


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ANTI-CORRUPTION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

VOLUME I

POLICE CORRUPTION: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINAL REPORT

VOLUME II

POLICE CORRUPTION: A GUIDE TO AGENCY
ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT

June 1, 1980

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ANTI-CORRUPTION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

VOLUME I

POLICE CORRUPTION: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINAL REPORT

by

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VOLUME II

POLICE CORRUPTION: A GUIDE TO
AGENCY ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

by

ROBERT J. McCORMACK

ANTI-CORRUPTION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

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VOLUME I POLICE CORRUPTION: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINAL REPORT

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Chapter I

HISTORY OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

The Anti-Corruption Management Project was funded under Grant #75-NI-99-0083 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in July of 1975. The purpose of this Project was to address what appeared to be becoming a national problem in law enforcement, police corruption. After the conclusion of what came to be known as Phase I of the Project, the Project was funded again in November of 1977, and Phase II of the Project concluded in November of 1979. The following brief history of Phase I of the Project provides a reader with the necessary information about Phase I of the Project to evaluate the research of Phase II which is the subject of this report.

Project Summary

Phase I of the Project addressed the problem of police corruption in the United States with an emphasis on research into the parameters of corruption and efforts to combat it. Particular attention was paid to the role of the police administrator in developing an anti-corruption management program.

Background of the Study

The emergence of corruption as a major national problem was confirmed in the early 1970's by exposés and investigations throughout the country. Although the best-selling book, Serpico, and articles in professional journals like Police Chief discussed corruption in law enforcement, it was clear that corruption was affecting all levels of criminal justice and government.

Although police corruption was not a new phenomenon, public and official concern about it had increased, and knowledge of the actual dimensions of corruption and the impact of anti-corruption efforts needed to be understood. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission noted:

Corruption and political influence in the (Philadelphia) Police Department are problems which have plagued the force since its inception. In the 20th century alone, there have been three previous special grand jury investigations, each of which found widespread corruption within the Department (Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1974).

And in New York City:

The problem of corruption is neither new nor confined to the police. Reports of prior investigations into police corruption, testimony taken by the Commission, and opinions of informed persons both within and without the Department make it abundantly clear that police corruption has been a problem for many years (Knapp Commission Report, 1973).

Project Objectives

Phase I of the Anti-Corruption Project had six primary objectives designed to address and correct some of the existing problems of police corruption:

- 1) the formation of a national advisory board to guide the work of the Project and to provide a source of objective evaluation;
- 2) a comprehensive review and assessment of the literature in the field of police corruption;
- 3) the assessment of existing types of corruption and the development of a comprehensive police corruption typology;
- 4) the development of suitable measurement techniques for assessing the extent and types of corruption in different sizes and types of police operations;
- 5) the evaluation of existing anti-corruption programs in selected cities throughout the United States;
- 6) the sponsorship of seminars, workshops and prescriptive manuals defining anti-corruption management guidelines for police administrators.

The major goal of Phase I was to provide police administrators with the information and administrative techniques necessary to develop an anti-corruption management program. Practical and philosophical results of research were to aid in understanding and combating future problems of police corruption.

The lack of a comprehensive anti-corruption effort in the United States and the inability of many police administrators to cope with corruption indicated a need for a concentrated effort. Although the Project planned a final report, Phase I concentrated on those police administrators who would be most concerned with development of anti-corruption programs. Workshops, a seminar, on-site visits to police departments, and a major research effort in the area of police corruption involved these administrators.

In addition to interdisciplinary monographs by consultants and research reports, a series of survey instruments utilizing interview and questionnaire techniques was developed for use by administrators. These instruments were tested for validity and provided several means for measuring corruption in a police department.

Methods

The methodological approach for Phase I involved several stages of development with a series of well-defined goals at critical intervals.

1. Establishment of a National Advisory Board.

During the first month of Phase I, an Advisory Board was established and included the following persons:

Robert di Grazia, Former Commissioner, Boston, Massachusetts Police Dept.

Thomas Decker, Former Deputy Director, Federal Defense Program, Chicago, Illinois

James Parsons, Chief of Police, Birmingham, Alabama

Lourn Phelps, Professor, University of Nevada, Reno

Albert Reiss, Professor, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

Later, the Advisory Board was expanded to seven members in order to provide regional representation.

The Advisory Board met every six months and provided overall guidance and recommendations on the Project's development. They also participated in workshops and the final seminar for police administrators.

2. A Comprehensive Review of the Literature Concerning Police Corruption.

A systematic research effort was undertaken to review the literature pertaining to police corruption. The research resulted in a comprehensive bibliography and a narrative analysis of the literature. The review, undertaken by the Project staff, aided in the development of a police corruption typology. Results were published as a separate report.

3. Research into Different Forms of Police Corruption: Development of a Police Corruption Typology.

Utilizing questionnaires, interviews, and analysis of reports and records, research was undertaken in six cities to help develop a corruption typology. Research was done by the Project staff in cooperation with police agencies and academic institutions in the six cities. A set of reports were published at the conclusion of Phase I in which different forms of police corruption were defined and discussed.

4. Development of a Methodological Approach to Measuring and Analyzing Various Levels of Corruption in a Given Area.

Several methods were developed to enable the police administrator to measure different forms of police corruption. Emphasis was placed upon practical methods of determining levels of corruption. They included:

- a. interviewing;
- b. complaint reviews
- c. questionnaires
- d. field tests

Research in methodologies was done by Project personnel with the assistance of outside consultants.

5. Research and Analysis of Existing Anti-Corruption Efforts in Cities/Throughout the United States.

The Project attempted to evaluate existing anti-corruption efforts, primarily in management, personnel, and technological aspects of programs. It was hoped that information and decision-making models would emerge for the police administrator. On-site visits were made to ten police departments by Project personnel who conducted interviews, examined records and met with representatives of other criminal justice

disciplines.

The exploratory research from Phase I of the Project soon was viewed as a base from which a more comprehensive approach to the problem of police corruption could be launched. Almost no empirical incident data on corruption existed anywhere in the literature; and even an uniformly acceptable definition of the term, corruption, was unavailable. The Project staff conducted a national survey to arrive at the following working definition:

Police corruption consists of acts which involve the misuse of police authority for the police employee's personal gain; activity of the police employee which compromises, or has the potential to compromise, his ability to enforce the law or provide other service impartially; the protection of illicit activities from police enforcement, whether or not the police employee receives something of value in return; or the police employee's involvement in promoting the business of one person while discouraging that of another person.¹

The primary goal of the Project was to provide police administrators with methods of developing anti-corruption programs. As a result, a series of essays on specific issues involving police corruption and a guide designed to assist managers in developing and managing an anti-corruption program were published. (By J J Press)

Administrator's Manual for Anti-Corruption Management Project, by Richard Ward and Robert McCormack

The Literature of Police Corruption: A Guide to Bibliography and Theory, by Antony Simpson

The Literature of Police Corruption: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, by Nina Duchaine

A Monograph Series including:

- 1) A Functional Approach to Police Corruption, by Dorothy H. Bracey
- 2) The Psychosocial Costs of Police Corruption, by Charles Bahn
- 3) The Role of the Media in Controlling Corruption, by David Burham
- 4) Police Integrity: The Role of Psychological Screening of Applicants, by Allen Shealy

1

Definition is from the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 473). This definition of corruption was among 14 others which were sent to 500 police departments in the United States. Sixty-five percent of the respondents chose this definition as being closest to their department's policy on corruption.

The development and use by the Project of a measuring instrument - the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire - illustrated the feasibility of using a testing instrument to identify corruption. The Questionnaire attempted to:

assess an officer's own personal integrity;

assess an officer's beliefs concerning the clarity of his or her department's anti-corruption policy and its level of enforcement;

assess an officer's perception of the degree and type of corrupt activity in his or her department;

assess the level of peer group solidarity mediating against the reporting of corrupt activities.

During Phase I, the Questionnaire was used to test:

how a particular police department and the community it services differ in regard to police corruption;

how the types and level of corruption change over time;

how different police departments compare with regard to police corruption.

Although the Questionnaire will not identify individuals who are corrupt, it does provide the administrator with several indicators which, when combined with other techniques, can be used to identify corruption and to guide pro-active efforts against the problem. Data indicate that a department with a "high" score on the Questionnaire is more likely to evince major corruption problems than one with a low score. Using item analysis it was possible to determine what types of corruption were prevalent and, to some degree, how deeply they extend into the organization.

The Questionnaire did not actually measure corruption, but did indicate a police officer's perception of corruption in a department. By using an aggregate "score" the Project did detect differences between departments and differences over time.

The Questionnaire should be viewed as a low cost instrument which can aid in decision-making. From a cost-benefit standpoint, it offers new alternatives to the administrator and offers an opportunity to detect problems before they are exposed externally.

The use and development of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire during Phase I led to the development during Phase II of the Ride-Along Interview scores. These scores - a further refinement of techniques used in Phase I - are designed to measure corruption "ethos" in an agency. They are described and discussed in Chapter III. In the research of Phase I two areas of inquiry, involving variables related to police corruption, appeared to warrant further research: (1) the "socialization hypothesis" supported the notion that corruptibility occurs during specific periods of a police officer's career and therefore can be anticipated and controlled and (2) the "individual hypothesis" supported the theory that distinct characteristics and traits of police rookies are indicative of corruptibility later in their careers. Both hypotheses were pursued in Phase II

of the Project and are discussed in Chapter VI and VII of this report.

Chapters IV, V, deal, respectively with the Commanders Corruption Hazard Profile, and Multiple Correlation and Regression Analysis. The appendices are comprised of tables, charts, and data, discussed in the text of this report.

A special report (Volume II) is included which is intended to bridge the gap between the statistical and theoretical orientation of this report, and the pragmatic day to day needs of law enforcement administrators. It provides the administrator with an effective package with which to address police corruption in his agency.

The program called the Police Corruption Assessment and Control Process is included in Volume II entitled, "Police Corruption: A Guide to Agency Assessment and Program Development."

DATA ANALYSIS: THE MC CORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY QUESTIONNAIRE

During Phase II of the Anti-Corruption Management Project, random samples of police officers and community residents were administered a survey instrument, the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, which was developed during Phase I of the Project.

The departments were chosen in consultation with the Project's Advisory Board. Three of the departments originally selected to participate declined, and replacements were drawn from a list of alternates. Eight police agencies were finally selected for the survey.

The final selection of agencies was based partly upon the need to provide a geographical range among the agencies and to assure inclusion of departments with varying police styles i. e., legalistic, service and watchman.² It was felt that the size of agencies selected would also be a factor in the analysis of police corruption, and therefore, a wide range of agencies with from 175 to 2000 sworn personnel were used in the testing.

Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, it was agreed that no agency would be identified. To help readers relate to the analysis but to protect agency confidentiality, a brief description of each jurisdiction is provided at the beginning of each of the analysis sections. Cities where the agencies exist have been given alphabetical designations "A" through "H."

Methodology

The methodology for the selection of the police sample and the public sample was consistent in each city.

Police Sample

The dates for on-site visits to participating agencies were arranged by Project researchers several months prior to their arrival. The researchers had no prior knowledge of officer assignments on the days of their visit. In preliminary telephone discussions with agency personnel, the extent of agency decentralization was determined, and depending on the nature of the agency, a random selection of sub-districts and duty tours was made for the administration of the questionnaire. An agenda of the locations and tours selected was forwarded to the agency. Those agenda were confirmed, and subordinate commanders were advised of the researchers' impending visit. A liaison officer was assigned by the agency to coordinate the activities of the research team and to provide transportation to the various locations. Upon arrival, the team was accompanied to the selected sub-districts where specifics regarding the Project were explained to the agency personnel in charge. In each city, the researchers were expected, and the requested time for questionnaire administration was allocated. When the subjects were

²

James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.

patrol officers, a fifteen minute period prior to "roll call" was reserved for this purpose; in investigative and administrative settings less formal questionnaire administration procedures were followed; usually the questionnaire was administered to individuals at their worksite.

Each group of subjects was provided with a brief explanation of the Project. They were informed that it was part of a national survey of police ethics and that once the questionnaires were completed and collected, agency personnel would not be permitted to see them. Before beginning to complete the questionnaire, officers were advised that their responses would remain anonymous and that completion time varied from seven to twelve minutes. The research team was present to distribute and to collect the questionnaires.

Because the size of the groups were consistently small - the largest group consisted of 37 officers - it was possible to assure a 100 percent return rate. Although some respondents declined to answer some questions, only nine questionnaires were returned blank. The data summary (Appendix 2) indicates which questionnaires were not completed and the categories in which the omissions occurred. The following chart illustrates the number of questionnaires administered by city. The use of the approximate total size of the agency is consistent with the Project's efforts to protect the agencies confidentiality.

Police Officer Sample Size		
City	Officers Surveyed	Approximate Number of Sworn Personnel
A	90	200
B	104	400
C	204	700
D	124	600
E	71	200
F	206	1000
G	152	1300
H	190	1300

Officers other than patrol officers were surveyed in each participating agency. Questionnaires from these groups were coded to indicate the specialized unit from which respondents came. Comparison of these questionnaires with those of patrol officers indicate no significant differences in responses.

Public Sample

It was decided by the Project that questionnaires in each city would be mailed to public respondents and that the assistance of local college or university personnel

would be sought to assist in its administration. The two most serious problems from the Project's point of view were the nature of the questionnaire itself and the reliability of college assistants to adhere to the questionnaire administration methodology and time schedule. It was felt that the sensitive nature of the questionnaire - a request for impressions of the local public regarding the level of police corruption in the community - might reduce the expected number of completed returns. Unanticipated problems by the college assistants regarding the preparation, mailing, collection, or immediate forwarding of the returns might further effect the response rate. Consequently, a local coordinator in each city was selected prior to the Project's on-site visit for the administration of the public questionnaire. The research staff then discussed the administration of the questionnaire with the local coordinator during the site visit.

The administration of the public questionnaire was as follows, with the first three steps conducted by the Project staff.

1. A cover letter to respondents was prepared to explain the nature of the survey and to provide instructions regarding its proper completion.
2. A random sample of subjects was selected from the local telephone directory in each of the selected cities.
3. A list of the randomly selected subjects, a copy of the cover letter and 500 copies of the questionnaire were sent to the local coordinator.
4. The local coordinator was instructed to reproduce the cover letter on university stationery and to mail one copy of it, a questionnaire, and a stamped self-addressed envelope with local university return address to each of the subjects selected.
5. The 500 questionnaires were mailed at one time, and the returns were forwarded, unopened, to Project researchers as they were received.

As anticipated, the return rate of the questionnaires was low. In cities "C" and "G" personnel changes of local assistants resulted in confusion and delay. In city "C" problems were never resolved despite repeated efforts of the research staff. In city "G" the mailing and collection problems occurred too late in the program to allow for effective tabulation. The following are the return rates for the public questionnaire:

Public Questionnaire Returns by City				
City	No.	Return Address		Return Rate
		Unknown	Completed Returns	
A	500	72	113	26.4%
B	500	54	137	30.7%
C	500	58	61	13.8%
D	500	33	133	28.4%
E	500	44	166	25.4%

F	500	50	143	31.7%
G	500	49	77	17.1%
H			200	(3)

Generally a response rate of at least 50 percent is considered adequate for analysis and reporting although the percentage has no statistical basis. Ideally, all members of an initial sample would complete and return their questionnaires (4) but they very rarely do. Even under the controlled conditions imposed by the Project in administering the police questionnaire, response bias becomes a concern. A brief review of the survey literature will reveal a wide range of acceptable response percentages. The literature does indicate that there are perhaps different return rate expectations depending on the nature of the survey. Because no empirical research involving the public in a national survey of police corruption was found, the Advisory Board of the Project estimated that the expected return rate from a mailed self-administered questionnaire similar in content to the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, would be from 25 and 30 percent.

Despite the limitations that a low return rate imposes in terms of statistical inference, the narrative of the analysis of the public sample will describe the data as though it were drawn from a somewhat smaller random sample of the total population than it actually was.

Survey Instrument

The Project's questionnaire was composed of five scales developed specifically for the research: the Personal Standards of Honesty Scale (PSN), the Discipline Scale (DISC), the Report Scale (RPT), the Typology Scale and the Professionalism Scale. The first three scales are based upon the theory of Guttman scaling which maintains that if respondents are given a series of three or more activities related in some way to a variable under consideration (in this research, unethical behavior) some of the activities may prove to be more certain or "harder" indicators of that variable than others. If, after testing among several groups, an order or scale of "hardness" among items emerges that has a coefficient of reproduceability of 90 percent or over (in 90 cases out of 100, groups will arrange the activities in the same order), that order constitutes a Guttman scale for that sample of respondents, and they may be rated or scored in relation to it. Based on the theory of Guttman scaling, the Project's questionnaire listed eight improbable activities which the researchers felt would be generally understandable to police officers throughout the country. The activities were listed randomly in the questionnaire as follows:

3

City H was surveyed with the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire during Phase I. Project records do not indicate the exact number of question sent to the public in this city.

4

Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. 1973. pp. 165.

1. diff. easy a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your area.
2. diff. easy d. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
3. diff. easy e. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.
4. diff. easy f. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes.
5. diff. easy g. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
6. diff. easy h. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman in your patrol area.
7. diff. easy i. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use.
8. diff. easy j. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre.

Questionnaires were administered in six police agencies in Phase I of the Project from 1975 to 1976 and to eight additional departments in Phase II from 1977 to 1979. The sample size ranged from 50 to 150 respondents depending on department size or of approximately 750 officers in Phase I and 1200 officers in Phase II. The first part of a scale is not a scale until it's been evaluated. The questionnaire asked respondents if in terms of their own standards of honesty it would be difficult or easy for them, as police officers, to justify certain activities. In each of eight items, respondents were to circle "difficult" or "easy" on the questionnaire. The random listing of the eight items was reordered by the respondents according to the level of seriousness they attached to each activity. For example, 95 percent of the respondents in a department might consider accepting a free cup of coffee as being easy to justify as opposed to only 40 percent who might be able to justify taking a \$10 gift at Christmas time. In each of the six departments, tested during Phase I of the Project, respondents reordered the eight items in the same way. The results - number 1 activity easiest to justify and 8 the most difficult - were as follows:

1. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your patrol area
2. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area
3. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area
4. using your police badge or ID badge to gain free access to a movie theatre
5. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman in your patrol area
6. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident

7. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use
8. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate

Although the reordering of the individual activities was the same in each of the site agencies surveyed, the mean number of respondents who selected one of more items as being easy to justify varied. Using the total survey population within a department, a score for each agency was determined.

The second part of the questionnaire, using the same eight activities, asked respondents to indicate which of the activities they would be disciplined for if it became known to their immediate supervisors that they were engaging in them.

The reordering of the items was similar to the reordering for Scale I, and the mean score by department for each item, although not identical, was similar for Scale I and Scale II. Departments in which officers had a higher improbity reading (a high reading indicates more corruptability in terms of their own standards of honesty (Scale I) also scored a high reading on the disciplinary Scale II (the higher the reading the greater tolerance for unethical behavior by supervisors).

A third part of the Questionnaire was developed late in Phase I of the project to determine at what level of observed impropus behavior would one police officer report that activity. Again the same eight activities were listed, and respondents were asked to indicate if they would report a fellow officer whom they observed engaging in them. The data indicate that even in police departments registering low levels of unethical activities, the tendency among officer not to report unethical behavior on the part of their peers is high.

It should be stressed that the researchers did not attempt to identify specifically the entire scope of unethical activities in the police milieu. The scales represent a range of impropus police behavior from least to most serious and are prototypes of other corrupt or criminal activities. The significance of each of the McCormack/Fishman typologies as prototypes are indicated as follows:

Typology #1: Accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your area.

This activity was used to represent the free acceptance of any small item or privilege like newspapers or parking spaces, on a routine basis. These items include those for which the public is normally charged a fee and those which are obtained based solely on one's status as a police officer.

Typology #2: Accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.

This activity is the prototype for police officer acceptance, at discount, of any item or service for which the general public is charged full price whereas the item can be obtained solely on the basis of police officer status.

Typology #3: Accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area

This activity is used to represent police acceptance, at no cost, of more significant items or services than those indicated in Typology #1. These items include free dry cleaning, cigarettes, drinks, for which the general public normally pays full price but which are bestowed upon police solely on the basis of the police officer status.

Typology #4: Using your police badge or ID to gain free access to movie theatre

This activity is representative of pro-active attempts on the part of officers, usually on off-duty time, to gain access to entertainment and exhibition areas at no cost when the general public is required to pay an admission fee.

Typology #5: Accepting \$10 at Christmas time from a businessman in your patrol area.

This typology signifies the acceptance of any gift or service on a periodic basis (once or twice a year) as a reward or "tip" for performing routine patrol duties.

Typology #6: Accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes.

This activity typifies situations in which a police officer takes advantage of his official capacity to provide preferential treatment or referrals to business or professional people like lawyers, bondsmen, or undertakers. A gift or fee is expected and received by the officer in connection with such activities.

Typology #7: Discovering an open business at night and removing merchandise for personal use.

This activity represents situations in which police officers abuse their public trust to engage in acts of theft and other opportunistic criminal acts by removing property from a corpse, an injured individual, or a drunk.

Typology #8: Accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.

This activity is used to represent the acceptance of money, sexual favors, or drinks from individuals conducting business outside the local laws established by the community.

An almost identical questionnaire was sent to a randomly selected group of 500 citizens in each of eight cities.

Scale #4 of the questionnaire, the Typology Scale was developed during Phase I of the Project. It was designed to assess the impressions of the public and the police regarding the levels of police corruption in the community. A series of seven corrupt activities ranging from free meals to coercing money from illegal vice operations

was included. Respondents were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in this activity?" The activities were presented individually, and respondents were asked to select one of the following responses: "almost all," "a large number," "quite a few," "very few," or "none."

It became clear as data analysis progressed that the number of responses was too great. The data was collapsed into three categories - "a large number," "very few," and "none" - and then into two when it became apparent that the most significant category was "none."

Scale #5 - Professionalism Scale - was developed at the beginning of Phase II of Project. It reflects the theory that some departments are more "professional" than others as measured by certain criteria and that a sense of professionalism has an impact on police ethics. It was also theorized that in departments, varied in terms of union/management identification, there was a relationship between the degree of unionization and the level and intensity of department discipline. The following eight statements were developed to assess public and police impressions of "police professionalism."

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do so.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

With the exception of statements #6 and #8, there were significantly different responses to the statements between the public and the police and between police and other police in the survey cities. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to the examination of the significant differences between the public and the police in the survey.

City A - Eastern Metropolitan Suburb

City A in the suburb of an Eastern Metropolis, has a population of approximately 75,000 people in an area of approximately ten square miles. Its police department, comprised of a decentralized force of neighborhood patrol teams, numbers just under 200 sworn personnel. The city government is headed by a city manager.

The city has been aptly described by one police officer as a "goldfish bowl." To him everyone in the department and the city, either know him or could easily identi-

fy him by the number of his squad car. The high visibility of police in City A seems to have greatly decreased individual officers' willingness to involve themselves in im-probus behavior. They also had few opportunities to engage in corrupt activities, because no pornographic theatres or bookstores, massage parlors or prostitution etc., exist in City A, although there is evidence of some bookmaking operations.

The following analysis of data generated in City A is based upon the Project's McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire. Appendix 2 provides a chi-square analysis of each item.

Statistical Summary City A Data

1. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified action)?

Public Question - Interm of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity)?

The figures in Table A-1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each of eight specified activities were easy to justify:

Table A-1

PSN SCALE (EASY)	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	86.5	65.1
DISCOUNTED MEAL	52.3	62.7
FREE MEAL	30.6	46.4
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	25.7	35.7
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	42.7	23.5
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	.9	8.3
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	.0	3.5
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	1.8	1.2

In Table A-2, little difference occurs between the responses of the police and the public on the Personal Standards of Honesty Scale (hereinafter referred to as the PSN Scale). Both groups have relatively low scores which indicates that according to their personal standards of honesty they would be able to justify few of the listed items. It must be remembered that these scores are means for each group and are, therefore, affected by extreme scores. Consequently, an item analysis was conducted to determine the impact of individual item scores on the scale mean.

Table A-2

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
PSN						
Group 1	113	2.3274	1.448	0.136	2.12	0.000
Group 2	90	2.2889	2.111	0.222		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T DEGREES OF FREEDOM		T DEGREES OF FREEDOM				
VALUE	PROB.	VALUE	PROB.			
0.15	201	0.878		0.15	151.34	0.883

On individual items in Table A-1 and Appendix 2, it becomes apparent that the response to specific improbous behavior varies significantly. Three distinct levels of corruption emerge. The first distinction is consistent with the observation made by the Knapp Commission Report⁵ that there are at least two levels of police corruption: the "grass eating" corruption or minor low-level improbity and "meat-eating" corruption in which rewards are high and the officer plays an aggressive pro-active role. The police and the public tend generally to agree about low-level and high-level corruption; they are unconcerned and tacitly approving of the former, and solicitous and opposed to the latter.

A mid-level of improbity also became apparent in the Project's scale and consists of activity toward which the officers and public respond with ambivalence. In the Project's analysis the three levels will be referred to as:

- a) Low-level Mc/F Items 1 & 2
- b) Mid-level Mc/F Items 3, 4, & 5
- c) High-level Mc/F Items 6, 7, 8

⁵

The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption, George Braziller, N. Y. Report of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Cities Anti-Corruption Procedures. Issued August 3, 1972, p. 65

The public and the police generally agree about low-level and high-level corrupt activities. About mid-level activities, statistically significant differences appear between the two groups. The public is less tolerant of what they view as corrupt behavior in two of the three mid-level activities and more tolerant than the police about activity on the third. They reject the idea that it is easy to tolerate police officers who accept free meals (69.4%) and use their police I.D. for special favors (77.3%). More than 42% of the public feel that giving a police officer \$10.00 at Christmas time is appropriate, but accepting such a gift is difficult for 76.5% of the police officers to justify. The difference between the public and police will be followed and correlated with the public's attitudes regarding the police on the professionalism scale. The public in City A may regard their police as like sanitation workers or mailmen, who customarily receive a tip at Christmas, or police may be reacting to the fact that the tip is specified as money rather than a bottle of liquor or a Christmas turkey. For most police officers the idea of taking money from the public for any reason may appear more corrupt than gifts of other kinds. Officers who think of themselves as professionals may perceive the idea of taking money at Christmas time as degrading. The data from City A indicate that items 3, 4 and 5 differentiate between the police and the public as groups.

A study of the data in Appendix 2 indicates that in the corruption category, there is no significant difference between the police and the public on two of the three items. On the third item, a larger percentage of police officers can justify accepting money from a towing company for giving it preferential treatment at accident scenes. During the ride-along interviews, it was confirmed that accepting money from towing companies was fairly routinely practiced by accident investigators within this department. However, only 8.3% of the officers in the department could justify the activity. It should also be stressed that the activities which differentiated the public and the police were not activities for which officers would ordinarily be criminally charged if caught. They were moderately serious corrupt activities that might not warrant prosecution but that did go beyond parameters of generosity usually associated with casual business friendships.

2. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked their impression about how serious their immediate supervisor would regard each of eight activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question - If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed below, for which activity would you be disciplined? The figures in Table A-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for eight activities:

Table A-3

DISC. SCALE	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	79.9
DISCOUNTED MEAL	64.0
FREE MEAL	57.5

POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	54.0
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	25.3
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	8.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	4.6
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	3.4

The Disciplinary Scale was not included in the public questionnaire because the Project felt that the public would have insufficient knowledge of the internal organization of a police department to make the necessary judgments.

The data clearly indicates that most officers felt they would not be disciplined if their superior became aware that they were engaged in the first four activities. It is evident from a comparison of Tables A-1 and A-3 that the respondents felt their own personal standards of honesty exceed those set for them by departmental supervisors. As the analysis continues, comparisons between agencies will be made to assess the impact of internal discipline on levels of integrity, because researchers felt that internal discipline had an important impact on the level of corruption in an agency.

3. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question - I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question - I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table A-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table A-4

RPT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	97.3	89.2
DISCOUNTED MEAL	78.2	85.9
FREE MEAL	73.6	84.7
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	58.2	81.0
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	64.5	58.8

GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	11.8	36.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	4.6	23.3
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	7.3	20.0

There are significant differences between the public and the police about reporting observed corrupt behavior on the part of officers. As expected, Table A-4 indicates that the police are much more reluctant to report their peers than the public for the same activity, and it was expected the non-reporting of police by police would be seen in all cities, even in highly ethical departments. The practice of not reporting peers for unethical or incompetent acts is not unusual within professional groups whose secrecy regarding their activities is viewed as a form of protection against legal action or criticism. Police officers are apparently sensitive to the same kind of protection of their security. For police, individual officers had to commit very serious acts for their peers to report them.

Table A-5

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)		F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION		
RPT					
Group 1	108	3.9352	1.805	0.174	
Group 2	82	4.8780	2.349	0.259	1.69 0.011
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE			
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
-3.13	188	0.002	-3.02	147.48	0.003

In the Ride-along interviews, it was indicated that police officers who "gave up" and reported their fellow officers were ostracized by the group.

The sensitivity of police to criticism can be supported by the item on the Professionalism Scale which states that the public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment. The public (67%) agrees with that statement, but only 23.9% of the police do. In the police subculture, the inclination to report is tempered by a fear of rejection by the group. The public seems reluctant to become involved or may fear reprisal if a report is made. To report police misconduct, most complainants must appear in person or give their names and addresses. The Project was concerned about the level of reporting of both groups, because very few pro-active Internal Affairs units exist within police agencies. That fully 20% of the officers in City A's department would not report their peers for corruption effectively provides immunity from discovery considering the low visibility of these acts.

4. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table A-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

Table A-6

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OFF DUTY TIME	55.9	36.0
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	57.1	77.5
REFRAIN FROM STRIKING	86.7	53.4
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	69.9	55.2
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	67.0	23.9
COLLEGE EDUCATION	49.1	43.2
PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORTANT	95.5	80.5
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	95.5	89.7

In City A statistically significant results occurred on six of the eight items; those items differentiate the two groups (Appendix 2). Both the public and the police agreed that officers should have some college education prior to being employed and that the public has a right to expect police to work continually to upgrade their skills. However, the two groups disagreed about the right of police to strike; sacrificing off-duty time; levels of police integrity; the use of force; the right to be critical of police errors of judgment; and the importance of the police service role. Interestingly, fewer of the public than the police thought that the police should have higher ethical standards than the rest of the community. The response may have been affected by the structure of item 2. It may have been interpreted to reflect on individual or community standards if respondents indicated an expectation of higher standards for the police. On the other items, the public had higher expectations of the police than the police felt the public had a right to demand.

Table A-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
PROFESSN						
Group 1	107	2.9591	0.353	0.034	1.409	0.102
Group 2	83	2.5693	0.417	0.046		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
6.69	188	0.000		6.832	159.98	0.000

The police were particularly sensitive to criticism by the public for errors in judgment, apparently reflecting the sensitive nature of police decision-making and the immediacy with which decisions are made. Five of the six items for which statistical significance was indicated were at the .001 level which expressed the degree of disagreement between the two groups (See Appendix 2).

5. Typology Scale

On the Typology Scale, a series of improbable police activities are listed. The public and police were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed are:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafeguarded property.
5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.
6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or a ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table A-8 represent the percentage of respondents who felt that none of the police in City A engaged in the activities:

Table A-8

TYPOLOGY SCALE (Percent NONE)	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPTING FREE MEALS	3.75	8.6
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	2.5	13.5
ACCEPTING MONEY FROM BUSINESS	10.97	49.3
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN USE	22.8	67.9
OVERLOOK VIOLATIONS FOR MONEY	6.8	74.0
ACCEPTING TRAFFIC BRIBES	15.9	80.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER, ETC.	14.1	82.5

The Typology Scale was developed to determine the differences between the public and the police in terms of impressions of police integrity. The seven-item scale elicited responses from participants regarding the number of police in their community they thought were engaged in a series of corrupt activities. The five choices on each question ranged from "almost all" to "none." The Scale was eventually collapsed to reflect the "none" responses and all others.

This scale is different than the first three Guttman Scales on the McCormack/Fishman Questionnaire. The two lower-level improbis measures on this scale were accepting free meals, and shopping in uniform (both of these activities fall into the area of middle-level corruption on each of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scales.) On these measures no significant differences existed between the public and police perceptions. (See Appendix 2 Table 5A) Most of both groups believed that a sizable number of police officers engaged in such activities. The other four items on the scale indicate that the majority of police but not the public feel that no officers are involved in these activities. (Exception taking money from a businessman.) The contrast in terms of the numbers of the public and the police who feel that way is, however, statistically significant. (See Appendix 2 for tables reflecting chi-square significance levels for this data.) As can be seen in Table A-8, the majority of public respondents felt that a significant number of police were engaging in improbis behavior.

Table A-9

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
TYPOLGY Group 1	113	5.1011	2.249	0.212	2.71	0.000
Group 2	90	4.8381	1.367	0.144		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
0.98	201	0.331		1.03	188.86	0.305

6. Demographic Factors

In City A 90 police respondents and 113 public respondents participated in the Project's survey. The average age of police was 32 years, with a range of from 22 to 58 years of age. The majority were white (86%) males (95%) with at least some college education (70%). Seventy-nine percent were married. They were members of City A's police department for an average of nine years, with individual employment ranging from one to thirty-one years. Over 50% were patrol officers. The public participants from City A were an average of 49.9 years of age, with a range between 18 and 80 years (seven of the respondents did not divulge their age). Ninety-six percent were white; 3.8% were black; 61.3% had some college education; and approximately 92.0% were married.

Table A-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
Age (mean)	49.8	32.7
Sex	M=70 F=30	M=95 F=5
Race	W=96.2 B=3.8	W=86 B=14
Education	HS=8.5 HS=30.2 C=61.3	HS=0 HS=30 C=70
Marital Status	M=91.8 S=8.2	M=78.9 S=21.1
Salary (median)		\$15-19k
Years in Dept.		9.1
Present Assignment		52.3
Sample Size (N)	113	90

City B - New England Urban

City B is in New England. It is approximately 20 square miles in area and has a population of more than 150,000 people. During the day, the population increases to more than a million, but when the work force leaves for the suburbs, the population diminishes. The city is governed by a city manager.

The decentralized police department has over 400 sworn officers. The team policing concept has been introduced and, although decreases in manpower have occurred, major crimes in City B had been stabilized for three years before the Project's on-site visit. The department had received several federally funded projects, including a Community Development grant, a Multi-Service Center, and a Regional Access Radio Frequency.

The population of City B is approximately 50 percent black and Hispanic. There are few pornographic or general movie theatres, porno book stores or massage parlors. However, prostitution primarily among Blacks, is evident on the streets. Many bar/restaurant establishments are located within the city limits.

Statistical Summary City B Data

1. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity?).

Public Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity?).

The figures in Table B-1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table B-1

PSN SCALE (EASY)	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	84.5	75.0
DISCOUNTED MEAL	55.9	63.1
FREE MEAL	49.6	38.2
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	18.3	18.4
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	45.0	4.9
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	11.4	1.9
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	3.8	0.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	3.1	1.0

In Table B-2 a significant difference between the police and the public is indicated on Personal Standards of Honesty mean scores. The police found it difficult to justify most

Table B-2

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)				
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
PSN						
Group 1	134	2.5970	1.756	0.152	1.37	0.093
Group 2	103	1.0097	1.498	0.148		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T VALUE		DEGREES OF FREEDOM
		2.72	235	2.77		232.41
		0.007			0.006	

of the listed activities, but the public found it easy to condone improbable behavior by police in approximately a third of these activities.

On the two least serious improbable items - acceptance of free coffee and discounted meals - no significant difference occurred in the responses of both groups who generally found the activities easy to justify. The three most serious activities - removing unprotected merchandise for personal use; accepting money from tow truck operators; and accepting bribes from a gambler - were difficult for both groups to justify.

As in City A, the items that differentiated the two groups were those concerning mid-level improbity.

Of the three mid-level activities, item #5, differentiated clearly between the groups. Approximately one half of the public respondents found it easy to justify a police officer accepting a Christmas gratuity or tip, but only 5 percent of the police concur with the public. The differences on item #5 are significant at the .95 level. The police found the other two items (#3 and #4) of mid-level corruption more difficult to condone than the public. Although the level of significance is above the .05 level on these Items #3 and #4, the tendency of the public to take these items less seriously than the police is clear. The public response to officers accepting Christmas gratuities is similar to the responses on this item in City A and may be related to the way the public views their police in these municipalities.

2. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how serious their immediate supervisor would regard each of the listed activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator),

Police Question - If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed, for which activity would you be disciplined? The figures in Table B-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for eight activities:

Table B-3

DISC. SCALE	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	79.9
DISCOUNTED MEAL	66.0
FREE MEAL	64.3
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	37.0
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	5.9
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	2.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	2.9
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	3.0

The level of discipline as perceived by members of the police department in City B is low. Officers indicated that they would not be disciplined for most low-level and mid-level improbable behavior. They are consistent in their feelings that they would be disciplined for accepting money from gamblers, from tow truck companies, and taking unprotected merchandise. Almost all police (95 percent) expected to be disciplined for accepting Christmas gratuities. In this department, the Chief of Police, who originally served in a major city police agency, took a strong position against accepting Christmas gratuities. From interviews with officers in the department, it was clear that the chief's concern was strongly reinforced by disciplinary action each year. The questionnaire responses further confirmed that police were aware of the chief's attitude: "it was not worth taking a chance on being caught accepting Christmas gratuities."

3. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question - I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question - I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table B-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table B-4

REPORT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	91.4	96.0
DISCOUNTED MEAL	81.3	92.0
FREE MEAL	79.6	97.0
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	40.6	71.0
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	58.7	46.0
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	12.2	33.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	6.1	20.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	7.6	14.0

In Table B-4, statistically significant differences between the public and police groups can be seen in four of the eight items listed. (See Appendix 2).

Table B-5

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
RPT Group 1	34	3.6176	1.826	0.313	1.02	0.970
Group 2	96	4.7396	1.848	0.189		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM 2-TAIL PROB.	
-3.05	128	0.003		-3.07	58.61	0.003

The public is much more likely than the police to report an officer observed engaging in corrupt activities. The two low-level improbable acts do not differentiate between the groups, although more of the public than the police would report officers who accepted discounted meals. Both groups would report police accepting money from a gambler. Although both groups found it difficult to justify removing unprotected merchandise for personal use, a significant difference exists in the levels of reporting. The police are less likely than the public to report this kind of theft perhaps because this kind of improbity usually occurs in low visibility situations and will generally go undetected if unreported by peers.

Mid-level corruption differentiates between the groups. On all three items, the public would report at higher levels than police (these tendencies are statistically significant at the .00 level). Only concerning Christmas gratuities would the public report at levels lower than the police. Apparently because the public felt that the activity is easy to justify according to their own personal standards of honesty.

4. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.

7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table B-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

Table B-6

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OWN TIME	46.9	32.7
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	57.9	74.0
REFRAIN FROM STRIKES	64.6	51.0
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	66.0	63.5
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	60.0	30.8
COLLEGE EDUCATION	38.1	33.7
PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORTANT	87.4	80.8
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	94.8	94.2

Unlike City A, which showed statistically significant differences between the public and the police on five of the seven items in this scale, City B shows agreement between the two groups on all but two items. More of the public than the police feel that they have a right to be critical of police errors in judgment; significantly more police feel that the public have a right to expect the police to have higher ethical standards than the public. Almost statistically significant are the items concerning public expectations that the police will not strike and that police will willingly give up their off duty time when required. On both items, fewer police agreed that the public had a right to expect such eventualities. Approximately two thirds of the public and police agreed that the police should use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters; more than 80% of each group felt that the police service role was very important. The two items on education and training did not discriminate between the two groups.

The major differences in the public and the police in City B concerned police work conditions. Newspaper accounts in City B indicated strong differences between departmental administrators and the police union regarding work conditions, and a labor-management dispute of almost three months duration could account for the differing expectations of the public and the police.

Table B-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)				
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
PROGRESSN Group 1	124	2.8448	0.419	0.038	1.08	0.679
Group 2	102	2.5833	0.043	0.043		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL VALUE FREEDOM PROB.			SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE T DEGRESS OF 2-TAIL VALUE FREEDOM PROB.			
4.58	224	0.000	4.567	212.29	0.000	

5. Typology Scale

On the Typology Scale a series of improbis police activities were tested. The public and police were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed are:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafeguarded property.
5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.
6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table B-8 represent the percentage of respondents who felt that none of the police in City B engaged in the activities:

Table B-8

TYPOLGY SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPTING FREE MEALS	3.4	3.9
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	7.7	13.0
ACCEPTING MONEY FROM BUSINESS	10.2	57.2
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN USE	17.2	54.0
OVERLOOKING VIOLATIONS FOR \$	7.0	59.3
ACCEPTING TRAFFIC BRIBES	16.9	67.3
MONEY FROM GAMBLER, ETC.	9.6	65.0

The data in Table B-8 clearly indicates that the public and the police have different perceptions of the level of integrity within the police department. Statistically different findings at the .00 level occur on five of the seven items. Fewer of the public than of the police believed that "none" of the officers engaged in the listed activities while the police had a tendency to perceive themselves to be more honest than the public thought they were.

Table B-9

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)				
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
TYPOLGY Group 1	134	4.4094	1.878	0.162	4.09	0.000
Group 2	103	4.4591	0.928	0.091		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL VALUE FREEDOM PROB.			SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE T DEGRESS OF 2-TAIL VALUE FREEDOM PROB.			
0.16	235	0.877	0.17	204.09	0.867	

6. Demographic Factors

A total of 137 public in City B responded to the questionnaire. The mean age of respondents was 44.94 years. Over half (57%) of the group were male, and most (91%) were white. There were no Hispanic respondents. Sixty-three percent were married. The educational level of the respondents in this sample was relatively high; almost ten percent indicated that they had some post-graduate training and three percent claimed having earned doctorates. Many (43.2%) indicated that they had a high school diploma.

Table B-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
AGE (MEAN)	44.94	34.6
SEX	M=57 F=43	M-98.8 F=1.2
RACE	W=91 B=9	W-93.8 B=6.2
EDUCATION	HS=10 HS=33.2 C=55	HS=2.6 HS=36.4 C=61
MARITAL STATUS	M=63 S=36	M-91.9 S=8.1
SALARY (MEDIAN)	25-30 K	15-19 K
YEARS IN DEPT.		10.9
PRESENT ASSIGNMENT		68.2 PATROL
SAMPLE SIZE (N)	137	104

There were 104 police respondents with an average of 35 years of age; they ranged from 23 to 55 years of age. Most were male (98.8%) and white (93.8%). Most (60%) of the officers had some college education, and only a few (2.6%) indicated that they had less than a high school education. Most (92%) were married.

On the average, officers had been employed by the department for 10 years. The range of employment was from less than one year to 25 years. A large group of the respondents (68%) were patrol officers, and as in City A, most officers indicated that they earned between \$15,000 and \$20,000 annually.

City C - Northwest Urban

City C is located in the extreme Northwest and is approximately 100 square miles in area. It has a population of almost 400,000 people. The police department, which is decentralized, has a sworn force in excess of 700, more than 90 percent of whom are Caucasian.

The department, which seems to function in an atmosphere of cooperative innovation, has an in-house computer capability for research work. Almost all of the sworn personnel have at least an Associate's degree, with a majority having a B.A. or B.S. degree.

City C has few pornographic theaters located in the downtown area of the city. There is no obvious "red light" district. There are no gambling houses although they legally exist in an adjacent municipality. There is a large homosexual population whose activities are generally limited to several bars.

Statistical Summary City C Data

1. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity?).

Public Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity?).

The figures in Table C-1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table C-1		
PSN SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	84.1	77.7
DISCOUNTED MEAL	48.4	41.3
FREE MEAL	38.7	10.8
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	9.5	3.9
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	38.7	3.4
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	3.2	1.5
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	0.0	0.5
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	0.0	0.5

In Table C-2 significant differences between the two groups occur on the PSN scores.

Table C-2

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public -- group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
PSN						
Group 1	63	2.1429	1.490	0.188		
Group 2	206	1.3786	1.083	0.075	1.89	0.001
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM			
4.46	267	0.000		3.78	82.99	0.000

On the scale police score significantly lower (indicating higher levels of personal honesty) than the public although both groups indicate higher standards of honesty than do both groups in City A and B.

The police in City C find it difficult to justify all but the most insignificant im-probus acts and their feelings are reconfirmed by the public.

Little difference occurs between the public and the police on low-level and high-level items. Almost no one can justify either of the third-level activities, and most (50%) of both groups have difficulty in terms of police officers accepting discounted meals. Police officers and the public (approximately 90% of each group) find it difficult according to their own personal standards of honesty, to justify police officers engaging in all but two of the remaining activities. The police (61.3%) find it difficult to justify a police officer accepting free meals and the same percentage cannot justify the police accepting Christmas gratuities.

2. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how serious their immediate superior would regard each of the listed activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question - If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed, for which activity would you be disciplined?

The figures in Table C-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for eight activities:

Table C-3

DISC. SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE		86.1
DISCOUNTED MEAL		58.3
FREE MEAL		37.9
POLICE I. D., FOR MOVIE		17.1
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS		5.4
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY		2.5
REMOVING MERCHANDISE		2.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER		2.0

Almost all of the police in this department indicated that they would be disciplined by their immediate supervisor if they were observed engaging in any of the third-level activities like gambling (98%), taking unprotected merchandise (98%), and accepting money from tow truck operators (97.5%). There was agreement at a slightly lower percentage level and police would be disciplined for all mid-level activities. Most officers agreed that they would not be disciplined for accepting free coffee or a discounted meal. Consistently personal standards of honesty exceeded departmental expectations in City C for this department had high demands for internal integrity, but individual standards were higher than expected by the Project's researchers.

3. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question - I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question - I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table C-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table C-4

REPORT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	96.9	97.5
DISCOUNTED MEAL	73.0	90.2
FREE MEAL	73.0	90.6
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	37.5	71.8
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	55.6	45.5
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	12.9	11.4
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	3.1	2.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	4.8	3.9

In Table C-4 the police have higher scores (less tendency to report) than the public. The items for which significant differences exist between the two groups are discounted meals,

Table C-5

T Test
(Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
RPT						
Group 1	61	3.4918	1.660	0.212	1.32	0.165
Group 2	198	4.1263	1.446	0.103		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE					SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE	
T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL VALUE					T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
-2.89	257	0.004			-2.69	89.85 0.009

free meals, and using police I. D. to gain access to movies and other entertainment. For these items, police reporting tendencies are low. From interviews it became known that a very small number of police officers engaged in these activities which were discouraged but not considered to be especially serious by the administration. In the interviews respondents said they did not report peers engaged in these activities because the activities were not serious enough a violation to jeopardize an officer's standing.

4. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do so.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table C-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OWN TIME	34.9	42.4
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	66.7	82.3
REFRAIN FROM STRIKES	70.3	65.8
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	60.3	71.1
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	46.9	32.8
COLLEGE EDUCATION	71.4	53.5
PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORTANT	95.2	74.9
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	93.7	93.1

Significant differences between the public and the police exist in Table C-6.

Table C-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)			F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR		
PROFESSN						
Group 1	59	2.8390	0.377	0.049	1.09	0.649
Group 2	199	2.6847	0.361	0.026		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T DEGRESS OF 2-TAIL VALUE		FREEDOM PROB.		
2.85	256	0.005		2.79	91.80	0.006

A larger percentage of the police (82.3%) than the public (66.7%) believe that the public has a right to expect the police to have higher ethical standards than themselves. However, a larger proportion of the public (71.4%) than the police (53.5%) feel that police should have some college education prior to employment. Interestingly, the public felt less strongly than police about the importance of the police service role apparently due to a gradual rise in the crime rate in City C. The rest of the items did not significantly discriminate between the two groups.

5. Typology Scale

On the Typology Scale a series of improbis police activities were tested. The public and police were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed are:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafeguarded property.
5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.
6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table C-8 represent the percentage of respondents who feel that none of the police in City C engages in the activities:

Table C-8

T TYPOLOGY SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPT FREE MEALS	73.7	71.2
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	85.7	80.4
ACCEPT MONEY FROM BUSINESS	87.7	100.0
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN USE	93.1	100.0
OVERLOOK VIOLATIONS FOR \$	86.7	100.0
ACCEPT TRAFFIC BRIBES	94.9	100.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER, ETC.	90.0	100.0

In City C, public and the police have the same perception of the levels of honesty within the agency. The majority of both groups agree that almost no one in the department is engaging in serious forms of corrupt activity. The perception was confirmed

Table C-9

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)			F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR		
T TYPOLOGY						
Group 1	63	4.5306	1.369	1.369	3.77	0.000
Group 2	206	4.5950	0.705	0.049		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T DEGRESS OF 2-TAIL VALUE		FREEDOM PROB.		
-0.49	267	0.621		-0.36	72.33	0.721

by a newspaper survey by the Project that found a dearth of information related to police corruption. Project researchers, having analyzed all of the survey data, concluded that this Department was one of the two most ethical agencies examined.

The majority of both groups felt that some police officers were engaged in accepting free meals or using their police credentials for preferential treatment. Significant differences occurred for each of the other five items, however. On each of the statistically significant items, police officers indicated the existence of a higher level of internal integrity than the public indicated. Although the pattern of response in City C is the same as that established in Cities A and B, the public in City C felt that a lower percentage of its police were engaged in corrupt activity.

6. Demographic Factors

A total of 64 citizens responded to the questionnaire. Their ages ranged from 21 to 68 years with a mean age of 39.8 years. Most respondents were male (68%) and white (94.9%). The education level of the respondents was high; none indicated less than a high school education and most (83.3%) indicated that they had at least some college training. Most (75%) indicated that they were married. The police sample included 204 officers from the department. The average age of respondents was 33.8 years with a range of from 22 to 59 years of age. Most (94%) were male and only two officers indicated that they were non-white. Most (86%) of the officers had some college education; their amount of education was only slightly higher than the public's in City C. Almost 25 percent of the officers had completed college or were in post-graduate school. Most (80%) of the respondents were married.

Table C-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
AGE (Mean)	39.8	33.8
SEX	M=68.9 F=31.1	M=94.9 F=5.1
RACE	W=94.9 B=5.1	W=99 B=1.0
EDUCATION	HS=0 HS=16.7 C=83.3	HS=.5 HS=13.2 C=86.3
MARITAL STATUS	M=74.1 S=25.9	M=80.9 S=19.1
SALARY (median)	25-30 K	15-19K.
YEARS IN DEPT.		9.0
PRESENT ASSIGNMENT		63% PATROL
SAMPLE SIZE	64	204

The officers had an average of nine years of police service; slightly less than 10 percent had under one year of service. A large proportion (63%) of the sample were patrol officers; the rest were investigative and administrative personnel. The majority of respondents indicated salaries between \$15,000 and \$20,000 per year. Approximately 20 percent indicated that they made in excess of \$20,000.

City D - Suburb of a Southwestern Metropolis

Governed by a city manager, City D has a population of approximately 350,000 in an area of 50 square miles. Its police department, which numbers 600 sworn officers and 350 civilians including a large complement of CETA employees, maintains area policing with a centralized headquarters and area offices.

This suburb has a definite waterfront "STRIP" where licensed premises, X-rated theatres, massage parlors, pornographic book shops, flourish. These establishments along with many bars exist in other sections of the city. The black and Hispanic population is less than 20 percent.

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity?)

Public Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity?)

The figures in Table D-1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table D-1

PSN SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	74.8	93.0
DISCOUNTED MEAL	54.1	85.2
FREE MEAL	40.0	64.1
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	14.4	40.6
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	36.1	7.0
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	3.0	2.3
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	0.8	1.6
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	1.5	0.8

Table D-2 indicates that significant differences exist between the public and the police on this scale. Unlike City C, the public indicated a higher standard of honesty than the police in City D. Concerning high-level police corruption, no statistical differences existed between the responses of the two groups. Both had difficulty justifying

Table D-2

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)			F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR		
PSN						
Group 1	73	2.3014	1.613	0.189	1.62	0.019
Group 2	128	2.9453	1.269	0.112		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T VALUE		DEGREES OF FREEDOM		
-3.13	199	-2.93		123.12	0.004	

gifts from a towing company, removing merchandise, and accepting money from a gambler. The three items of mid-level corruption and the two low-level activities indicate significant differences between the public and the police. More of the police than the public can justify these activities. More than half of the police officers can justify the acceptance of free coffee, discounted meals, and free meals. The public was able by a majority to justify only the acceptance of two items. More than 40 percent of the police found it easy to justify the use of badge or I.D. to obtain preferential treatment, but only 14 percent of the public agreed. The public again found it easier than the police to justify Christmas gifts for police officers, the significant difference being at the .00 level.

2. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how serious their immediate superior would regard each of the listed activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question - If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities, for which activity would you be disciplined?

The figures in Table D-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for eight activities:

Table D-3

DISC. SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE		96.8
DISCOUNTED MEAL		89.0
FREE MEAL		87.2
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE		69.0
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS		12.6
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY		4.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE		1.6
MONEY FROM GAMBLER		2.4

The responses in Table D-3 indicate that there was almost no doubt in police officers regarding the disciplinary response to the eight unethical activities listed on the survey questionnaire. The four low-level forms of improbable behavior were acceptable, and an officer could expect his supervisor generally to overlook them. The four high-level improbity items - including accepting \$10 at Christmas time - the officers expected to be disciplined if observed engaging in them. On only one item did there appear to be ambivalence - on the use of police I.D. to obtain free admission to theatres, etc. Most officers were convinced they would not be disciplined for using their I.D.'s yet almost 60 percent expressed difficulty in engaging in this activity. It is not clear whether their difficulty was caused by a general availability of special passes, private access, and tradition, or whether using their I.D.'s was contrary to their own personal standards of honesty.

3. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question - I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question - I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table D-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table D-4

REPORT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	93.8	99.2
DISCOUNTED MEAL	82.3	96.9
FREE MEAL	81.4	99.2
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	43.8	91.2
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	59.7	59.2
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	6.9	27.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	0.8	7.1
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	3.1	7.9

The public and the police in City D differ significantly on whether they would report an officer they observed engaging in various corrupt acts. Officers were less likely than the public to report. Differences between the two groups on six of the eight items are statistically significant, and on no item except taking \$10 at Christmas are the police more willing than the public to report. Both groups agree on the items dealing with gamblers and accepting money at Christmas time. On the former, both groups agreed to report; on the latter, almost 60 percent of each group would not.

Table D-5

T Test
(Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
RPT						
Group 1	70	3.8714	1.483	0.177	1.56	0.033
Group 2	125	4.8800	1.189	0.106		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	
-5.19	193	0.000	-4.88	118.98	0.000	

Of the four lowest low-level forms of improbable behavior - including using police position to gain free access to the theatre, etc. - more than 90 percent of the police in Department D would not report their peers. However, 56 percent of the public would report an officer observed engaging in these four low-level activities.

4. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table D-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

Table D-6

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OWN TIME	47.4	32.0
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	63.6	78.1
REFRAIN FROM STRIKES	85.6	64.8
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	72.3	64.1
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	52.6	14.2
COLLEGE EDUCATION	58.8	52.4
PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORTANT	94.7	83.6
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	94.0	85.3

There are no differences between the public and the police concerning the right of the public to expect police to have some college education before hiring or to continue to upgrade their skills after employment. The difference between the public and the police relative to the use of extraordinary restraint in their encounters with the public

Table D-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
TYPOLOGY						
Group 1	116	4.5123	1.933	0.179		
Group 2	77	4.4378	0.597	0.068	10.48	0.000
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
0.33	191	0.744		0.39	145.89	0.699

is also not statistically significant. Of the remaining items including the police right to strike, giving up off duty time, the importance of the police service role and the public's right to be critical of the police errors, the public's expectations of the police is higher than the police feel they have a right to expect.

5. Typology Scale

On the Typology Scale a series of improbis police activities were listed. The public and police were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed are:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafeguarded property.
5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.

6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table D-8 represent the percentage of respondents who feel that none of the police in City D engaged in the activities:

Table D-8

TYPOLOGY SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPT FREE MEALS	3.5	0
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	16.9	4.7
ACCEPT MONEY FROM BUSINESS	12.0	70.9
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN USE	18.9	80.9
OVERLOOK VIOLATIONS FOR \$	15.5	78.0
ACCEPT TRAFFIC BRIBES	34.4	94.4
MONEY FROM GAMBLER, ETC.	16.9	90.4

The data in Table D-8 provides a similar pattern of responses those received from City A, B, and C. For the first two low-level items, police perceive that the number of officers engaged in these corrupt activities higher than what the public perceives. None of the police indicated that no one in the department accepts free meals; only some of the public indicate that no one engages in low-level corruption. Approximately 95 percent of the officers acknowledged that some officers shop in uniform; only 17% of the public says none shop in uniform.

Table D-9

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
PROFESSN						
Group 1	111	2.7939	0.381	0.036		
Group 2	72	2.6007	0.400	0.047	1.11	0.630
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
3.29	181	0.001		3.25	146.26	0.001

6. Demographic Factors

A total of 133 citizens of City D responded to the questionnaire. The average age of the public group was 49.7 years, and the range of ages was from 19 to 71 years. Most (69%) of the sample were males and all were white. More than half (58%) had at least some college and 14.6 percent were graduates or had acquired advanced degrees. Most (70%) were married. The sample included 122 police officers. The average age of respondents was 35 years of age; the youngest was 24 years old, and the oldest, 52.

Table D-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
AGE (Mean)	49.7	35.0
SEX	M=69.0 F=31	M=97.5 F=2.5
RACE	W=100 B=0	W=99.2 B=.8
EDUCATION	HS=7.3 HS=33.9 C=58.9	HS=.8 HS=14.8 C=84.4
MARITAL STATUS	M=67.2 S=32.7	M=64.3 S=15.7
SALARY (Median)	20-25 K	20-25K
YEARS IN DEPT.		10.16
PRESENT ASSIGN.		100% PATROL
SAMPLE SIZE	133	128

The sample included two female officers and one black. Most (85%) of the respondents had some college and 29 officers indicated that they had completed college or were in graduate school at the time of the survey. Most (84.3%) were married. The officers surveyed had an average of 10.1 years of police experience, and 74 percent earned a salary between \$20,000 and \$25,000 per year.

City E - Southern Coastal Urban

City E is comprised of approximately 75,000 people in an area of 20 square miles. The Southern Coastal municipality is governed by a mayor and city council. The population's ethnic breakdown is half white and half black. Typical of the Old South, the city retains much historical charm.

The police department has 200 sworn officers and is decentralized. The team policing concept has been introduced.

In addition to after-hours clubs and some pornographic theatres, some obvious vice conditions related to prostitution exist in City E.

Statistical Summary City E Data

1. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity?)

Public Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity?)

The figures in Table E1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table E-1

PSN SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	89.4	67.1
DISCOUNTED MEAL	67.0	42.9
FREE MEAL	52.7	20.0
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	20.5	17.1
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	45.4	14.3
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	9.0	4.3
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	4.5	4.3
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	4.4	2.9

A comparison of mean scores indicate that the police in City E have higher personal standards of honesty than the public. The differences in the data are statistically significant, in four cases at the .00 level. (see Appendix 2.)

Table E-2

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)			F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR		
PSN						
Group 1	116	2.7845	1.758	0.163	1.31	0.211
Group 2	77	1.6364	1.538	0.175		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T VALUE		DEGREES OF FREEDOM		
4.66	191	4.79		177.02	0.000	0.000

No statistical differences existed between the public and the police on third level corrupt acts. Few in both groups were able to justify police officers taking money from gamblers or removing unprotected merchandise. Another item - accepting money from a tow truck operator - was also difficult for the public (91%) and the police (95.7%) to justify. Both groups agreed that using police identification to acquire special privileges was difficult to justify. On the other four items, statistically significant differences occurred between the two groups with the police finding it very difficult to engage in low-level impropus behavior. However, most police officers felt they could easily rationalize accepting free coffee and discounted or free meals. The officers evinced the same ambivalence as other officers in other cities regarding accepting money at Christmas time. Only 14.3 percent found Christmas gratuities easy to justify despite the fact that over 45 percent of the public would overlook them. The figures for personal standards of honesty on this item are identical with the responses to the same item on the Internal Discipline Scale; most officers (85.7%) felt they would be disciplined for taking Christmas gifts if observed by their supervisors.

2. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how their immediate superior would regard each of eight activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question - If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed, for which activity would you be disciplined?

The figures in Table E-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for these activities:

Table E-3

DISC SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FEE COFFEE		67.6
DISCOUNTED MEAL		34.3
FREE MEAL		25.4
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE		27.1
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS		14.3
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY		7.1
REMOVING MERCHANDISE		2.9
MONEY FROM GAMBLER		2.9

Apparently this department is tightly administered, for most of the officers felt they would be disciplined for engaging in high-level impropus behavior. Some uncertainty existed on mid-level corruption items, specifically using police I. D. s and accepting free meals. Some of the ambivalence regarding the acceptance of free meals originate in an adjacent police agency having serious corruption problems. The reform chief in City E has made an issue of the police practice of accepting free meals. Since the officers of both departments interact on a daily basis, the appropriateness of accepting free meals has become an issue in Department E.

3. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question - I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question - I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table E-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table E-4

RPT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	92.0	88.6
DISCOUNTED MEAL	77.7	82.9
FREE MEAL	72.8	71.4
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	38.1	67.6
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	55.4	40.0
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	8.9	23.2
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	1.7	5.7
MONEY FROM GABMLER	2.6	5.7

The scores in Table E-4 are very similar for both groups. A "T" Test on both the police

Table E-5

T Test
(Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
RPT Group 1	109	3.4862	1.636	0.157	1.48	0.065
Group 2	73	3.8082	1.991	0.233		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	
-1.19	180	0.235	-1.159	133.67	0.254	

and public respondents as a group indicated that no statistically significant differences existed between them (see Table E-5). In every other city surveyed, statistically significant differences existed; police officers generally tended to report corrupt acts at a much lower level than citizens. Since cohesion about reporting corruption among officers insulates the police from public scrutiny, the close affinity between the two groups in City E surprised Project researchers.

Among the individual items, only two significant activities emerge. The police (23.2%) seem to be more reluctant than the public (8.9%) to report officers for collusion with tow truck operators. On another item - using police identification for free entry to the theatre - most (67.6%) police would not report a fellow officer and almost 40 percent of the public would not file a complaint. It was hypothesized that both of these activities were more widely practiced in the department than the data indicates. Collusion with tow truck operators was supported internally by an informal system, and using police I. D. s was traditionally ignored by the public and generally done by the police. Almost 30 percent of the police felt they would not be disciplined if observed using their police I. D. for free access to a theatre.

4. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table E-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

Table E-6

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OWN TIME	34.5	44.3
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	53.1	81.7
REFRAIN FROM STRIKES	80.9	52.9
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	65.2	54.3
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	50.4	32.4
COLLEGE EDUCATION	41.7	34.3
PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORTANT	91.4	75.4
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	96.6	87.1

Generally public in City E had lower expectations of their police than other public respondents in the survey. Almost 50 percent of the public in City E did not expect the police to have higher ethical standards than themselves: only 34.5 percent expected the police to give up their off-duty time, only 50 percent felt they had a right to be critical of police errors in judgment; and only slightly more than 40 percent felt their police should be required to have some college before being employed. Much of the public's level of expectation may result from its reluctance to increase police salaries which

Table E-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION		
PROFESSN Group 1	69	2.9475	0.342	1.08	0.711
Group 2	125	2.5980	0.329		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE			
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	T VALUE	DEGRESS OF FREEDOM		
6.98	192	0.000		6.90	135.96
					0.000

were extremely low. Although 52.9 percent of the police agree that the public has a right to expect that the police will not strike, those police who disagreed constituted a sizable minority. In most interviews with officers, questions regarding police salaries in other jurisdictions predominated. However, unemployment in City E was relatively high, making working as a police officer an attractive occupation despite the low salaries.

5. Typology Scale

On the Typology Scale a series of improbable police activities were listed. The public and police were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed were:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafeguarded property.
5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.
6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table E represent the percentage of respondents who feel that none of the police in City E engaged in the activities:

Table E-8

TYPOLOGY SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPT FREE MEALS	11.3	13.1
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	14.5	17.1
ACCEPT MONEY FROM BUSINESS	13.6	55.2
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN USE	17.8	68.4
OVERLOOK VIOLATIONS FOR \$	8.2	67.5
ACCEPT TRAFFIC BRIBES	12.3	77.9
MONEY FROM GAMBLERS, ETC.	10.3	74.0

The data from City E in Table E-8 are similar to that obtained from other agencies. The police respondents indicate a lower level of corruption than the public believes exists. Most of the public believes that at least some police officers in City E engage in some of the activities listed. Significant differences exist between the groups on four items; accepting money for assisting businessmen, overlooking violations in bars, taking money at traffic stops and protecting vice operations. For each item more police officers than the public indicated that no police engaged in the activities.

Table E-9

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
TYPOLGY						
Group 1	73	4.8904	2.040	0.239	12.28	0.0
Group 2	128	4.3973	0.582	0.051		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE			SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE			
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
2.56	199	0.011		2.02	78.75	0.047

6. Demographic Factors

In City E, 116 of the public responded to the questionnaire survey. The average age of respondents was 45.0 years. Most were male (74.6%) and white (88.3%). As a group, the respondents had the lowest average in formal education of any public group surveyed; 47.7 percent had either a high school education or less and only a few

Table E-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
AGE (Mean)	44.48	32.0
SEX	M=74.6 F=25.4	M=92.2 F=7.1
RACE	W=88.3 B=11.7	W=75.4 B=24.6
EDUCATION	HS=12.5 HS=34.8 C=52.7	HS=13.2 HS=38.2 C=48.5
MARITAL STATUS	M=83.8 S=16.1	M=65.1 S=34.9
SALARY (Median)	15-20 K	10-14K
YEARS IN DEPARTMENT		8.2
PRESENT ASSIGNMENT		69% PATROL
SAMPLE SIZE	116	71

(6.2%) had training beyond college. Most were married (83%). The 71 officers in the police department had a lower level of formal schooling than officers in any department surveyed; over half had a high school education or less. Their average age was 32 years, and the youngest officer in the group was 19 years old. Most of the sample was male (93%), and City E had the highest proportion (24%) of black officers of any city surveyed. Most officers were married and had an average of eight years job experience. Most officers surveyed were from patrol (69%), others were from investigations (23%), and the rest were from administrative units. Some officers (42%) indicated that their salaries were less than \$10,000 per annum and others (50%) indicated that they earned between \$10,000 and \$15,000 a year. The rest, supervisors in the department, made over \$15,000 a year. The department in City E was unique compared with other agencies surveyed because it had:

1. the least educated sworn personnel;
2. the youngest sworn personnel;
3. the highest proportion of blacks; and
4. the lowest average annual salary.

City F -- Southern Metropolitan

City F is a Southern metropolis with a population of 600,000 and a very large land area. The police department has almost 1000 sworn personnel.

An obvious problem is the lack of close supervision due to the large area patrolled. The agency has some very unique patrol procedures which tend to offset what appears to be a shortage of manpower. For example, free housing is available to officers willing to provide security for certain housing developments in which they live.

There is no "red light" district, but licensed premises are scattered throughout the city.

Statistical Summary City F Data

I. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question -- In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity)?

Public Question -- In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity)? The figures in Table F1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table F-1

PSN SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	85.2	87.3
DISCOUNTED MEAL	59.2	82.0
FREE MEAL	48.2	58.0
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	18.4	30.7
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	44.4	15.1
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	2.8	3.4
REMOVING MERCHNADISE	0.7	4.4
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	1.4	2.9

The differences in the scores in Table F-1 are not statistically significant.

Table F-2

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
PSN						
Group 1	143	2.5804	1.667	0.139	1.45	0.010
Group 2	255	2.8039	1.384	0.087		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.
-1.43	396	0.152		-1.36	251.82	0.175

Both groups view high-level or serious corruption as being difficult to justify, and both groups are unconcerned with low-level improbity. Almost half find some mid-level corruption easy to justify; for example -- 48.2 percent of the public and 58 percent of the police condone free meals. Although no significant difference exists between the two groups concerning the acceptance of free meals, one exists concerning the acceptance of discounted meals. A significantly larger group of officers than members of the public can justify this practice. There is a difference between the two groups about accepting money at Christmas and a significant difference between the two groups regarding the use of police I.D. The public in City F is tolerant of the police getting small privileges without paying for them.

II. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how their immediate superior would regard each of eight activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question -- If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed, for which activity would you be disciplined? The figures in Table F-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for these activities:

Table F-3

DISC SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE		97.1
DISCOUNTED MEAL		92.2
FREE MEAL		87.8
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE		64.6
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS		28.8
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY		4.9
REMOVING MERCHANDISE		2.4
MONEY FROM GAMBLER		2.9

The pattern of responses resembles that from City D. Apparently, agency policy is clearly and adequately communicated, and with the possible exception of using police I.D. to receive preferential treatment and free access to theatres, there is little misunderstanding among the rank and file. Disciplinary action for serious misconduct is certain and is practically nonexistent for low-level corruption.

III. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question -- I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question -- I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table F-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table F-4

RPT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	92.9	97.6
DISCOUNTED MEAL	74.3	96.6
FREE MEAL	73.0	96.6
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	41.8	90.2
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	60.0	66.3
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	8.5	28.9
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	2.1	9.2
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	2.1	11.2

Generally, more members of the public than of the police will report improbable behavior in City F. Most police officers would not report their peers for mid-level and low-level corruption. On six of the eight items, statistically significant differences exist between the groups (see Appendix 2). Three of the statistically significant differences involve the most serious forms of corruption in which the public indicates a higher tendency to report.

From the data and impressions of the project researchers during on-site interviews, the main determinant for enforcing departmental discipline was embarrassment to the administration. Many low-level and mid-level forms of corruption were ignored provided officers engaged in them discretely. The administrator of the agency was elected on a four-year basis and was very sensitive to the potential professional embarrassment of serious corrupt conduct. High level corruption was immediately confronted when discovered, officers were summoned to the administrator's office, presented with the evidence against them, and forced to resign or be prosecuted. The diligence with which these investigations were pursued and the number of subsequent forced retirements each year were both a tribute and a commentary on the ethical climate within the agency. Ironically, the number of officers unwilling to report a peer on a third-level item was higher than in all other agencies surveyed. Almost 30 percent of the respondents indicated that they would not report a peer for accepting kickbacks from a tow company.

Table F-5

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)				
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
RPT						
Group 1	139	3.5540	1.724	0.146		
Group 2	252	4.9246	1.274	0.080	1.83	0.000
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL				T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL		
VALUE FREEDOM PROB.				VALUE FREEDOM PROB.		
		-8.95	389	0.000	-8.22	222.55 0.000

V. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgement.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table F-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

Table F-6

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OWN TIME	37.3	36.4
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	58.9	79.6
REFRAIN FROM STRIKES	77.3	47.8
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	69.8	65.9
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	47.9	21.6
COLLEGE EDUCATION	44.0	54.4
PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORT.	88.7	80.3
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	97.2	97.1

The public and the police agreed about most of the statements. Neither group felt that the public has a right to expect the police to give up their off duty time; both agreed that the police should use extraordinary restraint in their encounter with the public, that the police should upgrade their skills and that the police service role is important. They disagreed about the

Table F-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)		STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION			
PROFESSN						
Group 1	136	2.8263	0.395	0.034	1.09	0.571
Group 2	250	2.6400	0.379	0.024		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL				T DEGREES OF 2-TAIL		
VALUE FREEDOM PROB.				VALUE FREEDOM PROB.		
	4.54	384	0.000	4.492	267.62	0.000

right of police to strike; most of the police claimed that the public had no right to expect them not to strike. The police felt that citizens have a right to demand some college education before police are employed; the public did not agree. A statistically significant difference existed between the groups concerning the public's right to be critical of police errors of judgement (see Appendix 2). A majority of the police (78%) felt the public should not criticize them.

VI. Typology Scale

On Typology Scale a series of inprobis police activities were listed. The public and police were asked: "In your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed were:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafe-guarded property.

5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.
6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table F-8 represent the percentage of respondents who feel that none of the police in City F engaged in the activities:

Table F-8

TYOLOGY SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPT FREE MEALS	3.9	1.1
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	5.1	3.9
ACCEPT MONEY FROM BUSINESS	1.0	49.5
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN USE	17.0	51.5
OVERLOOK VIOLATIONS FOR \$	9.5	51.0
ACCEPT TRAFFIC BRIBES	23.1	66.9
MONEY FROM GAMBLERS, ETC.	10.9	61.1

All items differentiated between the groups in City F. The police conceded that the practices of accepting free meals and shopping in uniform were widespread, but they are apparently not discrete in those activities because the public generally indicated that they were aware of them.

Officers acknowledged greater levels of corrupt activity than those in any other agency surveyed. On the items other than the two previously indicated, the public feels less inclined than the police to suggest that "none" of the officers engage in them.

Table F-9

T Test
(Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
TYPOLOGY Group 1	143	4.3117	1.618	1.135	6.46	0.0
Group 2	255	4.0398	0.637	0.040		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM 2-TAIL PROB.	
2.38	396	0.018		1.93	167.02	0.056

VII. Demographic Factors

The public sample for City F was composed of 143 members. Their mean age was 44.3 years. Respondents ranged in age from 20 to 90 years. Most were male (61%) and were white (88.9%). There were no Hispanic respondents, and a minority were black (11.1%). Most had some college education (51%), and the majority (65%) were married. The average age of the police respondents was 30.6 years. Almost all the officers were male (98.5%) and were white (93%); 43.9 percent had some college education, and most were married (88%). The salary range for almost three quarters of the respondents was \$10,000 to \$15,000 a year.

Table F-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
AGE (Mean)	47.5	30.6
SEX	M=74.1 F=25.9	M=98.5 F=1.5
RACE	W=91.2 B=8.8	W=93.0 B=7.0
EDUCATION	$\bar{H}S=6.7$ HS=38.5 C=54.8'	$\bar{H}S=3.0$ HS=36.4 C=40.6
MARITAL STATUS	M=89.0 S=11.0	M=88.0 S=12.0
SALARY (Median)	20-25K	10-14K
YEARS IN DEPT.		8.9
PRESENT ASSIGN.		87% PATROL
SAMPLE SIZE	143	206

Most respondents were patrol officers (87%).

City G -- Coastal Gulf Urban

A gulf port with a population of less than one million whites, blacks, Hispanics and Indians, City G has a land area of approximately 400 square miles.

The police department is decentralized and has approximately 2,000 sworn personnel.

A clearly defined "red light" district exists in City G, and the area attracts many tourists.

Statistical Summary City G Data

1. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question -- In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity)?

Public Question -- In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity)?

The figures in Table G-1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table G-1

PSN SCALE (EASY)	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	90.8	93.4
DISCOUNTED MEAL	73.7	94.4
FREE MEAL	64.9	76.4
POLICE I.D. FOR MOVIE	22.7	40.6
\$10,00 AT CHRISTMAS	56.6	21.7
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	1.3	0.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	0.0	0.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	4.0	0.0

In Table G-2 little difference exists between the police and the public concerning personal standards of honesty. Both groups were capable of justifying relatively high levels of improbity especially on the first four items (Appendix 2). The data

Table G-2

T Test
(Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
PSN						
Group 1	77	3.0779	1.579	0.180		
Group 2	178	2.9551	1.310	0.098	1.45	0.046
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
		T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
		1.65	253	0.519	0.60	123.27
						0.550

reveal that the two groups differed significantly on only three items: acceptance of discounted meals, accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time, and using police badge or I.D. for special favors. The police had problems justifying these items although the public did not.

II. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how serious their immediate supervisor would regard each of eight activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question -- If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed, for which activities would you be disciplined? The figures in Figure C-3 indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for these activities:

Table G-3

DISC. SCALE	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	91.5
DISCOUNTED MEAL	88.7
FREE MEAL	85.8
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	74.5
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	34.3
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	.9
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	.9
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	.9

The data in Table G-3 indicate that officers are fairly consistent about activities they would be disciplined for. Only one item elicits some uncertainty -- using their badge or I.D. for free access to entertainment, and according to interviews, using I.D.s appears to be a quite common occurrence in the department. The respondents were in agreement that the most serious forms of corruption if discovered, would warrant disciplinary action by supervisors. The acceptance of gratuities at Christmas time seems only marginally unethical; more than 34% of the respondents felt they would not be disciplined if they discovered engaging in this practice.

III. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities they would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question -- I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging

Public Question -- I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table G-4 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table G-4

RPT. SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	96.1	96.1
DISCOUNTED MEAL	83.1	96.2
FREE MEAL	87.0	95.2
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	41.6	89.5
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	75.3	69.5
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	11.7	44.8
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	6.5	26.9
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	6.5	31.1

Both groups in City G scored high on the report scale indicating that they would not be inclined to report observed unethical behavior.

Table G-5

T Test (Group 1, Public -- group 2, Police)						
VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
RPT						
Group 1	76	4.1053	1.448	0.166	1.34	0.148
Group 2	173	5.2023	1.677	0.128		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE T DEGRESS OF 2-TAIL VALUE FREEDOM PROB.				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE T DEGRESS OF 2-TAIL VALUE FREEDOM PROB.		
	-4.95	247	0.000		-5.24	164.60
						0.000

For some specifics exist regarding significant differences between the groups in City G (See Appendix 2). Despite the similarities in the responses, police officers were less likely than civilians to report police for any type of corrupt activity.

IV. Professionalism Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to do.
2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves.
3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike.
4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters.
5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgement.
6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed.
7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers.
8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education.

The figures in Table G-6 represent the percentage of respondents who agreed with each statement:

Table G-6

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
GIVE UP OFF DUTY TIME	47.4	82.2
HIGHER ETHICAL STANDARDS	51.3	77.4
REFRAIN FROM STRIKING	4.0	11.2
USE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINT	1.3	6.5
CRITICAL OF POLICE ERRORS	55.8	70.1
COLLEGE EDUCATION	32.5	28.0

PUBLIC SERVICE ROLE IMPORTANT	16.9	59.4
UPGRADE SKILLS CONTINUALLY	32.5	34.3

Table G-7 indicates the differences between the two groups. Statistically significant differences exist between the police and the public about giving up off-

Table G-7

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	T Test (Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)				
		MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
PROFESSION						
Group 1	74	2.9341	0.346	0.040		
Group 2	173	2.6048	0.399	0.030	1.33	0.163
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
	T	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL VALUE	T	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL VALUE
	6.18	245	0.000	6.54	158.14	0.000

duty time, the police right to strike, the public's right to be critical of police errors, and the need for some college education. The public was about evenly split on the need for officers to have a college education.

V. Typology Scale

On the Typology Scale a series of improbable police activities were listed. The public and police were asked: "in your opinion, how many police in this city engage in such activities?" The activities listed are:

1. Accepting free meals.
2. Shopping in uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.
3. Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.
4. Removing for their own personal use unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other unsafe-guarded property.

5. Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, night clubs or other businesses.
6. Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.
7. Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

The figures in Table G-8 represent the percentage of respondents who feel that none of the police in City G engaged in the activities.

Table G-8

TYOLOGY SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
ACCEPTING FREE MEALS	1.5	1.1
SHOPPING IN UNIFORM	3.1	1.1
ACCEPTING MONEY FROM BUSINESS	1.6	1.9
REMOVING PROPERTY/OWN RISK	13.1	33.9
OVERLOOK VIOLATIONS FOR MONEY	2.8	24.5
ACCEPTING TRAFFIC BRIBES	1.2	36.7
MONEY FROM GAMBLER, ETC.	2.8	33.1

It is apparant from Table G-8 that many more of the police than the public feel that none of the police engage in the activities listed.

Table G-9

T Test
(Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
TYOLOGY						
Group 1	77	4.0408	1.754	0.200	6.98	0.0
Group 2	178	3.8186	0.664	0.050		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE		SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE				
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	
1.47	253	0.143	1.08	85.57	0.284	

The public apparently felt the police were involved in many forms of corruption and that some of them were engaged in high-level corruption. Ninety percent of the public felt that at least some police were accepting money from gamblers, more than 90% felt some overlook traffic violations for money, and roughly 90% felt some accept money from businessmen in their patrol areas for providing extra services. Because the return rate on the public questionnaire in City G was the lowest of all the survey cities, generalizations made from the data are subject to the same limitations previously indicated for the data from City C.

VI. Demographic Factors

The mean age of public respondents was 47.9 years. Most respondents were male (65%) and were white (87.1%); none were Hispanic. Three quarters of the sample were married, and 57.1% indicated that they had some college education. There were 150 police respondents. The department was the youngest of all the agencies surveyed. The average age of police respondents was 28.2 years, ranging from 20 to 43 years of age.

Table G-10

FACTORS	PUBLIC	POLICE
AGE (mean)	28.2	47.9
SEX	M=87.9 F=12.1	M=65 F=35
RACE	W=86.4 B=13.6	W=87.1 B=12.9
EDUCATION	HS=.7 HS=36.9 C=137.5	HS=11.4 HS=31.5 C=57.1
MARITAL STATUS	M=74 S=26	M=75 S=25
SALARY (median)		\$10-15k
YEARS IN DEPT.		6.0
PRESENT ASSIGNMENT		
SAMPLE SIZE		

City H - Southwestern Urban Metropolitan

Governed by a city manager, City H has a population of almost 800,000 living in an almost 400 square mile area. The city is predominantly white (80%), with an almost equal population of blacks and Hispanics, (8% each).

The police department is currently decentralized. Sworn personnel number over 1,100 with approximately 350 civilian employees.

The city has a relatively small downtown section with pornographic theatres, bookstores, and a red light area. The downtown section is more policed than the rest of the city which is mostly a beach resort and residential area.

Statistical Summary City H Data

1. Personal Standards of Honesty Scale

Using their own personal standards of honesty as a criteria, police and public respondents were asked similar questions to determine the levels of improbity they attached to eight activities.

Police Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify (a specified activity)?

Public Question - In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you to justify a police officer (doing a specified activity)? The figures in Table H-1 represent the percentage of respondents who felt each activity was easy to justify:

Table H-1

PSN SCALE (EASY)	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	77.9	56.3
DISCOUNTED MEAL	42.3	34.7
FREE MEAL	28.3	12.1
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	11.2	13.1

\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	31.6	2.1
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	4.6	1.1
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	4.1	1.0
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	3.6	1.0

As can be seen in Table H-1 a majority of both groups of respondents agreed that it was not acceptable for police officers to accept free cups of coffee. Significantly, more police officers held that view than did public respondents.

Both groups found it difficult to justify a police officer accepting a discounted meal. Both the police and the public are unable to justify "grass eating" improbity,

Table H-2

T Test
(Group 1, Public - group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
PSN						
Group 1	188	1.2021	1.345	0.098	1.40	0.020
Group 2	198	1.9798	1.593	0.113		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE				SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE		
T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	T VALUE	DEGREES OF FREEDOM	2-TAIL PROB.	
-5.17	384	0.030	-5.19	378.88	0.000	

and the police are more, adamant about their practices than the public. The police (90%) would find it difficult to accept free meals, and almost seventy percent of the public agreed. The police (98%) and the public (69%) differed significantly accepting Christmas gifts.

The police and the public were in agreement on all of the items describing as mid-level corruption. On these times and on each of the high-level items, the percentages of police and public finding it hard to justify unethical police behavior was in the 90% range.

II. Internal Discipline Scale

Police respondents were asked about how their immediate supervisor would regard each of eight activities (the seriousness being judged by the expectation of disciplinary action upon discovery of a violator).

Police Question - If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed, for which activity would you be disciplined? The figures below indicate the percentage of respondents who felt that they would not be disciplined for eight activities:

Table H-3

DISC. SCALE	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	33.5
DISCOUNTED MEAL	20.2
FREE MEAL	14.9
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	18.1
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	9.0
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	8.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	7.4
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	6.9

Most officers responding to the questionnaire indicated that they felt they would be disciplined for each item. Sixty-five percent of the officers felt they would be disciplined for accepting a free cup of coffee. Policy in the agency is clear regarding the use of discipline when corrupt activity is detected. Police officers each know that they will be disciplined for even minor instances of impropriety.

III. Report Scale

Police and public respondents were asked to indicate which of eight activities would prompt them to report officers.

Police Question - I would report a fellow officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

Public Question - I would report a police officer whom I observed engaging in the following activities:

The figures in Table H-5 represent the percentage of respondents who would not report an officer for the activities listed:

Table H-4

RPT SCALE	PUBLIC	POLICE
FREE COFFEE	91.0	96.0

DISCOUNTED MEAL	64.1	84.7
FREE MEAL	89.5	73.4
POLICE I. D. FOR MOVIE	34.2	68.6
\$10.00 AT CHRISTMAS	48.7	26.6
GIFT FROM TOW COMPANY	6.7	8.0
REMOVING MERCHANDISE	1.5	2.1
MONEY FROM GAMBLER	1.5	2.1

It is obvious from the data in Table H-5 that the police in City H, despite their high ethical standards, are more reluctant than the public to report police. Although they tend to overlook free coffee or a gift at Christmas, the public has a greater tendency than the police to report impropriety.

Table H-5

T Test
(Group 1, Public — group 2, Police)

VARIABLE	NUMBER OF CASES	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION	STANDARD ERROR	F VALUE	2-TAIL PROB.
RPT						
Group 1	188	3.5745	1.579	0.115	1.36	0.032
Group 2	198	3.0101	1.844	0.131		
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE					SEPARATE VARIANCE ESTIMATE	
T DEGREES OF FREEDOM					T DEGREES OF FREEDOM	
3.22	384	0.001			3.24	379.98
						0.001

The police and the public are in accord on the high-level items of corruption.

The Professionalism Scale and the Typology Scale were not included in the survey of this department.

Conclusions

The validity of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire relative to meeting the criteria for Guttman Scaling was demonstrated in Phase 1 of the Anti-Corruption Management Project. Its reliability in distinguishing between corrupt and non-corrupt departments was also demonstrated:

All three forms of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale (the Personal Standards of Honesty, the Discipline and the Report Scales) significantly discriminate between corrupt and non-corrupt departments. (5)

Traditionally, a coefficient of reproducibility of .9 or more and a coefficient of scalability of more than .6 indicates that a scale is truly unidimensional and cumulative. An analysis of Phase 1 data revealed that the original scale met the Guttman Scale requirements of reproducibility and scalability. The validation was accomplished by utilizing the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) subroutine, Guttman Scaling. (6)

The procedure was replicated with the Phase II data previously analyzed. Each of the three scales met the previously mentioned criteria as indicated in Table I-1.

Table I-1

Guttman Scale Validation (Phase II)

	Personal Standards of Honesty	Discipline	Report
Coefficient Reproducibility	.96	.96	.97
Coefficient Scalability	.78	.80	.89

The Typology Scale did not meet the criteria established for Guttman Scaling. It had a coefficient of reproducibility of .92; however, the coefficient of scalability was only .58. The Professionalism Scale was not created to constitute a Guttman Scale. However, both of these "Scales" generated very useful information.

(5) Measuring Police Corruption, Janet E. Fishman, Criminal Justice Monograph #10 1978 p. 20.

(6) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Nie et al, p. 531.

A Posteriori Contrast Testing

Because the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scales were shown to discriminate significantly between corrupt and non-corrupt police departments, project researchers attempted to establish categories of corruption into which the various agencies in Phase II could be placed. In order to determine whether the differences between agencies as measured by the project questionnaire were significant and if a range of improbity based on agency scores could be established, a Scheffe A Posteriori Contrast Test was conducted. An A Posteriori Contrast Test is a systematic procedure for comparing all possible pairs of group means. According to the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS):

The groups are divided into homogeneous subsets, where the difference in the means of any two groups in a subset is not significant at some prescribed level. (7)

The data in Tables I2 through I7 indicate the results of this test, using Scheffe criteria and a 95% confidence level (8). These data indicate that significant differences exist among the groups analyzed and that a range of improbity - based on the categories of low-level, low-medium level, medium-high level, and high-level corruption - can be established. Table I8 indicates the placement of individual agencies in improbity-level categories. Agencies H and E are assigned to the low-level category on the basis of having the lowest scores on most of the scales and because no statistically significant differences exist between the scales for them. Agencies C and B are assigned the low-medium category, because there were significant differences between them and agencies H & E on several scales and because no statistically significant difference exists between the 2. Agency A, in the medium-high category, differed significantly from agencies in the low-medium category and from agencies D, F & G in the high-level category.

Table I-8 indicates a range of scores for each improbus category. These ranges were established by taking in Tables I2 through I7 the range of the lowest and highest mean score for the agencies in that category. For example, Agency H has a PSN range of .67 to 1.1, Agency C, in the same category, has a range of .67 to 1.5. Some of the ranges overlap ex. PSN .67 - 1.5 in the low category (refer to table I8) and PSN in the low-medium category 1.3 - 2.3. An agency with a mean score of 1.4 could be included in both categories. The placement of an agency in a category, however, is based upon the statistical differences between it and other agencies in the two closest categories.

The significance and the practical applicability of the formulation of these categories are demonstrated in Volume II of this report, Police Corruption: A Guide to Agency Assessment and Program Development.

(7) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Nie et al, p. 427.

(8) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, Nie et al, p. 428, "Sheffe uses a single value for all comparisons, which is appropriate for examining all possible linear combinations of group means, not just pair wise comparisons. Thus, it is stricter than the other tests. Scheffe is exact, even for unequal group sizes.

Although the validity of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire has been demonstrated, its ability to consistently place police agencies accurately into corruption categories has not been proven. Other instruments developed by the Project add additional dimension to corruption analysis. The Ride-along procedures and the Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile provide insight into the evaluation. These measures provide a rationale for agency categorization and give direction to agency efforts to deal effectively with the problem of police corruption.

TABLE 1-2 A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST — PSN SCALE (PART 1)

Source	D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F Ratio	F Prob.
Between groups	7	549.7947	78.5421	41.129	0.0000
Within group	1099	2098.6866	1.9096		
TOTAL	1106	2648.4812			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct. Conf	Int for Mean
GRP01	90	2.2889	2.1107	0.2225	1.8468 to	2.7310
GRP02	103	2.0097	1.4983	0.2476	1.7169 to	2.3025
GRP04	204	1.3824	1.0832	0.0758	1.2328 to	1.5319
GRP05	128	2.9453	1.2693	0.1122	2.7233 to	3.1673
GRP06	71	1.7042	1.5528	0.1843	1.3367 to	2.0718
GRP07	77	0.8961	0.9677	0.1103	0.6765 to	1.1157
GRP09	256	2.8008	1.3817	0.0864	2.6307 to	2.9708
GRP11	178	2.9551	1.3098	0.0982	2.7613 to	3.1488
TOTAL	1107	2.2629	1.5475	0.04651	2.1716 to	2.3541
		Fixed Effects Model	1.3819	0.0415	2.1814 to	2.3444
		Random Effects Model		0.2964		

Random Effects Model — Estimate of between component variance 0.5707

Tests for Homogeneity of Variances

Cochrans C = Max. Variance/Sum(Variations) = 0.2707, P = 0.000 (Approx.)
 Bartlett-Box F = 12.169, P = 0.000
 Maximum Variance/Minimum Variance = 4.757

TABLE 1-3 A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST — PSN SCALE (PART 2)

VARIABLE PSN

MULTIPLE RANGE TEST

SCHEFFE PROCEDURE
 RANGES FOR THE 0.050 LEVEL —

5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32

THE RANGES ABOVE ARE TABLE RANGES. THE VALUE ACTUALLY COMPARED WITH MEAN(J)-MEAN(1) IS . 0.9771 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(1) + 1/N(J))

(*) DENOTES PAIRS OF GROUPS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT AT THE 0.050 LEVEL

MEAN	GROUP						
.8961	GRP07						
1.3824	GRP04						
1.7042	GRP06						
2.0097	GRP02	*					
2.2889	GRP01	*	*				
2.8008	GRP09	*	*	*	*		
2.9453	GRP05	*	*	*	*		
2.9551	GRP11	*	*	*	*		

G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
7	4	6	2	1	9	5	1

TABLE 1-4 A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST - DIS. SCALE (PART 1)

Source	D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F Ratio	F Prob.
Between groups	7	845.1835	120.7405	57.567	0.0000
Within group	1099	2305.6866	2.0974		
TOTAL	1106	3150.2043			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct. Conf	Int for Mean
GRP01	90	2.8000	2.1578	0.2275	2.3481 to	3.2519
GRP02	103	2.4951	1.6141	0.1590	2.1797 to	2.8106
GRP04	204	2.0686	1.5168	0.1062	1.8592 to	2.1780
GRP05	128	3.5703	1.1950	0.1056	3.3613 to	3.7793
GRP06	71	1.8028	1.6955	0.2012	1.4015 to	2.2041
GRP07	77	1.1039	1.1307	0.1289	0.8473 to	1.3605
GRP09	256	3.7578	1.0270	0.0642	3.6314 to	3.8842
GRP11	178	2.9061	1.5203	0.1139	3.4493 to	3.8990
TOTAL	1107	2.9061	1.6877	0.0507	2.8065 to	3.0056
Fixed Effects Model		1.4482	0.0435	2.8206 to		2.9915
Random Effects Model				0.3677		

Random Effects Model - Estimated of between component variance 0.8835

Tests for Homogeneity of Variances

Cochrans C = Max. Variance/Sum(Variances) = 0.2516, P = 0.000 (Approx.)
 Barlett-Box F = 15.744, P = 0.000
 Maximum Variance/Minimum Variance = 4.414

TABLE 1-5 A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST - DIS. SCALE (PART 2)

VARIABLE DIS

MULTIPLE RANGE TEST

SCHEFFE PROCEDURE
 RANGES FOR THE 0.050 LEVEL -

5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32

THE RANGES ABOVE ARE TABLE RANGES. THE VALUE ACTUALLY COMPARED WITH MEAN(J)-MEAN(1) IS . 1.0241 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(1) + 1/N(J))

(*) DENOTES PAIRS OF GROUPS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT AT THE 0.050 LEVEL

MEAN	GROUP						
1.1039	GRP07						
1.8028	GRP06						
2.0686	GRP04						
2.4951	GRP02	*					
2.8000	GRP01	*	*				
3.5703	GRP05	*	*	*	*		
3.6742	GRP11	*	*	*	*	*	
3.7578	GRP09	*	*	*	*	*	

G G G G G G G G
 R R R R R R R R
 P P P P P P P P
 O O O O O O O O
 7 4 6 2 1 9 5 1

TABLE 1-6 A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST — RPT SCALE (PART 1)

Source	D.F.	Sum of Squares	Mean Squares	F Ratio	F Prob.
Between groups	7	379.5561	54.2223	21.322	0.0000
Within group	1068	2698.2053	2.5431		
TOTAL	1068	3077.7612			

Group	Count	Mean	Standard Deviation	Standard Error	95 Pct. Conf	Int for Mean
GRP01	82	4.8780	2.3486	0.2594	4.3620 to	5.3941
GRP02	96	4.7396	1.8481	0.1886	4.3651 to	5.1141
GRP04	196	4.1224	1.4519	0.1037	3.9179 to	4.3270
GRP05	125	4.8800	1.1887	0.1063	4.6696 to	5.0904
GRP06	67	3.8358	1.9969	0.2440	3.3487 to	3.3229
GRP07	77	3.0390	1.5597	0.1777	2.6850 to	3.3930
GRP09	255	4.9289	1.2735	0.0801	4.7712 to	5.0865
GRP11	173	5.2023	1.6773	0.1275	4.9506 to	5.4540
TOTAL	1069	4.5940	1.6976	0.0519	4.4921 to	4.6959
		Fixed Effects Model	1.5947	0.0488	4.4983 to	4.6897
		Random Effects Model		0.2516	3.9991 to	5.1889

Random Effects Model — Estimated of between component variance 0.3993

Tests for Homogeneity of Variances
 Cochran's C = Max. Variance/Sum(Variations) = 0.2366, P = 0.000 (Approx.)
 Barlett-Box F = 12.585, P = 0.000
 Maximum Variance/Minimum Variance = 3.904

TABLE 1-7 A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST — RPT SCALE (PART 2)

VARIABLE RPT

MULTIPLE RANGE TEST

SCHEFFE PROCEDURE
 RANGES FOR THE 0.050 LEVEL —

5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32 5.32

THE RANGES ABOVE ARE TABLE RANGES. THE VALUE ACTUALLY COMPARED WITH MEAN(J)-MEAN(1) IS . 1.1276 * RANGE * SQRT(1/N(1) + 1/N(J))

(*) DENOTES PAIRS OF GROUPS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT AT THE 0.050 LEVEL

MEAN	GROUP						
3.0390	GRP07						
3.8358	GRP06						
4.1224	GRP04						
4.7396	GRP02	*					
4.8780	GRP01	*	*				
4.8800	GRP05	*	*	*	*		
4.9289	GRP09	*	*	*	*		
5.2023	GRP11	*	*	*	*		

G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G
R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
7	4	6	2	1	9	5	1

TABLE 1-8

A POSTERIORI CONTRAST TEST GROUPING OF MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE DATA

IMPROBITY SCALES	LOW	LOW-MEDIUM	MEDIUM-HIGH	HIGH
RANGE	(.6 — 1.5)	(1.3 — 2.3)	(1.8 — 2.7)	(2.6 — 3.1)
PSN	C — H	B — E	A	D — F — G
RANGE	(.84 — 2.2)	(1.8 — 2.8)	(2.3 — 3.2)	(3.3 — 3.8)
DIS	E — H	B — C	A	D — F — G
RANGE	(2.6 — 4.3)	(4.3 — 5.1)	(4.3 — 5.3)	(4.6 — 5.4)
RPT	E — H	B — C	A	D — F — G
IMPROBITY PLACEMENT	E — H	B — C	A	D — F — G

Chapter III
Police Officers Ride-Along Interviews

One of the major goals of the Anti-Corruption Management Project was to develop a measure of police corruption using a questionnaire-type format. As Phase I of the Project ended, it was apparent that the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire had accomplished that goal, because data from it enabled researchers to discriminate between corrupt and non-corrupt departments. The Advisory Board recommended that the researchers conduct in-car interviews with several officers in each department during the remaining site visits to determine if independent data could be generated that would either support or refute the information acquired through the questionnaire. The initial informal and unstructured efforts revealed that under certain circumstances police officers would discuss corruption within their department, would provide information about specific individuals and events with little or no encouragement from the researchers.

The first interviews were conducted late in Phase I of the Project. The first agency in which interviews were held was recovering from a major corruption scandal involving police and local political figures. After administering the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire at roll calls, two officers were randomly selected as subjects. The researchers were introduced to the officers, who were asked whether they would agree to be interviewed. Each agreed to participate. The interviews were to take approximately one hour.

Two researchers rode in a patrol car with each officer. The interviewer rode in the front seat next to the officer, and the recorder or note taker rode in the rear seat of the vehicle. The officer was notified immediately that notes would be taken and that the conversation would be kept confidential. The interviewer was a former ranking police officer in a major city agency who had previously observed and interviewed officers. During the first minutes of the interview, the interviewer spent time developing a rapport with the officer through a general discussion of the police officers' work. The interviewer acknowledged that he was a former officer and was generally aware of local conditions within the department. Knowledge of local conditions was acquired as a result of preparation for the on-site visit. In this particular agency, possibly due to the corruption scandal within the department, the conversation with the officer turned quickly, with no direction from the interviewer, to corruption. Once the subject was introduced by the officer, the interviewer asked specific questions regarding police involvement in corruption. The conversation notes were typed into final form after the interview. What came to be known as the Ride-Along Interview was used in two departments during Phase I, and the results clearly indicated that it would be a useful method of establishing an independent measure of corruption considered vital to the study.

The success of the initial interviews¹ in providing an open discussion with police officers on a topic as sensitive as corruption was not entirely surprising. A member² of the Advisory Board and a recognized expert in the areas of participant observation² had predicted success. The Advisory Board recommended that a structured format for

¹See: Ride-Along Interviews at end of this chapter. These narratives were reconstructed immediately upon completion of each interview.

²Dr. Albert Reiss, Yale University.

the Ride-Along Interviews be developed for use in Phase II of the project. It was decided that officers should be asked direct questions regarding levels of corruption within their agency and that the questions be specifically related to the already validated³ data from McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire. A procedure eventually developed which involved asking officers directly whether many or a few officers in the department were engaged in the activities listed on the Questionnaires Guttman Scales. Based upon Phase I initiatives, the procedure would require each of the following conditions:

1. That each officer be interviewed alone

In several of the interviews during Phase I, when more than one officer was in the patrol car, it was apparent that a second officer inhibited free discussion. In each situation, one officer was dominant and the other officer tended to be subdued or at least not willing to disagree with his colleague.

2. The interviewer have some prior experience as a law enforcement officer

The ability of the interviewer to quickly establish a "peer-like" relationship with the officer was crucial in the interview procedure. It was clear that after several probing questions by the officer about the interviewer's specific connection with law enforcement and some general conversation about police work, the conversation became open and relaxed.

3. That sufficient time be provided to develop a rapport prior to the discussion of corruption

Rapport with the officer was usually established in 15 to 20 minutes. However, some officers were resentful that their regular patrol routine was being interrupted, and a concerted effort to elicit cooperation was necessary. In only one interview during Phase I did two veteran officers refuse to discuss police corruption despite efforts of the interviewer to soften their resistance.

³Measuring Police Corruption. Janet Fishman

4. That a structured quantifiable format be used for the interview

A specific format for the Phase II Ride-Along Interviews was devised with suggestions from the Project's Advisory Board. Questions asked were to be unambiguous, and the responses by the interviewer should be easily categorized, a simple dichotomy was developed with rules governing what constituted a "yes" or "no" answer.

Phase II Ride-Along Interviews

The Ride-Along Interviews technique in Phase II was based upon previous experience of the Project. A research team of two interviewers was maintained.⁴ The new structured format was as follows:

a) Prior to the Ride Along

After the questionnaire had been administered to officers, a list of officers present and going on duty was obtained after roll call from the commanding officer. Each tested officer had been given a number starting with one. Selection for Ride-Along interviews was made from a set of numbered cards which indicated whether or not officers were available for interviews. A schedule of "drop offs" and pick up" for research teams was established so that time between interviews would be minimal. In each city a goal of eight interviews per day was set. Because the number of interviews in each department was to be a total of twenty, the third day provided several extra hours to meet this total. The format differed only slightly in the decentralized departments in which researchers selected districts at random but selected officers in the usual way.

b) Ride-Along Interview Procedures

Each ride-along interview lasted approximately one hour. The interviewer sat in the front seat of the patrol car, and the other researcher who was to record the interview sat in the rear behind the police officer driving the car. The officer was promised anonymity and informed that the other researcher would be taking notes during the interview. Permission to conduct the interview was requested, and in each case was granted. The interviewer spent the first 15 to 20 minutes developing a rapport with the officer by discussing general police procedure. Once initial tension eased, the subject matter of the questionnaire was introduced, and each of the questionnaire items was mentioned. The officer was told that the interviewer was not interested in determining the types of activities the officer himself may or may not have engaged in. The interviewer wanted to know whether in the officer's experience many or very few departmental officers engaged in the improbable activities itemized on the questionnaire. The other researcher recorded and categorized the officers responses. In some cases, the officer (see Illustration #1 Ride-Along Interview Guide) would digress from the specific item in question, and the conversation would have to be returned to that item

⁴There were two interviewers and one note taker involved in the 180 interviews conducted in Phase II of the program. Both interviewers had been ranking officers in a major city police department and had approximately 40 years experience in law enforcement between them.

for a response. Only clearly positive answers to questions about general departmental participation in an activity were recorded as "yes" answers. "not sure" or "its difficult to say" were not tabulated answers. No effort was made to record a verbatim record of each interview. As each interview concluded, the officer drove to a location where the researchers met the next officer to be interviewed.

Illustration #1

Ride-Along Interview Guide
Structured Inquiry

City _____ Date _____

Interview # _____ Time Started _____ Time Completed _____

Question #1

To your knowledge, do officers in this Department engage in the practice of accepting free meals from restaurants, etc.:

Many/Quite a Few = Yes

Other Answers = No

Remarks:

Question #2

To your knowledge, do officers in this Department engage in the practice of using their police badge or I. D. to gain free access to a movie theatre, etc.:

Many/Quite a Few = Yes

Other Answers = No


Remarks:

Question #3

To your knowledge, do officers in this Department engage in the practice of accepting money or gifts at Christmas time from businessmen in their patrol areas.

Many/Quite a Few = Yes

Other Answers = No



CONTINUED

1 OF 3

Remarks:

Ride-Along Data by Department

Data from ride-along interviews is provided in Tables 1 through 8. Table 9 provides a comparison of agencies and an agency score based on percentages of all possible responses.

Table # 1

City A	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
Free Coffee															X						75
Discount Meals										X											50
Free Meals					X																30
Police I.D.														X							70
\$10 at Christmas										X											50
Gift from Tow Co.																					0
Removing Merchandise																					0
Money from Gambler	X																				05

Table # 2

City B	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
Free Coffee																		X			90
Discount Meals																	X				85
Free Meals											X										60
Police I.D.					X																25
\$10 at Christmas													X								65
Gift from Tow Co.																					0
Removing Merchandise											X										55
Money from Gambler																					0

Table # 3

City C	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total	
Free Coffee																					X	100
Discount Meals																					X	100
Free Meals				X																		40
Police I.D.			X																			30
\$10 at Christmas				X																		40
Gift from Tow Co.	X																					10
Removing Merchandise																						-0
Money from Gambler																						0

Table # 4

City D	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total	
Free Coffee																					X	100
Discount Meals																					X	100
Free Meals																			X			90
Police I.D.													X									70
\$10 at Christmas					X																	30
Gift from Tow Co.																						0
Removing Merchandise																						0
Money from Gambler																						0

Table # 5

City E	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total	
Free Coffee																					X	100
Discount Meals														X								70
Free Meals				X																		20
Police I.D.																	X					80
\$10 at Christmas							X															30
Gift from Tow Co.																						0
Removing Merchandise									X													40
Money from Gambler	X																					10

Table # 6

City F	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total	
Free Coffee																					X	100
Discount Meals																					X	100
Free Meals																	X					80
Police I.D.										X												50
\$10 at Christmas																	X					80
Gift from Tow Co.									X													40
Removing Merchandise				X																		20
Money from Gambler				X																		20

Table # 7

City G	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
Free Coffee																				X	100
Discount Meals																				X	100
Free Meals																				X	95
Police I.D.												X									60
\$10 at Christmas															X						75
Gift from Tow Co.								X													40
Removing Merchandise													X								65
Money from Gambler		X																			15

Table # 8

City H	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
Free Coffee																				X	100
Discount Meals														X							70
Free Meals	X																				05
Police I.D.		X																			10
\$10 at Christmas	X																				05
Gift from Tow Co.																					0
Removing Merchandise																					0
Money from Gambler																					0

Table # 9

Composit of Ride-Along Scores

ITEMS / AGENCIES	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
Free Coffee	75	90	100	100	100	100	100	100
Discount Meals	50	85	100	100	70	100	100	70
Free Meals	30	60	40	90	20	80	95	05
Police I.D.	70	25	30	70	80	50	60	10
\$10 at Christmas	50	65	40	30	30	80	75	05
Gift from Tow Co.	0	0	10	0	0	40	40	0
Removing Merchandise	0	55	0	0	40	20	65	0
Money from Gamblers	05	0	0	0	10	20	15	0
	<u>275</u> 800	<u>380</u> 800	<u>320</u> 800	<u>390</u> 800	<u>350</u> 800	<u>490</u> 800	<u>550</u> 800	<u>190</u> 800
Agency Score	.34	.47	.40	.49	.44	.61	.69	.24

*Figures in cells are in percent. Percent equals the number of respondents who indicated that the items were commonly practiced by members of the departments.

Summary

As a result of experience with the ride-along interviews during Phase II of the Project, it became clear from both an empirical and intuitive sense that the interviews provided a direct and independent measure of the phenomena of police corruption in the agencies studied. They were the most accurate measure of the actual behavior of officers relative to the items in the questionnaire because of the confidentiality of the interview, this one-on-one conversation, the promise of anonymity, the specificity and highly structured nature of the inquiry, and the objective tabulation of responses. There was also a very strong relationship between the data from the interviews and other data generated by the Project with other techniques. During the field work the two interviewers developed a sensitivity to insincerity on the part of the officers. When insensitivity was apparent to interviewers it was also perceived by the note taker. The Ride-Along Interview data will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

The rest of this chapter is comprised of interviews which are considered to be crucial in assessing the validity of techniques of the Ride-Along Interview technique. They are illustrative of the Ride-Along Interviews and consist of five of the Phase I field interviews. These interviews were reconstructed from field notes immediately after the actual conversations and indicate the in-depth nature of discussion that may be generated.

P1 = Non-Driver INTERVIEW #1
P2 = Driver

1. The two officers were joined during their regular tour of duty. They are regular partners and are also roommates. To quote one of them, ". . . we are both divorced. . . we were thrown out of the house at the same time." They were white males in their thirties.
11. The interviewer spent some time (15 minutes) talking about general police matters. The two officers proceeded to take us on a tour of their patrol area. The men were given copies of the questionnaire and asked to comment on it.

11. THE INTERVIEW

- Q. Looking at the list of activities in questions 2, do you think these acts are corrupt?
- A. P1 "Around here people give us free coffee and say that they are glad to have us in there. . . as to sleeping in the patrol car--here, in the dead hours of morning, one man might sleep, well, cat nap. . . some officers may take to a free narcotics arrest. Not me. I enjoy busting guys for dope. But sometimes the druggies will squeal on you.
- Q. Would you take money not to arrest someone?
- A. P1 "No, you make more going to court--\$50 a time. In court you can make \$300."
- Q. What about free meals?
- A. P1 "You never get a regular sector--I live here and sometimes a friend will pick up a tab. We're around and is security.
- Q. What happens at Christmas?
- A. P2 "We say no--people are annoyed and they bring it (gifts) to the station--Once a cop saved a kid's life. The station refused a gift package and the people sent it to his home.
- Q. Have there been changes since Chief X arrived?
- A. P1 "morale had gone down. He leans on people about stupid things, e.g. name tags, white shirts that now make people targets, jackets. . ."
- Q. What about "shoo-flies"?
- A. P1 "No one trusts anyone. No one trusts one another unless they are regular partners. The union will kick out an officer it discovers is SIU (special investigating unit).
- Q. Look at our last list of questions. What do you think of a cop who turns a guy in?
- A. P1 "For many things, it's not my interest--you take care of yourself--I could not turn a guy in, even for narcotics.

- Q. Are there people on a pad?
- A. P2 "Management people--maybe."
- Q. Are there districts with more opportunity for corruption?
- A. P2 "Where there are more drugs. . .but there is not a lot of money."
- Q. What about using your I.D. to enter a movie or some such place?
- A. P1 "if they know you, you automatically go in. Cause if they know you are in there, they know that you will act like a police officer, if need be. You are at their disposal."
- Q. Had Chief X. changed officer behavior?
- A. P1 "Guys don't like him."
- Q. What do you think Chief X. is looking for?
- A. P1 "Hurting as many cops as he can. . .we had six cops in a bar fight--to pay back how men treated a sergeant. These men were put free in court. . . but Chief X. suspended two. He holds his own court."
- Q. What happens if an SIU is identified?
- A. P2 "He's dead. No one would talk to him."
- Q. Would he have an "accident?"
- A. P1 "Maybe."
- Q. Would you turn a guy in for corrupt behavior?
- A. P1 "We would know if he did things--but we couldn't. One guy (a Black officer) was selling narcotics. We knew and so did others--but it's hard to turn a guy in. A man who's bad or an alcoholic, we can bury them some place. It took a Federal narcotics agent to turn this cop in."
- Q. Had Chief X. added any new programs?
- A. P2 "We had a Stress program. The department hired a bi-sexual. We had a Puerto Rican cop who was a bi-sexual and he was having some trouble with his boyfriend. He went to the Stress psychiatrist, who told the police and the cop was fired. Guys resent being sent to the Stress program."

P1 = Non-Driver INTERVIEW #2
P2 = Driver

- I. The men were joined during their regularly scheduled patrol. The interviewer spent some time talking to the officers about general police related topics. He then eased into a description of the project. After being told about the general nature of the questionnaire, patrolman #2 volunteered:
- II. "You will have trouble speaking to people. He (Chief X.) speaks with a forked tongue. . .you know we have a "Stress Program" here. This cop who has a drinking problem speaks "confidentially to the Stress doctor. Next thing you know he gets a notice to shape up or out. We can't believe promises of confidentiality. Also, we have been screwed so often by well meaning people."

III. THE INTERVIEW

- Q. (Gives the men the questionnaire to look over) We are trying to define corruption. What do you think of the items on that list?
- A. P2 "If you have a regular route and stores offer you coffee and a donut, I don't think it's corruption. If he came to my house, I'd give him coffee. But if you go into a store expecting things free, it's corrupt. The small guys (meaning patrol cops) are not really corrupt. . .you can go to the North End where the mafia is and we are told by someone to lay off--I myself never heard this--but you hear from scuttlebutt that you don't give certain folks and cars tickets. Some tickets we think are being squashed somehow by someone."
- Q. Do officers ever squash tickets?
- A. P2 "Perhaps in the past we would do it from the goodness of our hearts--like if we got a poor student. Now, we are afraid that the _____ would suspect you (of taking bribes). . .some people can get us for nothing. I think it's wrong to put our name and badge number on a ticket--Chief X. will follow through even on anonymous letters from the public--they take the citizens word without investigation. Now we tag everyone. We even tagged a senator once--because otherwise it's not fair."
- Q. How many years have you been here?
- A. P2 "I've been here nine years."
- P1 "Seven years."
- P2 "We've been partners about four years. We used to drive the skooters. Louie was very popular and he was taken out of the community."
- P1 "We got 500 citizens who wanted me back--but Chief X. feels we will be corrupt."

P2 "They are trying to break up steady partners. They think that teams may be corrupt. We think that Chief X looks down on us."

Q. What about your associates?

A. P1 "They young guys were looking for change. We wanted new leadership. The last three years has been a time of constant screwing. I used to be proud to be a cop--now citizens all think we're corrupt. . .my relatives own a restaurant and they think all cops are corrupt."

Q. Is free meals a policy?

A. P2 "Well, Louie and I buy our own lunch. My nephew tells me that in restaurants kids spit in cops' food and do things to it--so I don't eat out. This can happen if the cop pays for it or not. People look at the police as moochers, leachers. I can't speak for all police officers, but especially with the younger officers, we make more money and we do not like or have to mooch."

Q. Would you answer our questionnaire?

A. P1 "In our association (X City), we have been told not to cooperate. If you approach our association, they might have given you permission and our men would have felt at ease and cooperated. Here, everytime Chief X has let outsiders come in, we've been screwed."

P2 "When the police commissioner first came to X City., he went to the academy and said that all would be confidential. However, the commissioner used the information gotten and then gave men the boot. . .for example, one man asked him for advise as to what to do if a guy (fellow officer) is drunk on the job. Chief X would give advice and the next thing you know they sent a () to look for the guy (drunken officer) and picked him up. We've been screwed by the best--Chief X shows little or no respect for us, for our contract."

Q. If you would fill out the questionnaire, what would you answer?

A. P1 "Chief X. don't want you to take anything--why not take from a friend--we always offer friends coffee."

P2 "On Christmas my friends the politicians get big gifts and these guys are saying we can't get gifts--they push us down and the legislators talk about our corruption and pass laws to keep us lower than the labor class and not as professionals. At Christmas someone wanted to give us a turkey and we had the man send it to a poor family. Our newspapers of X City are geared to the politicians. They are in a clique with the politicians. We fight (Mayor) X and those that judge us are appointed by Mr. X and we can't win."

Q. Is there corruption in this city?

A. P1 "There are certain districts where the mafia have power. People in the North End hate the police and they respect the mafia and they send in letters against officers."

P2 "If you have an area with no parking facilities--you could really shake-down the merchants--sometimes we give customers consideration."

Q. Have there been changes in corruption since Chief X came?

A. P1 "I think Chief X is the lowest. Our Internal Affairs, the SIU, has not had a conviction. . .Chief X had the 'Bookie Scandal'--anyone in District 5 with the name of Chief X had to submit a financial statement. The news media is our trouble. You do something good and maybe it's on p. 43. If a cop does something bad, it's on the front page."

Q. What about the politicians, are they corrupt?

A. P1 "They have a bad reputation like the police, but people can't or don't name names."

Q. What if you heard of a shakedown?

A. P2 "if someone in my family had a problem with one, I'd take it to the sergeant. But today people are afraid to do it informally. They would have to make a formal complaint."

Q. Would it have to be serious for you to turn someone in?

A. P1 "For a moocher--I'd informally approach the officer. If that didn't work, I'd go to the sergeant."

Q. Have you seen any incidents of corrupt behavior higher up?

A. P1 "When Chief X first came here, we were ordered to tag cars on Newberry Street. Then the merchants complained to (Mayor) X and our orders to ticket stopped. . .you know that when Chief X got here, the patrolman's organization got a telegram from the men where he was before. It said something like 'HA-HA we're glad we're rid of him.'"

Interview: Bob McCormack
Janet E. Fishman

Patrol Car Interview

Police Department

Subject: Officer
White, male, 25 years old

Jan. 15, 1976
5:00 - 6:30 p. m.

1. Bob McCormack sat in the front of the patrol car next to Officer X Janet Fishman sat in the back seat where she took notes and occasionally asked a question. There was a protective grating separating the front and back seat of the car. The interviewers accompanied the S as he cruised his patrol area. The interview was interrupted on the occasions when the officer answered calls.

11. For the first 20 minutes McCormack and the S engaged in general conversation. The S had not taken the questionnaire and was unaware of the intent of the project. The project was discussed for a short time. McCormack and the S discussed the S's job and the background of the officer and eased into the discussion of corruption.

111. THE INTERVIEW

Q. How many years have you been on the force?

A. Three years.

Q. Why did you choose this career?

A. I had a good job before this - more money, regular hours, benefits. But I was not cut out to sit behind a desk.

This job is more interesting. I like the responsibility.

Q. What went on here before Chief X arrived? What changes do you see?

A. Well, he changed the uniforms. But more than the uniform must be changed. The person in the uniform must change.

Q. Is the department corrupt?

A. Two eyes, two ears, one mouth, - you see a lot. I've seen people fleece others. I've had \$100 put in my pocket by a fellow officer. He took money out of the wallet of a drunk and told me "he'll never know." I put the money back.

Q. Did that happen a lot?

A. Yes. But not so much now. People are afraid of who might tell.

Q. What are people afraid of?

A. That people will tell the Internal Affairs people and that they will go to the man (meaning X). Those IA guys just look at you with beady eyes. These guys who I once worked with now think that they are cool

NOTE - We passed through a very poor black neighborhood sprinkled with a few fine homes.

Q. Who lives in these better homes? How can they afford them?

A. There are many vice joints here. We're afraid to close them. We don't harass them cause they serve a purpose. They say gambling and prostitution keep the bad people off the street.

The old vice squad did not mess with this area.

Q. Does politics influence arrests?

A. Not my tickets. I give them but nothing happens. The judges won't prosecute. The judges coerce the police officers. Often the corruption is so bad some cases never come up. The state will not prosecute certain cases. This is very discouraging to us who want to do our job. The magistrates are really corrupt.

Q. What differences has Chief X made?

A. All I can see is that the people he promotes deserve it. In the past people got promoted through pull and often those who get promoted know nothing.

Policy has been sent down on things. We need tightening of rules and regulations - now things are in black and white.

The administration in the North area is better. Supervisors are actually supervising.

Everything Chief X has done I agree with, especially the cars.

Q. How is morale?

A. Morale is about the same. In the past people would tell the chief what we were doing.

Now people backstab and go to Chief X. The supervisors are trying to make a good impression. Police officers and supervisors run to the IA and Chief and tell - they kiss ass so as to get in with the little group.

Q. How do the rules about free meals affect you.

A. We never did get anything free in this district. Here all the rich old line people live. They want things done for them. They get things done by pull higher up. They don't have to give the cops anything. They just used to call the chief.

Q. Do you resent the cops that get "goodies" - while in this district you get all the "crap".

A. It ticks you off - the other cops are appreciated.

Q. Is there a race problem?

A. Yes. It all gets into race. The judges prosecute the blacks and white trash while the rich whites go free.

"Money talks and bullshit walks!" Here you can grease the palms of the magistrates. For example, the son of a rich resident was issued a number of tickets. He never showed up in court. Nothing happened to him.

They all have fixes in with magistrate. They know that they can't be touched.

NOTE - As we drive by some houses in a poor black area, the Officer points out three houses of prostitution. He told us that the vice squad would never touch them.

Q. How does the vice squad select which houses will be raided?

A. Well in the past the vice squad members would get \$100 to raid a whisky place. These places wanted to be raided so that they would get free publicity. They would insist that the arrest record was complete and named the specific type of gambling that went on, that whiskey was served and that girls were available. The newspapers would print the charges and thus give the joint publicity.

Q. Can you mention any other kinds of related behavior by officers?

A. Cops sometimes would misplace evidence. I once saw an officer steal a gun from an arrested drunk. The officer did not mention in his report that the individual has a gun - he just wrote that the man was drunk.

Sometimes cops mishandle their cars - Some of them drive the cars when they are drunk and some ride around with girls (prostitutues) in them. This is not just regular cops but brass and all.

Q. What percent of the officers on the force engaged in corrupt activity?

A. Before Mr. x I'd say 100% were doing things. They all took free liquor and free meals.

About 10% of them were doing the big stuff. Let me tell you some of the best flimflam fleece men have stripes.

Did you see that movie Serpico, well it was true. You just didn't know who was straight.

Interviewer: Bob McCormack
Janet E. Fishman

Patrol Car Interview

Police Department

Subject: Officer B

Jan. 14, 1976

4:00 - 6:30 p. m.

1. Bob McCormack sat in the front of the patrol car next to Officer B. Janet Fishman sat in the back seat, where she took notes and occasionally asked a question. There was no protective grating separating the front and back seat of the car. The interviewers accompanied the subject as he cruised his patrol area. The interview was interrupted on the occasions when the officer answered calls.

11. For the first 15 minutes, McCormack and the Subject engaged in rather general conversation. The Subject described his job and described the districts he was responsible for. He told us a story about a fellow officer who was shot and subsequently rehabilitated as their department's "Ironside. . ."

The Subject had already taken the questionnaire and brought up the issue of corruption himself. McCormack then proceeded to the interview.

111. THE INTERVIEW

Q. How was it under your ex-police chief?

A. He never really bothered me. He was a politician. But I and others often received calls from him asking us to disregard the tickets we had written for his friends. We were asked by him -- "help me out." At one time the Chief could legally ask an officer not to process a ticket. For example, one time he asked me not to process a ticket that I had given one of his friends in his hunt club. . . . The officer has the right not to non-pros a ticket. . . . I don't like someone to tell me to non-pros. . . . We were under the threat of being given a had work assignment or transfer. . . . We could not do anything about it.

I like the new Chief in that he doesn't do this. You can speak to him and he'll listen.

This new Chief is changing the uniforms, painting the cars. I like it. . . . But I wish they would pay us more.

We had a sergeant, the Chief's son-in-law, who is now suspended. . . . He got promoted to sergeant after being told he passed the sergeant's exam. Many better men were told that they failed. . . . Only the Chief's son was told he passed. Let's face it, this department was corrupt.

The county councilmen were corrupt and they would often interfere with our work. One guy would follow us around and check if we were speeding -- many councilmen were corrupt.

Q. You were on the Vice Squad. How were you picked?

A. I was chosen because I had a new face, unknown in the bars.

The situation here is that one man furnished money for all the bars -- but technically we can't prove it.

Q. Is the Vice Squad an area that is prone to corruption?

A. Yes. . . . The supervisor determined what we could prosecute -- the ex-Chief's son-in-law, who was suspended, was in this division when he was a corporal.

When I was on the Vice Squad, we did many busts of prostitutes. At that time I was a rookie and would not have known if people were on the take.

One time some members of the Vice Squad rented a motel room for a prostitution party -- our Vice Squad used their American Express Card to charge the room -- a patrolman found out about it and made a report, even after being threatened by the Chief's son-in-law. The officers involved were supposedly suspended for 10 days without pay but we believe that they were getting paid. The Chief took care of the case and did not put it through the normal disciplinary procedure.

Q. What are some of the changes.

A. Coffee breaks -- we get two, 15 minute breaks and one half-hour break for a meal. In the past, they did not get their money's-worth from us. As long as we were not busy, we could take as many breaks as we'd like to.

Still, many jobs are political. I think that the new juvenile detective will probably be a Black.

Q. How did our questionnaire relate to the situation here?

A. Some questions were hard to answer. We've had a changeover. Some were true then and false now.

Q. How about the accident scene question?

A. I don't think this applies here. . . . But our tower may have payed off the guy.

Q. Any other comments?

A. This Chief is 200% more honest. I don't get anymore calls to "help him out." Right after Mr. X got here, a big-shot got a ticket and he was prosecuted. Chief X takes the heat. . . .

When I was on the Vice Squad we had a list of bars we could "visit" and some bars we could not -- We had one uncorruptable sergeant, though, who was put on the Vice Squad every election time.

Q. What about the Dixie Mafia? Is there one?

A. No, but we do know that Mr. Y owned most of the bars and prostitutes.

Q. How is it that everyone knows him and he's still not in trouble?

A. He knows who the cops are and closes his doors to them.

Q. What happens at Christmas time?

A. We used to get gifts, but no more. In the past, we could get 18 - 20 bottles of liquor.

Q. What changes in the department don't you agree with?

A. I like it better now -- but it's too fast -- we could do all we liked and now we can do nothing. . . .

Chief X changed our patrol hours and he won't tell us why. He listens to our complaints but he does not change things. I liked the old hours better. But now I enjoy coming to work. I know that if I write a ticket it will stick. Morale is up. I like Mr. X.

Q. Can you sum up the difference between now and before?

A. It's better now. Morale is much better. Promotions were unfair in the past. Many guys were passed over due to politics.

Q. Do you think many who were corrupt would have done these things if Chief X had been the Chief?

A. No. This Chief is around more. We would hardly see the old Chief.

Q. Do you resent any of the new policies?

A. He took away our half-price at Burger King. . . . I was never approached by Burger King for any favors. Holiday Inn always gave free dinners, and he took that away too. The Chief calls it a bribe.

Q. Do you consider Christmas liquor a bribe?

A. Yes.

Q. What changes do you like?

A. We now have individual responsibility for our cars. In the past, if one guy was drunk and messed up a car we all lost our car privileges. Now each officer is responsible for his own car. Morale is up.

P1 = Driver

P2 = Non-driver

The interviewers joined two older policemen (in 50's or 60's) during their regularly scheduled patrol period. These men have been partners for five years. They had 20 and 25 years experience in the Police Dept. Both men were very hostile to us. They were against our talking to them. They refused to even look at the questionnaire. We were able to briefly talk to the driver (P2) of the car, but the other officer (P1) refused to communicate with us. . . . The interviewer brought up many items on the questionnaire and the officers refused to comment. . . .

Q: Is there a move in the department to break up partners?

P1: I don't know--Chief X wants to, but for what purpose?

Q: Why do you think he transferred so many sergeants?

P1: Who knows? And just overnight.

Q: Does it have anything to do with Anti-Corruption?

P1: I don't know. What is the purpose? Anyway many sergeants (new ones) are green and they are dependent on the men and they don't know what they are doing.

Q: There are rumors that they put corruption informers right out of the academy into the department.

P1: We hear that.

Q: What do you think of Chief X? Are there many changes since he's come here?

P1: No one has figured out his changes.

Q: What turns you off about cooperating with us?

P1: We don't trust anyone who comes from headquarters. When you are quoted it is out of context. . . You often come off looking like a clown. . . . Mr. X came in and the men were told that we were like the worst police department in the country. . . .

Q: Do you think Chief X accomplished what he wanted to in regard to eliminating corruption?

P1: I don't know, maybe. . . .

Q: Is there any mooching going on in this department?

P1: Maybe 10% mooch.

Q: What are the biggest changes since Chief X ?

P1: Supreme Courts made changes and tied our wrists. Now we are the defendents.

Commanders Corruption Hazard Questionnaire

Early in Phase II of the Anti-Corruption Management Project, a Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile Questionnaire was developed. The Kit had a practical administrative objective as well as a research objective. For the police administrator, it was hoped that the questionnaire would indicate to the chief of police the level of knowledge of his subordinate commanders regarding corruption; that it would be helpful in intelligence gathering; and that it would aid the administration in determining appropriate responses to corruption. For researchers, it was hoped that when analyzed, the data gathered as a result of the questionnaire's would explain the internal nature of police corruption.

The original concept for the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire was based on a 1975 publication of the New York City Police Department entitled The Integrity Control Anti-Corruption Manual.¹ The manual contained a suggested list of internal corruption hazards and requested that Unit and Bureau Commanders submit a report to the Commissioner's Office about the presence or absence of those hazards. Reporting other forms of corruption was also encouraged. The table of contents provided a list of suggested corrupt activities including the misuse of department records, falsification of department time and money records, acceptance of gratuities, organized payoffs and misuse of property coming into police custody. Subordinate commanders were requested to report on suggested procedures to overcome these hazards. Published after the Knapp Commission Corruption hearings, the intent of the manual was clear. Although congratulating members of the department for their successful attempts at restoring a positive agency image, the authors of the manual appealed to commanders not to slacken their efforts:

Our Department has made great strides in eliminating corrupt behavior and at the same time improving its management and supervisory practices. To sustain this effort and to deter the emergence of any backward trends, formal corruption assessments may be required periodically. Formal and continuing assessments must be part of every commanding officer's daily routine.²

In terms of developing a set of administrative guidelines as part of the Anti-Corruption Management Project, the manual seemed useful in developing the Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile Questionnaire which would be administered to the agencies participating in the study.

The questionnaire was developed to be administered prior to on-site visits by researchers. The commissioner or chief of police was requested to send a confidential questionnaire to his subordinate commanders. The questionnaire was to be returned to the chief, not through "normal channels". The open-ended questionnaire requested information from commanders about possible corruption hazards. The purpose of the questionnaire was to determine the extent to which commanders are aware of corruption in their jurisdiction and among their per-

¹Integrity Control Anti Corruption Manual, New York City Police Dept, Nov. 1975

²ibid, p. 111 of Forward

sonnel. The following instructions and questions were provided to each commander:

- a) Indicate on attached sheets conditions in your command which are, or may become, a corruption hazard.
- b) Are records and reports maintained on a regular basis?
- c) Do the reports indicate how the corruption hazards manifest themselves? (double parking, frequent visits by officers--no reports filed, etc.)
- d) Do commanders make policy to guide subordinates responses to corruption hazards? (order, memos, roll call training sessions) Are there department wide guidelines in these areas?
- e) What initiatives have been undertaken in your command to reduce the problems caused by corruption-prone locations and conditions?
- f) Have the initiatives been effective? How is the effectiveness or lack of it indicated?

A set of specific directions were included with the open-ended questionnaire. Each commander was requested to list all corruption hazards in his command according to the following categories:

a) Corruption hazard or condition

Briefly define: example: acceptance of free meals from restaurant owners in area to overlook. violations of parking regulations in vicinity of premises.

b) Observable indicators of the hazard

Example: numerous illegally parked vehicles in area--few summons served. Premises frequented by officers on meal periods on a regular

c) Command initiatives to control

d) Command accountability

Final responsibility for anticipating and counteracting corruption hazards is the responsibility of the commander of the area. This responsibility and commensurate authority is in some cases delegated to subordinates. To whom is this responsibility delegated in your command for each of the corruption hazards listed (if not delegated, indicate self).

Each commander was reminded that a possible internal corruption hazards might exist concerning days off, moonlighting, filing inaccurate reports, property custody, or overtime arrests. It was requested that these hazards, if they existed, be listed.

Illustration I is the "mock-up" of a suggested interdepartmental communication to accompany the questionnaire, and illustration II is one of several survey sheets to be completed and attached by the subordinate commanders to their narrative report.

The initial intent of the Project researchers was to review the Commander's returned profiles with him before conducting questionnaire administration or the Ride-Along surveys. Interviews were conducted in each department, and the resulting information from the profiles proved to be surprisingly frank and generally comprehensive as judged by the chief administrator. Although few agency heads indicated that the listed hazards were entirely unknown to them, many indicated to aids that their internal affairs section investigate specific reported conditions. An early analysis of the questionnaire disclosed the following potential corruption hazards within the agencies surveyed:

COMMUNITY-CORRUPTION OPPORTUNITY PROFILE
CONTENT ANALYSIS

Discounted or free coffee/meals
Using position for favors/discounts
Christmas gifts
Pawn shops (overlook stolen property for favors)
Property room (theft from)
Gambling (favors for not arresting)
Prostitution (favors for not arresting)
Abuse of overtime, sick leave, days
Towing service (kickback from operators)
Theft of Dept. supplies, petty cash
Unauthorized use of Departmental vehicles
Theft or alteration of records
Non-enforcement of traffic (parking) violations
Free liquor at bars off duty
Drinking alcohol while on duty
Non-enforcement at inspected/regulated business
Narcotics involvement/shakedown
Funeral homes (give preferential treatment)
Motel (give preferential treatment)
Movie theatres (give preferential treatment)
Ticket fixing
Failure to arrest
Collusion in accidents (minor accident/major injury)
Rolling drunks
Removal of items from past burglary/open business
Involved with organized crime or criminal elements
Bond referral for kickback
Case fixing/special treatment for defendant
Tipping off suspected premise of future raid
Bribing of Internal Affairs for non-prosecution
Theft of informant funds
Loose enforcement of taxi regulations
Bribery of correctional officers for easy work
Prior info. given or sold re: police auction
Groups receiving prior promotion exam information
Non-enforcement of overloaded trucks for money
Attorney referral by officer for kickback

As data was collected in survey cities, it became apparent to Project researchers that many of the identified community-based corruption hazards were

ILLUSTRATION I

TO: Subordinate Commanders

FROM: The Police Chief/Commissioner

SUBJECT: Commanders Corruption/Hazard Profile

In order to provide up to date information on the awareness of and the suggested remediea for possible corruption hazards within this agency, I am requesting all subordinate commanding officers to provide a confidential and comprehensive corruption hazard profile of their commands. This profile will contain specifics regarding all internal and external conditions which have the potential to be a source of corruption or which have already become such. Please read and be guided by the instructions attached to this memorandum.

Please submit this report directly in a sealed envelop marked "confidential" and addressed to the Chief of Police/Commissioner by (thirty days). Should you wish to discuss the report further, please indicate such a desire in your reply.

By Direction of
the Police Commissioner/Chief

ILLUSTRATION II

CORRUPTION HAZARD PROFILE

Survey Sheets

Sheet _____ of _____

A. Corruption hazard or condition.

B. Observable indicators of the hazard.

C. Command initiatives to control.

D. Command accountability.

positively correlated with the indirect measures of corruptions identified by the correlations the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire and with the direct measure of corruption being generated by the Ride-Along Interviews.

This presented a major methodological problem because no specific measure of the levels of corruption opportunity in the community was originally established. When the need for such a measure was identified, the data gathering process were discussed to develop a community measure including on-site demographic studies and hiring local consultants. The former was determined to be too expensive and time consuming, and demographic studies, based on the Project's previous experience with on site consultants seemed too uncertain. It appeared that the unstructured and perhaps not all inclusive the Commanders Corruption Hazard Questionnaire provided the best available measure of community corruption opportunity.

Use of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire Survey as a Proxy for Community Opportunity Variables

Our research during Phase I and Phase II of the Project indicated that low levels of corruption existed in some departments coincidental with low levels of administrative discipline as measured by the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire. Ride-along data indicated that in these departments two major factors accounted for low-level corruption: lack of opportunity and/of lack of anonymity. In these departments - one near a major city then recovering from a police corruption scandal - comments such as "There is nothing here" or "I bring my lunch so that no one thinks I'm mooching" were common. In a smaller agency, the police working environment was described as a "gold fish bowl."

In order to incorporate a parameter of community opportunity, although indirectly measured, the Project staff decided to use the existing data from the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire. An experienced member of the Project staff who was not directly involved with either the collection or analysis of data was requested to conduct an evaluation. The data from each agency was to be compared against that from every other agency to determine a hierarchy of community opportunity. He was directed to read the entire corruption Hazard Questionnaire base data (132 response sheets and 36 typewritten reports). He was then to take the responses from City A and compare them to those of City B, City C, City D, etc. City B was then to be compared with City C, City D, etc., until each survey city was compared to every other survey city. It was generally hypothesized that cities high in corruption as measured by Ride-Along Interview scores would have high levels of corruption in terms of this new measure of community opportunity.

The results of the paired comparisons are shown in Table 1. Table 1 also provides the Ride-Along scores previously described in Chapter III. Generally, the highest and lowest scoring cities are consistent in both their paired comparison and Ride-Along Interview scores. Cities A and C have the two lowest scores on the paired comparison and the second and third lowest on the Ride-Along Interviews. Cities F and G are the highest respectively on both. Cities B and D are close on both the Ride-Along scores and the paired comparisons.

The following comments from the Project researcher will indicate some of the difficulties encountered in the evaluation process.

The methodological problems are many. The two most important are 1. different cities have different definitions of corruption. This manifests itself in what is reported, 2. researchers must specify (in the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire) exactly what they want to be reported.

You must also specify for the rater what you want to be judged as corruption otherwise the process is much too subjective.

Future research efforts should focus on the construction of a validated instrument to measure community corruption opportunity.

Table #1
Paired Comparison Table

	City A	City B	City C	City D	City E	City F	City G	City H
	A < B	B > C	C < D	D > E	E < F	F < G	G > H	H < G
	A < C	B > D	C < E	D < F	E < G	F > H	G > F	H < F
	A < D	B > E	C < F	D < G	E < H	F > E	G > E	H > E
	A < E	B < F	C < G	D < H	E < D	F > D	G > D	H > D
	A < F	B < G	C < H	D > C	E > C	F > C	G > C	H > C
	A < G	B < H	C > A	D < B	E < B	F > B	G > B	H > B
	A < H	B > A	C < B	D > A	E > A	F > A	G > A	H > A
PCE Score	0	4	1	3	2	6	7	5

Ride -Along Interview Scores							
City A	City B	City C	City D	City E	City F	City G	City H
34.0	47.0	40.0	49.0	44.0	61.0	69.0	24.0

(Score # of times greater than >)

Community Corruption Variables

Because of the dearth of empirical research in the area of police corruption generally, and especially about police corruption as it is affected by community opportunity variables, a special study on community opportunity variables was

undertaken.⁵ The purpose of the study was to gather and relate the data previously generated by the researchers to identify community opportunity variables. The following is an edited version of that brief study.

Community Corruption Variables

Richard B. Hoffman

The Knapp Commission identification of "meat eaters" and "grass eaters" has been extended for the research of the Project into a complex typology of forms of police corruption.⁶ The complexities of corruption requires that attention be paid not only to the very obvious legislative and societal conditions which lead to corruption but also to the active role played by many corrupt police officers exploiting opportunities to engage in unethical and corrupt behavior.

The most common measures of police corruption have related to bribery, vice, organized crime, illegal businesses, and the need to uphold the moral standards of the community. Although the problems of police corruption cannot be separated from these activities, the research by the Project has revealed that the problems of police corruption are broader and complex, the problems extend to police inter-relationships with the opportunities available for corrupt behavior in the community as well as to the ethical disparity between the police and the communities in which they work.

The community variables and measures which affect police corruption include both active forms of corruption (when an officer either directly or subtly initiates the conditions for corruption) and passive forms of corruption (when an officer receives small favors as an inducement for remaining friendly or cooperating with specific members of the community.) Generally these variables can be summarized as follows:

- population
- land area
- income level
- community and criminal justice processes
- respect for private property
- community expectations
- community sensibility i. e., willingness to report
- corrupt police actions
- community morality

⁵ This is commented on in some depth in the Projects' Literature Review.

⁶ Knapp Commission Report

Although the relationship of police corruption to many of the variables is well known, the impact of community variables on the level of corruption must be viewed as a major finding. This finding occurred as a result of attempts to explain the relative lack of corruption in a community where the department's level of discipline was not particularly strong and where the ethical standards of the members of the department were moderately low compared to those of other departments.

Further, the geographical area from which these officers were recruited had previously sustained some of the most serious corruption within the country. The willingness of the members of this department to report their peers for corrupt activities was the second lowest of any city studied. However, this particular jurisdiction appeared to be one of the least corrupt of all the cities studied in terms of direct Ride-along interviews. Efforts to develop an explanation for an absence of corrupt behavior and low values on McCormack/Fishman Improbability variables measuring personal standards of honesty, willingness to report other officers, and level of discipline led to the identification of the concept of "community opportunity." Further analysis indicated that the original measure of opportunity, developed from the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire, was more complex than was originally thought.

Further analysis revealed that two variables affected the measure of opportunity. The first was a measure of "community sensibility" or the willingness to report corrupt behavior on the part of police officers. The public surveys using McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaires provided this measure in a very direct manner, because it asked the public respondents to identify corrupt acts by a police officer which respondents would report.

The second measure was that of "community expectations." This measure is less direct, because it requires analysis of the ethical standards of the public respondents, their answers to the personal standards of honesty questions in the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, and the responses to the same items by police officers from that community.

Although these variables measured by the Improbability questionnaire have a clear meaning in the context of the impact of community variables upon police corruption, the community opportunity measure was initially developed from paired-comparison rankings of the responses to the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire.

Corruption Hazards

A. Opportunities for Corruption Within the Community

The study methodology provided that the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire be distributed by the chief law enforcement official of the community to police commanders. The questionnaire requested information on possible corruption hazards within the agency or the community and suggested remedies. It attempted to elicit specific internal and external conditions having the potential to be sources of corruption or which were already sources of corruption.

Discipline and Commander Corruption Hazard Profiles as a Ride-Along Proxy

In the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, the questions relating to discipline initially appeared to be the most important in terms of finding a proxy for the ride-along. However, the use of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile to provide an initial measure of the opportunities for corruption within the community was also very important in the development of the proxy measure. This opportunity measure turned out to be the second most important variable, increasing the statistic from $F= 10.839$ to $F= 15.328$ over that which would be obtained by regressing the McCormack/Fishman disciplinary question responses. Although it is recognized that the expectations of a community with respect to the standards of behavior expected of the police are more closely related to the discipline series of questions, the degree to which these variables may exhibit autocorrelation did not affect the very important result that 1) the two variables alone described 92.6 percent of the variation on the ride-along scores (multiple R) and that an R^2 of the .858 and an adjusted R^2 of .0802 were obtained with a very significant value for the F statistic and 2) the degree to which there were corruption opportunities in the community was an exceedingly important determinant with respect to the level of corruption which existed in the community. (Refer to Chapter V for more specific details).

Analysis of the Corruption Hazard Questionnaire

The Commander's survey provided a broad conceptual view of the range of police corruption. From the analysis of the survey results, it was possible to develop a relatively strong taxonomy of the types and forms of police corruption. It was, however, very difficult if not impossible to separate a department's view of corrupt behavior from those items which they perceive to be corruption hazards. The notion of the relative nature of deviance continues to be a key conceptual issue with respect to a definition of police misbehavior.

It has been cogently stated that a society in which a large proportion of the population regularly practices a given form of behavior will tend to permit the behavior and not define it as "deviant." According to this interpretation of the term, "deviant," it is impossible to conceive of any action being classified as deviant when the majority of the population within a culture regularly practices that action. However, allowing for the inertia within social systems, the official definition of deviance may not fall within the definitions of individuals.

In attempting to identify those community variables which relate to corruption, a major conceptual issue is the need to recognize the rather wide variations among the sets of behaviors considered acceptable in each community. In departments where "grass eating" types of corruption were quite prevalent, offers of

free coffee or free meals were not viewed as corruption hazards; in other departments, they were seen as serious opportunities for corrupt behavior.

Extensive analysis of conditions throughout the study cities indicated that some important community variables led to the existence or non-existence of corruption. These variables were initially classified as opportunities or lack of opportunities for corruption. Further in-depth analysis using data from the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire led to the development of a broader classification, formed by expanding the original active-passive notion of police corruption as follows:

a) Continuing Corruptive Relationships

- active, "meat-eating" - high prevalence
- active, "grass-eating" - low prevalence
- passive, "grass-eating" - high prevalence
- passive, "meat-eating" - rarely if ever exists

b) Opportunistic Corruptive Behavior

- active, "meat-eating" - low prevalence
- active, "grass-eating" - low prevalence
- passive, "meat-eating" - can occur with generally honest officers
- passive, "grass-eating" - highest prevalence

Continuing Corruptive Relationships

The types of continuing opportunities for corruption relate to more than vice, alcohol, and the problems of licensed establishments. They extend to a wide variety of interactions with the public which lend themselves to "grass-eating" forms of corruption. They include:

- regulation of taxi-cabs,
- paying towing trucks,
- relations with bonding companies, and
- improper access and/or distribution of criminal reports and records.

Although they are indicative of the kinds of corruptive behavior available to officers who desire or are induced to undertake such behavior, there are more subtle forms of continuing corruptive relationships which even the most astute observers have not seen as serious.

These areas, although they do provide significant continuing opportunities for corruptive behavior, are among the few opportunities which 1. are directly subject to the internal control by the department and 2. which are only slightly affected by the community and its expectations. Among these kinds of continuing activities are:

- favoritism to vendors or suppliers,
- diversion of supplies, and
- use of police as go-betweens for pay-offs to correctional officials to provide favoritism or special considerations for prisoners.

The likelihood that the community and the public will become aware of these forms of corrupt activity is considerably less likely than is the case with other continuing forms of potential corruption, because an officer's participation in these corrupt activities may come to the attention of very few other people. Such participation does not involve members of the public, nor does it necessitate the cooperation of a large number of police officers. The isolation in which these acts occur is important because it affects the major means by which corrupt behavior is controlled. Departmental discipline, peer group pressure, and community disapproval can act as deterrents only when there is a fairly high probability that the corrupt behavior will become known to at least one of those sanctioning groups. In cases of continuing corruptive relationships which do not involve the community at large, deterrence is even lower than it is with most forms of corruption.

Opportunistic Corruptive Behavior

In opportunistic corruptive behavior the participants are exposed to the officers' corrupt behavior on a mere chance or random basis. Most of the activities which lend themselves to such opportunistic corruptive behavior relate to:

- traffic violations,
- driving while intoxicated,
- consumption of vice,
- recovery of stolen property, and
- theft of goods at a crime scene.

Many officers who would not engage in the virtual betrayal of their department explicit in "meat-eating" corruption might quite willingly take home a part of a side of beef from a truck that has been wrecked or hijacked. To a great degree, their corrupt behavior occurs when:

- it takes place in relatively low visibility situations;
- there is little chance of the activity being reported;
- the possibility of serious disciplinary action being taken is low, and more important;
- the officer is able to rationalize the corrupt behavior in terms of:

- his salary;
- the danger to which he is exposed on a regular basis;
- the public attitude towards the police, and/or;
- the lack of resultant harm to any individual.

Very often the police officer justifies forms of corruption with the rationalization that they do not hurt the affected members of the community. Another rationalization provided by the community is a distinction between bribery on the scene and the promise of future favors. A lawyer, stopped for drunk driving, may promise to "help the officer out" if he runs into any legal problems in exchange for either, the officer driving the lawyer home or calling him a cab. Consequently, "respectable" members of the community encourage the police to engage in improbus activities which have little chance of being detected and which are easy to justify in terms of community values.

Police Expectations and Community Expectations - Commonality

For most departments, there was a considerable difference between what the individuals in the department expected of themselves and their peers and what the public expected of the members of the department (see Chapter II.)

Although data were available for only a limited number of cities with respect to a direct comparison of the responses of the citizens and local police to the same question, the Project found considerable agreement on two matters. In two of the cities, for the question "Does the public have a right to expect officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves?" We found the following:

In one city with 104 officers responding and 88 public citizen responses, the mean value of the citizens was 2.85 which had a two-tailed probability estimate of the distributions being the same of .783 (pooled) and .79 (separate) variance estimates. In the second city very similar results were obtained. With 128 officers responding with a mean of 2.85 and 75 citizen questionnaire responses with a mean of 2.85 the two-tail probability that the responses came from the same distribution were .914 (pooled) and .917 (separate) variance estimates.

In both cities police and public agreed that the ethical standards of the police should be higher than those of the community they serve.

Police Expectations and Community Expectations - Divergence

Another series of questions were asked about the willingness of police

- to give up their off-duty time;
- to refrain from striking;
- to allow the public to be critical of police errors in judgment;
- to have some college education prior to employment;
- to view their public service role as being important as their law enforce-

ment role, and;

- to expect the police officer continually to upgrade themselves through higher education and training.

On these matters the difference between the police and public responses was considerable. For each of the above questions, there was no single city where the probability that the responses came from the same distribution was zero or, at best very low, (on the order of 0.1) for both pooled and separate variance estimates.

Community Sensibility

To measure community sensibility, the police/public surveys were extended, requiring members of the public in each city to answer the "Personal Standard of Honesty" and "Reporting of Police Behavior" questions asked of the police.

Questions relating to discipline were not appropriate for the public group.

Generally considerable difference existed between the responses of the citizens and police with respect to their personal standards of honesty.

However, in a Southwest metropolitan suburban city having relatively low levels of corruption as measured by the Ride-along interviews score, there were a means of 9.37 for the 143 public members surveyed and a mean of 9.56 for the 206 police officers surveyed.

With respect to reporting improbus behavior, however, considerable variance was displayed. The public group would report activities with a mean of 4.5 as compared with the police group which would report activities with a mean of 8.07. The variance estimates (both pooled and separate were 0.0, indicating that the distributions were so divergent that it can be stated with considerable certainty that the response came from considerable different groups. Apparently most of the officers and citizens believe that relatively petty activities like accepting free cups of coffee or providing discounts on meals are not serious matters. The police officers indicated that they would not usually report taking free meals, but, given the Project's typology, they would report any behavior which exceeded this level. The public sensibility with respect to reporting was considerable lower and would allow all but items like taking money from gamblers or towing companies and taking merchandise from stores to go unreported. Nor surprisingly, the data corresponds very closely with the level of corruption found within this city.

This city is relatively free of major corruption, although some "grass-eating" does exist. Apparently the department has been able to motivate its members' behavior well above the community expectations as measured by the "would you report," series of questions. Lack of corruption is further reinforced by a review of the officers' responses to the discipline question, wherein the 206 officers responding had a mean of 1054 with a relatively small standard of error of .372, which indicates considerable reliability and consistency among the responses. The findings of the Projects study for the city are rather consistent; specifically,

- the city has a moderate to medium level of corruption;
- members of the community and of the police department have personal standards which are slightly higher than those which Project observers in the Ride-along interviews discovered;
- the willingness of the citizens to report (used as an indication of their expectations of police behavior) is relatively low;
- the level of organizational integrity as measured by the discipline questions is exceptionally high and is reflected in the considerable difference between the public expectations as measured by their responses to the questions, and the willingness of officers to report their peers as measured by the police officer responses to the questions.

For an Eastern metropolitan suburb also having moderately low corruption, the Project developed a different profile. The public standards and police standards of honesty were similar.

- The overall level of standards of honesty in the two cities are considerably different; there is almost a full percentage difference between the two groups.
- The moderately low level of corruption within the city as measured by the Ride-along interview scores can be attributed to a lack of opportunity for corruption as opposed to willingness to engage in corrupt behavior. The lack of corruption is further collaborated by the relatively low willingness of the public to report (5.5 for 113 public respondents) and the mean considerable divergence between the 90 police respondents mean of 9.08. With variance estimates on the order of .001 (pool) and .002 (separate) various considerable divergence between the citizenry and the police.

The level of organizational integrity as measured by the questions about discipline was considerably lower than that of the reporting scores, implying that it would be impossible to commit certain activities and that the likelihood of being disciplined may not be a significant deterrent.

Although a formal model which incorporated community sensibility as measured by the public response to the personal standards of honesty question and community expectations as measured by the public response to the reporting question has not been developed as a part of this study, these two variables taken from the Commander's Profile Questionnaire have a significant power as an explanatory mechanism, particularly when coupled with comparative analysis using police responses to questions of reporting, honesty, and discipline.

Understanding of the role Corruption Hazards Have on Creating Opportunites

for Police Corruption within the Community

From the least corrupt to the most corrupt city, command officers were concerned about completing the Corruption Hazard Questionnaire with respect to sexually oriented business establishments and activities. Sexually oriented activities provide opportunities for corruption involving:

illegally based criminal activities,

marginally legal and regulated business. and

legal activities having opportunities for corrupting police officer and agencies.

All police environments, even those in which legal behavior is regulated and laws enforced, provide officers with significant opportunities to exercise discretion. "Meat-eating" types of corruption involve the forbearance or inaction by an officer, and in them, his culpability is clear. In these types of activities, it is often possible for officers to cooperate with the corruptively-based or the illegally based-criminal activity without directly exposing themselves. In many cases, the officers' major risk and exposure occurs when they receive payment for their cooperation. With marginally legal activities and many regulated business, police officers can very often claim that their activities were proper and were consistent with the desires of the community as a whole. When an officer is primarily engaging in oversight, inspection, and regulation of these activities it is often difficult to strike the appropriate balance between public service and reasonable enforcement of ordinances.

An exceptionally common measure used to indicate an absence of corruption, was described by one commander: "Officers of my unit or under my command made no bribery arrests and there was no complaint of corruption reported or otherwise relative (sic) to an officer of my command over the last 12 months." Given that Project data suggests that the evidence necessary to indicate corruption is difficult to obtain when police officers are not apprehended in the possession of physical evidence which clearly demonstrated culpability, measures which rely upon the absence of conviction or complaints have little or no validity. In those departments and districts where the district commanders had potential and actual corruption to be defensive about, they were the major proponents of this measure.

A significant aspect of corruptive behavior is the degree to which command personnel are able to cope with its existence and to rationalize their responses to it through the selection of measures of corruption which are extremely stringent.

The Role of Denial of Corruption by Command Officials

A major reason for the apparent lack of interest in problems of corruption by a number of command officers can be found in their ability to accomplish organizational objectives under what are often extremely tight resource constraints.

The talents that provide officers in command positions with the ability to allocate scarce resources effectively are often the most important key to their ultimate success or failure in their careers. Fighting corruptive behavior provides little personal reward for command officers and utilizes precious resources.

Among the reasons officers will give very low priorities to the investigation and ultimate prosecution of corruptive activities.

- It uses scarce personal resources of the command officers and rarely can be delegated because of the sensitive nature of the task and the possibility that the investigation may be compromised by other individuals.
- Individuals and organizations engaged in corruptively based criminal activities often have significant legal resources and may have powerful connections within the community who are capable of affecting the command officers career or promotability.
- The forces who might most reasonable object to many of the activities of the marginally legally and regulated business and their impact upon the community are often citizens and citizen groups having very little political power and who may lack significant credibility because of their vociferousness and continued agitation.
- The command officer may feel these individuals are difficult to deal with and cannot be depended upon to compromise or to negotiate in good faith.
- The selective provision of resources and enforcement meets demands which are places on the command officer by citizens requesting additional protection or special privileges.
- The command officer may tend to overlook certain type of "grass-eating" corruption, recognizing that the officers are providing services which he would like them to provide irrespective of the manner in which the officers are induced to selectively provide this protection or enforcement.

Command officers have an exceptionally difficult time in obtaining cooperation from the operational/patrol officers. They may have two or three levels of supervision between themselves and the field personnel. Additionally, command officers receive direction from their own superiors as well as direct requests from the members of the community to provide services which the "grass-eating" type of corrupt officer may be providing. Therefore, they cannot be the self-directed field officers to work harder to provide extra services to specific members of the business community.

With respect to serious corruption, the command officers have a number of other options:

- to pretend that those activities do not exist;
- to assure themselves that none of their own colleagues were involved in those activities when in a similar first line/field position;
- to assume that if serious misconduct was being engaged in, it would have been reported either by a citizen or member of the department or command;

- to take the position detection of corruption is a responsibility of internal investigation and they have not found any serious problems in "my district" or,
- to accept the fact that our officers' pay is so low and the risks that they undertake so great that little indiscretions such as free meals, cups of coffee or even accepting gifts of small nature help the men's morale.

The key to understanding command acceptance of officers who provide special privileges to specific organizations or individuals is that the law can at best be enforced selectively and henceforth in an inconsistent and perhaps discriminatory way. The acceptance is in no small part due to the ambivalence a community has towards the enforcement of its laws. That ambivalence results in the community attitude that the officers ought not to be enforcing traffic laws and parking violations, but should be focusing on crimes of physical violence and property theft. The politicians' ambivalence is manifested in the constraints, both in terms of resource allocation and enforcement objectives, which are placed upon the police.

Illegally Based and Corruptably Based Criminal Activities

"Meat-eating" types of corruption opportunity have numerous ramifications for the productivity and efficiency of the police department. These activities include:

- Illegal businesses such as loan sharking, protection rackets, extortion from individuals and businessmen, distribution of hijacked and stolen goods, and distribution of bootleg liquor and cigarettes.
- Sexually based corruptive criminal activities, which include organized prostitution, red light district operation, operations that use children as sexual objects, and rackets which include compromising individuals coupled with imposed or direct extortion or theft.
- Organized crime, including gambling, narcotics, diversion and theft of drugs from physicians and pharmacies, theft of valuable commodities such as artwork, credit cards, jewelry, securities, as well as counterfeiting and many other activities which rely on the forbearance of law enforcement for the opportunities to exist.
- Criminally corruptive activities including the individual criminal oriented entrepreneur, whose activities include pimping, small numbers operations, bookmaking provided as a "service" for customers of other businesses and many of the aspects of distribution of drugs and narcotics.

These kinds of criminal behavior rely on explicit cooperation by at least individuals if not groups of law enforcement officials whose tacit or implicit cooperation operates in a number of ways:

- tip-offs of impending police action;

- selective and discriminatory enforcement so as to restrict the activities of criminally oriented entrepreneurs, allowing other criminals performing the same activities to continue to operate;
- errors in arrest procedures which result in an inability to prosecute;
- release of confidential data of the department including names of witnesses which allow for intimidation;
- destruction of police records and theft or destruction of evidence;
- covert and overt participation by members of the department in any of the above illegal or corruptively based criminal activities.

Each of these activities strain the loyalties of the officers and increase their dependence on large amounts of cash and favors. When the public becomes aware of "meat-eating," it seriously impairs trust in the police and the willingness of the public to perform their own roles in crime control. There will be little or no community cooperation with the police when members of the community fear retribution or feel that their actions are futile.

"Meat-eating" corruption reduces police department productivity and efficiency because of the diversion of resources by officers who engage in corruption-related activities while on duty. Diversion also occurs when honest members of the department may spend considerable time and effort on standard police investigations which are then compromised by the corrupted officers.

It is clear that a police department does not only operate in a particular community, it is also an integral part of the community. The ethical standards of the department and of its officers are consistently being measured against those of the public whom they serve, and any sizable disparity in either direction will impede efficient and honest law enforcement. Only when police and community agree on a high level of integrity will that level be enforced consistently, just as a low level will be enforced consistently when that is the wish of both parties.

The nature of this inquiry into police corruption is exploratory, and none of the measures of corruption used by the Anti-Corruption Management Project were considered perfect instruments. The Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire was utilized as a measure of community opportunity as the need for that measure became apparent. The McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scales had been validated and were considered reasonably reliable.

In view of the exploratory nature and the improvization of the measures of corruption, too much emphasis should not be placed on the exactness of the correlational relationships that follow. What is important is that the research has identified several variables which have a significant impact on police corruption and has measured their effects.

This study of police corruption was originally oriented toward an internal agency approach to develop a very pragmatic program that would assist law enforcement executives in controlling corruption. Of primary interest were the characteristics of individuals and conditions within agencies which contributed in some direct way to police corruption, and over which the commissioner or chief had considerable authority. The most important characteristics were considered to be recruitment standards, police socialization, discipline, and leadership. Efforts were made through interviews and questionnaire administration to develop parameters for each.

As Phase II of the Project began, the need for a direct measure of police corruption was clear as was the desirability of broadening the perspective of the study to include the concept of community corruption opportunity.

The rationale for developing a direct measure of corruption by means of a highly structured Ride-Along Interview format is discussed in Chapter III. The expediency of using the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire as a measure of community opportunity is explained in Chapter IV. The peer reporting scale, an indicator of agency cohesiveness and a measure of police socialization was added to the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire. The agency discipline and personal standards of honesty measures were already included in the survey. Developing measures for the impact of individual officer characteristics and for the significance of police socialization on the corruption process were given high priority. Chapters VI and VIII discuss each of these measures respectively.

Theoretical Relationships among Corruption Variables

The Project staff utilized the following direct and indirect theoretical relationships among the variables. It was posited that in terms of:

A) Direct Effects

1. The higher the level of personal standards of honesty of agency personnel, the lower the levels of corruption.

2. The higher the level of discipline, the lower the levels of corruption.
3. The higher the level of community opportunity, the higher the level of corruption.
4. The higher the level of internal peer reporting, the lower the level of corruption.

B) Indirect Effects

1. The higher the level of personal standards of honesty of agency personnel, the higher the level of reporting.
2. The higher the level of community opportunity, the lower the personal standards of honesty of agency personnel (assuming local recruitment).
3. The higher the levels of discipline, the higher the levels of peer reporting.

C) Interaction Effects

It was assumed that the data would indicate interreaction among all of the variables.

It has been previously demonstrated that the variables in the Projects' corruption (schema) differentiated between the survey cities. Each of the cities had significantly different scores on the Personal Standards of Honesty (PSN), Discipline (DIS) and Reporting (RPT) Scales. They also varied in terms of community opportunity and the direct Ride-along measure. It was also shown that some of the cities were above or below the average score on each parameter and that a scale or continuum of scores had been developed.

One of the major tasks of this study was to analyze the relationship between the responses of police officers in given communities to a series of questions regarding corruption, the Project expected to use those responses on an aggregate basis for each department - coupled with other available indicators - to provide a reliable and replicable measure of corruption within a given policing jurisdiction. Initial data was provided from a data base composed of officer related data and from the opportunity score taken from the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire. First results indicated very strong correlations could be developed between the Ride-along measures and Project data using the multiple regression techniques. Rather than use raw scores from these instruments, the researchers decided to weight the corruption data, because of the need to ascribe more importance to the serious items of improbity indicated by the reordering of the McCormack/Fishman scale items by respondents. Tables I thru IV indicate the weighting methodology based on data collected in seven of the eight project cities. Table V summarizes the data from the eight project cities. The weights for the items in each of the PSN, DIS, and RPT scales were derived separately from the data in each scale. These weights

were then applied to the responses on the questionnaire, and the score for each respondent was computed by adding the weighted scores in each scale. Ride-along scores were computed using a similar technique; weights were derived from the response frequencies of the Ride-along data.

TABLE I

Percentage of total sample (N = 956, 7 cities) endorsing the response "difficult to justify as a police officer", and the weight derived as a function of this proportion for each item in the PSN scale. The standardized weights are given in the last column.

PSN	%	Weights ¹	Standardized Weights ²
PSN 1 free coffee	18%	1.44	3.20
PSN 2 free meal	55.1%	4.41	9.81
PSN 3 gambler	98.7%	7.90	17.58
PSN 4 towing	97.4%	7.79	17.33
PSN 5 disc meal	31.4%	2.51	5.59
PSN 6 X-mas	88.4%	7.07	15.73
PSN 7 merchandise	98.1%	7.85	17.47
PSN 8 I.D.	74.6%	$\sum_{j=1}^8 w_j = 44.94$ 5.97	$\sum_{j=1}^8 w_j S_j = 13.28$ =100

1. Weights were derived in the following manner. For example, for PSN 1

$$w_1 = 8 \times \frac{18}{100}$$

2. Standardized weights were computed as given below in order to make the sum of weights for all 8 items equal 100. For example, for PSN 1

$$ws_1 = \frac{1.44}{44.94} \times 100 = 3.20$$

Thus, each subject's PSN score is the sum of the standardized weights for those items that he considers "easy to justify".

TABLE II

Percentage of total sample (N = 956, 7 cities) endorsing the response "be disciplined for", and the weight derived as a function of this proportion for each item in the DIS scale. The standardized weights are given in the last column.

DIS	%	Weights	Standardized Weights
DIS 1 free coffee	12.3%	0.98	2.47
DIS 2 free meal	33.7%	2.70	6.80
DIS 3 gambler	97.4%	7.79	19.63
DIS 4 towing	95.8%	7.66	19.30
DIS 5 disc meal	26.0%	2.08	5.24
DIS 6 X-mas	82.3%	6.58	16.58
DIS 7 merchandise	97.5%	7.80	19.65
DIS 8 I.D.	51.2%	$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_j}{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_j} \frac{4.10}{39.69}$	$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_{Sj}}{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_{Sj}} \frac{10.22}{100}$

The derivation of the weights used in the DIS scale was the same as in the PSN scale (See Table 1).

TABLE III

Percentage of total sample (N = 956, 7 cities) endorsing the response "would reprimand a fellow officer", and the weight derived as a function of this proportion for each item in the RPT scale. The standardized weights are given in the last column.

RPT	%	Weights	Standardized Weights
RPT 1 free coffee	3.6%	0.29	1.10
RPT 2 free meal	7.3%	0.58	2.21
RPT 3 gambler	88.1%	7.05	26.81
RPT 4 towing	72.8%	5.82	22.13
RPT 5 disc meal	7.1%	0.57	2.17

RPT 6 X-mas	43.2%	3.46	13.16
RPT 7 merchandise	88.7%	7.10	27.00
RPT 8 I.D.	17.9%	$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_j}{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_j} \frac{1.43}{26.30}$	$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_{Sj}}{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_{Sj}} \frac{5.44}{100}$

The derivation of the weights used in the RPT scale was the same as in the PSN scale (see Table I).

TABLE IV

Percentage of total sample (N = 120, 8 cities) responding with negative answer to the question "Do officers in your department avail themselves off", and the weight derived as a function of this proportion for each item in the Ride-Along interview. The standardized weights are given in the last column.

Ride-Along	%	Weights	Standardized Weights
Ride Along 1 free coffee	5.8%	0.47	1.30
Ride Along 2 free meal	55.0%	4.40	12.20
Ride Along 3 gambler	94.2%	7.53	20.88
Ride Along 4 towing	90.0%	7.20	19.97
Ride Along 5 towing	21.7%	1.73	4.80
Ride Along 6 X-mas	53.3%	4.27	11.84
Ride Along 7 merchandise	76.7%	6.13	17.00
Ride Along 8 I.D.	54.2%	$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_j}{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_j} \frac{4.33}{4.33}$	$\frac{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_{Sj}}{\sum_{j=1}^8 W_{Sj}} \frac{12.01}{100}$

The derivation of the weights used in the Ride-Along Scale was the same as in the PSN scale (See Table I).

TABLE V

	<u>Southwest Metro Urb.</u>	<u>Northwest Urban</u>	<u>Eastern Met. Sub.</u>	<u>Southwest Metro Sub.</u>	<u>Southeastern Coastal</u>	<u>New Eng. Urban</u>	<u>South. Metro</u>	<u>Coastal Gulf</u>
PSN	3.10	7.38	20.56	21.26	12.89	12.90	21.48	23.18
DIS	3.36	11.54	22.20	23.87	12.63	16.16	26.57	26.16
REP	4.19	19.04	37.60	28.24	20.79	32.27	30.63	40.76
OPPO	"6"	"2"	"1"	"4"	"3"	"5"	"7"	"8"
132 Ride Along	7.07	11.15	22.41	25.38	25.43	32.61	46.20	55.93

Table 6 includes the basic correlative and regression statistics for a rather naive model of Ride-along scores, Personal Standards of Honesty, Discipline and Reporting. The adjusted r square, which takes into account many of the multi colinearity and auto-correlation conditions, was at its maximum .76 with just two variables regressed against the Ride-along score. These variables were reporting and personal standards of honesty. Other variables in the equation did raise the unadjusted r square slightly, but in most cases caused significant reductions in the adjusted r square along with similar reductions in the value of F and most of the standard error measures.

The next series of efforts were to add to the multiple linear regression the paired comparison measure of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire which serves as a proxy for community opportunity (and may well also be a clue to a measure of community expectation and community sensibility). These measures are described in table 7a and the statistics relating to these measures are provided in Tables 7b and 7c.

Specifically the adjusted r square increased considerably to .87 although the problems of multicollinearity created a significant variation between it and the unadjusted multiple r. Researchers were unable to continue to utilize the full data base of official data as there was now two variables, the Ride-along and opportunity Variables, for which the department means must be used. Consequently, researchers had to use a limited number of variables (the eight study cities) as their individual unit of analysis. With a multiple r of .963, and r square of .928 and an adjusted r square of .874, the correlation appeared to be not only significant as measured by the F test, but a very good approximation of the Ride-along scores, our direct measure of police corruption.

Additional work had to be done because researchers were concerned that the variable measuring the personal standards of honesty when added to the regression coefficient significantly lowered its adjusted r square. It was not possible to determine whether the lowering of the adjusted r square occurred because of any lack of reliability in the personal standards of honesty measure or was due more to the considerably reduction in the degree of freedom associated with moving from 3 to 4 degrees of freedom in the regression equation.

Researchers decided to remove the discipline value from the regression, because there appeared to be a very strong correlation between the discipline measure and some of the other variables in the equation. As seen in Tables 8, this effort increased the value of the regression only slightly in terms of the r square value. The multiple r increased from .963 with the earlier model, but more importantly there was a slight incremental increase in the adjusted r square from .874 to .877 with an accompanying reduction in the standard error from 5.84 to 5.77. There was, however, one disconcerting factor: the decrease in the value of F from 17.19 to 15.1. This decrease led researchers to attempt another series to significantly improve their results and to provide the best estimate of the Ride-along score using the technique of multilinear regression using personal standards of honesty, opportunity and reporting as described in table 8. These results (comparing tables 8 and 9c) would not be quite so strong if it were not for the value

TABLE 6

	RIDE	PSN	DIS	RPT
RIDE	1.00000	0.79778	0.80834	0.87115
PSN	.79778	1.00000	0.98160	0.88419
DIS	0.80834	0.98160	1.00000	0.90131
RPT	0.87115	0.88419	0.90131	1.00000

	MULTIPLE R	R SQUARE	ADJUSTED R SQUARE	STANDARD ERROR	ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	REGRESSION	RESIDUAL	DF	F
	0.87314	0.76238	0.76183	7.89917	2.	1397.2484	871.		

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLES	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
RPT	5.145765	0.75965	0.23951	461.575
PSN	0.6855861	0.12611	0.19222	12.721
(CONSTANT)	-16.11446			

TABLE 7A

VARIABLE	MEAN	STANDARD DEV	CASES
PSN	15.3437	7.4315	8
DIS	17.8112	8.2819	8
RPT	26.6900	11.7451	8
OPPO	4.5000	2.4495	8
RIDE	28.2725	16.4694	8

TABLE 7B

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

A VALUE OF 99.00000 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED

	PSN	DIS	RPT	OPPO	RIDE
PSN	1.00000	0.97843	0.88014	0.20055	0.78362
DIS	0.97843	1.00000	0.88666	0.23714	0.80230
RPT	0.88014	0.88666	1.00000	0.08516	0.76833
OPPO	0.20055	0.23714	0.08516	1.00000	0.64103
RIDE	0.78363	0.80230	0.76833	0.64103	1.00000

TABLE 7C

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

DEPENDENT VARIABLE . . . RIDE

VARIABLE (S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 3 . . . RPT

		ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF	F
MULTIPLE R	0.96335	REGRESSION	3.	17.19545
R SQUARE	0.92804	RESIDUAL	4.	
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	0.87407			
STANDARD ERROR	5.84444			

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
DIS	0.2899271	0.14579	0.61596	0.222
OPPO	3.738746	0.55606	0.96653	14.963
RPT	0.8297018	0.59170	0.42348	3.839
(CONSTANT)	-15.86056			

TABLE 8

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

DEPENDENT VARIABLE..	RIDE				
VARIABLE (S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 3..	RPT				
MULTIPLE R	0.96424	ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF	F	
R SQUARE	0.92976	REGRESSION	3.	17.64950	
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	0.87708	RESIDUAL	4.		
STANDARD ERROR	5.77412				

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
PSN	0.3658055	0.16506	0.64167	0.325
OPPO	3.757936	0.55892	0.92751	14.416
RPT	0.8069122	0.57545	0.39921	4.086
(CONSTANT)	-15.78753			

TABLE 9A

VARIABLE	MEAN	STANDARD DEV	CASES
PSN	15.3437	7.4315	8
DIS	17.8112	8.2819	8
RPT	26.6900	11.7451	8
OPPO	4.5000	2.4495	8
RIDE	28.2725	16.4694	8

TABLE 9B

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

A VALUE OF 99.00000 IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED

	PSN	DIS	RPT	OPPO	RIDE
PSN	1.00000	0.97843	0.88014	0.20055	0.78363
DIS	0.97843	1.00000	0.88666	0.23714	0.80230
RPT	0.88014	0.88666	1.00000	0.08516	0.76833
OPPO	0.20055	0.23714	0.08516	1.00000	0.64103
RIDE	0.78363	0.80230	0.76833	0.64103	1.00000

TABLE 9C
MULTIPLE REGRESSION

		ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF	F
MULTIPLE R	0.96128	REGRESSION	2.	30.41822
R SQUARE	0.92405	RESIDUAL	5.	
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	0.89368			
STANDARD ERROR	5.37024			

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
RPT	1.008134	0.71895	0.17345	33.783
OPPO	3.898345	0.57980	0.83167	21.972
(CONSTANT)	-16.17716			

of F now clearly improved at 30.4 as opposed to 15.1. There are only two degrees of freedom in the latter regression as opposed to three degrees of freedom in the former case. This latter equation appears to have significantly lower standard errors throughout and does not significantly change the constant of any of the last equations.

Project researchers believe that considerable work can be done to improve the measurement of these variables and that they will need to test on a high priority basis the continuing ability of these variables to predict police corruption as measured by the Ride-along scores. In future research it will be possible to replicate this study by applying a relatively simple model which utilizes the scores from the reporting and opportunity measures alone to predict the parameter of corruption within a city as it has been described by the direct Ride-along measure.

Towards a Theoretical Model of Police Corruption

As a result of data analysis involving the main variables identified in this survey, a theoretical model of police corruption has been developed. The three variables used - opportunity, detection, and discipline - explain 96% of the measure of police corruption (see table 7c). In subsequent research, using more validated research instruments, measurements of the impact of each of these variables may be made as they relate to specific communities. Perhaps as a result of further refinement, subvariables within these categories may be identified.

POLICE CORRUPTION MATRIX

		- OPPORTUNITY		+ OPPORTUNITY	
		-	+	-	+
+	+DETECTION	0	1	2	3
	-	4	5	6	7
-	-DETECTION	8	9	10	11
	-	12	13	14	15

MATRIX KEY

Where "0" is the theoretical situation in which there is absolutely no opportunity for undetected corruption to occur, where should such improbable behavior occur it would be reported by a peer to the administration of the agency in 100% of the cases, and where when reported, disciplinary action of some nature would be taken in every case.

A "1" correlation would indicate the slightest possibility of opportunity, with close to 100% assurance of being reported if detected, and where certainty of discipline if detected was close to 100%.

A "15" correlation would indicate an agency which was operating in an environment in which there are no limits to the opportunity to commit corrupt acts, in which peers would not report to the administration of the agency any unethical acts they became

aware of, and where, should these acts be reported, no disciplinary action whatsoever would be taken.

Many of the theoretical relationships referred to earlier, were found to exist. The correlation coefficients of each variable indicate that a strong positive relationship exists among them. From analysis of the data, the direct and indirect effects posited earlier were correct. However, because of the limitations of the data and measuring instruments, no attempt, as regression analysis allows, was made to predict the exact value of one variable from another. The notion of regression is theoretically more important than that of correlation and should be predicated on more precise measures than have been developed in this research. However, the results of this research may be utilized as has been done in the attached Police Corruption Assessment and Control Process (PCACP) to provide gross measures or ranges of corruption within agencies and to develop programs to address the perceived shortcomings. For further discussion of the PCACP, see Volume 11, Police Corruption: A Guide to Agency Assessment and Program Development.

INTRODUCTION

During Phase 1 of the Anti-Corruption Management Project, the impact of pre-employment predispositional variables on the incidence of corruption within a police agency. It was hypothesized that candidates entering police service have a well developed set of individual characteristics which make them more or less immune to the corrupt environment in which law enforcement sometimes functions. The trait orientation as proposed in this project does not entirely negate the impact of situational variables on individual actions but, in fact, is a synthesis of the two theories as indicated in the following research. Based on a prior study the researcher concludes that

police integrity is at least partly determined by personality characteristics which are present when the recruit is hired. There is also convincing evidence that the problem of police impropriety is in part a function of the personality type that is attracted to police work. This is not to deny the importance of organizational factors and the socialization process as casual factors; however, to assert that job-related improper moral conduct of some policemen is the sole result of past hiring organizational dynamics is to over simplify the problem. Police moral conduct is likely to have complex causes including an interaction between personal traits and situational variables.

Extending this prior research with police veterans and recruits, the author, in an independent study supported by the Project, assessed the degree to which the process of police corruption is explainable in terms of individual pre-employment variables. In the report below a Moral Maturity Interaction Schema illustrates the relationship between moral maturity in citizens, police recruits and veteran officers, and community and organizational influences. It suggests that the interaction among these variables may determine an area of vulnerability to police corruption.

Personal Characteristics and the Police Corruption Process

(Pre-Employment Predispositional Variables)

Dr. Allan Shealy

I. Background

A. Rationale

This study focuses on the question "to what extent is police corruption related to the individual police officer's morality or integrity?" It is not concerned with the forces impinging on police officers after they are hired and assume the police role. Although it is generally assumed that police corruption, like most behavior, is largely determined by social or situational stimuli, it is also generally assumed among behavioral scientists that some cross-situational forces act on behavior. An extreme view of this position is the instinct theory which posits that behavioral patterns are genetically determined. Modern instinctivists,

called socio biologists, purpose that social behavior is primarily determined by genes present in the individual at birth. A socio biologists view of police corruption might then be that improbus behavioral tendencies were present in the police officer at birth and anti-corruption methods should aim toward identifying these individuals and screening them out of police work. A related but less extreme position in trait theory which posits that behavioral tendencies like extroversion are determined early in the development of a person and are resistant to change in adults. The trait theory of moral development can be relevant to police corruption. Lawrence Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist, is well known for his extension of Piaget's model of cognitive development to morality and purports that moral conduct patterns of an individual are largely determined before a person reaches adulthood. Robert Hogan, a clinical psychologist at John Hopkins University, has devoted his career to developing scales to measure the constructs believed by Kohlberg to account for a wide range of moral conduct. It is Kohlberg's theoretical position and measures derived by Hogan which were applied to police corruption. Rather than taking a pure trait theoretical position, this project segment has adopted an interactionist position. Interactionism holds that behavior, including moral conduct is determined partly by predetermined trait patterns or predispositions to respond in certain ways. This predisposition, combined with situational pressures, determines behavior. In the case of police corruption, the moral maturity of a police recruit interacts with peer or socialization pressures in the police role to determine whether or not that individual police officer becomes corrupt. It follows that moral maturity is fixed, and measures of this construct should show little change across time in adults.

B. Previous Research Upon Which this Project was Based

In 1976, a monograph was published which describes earlier research in detail. Following is a summary of that research.

A sample of corrupt and non-corrupt police officers in a Southeastern municipal police department was identified by having experienced administrative officers rate each officer in the department on the likelihood of being corrupt. A paired-comparisons rating method was used so that each officer was rated in comparison with each other officer after an initial identification of those thought to be corrupt by the Internal Affairs Division. Reliability of ratings was replicated, and it was found that there was a high degree of agreement by three independent judges as to who was corrupt and who was non-corrupt. Following this identification of the two samples, scales which were designed by Hogan to measure the constructs posited by Kohlberg's theory of moral development were administered to the two samples. The constructs measured included an Empathy scale, a Socialization scale, a Survey of Ethical Attitudes scale and a scale measuring overall moral maturity or Moral Values. This latter scale discriminated between the two groups at an acceptable level of statistical significance. (Table #1 & #2). The four constructs used in scoring responses on this scale are 1. judgments based on the spirit of the law rather than the letter of the law; 2. ability to see more than one side to a situation requiring a moral judgement; 3. respect for the sanctity of an individual; and 4. judgments based on the good of society as a whole. The non-corrupt group scored higher on this scale.

II. Goals

A. General Goals

The overall goals of the Anti-Corruption Management Project, Phase 11 was to continue research investigating the degree to which police corruption is related to moral maturity, a personal trait assumed to exist and be measurable when applicants apply for positions as police officers.

B. Specific Goals

1. To conduct an extension of the original study in the Southeastern city in order to:
 - a. determine how many corrupt officers had become non-corrupt; how many had been terminated or resigned; and how these events relate to moral maturity.
 - b. determine the degree to which moral maturity scores change when the scale is administered two years after the first administration. The differences, if any, would provide a measure of stability of the moral maturity scale as well as indicate the amount of change in the corrupt and non-corrupt group scores over a two-year period.
 - c. determine if the group of corrupt officers had a different set of general values as compared to the non-corrupt group.
2. To determine, based on the identification of relatively corrupt and non-corrupt police departments as measured by the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale and the Ride-Along technique. See chapter 11 & Chapter 111, Volume 1 if the mean level of moral maturity of police officers with two or more years of experience in corrupt departments is different from the level of moral maturity in a similar sample of officers in non-corrupt departments. Based on trait theory, a finding of significantly lower scores on officers in corrupt departments would suggest that police corruption measured at an organizational level is in part determined by the traits of individual officers, determined before entry into the organization. Also, to determine if general values are different in experienced officers in corrupt and non-corrupt departments.
3. To administer the moral maturity scale to a sample of applicants or recruits in the corrupt and non-corrupt organizations in the eight-city sample to:
 - a. determine if more corrupt departments are attracting applicants and recruits who are more predisposed to corruption than applicants or recruits in non-corrupt departments. If police recruits in non-corrupt departments are more morally mature, a portion of the corruption may be accounted for by the pre-employment predispositional variable. Conversely, analysis would also indicate the extent to which police corruption is determined by post-employment socialization processes.

- b. by comparing recruits and experienced officers on level of moral maturity, determine the degree to which there is a "moral values gap" between recruits and experienced officers, and relate this difference to socialization processes as measured in those departments by the Bahn Socialization Scale.
4. To administer the moral maturity scale to a sample of non-police citizens in the communities of each corrupt and non-corrupt department from which moral maturity measures were taken in order to:
 - a. compare the moral maturity of recruits, experienced officers, and non-police to determine if police moral maturity is reflective of the moral values of the community.
 - b. determine if applicants to corrupt police departments are less morally mature than a non-police sample as compared to citizen-police differences in non-corrupt departments.
 5. To administer the moral maturity scale to all applicants, to all law enforcement agencies in a county of a Southeastern state (including an 800 member municipal police department, a smaller county sheriff's department, and 10 small suburban municipal police departments) over the 18-month grant period in order to:
 - a. develop a data base which could be later used for a longitudinal predictive study.
 - b. determine the degree to which the information from research would be used in hiring decisions when incorporated into a pre-employment psychological screening report.

III Methods and Findings

A. Follow-Up Study of Corrupt and Non-Corrupt Samples in Southeastern City.

1. The director of the Internal Affairs Division in this police department in 1978 at the time of follow-up testing, had been one of the paired-comparisons judges in the original 1976 study. He was contacted and asked to determine current corrupt or non-corrupt status for those officers still on the force in 1978 and to determine the number of officers for each of the two groups who had retired, resigned, or had been terminated. It was found that of the original non-corrupt group, no officer had been terminated, six officers had retired, and one had resigned. One officer in this group was judged to have become corrupt. Of the original corrupt group, two officers had been terminated, one for corruption and the second for misconduct. Three officers had resigned, and three had retired. Four officers in the corrupt group were judged to have become non-corrupt; (no corrupt activities noted since the previous rating) "turn-around" officers who were retested in 1978 showed

an increase in moral maturity scores, while the one officer who became corrupt showed a decrease. Both officers who were terminated in the corrupt group had an original moral maturity score well below the mean of even the corrupt group.

2. The subjects of the 1976 study were again contacted, and those who agreed to participate in retesting were again given the moral maturity scale and the Rokeach Value Survey. In the original study, thirty officers in the original non-corrupt sample and twenty-nine officers in the corrupt group participated. In the 1978 retesting, the number of participants decreased in each group; there were twenty-two in the non-corrupt group and thirteen in the corrupt group. Again, the difference between the two groups was statistically significant (p. 01) (Table #3) with the corrupt group scored even lower in 1978 (11.1) than in 1976 (12.6) and the non-corrupt group scored slightly higher in 1978 (15.2) than in 1976 (14.8). These group changes across time, however, were not statistically significant, suggesting that the measure of moral maturity has reasonably good test-retest reliability as was hoped with a trait measure (Table #4).

B. Testing of Experienced Officers

Of the eight police departments studied by the Anti-Corruption Management Project, the two least corrupt and the two most corrupt were chosen for the moral maturity aspect of the project see Chapter II of Vol. I. A sample of officers with a minimum of two years of uniformed experience, all at the patrol rank, were given the moral maturity scale and the general values survey. The total number sampled in the two relatively non-corrupt departments was 63. (N = 40, 23), and the total number tested in the two relatively corrupt departments were combined into one sample and compared with the corrupt sample which was constituted of a combination of the two corrupt departments. Results indicate that experienced officers in corrupt departments have significantly lower moral maturity (M = 11.4) than experienced officers in non-corrupt departments (N = 14.3) (Table #7). These results suggest that the organizational level of corruption could be partially accounted for by the individual trait of moral maturity. One disturbing finding was that most of the difference between the two groups was caused by one of the corrupt cities (M = 8.0) because the remaining corrupt city was not significantly different (M = 13.3) from one of the two non-corrupt cities (Table #6). However, both corrupt cities had means that were lower than the mean of either non-corrupt city. That one corrupt city had officers with high moral maturity suggests that relatively high moral maturity of individual officers does not "immunize" an organization against corruption.

C. Testing of Applicants and Recruits

1. The testing of applicants was accomplished in only one of the four cities described above. That department was the one of the two corrupt organizations which had a relatively high moral maturity mean score. Few conclusions can be drawn because of the lack of comparison sampled. However, in this one city, applicants did not differ from experienced officers (Table #8). Since it is already assumed that the corruption in this department is not a function of low moral maturity of the individual officers, it is not surprising that applicants' scores were not low.

2. Police recruits were tested in the training academy in both corrupt departments and in one of the two non-corrupt departments. Neither applicants nor recruits were available in the remaining departments because of a hiring freeze resulting from the "taxpayer revolts." Perhaps the strongest argument against the moral maturity trait determinant of police corruption is found in the comparison of recruits' moral maturity in the corrupt vs. non-corrupt departments. When the two non-corrupt department samples were combined and compared with the corrupt department sample, there was no significant difference between the two (Corrupt Cities Mean = 13.3, Non-corrupt Mean = 14.8) (Table #9). Consequently, the different levels of corruption may not be a function of moral maturity differences in recruits. However, when the sample from the corrupt department sample of recruits in the non-corrupt department, the corrupt department's recruits are significantly lower in moral maturity (Ms = 12.5, 14.8) (Table #10). The lower scoring supports the hypothesis that in some departments, corruption or the lack of it, may be function of the moral maturity of recruits. However, high moral maturity of recruits does not prevent a department from having a relatively high degree of corruption. It may well be that given exceptionally high opportunity for corruption, lack of administrative controls, poor morale, and generally questionable leadership (all found in this particular department), corruption exists no matter how mature the individual morality of its experienced officers and recruits.

3. Another argument against pre-employment moral maturity being a major determinant of organizational corruption is found in the comparison of recruits with experienced officers in corrupt and non-corrupt departments. In the combined sample from corrupt cities, the recruits had a significantly higher mean moral maturity score (M = 13.3) than the experienced officers

(M = 11.4) (Table #11). In the non-corrupt city in which recruits were tested, no significant differences occurred between recruits and experienced officers (Table #12), although recruits in the non-corrupt city were slightly higher in moral maturity (M = 14.8) than recruits in the corrupt cities (M = 13.3) (Table #9). One of the two corrupt departments had recruits of much higher moral maturity (M = 12.5) than its experienced officers (M = 7.7) The "moral values gap" between recruits and experienced officers might be accounted for by socialization and organizational pressures which could result in the attrition of officers with higher moral maturity who do not fit in with the model moral values in that department. An alternative explanation for this difference is that moral maturity is not immutable by adulthood but is itself more subject to social and situational influence than moral development theory has posited.

TABLE #1

Summary Table of Means

of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores

for Corrupt Group and Non-Corrupt Group

in a Southeastern City

Obtained in 1976 and in 1978

	<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	<u>Corrupt Group</u>
1976	14.8 (N = 30)	12.7 (N = 29)
1978	15.2 (N = 22)	11.1 (N = 13)

TABLE #2

Summary Table of t-Test
on Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Non-Corrupt Group and Corrupt Group

Obtained in 1976

<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	<u>Corrupt Group</u>
14.8 (N = 30)	12/6 (N = 29)
t = 1.83	
df = 57	
p = 0.05	

TABLE #3

Summary Table of t-Test
on Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Non-Corrupt Group and Corrupt Group

Obtained in 1978

<u>Non-Corrupt Group</u>	<u>Corrupt Group</u>
15.2 (N = 22)	11.1 (N = 13)
t = 2.50	
df = 33	
p = 0.01	

TABLE #4

Summary Table of t-Test
on Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between 1976 and 1978
for Non-Corrupt Group and for Corrupt Group

Non-Corrupt Group

1976	1978
14.8 (N = 30)	15.2 (N = 22)
t = 0.32	
df = 50	
p = 0.40	

Corrupt Group

1976	1978
12.6 (N = 29)	11.1 (N = 13)
t = 0.99	
df = 40	
p = 0.25	

TABLE #5

Summary Table of Means
for Three of McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale
and Means of Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
for Experienced Officers in Four Cities Tested

*See chapter 2 of Vol. I

	<u>Southwest Metro Urban</u>	<u>Northwest Urban</u>	<u>Southern Metro</u>	<u>Coastal Gulf</u>
Personal Standard of Honesty	2.8	2.9	9.5	16.6
Typology	30.28	31.4	28.0	26.3
Socialization	31.52	34.6	33.1	34.9
Hogan Moral Judgment	15.3 (N=23)	13.7 (N=40)	8.0 (N=22)	13.3 (N=41)

TABLE #6

Summary Table of Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
for Experienced Officers, Recruits, Applicants
and Nonpolice Samples in Different Cities

	<u>Southwest Metro Urban</u>	<u>Northwest Urban</u>	<u>Southern Urban</u>	<u>Coastal Gulf</u>
Experienced Officers	15.3	13.7	8.0	13.3
Recruits	14.8	-	-	13.9
Applicants	-	-	-	12.8
Citizens				18.0

TABLE #7

Summary Table of t-Test
Between Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
of Experienced Officers of Non-Corrupt Cities
(Southwest Metro Urban and Northwest Urban Combined)
and Corrupt Cities (Southern Metro and Coastal Gulf Combined)

<u>Non-Corrupt Cities</u>	<u>Corrupt Cities</u>
14.3 (N=63)	11.4 (N=63)
t = 3.07	
df = 124	
p = 0.0025	

TABLE #8

Summary Table of t-Test
on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Applicants and Experienced Officers
in One of Corrupt Cities (Coastal Gulf)

<u>Applicants</u>	<u>Experienced Officers</u>
12.7 (N=25)	13.3 (N=41)
t = 0.43	
df = 64	
p = 0.40	

TABLE #9

Summary Table of t-Test

Between Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
of Recruits of Non-Corrupt City (Southwest Metro Urban)
and Corrupt Cities (Southern Metro and Coastal Gulf Combined)

Non-Corrupt City

14.8 (N=50)

Corrupt City

13.3 (N=70)

t = 1.48

df = 118

p = 0.10

TABLE #10

Summary Table of t-Test

Between Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
of Recruits of One of Non-Corrupt Cities
and One of Corrupt Cities

Southwest
Metro Urban

t = 1.87

df = 76

p = 0.05

Southern
Metro

TABLE #11

Summary Table of t-Test

on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Recruits and Experienced Officers
in Corrupt Cities (Southern Metro and Coastal Gulf Combined)

Recruits

13.3 (N=70)

Experienced Officers

11.4 (N=63)

t = 1.95

df = 131

p = 0.05

TABLE #12

Summary Table of t-Test

on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
Between Recruits and Experienced Officers
in One of Non-Corrupt Cities (Southwest Metro Urban)

Recruits

14.8 (N=50)

Experienced Officers

15.3 (N=23)

t = 0.43

df = 71

p = 0.40

TABLE #13

Summary Table of t-Test
 on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
 Between Hired and Non-Hired Male Applicants
 in a Southeastern City

<u>Hired Male Applicants</u>	<u>Not-Hired Male Applicants</u>
17.1 (N=68)	15.6 (N=96)

t = 2.20

df = 162

p = 0.025

TABLE #14

Summary Table of t-Test
 on Mean Hogan Moral Judgment Scores
 Between Hired and Non-Hired Female Applicants
 in a Southeastern City

<u>Hired Female Applicants</u>	<u>Not-Hired Female Applicants</u>
15.5 (N=14)	13.9 (N=22)

t = 1.52

df = 34

p = 0.10

Moral Maturity Interaction Schema

The relationship of moral maturity in recruits, veteran police officers and citizens and their interaction may determine the areas of vulnerability to corruption. The following schema illustrates these interactions and hypothesizes outcomes:

1.

Community	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	High Moral Maturity

In this situation, there would be the lowest probability of police corruption. The high level of moral maturity in the non-police community would be related to low opportunity (e.g., few bribes offered by citizens) and very low tolerance for police corruption. There would be no "moral values gap" between the police and the community. The police would be socialized into the broad community which would have the additional effect of decreasing the functional needs for police corruption as outlined by Bracey. (Bracey, D. H., A Functional Approach to Police Corruption. Criminal Justice Center Monographs, New York: John Jay Press, 1976). The high moral maturity of veteran police officers would be related to a positive socialization process so that recruits, regardless of their individual level of maturity would not be exposed to organizational socialization pressures to become corrupt. In this situation, most applicants and recruits would be high in moral maturity, at least to the extent to which they are drawn from the population of that community. Recruits who are low in moral maturity would be socialized into non-corruption or would be forced out of the organization. This is the ideal anti-corruption climate and may exist only as an ideal.

2.

Community	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	Low Moral Maturity

In this situation, there would be a relatively high degree of police corruption among police veterans. Police recruits would begin with a high level of moral maturity but would be vulnerable to socialization processes toward corruption. Also, police recruits with high moral maturity may leave the organization voluntarily because of their intolerance of corruption. While the mean level of moral maturity in the community is high and tolerance of police corruption therefore low among the citizenry, there may be a subset of the community which creates unusually high opportunity and tolerance for corruption. For example, a city with a population subset of low morality tourists which might be tolerated by the community for economic reasons.

3.

Community	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	Low Moral Maturity

This model represents the self-selection hypothesis. Recruits of low moral maturity are attracted to an organization known to have low levels of morality among the veteran officers. Socialization would occur at the pre-employment stage and police applicants would not be drawn from the general community population. This model might also represent the far-flung possibility of a corrupt screening program, perhaps in collusion with a corrupt police administration. This model would require a strong and perhaps charismatic low moral maturity administrator. A reform police chief would have difficulty but could succeed in reforming the department with citizenry support.

4.

Community	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	High Moral Maturity

This mode represents the self-selection of low morality recruits who are either positively socialized into a non-corrupt department, or who are not tolerated by the police department. It is hypothesized that such a situation would have a high turnover rate. There would be strong socialization pressures both from the community and the organization toward non-corruption. As in the model above, police applicants in such a situation would not be drawn from the broad community but rather from a subset of the population.

5.

Community	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	High Moral Maturity

In this situation, there are socialization pressures in the community such as high opportunity and tolerance of corruption. However, the intra-organizational socialization pressures are toward non-corruption. Recruits of high morality perceive a non-corrupt organization and are attracted to it from another community or from a subset of the general population.

6.

Community	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	High Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	Low Moral Maturity

In this situation, both community and organizational corruption socialization processes are at work. High morality, perhaps idealistic recruits are socialized into police corruption. This model is supported as feasible by the lack of empirical support for the hypothesis that high moral maturity immunizes recruits from becoming corrupt.

7.

Community	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	High Moral Maturity

This situation represents the selection of low morality recruits from a community with low moral maturity into a high moral maturity organization. The police organization is able to resist community opportunity and socialization pressures and has maintained a positive socialization process within the organization. Low morality recruits are either forced out or are socialized into non-corruption. This model would also be associated with a high turnover rate. Such a situation might exist with a strong non-corrupt leader who has active corruption management controls to offset opportunity and tolerance in the community.

8.

Community	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Recruits	-	Low Moral Maturity
Police Veterans	-	Low Moral Maturity

This model represents the most corruption-fostering situation. Corruption results from community socialization processes, self-selection of low morality applicants and intra-organizational corruption-fostering socialization processes. In such a situation, a reform administrator would likely be alienated from the organization in general as well as have difficulty being accepted by the citizenry. With such little support, it is unlikely that a reform chief would be successful. It is also unlikely that recruits of high moral maturity would be tolerated or would tolerate the socialization pressures within the organization.

The Police Socialization Process

This report was submitted during Phase II of the Project as independent research on further efforts to understand the phenomenon of police socialization and its relationship to organizational corruption.

Police Corruption through Organizational Socialization

Dr. Charles Bahn

Any organization, aside from its formal functional structure, is also a social entity, defined as an informal structure. Peter Drucker (1973, p. 107) defined work as providing a social and communal bond for people: "Not only does it determine status, but work satisfies man's need for belonging to a group and for a meaningful relationship to others of his kind."

In police agencies or organization, the tendency toward social bonding is markedly stronger than in other work groups, because the police identity tends to separate officers from the general population and causes them to find solidarity with their colleagues.

An individual officer may belong to several informal groups. One is a group which has a common supervisor; another is a group engaged in a common task or function; another is a friendship clique, composed of officers who have a liking for each other; another is an interest group of employees, who "share a common economic interest and seek to gain some objective relating to the larger organization" (Sayles, 1957).

These possible peer groups in police agencies can exert formidable influence on the individual police officer.

The pioneer Hawthorne studies found that "the values and customs of the group were more important to individuals composing it than any cash benefits" (Brown, 1954, p. 81). Subsequent studies (Bakke, 1953; Seashore, 1954; Asch, 1955; Dearborn & Gunderson, 1969; Estabrook & Sommer, 1972) have further demonstrated the influence of the work group on the attitudes, values, and perception of the individual.

If a police organization is to accomplish its purpose, every person in it must be changed to some degree to reflect the image of the organization. Bakke (1953) has suggested that the process by which an individual changes be labeled the formal socializing process.

In a police agency the position of police officer has been delegated certain formal tasks or functions. A police applicant takes a battery of tests and is screened by interviewers and by a pre-employment check. If test scores are high enough, if physical requirements are met and if pre-employment screening and interview qualifies the applicant, that individual is selected. Induction into the police agency is a formally planned ceremony that usually

includes an address by the Chief of Police, Mayor, or other official. The rookie is issued a uniform: in a large police agency it may be a special uniform indicating probationary status. The rookie enters a training program or academy where minimum hours of training are mandated by state law. Within the training program, the rookie usually encounters personnel specialists, firearms experts, detectives, line managers, police surgeons, chaplains, and other agency officials, all of whom assert that they are helping the individual to become a well coordinated and highly motivated employee. Laws, regulations and procedures are learned, that rule the formal work process. A key initiation occurs when the rookie is given a weapon, and often times, the badge is presented in formidable and significant ceremony, sometimes even as part of the graduation from training. The rookie is now expected to assume an assigned position and to function as defined. While working, the new officer will be continually reminded of the organizational duty at the daily roll call by the "duty" sergeant.

While the formal organization is trying to make the individual into a police officer for the accomplishment of agency purposes, the individual is trying to mold the organization for the accomplishment, the individual is trying to mold the organization for the accomplishment of the individual's personal aims and to realize the rookie's self-conception of what a police officer is. The new officer may bargain for specific assignments and for special conditions. An officer will emphasize the preferred functions and will minimize those that are disliked. Officers will form a conception of the personal behavior or conduct which they expect of themselves and a conception of the position which is appropriate for them as officers to occupy. The process by which a person tries to impose a self-image on the formal job has been called "the personalizing process."

While an individual assumes the identity of a police officer, that individual also sees himself becoming separated from civilian society. Friends and relatives relate to the officer in new ways and are curious about the officer's role and function. A barrier develops between the officer and former friends. Part of what a rookie learns in training is, in fact, secret police lore, sometimes because of its legitimate relationship to criminal investigation procedures or data, sometimes because of a history of in-group secrecy that has a protective and binding function. As a novice, the rookie cannot always tell the basis of the oaths secrecy that are directly or implicitly elicited, but that rookie will feel constrained in talking to friends and relatives, and can be at ease only when conversing with fellow officers.

The rites and emotional significance of firearms training and target practice are sufficiently jarring for most recruits that this part of training builds a solidarity. Aggressive impulses, carefully harnessed and controlled, now find an outlet of considerable immediacy. While the purpose of training is, to help in achieving control of the weapon and its use, the internal struggle can be best understood by those who experienced it while maintaining a required mask of stoic acceptance.

Whether on foot patrol, motorized patrol, or on stationhouse duty, the police officer meets people for the first time in the new role of officer. Slowly the individual begins to acquire the appropriate suspiciousness of "civilians" that is part of the stance of the police officer. One learns that in "real life" the first person in an incident who comes forward with a complaint is as likely to be perpetrator as he is the victim. The new officer also learns that, given the discretion that is vested in a police officer, the regulations learned in the academy offer alternatives, not clear prescriptions for behavior. Also, preconceptions about police work generally are not helpful in preparing someone to actually fill the role, deriving, at worst, from the distortions of the media, and, at best, from the selective emphases and colorations of accounts from close relatives or friends.

The social structure of police work has specific effects. Unlike work in a factory, shop, or office, most police work is done by individuals or pairs on patrol. While patrol covers a given sector, in most departments some discretion is given to the officer(s) about the specific route and how much time or attention should be given to each sub-sector. Supervision, therefore, is inevitably remote, although most police officers are monitored via portable radio. The work site isolation of the police role makes the new officer particularly susceptible to influence from fellow officers, from the reference group or work group that commands the officer's attention. The most obvious source of what can be termed "informal socialization" is the senior police officer or experienced partner to whom raw recruits are assigned by most police agencies. Throughout life an individual's initial source of information about role-related behaviors usually comes from observing other people in these roles. When we like or respect or in other ways identify with the person whom we are observing, that person becomes a "role model." Experienced police officers, going through the routines of a regular tour of duty, are often role models, socializing the neophyte to the police function.

However, the influence of other officers should not be underestimated. If a strong cohesiveness exists between the members of a group who work for a specific supervisor or who have a specific function like traffic, narcotics, vice, or property clerking, then any member of the group can exercise influence on a newcomer, even with a few chance comments offered in casual conversation. If the newcomer finds an affinity based on economic interest with his peers in the academy or a fellow member of an ethnic group, then those officers can be influential on the newcomer. The influence that is exercised is not simply a definition of how to behave, what to think and feel, but extends to basic work values.

Most police officers who have been identified as corrupt, particularly those tried and convicted for corruption, describe a process of early influence. They remember synical asides from senior officers whose opinions they respected. Most of them also describe the movement through successive stages of improbus behaviors beginning with minor and insignificant violations of the formal rules that could easily be rationalized, and proceeding sequentially

through more and more serious violations that required more elaborate re-rationalization and value shift with each violation. Along the route to serious corruption are the landmarks of gifts, solicited gifts, graft, bribes, and, in some cases, the extremes of overt, deliberate criminal activity. The landscape on this route is marked by notions of "clean money," "dirty money," opportunities to "good" to be turned down, and finally the rationalization that "everyone is doing it, anyway."

Not only is the introduction to this route determined, in part, by the influence of the reference group in the informal social structure, but movement through the successive stages of corruption often requires additional socialization of behaviors and attitude. A New Yorker magazine cartoon of some years ago shows a long haired artist, with a beret and a portfolio of paintings, asking the receptionist in a plush suite of corporate offices, "Where do you go to sell out?" Not only is corruption a moral decision, but the individual has to learn how, where, and with whom to be corrupt.

The formal organization of the police agency provides a backdrop that either facilitates or inhibits the process of socialization to corruption. A poorly administered police agency tends to maximize the individual discretion of each officer and to allow so much freedom and autonomy that any concept of accountability will be lacking. Although tight and effective administration will not eliminate corruption, the right administration will limit many opportunities for corruption by monitoring an individual officer's performance and by keeping officers busy with legitimate police work.

Leadership is sometimes defined as the capacity to influence the behavior of subordinates. Police leadership must be defined in this way, because the social structure of police work allows individual officers to ignore or evade leadership behaviors that are inappropriate. When a leader is effectively articulating the goals of the agency, planning its use of resources in meeting those goals, and developing timetables and procedures for goal attainment, then the leaders become prime role models and strong influences. Some social psychologists have suggested that leaders must embody and articulate the highest ideals of the group, ideals which because of their very mobility and transcendence cannot be articulated by members of the group without their seeming naive and unrealistic to their peers. Often police officers are passive about goals and planning and are silent in concerning ideals. When police agencies are primarily responsive, activity is initiated by others, and ideals are discussed only in the context of defending the agency against charges.

Policy is most effective when it is clear, available, and relevant. Some police administrators believe that integrity is and should be an unspoken value in work. They see no need to develop, print, and distribute policies defining the borderline between probus and improbus police behaviors. In the gray area of the two extremes, individual police officers must supply their own evaluation and definition in accordance with their understanding and reasoning. Allowing officers to define corruption is an open invitation to begin the process of becoming corrupt. Police authorities have debated and still debate the value and

appropriateness of banning or allocating the free cup of coffee as potential corruption. The absence of any clearly written, detailed policy on free cups of coffee is implicit license to the individual officer to make up his own mind about this offer and other gifts. Although successive steps of corruption often involve violation of the law, it is clear that there are times when a free cup of coffee, a free meal, or a gift can also be a part of a pattern that clearly breaks the law. The difference between a gift and a bribe rests with its timing, purpose, and with the understanding of past or future reciprocity held by one or both parties.

Specialized units within police departments have an augmented capacity to socialize the newcomer for good or ill. Often the specialization means the existence of a cohesive group, separated not only from the public but also from other police officers. Specialized police units tend to be created around either administrative needs or around particular crime areas of great sensitivity. The information under the control of these units has an actual or potential value to others, whether it is criminal records, crime reports, investigative data, or group activity reports. In sensitive areas, like prostitution, gambling, robbery, vice, homicide and particularly narcotics, the monetary or other stakes may be so lucrative as to breed active corrupters. Oscar Wilde once remarked that he could resist everything but temptation, and in many specialized police areas, temptation is great. Police engaged in traffic duty can allocate work to towing companies with a heavy profit potential. Specialized units are often vulnerable because of their social isolation, abundant opportunity, and internal social organization that maximizes secrecy and solidarity.

When police agencies are highly decentralized, some less specialized units will also be vulnerable. In decentralization, they will gain a social autonomy that breeds secrecy and solidarity and will become increasingly isolated, all that may be missing is abundant temptation and opportunity. The lack of comparative opportunity is not much of a safeguard when all other conditions foster corruption because, given the power and discretion of the police role, ingenuity can offset the lack of obvious opportunity.

Extreme centralization is not necessarily an antidote to corruption, because often the very rigidity of a central structure increases the isolation of those far removed from headquarters. When centralization removes local responsibility and accountability, it also minimizes effective control of individual behavior, a process that facilitates corruption. It is easier to deceive an impersonal system than it is to deceive a local manager. It would appear that a mixed or intermediate model would be most effective in minimizing corruption, because it would limit the individual officer's or individual commander's complete autonomy, while nevertheless retaining responsibility and accountability at a level sufficiently local to be effective in monitoring informal behavior.

Corruption hazards for the individual police officer involve being left alone, exposed to the blandishments of a corrupt fellow officer, or exposed to the strong conformity influences of an isolated or specialized sub-group that has developed group standards and values that are below those of the organization. Without appropriate guidance, supervision, or policy directives, the individual police officer is virtually a corruption hazard.

Hypothesis

It was hypothesized by the Anti-Corruption Management Project that measures of socialization would correlate with measures of corruption, assuming that in those cities in which a department score indicated a high level of improbis behavior, a high level of socialization would also be found. The notion was that for improper practices to exist, it was necessary to have the compliance, either active or passive, of fellow police officers who would either approve or, in disapproving, remain silent. Where socialization was high, therefore, the compliance of fellow officers was assumed to be not only more likely but predictable.

It was further hypothesized that low socialization or higher individualism would have a limiting effect on improbis behavior.

Results

To identify results with precision, it was decided that the Socialization Scale analysis would be undertaken using the two identified sub-factors on the 10 item socialization scale. These were:

Socialization A - consisting of items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 and
Socialization B - consisting of items 1, 9, 10 (see page).

Socialization A provides a measure of an individual officer's purported knowledge of the formal and informal lore, policies and practices of his police department. Socialization B measures the extent to which an officer claims an "imbedded" police identity and the extent to which he derives his values and standards from his peers.

These two sub-scales were correlated with each of the other variables in the study, identified for the purpose of the analysis as possible dependent variables. The reasoning was that socialization, in terms of either identity as measured in Socialization B, or knowledge of the agency's rules and procedures as measure in Socialization A, might explain some of the variance in other study factors.

The key analyses were related to the various corruption measures, because socialization had been hypothesized as an independent variable that might contribute to the variance in either personal standards, disciplinary expectations, or perceived peer improbis behaviors.

Data was available for 888 police officers in six of the Project cities, although the actual number of scores for each correlation was different due to missing scores in individual protocols.

The significant correlations, at least the .05 level for Socialization A and personal history variables, were:

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Age	.1171	.001
Education	-.0646	.033
Year in Dept.	.1642	.001

The identity component of socialization was significantly correlated with age and years in department. The older the officer and the longer the service in the department, the greater was that officer's sense of deriving personal identity from the police role. Educational level had an inverse relationship with the strength of occupational identity.

For Socialization B, the significant correlations, at the .05 level or better, were:

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Pearson Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Ethnicity	-.1268	.001
Years in Dept.	-.1233	.001
Field or Staff	-.1155	.001

The greater the knowledge of the formal and informal practices of the department, the more likely it was that an officer was white, had served for a longer period of time in the department, and was in a staff rather than field department.

These correlations were made only between socialization dimensions and personal testing variables. The correlations between socialization and personal standards were not significant, nor were the correlations between socialization and willingness to report a given level of improbity.

However, the correlations between both of the sub-dimensions of socialization and the disciplinary expectations scores were significant:

	<u>Correlation Coefficient</u>	<u>Level of Significance</u>
Socialization A and D15	.0561	.048
Socialization B and D18	.0781	.010

Although it might be expected that Socialization B - Knowledge of the formal and informal practices-would correlate significantly with the heightened perception of disciplinary levels in the department, it was not expected that Socialization A-the extent of derived police identity-would also correlate at a significant level with heightened disciplinary expectations.

However, despite the expected correlations with personal variables related to longevity and tenure and the somewhat unexpected correlations with disciplinary expectations, the dominant finding is the lack of significant correlation with other variables related to improbous behavior.

Discussion

The elements of socialization, measured in the scale that was developed for this study, may not contribute to the variance in either personal standards of honesty nor in willingness to report perceived peer improbous behavior. This would appear to contradict the notion that socialization to the police role within a given police department leads both to the adaption of the values of that department and to increasing deterioration in personal standards or to growing awareness of improbous behaviors on the part of fellow officers. However, it must be recognized that even the bifurcated socialization scale measures only two gross dimensions of socialization. It does not take into account the size and nature of the reference groups actually involved in the socialization of the individual officer. Nor does it take into account the possibility of changes in department values, in their ambiguity in a given department, or in their level of clarity within a particular department.

There may also be a problem of level of measurement. Although, appropriately, the level of measurement in the study was centered on the individual police officer, (measured by product moment correlations of individual scores), the greater differentiation, indeed the differentiating level, was in department means. The point, simply stated, is that in the least improbous department there might well be an individual officer whose scale scores were at the extremely improbous end of the scene showing a high level of improbous behavior, that individual officers score as models of probity and integrity. Individual variability within a department thus vitiates the correlation of socialization with the probity dimension. At the same time, the mean socialization scores of each department are sufficiently affected by the mean age of the officers, and mean tenure within the department, to be less valuable as measures of imbeddedness, identity strength, or intra-department sophistication. Yet, presumably, it is these underlying socio-psychological factors that might influence probity.

From this perspective, it might be suggested that a future study partial out the effects of longevity in the department (which could have the effect of partialling out age as well) from the socialization score before studying the correlations between this factor and the other study variables. The results would then demonstrate the extent to which officers of equal age and departmental tenure differ with regard to their socialization, in terms of "imbeddedness" or of knowledge of the formal and informal rules and practices of the department. This comparison might be a better predictor of the various probity scale scores.

However, a suggestion of the curvilinearity of the integrity dimension comes through strongly when a city by city examination of the correlations is made. In

Table #1, it becomes apparent that in the more extreme cities, socialization does correlate at a significant level with the report variable, age, education, years in department and salary. This includes both the high integrity and the low integrity departments. In the middle of the range of departments, significant correlations are less likely to be found.

This suggests that in more extreme departments socialization plays a larger role deriving from age and tenure, than it does in moderate integrity departments.




TABLE # 1

CORRELATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF TOTAL SOCIALIZATION SCORES AND OTHER VARIABLES BY CITY IN RANKED PROBITY ORDER

		CQPSN	CQDIS	CQRPT	AGE	SEX	RACE	EDU	MARSTAT	YRSDEPT	ASSIGN	SAL
Highest	R	.0031	-.0821	-.1344	.2499	.0028	.0172	-.1254	-.0300	.3055	-.04886	-.0282
Integrity	S	.484	.141	.039	.001**	.480	.412	.05*	.349	.001**	.265	.361
High		-.2051	-.0868	-.1951	.0409	.0225	-.1677	.6286	.0855	.1813	.0286	.1404
Integ		.02*	.189	.023*	.341	.411	.049	.386	.196	.034	.388	.046
Mod High		-.1813	-.1426	.0002	-.0148	.0133	-.0477	.0371	.1718	.0036	.1214	.3949
Integ		.076	.130	.499	.455	.459	.356	.386	.091	.489	.172	.001**
Mod Low		.1230	.0883	-.1863	-.0578	-.0537	.1062	.2279	.1103	.0800	.0626	.0432
Integ		.102	.182	.027*	.279	.293	.140	.009*	.131	.209	.288	.333
Low		-.026	.1162	.0826	.0247	-.0028	.0140	.1480	-.1200	.1543	.0151	.1822
Integ		.365	.063	.138	.168	.485	.0428	.025*	.058	.022*	.422	.011*
Lowest		.0152	-.0178	.0450	.2392	-.0516	-.2649	-.365	-.0650	.317	.3425	.3421
Integ		.429	.417	.298	.002	.247	.001**	.334	.223	.011*	.001**	.001**

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*Significant at .05 level
 **Significant at .001 level

R = Correlation
 S = Significant Level

Interviews and Case Studies of Former Corrupt Police Officers

Theoretical Perspective

Corruption is a complex phenomenon, involving covert behaviors, attitudes and perceptions. Questionnaires, no matter how carefully constructed, could only measure related variables, either independent or dependent. The interview method on the other hand has been identified as flexible, comprehensive and non-restrictive in its approach. By achieving rapport, the skilled interviewer is able to elicit sensitive and complex information from the subject. Thus, it seemed desirable to augment the study of socialization to corrupt police behaviors with a sample of interviews that would detail the process by which the individual moved from probity to improbity in the performance of police duties.

Methodology of the Interview

It was decided that the only possible subjects that might be available for interviews describing socialization to police corruption were those who had been convicted for such offenses and were now willing to discuss what had happened. Accordingly, contact was made with police chiefs from a neighboring state that had been the site of several major police corruption scandals. The chiefs were asked whether it might be possible to telephone former police officers who had been dismissed for improbity and solicit their participation in the study. Of the ten chiefs who were queried, seven had the names of officers in this category, and calls were made to over thirty former police officers who had either been dismissed or convicted for improbity who might be willing to serve as respondents. After calling and talking to these officers, nine respondents were identified and interviewed. The interviews were at least of an hour's duration and one that lasted for over three hours. Six involved face-to-face meetings, three had to be conducted over the telephone. The specific complaints that had resulted in the dismissals or convictions ranged from misuse of police authority (obtaining merchandise without payment) to participating in a burglary ring. Three of the nine officers had been dismissed for taking bribes from gamblers in a single city.

Initial Expectations

It was hypothesized that all of these former police officers would identify a process of drifting values and practices that led them to the behaviors for which they were either dismissed or convicted. It was further hypothesized that these officer-respondents, on the basis of their willingness to serve as respondents, would see themselves as having been seduced by circumstances and group pressure to participate in behaviors contrary to their personal values. Having been caught and punished, they would be motivated to talk about their experiences as a warning to fellow officers equally vulnerable.

Interview Results

The first hypothesis was confirmed. Not a single one of the respondents asserted that the behavior for which they were dismissed or convicted was an isolated incident, unrelated to their usual police behaviors. Nor did any of the respondents say that the improbous behavior had been part of their repertoire of police behavior from the start of their careers. On the contrary, these respondents all told of a gradual process of erosion of standards that they had upheld at the start of their police careers. They described the erosion as consisting of a sequence of steps, involving silent acquiescence at the misdeeds of others, participation in behaviors of questionable probity, and finally a process of rationalization that antidoted the emergence of the improbous behavior in question. In every case, they cited constant pressures that moved them in the direction of improbity, including a growing awareness of the medacity of the public at large, a feeling that the public and their fellow officers alike expected them to "look out for themselves" and an awareness that fellow officers were engaged in a variety of borderline, if not engaged in a variety of borderline, if not outright improbous behaviors.

"My first reaction was that I was unlucky because I got caught. After all, there were many others who did exactly what I did. Even during my first year on the force, I heard it was possible to pick up something extra if you worked in the _____ sector. There was plenty that I saw before I began to feel that it was all part of the job."

One respondent, at least, specifically said that he had been exposed to behaviors by the group that represented the informal practice of his department.

Thus, despite their limitations, these interviews confirmed a developmental pattern of police corruption and described an influential process of socialization.

Seven of the nine respondents specifically stated that other officers had persuaded them to accept as routine practices that contravened departmental regulations. The other two respondents, while denying these value influences, described a personal process of moving from rationalizing less serious improbity to rationalizing more serious improbous.

Limitations

It must be borne in mind that the respondents were a selected sample of former police officers whose whereabouts were known to the local chief of police and who were considered as potentially cooperative respondents.

They not only constituted a minority of the population of police officers discovered as corrupt, but were a selected sample as well. At that, three of the interviews were not face-to-face encounters, but were simply extended telephone conversations. Finally, the testimony of individuals who have been punished because of their misdeeds has the double limitation of being suspected of being self-serving and of coming from an established untrustworthy source. Caution should therefore be exercised on generalizing how these few interviews, although they do tend to confirm other accounts of corrupt officers such as William Phillips and by honest ones such as Frank Serpico.

Appendix I

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

Criminal Justice Center

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

1. Please assume that all references to the "police department" or "police officers" refer to your local department and its officers unless otherwise specified.
2. Please assume that all references to the public refer to residents of your area.
3. In order to assure anonymity please DO NOT sign your name or identify yourself in any way upon completion of this questionnaire.

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to (1)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves. (2)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike. (3)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters. (4)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment. (5)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed. (6)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers. (7)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education. (8)

Strongly Agree _____ Agree _____ Disagree _____ Strongly Disagree _____

9. In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify:

Please circle one

- a. diff. easy a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. (9)
- b. diff. easy b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. (10)
- c. diff. easy c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basic to allow a gambler to operate. (11)
- d. diff. easy d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. (12)
- e. diff. easy e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. (13)
- f. diff. easy f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. (14)
- g. diff. easy g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. (15)
- h. diff. easy h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. (16)

10. If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed below which would you be disciplined for? (17)

Please circle one

- a. disc. not a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. (17)
- b. disc. not b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. (18)
- c. disc. not c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. (19)
- d. disc. not d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. (20)
- e. disc. not e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. (21)
- f. disc. not f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. (22)
- g. disc. not g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. (23)
- h. disc. not h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. (24)

11. I would report a fellow officer who I observed engaging in the following activities:

Please circle one

- a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. Yes No (25)
- b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. Yes No (26)

- c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. Yes No (27)
- d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. Yes No (28)
- e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. Yes No (29)
- f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. Yes No (30)
- g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. Yes No (31)
- h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. Yes No (32)

12. Police in some communities engage in the following or similar types of activities:

(a) Accepting free meals.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (33)

(b) Shopping uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (34)

(c) Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (35)

(d) Removing, for their own personal use, unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other safeguarded property.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (36)

(e) Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, nightclubs or other businesses.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (37)

(f) Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (38)

(g) Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (39)

- Age _____ (40-41)
- Sex _____ (42)
- Race _____ (43)
- Last Grade of School Completed. _____ (44)
- Marital Status. _____ (45)
- Years in the Department. _____ (46-47)
- Present Assignment (Patrol, Detective, etc.) _____ (48)
- Is Present Assignment a Field Assignment or Staff? _____ (49)
- Base Salary. _____ (50)

McCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY QUESTIONNAIRE

ITEM ANALYSIS BY CITY

APPENDIX # 2

CITY A - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>15</u> 13.5%	<u>96</u> 86.5%	<u>111</u> 57.2%
POLICE	<u>29</u> 34.9%	<u>54</u> 65.1%	<u>83</u> 42.8%
TOTAL	<u>44</u> 22.7%	<u>150</u> 77.3%	<u>194</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	11.24	P(SIG)	-.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>109</u> 98.2%	<u>02</u> 1.8%	<u>111</u> 56.9%
POLICE	<u>83</u> 98.8%	<u>1</u> 1.2%	<u>84</u> 43.1%
TOTAL	<u>192</u> 98.5%	<u>03</u> 1.5%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	-.06	P(SIG)	-.8
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>53</u> 47.7%	<u>58</u> 52.3%	<u>111</u> 57.2%
POLICE	<u>31</u> 37.3%	<u>52</u> 62.7%	<u>83</u> 42.8%
TOTAL	<u>84</u> 43.3%	<u>110</u> 56.7%	<u>194</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	1.69	P(SIG)	-.19
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>111</u> 100%	<u>0</u> 0%	<u>111</u> 56.6%
POLICE	<u>82</u> 96.5%	<u>3</u> 3.5%	<u>85</u> 43.4%
TOTAL	<u>193</u> 98.5%	<u>3</u> 1.5%	<u>196</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	1.98	P(SIG)	-.15

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>77</u> 69.4%	<u>34</u> 30.6%	<u>111</u> 56.9%
POLICE	<u>45</u> 53.6%	<u>39</u> 46.4%	<u>84</u> 43.1%
TOTAL	<u>122</u> 62.6%	<u>73</u> 37.4%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	4.44	P(SIG)	-.03
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>110</u> 99.1%	<u>01</u> .9%	<u>111</u> 56.9%
POLICE	<u>77</u> 91.7%	<u>07</u> 8.3%	<u>84</u> 43.1%
TOTAL	<u>187</u> 95.9%	<u>8</u> 4.1%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	4.96	P(SIG)	-.02
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>63</u> 57.3%	<u>47</u> 42.7%	<u>110</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>65</u> 76.5%	<u>20</u> 23.5%	<u>85</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>128</u> 65.6%	<u>67</u> 34.4%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	7.00	P(SIG)	-.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>85</u> 77.3%	<u>25</u> 22.7%	<u>110</u> 56.7%
POLICE	<u>54</u> 64.3%	<u>30</u> 35.7%	<u>84</u> 43.3%
TOTAL	<u>139</u> 71.6%	<u>55</u> 28.4%	<u>194</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	3.34	P(SIG)	-.06

CITY A - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>22</u> 25.6%	<u>64</u> 74.4%	<u>86</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>84</u> 96.6%	<u>3</u> 3.4%	<u>87</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>31</u> 36.0%	<u>55</u> 64.0%	<u>86</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>83</u> 95.4%	<u>04</u> 4.6%	<u>87</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>37</u> 42.5%	<u>50</u> 57.5%	<u>87</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>80</u> 92.0%	<u>7</u> 8%	<u>87</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>65</u> 74.4%	<u>22</u> 25.3%	<u>87</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>40</u> 46.0%	<u>47</u> 54.0%	<u>87</u> 100%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----

CITY A - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	<u>3</u> 2.7%	<u>107</u> 97.3%	<u>110</u> 57.0%
POLICE	<u>9</u> 10.8%	<u>74</u> 89.2%	<u>83</u> 43.0%
TOTAL	<u>12</u> 6.2%	<u>181</u> 93.8%	<u>193</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>4.04</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.04</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	<u>102</u> 92.7%	<u>8</u> 7.3%	<u>110</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>68</u> 80.0%	<u>17</u> 20.0%	<u>85</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>170</u> 87.2%	<u>25</u> 12.8%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>5.86</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.01</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	<u>24</u> 21.8%	<u>86</u> 78.2%	<u>110</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>12</u> 14.1%	<u>73</u> 85.9%	<u>85</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>36</u> 18.5%	<u>159</u> 81.5%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>1.41</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.23</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	<u>104</u> 95.4%	<u>5</u> 4.6%	<u>109</u> 55.9%
POLICE	<u>66</u> 76.7%	<u>20</u> 23.3%	<u>86</u> 44.1%
TOTAL	<u>170</u> 87.2%	<u>25</u> 12.8%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>13.37</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>29</u> 26.4%	<u>81</u> 73.6%	<u>110</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>13</u> 15.3%	<u>72</u> 84.7%	<u>85</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>42</u> 21.5%	<u>153</u> 78.5%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>2.85</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.09</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>97</u> 88.2%	<u>13</u> 11.8%	<u>110</u> 56.1%
POLICE	<u>55</u> 64.0%	<u>31</u> 36.0%	<u>86</u> 43.9%
TOTAL	<u>152</u> 77.6%	<u>44</u> 22.4%	<u>196</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>14.91</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>39</u> 35.5%	<u>71</u> 64.5%	<u>110</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>35</u> 41.2%	<u>50</u> 58.8%	<u>85</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>74</u> 37.9%	<u>121</u> 62.1%	<u>195</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>.45</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.50</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>46</u> 41.8%	<u>64</u> 58.2%	<u>110</u> 56.7%
POLICE	<u>16</u> 19.0%	<u>68</u> 81.0%	<u>84</u> 43.3%
TOTAL	<u>62</u> 32.0%	<u>132</u> 68.0%	<u>194</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>10.33</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

CITY A - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Off Duty Time		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 62	49	111
55.9%	44.1%	55.5%
POLICE 32	57	89
36.0%	64.0%	44.5%
TOTAL 94	106	200
47.0%	53.0%	100%
CHI SQUARE 7.07	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: No Strike		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 98	15	113
86.7%	13.3%	56.2%
POLICE 47	41	88
53.4%	43.6%	43.8%
TOTAL 145	56	201
72.1%	27.9%	100%
CHI SQUARE 25.62	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 75	37	112
67.0%	33.0%	56.0%
POLICE 21	67	88
23.9%	76.1%	44.0%
TOTAL 96	104	200
48.0%	52.0%	100%
CHI SQUARE 34.98	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 106	5	111
95.5%	4.5%	56.1%
POLICE 70	17	87
80.5%	19.5%	43.9%
TOTAL 176	22	198
88.9%	11.1%	100%
CHI SQUARE 9.69	P(SIG)	.00

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 64	48	112
57.1%	42.9%	55.7%
POLICE 69	20	89
77.5%	22.5%	44.3%
TOTAL 133	68	201
66.2%	33.8%	100%
CHI SQUARE 8.32	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 79	34	113
69.9%	30.1%	56.5%
POLICE 48	39	87
55.2%	44.8%	43.5%
TOTAL 127	73	200
63.5%	36.5%	100%
CHI SQUARE 3.99	P(SIG)	.04
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Some College Education		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 54	56	110
49.1%	50.9%	55.6%
POLICE 38	50	88
43.2%	56.8%	44.4%
TOTAL 92	106	198
46.5%	53.5%	100%
CHI SQUARE 4.7	P(SIG)	.49
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Upgrade Skills		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 106	5	111
95.5%	4.5%	56.1%
POLICE 78	9	87
89.7%	10.3%	43.9%
TOTAL 184	14	198
92.9%	7.1%	100%
CHI SQUARE 1.72	P(SIG)	.18

CITY A - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYOLOGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 77	3	80
51.0%	30.0%	49.7%
POLICE 74	7	81
49.0%	70.0%	50.3%
TOTAL 151	10	161
43.8%	6.2%	100%
CHI SQUARE .92	P(SIG)	.33
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 73	9	82
64.0%	18.4%	50.3%
POLICE 41	40	81
36.0%	81.6%	49.7%
TOTAL 114	49	163
69.9%	30.1%	100%
CHI SQUARE 26.79	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 81	6	87
79.4%	9.1%	51.8%
POLICE 21	60	81
20.6%	90.9%	48.2%
TOTAL 102	66	168
60.7%	39.3%	100%
CHI SQUARE 76.57	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 73	12	85
83.9%	15.4%	51.5%
POLICE 14	66	80
16.1%	84.6%	48.5%
TOTAL 87	78	165
52.7%	47.3%	100%
CHI SQUARE 74.59	P(SIG)	.00

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 78	2	80
52.7%	15.4%	49.7%
POLICE 70	11	81
47.3%	84.6%	50.3%
TOTAL 148	13	161
91.9%	8.1%	100%
CHI SQUARE 5.24	P(SIG)	.03
* * *	*	*
ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 64	19	83
71.1%	25.7%	50.6%
POLICE 26	55	81
28.9%	74.3%	49.4%
TOTAL 90	74	164
54.9%	45.1%	100%
CHI SQUARE 31.74	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	*	*
ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 74	14	88
82.2%	17.9%	52.4%
POLICE 16	64	80
17.8%	82.1%	47.6%
TOTAL 90	78	168
53.6%	46.4%	100%
CHI SQUARE 66.65	P(SIG)	.00

1A
CITY B - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	20 15.5%	109 84.5%	129 55.6%
POLICE	26 25.2%	77 74.8%	103 44.4%
TOTAL	46 19.8%	186 80.2%	232 100%
CHI SQUARE	2.83	P(SIG)	.09
* * *			
ITEM: Gambler	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	126 96.9%	4 3.1%	130 56.0%
POLICE	101 99.6%	1 1.0%	102 44.0%
TOTAL	227 97.8%	5 2.2%	232 100%
CHI SQUARE	.40	P(SIG)	.52
* * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	60 46.5%	69 53.5%	129 55.8%
POLICE	37 36.3%	65 63.7%	102 44.2%
TOTAL	97 42.0%	134 58.0%	231 100%
CHI SQUARE	2.04	P(SIG)	.15
* * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	126 96.2%	5 3.8%	131 56.2%
POLICE	102 100%	0 0.0%	102 43.8%
TOTAL	228 97.9%	5 2.1%	233 100%
CHI SQUARE	2.36	P(SIG)	.12

ITEM: Free Meal	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	65 50.4%	64 49.6%	129 56.1%
POLICE	63 62.4%	38 37.6%	101 43.9%
TOTAL	128 55.7%	102 44.3%	230 100%
CHI SQUARE	2.83	P(SIG)	.09
* * *			
ITEM: Towing Company	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	117 88.6%	15 11.4%	132 56.4%
POLICE	100 98.0%	2 2.0%	102 43.6%
TOTAL	217 92.7%	17 7.3%	234 100%
CHI SQUARE	6.21	P(SIG)	.01
* * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	71 55.0%	58 45.0%	129 56.1%
POLICE	96 95.0%	5 5.0%	101 43.9%
TOTAL	167 72.6%	63 27.4%	230 100%
CHI SQUARE	43.60	P(SIG)	.00
* * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	107 81.7%	24 18.3%	131 56.2%
POLICE	83 81.4%	19 18.6%	102 43.8%
TOTAL	190 81.5%	43 18.5%	233 100%
CHI SQUARE	0.0	P(SIG)	1.0

CITY B - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	20 20.2%	79 79.8%	99 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * *			
ITEM: Gambler	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	98 97.0%	3 3.0%	101 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	33 34.0%	64 66.0%	97 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	99 97.1%	3 2.9%	102 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----

ITEM: Free Meal	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	35 35.7%	63 64.3%	98 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * *			
ITEM: Towing Company	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	99 98.0%	2 2.0%	101 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	95 94.1%	6 5.9%	101 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	63 63.0%	37 37.0%	100 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----

CITY B - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>3</u> 8.6%	<u>32</u> 91.4%	<u>35</u> 25.9%
POLICE	<u>4</u> 4.0%	<u>96</u> 96.0%	<u>100</u> 74.1%
TOTAL	<u>7</u> 5.2%	<u>128</u> 94.8%	<u>135</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>.36</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.54</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>121</u> 92.4%	<u>10</u> 7.6%	<u>131</u> 57.0%
POLICE	<u>86</u> 86.9%	<u>13</u> 13.1%	<u>99</u> 43.0%
TOTAL	<u>207</u> 20.0%	<u>23</u> 10.0%	<u>230</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>1.33</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.24</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>24</u> 18.8%	<u>104</u> 81.3%	<u>128</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>7</u> 7.1%	<u>92</u> 92.9%	<u>99</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>31</u> 13.7%	<u>196</u> 86.3%	<u>227</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>5.50</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.019</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>123</u> 93.9%	<u>8</u> 6.1%	<u>131</u> 57.0%
POLICE	<u>79</u> 79.8%	<u>20</u> 20.2%	<u>99</u> 43.0%
TOTAL	<u>202</u> 87.8%	<u>28</u> 12.2%	<u>230</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>9.20</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.002</u>

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>30</u> 23.4%	<u>98</u> 76.6%	<u>128</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>3</u> 3.0%	<u>96</u> 97.0%	<u>99</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>33</u> 14.5%	<u>194</u> 85.5%	<u>227</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>17.10</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>115</u> 87.8%	<u>16</u> 12.2%	<u>131</u> 57.0%
POLICE	<u>66</u> 66.7%	<u>33</u> 33.3%	<u>99</u> 43.0%
TOTAL	<u>181</u> 78.7%	<u>49</u> 26.3%	<u>230</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>13.76</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.002</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>52</u> 41.3%	<u>74</u> 58.7%	<u>126</u> 56.0%
POLICE	<u>53</u> 53.5%	<u>46</u> 46.5%	<u>99</u> 44.0%
TOTAL	<u>105</u> 46.7%	<u>120</u> 53.3%	<u>225</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>2.87</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.08</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>76</u> 59.4%	<u>52</u> 40.6%	<u>128</u> 56.4%
POLICE	<u>28</u> 28.3%	<u>71</u> 71.7%	<u>99</u> 43.6%
TOTAL	<u>104</u> 45.8%	<u>123</u> 54.2%	<u>227</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>20.50</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>

CITY B - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Off Duty Time			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>67</u> 51.5%	<u>63</u> 48.5%	<u>130</u> 60.5%
POLICE	<u>55</u> 64.7%	<u>30</u> 35.3%	<u>85</u> 39.5%
TOTAL	<u>122</u> 56.7%	<u>93</u> 43.3%	<u>215</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>3.11</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.07</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: No Strike			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>45</u> 34.4%	<u>86</u> 65.6%	<u>131</u> 60.6%
POLICE	<u>41</u> 48.2%	<u>44</u> 51.8%	<u>85</u> 39.4%
TOTAL	<u>86</u> 39.8%	<u>130</u> 60.2%	<u>216</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>3.58</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.058</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>53</u> 41.1%	<u>76</u> 58.9%	<u>129</u> 60.3%
POLICE	<u>60</u> 70.6%	<u>25</u> 29.4%	<u>85</u> 39.7%
TOTAL	<u>113</u> 52.8%	<u>101</u> 47.2%	<u>214</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>16.73</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>13</u> 9.8%	<u>119</u> 90.2%	<u>132</u> 60.8%
POLICE	<u>15</u> 17.6%	<u>70</u> 82.4%	<u>85</u> 39.2%
TOTAL	<u>28</u> 12.9%	<u>189</u> 87.1%	<u>217</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>2.147</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.14</u>

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>49</u> 37.7%	<u>81</u> 62.3%	<u>130</u> 60.5%
POLICE	<u>24</u> 28.2%	<u>61</u> 71.8%	<u>85</u> 39.5%
TOTAL	<u>73</u> 34.0%	<u>142</u> 66.0%	<u>215</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>1.649</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.19</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>45</u> 34.1%	<u>87</u> 65.9%	<u>132</u> 60.8%
POLICE	<u>30</u> 35.3%	<u>55</u> 64.7%	<u>85</u> 39.2%
TOTAL	<u>75</u> 34.6%	<u>142</u> 65.4%	<u>217</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>.0012</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.97</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Some College Education			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>79</u> 59.0%	<u>55</u> 41.0%	<u>134</u> 61.2%
POLICE	<u>56</u> 65.9%	<u>29</u> 34.1%	<u>85</u> 38.8%
TOTAL	<u>135</u> 61.6%	<u>84</u> 38.4%	<u>219</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>.782</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.376</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Upgrade Skills			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	<u>7</u> 5.3%	<u>126</u> 94.7%	<u>133</u> 61.3%
POLICE	<u>5</u> 6.0%	<u>79</u> 94.0%	<u>84</u> 38.7%
TOTAL	<u>12</u> 5.5%	<u>205</u> 94.5%	<u>217</u> 100%
CHI SQUARE	<u>.0</u>	P(SIG)	<u>1.0</u>

5A
CITY B - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYPOLOGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	111 53.4%	4 50%	115 53.2%
POLICE	97 46.6%	4 50%	101 46.8%
TOTAL	208 96.3%	8 3.7%	216 100%
CHI SQUARE	0.0	P(SIG)	1.0
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	101 67.8%	12 19.4%	113 53.6%
POLICE	48 32.2%	50 80.6%	98 46.4%
TOTAL	149 70.6%	62 29.4%	211 100%
CHI SQUARE	39.36	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	106 73.1%	8 12.3%	114 54.5%
POLICE	39 26.9%	57 87.7%	96 45.5%
TOTAL	145 68.7%	65 30.8%	211 100%
CHI SQUARE	67.73	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	103 75.2%	11 14.7%	114 53.8%
POLICE	34 24.8%	64 85.3%	98 46.2%
TOTAL	137 64.6%	75 35.4%	212 100%
CHI SQUARE	68.99	P(SIG)	.0

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	107 55.2%	9 40.9%	116 53.7%
POLICE	87 44.8%	13 59.1%	100 46.3%
TOTAL	194 89.8%	22 10.2%	216 100%
CHI SQUARE	1.09	P(SIG)	.29
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	91 66.4%	19 26.0%	110 52.4%
POLICE	46 33.6%	54 74.0%	100 47.6%
TOTAL	137 65.2%	73 34.8%	210 100%
CHI SQUARE	29.55	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	93 74.4%	19 22.4%	112 53.3%
POLICE	32 25.6%	66 77.6%	98 46.7%
TOTAL	125 59.5%	85 40.5%	210 100%
CHI SQUARE	52.99	P(SIG)	.00

1A
CITY C - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	10 15.9%	53 84.1%	63 23.8%
POLICE	45 22.3%	157 77.7%	202 76.2%
TOTAL	55 20.8%	210 79.2%	265 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.84	P(SIG)	.36
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	63 100.0%	0 0.0%	63 23.7%
POLICE	202 99.5%	1 0.5%	203 76.3%
TOTAL	265 99.6%	1 0.4%	266 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.39	P(SIG)	.54
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	32 51.6%	30 48.4%	62 23.6%
POLICE	118 58.7%	83 41.3%	201 76.4%
TOTAL	150 57.0%	113 43.0%	263 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.71	P(SIG)	.40
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	63 100.0%	0 0.0%	63 23.6%
POLICE	203 99.5%	1 0.5%	204 76.4%
TOTAL	266 99.6%	1 0.4%	267 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.39	P(SIG)	.53

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	38 61.3%	24 38.7%	62 23.4%
POLICE	181 89.2%	22 10.8%	203 76.6%
TOTAL	219 82.6%	46 17.4%	265 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	23.81	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	61 96.8%	2 3.2%	63 23.7%
POLICE	200 98.5%	3 1.5%	203 76.3%
TOTAL	261 98.1%	5 1.9%	266 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.11	P(SIG)	.74
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	38 61.3%	24 38.7%	62 23.3%
POLICE	197 96.6%	7 3.4%	204 76.7%
TOTAL	235 88.3%	31 11.7%	266 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	54.10	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	57 90.5%	6 9.5%	63 23.6%
POLICE	196 96.1%	8 3.9%	204 76.4%
TOTAL	253 94.8%	14 5.2%	267 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	2.02	P(SIG)	.16

CITY C - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	28 13.9 %	173 86.1 %	201 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Gambler			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	199 98.0 %	4 2.0 %	203 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	83 41.7 %	116 58.3 %	199 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	200 98.0 %	4 2.0 %	204 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	123 62.1 %	75 37.9 %	198 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	199 97.5 %	5 2.5 %	204 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	191 94.6 %	11 5.4 %	202 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %
POLICE	165 82.9 %	34 17.1 %	199 100.0 %
TOTAL	_____ %	_____ %	_____ %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

CITY C - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	2 3.1 %	62 96.9 %	64 23.9 %
POLICE	5 2.5 %	199 97.5 %	204 76.1 %
TOTAL	7 2.6 %	261 97.4 %	268 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ---0.02 P(SIG) .88---

* * * *

ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	60 95.2 %	3 4.8 %	63 23.6 %
POLICE	196 96.1 %	8 3.9 %	204 76.4 %
TOTAL	256 95.9 %	11 4.1 %	267 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.01 P(SIG) .95---

* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	17 27.0 %	46 73.0 %	63 23.6 %
POLICE	20 9.8 %	184 90.2 %	204 76.4 %
TOTAL	37 13.9 %	230 86.1 %	267 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 10.51 P(SIG) .00-----

* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Reported	
PUBLIC	62 96.9 %	2 3.1 %	64 23.9 %
POLICE	200 98.0 %	4 2.0 %	204 76.1 %
TOTAL	262 97.8 %	6 2.2 %	268 100 %

CHI SQUARE 0.00 P(SIG) .95-----

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	17 27.0 %	46 73.0 %	63 23.7 %
POLICE	19 9.4 %	184 90.6 %	203 76.3 %
TOTAL	36 13.5 %	230 86.5 %	266 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 11.30 P(SIG) .00-----

* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	54 87.1 %	8 12.9 %	62 23.6 %
POLICE	178 88.6 %	23 11.4 %	201 76.4 %
TOTAL	232 88.2 %	31 11.8 %	263 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.01 P(SIG) .93---

* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	28 44.4 %	35 55.6 %	63 24.0 %
POLICE	109 54.5 %	91 45.5 %	200 76.0 %
TOTAL	137 52.1 %	126 47.9 %	263 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 1.56 P(SIG) .21-----

* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	40 62.5 %	24 37.5 %	64 24.1 %
POLICE	57 28.2 %	145 71.8 %	202 75.9 %
TOTAL	97 36.5 %	169 63.5 %	266 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 23.20 P(SIG) .00-----

CITY C - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Off Duty Time		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 22 34.9 %	41 65.1 %	63 23.7 %
POLICE 86 42.4 %	117 57.6 %	203 76.3 %
TOTAL 108 40.6 %	158 59.4 %	266 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 0.82	P(SIG)	.37
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: No Strike		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 45 70.3 %	19 29.7 %	64 24.1 %
POLICE 133 65.8 %	69 34.2 %	202 75.9 %
TOTAL 178 66.9 %	88 33.1 %	266 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 0.26	P(SIG)	.61
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 30 46.9 %	34 53.1 %	64 24.2 %
POLICE 66 32.8 %	135 67.2 %	201 75.8 %
TOTAL 96 36.2 %	169 63.8 %	265 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 3.56	P(SIG)	.06
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 60 95.2 %	3 4.8 %	63 23.7 %
POLICE 152 74.9 %	51 25.1 %	203 76.3 %
TOTAL 212 79.7 %	54 20.3 %	266 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 11.09	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	* * *	* * *

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 42 66.7 %	21 33.3 %	63 23.7 %
POLICE 167 82.3 %	36 17.7 %	203 76.3 %
TOTAL 209 78.6 %	57 21.4 %	266 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 6.05	P(SIG)	.01
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 38 60.3 %	25 39.7 %	63 23.9 %
POLICE 143 71.1 %	58 28.9 %	201 76.1 %
TOTAL 181 68.6 %	83 31.4 %	264 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 2.13	P(SIG)	.14
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Some College Education		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 45 71.4 %	18 28.6 %	63 23.8 %
POLICE 108 53.5 %	94 46.5 %	202 76.2 %
TOTAL 153 57.7 %	112 42.3 %	265 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 5.64	P(SIG)	.02
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Upgrade Skills		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC 59 93.7 %	4 6.3 %	63 23.7 %
POLICE 189 93.1 %	14 6.9 %	203 76.3 %
TOTAL 248 93.2 %	18 6.8 %	266 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 0.02	P(SIG)	.89
* * *	* * *	* * *

CITY C - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYPOLGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 51 20.7 %	5 50.0 %	56 21.9 %
POLICE 195 79.3 %	5 50.0 %	200 78.1 %
TOTAL 246 96.1 %	10 3.9 %	256 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 3.25	P(SIG)	.07
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 43 43.9 %	13 8.1 %	56 21.7 %
POLICE 55 56.1 %	147 91.9 %	202 78.3 %
TOTAL 98 38.0 %	160 62.0 %	258 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 43.63	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 48 52.2 %	11 6.5 %	59 22.6 %
POLICE 44 47.8 %	158 93.5 %	202 77.4 %
TOTAL 92 35.2 %	169 64.8 %	261 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 68.41	P(SIG)	0.0
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 42 58.3 %	17 9.0 %	59 22.6 %
POLICE 30 41.7 %	172 91.0 %	202 77.4 %
TOTAL 77 27.6 %	189 72.4 %	266 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 69.75	P(SIG)	.0
* * *	* * *	* * *

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 49 21.1 %	6 25.0 %	55 21.5 %
POLICE 183 78.9 %	18 75.6 %	201 78.5 %
TOTAL 232 90.6 %	24 9.4 %	256 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE .03	P(SIG)	.85
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 37 38.9 %	20 12.3 %	57 22.1 %
POLICE 58 61.1 %	143 87.7 %	201 77.9 %
TOTAL 95 36.8 %	163 63.2 %	258 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 23.29	P(SIG)	.00
* * *	* * *	* * *
ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC 36 55.4 %	22 11.3 %	58 22.3 %
POLICE 29 44.6 %	173 88.7 %	202 77.7 %
TOTAL 65 25.0 %	195 75.0 %	260 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE 52.19	P(SIG)	.0
* * *	* * *	* * *

CITY D - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>33</u> 25.2 %	<u>98</u> 74.8 %	<u>131</u> 50.6 %
POLICE	<u>9</u> 7.0 %	<u>119</u> 93.0 %	<u>128</u> 49.4 %
TOTAL	<u>42</u> 16.2 %	<u>217</u> 83.8 %	<u>259</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 14.41 P(SIG) .00

* * * *

ITEM: Gambler			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>131</u> 98.5 %	<u>2</u> 1.5 %	<u>133</u> 51.0 %
POLICE	<u>127</u> 99.2 %	<u>1</u> 0.8 %	<u>128</u> 49.0 %
TOTAL	<u>258</u> 98.9 %	<u>3</u> 1.1 %	<u>261</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.00 P(SIG) .97

* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>61</u> 45.9 %	<u>72</u> 54.1 %	<u>133</u> 51.0 %
POLICE	<u>19</u> 14.8 %	<u>109</u> 85.2 %	<u>128</u> 49.0 %
TOTAL	<u>80</u> 30.7 %	<u>181</u> 69.3 %	<u>261</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 28.09 P(SIG) .00

* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>132</u> 99.2 %	<u>1</u> 0.8 %	<u>133</u> 51.2 %
POLICE	<u>125</u> 98.4 %	<u>2</u> 1.6 %	<u>127</u> 48.8 %
TOTAL	<u>257</u> 98.8 %	<u>3</u> 1.2 %	<u>260</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.00 P(SIG) .97

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>78</u> 60.0 %	<u>52</u> 40.0 %	<u>130</u> 50.4 %
POLICE	<u>46</u> 35.9 %	<u>82</u> 64.1 %	<u>128</u> 49.6 %
TOTAL	<u>124</u> 48.1 %	<u>134</u> 51.9 %	<u>258</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 14.01 P(SIG) .00

* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>129</u> 97.0 %	<u>4</u> 3.0 %	<u>133</u> 51.0 %
POLICE	<u>125</u> 97.7 %	<u>3</u> 2.3 %	<u>128</u> 49.0 %
TOTAL	<u>254</u> 97.3 %	<u>7</u> 2.7 %	<u>261</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.00 P(SIG) .96

* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>85</u> 63.9 %	<u>48</u> 36.1 %	<u>133</u> 51.0 %
POLICE	<u>119</u> 93.0 %	<u>9</u> 7.0 %	<u>128</u> 49.0 %
TOTAL	<u>204</u> 78.2 %	<u>57</u> 21.8 %	<u>261</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 30.59 P(SIG) .00

* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>113</u> 85.6 %	<u>19</u> 14.4 %	<u>132</u> 50.8 %
POLICE	<u>76</u> 59.4 %	<u>52</u> 40.6 %	<u>128</u> 49.2 %
TOTAL	<u>189</u> 72.7 %	<u>71</u> 27.3 %	<u>260</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 21.22 P(SIG) .00

CITY D - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>4</u> 3.2 %	<u>122</u> 96.8 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>126</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

* * * *

ITEM: Gambler		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>123</u> 97.6 %	<u>3</u> 2.4 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>126</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>14</u> 11.0 %	<u>113</u> 89.0 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>127</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>124</u> 98.4 %	<u>2</u> 1.6 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>126</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

ITEM: Free Meal		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>16</u> 12.8 %	<u>109</u> 87.2 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>125</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>121</u> 96.0 %	<u>5</u> 4.0 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>126</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>111</u> 87.4 %	<u>16</u> 12.6 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>127</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>39</u> 31.0 %	<u>87</u> 69.0 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>126</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE — P(SIG) —

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	8 6.2%	122 93.8%	130 50.6%
POLICE	1 0.8%	126 99.2%	127 49.4%
TOTAL	9 3.5%	248 96.5%	257 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	4.00	P(SIG)	.05
* * *			
ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	127 96.9%	4 3.1%	131 50.8%
POLICE	117 92.1%	10 7.9%	127 49.2%
TOTAL	244 94.6%	14 5.4%	258 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	2.06	P(SIG)	.15
* * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	23 17.7%	107 82.3%	130 50.6%
POLICE	4 3.1%	123 96.9%	127 49.4%
TOTAL	27 10.5%	230 89.5%	257 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	12.95	P(SIG)	.00
* * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	129 99.2%	1 0.8%	130 50.6%
POLICE	118 92.9%	9 7.1%	127 49.4%
TOTAL	247 96.1%	10 3.9%	257 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	5.27	P(SIG)	.02

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	24 18.6%	105 81.4%	129 50.4%
POLICE	1 0.8%	126 99.2%	127 49.6%
TOTAL	25 9.8%	231 90.2%	256 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	21.08	P(SIG)	.00
* * *			
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	122 93.1%	9 6.9%	131 51.0%
POLICE	92 73.0%	34 27.0%	126 49.0%
TOTAL	214 83.3%	43 16.7%	257 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	17.24	P(SIG)	.00
* * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	52 40.3%	77 59.7%	129 50.8%
POLICE	51 40.8%	74 59.2%	125 49.2%
TOTAL	103 40.6%	151 59.4%	254 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	6.00	P(SIG)	.96
* * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	72 56.3%	56 43.8%	128 50.6%
POLICE	11 8.8%	114 91.2%	125 49.4%
TOTAL	83 32.8%	170 67.2%	253 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	62.46	P(SIG)	.00

ITEM: Off Duty Time			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	65 47.4%	70 52.6%	133 51.0%
POLICE	41 32.0%	87 68.0%	128 49.0%
TOTAL	104 39.8%	157 60.2%	261 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	5.78	P(SIG)	.02
* * *			
ITEM: No Strike			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	113 85.6%	19 14.4%	132 50.8%
POLICE	83 64.8%	45 35.2%	128 49.2%
TOTAL	196 75.4%	64 24.6%	260 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	13.99	P(SIG)	.00
* * *			
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	70 52.6%	63 47.4%	133 51.2%
POLICE	18 14.2%	109 85.8%	127 48.8%
TOTAL	88 33.8%	172 66.2%	260 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	41.21	P(SIG)	.00
* * *			
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	126 94.7%	7 5.3%	133 51.0%
POLICE	107 83.6%	21 16.4%	128 49.0%
TOTAL	233 89.3%	28 10.7%	261 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	7.33	P(SIG)	.01

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	84 63.6%	48 36.4%	132 50.8%
POLICE	100 78.1%	28 21.9%	128 49.2%
TOTAL	184 70.8%	76 29.2%	260 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	5.91	P(SIG)	.02
* * *			
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	94 72.3%	36 27.7%	130 50.4%
POLICE	82 64.1%	46 35.9%	128 49.6%
TOTAL	176 68.2%	82 31.8%	258 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	1.66	P(SIG)	.20
* * *			
ITEM: Some College Education			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	77 58.8%	54 41.2%	131 51.0%
POLICE	66 52.4%	60 47.6%	126 49.0%
TOTAL	143 55.6%	114 44.4%	257 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.82	P(SIG)	.37
* * *			
ITEM: Upgrade Skills			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	125 94.0%	8 6.0%	133 51.0%
POLICE	122 95.3%	6 4.7%	128 49.0%
TOTAL	247 94.6%	14 5.4%	261 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.04	P(SIG)	.84

5A
CITY D - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYPOLOGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	55 30.6 %	2 100 %	57 %
POLICE	125 69.4 %	0 0 %	125 %
TOTAL	180 98.9 %	2 1.1 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	1.79	P(SIG)	.18
* * * *			
ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	51 58.6 %	7 7.4 %	58 31.9 %
POLICE	36 41.4 %	88 92.6 %	124 68.1 %
TOTAL	87 47.8 %	95 52.2 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	52.60	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	49 64.5 %	9 8.6 %	58 32.0 %
POLICE	27 35.5 %	96 91.4 %	123 68.0 %
TOTAL	76 42.0 %	105 58.0 %	181 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	60.7	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	49 80.3 %	10 8.1 %	59 31.9 %
POLICE	12 19.7 %	114 91.9 %	126 68.1 %
TOTAL	61 33.0 %	124 67.0 %	185 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	94.99	P(SIG)	.00

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	49 29.0 %	10 62.5 %	59 31.9 %
POLICE	120 71.0 %	6 37.5 %	126 68.1 %
TOTAL	169 91.4 %	16 8.6 %	185 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	6.09	P(SIG)	0.13
* * * *			
ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	47 66.2 %	11 9.7 %	58 31.5 %
POLICE	24 33.8 %	102 90.3 %	126 68.5 %
TOTAL	71 38.6 %	113 61.4 %	184 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	61.80	P(SIG)	.0
* * * *			
ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	40 85.1 %	21 15.1 %	61 32.8 %
POLICE	7 14.9 %	118 84.9 %	125 67.2 %
TOTAL	47 25.3 %	139 74.7 %	186 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	74.94	P(SIG)	.00

CITY E - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	12 10.6 %	101 89.4 %	113 61.7 %
POLICE	23 32.9 %	47 67.1 %	70 38.3 %
TOTAL	35 19.1 %	148 80.9 %	183 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	12.42	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: Gambler			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	108 95.6 %	5 4.4 %	113 61.7 %
POLICE	68 97.1 %	2 2.9 %	70 38.3 %
TOTAL	176 96.2 %	7 3.8 %	183 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	0.02	P(SIG)	.89
* * * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	35 33.0 %	71 67.0 %	106 60.2 %
POLICE	40 57.1 %	30 42.9 %	70 39.8 %
TOTAL	75 42.6 %	101 57.4 %	176 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	9.07	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	105 95.5 %	5 4.5 %	110 61.1 %
POLICE	67 95.7 %	3 4.3 %	70 38.9 %
TOTAL	172 95.6 %	8 4.4 %	180 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	0.08	P(SIG)	.77

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	53 47.3 %	59 52.7 %	112 61.5 %
POLICE	56 80.0 %	14 20.0 %	70 38.5 %
TOTAL	109 59.9 %	73 40.1 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	17.81	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	101 91.0 %	10 9.0 %	111 61.3 %
POLICE	67 95.7 %	3 4.3 %	70 38.7 %
TOTAL	168 92.8 %	13 7.2 %	181 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	0.82	P(SIG)	.37
* * * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	59 54.6 %	49 45.4 %	108 60.7 %
POLICE	60 85.7 %	10 14.3 %	70 39.3 %
TOTAL	119 66.9 %	59 33.1 %	178 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	17.14	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	89 79.5 %	23 20.5 %	112 61.5 %
POLICE	58 82.9 %	12 17.1 %	70 38.5 %
TOTAL	147 80.8 %	35 19.2 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	0.14	P(SIG)	.71

CITY E - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>23</u> 32.4 %	<u>48</u> 67.6 %	<u>71</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Gambler			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>67</u> 97.1 %	<u>2</u> 2.9 %	<u>69</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>46</u> 65.7 %	<u>24</u> 34.3 %	<u>70</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>68</u> 97.1 %	<u>2</u> 2.9 %	<u>70</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>53</u> 74.6 %	<u>18</u> 25.4 %	<u>71</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>65</u> 92.9 %	<u>5</u> 7.1 %	<u>70</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>60</u> 85.7 %	<u>10</u> 14.3 %	<u>70</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>51</u> 72.9 %	<u>19</u> 27.1 %	<u>70</u> 100.0 %
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

CITY E - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>9</u> 8.0 %	<u>104</u> 92.0 %	<u>113</u> 61.7 %
POLICE	<u>8</u> 11.4 %	<u>62</u> 88.6 %	<u>70</u> 38.3 %
TOTAL	<u>17</u> 9.3 %	<u>166</u> 90.7 %	<u>183</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.27 P(SIG) 60
* * * *

ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>112</u> 97.4 %	<u>3</u> 2.6 %	<u>115</u> 62.2 %
POLICE	<u>66</u> 94.3 %	<u>4</u> 5.7 %	<u>70</u> 37.8 %
TOTAL	<u>178</u> 96.2 %	<u>7</u> 3.8 %	<u>185</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.46 P(SIG) 50
* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>25</u> 22.3 %	<u>87</u> 77.7 %	<u>112</u> 61.5 %
POLICE	<u>12</u> 17.1 %	<u>58</u> 82.9 %	<u>70</u> 38.5 %
TOTAL	<u>37</u> 20.3 %	<u>145</u> 79.7 %	<u>182</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.43 P(SIG) 51
* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>113</u> 98.3 %	<u>2</u> 1.7 %	<u>115</u> 62.2 %
POLICE	<u>66</u> 94.3 %	<u>4</u> 5.7 %	<u>70</u> 37.8 %
TOTAL	<u>179</u> 96.8 %	<u>6</u> 3.2 %	<u>185</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 1.11 P(SIG) 29

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>31</u> 27.2 %	<u>83</u> 72.8 %	<u>114</u> 62.0 %
POLICE	<u>20</u> 28.6 %	<u>50</u> 71.4 %	<u>70</u> 38.0 %
TOTAL	<u>51</u> 27.7 %	<u>133</u> 72.3 %	<u>184</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 0.00 P(SIG) 97
* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>102</u> 91.1 %	<u>10</u> 8.9 %	<u>112</u> 61.9 %
POLICE	<u>53</u> 76.8 %	<u>16</u> 23.2 %	<u>69</u> 38.1 %
TOTAL	<u>155</u> 85.6 %	<u>26</u> 14.4 %	<u>181</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 5.95 P(SIG) 02
* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>50</u> 44.6 %	<u>62</u> 55.4 %	<u>112</u> 61.5 %
POLICE	<u>42</u> 60.0 %	<u>28</u> 40.0 %	<u>70</u> 38.5 %
TOTAL	<u>92</u> 50.5 %	<u>90</u> 49.5 %	<u>182</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 3.47 P(SIG) 06
* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>70</u> 61.9 %	<u>43</u> 38.1 %	<u>113</u> 62.4 %
POLICE	<u>22</u> 32.4 %	<u>46</u> 67.6 %	<u>68</u> 37.6 %
TOTAL	<u>92</u> 50.8 %	<u>89</u> 49.2 %	<u>181</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 13.72 P(SIG) 00

CITY E - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Off Duty Time		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	39 34.5%	74 65.5%
POLICE	31 44.3%	39 55.7%
TOTAL	70 38.3%	113 61.7%
		70 38.3%
		113 61.7%
		183 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	1.36	P(SIG) .24
*	*	*
ITEM: No Strike		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	93 80.9%	22 19.1%
POLICE	37 52.9%	33 47.1%
TOTAL	130 70.3%	55 29.7%
		115 62.2%
		70 37.8%
		185 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	15.03	P(SIG) .00
*	*	*
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	58 50.4%	57 49.6%
POLICE	23 32.4%	48 67.6%
TOTAL	81 43.5%	105 56.5%
		115 61.8%
		71 38.2%
		186 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	5.10	P(SIG) .02
*	*	*
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	106 91.4%	10 8.6%
POLICE	52 75.4%	17 24.6%
TOTAL	158 85.4%	27 14.6%
		116 62.7%
		69 37.3%
		185 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	7.67	P(SIG) .01

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	60 53.1%	53 46.9%
POLICE	58 81.7%	13 18.3%
TOTAL	118 64.1%	66 35.9%
		113 61.4%
		71 38.6%
		184 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	14.28	P(SIG) .00
*	*	*
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	75 65.2%	40 34.8%
POLICE	38 54.3%	32 45.7%
TOTAL	113 61.1%	72 38.9%
		115 62.2%
		70 37.8%
		185 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	1.75	P(SIG) .19
*	*	*
ITEM: Some College Education		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	48 41.7%	67 58.3%
POLICE	24 34.3%	46 65.7%
TOTAL	72 38.9%	113 61.1%
		115 62.2%
		70 37.8%
		185 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.73	P(SIG) .39
*	*	*
ITEM: Upgrade Skills		
Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	112 96.6%	4 3.4%
POLICE	61 87.1%	9 12.9%
TOTAL	173 93.0%	13 7.0%
		116 62.4%
		70 37.6%
		186 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	4.59	P(SIG) .03

CITY E - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYPOLOGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	86 56.6%	11 52.4%
POLICE	66 43.4%	10 47.6%
TOTAL	152 87.9%	21 12.1%
		97 56.1%
		76 43.9%
		173 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	.01	P(SIG) .89
*	*	*
ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	83 70.9%	12 22.2%
POLICE	34 29.1%	42 77.8%
TOTAL	117 68.0%	54 31.4%
		95 55.8%
		76 44.2%
		172 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	36.35	P(SIG) .00
*	*	*
ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	89 78.1%	8 13.3%
POLICE	25 21.9%	52 86.7%
TOTAL	114 65.5%	60 34.5%
		97 55.7%
		77 44.3%
		174 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	64.18	P(SIG) .00
*	*	*
ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	87 81.3%	10 14.9%
POLICE	20 18.7%	57 85.1%
TOTAL	107 61.5%	67 38.5%
		97 55.7%
		77 44.3%
		174 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	70.93	P(SIG) .00

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	82 56.6%	14 51.9%
POLICE	63 43.4%	13 48.1%
TOTAL	145 84.3%	27 15.7%
		96 55.8%
		76 44.2%
		172 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	.05	P(SIG) .81
*	*	*
ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	78 76.5%	17 24.6%
POLICE	24 23.5%	52 75.4%
TOTAL	102 59.6%	69 40.4%
		95 55.6%
		76 44.4%
		171 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	42.7	P(SIG) .0
*	*	*
ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets		
Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	85 83.3%	12 16.7%
POLICE	17 16.7%	60 83.3%
TOTAL	102 58.6%	72 41.4%
		97 55.7%
		77 44.3%
		174 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	73.3	P(SIG) .00

CITY F - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	21 14.8%	121 85.2%	142 41.0%
POLICE	26 12.7%	178 87.3%	204 59.0%
TOTAL	47 13.6%	299 86.4%	346 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.15	P(SIG)	.70
* * * *			
ITEM: Gambler			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	140 98.6%	2 1.4%	142 40.9%
POLICE	199 97.1%	6 2.9%	205 59.1%
TOTAL	339 97.7%	8 2.3%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.32	P(SIG)	.57
* * * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	58 40.8%	84 59.2%	142 40.9%
POLICE	37 18.0%	168 82.0%	205 59.1%
TOTAL	95 27.4%	252 72.6%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	20.80	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	140 99.3%	1 0.7%	141 40.9%
POLICE	195 95.6%	9 4.4%	204 59.1%
TOTAL	335 97.1%	10 2.9%	345 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	2.85	P(SIG)	.09

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	73 51.8%	68 48.2%	141 40.8%
POLICE	86 42.0%	119 58.0%	205 59.2%
TOTAL	159 46.0%	187 54.0%	346 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	2.86	P(SIG)	.09
* * * *			
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	138 97.2%	4 2.8%	142 40.9%
POLICE	198 96.6%	7 3.4%	205 59.1%
TOTAL	336 96.8%	11 3.2%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.00	P(SIG)	.99
* * * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	79 55.6%	63 44.4%	142 40.9%
POLICE	174 84.9%	31 15.1%	205 59.1%
TOTAL	253 72.9%	94 27.1%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	34.86	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	115 81.6%	26 18.4%	141 40.8%
POLICE	142 69.3%	63 30.7%	205 59.2%
TOTAL	257 74.3%	89 25.7%	346 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	5.98	P(SIG)	.02

CITY, F - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	6 2.9%	200 97.1%	206 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—
* * * *			
ITEM: Gambler			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	199 97.1%	6 2.9%	205 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—
* * * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	16 7.8%	190 92.2%	206 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—
* * * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	201 97.6%	5 2.4%	206 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	25 12.2%	180 87.8%	205 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—
* * * *			
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	195 95.1%	10 4.9%	205 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—
* * * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	146 71.2%	59 28.8%	205 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—
* * * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl	
PUBLIC	— %	— %	— %
POLICE	73 35.4%	133 64.6%	206 100.0%
TOTAL	— %	— %	— %
CHI SQUARE	—	P(SIG)	—

CITY F - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	10 7.1%	131 92.9%	141 40.6%
POLICE	5 2.4%	201 97.6%	206 59.4%
TOTAL	15 4.3%	332 95.7%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	3.35	P(SIG)	.07
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	138 97.9%	3 2.1%	141 40.6%
POLICE	183 88.8%	23 11.2%	206 59.4%
TOTAL	321 92.5%	26 7.5%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	8.60	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	36 25.7%	104 74.3%	140 40.5%
POLICE	7 3.4%	199 96.6%	206 59.5%
TOTAL	43 12.4%	303 87.6%	346 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	36.12	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	138 97.9%	3 2.1%	141 40.6%
POLICE	187 90.8%	19 9.2%	206 59.4%
TOTAL	325 93.7%	22 6.3%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	5.95	P(SIG)	.02

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	38 27.0%	103 73.0%	141 40.6%
POLICE	7 3.4%	199 96.6%	206 59.4%
TOTAL	45 13.0%	302 87.0%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	39.08	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	129 91.5%	12 8.5%	141 40.9%
POLICE	145 71.1%	59 28.9%	204 59.1%
TOTAL	274 79.4%	71 20.6%	345 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	20.02	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	56 40.0%	84 60.0%	140 40.6%
POLICE	69 33.7%	136 66.3%	205 59.4%
TOTAL	125 36.2%	220 63.8%	345 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	1.19	P(SIG)	.28
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	82 58.2%	59 41.8%	141 40.8%
POLICE	20 9.8%	185 90.2%	205 59.2%
TOTAL	102 29.5%	244 70.5%	346 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	91.82	P(SIG)	.00

CITY F - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Off Duty Time			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	53 37.3%	89 62.7%	142 40.8%
POLICE	75 36.4%	131 63.6%	206 59.2%
TOTAL	128 36.8%	220 63.2%	348 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.00	P(SIG)	.95
*	*	*	*
ITEM: No Strike			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	109 77.3%	32 22.7%	141 40.8%
POLICE	98 47.8%	107 52.2%	205 59.2%
TOTAL	207 59.8%	139 40.2%	346 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	29.03	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	67 47.9%	73 52.1%	140 40.7%
POLICE	44 21.6%	160 78.4%	204 59.3%
TOTAL	111 32.3%	233 67.7%	344 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	25.06	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	125 88.7%	16 11.3%	141 41.0%
POLICE	163 80.3%	40 19.7%	203 59.0%
TOTAL	288 83.7%	56 16.3%	344 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	3.67	P(SIG)	.06

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	83 58.9%	58 41.1%	141 40.6%
POLICE	164 79.6%	42 20.4%	206 59.4%
TOTAL	247 71.2%	100 28.8%	347 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	16.57	P(SIG)	.00
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	97 69.8%	42 30.2%	139 40.4%
POLICE	135 65.9%	70 34.1%	205 59.6%
TOTAL	232 67.4%	112 32.6%	344 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.42	P(SIG)	.52
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Some College Education			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	62 44.0%	79 56.0%	141 40.9%
POLICE	111 54.4%	93 45.6%	204 59.1%
TOTAL	173 50.1%	172 49.9%	345 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	3.23	P(SIG)	.07
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Upgrade Skills			
	Agree	Disagree	
PUBLIC	137 97.2%	4 2.8%	141 40.9%
POLICE	198 97.1%	6 2.9%	204 59.1%
TOTAL	335 97.1%	10 2.9%	345 100.0%
CHI SQUARE	0.07	P(SIG)	.79

CITY F - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYPOLOGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	122	5	127
	32.7 %	62.5 %	33.3 %
POLICE	251	3	254
	67.2 %	37.5 %	66.0 %
TOTAL	373	8	381
	97.9 %	2.1 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	116	13	129
	47.1 %	9.5 %	33.7 %
POLICE	130	123	253
	52.8 %	90.4 %	66.2 %
TOTAL	246	136	382
	64.3 %	35.6 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	117	11	128
	54.1 %	6.6 %	33.5 %
POLICE	99	155	254
	45.8 %	93.3 %	66.4 %
TOTAL	126	166	382
	56.5 %	30.3 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	114	14	123
	55.8 %	7.9 %	33.5 %
POLICE	90	163	253
	44.1 %	92.0 %	66.4 %
TOTAL	204	177	381
	53.5 %	46.4 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	121	7	128
	33.1 %	41.1 %	33.5 %
POLICE	244	10	254
	66.8 %	58.8 %	66.4 %
TOTAL	365	17	382
	95.5 %	4.4 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	107	22	129
	48.1 %	13.7 %	33.7 %
POLICE	115	138	253
	51.8 %	86.2 %	66.2 %
TOTAL	222	160	382
	58.1 %	41.8 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	98	30	128
	53.8 %	15.0 %	33.5 %
POLICE	84	170	254
	46.1 %	85.0 %	66.4 %
TOTAL	182	200	382
	47.6 %	52.3 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

* * * *

CITY G - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	7	69	76
	9.2 %	90.8 %	41.8 %
POLICE	7	99	106
	6.6 %	93.4 %	58.2 %
TOTAL	14	168	182
	7.7 %	92.3 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE --.136 P(SIG) --.712

* * * *

ITEM: Gambler			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	72	3	75
	96.0 %	4.0 %	41.4 %
POLICE	106	0	106
	100.0 %	0.0 %	58.6 %
TOTAL	178	3	181
	98.3 %	1.7 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 2.20 P(SIG) --.13

* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	20	56	76
	26.3 %	73.7 %	41.8 %
POLICE	7	99	106
	6.6 %	93.4 %	58.2 %
TOTAL	27	155	182
	14.8 %	85.2 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE --12.09 P(SIG) --.000

* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	76	0	76
	100.0 %	0 %	41.4 %
POLICE	106	0	106
	100.0 %	0 %	58.6 %
TOTAL	182	0	182
	100.0 %	0 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	26	48	74
	35.1 %	64.9 %	41.1 %
POLICE	25	81	106
	23.6 %	76.4 %	58.9 %
TOTAL	51	129	180
	28.3 %	71.7 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE --2.32 P(SIG) --.12

* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	75	1	76
	98.7 %	1.3 %	41.8 %
POLICE	106	0	106
	100.0 %	0.0 %	58.2 %
TOTAL	181	1	182
	99.5 %	.5 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE --.02 P(SIG) --.86

* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	33	43	76
	43.4 %	56.6 %	41.8 %
POLICE	83	23	106
	78.3 %	21.7 %	58.2 %
TOTAL	116	66	182
	63.7 %	36.3 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 21.81 P(SIG) --.00

* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Difficult	Easy	Total
PUBLIC	58	17	75
	77.3 %	22.7 %	41.4 %
POLICE	63	43	106
	59.4 %	40.6 %	58.6 %
TOTAL	121	60	181
	66.9 %	33.1 %	100.0 %

CHI SQUARE 5.56 P(SIG) --.018

CITY G - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>9</u> 8.5 %	<u>97</u> 91.5 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Gambler		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>105</u> 99.1 %	<u>1</u> .9 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>12</u> 11.3 %	<u>94</u> 88.7 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>105</u> 99.1 %	<u>1</u> .9 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

ITEM: Free Meal		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>15</u> 14.2 %	<u>91</u> 85.8 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>105</u> 99.1 %	<u>1</u> .9 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>69</u> 65.7 %	<u>36</u> 34.3 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>105</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----
* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access		
Disciplined	Not Dscpl.	
PUBLIC	— %	— %
POLICE	<u>27</u> 25.5 %	<u>79</u> 74.5 %
TOTAL	— %	<u>106</u> 100.0 %

CHI SQUARE ----- P(SIG) -----

CITY G - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>3</u> 3.9 %	<u>73</u> 96.1 %
POLICE	<u>2</u> 1.9 %	<u>103</u> 98.1 %
TOTAL	<u>5</u> 2.8 %	<u>176</u> 97.2 %

CHI SQUARE 1.35 P(SIG) .71
* * * *

ITEM: Gambler		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>72</u> 93.5 %	<u>5</u> 6.5 %
POLICE	<u>71</u> 68.9 %	<u>32</u> 31.1 %
TOTAL	<u>143</u> 79.4 %	<u>37</u> 20.6 %

CHI SQUARE 14.82 P(SIG) .0001
* * * *

ITEM: Discount Meal		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>13</u> 16.9 %	<u>64</u> 83.1 %
POLICE	<u>4</u> 3.8 %	<u>101</u> 96.2 %
TOTAL	<u>17</u> 9.3 %	<u>165</u> 90.7 %

CHI SQUARE 7.48 P(SIG) .0062
* * * *

ITEM: Merchandise from Store		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>72</u> 93.5 %	<u>5</u> 6.5 %
POLICE	<u>76</u> 73.1 %	<u>28</u> 26.9 %
TOTAL	<u>148</u> 81.8 %	<u>33</u> 18.2 %

CHI SQUARE 11.05 P(SIG) .0009

ITEM: Free Meal		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>10</u> 13.0 %	<u>67</u> 87.0 %
POLICE	<u>5</u> 4.8 %	<u>100</u> 95.2 %
TOTAL	<u>15</u> 8.2 %	<u>167</u> 91.8 %

CHI SQUARE 2.96 P(SIG) .08
* * * *

ITEM: Towing Company		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>68</u> 88.3 %	<u>9</u> 11.7 %
POLICE	<u>58</u> 55.2 %	<u>47</u> 44.8 %
TOTAL	<u>126</u> 69.2 %	<u>56</u> 30.8 %

CHI SQUARE 21.28 P(SIG) .0000
* * * *

ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>19</u> 24.7 %	<u>58</u> 75.3 %
POLICE	<u>32</u> 30.5 %	<u>73</u> 69.5 %
TOTAL	<u>51</u> 28.0 %	<u>131</u> 72.0 %

CHI SQUARE .481 P(SIG) .48
* * * *

ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access		
Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>45</u> 58.4 %	<u>32</u> 41.6 %
POLICE	<u>11</u> 10.5 %	<u>94</u> 89.5 %
TOTAL	<u>56</u> 30.8 %	<u>126</u> 69.2 %

CHI SQUARE 45.75 P(SIG) .0000

CITY G - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PROFESSIONALISM SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Off Duty Time			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	36 47.4 %	40 52.6 %	76 41.5 %
POLICE	88 82.2 %	19 17.8 %	107 58.5 %
TOTAL	124 67.8 %	59 32.2 %	183 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	23.16	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: No Strike			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	3 4.0 %	72 96.0 %	75 41.2 %
POLICE	12 11.2 %	95 88.8 %	107 58.8 %
TOTAL	15 8.2 %	167 91.8 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	2.156	P(SIG)	.14
* * * *			
ITEM: Critical Errors in Judgement			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	43 55.8 %	34 44.2 %	77 41.8 %
POLICE	75 70.1 %	32 29.9 %	107 58.2 %
TOTAL	118 64.1 %	66 35.9 %	184 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	3.35	P(SIG)	.06
* * * *			
ITEM: Police Public Service Role Important			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	13 16.9 %	64 83.1 %	77 42.1 %
POLICE	63 59.4 %	43 40.6 %	106 57.9 %
TOTAL	76 41.5 %	107 58.5 %	183 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	31.52	P(SIG)	.00

ITEM: Higher Ethical Standard			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	39 51.3 %	37 48.7 %	76 41.8 %
POLICE	82 77.4 %	24 22.6 %	106 58.2 %
TOTAL	121 66.5 %	61 33.5 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG)	-----
* * * *			
ITEM: Extraordinary Restraint			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	1 1.3 %	75 98.7 %	76 41.5 %
POLICE	7 6.5 %	100 93.5 %	107 58.5 %
TOTAL	8 4.4 %	175 95.6 %	183 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	1.787	P(SIG)	.18
* * * *			
ITEM: Some College Education			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	25 32.5 %	52 67.5 %	77 41.8 %
POLICE	30 28.0 %	77 72.0 %	107 58.2 %
TOTAL	55 29.9 %	129 70.1 %	184 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	.234	P(SIG)	.62
* * * *			
ITEM: Upgrade Skills			
	Agree	Disagree	Total
PUBLIC	25 32.5 %	52 67.5 %	77 42.3 %
POLICE	36 34.3 %	69 65.7 %	105 57.7 %
TOTAL	61 33.5 %	121 66.5 %	182 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	.009	P(SIG)	.92

CITY G - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

TYOLOGY SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Accepting Free Meals			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	65 27.4 %	1 25.0 %	66 27.4 %
POLICE	172 72.6 %	3 75.0 %	175 72.6 %
TOTAL	237 72.6 %	4 1.7 %	241 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	0	P(SIG)	1.0
* * * *			
ITEM: Accepting \$ from Businesses			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	61 30.0 %	3 8.1 %	64 26.7 %
POLICE	142 70.0 %	34 91.9 %	176 73.3 %
TOTAL	203 84.6 %	37 15.4 %	240 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	6.62	P(SIG)	.01
* * * *			
ITEM: \$ for Overlooking Violations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	67 33.7 %	2 4.4 %	69 28.3 %
POLICE	132 66.7 %	43 95.6 %	175 71.7 %
TOTAL	199 81.6 %	45 18.4 %	244 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	14.04	P(SIG)	.000
* * * *			
ITEM: \$ to Protect Vice Operations			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	68 36.8 %	2 3.3 %	70 28.6 %
POLICE	117 63.2 %	58 96.7 %	175 71.4 %
TOTAL	185 75.5 %	66 24.5 %	245 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	23.18	P(SIG)	.00

ITEM: Shopping in Uniform			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	62 26.4 %	2 50 %	64 26.8 %
POLICE	173 73.6 %	2 50 %	175 73.2 %
TOTAL	235 98.3 %	4 1.7 %	239 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	.23	P(SIG)	.62
* * * *			
ITEM: Removing Unprotected Property			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	58 33.0 %	8 12.1 %	66 27.3 %
POLICE	118 67.0 %	58 87.9 %	176 72.7 %
TOTAL	176 72.7 %	66 27.3 %	242 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	9.47	P(SIG)	.00
* * * *			
ITEM: \$ for No Traffic Tickets			
	Some	None	Total
PUBLIC	61 35.3 %	9 12.2 %	70 28.3 %
POLICE	112 64.7 %	65 87.8 %	177 71.7 %
TOTAL	173 70.0 %	74 30.0 %	247 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	13.50	P(SIG)	.004

CITY H - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

PERSONAL STANDARDS OF HONESTY: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>43</u> 22.1 %	<u>152</u> 77.9 %	<u>195</u> 50.6 %
POLICE	<u>83</u> 43.7 %	<u>107</u> 56.3 %	<u>190</u> 49.4 %
TOTAL	<u>120</u> 32.7 %	<u>259</u> 67.3 %	<u>385</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>19.48</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
* * * *			
ITEM: Gambler			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>189</u> 96.4 %	<u>7</u> 3.6 %	<u>196</u> 50.6 %
POLICE	<u>189</u> 99.0 %	<u>2</u> 1.0 %	<u>191</u> 49.4 %
TOTAL	<u>378</u> 97.7 %	<u>9</u> 2.3 %	<u>387</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>1.71</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.19</u>
* * * *			
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>112</u> 57.7 %	<u>82</u> 42.3 %	<u>194</u> 50.5 %
POLICE	<u>124</u> 65.3 %	<u>66</u> 34.7 %	<u>190</u> 49.5 %
TOTAL	<u>236</u> 61.5 %	<u>148</u> 38.5 %	<u>384</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>1.99</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.15</u>
* * * *			
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>188</u> 95.9 %	<u>8</u> 4.1 %	<u>196</u> 50.6 %
POLICE	<u>189</u> 99.0 %	<u>2</u> 1.0 %	<u>191</u> 49.4 %
TOTAL	<u>377</u> 97.4 %	<u>10</u> 2.6 %	<u>387</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>2.43</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.11</u>

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>132</u> 71.7 %	<u>52</u> 28.3 %	<u>184</u> 49.2 %
POLICE	<u>167</u> 87.9 %	<u>23</u> 12.1 %	<u>190</u> 50.8 %
TOTAL	<u>299</u> 79.9 %	<u>75</u> 20.1 %	<u>374</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>14.22</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
* * * *			
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>187</u> 95.4 %	<u>9</u> 4.6 %	<u>196</u> 50.8 %
POLICE	<u>188</u> 98.9 %	<u>2</u> 1.1 %	<u>190</u> 49.2 %
TOTAL	<u>375</u> 97.2 %	<u>11</u> 2.8 %	<u>386</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>3.18</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.07</u>
* * * *			
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>136</u> 69.4 %	<u>60</u> 30.6 %	<u>196</u> 50.6 %
POLICE	<u>187</u> 97.9 %	<u>4</u> 2.1 %	<u>191</u> 49.4 %
TOTAL	<u>323</u> 83.5 %	<u>64</u> 16.5 %	<u>387</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>54.95</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
* * * *			
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Difficult	Easy	
PUBLIC	<u>174</u> 88.8 %	<u>22</u> 11.2 %	<u>196</u> 50.6 %
POLICE	<u>166</u> 86.9 %	<u>25</u> 13.1 %	<u>191</u> 49.4 %
TOTAL	<u>340</u> 87.9 %	<u>47</u> 12.1 %	<u>387</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>.16</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.68</u>

CITY H - MCCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY SCALE

DISCIPLINARY SCALE: POLICE DATA ONLY

ITEM: Coffee		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>125</u> 66.5 %	<u>63</u> 33.5 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----
* * * *		
ITEM: Gambler		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>175</u> 93.1 %	<u>13</u> 6.9 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----
* * * *		
ITEM: Discount Meal		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>150</u> 79.8 %	<u>38</u> 20.2 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----
* * * *		
ITEM: Merchandise from Store		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>174</u> 92.6 %	<u>14</u> 7.4 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----

ITEM: Free Meal		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>160</u> 85.1 %	<u>28</u> 14.9 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----
* * * *		
ITEM: Towing Company		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>173</u> 92.0 %	<u>15</u> 8.0 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----
* * * *		
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>171</u> 91.0 %	<u>17</u> 9.0 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----
* * * *		
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access		
	Disciplined	Not Dscpl
PUBLIC	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
POLICE	<u>154</u> 81.9 %	<u>34</u> 18.1 %
TOTAL	<u>—</u> %	<u>—</u> %
CHI SQUARE	-----	P(SIG) -----

PEER REPORTING SCALE: POLICE-PUBLIC COMPARISON

ITEM: Coffee			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>17</u> 8.7 %	<u>178</u> 91.3 %	<u>195</u> 50.8 %
POLICE	<u>6</u> 3.2 %	<u>183</u> 96.8 %	<u>189</u> 49.2 %
TOTAL	<u>23</u> 6.0 %	<u>361</u> 94.0 %	<u>384</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>4.29</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.03</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Gambler			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>192</u> 98.5 %	<u>3</u> 1.5 %	<u>195</u> 50.8 %
POLICE	<u>185</u> 97.9 %	<u>4</u> 2.1 %	<u>189</u> 49.2 %
TOTAL	<u>377</u> 98.2 %	<u>7</u> 1.8 %	<u>384</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>.00</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.96</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Discount Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>70</u> 35.4 %	<u>125</u> 64.1 %	<u>195</u> 50.8 %
POLICE	<u>29</u> 15.3 %	<u>160</u> 84.7 %	<u>189</u> 49.2 %
TOTAL	<u>98</u> 25.5 %	<u>285</u> 74.2 %	<u>384</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>21.53</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.0</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Merchandise from Store			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>191</u> 98.5 %	<u>3</u> 1.5 %	<u>194</u> 50.7 %
POLICE	<u>185</u> 97.9 %	<u>4</u> 2.1 %	<u>189</u> 49.3 %
TOTAL	<u>376</u> 98.2 %	<u>7</u> 1.8 %	<u>383</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>.00</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.97</u>

ITEM: Free Meal			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>80</u> 41.2 %	<u>114</u> 58.8 %	<u>194</u> 50.8 %
POLICE	<u>50</u> 26.6 %	<u>138</u> 73.4 %	<u>188</u> 49.2 %
TOTAL	<u>130</u> 34.0 %	<u>252</u> 66.0 %	<u>382</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>8.47</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Towing Company			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>182</u> 93.3 %	<u>13</u> 6.7 %	<u>195</u> 50.7 %
POLICE	<u>173</u> 92.0 %	<u>15</u> 8.0 %	<u>188</u> 49.1 %
TOTAL	<u>355</u> 92.7 %	<u>28</u> 7.3 %	<u>383</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>.08</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.76</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: \$10 at Christmas Time			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>98</u> 50.8 %	<u>94</u> 48.7 %	<u>193</u> 50.7 %
POLICE	<u>138</u> 73.4 %	<u>50</u> 26.6 %	<u>188</u> 49.3 %
TOTAL	<u>236</u> 61.9 %	<u>144</u> 37.8 %	<u>381</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>21.16</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>
*	*	*	*
ITEM: Badge or I.D. for Access			
	Report	Not Rep.	
PUBLIC	<u>127</u> 65.8 %	<u>66</u> 34.2 %	<u>193</u> 50.7 %
POLICE	<u>59</u> 31.4 %	<u>129</u> 68.6 %	<u>188</u> 49.3 %
TOTAL	<u>186</u> 48.8 %	<u>195</u> 51.2 %	<u>381</u> 100.0 %
CHI SQUARE	<u>43.70</u>	P(SIG)	<u>.00</u>

ANTI-CORRUPTION MANAGEMENT PROJECT

VOLUME II

POLICE CORRUPTION: A GUIDE TO AGENCY ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

June 1, 1980

by

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VOLUME II

POLICE CORRUPTION: A GUIDE TO AGENCY
ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

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Police Corruption: A Guide to Agency Assessment and Program Development

Introduction

The Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program (PCACP) is a systematic approach to assessing the levels of corruption in a law enforcement agency. It will assist the chief executive in determining 1. whether an agency has a problem in terms of unethical behavior, 2. where in the agency the problem is most prevalent, and 3. how best to correct or control the problem internally. The program emphasizes ways of changing the internal environment of the organization and behavioral change among agency personnel. Initiatives will only be successful under conditions of total commitment by the administration and through decisive leadership. Clear policy statements followed by strong internal affairs efforts are essential.

Chapter I describes the typologies of police corruption developed by the Anti-Corruption Management Program and utilized as a measure of corruption in the PCACP. The Chapter also describes measuring instruments like the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, the Ride-Along Interview and the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire. An in depth discussion of each of these measures is provided in Volume I the Statistical Report. The process of assessing and categorizing the agency in terms of levels of corruption is explained.

Chapter II describes the first two steps of the PCACP which illustrates how each of the instruments are used in making the corruption assessment. A practical guide for auditing and evaluating the agencies internal affairs capability is also provided.

Chapter III describes the final and most important step in the PCACP, the implementation of an Anti-Corruption Program. Recommendations for each step in the planning process are provided and include suggestions for soliciting the support of local community leaders and preparing the public for the proposed changes.

The Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program is the most comprehensive program available to insure planned, internal upgrading of the ethical levels of policing agencies. It provides realistic alternatives to traditional approaches to the problem of police corruption.

Chapter I: The Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program (PCACP)

Based on the personal experiences of the researchers and some preliminary scientific study, it was believed that police corruption varied geographically and that public tolerance regarding it differed among communities based upon their unique social and economic needs. It was also believed that an instrument could be developed that would 1. reliably measure the levels of corrupt behavior in a police agency, 2. allow for comparisons to be made between agencies, and 3. establish categories against which administrators could compare their agencies, of tolerable and intolerable levels of police improbity.

It was also assumed that some well developed and socially accepted forms of corruption or privilege involved personnel in every police agency in the country. For a working definition of corruption, a list of typologies or corruption activities was devised that included at the lowest end of the scale the legendary "free cup of coffee" and at the upper, the criminal act of accepting sums of money from a gambler on a systematic basis to allow him to operate. Each of eight items was a prototype of other forms of corrupt activities often found in the police environment. The significance of each of the prototypes was as follows:

Typology #1: Accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your area.

This activity is used to signify acceptance of any free small item or privilege (newspapers, parking spaces, etc.) on a routine basis. These items involve those for which the public is normally charged a fee and where such privilege is based solely on one's status as a police officer.

Typology #2: Accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your area.

This activity is the prototype for police officer acceptance, at discount, any item or service for which the general public is charged full price when such privilege is bestowed solely on the basis of police officer status.

Typology #3: Accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.

This activity is used to signify police acceptance, at no cost of more significant items or services than those indicated in typology #1. For example, free dry cleaning, cigarettes, drinks, for which the general public normally pays full price, and are bestowed upon police solely on the basis of the police officer status.

1. See McCormack & Burger, Police Corruption Data Analysis & Final Report Chapter, I, History of the Anti-Corruption Management Project.
2

Typology #4 : Using your police badge or ID to gain free access to movie theatres.

This activity is representative of pro-active attempts on the part of officers (usually on off-duty time) to gain access to entertainment and exhibition areas at no cost where the general public is required to pay an admission fee.

Typology #5: Accepting \$10 at Christmas time from businessmen in your patrol area.

This typology signifies accepting any gift or service on a periodic basis (once or twice a year) as a reward or "tip" for performing routine patrol duties. Usually at a level somewhat above that which is ordinarily provided to the general public.

Typology #6: Accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at an accident scene.

This activity typifies situations in which a police officer takes advantage of his official capacity to provide specific preferential treatment to business or professional persons (lawyers, bondsmen, undertakers, etc.) who are not entitled to such service. A gift or fee is expected and received by the officer in connection with such activities.

Typology #7: Discovering an open business at night and removing merchandise for personal use.

This activity typifies situations in which police abuse their public trust to engage in acts of theft and other opportunistic criminal acts (e.g., removing property from a dead human body or injured person, rolling drunks, etc.)

Typology #8: Accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.

This activity is used to signify accepting money, sexual favors, drink, etc. from individuals conducting business outside the legally prescribed rules as established by the community.

The Project research was not focused on measuring police corruption of individual officers but on an aggregate or agency-wide level. There was, therefore, a determination made not to emphasize entrepreneurial or opportunistic types of corruption, regardless of their seriousness, unless they were conspiratorial.

That an officer acting by himself in a low visibility situation committed a corrupt act was not to be viewed as representative of the ethos of a department. Corrupt acts committed in the presence of other officers or with their knowledge are better indicators of the ethical climate of an agency.

Survey Instruments

The major survey instruments used in the measurement phase of the Project were:

- A) The McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, the first and most reliable of the instruments, is based on the theory of Guttman Scaling, which maintains that if respondents are given a series of three or more activities related in some way to a variable under consideration (in this case, corrupt behavior) some of the activities may prove to be "harder" indicators of that variable than others. If, after being tested among several groups, an order or scale of "hardness" among items emerges that has a coefficient of reproducibility of 90 percent or over (in 90 cases of 100, the activities will be listed in the same order), it constitutes a Guttman scale for that sample of respondents, and they may be rated or scored in relation to it.

Based on this theory the Project questionnaire listed the eight improbable typologies which the researchers felt would be understandable to police officers throughout the country. The activities were listed randomly as follows:

1. Diff. Easy a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your area.
2. Diff. Easy b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
3. Diff. Easy c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.
4. Diff. Easy d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes.
5. Diff. Easy e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
6. Diff. Easy f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman in your patrol area.
7. Diff. Easy g. discovering an open business establishment at night and removing merchandise for personal use.
8. Diff. Easy h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre.

Questionnaires were administered in six police agencies over a 12 month period in 1975 and 1976. Eight additional agencies were surveyed during Phase II of the Project in 1978-79. Samples ranged between 50 and 150 officers depending on department size. A total of approximately 1900 officers participated in Phase I and II. Respondents were asked if in terms of their own standards of honesty, it would be difficult or easy for them as police officers to justify eight listed activities. In each case they were to circle "difficult" or "easy" on the questionnaire. The random order of the items was reordered by the respondents according to the level of seriousness they attached to each activity. For example, 95 percent of the respondents in a department might consider accepting a free cup of coffee as being easy to justify as opposed to only 40 percent who might be able to justify taking a \$10 gift at Christmas time. In each of the departments surveyed, the reordering of the eight items was the same. The results-- the 1. activity easiest to justify and the 8. activity the most difficult--are as follows:

1. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
2. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
3. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner in your patrol area.
4. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre.
5. accepting \$10 at Christmas time from a business man in your patrol area.
6. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes.
7. discovering an open business establishment at night and removing merchandise for personal use.
8. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate.

Although the reordering of the individual activities was similar in each of the agencies surveyed, the mean number of respondents who selected one or more items as being easy to justify varied. Using the total survey population within a department, a score for the agency was determined. If the score for a department was 1.20, it indicated that the respondents would easily justify accepting a free cup of coffee (activity 1), but found some difficulty accepting a discounted meal (activity 2). A score of 3.40 would indicate that accepting free meals (activity 3) was easy for most officers in that department to justify and

(2) Measuring Police Corruption, Janet E. Fishman p. 22.

that some did not find it difficult to use their police badge for free access to a movie theatre (activity 4). The reordered items became the first McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale.

The second McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale used the same eight activities and asked the respondents to indicate for which activities they would be disciplined.

The reordering of the items in Scale II was similar to the reordering in Scale I, and the mean score by department for each scale, although not exactly the same, was similar for Scale I and II. Departments that had a higher improbity reading (a high reading indicates less ethics) in terms of their own standards of honesty (Scale I) also scored a high reading on the disciplinary Scale II (the higher the reading, the higher tolerance of unethical behavior by supervisors).

A third McCormack/Fishman Scale was developed later in Phase I of the Project to determine at what level of observed impropus behavior one police officer would report his peers. The same eight activities were used, and respondents were asked to indicate if they would report a fellow officer whom they observed engaging in them. The data indicate that even in the police departments registering low levels of unethical activities, the tendency among officers not to report corrupt behavior on the part of their peers is high.

The initial assumptions regarding the ability of the questionnaire to measure levels of police corruption were based on the success in Phase I of the Project in which the questionnaire discriminated between corrupt and non-corrupt departments.³ Additional testing during Phase II established the reliability of the instrument.

Before Phase II of the Project began, it was felt that additional data should be generated through independent tests and oral interviews to support or refute the McCormack/Fishmen data. The original McCormack/Fishmen Improbability Questionnaire was changed several times during Phase I of the Project and was substantially changed at the beginning of Phase II. However, the three scales have remained essentially intact since they were developed in 1975-76.

B) Structured Ride-Along Interviews

The second major corruption measure was developed from a series of structured Ride-Along Interviews conducted by the Project in each department. Twenty randomly selected officers were interviewed for a period of one hour and were asked questions related to the McCormack/Fishmen Questionnaire items. They were promised anonymity and were interviewed in the privacy of their vehicles while on patrol. All of the 160 interviews were conducted by two interviewers and that all were recorded in written notes by a single research associate who, with the approval of the patrol officer, rode in the back seat of the patrol vehicle. Further discussion of this procedure is provided in Chapter II of this volume.

(3) *ibid*, p. 12

C) Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire

The final measuring instrument utilized in the PCACP is the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire. This open-ended questionnaire is an adaptation of a similar survey instrument developed by the New York City Police Department. It was developed to fix responsibility for corrupt activities at an appropriate subordinate level of command. Middle management level commanders were asked to identify corruption hazards in their commands. They were also requested to signify how the corruption hazards manifested themselves and what plans commanders had to address such conditions. The instrument supported data generated as a result of the administration of the McCormack/Fishmen Improbability Questionnaire and the Ride-Along Interviews. Further discussion of the Questionnaire is provided in the next Chapter.

Developing Corruption Categories

The validity of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire in distinguishing between corrupt and non-corrupt departments showed that: All three forms of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale (The Personal Standards of Honesty Scale, the Discipline Scale and the Report Scale) significantly discriminate between corrupt and non-corrupt departments.⁴

The validity was demonstrated in Phase II, using data collected in eight major city police agencies. Project researchers also established ranges of police corruption based on A Posteriori Contrast Testing procedures.⁵ The eight agencies were categorized according to the statistically significant differences that existed between them. Based on these differences they were placed in one of the following four categories:

- (1) Low-level corruption
- (2) Low-level medium corruption
- (3) Medium high-level corruption
- (4) High-level corruption

Using data generated by the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, administrators may compare their agency scores with those of other agencies which have participated in the program to date. Depending on the results of these procedures, the administrator may select the appropriate option below:

Category #1: Low-level Improbability Range

Departments in this category have no need to continue with the Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program (PCACP) at this time. Agency personnel should be made aware of their integrity rating and encouraged to continue their efforts. Surveys should be planned on a periodic basis to assure continuity of integrity.

(4) ibid, p. 20

(5) McCormack & Burger, Police Corruption: Data Analysis and Final Report p. 116 b, c.

Category #2: Low Medium Range

Integrity ratings in this range are indicative of policing environments generally not supportive of corruption. Individual members or small groups of officers may be involved in low-level improbity, and the administrator may wish to have his Internal Affairs Unit monitor them carefully. Certainly it would be appropriate for top level management to reaffirm the agency's integrity policies and encourage officers who witness corrupt acts to report them. Periodic reevaluation should be planned.

Category #3: Mid-High Range

Category 3 is a critical one in terms of the levels of commitment to corruption within an agency. Departments can expect to find that a considerable number of officers are involved in low-level corrupt practices like accepting gratuities, free meals, entertainment. They may take advantage of more serious corruption opportunities on occasion. One can expect to find some serious conspiratorial types of corruption. The public may be vaguely aware of a corruption problem but is generally not supportive of these activities. The closer the agency is to the range of category 2, the more effective a reaffirmation of the agency's integrity policies will be. However, agencies in category 3 should increase their efforts in the area of pro-active internal affairs investigations. Administrators should hold their subordinate supervisors strictly accountable for the integrity of their officers and take appropriate disciplinary action. Agencies in this range should utilize procedures indicated in Steps I and II of the Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program in Chapter II of this volume.

Category #4: High-level Range

Agencies in this category are perhaps as unusual as those found in category 1 and are generally characterized by a historical tolerance for municipal and police corruption. In many instances, the economy of the community is closely tied to the selective compliance with and enforcement of local laws. Local residents articulate a dual standard for police in that they are tolerant of high-levels of crime, vice, and ordinance violations in certain areas of the city, and yet make demands for quality service in the rest of the community. Administrators must make every effort to minimize police collusion in corrupt practices with firm leadership, personal example, and internal diligence. Integrity policies should be reaffirmed, supervisors should be held strictly accountable for their subordinates actions, and planned pro-active internal affairs initiatives should be established. A corruption free police department is difficult to maintain in a corrupt local environment, and consequently, it may be necessary to act against accepted, unlawful community standards. To effectively commit the department to such a course of action, the police "house" must be in order. Category 4 agencies should avail themselves of procedures in Steps II and II of PCACP.

Chapter II: Administration of the Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program (PCACP), Steps I and II

The Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program is a multi-step process designed 1. to assess the levels of corruption in law enforcement agencies, 2. to determine the causes of corruption and how it is manifested in specific environments, and 3. where necessary to implement a well developed anti-corruption program to address corruption.

An important feature of the assessment program is that its administration can be controlled and supervised by the administering agency. Consequently, the assessment program becomes an internal auditing tool to assist top level management. It can be used by the administration so that it does not coincide with labor contract negotiations, vacation months, or other crucial periods. Data analysis and reporting may be an in-house responsibility and the results can be as confidential or as public as the administration sees fit. However, total self-administration is not advisable. To assure that respondents will forthrightly answer questions, an independent consultant firm, preferably one with researchers who have several years of law enforcement experience, should be hired to administer questionnaires and conduct interviews. The expense of hiring such a firm will be minimal because data collection for this aspect of the survey involves approximately one week.

The PCACP is administered in three sequential steps. Steps I and II are discussed in this chapter and the final step, the development and implementation of an anti-corruption program, is addressed in Chapter III of this volume.

Step I:

- a) The administration of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire.
- b) Conducting Ride-Along Interviews with randomly selected officers.
- c) An analysis of data from a) and b).
- d) A determination of agency corruption status.

Step II:

- a) The administration of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire to identify corruption prone areas.
- b) Directing a survey of Internal Affairs to determine the nature and volume of citizen complaints, the number of pro-active investigations, and the level of peer reporting.
- c) An analysis of data from a) and b).

Step III:

- a) The development and implementation of a well planned anti-corruption program based on guidelines provided in Chapter III.

Step I

Agency corruption assessment should be conducted periodically to assure that the internal working environment is ethically sound. Assessment begins with the administration of the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for a complete version of the questionnaire) to a random sample of officers at roll calls, specialized unit masters, and at one-site location where administrative and specialized unit personnel tend to gather. Information from questionnaires will be utilized to establish the agency's corruption category. Simultaneously, a series of at least 20 one-hour Ride-Along Interviews are conducted with randomly selected officers. The specific number of interviews to be conducted will be determined statistically with reference to agency size and the degree of specialization and decentralization. The interviews are to be conducted according to the methodology developed during the field testing of this procedure including random selection of officers, a promise of anonymity, the development of rapport and completion of a structured check list containing the items listed in the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire. 6 These interviews should be conducted with individuals privately. The research team should consist of one person to conduct the interview and another to record it in writing.

Data from the Ride-Along Interview in field surveys supported and gave added dimension to data gathered through questionnaires. When differences existed in the two data sets, less corruption generally was being measured in the questionnaire data. 7 Candidate for the Ride-Along Interviews were selected randomly from among department members who had been administered the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire, because candidates for interviews were aware of the general nature of the survey, and had already given some thought to corruption.

(6) McCormack & Burger, Police Corruption: Data Analysis & Final Report, Chapter III, Police Officer Ride-Along Interviews.

(7) The research staff are convinced that the differences are explainable partially in terms of the differences in the testing environments employed in the two techniques. For example, the questionnaire administration was conducted at roll-calls, muster and other agency locations just prior to "turn outs" in order to maximize the number of respondents. There was only a few minutes allocated to explaining the purpose of the survey, explaining their confidential nature (no identification required on the questionnaire and no one in the agency would see the questionnaire once collected), and developing a fundamental rapport (the research team consisted of two former police officers with a combined total of 50 years policing experience). Additionally, it was impossible to provide respondents with privacy during completion of the questionnaire since most of the administrations were conducted in classroom type settings. In contrast with this arrangement, the Ride-Along Interviews were conducted in the privacy of the officers assigned vehicle, and only one officer was interviewed at a time

Approximately fifteen minutes of the allotted one hour interview was used to establish a rapport with the officer. Once rapport was established, the officer was told the nature of the interview. It was explained that the purpose of the interview was to obtain a more in depth knowledge of the ethical climate of the agency than could perhaps be acquired by means of the questionnaire administration. The researchers indicated that they were not interested in assessing the officer's personal standards of honesty, but rather the types of improbis activities that were accepted and practiced by department members as a group. The officer was then specifically asked about each of the eight items on the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Scale. (See Chapter IV of the Statistical Report for additional information.)

The data analysis in connection with Step I of the Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program is a relatively simple procedure which can be facilitated by the application of the techniques of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The current availability of both computer access and technical knowledge of this techniques makes this procedure practical for many smaller agencies. The research consulting firm should code the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaires according to directions in the code book in Appendix 2. Data from the questionnaires should be key punched and entered into the system with the appropriate instructions (SPSS cards).

Step II

Departments utilizing Step II of the PCACP are those that have been classified in corruption categories 3 or 4. It is imperative that all subordinate commanders are forcefully reminded of their responsibility to uncover and correct corruption hazards in their commands. They should be specifically questioned about these conditions. The major goals of Step II are 1. to determine the extent to which commanders are are aware of the corruption problems in their area of responsibility, 2. to raise the level of concern about the problem among agency commanders, 3. to affirm or reaffirm the agency's policy of fixing responsibility for properly supervising subordinates, and 4. to assess closely the quality and volume of information about corruption being forwarded by the Internal Affairs Unit.

The first three objectives are accomplished by means of a survey of all command level officers in an agency. In large metropolitan police agencies, a survey may involve considerable work for officers in charge. However, the analysis of these survey forms will provide valuable insight into the scope and nature of the corruption problem and will provide the initiatives of commanders to correct them. Figure I-IV are suggested for the administration of the open-ended questionnaire.

Upon receipt of the responses to the questionnaire, a content analysis should be conducted to determine the most frequently cited corruption hazards and the most promising suggestions for addressing them. Comparisons should be made between the content of this data and the responses to the McCormack/Fishman Improbability Questionnaire and the Ride-Along Interviews. Conditions mentioned in the Step I surveys, not mentioned in the Commander's Corrup-

tion Hazard Questionnaires, indicate that perhaps commanders were unaware of situations or refrained for some reason from including them. In any event, an investigation should be conducted by Internal Affairs to determine if corrupt conditions exist in those commands. The content analysis of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaire should result in a series of "corruption specific" plans for the agency. These should coincide with a well developed anti-corruption program as outlined in Step III.

The fourth goal of Step II is to assess the value of information being forwarded to the Chief of the Internal Affairs Unit of the department.

Detailed procedures and civilian complaint forms do not necessarily mean that a good information system is in operation. In one department of approximately 400 men, the agency had developed citizen complaint procedures which included such classifications as Class A complaints and Class B complaints. Formal procedures were prescribed for recording and investigating each type of citizen complaint, and forms were provided to subordinate commands. The Internal Affairs staff of this medium sized agency was comprised of a lieutenant, two sergeants and two detectives; the size of that staff signifies the concern of the chief with the seriousness of corruption problems. During interviews with agency staff, they were asked if any pro-active investigations had ever been conducted. Their answer was "No, but the chief has a memo covering Christmas gratuities every year that is read at all roll calls."

Although this department used typical internal affairs procedures, both in size and dedication of its personnel, it had one of the better Internal Affairs Units that Project researchers observed. Field notes indicate that "the personal integrity of the (I. A. D.) personnel seemed to be high as was the willingness to work. Complaint information, however, is not being properly handled at the first and second levels of supervision. A stronger pro-active program is necessary before the problem of corruption is resolved in this department."

The Internal Affairs Unit records in each agency were made available to Project researchers. Many common corrupt activities were apparently not recorded. In the previously mentioned department, only very serious complaints received thorough investigation; these generally involved allegations of outright criminal activity. The following statistics for this department were provided.

Date of Arrest	Criminal Charges	Department Action	Court Action
1975	*False complaint to police - making false statement (off duty)	Allowed to resign	Accelerated Rehab.
	Assault III (off duty)	Reinstated	Charges Dismissed
	Larceny IV (off duty)	Dismissed	Accelerated Rehab

Arrest	Criminal Charges	Department Action	Court Action
1975	Larceny IV (on duty)	Allowed to resign	Fined
1976	Assault (off duty)	Allowed to resign	Accelerated Rehab.
	Narcotics violation (off duty)	Dismissed	Fined
	Larceny (extortion) (off duty)	Allowed to resign	Accelerated Rehab.
	Robbery (several counts) (off duty)	Allowed to resign	Prison term
1977	Narcotics violation (off duty)	Termination of Probation	Pending
	Larceny (shoplifting) (off duty)	Allowed to resign	Fined
	*Making false statement to police (on duty)	Allowed to resign	Accelerated Rehab.
	Assault (on duty)	Written Reprimand	Not guilty
	Assault (on duty)	Written Reprimand	Not guilty
1978	Larceny IV	Pending	Pending
	Rape (off duty)	Pending	Pending

* Civilian employees.

No recorded complaints were found regarding officers involved in traffic ticket fixing, collusion with gambler or extorting free meals, yet all these activities were confirmed to exist on a regular basis during the Ride-Along Interviews. The Project staff became convinced that the previously reported criminal activity by officers could not exist without systemic low-level improbity involving other officers and probable wide-spread criminal activity.

One departments surveyed had a reputation for being an "open city," historically engaged in gambling, prostitution, and pornography. During "Ride-Along Interviews" and interviews with other department perscanal and civilians, it became clear that a high level of "grass-eating" and "meat-eating" corruption existed among the department officers. 3 In several

3 Commission Report, Knapp Commission to Investigate allegations of Police Corruption: 1973

cases, obviously corrupt activities were so socially accepted by the public and the police that they were not viewed as corrupt. It was conclusively felt that the commander of the Internal Affairs Unit and his officers were of the highest integrity and had the highest degree of integrity as a group within the agency. One way their integrity was maintained was by discouraging members of the unit from conducting proactive investigations in the "red light" district of the city. It was in this area that Project researchers observed uniformed police officers in twos and threes frequenting one of the section's largest brothels for food and drinks. Fortunately for the agency, a new administration intent on correcting corruption problems had made some significant progress in changing the internal environment. It remains to be seen whether the historical and social climate of the city presents a more formidable barrier to the eradication of police corruption than the determination of the new administration to eliminate it.

Administrators who recognize that corruption problems in their departments are out of control and ignore them hope also that a major scandal about police corruption does not occur. In many cases, unsincere efforts or "window dressing" is used to reduce the possibility of scandal and the firing of the agency chief. When situations create the illusion of administrative concern with corruption without the necessity to deal with those situations forthrightly, a chief and his agency are in serious trouble.

Internal Affairs Audit

As a result of personal experience and on-site interviews with I. A. D. personnel, an evaluation and auditing tool has been developed for law enforcement administrators:

1. Is there an on-going program to advise the public of the procedures for recording complaints against police, i. e., media coverage in press, radio and /or TV; special telephone number; post office box confidentiality assured?

0	/	10
No media coverage last 12 months		on-going project involving all of above

2. Are there procedures on a decentralized level to assure that complaints are forwarded, i. e., I. A. D. forms, serial numbers, forwarding procedures?

0	/	10
No such forms forwarded in previous 12 months		forms frequently forwarded to I. A. D. for investigation

3. Is there a special Internal Affairs Unit or officer to follow up on charges of police corruption? (Departments of 50 or more sworn personnel)

0	/	10
No one specifically assigned		Special unit officer

4. Other than investigating charges of brutality, misfeasance or corruption, does this unit perform any other functions?

0 / 10
 More than 50% of time on other assignments 100% of time spent on above

5. How many reports of police corruption have been reported to I. A. D. in the previous year (a) directly from civilians, (b) from subordinate commands?

0 / 10
 None from (a) or (b) Several from (a) or (b)

6. How many pro-active (self initiated) investigations have been undertaken by Internal Affairs during the previous 12 months?

0 / 10
 None Several/many (depending on agency size)

7. How many fines, suspensions, dismissals, etc., for corrupt activities have taken place as a result of I. A. D. investigations during the previous 12 months?

0 / 10
 None Several/many (depending on agency size)

8. Are there procedures in effect to keep complainants advised of progress in their cases?

0 / 10
 No formal procedure Notification after 24/48 hours

9. To what degree are Internal Affairs personnel aware of the corruption conditions in the agency? (Compare I. A. D. Corruption Hazard Profile with content analysis of department as a whole.)

0 / 10
 Completely out of touch Full awareness of true conditions

10. To what degree do members of the department feel free to report the corrupt activities of their peers? (Based upon the number of such complaints in the past 12 months.)

0 / 10
 No such complaints filed Several complaints filed against peers

There is no overall score for the ten-item audit. Each item contributes to the success of the agencies I. A. D. program, and each item must be evaluated and

strengthened individually if credibility of the system is to be established. Plans to revitalize each item should be developed as a prerequisite for the implementation of the agency's anti-corruption program (Step III), especially when corruption in city government is an historically accepted fact. The elimination of corruption in a police agency that exists in a corrupt city environment must, of necessity, be a gradual process. The anti-corruption efforts of the agency must be seen as being reasonable and consistent, with appropriate warning of impending policy changes. A strong reliable internal affairs capability will be necessary to monitor and provide feedback on the impact of an anti-corruption program's initiatives. A prudent administrator will monitor both internal and external reactions to his efforts because the public will be effected directly by them.

Chapter III: Developing and Implementing an Agency Anti-Corruption Program

Step III of the Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program (PCACP) concentrates on the development and implementation of an anti-corruption program based on standards established in An Anti-Corruption Manual for Administrators in Law Enforcement. (Ward and McCormack, 1979) Because that material was written during Phase I of the Project, before data analysis had been completed, many questions regarding the nature of corruption and police attitudes towards it were simply raised as considerations for anti-corruption planners. On the basis of subsequent research, some of these questions have been answered. Phase II of the Project addressed the nature of police corruption in some depth and concluded that its causes are related to at least three major variables: community opportunity, chances of detection, and internal department discipline.

Questions about police attitudes towards corruption and the development of an appropriate operational definition were addressed in research after the Anti-Corruption Management Program. Analysis of these data makes it clear that American police officers do not generally view activities subsumed within the first five typologies as being seriously corrupt. Ride-Along Interviews across agencies indicate that 96 percent of the officers stated that accepting free coffee (typology #1) was an accepted daily practice in their departments. (see Volume I for data regarding Ride-Along Interviews). Eighty-five percent indicated that the same applied to the acceptance of discounted meals. (typology #2) According to 53 percent of the interviewees, free meals (typology #3) was a commonly accepted practice, and 49 percent and 47 percent respectively indicated that using a police identification to gain access to a theatre (typology #4) and accepting gratuities (typology #5) were common. There is a noticeable decrease in these percentages at the level of typology #6, accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment; typology #7, removing merchandise from an open business, and typology #8, accepting money on a systematic basis from a gambler to allow him to operate. In at least three departments removing merchandise from an open business was indicated to be almost as common as accepting Christmas gratuities.

To establish a working definition of police corruption that would have applicability in most American law enforcement agencies, the Project conducted a national survey of Internal Affairs Procedures. Over 500 police agencies with 50 or more sworn officers were contacted and asked to choose from among 14 of the most commonly cited definitions of police corruption the one which most aptly described their agency's definition.

The following definition from the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals was selected by most respondents as being closest to their own:

... Police corruption consists of acts which involve the misuse of police authority for the police employee's personal gain; activity of the police employee which compromises, or has the potential to compromise, his ability to enforce the law or provide other service impartially; the protection of illicit activities from police enforcement, whether or not the police employee receives something of value in return; the police employee's involvement in promoting the business of one person while discouraging that of another person. (1973: 473)

Police administrators differ about the seriousness of low-level improbity and the efficacy in terms of department morale of purging an agency of these practices. The Knapp Commission and many outstanding law enforcement officials view minor improbity as the precursor of major corruption problems. Other equally able administrators tolerate low-level view and improbity as the benign historical "privilege" of the profession. Generally, these administrators are from medium sized agencies and have an intuitive sense of the ethical standards of their personnel; usually, they have not experienced a major corruption scandal.

For administrators embarking on Step III of the PCACP, the problem of police corruption is a reality that an agency has already determined it will face and eliminate. The initial commitment of an agency is important. What follows is the development of a comprehensive plan that will effectively eliminate corruption without subverting the day to day operations of the agency. Changing the internal and external working environment of a police system is a major undertaking, and plan for achieving it should be executed in stages that permit department personnel and the public to make appropriate adjustments.

Define Corruption

The first step in the development of an anti-corruption plan is to establish a clear definition of the term. It is recommended that the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals' definition be used as a policy guideline and that all activities represented by the police corruption typologies be expressly prohibited. Plans to establish an ethics board should be made. The board would

receive requests for rulings on questions of ethics and extenuating circumstances. The board's rulings will firmly establish an objective set of standards which will not be predicated on political or community values but on established professional principles.

Determine the Nature of Corruption

When data from Steps I and II has been analyzed, planning for the implementation of the anti-corruption program should be established. The group should be representative of all levels of the agency. They should be briefed regarding the administrators concern about corruption, the results of the PCACP survey, and planning steps taken. The administrator should meet frequently with the group, and a task force director should be designated to coordinate the group's activities. The task force should begin to analyze the existing anticorruption procedures within the agency, including current and past memos, general orders and policy statement, past disciplinary fines, suspensions, terminations, and the current effectiveness of internal affairs as indicated by the Internal Affairs Audit (see Chapter II). The group should also review the content analysis of the Commander's Corruption Hazard Profile Questionnaire and begin to outline "corruption specific" procedures to address the various hazards identified. A complete picture of the nature and scope of police corruption should be developed.

The following activities should have been accomplished:

- 1) A satisfactory operational definition of police corruption accepted by the chief administrator.
- 2) The selection of an Anti-Corruption Task Force to plan and implement the program should be completed.
- 3) A preliminary review of current and past anti-corruption tactics and procedures, and an analysis of agency corruption hazards as indicated by the Commander's Corruption Hazard Questionnaires should be underway.
- 4) Plans for the development of an ethics board should be assigned to a committee for the task force.

Each of these steps are preliminary to program development and are designed primarily to acquaint the Anti-Corruption Task Force, including the chief, with the nature and scope of the corruption problem. These steps will also focus the attention of the task force on some of the difficulties to be faced in implementing the program.

Obtaining Commitments from Authorities

Because the chief of police or commissioner has the prime responsibility

For the external relations of the department, he should seek commitments from local officials regarding his anti-corruption efforts. He should meet with the mayor, board of commissioners, town council and other municipal agencies with information on the extent of the problem in the agency.

For the administrator of an agency in corruption categories 3 or 4, there may be a hidden agenda at some of these meetings. To the extent that community corruption opportunity is generally a function of municipal government and community tolerance, the anti-corruption efforts of the police department may be viewed as threatening. Fortunately, others will be supportive of planned changes, and their advice and perhaps participation should be sought during the planning and implementation stages. By carefully assessing the level of commitment of supporters and protagonists, an administrator can gauge the degree of external pressure his reforms will create and will be able to determine realistically the pace at which the program may proceed.

Development of An Anti-Corruption Policy

Anti-corruption policy must be characterized by clarity, fairness, and consistency. The policy should have a general framework or definition and a range of prevalent, corrupt activities which the administration is attempting to eliminate.

Meetings to disseminate policy should be conducted at every level of the agency. Responsibility for the corrupt acts of subordinates must be forcefully fixed at each level of command, and it should be clearly stated that a commander's anti-corruption efforts will be evaluated periodically to determine continuity of assignment and promotion.

A written copy of the anti-corruption policy should be made available to each member of the department. Officers should be encouraged to discuss the policy with their immediate supervisors and to confer with the ethics board on issues which are unclear. Decisions of the ethics board should be published periodically because they may have application to questions of other members of the department.

Designing the Anti-Corruption Program

The Anti-corruption Task Force should meet and report on its preliminary anti-corruption assignments. It should prepare to design a system-wide program for implementation. The administrator's already-announced policies will provide the task force with a framework to guide their efforts. This stage should begin with a restructuring, if necessary, of the Internal Affairs Unit of the department. This unit must function properly because, in addition to providing pro-active anti-corruption capability, it should be providing control information to the task force director and the chief regarding the effectiveness of the new procedures.

As the program to address each of the corruption specific areas is beginning to function, a decentralized internal affairs capability should be established to assist subordinate commanders. The role of the staff often becomes obscured by the inspections necessitated by anti-corruption efforts, and cover-ups and restricted communications can result within the agency. Consequently personnel should be provided within subordinate commands specifically to act as Internal Affairs officers or commanders authorized to utilize a member of their existing staff for internal affairs purposes. Once the capability for monitoring corruption is established, accountability for conditions can be exacted.

In addition to a restructured internal affairs capability, the program design should include:

1. improved procedures for handling civilian complaints.
2. a media program to inform the public of the new initiatives. A press conference should be planned in which the purpose of the anti-corruption program is explained and the events that prompted implementation are discussed. The conference should be as frank and open as the circumstances allow, although there may be legal or humanitarian reasons for withholding certain information.
3. new written orders for internal distribution, outlining the purposes of the new policies, proposals for carrying out the policies, and the proposed sanctions attached to violation.
4. specifics regarding decentralized responsibility and accountability for corrupt practices, and the re-organization and decentralization of Internal Affairs.
5. the role of re-training as a form of positive discipline when violations are not criminal in nature and when the use of probation as an alternative to termination seems appropriate.
6. a proposed agency response to the external pressure from citizens and businessmen who may be adversely affected by the plan.
7. a program to encourage and support officers who report the corrupt acts of their peers.

Implementating the Plan

The plan should be implemented on a specific date, but retroactive enforcement of its provisions--except in extraordinary cases--should be avoided. Support should be solicited from police union and fraternal groups, and a sustained effort should be made by subordinate commanders to elicit the support of the officers by explaining the positive aspects of the program like a new image for the police, greater respect from the public, and the possibility to salary increases.

The chief should continually indicate his support for the anti-corruption program and take swift action against all commanders and supervisors who do not support the program. It is imperative, practically at the outset of the program, the decisive action to be taken against violators because the creditability of both the administration on the progress of the program.

Anti-Corruption Training

The Anti-Corruption Task Force should meet with police academy personnel early in program planning to determine the role of this unit. Traditional training methods in police ethics have not proven effective in changing officers behavioral responses to corruption. Project researchers felt that current Ethical Awareness Workshop training has not met with better success. 1

If levels of corruption within an agency have been identified in Steps I and II of PCACP as being in the medium-high or high level, anti-corruption training should be used to inform officers that these levels of corruption are not acceptable to the department. Based on data developed by the Project, the most effective method of achieving the desired behavioral change is--to use a current vernacular phase--"to tell it like it is." Straight forward discussions with small groups of officers should be scheduled. The department's awareness of specific types prevalent violations should be the major topic of consideration. It should be pointed out that much of the information under discussion was gathered from the commander's corruption hazard questionnaires and that

1

During a period of several years after the Knapp Commission scandal in New York in the early 1970's, the New York City Police Department mandated that each of its 30,000+ officers attend a three day Ethical Awareness Training Program at a cost of 90,000 man/days or over \$10,000,000. There never was an evaluation of this costly program. How much of the post-Knapp improvement can be attributed to quality leadership, administrative reform, tighter discipline or training, no one knows. We are inclined to believe that training had the least impact. Project data indicates that "given exceptionally high opportunity for corruption, lack of administrative controls, poor morale, and generally questionable leadership... corruption exists no matter how morally mature the individual morality of its experienced officers and recruits."

no officers are specifically being accused of committing violations. The department's new procedures regarding the enforcement of regulations and laws or corruption should be discussed in detail, particularly the department's efforts to reorganize internal affairs and to hold subordinate commanders accountable for corruption in their commands. The department's policy statement regarding corruption should be discussed, and each of the specifically prohibited activities should be reviewed along with the possible penalties for violations. The entire session should be conducted in an adult, dispassionate atmosphere with no recriminations, the fact that, except in extraordinary cases, retroactive enforcement of the regulations will not be taken should be made clear. The session should close on a realistic note that what is being done is absolutely necessary and in the best interests of the community, the department, and the officers themselves.

Positive Discipline: A New Approach to Behavioral Change

Anti-Corruption Task Force personnel should investigate private industry's initiatives into the areas of positive discipline. In Department D information was acquired about Positive Discipline, a technique borrowed from private industry and rather unique and innovative police work. Generally, Positive Discipline is a substitute for an individual employee's self discipline and results in desired behavioral change. If the training is not successful, the agency has a documented step-by-step record of its efforts to rehabilitate and retain the errant officer. Should it be necessary to dismiss an officer, dismissal will have no motive of retribution attached to it; dismissal will be done for the good of the agency only after all other options have been exhausted.

In the Department D, the training called Discipline Without Punishment. The following are the procedures for the implementation of the program.

Policy Statement

No disciplinary letters or reprimands, suspensions, demotions, dismissal from service, or other forms of punishment will henceforth be applied. In the case of unsatisfactory work performance, the following procedures will be followed.

Procedure I - In the case of a sustained citizen's or administrative complaint, the employee's immediate supervisor shall counsel the employee in a casual and friendly manner. This counseling should be noted on the case record.

Procedure II - Should another sustained incident arise within four to six weeks of Procedure I, the supervisor will again have a serious but friendly counseling session with the employee. The supervisor will explain the need for and purpose of the rule(s); make sure the employee understands the explanation; and express his confidence that the employee will henceforth decide to abide by them. The supervisor will solicit an explanation for the deviant behavior from the employee. If he receives an explanation from the employee, he will file this information, the employee will read it and then place this information with the completed case record.

Procedure III - Should another sustained incident occur within six to eight weeks, step II is repeated with some variation; first, the employee's commanding

officer is also present at the counseling session; secondly, the employee's attention is directed to the possibility that he may dislike the work the department has to offer or he may find that the strict self-discipline required by police work distasteful. In such case, would it not be better to look for some other job or line of work? (Vocational counseling should be made available through the Personnel Office.) The commanding officer then expresses his hope that the employee will, in fact, decide that he likes the work and the department and will adapt himself to the requirements. This conversation is confirmed in a letter to the employee and a copy is attached to the case.

Procedure 1V - Should another sustained incident occur within eight to ten weeks of Procedure III, the employee is requested to attend a meeting in his bureau chief's office with his commanding officer and supervisor attending. He is directed to go home for the rest of that work day and consider seriously whether he does or does not wish to abide by the department's standards. The employee is informed that he will receive full pay for that shift as a last expression of the department's hope that he will wish to remain and abide by the rules. The employee is also told that another occurrence within a reasonable time will regretfully lead to his dismissal. The employee is also informed to report to his bureau chief on his next working day, prepared to articulate his commitment to the department. This information shall be filed with the completed case.

- A. If another incident should occur within a reasonable time, the employee's services are terminated.
- B. In the case of several incidents happening within unusually close intervals, Steps II and III may be skipped.
- C. In the case of a serious infraction, Steps I, II and III may be skipped.
- D. In the case of totally unacceptable behavior, dismissal results with no preliminary steps. Such behavior should be taken as conclusive evidence of the lack of adequate self-respect and discipline even if it happens only once.

The Police Corruption Assessment and Control Program (PCACP) should be implemented after careful planning and preparation. If successful, the program will affect the lives of the offices of the agency as well as community residents. It has the potential for changing an undisciplined self-serving agency of social control into a professional community service organization. The effort is worth it, for without integrity law enforcement is a negative factor in society.

APPENDIX # 1

THE McCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

Criminal Justice Center

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

1. Please assume that all references to the "police department" or "police officers" refer to your local department and its officers unless otherwise specified.
2. Please assume that all references to the public refer to residents of your area.
3. In order to assure anonymity please DO NOT sign your name or identify yourself in any way upon completion of this questionnaire.

In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify:

Please circle one

- | | | |
|----------|------|--|
| a. diff. | easy | a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. |
| b. diff. | easy | b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. |
| c. diff. | easy | c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basic to allow a gambler to operate. |
| d. diff. | easy | d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. |
| e. diff. | easy | e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. |
| f. diff. | easy | f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. |
| g. diff. | easy | g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. |
| h. diff. | easy | h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. |

If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed below which would you be disciplined for?

Please circle one

- | | | |
|----------|-----|--|
| a. disc. | not | a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. |
| b. disc. | not | b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. |
| c. disc. | not | c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. |
| d. disc. | not | d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. |
| e. disc. | not | e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. |
| f. disc. | not | f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. |
| g. disc. | not | g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. |
| h. disc. | not | h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. |

I would report a fellow officer who I observed engaging in the following activities:

- Please circle one
- | | | |
|--|-----|----|
| a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. | Yes | No |
| b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. | Yes | No |
| c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. | Yes | No |
| d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. | Yes | No |
| e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. | Yes | No |
| f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. | Yes | No |
| g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. | Yes | No |
| h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. | Yes | No |

Age _____

Sex _____

Race _____

Last Grade of School Completed. _____

Marital Status. _____

Years in the Department. _____

Present Assignment (Patrol, Detective, etc.) _____

Is Present Assignment a Field Assignment or Staff? _____

Base Salary. _____

APPENDIX # 2
CODE BOOK FOR THE McCORMACK/FISHMAN IMPROBITY
QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS AND PRACTICES

Criminal Justice Center

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions

1. Please assume that all references to the "police department" or "police officers" refer to your local department and its officers unless otherwise specified.
2. Please assume that all references to the public refer to residents of your area.
3. In order to assure anonymity please DO NOT sign your name or identify yourself in any way upon completion of this questionnaire.

1. The public has a right to expect police officers to give up their off duty time more than they would expect the average citizen to (1)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

2. The public has a right to expect police officers to have higher ethical standards than themselves. (2)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

3. The public has a right to expect the police to refrain from going on strike. (3)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

4. The public has a right to expect the police to use extraordinary restraint in police/citizen encounters. (4)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

5. The public has a right to be very critical of police errors in judgment. (5)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

6. The public has a right to expect police officers to have at least some college education prior to being employed. (6)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

7. The public has a right to expect the police to view their public service role as being as important as their role as law enforcers. (7)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

8. The public has a right to expect the police to continually upgrade their skills through training and higher education. (8)

Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree

9. In terms of your own personal standards of honesty, would it be difficult or easy for you, as a police officer, to justify:

Please circle one

- a. diff. easy a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. (9)
- b. diff. easy b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. (10)
- c. diff. easy c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. (11)
- d. diff. easy d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. (12)
- e. diff. easy e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. (13)
- f. diff. easy f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. (14)
- g. diff. easy g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. (15)
- h. diff. easy h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. (16)

10. If your immediate supervisor became aware that you were engaged in any of the activities listed below which would you be disciplined for? (17)

Please circle one

- a. disc. not a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. (17)
- b. disc. not b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. (18)
- c. disc. not c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. (19)
- d. disc. not d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. (20)
- e. disc. not e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. (21)
- f. disc. not f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. (22)
- g. disc. not g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. (23)
- h. disc. not h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. (24)

11. I would report a fellow officer who I observed engaging in the following activities:

Please circle one

- a. accepting a free cup of coffee from a restaurant owner. Yes No (25)
- b. accepting a free meal from a restaurant owner. Yes No (26)

- c. accepting sums of money on a systematic basis to allow a gambler to operate. Yes No (27)
- d. accepting gifts from a towing company for preferential treatment at accident scenes. Yes No (28)
- e. accepting a discounted meal from a restaurant owner. Yes No (29)
- f. accepting \$10.00 at Christmas time from a businessman. Yes No (30)
- g. discovering an open business establishment at night, and removing merchandise for personal use. Yes No (31)
- h. using your police badge or ID card to gain free access to a movie theatre. Yes No (32)

12. Police in some communities engage in the following or similar types of activities:

(a) Accepting free meals.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (33)

(b) Shopping uniform and accepting discounts, free admission to movies, amusements, etc.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (34)

(c) Accepting money or goods from towing, ambulance, undertakers, service stations, etc., for assisting in getting them work.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (35)

(d) Removing, for their own personal use, unprotected property from crime scenes (past burglaries), arrested persons, DOAs, or other safeguarded property.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (36)

(e) Accepting money to overlook violations in bars, nightclubs or other businesses.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (37)

(f) Accepting money from traffic violators in return for not issuing a summons or ticket.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (38)

(g) Accepting money to cooperate with individuals in the area of gambling, prostitution or other public morals violations.

In your opinion how many police in this city engage in such activities?

Almost All A Large Number Quite a Few Very Few None (39)

Age _____ (40-41)

Sex _____ (42)

Race _____ (43)

Last Grade of School Completed. _____ (44)

Marital Status. _____ (45)

Years in the Department. _____ (46-47)

Present Assignment (Patrol, Detective, etc.) _____ (48)

Is Present Assignment a Field Assignment or Staff? _____ (49)

Base Salary. _____ (50)

APPENDIX # 3

COMMANDERS CORRUPTION HAZARD PROFILE

TO: Subordinate Commanders
FROM: The Police Chief/Commissioner
SUBJECT: Commanders Corruption/Hazard Profile

In order to provide up to date information on the awareness of and the suggested remedies for possible corruption hazards within this agency, I am requesting all subordinate commanding officers to provide a confidential and comprehensive corruption hazard profile of their commands. This profile will contain specifics regarding all internal and external conditions which have the potential to be a source of corruption or which have already become such. Please read and be guided by the instructions attached to this memorandum.

Please submit this report directly in a sealed envelope marked "confidential" and addressed to the Chief of Police/Commissioner by (thirty days). Should you wish to discuss the report further, please indicate such a desire in your reply.

By Direction of
the Police Commissioner/Chief

COMMANDERS CORRUPTION HAZARD PROFILE

The purpose of this survey is to determine the extent to which commanders are aware of the corruption problems in their area of responsibility:

- a) Are specific locations and/or conditions documented as corruption hazards?
- b) Are records and reports maintained on a regular basis?
- c) Do the reports indicate how the corruption hazards manifest themselves? (double parking, frequent visits by officers - no reports filed, etc.)
- d) Do commanders make police guiding subordinates responses to corruption hazards? (order, memos, roll call training sessions.) Are there department wide guidelines in these area?
- e) What specific command initiatives have been undertaken in your command to reduce the problems caused by corruption prone locations and conditions?
- f) Have the initiatives been effective? How is the effectiveness or lack of it indicated?

Directions

On the sheets provided, list all the corruption hazards you have identified within your command. Xerox additional copies of survey sheets as needed. In order to maintain standardization, please use the following format:

Corruption hazard or condition

Briefly define; example: acceptance of free meals from restaurant owners in area to overlook violations of parking regulations in vicinity of premises.

Observable indicators of the hazard

Example: numerous illegally parked vehicles in area - few summons served. Premises frequented by officers on meal periods on a regular basis.

Command Initiatives to control

Example: supervisory checks to insure enforcement of traffic regulations and to supervise meal periods of subordinates.

Command responsibility

Final responsibility for anticipating and counteracting corruption hazards is the responsibility of the commander of the area. This responsibility and commensurate authority is in some cases delegated to subordinates. To whom is this responsibility delegated in your command for each of the corruption hazards listed (if not delegated, indicate self).

CORRUPTION HAZARD PROFILE

Survey Sheets


Sheet ____ of ____

A. Corruption hazard or condition. (please use a separate sheet for each condition)

B. Observable indicators of the hazard.

C. Command initiatives to control.

D. Command accountability.



END