most of them has been blocked by concrete bollards.


The Park Hill Apartments development is subject to many of the social problems commonly experienced by large low-income projects.

**PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA
PARK HILL APTS.**



It's vulnerabilities are further increased by a number of site security problems generated by the design features of its mid-rise building forms. The buildings are extremely penetrable; the main entrance intercom/buzzer systems have been destroyed and the vestibule doors are either unlocked or broken, as are most of the side and rear exit doors, permitting anyone to enter the buildings. Once inside, access to the mailbox alcoves is unobstructed, and the elevators at both ends of the building provide easy access to any floor. In addition, the two sets of stairwells at opposite ends of the hallways provide a secluded means of moving from floor to floor or exiting the building. The windows adjacent to the fire escapes also are used by intruders as a means of penetrating the buildings; tenants and management report that they are frequently used by burglars to break into the apartments.


Opportunities for surveillance are limited because access is not structured or controlled; intruders can enter from any number of ground floor doors without being observed and move through the buildings undetected by using the stairwells. Although a contract guard service is present on the site, the inadequate number of guards per shift, relative to the size and number of buildings, and the absence of 24 hour service, limits the extent and quality of the surveillance they can provide. Because there are not enough guards to adequately monitor the developments, the stairwells and roofs are vulnerable to the youth who vandalize them or use them for anti-social activities. During certain hours, guards are stationed in



the lobbies, however, they currently have no way of determining who is a tenant or legitimate visitor, and who is an intruder. Due to the large tenant population, visual identification is difficult for the guards, and the unlocked entrances and lack of any kind of ID check enable intruders to blend in with tenants.


The Park Hill development site is also penetrable; pedestrian and vehicular traffic through the rear areas and parking lots is not adequately monitored or controlled. The numerous holes in the perimeter fencing of the parking lot have been made by pedestrians using the dirt paths along the fence. These paths and the screen provided by the overgrown grass and shubbery of the vacant land enable people to take short cuts or enter and leave the development without being seen. In addition, a number of side and rear parking lot areas are used as hang-outs by intimidating groups of adult males, many of whom are not tenants. In fact, tenants, management and security guards report that the abandoned and stripped cars found in the lots are left by organized car theft gangs who use the parking lots as both a secluded car storage area and as a workshop to strip them.

The penetrability of Park Hill is increased at night due to uneven site lighting. Most of the illumination is provided by light fixtures attached to the facades of the buildings. When the lights are operative, most of the main entrances, rear sitting/play areas, walkways and large areas are adequately illuminated, although it should be noted that some parking areas along the perimeter fencing and the border area of vacant land behind it are unacceptably dark.



However, the beneficial effect of the existing lighting is jeopardized by the fact that many of the fixtures lack vandal-proof lenses, leaving bulbs exposed and vulnerable. As a result, the quantity and quality of the lighting and the opportunities for surveillance of these areas, varies considerably from month to month depending on the amount of vandalism that has taken place. The uneven site lighting and the adjoining large expanse of unlit vacant land also serve to impede good surveillance by tenants and police by inadvertently providing both cover and hiding places for people moving covertly through the development.

As is often the case with mid or high-rise residential buildings, the Park Hill development has not been able to generate a strong tenant sense of territoriality. Because the design of both the site and the buildings does not encourage tenants to claim and control significant areas in their development, outsiders feel free to encroach upon the development and to use it for anti-social or criminal activities. With the exception of the abandoned rear sitting/play areas, the development lacks a well developed hierarchy of public, semi-private and private space. Divided into two kinds of space, the development offers only public space which anyone can occupy without challenge, and the very private space of the individual apartment units. The lack of a clearly defined hierarchy of space which utilizes real and symbolic barriers to establish tenant control and challenge intruders has made the doors of the apartment units the first line of defense for tenants, drastically increasing their vulnerability to crime and victimization.



The territorial problems of the Park Hill Apartments are due in part to the large amount of unassigned space on the site. The design of the outdoor space is ambiguous and lacks strong visual cues to indicate who is to use different areas on the site and for what purpose. The resultant unclaimed and abandoned appearance invites outsiders to use the site for undesirable purposes such as loitering or short cuts, which jeopardize the security of the development.

This lack of clearly defined space has contributed to two major design conflicts at Park Hill. These conflicts are generated by the lack of sufficient indoor and outdoor social and recreational space. Due to the absence of well-defined and controlled sitting/play areas, groups of all ages - adults, teenagers, and children - tend to congregate around the main entrances to the buildings. Although many members of the groups are tenants, some are not, and the inability to determine who is a neighbor and who is a potentially dangerous outsider intimidates many tenants, all of whom must walk through these groups to reach the entrances. This problem is compounded by the rough play and aggressive talk of the teenagers and young adults, who regardless of their intention further intimidate tenants entering their buildings. The main lobbies are the site of additional loitering and rough play particularly by children and teenagers who use them as indoor play areas and meeting places in inclement weather. The effect of these conflicts should not be underestimated; in addition to exposing tenants to fear and risk, the tension generated by these activities inhibits tenant willingness to work together, and subsequently, their collective ability to resist crime.

Security at Park Hill Apartments is further weakened by the impact of several intrusive neighborhood influences which significantly increase tenant vulnerability to crime and victimization. Bounded on its west perimeter by a large tract of vacant and overgrown land, Park Hill is isolated on one side from the rest of the four developments. Overgrown and poorly lit at night, the land is frequently used as a secluded place where criminal or anti-social activities can take place unobserved and as a hiding place for people evading police. As a consequence, the land has become a fear evoking place for tenants and contributes to their reluctance to claim and use the adjacent parking lots and rear sitting/play areas.

The undesirable outside groups and individuals who are drawn to Park Hill can in themselves be considered another intrusive neighborhood influence. Attracted by the penetrable site and the absence of tenant or police control, these outsiders encroach upon the site and use it for activities which range from peddling drugs to burglarization of the units to stripping stolen cars. The negative impact of these criminal and other anti-social activities critically affects the security of Park Hill by increasing the probability of crime and victimization on the site and causing tenants to withdraw from their environment and each other out of fear.




FOX HILLS APARTMENTS

Fox Hills Apartments is a 366 unit development consisting of three identical mid-rise buildings arranged on the site in a rough triangle at the south end of Park Hill Avenue. The second largest of the developments, Fox Hills is bounded by a major thoroughfare, Vanderbilt Avenue, to the east; by Roff Street, a small dead end side street with private homes to the north; by Park Hill Avenue to the west, and by Osgood Avenue to the south. Like the other developments, the buildings are U-shaped in plan, are constructed of brick, have main entrances oriented to the street, and project the same anonymous and institutional image. Unlike the other developments however, most of the Fox Hills sitting/play areas and parking lots are located on the interior site and are enclosed by the buildings. Open space on the site consists of three small sitting/play areas, each located behind a building and fourth area with basketball backstops converted from a side parking lot between buildings 320 and 350.

In addition to the social and locational problems commonly experienced by all of the developments, Fox Hills has a number of project-specific security problems which increase tenant vulnerability to crime and victimization. The security of Fox Hills is weakened by its penetrable site; access to the buildings is not controlled despite previous efforts to install intercom/buzzer systems and locked vestibules at each main entrance. Currently the door locks and intercom system of all the main entrances are broken, enabling anyone



**PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA
FOX HILLS APTS.**



to enter, circulate through and leave the buildings unchallenged. Because the buildings are so penetrable, the laundry rooms are subjected to regular break-ins by people who steal money from the machines and destroy the equipment in the process.

Opportunities for casual surveillance by tenants and formal surveillance within the buildings by guards are poor because they have no means of determining who is a tenant or legitimate visitor and who is an intruder. Although Fox Hills is the only development which currently provides 24 hour guard service, the manpower per shift is not enough, given the number of buildings and size of the tenant population, to adequately patrol the development and guard the main entrances around the clock. Surveillance is also hindered by the frequently unlocked or broken door locks of the rear and basement entrances which enable intruders to enter the buildings and use the elevators and stairwells without being observed. The stairwells are particularly vulnerable because they are used regularly by outsiders and development youth as places where they can participate in anti-social or illegal activities without being observed.

Opportunities for surveillance on the site are good due to the orientation of most sitting/play areas and parking lots to the interior of the site. The location of the buildings along the perimeter of the triangular site help to channel pedestrian traffic to the interior spaces along a few major routes, making it easier for tenants to observe who is moving through the site. At night however, opportunities for surveillance decrease due to the uneven lighting

on the site which leave perimeter areas along Park Hill Avenue, the north side of the site, and some sections of the parking lots too dark to observe.

Fox Hills tenants exhibit more territoriality than their neighbors. Although their territoriality is not sufficient to enable tenants to claim all of the areas on the site, the two enclosed sitting/play areas and parking lots at the north end of the site are intensively used, and thus controlled, by tenants. Tenant ability to claim and control these spaces is aided in part, by the interior location of the areas which are buffered from the street by the location of the buildings on the perimeter of the site. The intimate character of these interior areas and the interesting pedestrian traffic generated by the Super-Deli, a food and convenience store located in the rear of building 141, is strong enough to draw large number of tenants to the area, who in turn, by their sheer number are able to claim and control the area. Unfortunately, the remainder of the site, including the buildings, has not been successfully claimed by tenants. The resultant neglected and unprotected appearance of these spaces encourage outsiders to encroach upon the development and use it for anti-social and/or criminal activities.

Some of Fox Hills territoriality problems can be attributed to the absence of a well defined hierarchy of public, semi-private space which successfully structures access to the development and assigns activity areas and user groups to available open space. Currently most of the sitting/play areas lack environmental cues to

suggest how they should be used or which user group should control them. The poorly defined and anonymous appearance of the sitting/play areas and the general absence of play equipment do not indicate assigned uses or provide a fair distribution of outdoor space. A system of assigned uses is needed at Fox Hills because outdoor space on the site is scarce, given the density of the population, and competition among tenants for its use is fierce.

The competition among user groups for outdoor social and recreational space is one of the two major design conflicts which exist at Fox Hills. Because there is not enough developed open space to accommodate all of the tenant user groups, tenant youth are forced to compete with one another for the use of the sitting/play areas, and the basketball court. A second design conflict occurs when the active play and hang-out activities of the groups unable to gain possession of these areas "spill over" into the parking lots jeopardizing parked cars and pedestrians alike.


Like the rest of the developments, Fox Hill's penetrable site and buildings and its high profile as low-income housing has served to attract undesirable groups and individuals from the surrounding neighborhood whose anti-social and criminal activities expose tenants to risk and further weaken security. Some activities of these outsiders, such as the purchase and sale of drugs, victimization of tenants, and burglarization of units are extremely dangerous, while other activities, such as loitering, or stripping stolen cars, usurp scarce open space from tenants and inhibit them from gaining complete control of the development.

ST. GEORGE PLAZA

St. George Plaza is a 299 unit development comprised of two six-story brick buildings arranged linearly along the north end of Park Hill Avenue across the street from the Park Hill Apartments. The development occupies a small city block formed by Bowen Street to the east, Park Hill Avenue to the west, Roff Street to the south and Sobel Street to the north. The site has a marked change in grade from east to west, with the Bowen Street or east side at a grade considerably lower than the west side. The St. George Plaza buildings closely resemble those of the other four developments, particularly Park Hill, echoing the linear siting of buildings along Park Hill Avenue with parking to the rear, the U-shape building prototype, and the same street orientation of the main entrances and lobbies.

Unlike the other developments however, St. George Plaza possesses a large enclosed parking garage built out from between the two buildings, separating the open air parking lots located behind each building. The only "developed" open space is located between the two buildings extending out onto the roof of the parking garage. The space is divided into two areas, the first area is adjacent to the street and was intended to provide seating and access, via criss-crossed walkways, to the street and from building to building. Beyond it, towards the back of the buildings, a sparsely furnished play area was constructed on the roof of the parking garage.

**PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA
ST. GEORGE PLAZA**



St. George Plaza is subject to many of the security problems experienced by the other developments. Its site and buildings are highly penetrable; the development can be entered from a number of points on the perimeter at either grade level, and access to the buildings is not controlled. Building penetrability is increased by the fact that each building has two main entrances and lobbies, several rear exits, and side doors which open onto the sitting area permitting quick access back and forth between buildings. The main entrances and lobbies are located at each end of the buildings and lead to mailrooms and elevators. Although the main entrances were equipped with locked vestibules and buzzer/intercom systems, all of the equipment has been broken or destroyed. As a result, access to the buildings, the lobbies, the elevators and ultimately all of the floors is completely uncontrolled, enabling intruders to enter the development unchallenged and to move through it at will. Controlling access at St. George Plaza is especially difficult because tenants use the rear doors and fire exits on the lower grade more frequently than the main entrances on the higher grade of Park Hill Avenue. The rear doors of the buildings are intensively used by tenants and visitors because they are closer and more convenient to major pedestrian destinations in the neighborhood such as the elementary school, the shopping center, McDonalds, and the bus stop and commercial strip located on Targee Avenue. For these reasons efforts to establish controlled access at St. George Plaza should focus on the rear entrances because tenant use of them is too strong to ignore or circumvent.

The penetrable site, variance in grade level, and the numerous entrances to the building seriously impede good surveillance of the development. Because traffic on the site and through the buildings can take so many routes, it is difficult for tenants or guards to observe and monitor everyone who comes to the development. Currently St. George Plaza security guards are stationed in the main entrance/lobbies located on the Park Hill Avenue side of the buildings during afternoon and evening hours. The more intensively used doors and fire exits at the rear of the buildings however remain unguarded except for infrequent site patrols by the guards, enabling intruders to enter or leave the buildings without being observed.

Another feature of the site which inhibits surveillance is the enclosed parking garage. The garage effectively divides the open air parking lots and blocks visual surveillance from one lot to the other. Finally, the location of the open space between the two buildings on top of the garage is difficult for tenants and guards to observe and monitor because none of the apartment units have windows which overlook the side area, and neither it nor the space on top of the garage can be observed by guards stationed in the entrance/lobbies.

The existing design and layout of St. George Plaza does not encourage tenant territoriality because there are few opportunities for them to claim and control the development. Given the size and density of its tenant population, St. George Plaza has a severe shortage of usable open space. The awkward location of the small open space that is available between the buildings discourages its

use since site circulation patterns do not bring tenants near or through the area. The absence of attractive play equipment and other environmental cues suggesting how the space should be used and which user groups should control it further inhibits the development of tenant territoriality. Consequently, the open space appears abandoned and unprotected, reinforcing the development's anonymous and vulnerable image.

Finally as is the case with the rest of the developments, St. George Plaza does not have a well defined hierarchy of public semi-private and private space and fails to provide a system of real or symbolic barriers between the sidewalk and the door of the apartments. As a result tenants, management, and guards have not been able to successfully claim and control their development, and have surrendered most of the site and sections of the buildings to outsiders who use them for anti-social and/or criminal activities.

The absence of tenant control over activities and behaviors occurring in the development and the subsequent withdrawal of many tenants from areas on the site and inside the buildings, has increased the development's vulnerability to intrusive neighborhood influences. The proximity of the north end of St. George Plaza to the shopping center and the lack of tenant control or guard supervision has enabled outsiders and undesirable tenants from all the developments to claim and use the corner of Park Hill Avenue and Sobel Street as a neighborhood hang-out. The hang-out is frequented by groups and individuals drinking liquor conveniently purchased in the shopping

center, by people purchasing and selling drugs, and occasionally, by prostitutes. The activities of these groups, whose numbers were observed to range from three to eighteen individuals depending on the time of day and the weather, pose a serious threat to the tenants from all the developments who must pass by them to reach the shopping center or the Targee Avenue bus stop and commercial strip. During inclement weather the anti-social and criminal activities of these people move indoors, primarily into building 225 of St. George Plaza.

The presence of this hang-out generates a negative impact on the overall security of the developments beyond its immediate activities, by drawing undesirable individuals and groups from the surrounding neighborhood, who, attracted to the area by the availability of alcohol, drugs, and prostitution, stay to commit crimes and victimize tenants. As a result, tenants, management, and guards from all the developments commonly perceive this corner and building 225 as the two most dangerous and fear evoking places in the entire study area.




SEAVIEW ARMS AND CONCORD COURT

For the purpose of this analysis, Seaview Arms and Concord Court will be discussed together because they are the two smallest developments, each having only one six-story brick building, and because they provide an opportunity to compare examples of good and bad site security conditions within the target area.

The two developments are located at opposite ends of the target area; Seaview Arms is located at the south end on Osgood Avenue up one block and west of Park Hill Avenue, and Concord Court is located at the north end of Bowen Street, one block east of Park Hill Avenue. The physical features of the developments vary in minor ways; Seaview Arms has an 84 unit rectangular building which possesses a large lawn area and parking lots located both behind and to one side. Concord Court is a 155 unit building U-shaped in plan, which has a narrow fenced in lawn area on its street sides and parking in the rear.

Concord Court is bounded by Bowen Street to the west, Sobel Street and the shopping center to the north, the Targee Avenue commercial strip to the east, and a small pocket of single family homes to the south. Of the two developments, Concord Court is more penetrable because it lies between Targee Avenue and the developments along Park Hill Avenue, and is subject to site and building penetration by pedestrian traffic moving back and forth between the two areas. As in other developments, access to the building is not controlled; the door locks and buzzer/intercom system in the main entrance are broken,

**PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA
SEAVIEW ARMS & CONCORD CTS.**



and the rear exits to the parking lots remain open. Intruders can enter Concord Court through any number of doors and use the elevators and stairwells to move through the building without being observed. The attractiveness of the building as a target for intruders is increased by the inability of tenants and the one guard on the evening shift to provide good surveillance. Opportunities for surveillance at night by tenants, the guard, or the police are further hampered by the inadequate site lighting which leaves most of the parking lots and the vacant lot adjacent to the sitting/play area on the south side of the building in darkness.

The design and appearance of the interior of the building also contribute to the development's poor security and the high level of tenant fear of crime and victimization. The deserted and unprotected lobby encourages intruders to penetrate the building, while the hallways, which are painted dark brown from floor to ceiling and illuminated by stark fluorescent tubes, are fear evoking places for tenants who must walk to either end of the hallway and around a blind corner to reach elevators. The waiting areas by the elevators are extremely vulnerable because they cannot be observed by the guard from the lobby or main hallway, and because they are directly accessible to intruders using the secluded rear exit doors.

Outside, Concord Court has only one small developed open space although sections of the partially abandoned parking lot are occasionally used as play space by children and as an impromptu gathering place for adult males. The lack of adequate open space and the absence of

environmental cues establishing a hierarchy of public, semi-private, and private space within the development has discouraged tenants from asserting their territoriality and inhibited them from claiming and controlling the site.

In direct contrast, tenants at Seaview Arms control the interior of their building and most of their site with the help of their manager and maintenance staff. Bounded on the north by the same large piece of vacant land which also adjoins the Park Hill Apartments, on the east by Fairway Avenue, a street lined with duplex homes by single family homes to the south, and by more of the vacant land to the west, Seaview Arms occupies a relatively isolated site. Nevertheless Seaview Arms has the best security and the least amount of site vulnerabilities relative to the rest of the developments in the target area even though it does not currently have the protection of a guard service.

The development is not easily penetrated; the large open grassy area which surrounds the building acts as a buffer, and the perimeters of the parking lots are completely fenced in. The main entrance vestibule door locks and buzzer/intercom are in place and functioning well, and all of the fire exits which open onto the rear parking lot are locked from the outside. The main entrance lobby and mailbox alcove are in excellent shape and have not been subjected to vandalism. The sense of tenant control and possession is reinforced by the presence of a brightly painted paper mache sculpture which decorates

the lobby undisturbed. The stairwells and elevators are clean and devoid of graffiti, and do not appear to be used for anti-social or destructive activities.

Burglaries committed by people who climb the balconies and break into the units is a chronic problem at Seaview Arms. However, management and tenants have helped to cure this problem by working closely together. During one period of frequent burglaries, the tenants formed their own surveillance teams and by watching their building and listening for unusual noises, helped management and police corner the burglar on the roof. More recently, a series of burglaries were traced by management with the help of tenants, to a particular tenant who was promptly evicted.

The manager of Seaview Arms attributes these successes and the strong social structure of the development to careful screening of applicants. Because management has made an effort to select tenants who share a consensus about acceptable behaviors and activities, the tenants have been able to form a strong supportive social structure which serves as their best defense against crime. Tenants and management, with the help of a protective maintenance staff work closely with each other and cooperate when problems arise or crimes occur. As a result very little crime or victimization is currently experienced inside the building.

The outdoor space is less secure due to the rather isolated location of the development, and uneven site lighting at night. Some areas of the parking lot are particularly vulnerable; car theft



and car accessory theft (batteries, radiator, tires, etc.) are a problem. However, good informal surveillance by tenants and maintenance has helped to reduce crime in the parking lots.

There is one additional security problem that is generated by the location of Seaview Arms and conditions in the surrounding neighborhood. Seaview Arms' isolated site requires tenants to walk along a route from the bus stop which leads them through dimly lit areas, past an abandoned duplex unit sometimes used by vagrants, and near an unfenced section of the vacant land. These neighborhood conditions provide outsiders with a number of opportunities to ambush and victimize the tenants without being observed and expose tenants to risk and incidents of personal victimization.

Despite these problems, Seaview Arms offers a number of valuable lessons in site security. Without the benefit of guard service protection, without extra access control hardware, and despite its isolated location, Seaview Arms has the best security and most cooperative tenant/management relationship. Clearly, careful applicant screening by the manager, the presence of a supportive and protective maintenance staff, the cooperative relationship between the management and tenants, has enabled all parties to claim and control most of the development and successfully defend it against crime.

THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PLAN

OVERVIEW

This section presents a comprehensive security plan designed to counteract the vulnerabilities of the five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area identified during the site security analysis.

The plan emphasizes the need to provide a mix of social and physical improvements designed to reinforce one another and address the multi-dimensional problems which make the Park Hill/Fox Hills developments vulnerable to crime and victimization. The plan presents both physical improvements aimed at reducing or eliminating features of the developments which expose tenants to risk and social improvement strategies designed to encourage tenant and community groups to organize and work together to improve their housing environment. Supplemental recommendations directed towards acquiring needed assistance from city and federal agencies, public officials, the police, and the broader community are included as well. The plan also presents recommendations suggesting cooperative management policies and programs such as a community based guard service designed to strengthen and unify security efforts in the Park Hill/Fox Hills area as a whole.

RATIONALE

As envisioned, the comprehensive security plan would build on improvements begun at the development level, and by weaving together physical, social, and economic improvements, expand to include the surrounding community. The plan presents a broad spectrum of recommendations which utilize the issue of security and the security-related improvements as a catalyst to bring currently dissident tenant and community groups in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area together in a productive working relationship. Resolution of the study area security problems will necessarily involve working with each other, management, police, city and federal agencies, the private business sector, and the surrounding neighborhoods, and would naturally lead the groups into other related issues such as the development of a community facility to house urgently needed programs or the economic revitalization of their community.

Resolving the security problems of the developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area will provide the participants in the plan - tenants, management, community groups, city and federal agencies - with both a reason and an opportunity to work together and achieve basic goals which will lay the foundation for future community improvement efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations which follow are divided into two sections, the first section presents recommendations which apply collectively to the entire Park Hill/Fox Hills study area. The second section presents more specific recommendations for each of the five developments in the study area.

SECTION I: AREA - WIDE IMPROVEMENTS

Increase Tenant/Community Group Capacity to Participate in Their Comprehensive Security Plan

Experience has shown that a major impediment to successful implementation of security improvements has been the lack of sustained tenant acceptance and active cooperation. Often, this problem stems from a lack of tenant participation during the development of their security plan and the failure of HUD or management to explain the interdependent relationship of the security improvements and the importance of tenant compliance with new security procedures. The problem of tenant acceptance and support is frequently made more difficult by the inability of tenants, regardless of their desire to cooperate, to work as a cohesive group to support and protect new security improvements. Put simply, most tenant populations are just not able to form the unified social structure necessary to control behaviors and activities affecting the operation of security program.

This is particularly true of the developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area where tenant support, linked with tenant and community group ability to organize, will be a critical factor to the success of this security plan. In the past tenant organization and group cohesion has been difficult to achieve because of the diverse value systems within the tenant populations and a general lack of consensus about acceptable behavior and lifestyles. As a result, many of the existing tenant and community groups are weak or highly factionalized. Their effectiveness is further diminished by a lack of organizational skills and broad base support necessary to mobilize a sustained, day-to-day cooperative tenant or community group effort.

Security Objective: Strengthen tenant and community group ability to function effectively; help them to form a coalition organization so that they can focus their efforts on common goals such as security and work collectively to achieve them.

1. Conduct a community workshop on security for Park Hill/Fox Hills study area tenant and community group leaders. The workshop should be conducted jointly by William Brill Associates (WBA), the Staten Island Office of the City Planning Department (CPD), the Neighborhood and Consumer Affairs staff of the HUD area office (HUD), and the Community Service Society (CSS). Held on-site one night a week for five weeks, the workshop would devote one session to do each of the following:

Session 1:

- Present the new comprehensive security plan and explain security improvements to tenant leaders, define role of tenants in security program (WBA sponsor).

Session 2:

- Improve relations among existing tenant and community groups by demonstrating shared problems and emphasizing common goals. (WBA/CPD sponsors)

Session 3:

- Guide the tenant and community group leaders to an overall consensus about security related goals and help them to select priority projects to work on together. (WBA/CPD/HUD sponsors)


Session 4:

- Help tenant and community group leaders form a coalition group which includes and represents them all as a Local Development Corporation (LDC) or a non-profit Community Development Corporation (CDC). The purpose of the coalition organization would be to narrow tenant and community group focus to one or two priority issues, concentrate their energies and efforts on one or two priority goals, and most importantly, provide the study area with a unified, highly representative organization able and eligible to seek and receive programs and resources. (WBA/CPD/CSS sponsors)

Session 5:

- Provide technical training to upgrade group organizational skills so that they are able to function effectively over a sustained period of time.

If the workshop is successful, the tenant and community groups of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area should be able to apply the skills developed during these sessions beyond the security plan to other issues and problems of equal concern. For example, the coalition organization could set up sub-committees or boards to serve as



mechanisms by which the goals and priority projects selected during the workshop could be achieved. One of these could become the supervisory body for a community-based guard service recommended and described elsewhere in this section. This supervisory body could also work with police to mount a coordinated attack on the illegal drug and stolen car activities which threaten the developments. If the coalition organization takes the form of an LDC other goals (which reinforce the stability and security of the study area) such as the economic revitalization of the neighborhood or the development of a community center could be realized. Whatever the final form, the coalition organization would provide a vital service to the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area by working with private, city, state, and federal agencies to obtain urgently needed programs and project funding.

Establish or Strengthen Tenant Organizations in Each Development

Most tenant groups in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area developments lack the organizational structure, in-house representation and broad-based tenant support necessary to function effectively. Many of the organizations are simply ad hoc groups formed during a crisis or around a specific issue, while others consist of a small core of individuals who share common concerns and an enduring willingness to work on development problems. Frequently the membership of these groups, because of their informal nature, is formed by friends and neighbors rather than a structured system of representatives from the entire development. As a result the groups are often perceived by the general tenant populace as

narrowly defined interest groups and thus do not have, or are unable to generate, broad based tenant support.

Tenant organizations which have structured representation and broad base support must be developed so that each development will have a formal mechanism through which tenants can effectively communicate and work with management, broader community coalitions, city officials and government agencies, to improve their housing environment.

Security Objective: Initiate a system of structured tenant organizations for each development so that tenants will have a formal mechanism through which they can communicate regularly with management, police, and local government, and increase the effectiveness of services delivered to the site.

1. The objectives of the tenant organizations will be to:
 - Provide a structured opportunity for tenants to meet and work together to improve their housing environment. Such an opportunity should help to strengthen social cohesion within the development as tenants begin to learn about and understand each other, and develop positive ways of resolving their problems.
 - Provide a channel for the regular exchange of information between tenants and management, community coalitions, police, city officials, and relevant agencies.
 - Increase tenant participation in policy decisions which require their cooperation.
 - Work with management and government agencies to improve the delivery of programs and services to the developments.

2. Develop and initiate a system of structured tenant organizations which ensure that all tenants and buildings within each development have an opportunity to be represented. All of the developments should utilize similar organizational structures so that the levels of representation will match on the committees or community coalition groups formed for area-wide cooperative efforts. The structure of the tenant organizations could build in the following manner:

- Floor captains - elected/selected by the tenants on each floor; floor meetings should be held once a month and/or when a crisis occurs.
- Building Committees - composed of all floor captains, who elect/select a building representative. Meetings should be held once a month although the buildings representative should be able to call additional meetings if the need arises.
- Development-Wide Tenant Association - composed of all building representatives; meetings should be held once a month to work on problems which affect the development as a whole. This association should serve as a liason between the tenants and management, police, other developments in the study area, and government agencies. Each tenant association should elect/select a president to call meetings and represent or appoint association members to represent the development in area-wide cooperative efforts or community coalition organizations.

3. The improved tenant organizations should receive recognition and full cooperation from the management of the developments. Such recognition and cooperation would involve:

- Provision of office space near the lobby or in the basement for each Building Committee.
- Mandatory attendance of managers and maintenance supervisors to Development Tenant Association meetings on a quarterly basis or upon the written invitation of the Development Tenant Association president.



- Establishment of a Tenant/Management Committee composed of the manager, the maintenance supervisor and building representatives, to work on problems requiring tenant/management cooperation such as security, vandalism, coping with problem families, delivery of social and recreational services and programs to the development etc.

4. The Tenant Associations should utilize available community and federal/local government resources such as the Multi-Service Center and the Borough Presidents office to capitalize on progress made during the community workshop.

- Work with the Community Service Society and HUD to obtain as on-site community office and Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) funded community workers to help tenants organize. The NSP workers could help tenants organize at both the development and community-wide level. The NSP workers could begin by providing:

- Counseling and technical assistance to developing tenant associations in each development.
- Counseling and technical assistance to help develop a community coalition group such as an LDC or non-profit community corporation.
- Technical assistance; applications for programs or grants, referrals to specialized agencies.
- A central information exchange center.
- Coordination with the City Planning Department and the Borough President's office to set up a LDC.
- Coordination with HUD and the management of all five developments to establish a governing body for the proposed community based guard service.

Explore Feasibility of Cooperative Management Policies and Programs


One important finding of the Site Security Analysis is that the five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area share a number of common security problems. The aspects of the social environment and the site vulnerabilities which affect the security of each development are quite similar and consequently, require

similar improvements to resolve them. Given the limited amount of management and maintenance staff and resources available relative to the size of the developments and the tenant populations, it makes sense to explore the feasibility of establishing cooperative management policies and programs to carry out some aspects of the comprehensive security plan.

Security Objective: Establish a Cooperative Management Committee composed of the Managers and Tenant Association presidents from each development to explore ways in which they can improve the security of the development and quality of the housing environment through cooperative policies and programs.

1. The purpose of the Cooperative Management Committee (CMC) would be to:
 - Review common security and housing environment problems and/or gaps in services identified during the Site Security Analysis.
 - Review existing and proposed management policies and programs designed to address these common problems.
 - Explore ways in which existing and proposed policies, procedures, and programs of all the developments could be combined or shared among the developments to increase their efficiency and effectiveness.

2. The CMC should begin by examining the feasibility of establishing cooperative policies and/or programs in the following areas:
 - Development of a community based guard service; a cooperative agreement by the management of all developments to proportionately share the cost and administration of the proposed community based guard service would enable each development




to receive an improved guard service whose specially trained personnel and increased shift coverage would immediately and dramatically improve security.

- **Crime Reduction:** cooperative efforts to reduce crime could range from sharing the proposed community based guard service, to initiating standardized forms to report location and type of crime so that guards and police can adjust their patrols accordingly, to community surveillance of sites and buildings in the study area.
- **Problem Tenant Alert:** often problem tenants asked to leave or evicted from one development will simply move across the street or down the block into one of the other four developments and continue the disruptive or anti-social behavior which precipitated their exit from the original development. Management could share information about evicted or disruptive tenants on a monthly basis and help each other avoid accepting repeat applicants with a history of undesirable behavior.
- **Referral Services;** management could pool their knowledge and agency contacts to develop a referral service that could help tenants with problems who request help to link up with the specific agency and service they need.
- **Lobbying for City Services;** together the five developments in the study area encompass thirteen mid-rise buildings and thousands of tenants. Combined requests for improved police, social, sanitation and recreational services, etc. would carry more political weight and increase the likelihood of a prompt response from city agencies.

Establish a Community Based Guard Service for the Park Hill/Fox Hills Study Area

The present system of diverse security guard services does not generate enough guards to provide adequate security coverage for the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area. The security programs are fragmented and offer limited service to only four of the five developments, and there is no coordinated effort to exchange information on crime and security related issues. In addition, the guards are not adequately trained, equipped or supervised, and thus have little impact on the




crime and victimization occurring in the study area.

Security Objective: Establish a cooperative security guard service with responsibility for all five developments. The guard force would be recruited from the community and specially trained to address the security needs of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area.


1. Establish a community based guard service with an expanded staff of 39 to provide a unified security program and increase shift coverage for all five developments. The cost of the guard service would be shared cooperatively between all of the developments, enabling the staff to expand and include the following personnel:
 - 1 security director
 - 1 assistant director
 - 1 secretary clerk
 - 4 equipment monitor/dispatchers
 - 28 regular guards

2. All candidates for the new security guard force should be recruited from the Staten Island community and reflect proportionately the racial composition of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area. (See Appendix B, page 88 for description of recruitment standards.)

3. All candidates should participate in a two week (80 hour) intensive training program which includes instruction in law enforcement, self-defense, first aid, fire safety, crisis intervention and community relations. All guards must successfully complete the course to be eligible for final selection to the force.



PROPOSED GUARD SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Park Hill/Fox Hills Study Area



4. All guards should be uniformed and supplied with the proper equipment; walkie-talkies, flashlight, nightstick and handcuffs.
5. The duties of new guards should be clearly defined; as a minimum the guards should be expected to:
 - Provide general surveillance; patrol of lobbies, corridors, stairwells and parking areas.
 - Detect criminal acts (burglary, rape, robberies and aggravated assault, etc.) and alert police.
 - Quell minor disturbances within the developments.
 - Report acts of vandalism to management.
 - Identify and work with problem families.
 - Work with juveniles to curtail vandalism problems when possible.
 - Respond to tenant requests for help in emergencies.
 - Identify and report potential safety and security hazards.
 - Cooperate with police and fire department staff when necessary.
 - Prepare reports as required.
6. Improve security guard and shift coverage for all five developments by instituting the following schedule:
 - 9 a.m. - 5 p.m./8 guards
 - 5 p.m. - 1 a.m./12 guards
 - 1 a.m. - 9 a.m./8 guards

Note: At least one supervisory guard will be required per shift.

7. Initiate a new patrol system which divides the study area into four patrol zones and utilizes two-man security guard teams to patrol them. The new system will increase the effectiveness of patrols, focus the activities of the guards, and enable the teams

to tailor their activities to the special security problems of each zone. See page 70 for map depicting proposed zones. The guards should be assigned to the four zones as follows:

Zone A: 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2
5 p.m. - 1 a.m. 3
1 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2

Zone B: 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2
5 p.m. - 1 a.m. 3
1 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2

Zone C: 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2
5 p.m. - 1 a.m. 3
1 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2


Zone D: 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2
5 p.m. - 1 a.m. 3
1 a.m. - 5 p.m. 2

8. Establish a centrally located office/base station for the security guard service large enough to accommodate the following:
- Office for the security director
 - Small waiting/reception area with desk for secretary clerk.
 - Guard meeting room for roll call, briefings, in-service training seminars.
 - Guard locker room with toilet and shower facilities.
 - Communications equipment room with counter space for the monitor/dispatcher guards.

Note: Part of the vacant St. George Plaza parking garage could be renovated and utilized for this purpose.

9. Establish a non-profit corporate entity to manage and administer the security guard service. The new corporation would reflect the cooperative relationship between the management of all the developments, and incorporate tenant participation. The corporation could be a special branch of the proposed LDC or a

**PARK HILL/FOX HILLS STUDY AREA
PATROL ZONE MAP**



separate non-profit community organization. Whichever corporate form is selected should have a 12 member Executive Board of Directors whose responsibilities would include the development of policies and procedures as well as administrative, bookkeeping, and payroll duties for the force. The composition of the 12 member Board should be:

- Five representatives appointed by the owners of each development; (may include managers of each development to represent the interests of the owners.)
- Five representatives from the Tenant Security Committee (1 resident representative from each development).
- The security director.
- One police community relations representative from the 120 Precinct.

It is expected that the Security Director would report directly to the Executive Board and provide it with monthly reports on specific crime problems within the various developments and patrol zones.

To ensure that the tenant population has an opportunity to have their views represented, the five representatives of the Tenant Security Committee should serve as liasons between the Board and the tenants.

Note: See page 66 for organizational chart.

Establish a Community Center for the Park Hill/Fox Hills Study Area

One of the most critical problems of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area, given the density of the tenant population and the magnitude of their problems, is the pervasive lack of indoor and

outdoor communal space, and the concomitant lack of urgently needed on-site support services and programs. A community center would provide a positive focus for the study area and could centrally house a variety of needed programs.

Security Objective: Renovate or construct a multi-purpose community center facility large enough to house and accommodate both the offices and meeting rooms for outreach social service, educational, and training programs as well as large indoor recreational spaces for evening, winter, and rainy day activities.

1. Explore the feasibility of creating a community center facility in one of these alternative locations:
 - The under-utilized P.S. 57 located at the north end of Park Hill Avenue on Palma Drive.
 - One of the larger vacant stores in the shopping center located between Park Hill and Targee Avenues.
2. The new facility should have two kinds of interior space; large multi-use rooms capable of accommodating active recreational play, social activities such as dances, community meetings, and workshops, and smaller office spaces to accommodate outreach services and programs.
3. The following is a list of the kinds of activities and programs which tenant and community group leaders, management, and city agencies felt were urgently needed by the Park Hill/Fox Hills

population and should be available in a community center:

- Active recreational programs; particularly for the youth during the summer, after school, at night, and on weekends.
- Creative development programs; arts and crafts, dance classes, music classes, theater productions.
- Social activities; dances, festivals, supervised excursions etc.
- Social service programs; family counseling, crisis intervention, planned parenthood counseling, drug and alcohol abuse programs, etc.
- Support services; daycare, tutoring programs, employment counseling, job training, money management classes, etc.


Work with City Agencies and Private Business to Stimulate Economic Revitalization of the Neighborhood

Most of the improvements presented in the comprehensive security plan are intended to provide the tenants of the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area with opportunities to claim, control and protect their developments. The problems which weaken the ability of tenants to successfully use these "opportunities" however, extend beyond the boundaries of the development. Problems such as unemployment and limited job opportunities impede the progress of tenants, eroding their self-sufficiency, and ultimately, their ability to assume an active role in security. Economic revitalization of the neighborhood and the hope it holds for employment and community advancement is a major goal shared by all tenants. It is expressed by their desire to form an LDC and their interest in reviving the vacant shopping center at the north end of Park Hill Avenue. In June 1980 the tenants learned that Waldbaums, a major food store chain, was opening

a supermarket in the shopping center and bringing with it a number of smaller stores. While the tenants of five developments in the Park Hill/Fox Hills study area are pleased to have the convenience and variety of the stores, they feel an economic revitalization of the area has still not taken place; the merchants in the shopping center have not faced the issue of hiring minorities from the study area for responsible positions, and none of the stores are owned locally. For these reasons the tenant and community groups are extremely interested in forming an organization such as an LDC and working with city officials and agencies to increase job opportunities and develop locally owned and operated small businesses.

Security Objective: Work with city officials/agencies and private business to stimulate economic revitalization of the neighborhood by improving the area to make it a more desirable place for business investment, by increasing the number of job opportunities, and by encouraging the development of locally owned and operated businesses.

1. Encourage tenants and community groups in the study area to work with the City Planning Department (CPD), the Borough President's office, and the Community Service Society (CSS) to form a Local Development Corporation (LDC). As already planned, the LDC would serve as a coalition of tenant and community groups and would be organized into the following committees:



- Steering Committee (Composed of all Sub-committee chairmen)
 - Commercial Development Committee
 - Employment/Job Training/Education Committee
 - Community Services Committee
 - Security/Crime Committee
 - Management/Tenant Liason Committee
 - Recreation and Open Space committee
2. Utilize the LDC committee framework to pursue the objectives discussed elsewhere in these recommendations:
- Development of inter-development cooperative policies and programs.
 - Development of a new community based guard service.
 - Development of an on-site community assistance office.
 - Development of a community center facility.
 - Improved delivery of services.
 - Safe and secure neighborhood.
 - Development of employment and job training opportunities.
 - Economic revitalization of the shopping center and the Targee Avenue commercial strip.
3. Capitalize on the job opportunities presented by the reopening of the shopping center and utilize the LDC and the support of the CPD and Borough President's office to meet with the owners of the new stores to establish a cooperative relationship and increase owner community awareness.

- The LDC could work with the owners to reduce vandalism and crime at the shopping center.
- The LDC could, with the support of the CPD and the Borough President's office, work with store owners to establish a community hiring program.



SECTION II: PROJECT SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Park Hill Apartments

1. Reduce Penetrability of Site and Buildings

- Establish controlled-access lobbies at all main entrances; repair and upgrade locks on entrance doors and the buzzer/intercom systems. Investigate cost and feasibility of installing more sophisticated locks on entrance doors which utilize specially designed keys that are hard to duplicate commercially.
- Work with management and maintenance staff to control number and use of master keys to apartment units.
- Repair broken fire exit and basement doors, install panic bars on those not to be used by tenants coming from the parking lots.
- Limit access from parking lots to building interiors to one door per building. Keep door locked, require tenants to use key to open, if feasible establish controlled route through building to lobby.
- Install security screens or grills on all windows adjoining the fire escapes.
- Repair and reinforce perimeter fencing along parking lots, prune or remove adjacent overgrown shrubbery and/or vines covering fence.

2. Increase Opportunities for Surveillance

- Initiate community based guard service to increase shift coverage and use guards to monitor entrances and patrol the site and buildings.
- Initiate tenant monitor system to assist surveillance of the entrances and lobbies during peak use periods. Volunteer tenant monitors could be present in the lobbies between 2:30 and 6:00 p.m. during the school year to open doors for small children who do not have keys and monitor youth activities outside the entrances and in the lobbies. If problems occur, the tenant monitors could call the guards for assistance.

- Provide tenants with a hot line telephone number to the central guard station so that they can report emergencies and suspicious activities immediately.
 - Upgrade the exterior lighting system to provide uniform level of illumination in parking lots and along walkways; install vandal-proof lenses on existing fixtures which have broken or missing lenses.
3. Develop Tenant Sense of Territoriality/Assign Open Space
- Define and repair rear play and sitting areas, develop primarily as tot play (ages 3-6) and adult sitting areas. Install small scale, attractive play equipment.
 - Redevelop the under utilized side parking lots that already have bollards across the driveway to prevent street access. Develop these areas for elementary school age children and teenagers, install sturdy, attractive play equipment. Buffer play areas assigned to different user groups with low fencing, shrubs, or walkways.
4. Reduce Impact of Neighborhood Influences
- Work with security guards and police to reduce crime generated by outsiders.
 - increase patrols of parking lots to reduce stolen car ring activities.
 - increase building patrols of stairwells and basement areas to reduce opportunities for the purchase and sale of drugs.

Fox Hills Apartments

1. Reduce Penetrability of Site and Buildings
- Establish controlled access lobbies at all main entrances; repair and upgrade locks on entrance doors and the buzzer/intercom systems. Investigate cost and feasibility of installing a computerized credit card key system.



- Work with management and maintenance staff to control number and use of master keys to apartment units.
- Repair locks on fire exit and basement doors, install panic bars. Control access to buildings from parking lots by keeping basement doors closed and locked, require tenants to use a key to open. If locking the basement door is not feasible due to the large number of children moving back and forth to the play areas, keep doors open from 8:00 a.m. - 8:00 p.m. during the summer, and between 2:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. during the school year, but keep doors closed and locked the rest of the time.
- Install security screens or grills on laundry room windows, and on all windows adjoining the fire escapes.

2. Increase Opportunities for Surveillance

- Initiate community based guard service to increase shift coverage and use guards to monitor entrances and patrol the site and buildings.
- Initiate tenant monitor system to assist surveillance of the entrances and lobbies during peak use periods. Volunteer tenant monitors could be present in the lobbies between 2:30 and 6:00 p.m. during the school year to open doors for young children without keys and monitor older youth activities inside the lobbies. In case of trouble the monitors could call the guards for assistance.
- Prune overgrown trees and shrubs along the north perimeter of the site.
- Repair and upgrade lighting system to provide a more uniform level of illumination. Particular attention should be paid to the south parking lot along Park Hill Avenue. Install vandal-proof lenses on broken pole and wall light fixtures.
- Provide tenants with a hot line telephone number to the central guard station so that tenants can report emergencies and suspicious activities to guards immediately.

3. Encourage Tenant Sense of Territoriality/Assign Open Space

- Redefine and repair rear play and sitting areas, develop primarily as tot play and adult sitting areas. Install new seating, and small scale, attractive play equipment.
- Redevelop a portion of the under-utilized parking lot at the north end of the site. Develop the area for active elementary school age play (ages 7-12) install a variety of sturdy, attractive play equipment, buffer different use areas with low fencing or shrubs.

St. George Plaza Apartments

1. Reduce Penetrability of Site and Buildings

- Establish controlled access lobbies at all main entrances; repair and upgrade locks on doors and buzzer/intercom systems. Investigate cost and feasibility of installing a computerized credit card key system.
- Establish new system of rear entrances and controlled routes to lobby to address the intensive use of rear doors. Limit access from parking lot to building to one or two doors, repair locks and remaining doors and install panic bars. Control route from rear doors to lobbies, if feasible prevent people who use the rear doors from gaining access to the stairwells.
- Install security screens or grills on all windows adjacent to fire escapes.
- Repair fencing and sidewalk along Roff Street.

2. Increase Opportunities for Surveillance

- Initiate community based guard service to increase shift coverage and use guards to monitor all entrances and patrol the site and buildings.
- Initiate tenant monitor system to assist surveillance of the entrances and lobbies during peak use periods. Volunteer tenant monitors could be present in the lobbies between 2:30 - 6:30 p.m. to open doors for young children without keys after school and monitor older youth activities outside the entrance and in the lobbies. In case of trouble, the monitors could call the guards for assistance.

- Provide tenants with a hot line telephone number to the central guard office so that tenants can report emergencies or suspicious activities immediately.
 - Repair and upgrade the outdoor lighting system to provide a more uniform level of illumination in the rear parking lots and around the rear doors of the building. Install vandal-proof lenses on all pole and wall mounted light fixtures.
3. Encourage Tenant Sense of Territoriality/Assign Open Space
- Redefine and upgrade the open space between the two buildings and on top of the parking garage.
 - Develop the area closest to the sidewalk as a sitting area, reduce number of sidewalks, install seating and checker/chess game tables.
 - Redevelop area on top of garage; assign one half of area for grade school children install active play equipment (swings, climbing apparatus, etc.), install half basketball court for teenagers on remaining half. Buffer the two areas with low chain link fencing.
4. Reduce Impact of Neighborhood Influences
- Work with security guards and police to focus patrols on building 225 and the corner of Sobel Street and Park Hill Avenue.
 - Increase surveillance of the interior of building 225 - lobbies, stairwells, basement - during inclement weather to discourage people hanging out on the corner from seeking shelter inside the building.

Concord Court

1. Reduce Penetrability of Site and Buildings
- Establish a controlled access lobby at the main entrance; repair and upgrade the door locks and buzzer/intercom system. Investigate cost and feasibility of installing more sophisticated locks on entrance doors which utilize specially designed keys that are hard to duplicate commercially.



- Repair broken fire exit and rear access doors, install panic bars on all doors except one designated for use by tenants entering the building from the parking lot.
- Limit access from parking lot to building interior to one door. Keep door locked at all times, require tenants to use key to enter.
- Repair damaged sections of the perimeter fencing along the parking lot.

2. Increase Opportunities for Surveillance

- Initiate community based guard service to increase shift coverage and use guards to patrol the site and building.
- Initiate a tenant monitor system to assist surveillance of the main entrance and lobby during peak use periods. Volunteer tenant monitors could be present in the lobbies between 2:30 - 6:00 p.m. to open doors for young children without keys after school and monitor activities outside the entrance. If necessary, monitor could call the guards for assistance.
- Mount small security mirrors on the wall at each end of the hallways on all floors to enable tenants and guards to view the elevator waiting areas around the corner from the center of the hallway.
- Provide tenants with a hot line telephone number to the central guard office so that tenants can report emergencies or suspicious activities immediately.
- Increase the amount of outdoor lighting of rear parking lot; install vandal-proof lenses on all lighting fixtures.

3. Encourage Tenant Sense of Territoriality/Assign Open Space

- Create additional play space assigned to elementary school age children by redeveloping the south end of the parking lot. Install sturdy and attractive play equipment, buffer from parking lot with low fencing.

Seaview Arms

1. Reduce Penetrability of Site and Buildings

- Install inexpensive barriers on second floor balconies to prevent intruders from gaining access to the balconies from the ground.
- Install additional shrubbery to fill in the gaps in the hedge which separates the lawn of the development from the sidewalk.

2. Increase Opportunities for Surveillance

- Initiate community based guard service to provide security protection and use guards to patrol the site and building.
- Provide tenants with a hot telephone number to the central guard station so that they can report emergencies and suspicious activities immediately.
- Upgrade exterior lighting system to provide an uniform level of illumination, particularly along the parking lot perimeter and the front sidewalks.

3. Develop Tenant Sense of Territoriality/Assign Open Space

- Redevelop the under-utilized parking area on the west end of the site. Develop the area for tot and elementary school age play activities. Install a variety of attractive play equipment and seating areas for adults. Buffer different use areas with benches or shrubs, separate the play area from the rest of the parking lot with low fencing.

4. Reduce Impact of Neighborhood Influences


- Improve the safety and security of the pedestrian route between Seaview Arms and the bus stop on Vanderbuilt Avenue.

-work with the city and Fox Hill Apartment to improve night lighting along the route.

-increase security guard surveillance of the route.



- Fence the perimeter section of vacant land along Osgood Avenue across the street from Seaview Arms to prevent people from using the overgrown grass and shrubbery as a hiding place to ambush pedestrians, or as an escape route after committing crimes in the development.



APPENDICES



APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS RECOMMENDED
FOR FURTHER STUDY

I. MANAGEMENT SERVICE PROBLEMS

● Management Service Relationships with On-Site Managers

The management services of some of the larger developments such as Park Hill and St. George Plaza appear to be primarily interested in the "bottom-line" of vacancy rates, rents, etc., and do not provide much assistance or support to on-site managers. As a result managers are reluctant to risk new policies or programs to deal with the problems and service needs of their tenant population which affect the daily operations, security, and social environment of the developments.

● Management Screening of Applicants/Action on Disruptive Tenants

In general management does not adequately screen applicants. Although minimum HUD screening regulations may be followed there is little effort to double check for false references or information. The increased turnover rate at some developments may place an increased burden on management staff and thus discourage thorough applicant screening, however the problem must be resolved.

In addition, management staff in most developments have not been effective in weeding out disruptive or dangerous tenant families or individuals. The lack of a formal identification, warning, and eviction process in all of the developments, and managers who have been intimidated by tenants in some of the developments, are two major problems.

● Management Supervision/Record Keeping

In most cases, management does not require their maintenance and guard services to keep systematic and complete records of their activities making it extremely difficult to monitor, supervise, or assess the performance of those services.



II. MAINTENANCE SERVICE PROBLEMS

- Supervise/Monitoring of Maintenance Staff

Most of the maintenance supervisors do not adequately screen their staff before hiring. Tenants claim that some maintenance staff are involved in the numerous break-ins/burglaries and the drug traffic which occur in the developments. In addition, the record systems discussed previously make it difficult for maintenance supervisors to monitor the performance and activities of their staff particularly in the larger developments.

- Inadequate Security Precautions

One critical problem is the lack of maintenance service control, supervision and responsibility for master keys utilized by maintenance staff and outside contractors. Most of the break-ins and burglaries which occur in the developments involve the use of keys and tenants allege that maintenance staff use the master keys themselves or share them with outsiders.

- Tenant Complaints

Tenant complaints were similar in all developments. Tenant complaints ranged from poor maintenance response to tenant requests, to staff favoritism, to staff demands for extra payment for normal services. These allegations are serious and should be checked.



APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/PROPOSED GUARD SERVICE

I. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION PROCEDURES

1. Recruitment Standards

- Education - High school diploma or demonstrated ability to read, write and communicate clearly.
- Experience - Previous work with guard services or community oriented program is preferred but not necessary.
- Health - Candidate must be in good physical condition and able to walk or stand for long periods of time.
- Background - Candidates must have no felony convictions or an active record of arrest by police and no record of selling or distributing drugs/narcotics. Candidates must also supply at least three references as a background check.
- Special/Talent - Candidates with long history of community involvement in the community and proven ability to lead or follow should receive preference.

2. Applicant Selection Procedures

- All candidates must be required to submit a written application.
- All candidates must be interviewed individually and required to participate in a group interview session to provide additional information on their performance in a group setting.

3. Final Selection Criteria

- Attitude
 - Respect for individual rights
 - Willingness to accept supervision
 - Willingness to accept responsibility
 - Willingness to work odd hours.



- Skills

- Ability to function well in high stress and/or emergency situations.

- Ability to understand security policies and program.

- Ability to identify social and security problems.

- Ability to write clear and concise reports.

- Ability to understand and explain security regulations and procedures to residents in the Park Hill/Fox Hills community.

- Ability to work well with the resident of the Park Hill/Fox Hills community.

- Maturity and sound judgement.

- Ability to satisfactorily perform duties as outlined in training.

- Successful completion of the two week training program.

