

MF-1

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

This document has been reproduced exactly as received from the person or organization originating it. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the National Institute of Justice.

Permission to reproduce this copyrighted material has been granted by

Public Domain

OJARS

to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).

Further reproduction outside of the NCJRS system requires permission of the copyright owner.

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS:
THE PROBLEMS AND A RESPONSE

HANK OLTMANN
OJARS
Room 1342

83306

NCJRS
MAR 19 1982
ACQUISITIONS

The history of organized law enforcement efforts can be traced back to the reign of Alfred the Great (870-900 A.D.), and in fact the basic system of that time may be recognized as the forerunner of American police agencies. The King placed responsibility and authority for self-protection and group police action upon units of ten families (called the mutual pledge system), each of which was known as a "tithing", and expected it to maintain "law and order" within its own boundaries. The next step was to combine ten tithings--forming a "hundred"--and appoint the first constable whose duty would be to supervise the equipment and weapon of the hundred. Shortly thereafter, the hundreds were grouped to form a "shire", the geographical equivalent of a county, to be supervised by a "shire-reeve", the literal antecedent of a modern county sheriff in America.

It was in the late thirteenth century under the reign of Edward I that the first official police forces--called the "watch and ward"--were created in the large towns. The responsibilities of this new force were to protect property against fire, guard the gates of the town, and arrest those who committed offenses against the peace, but the force worked only at night. By now the constable had become the primary law enforcement officer in the towns of England, but the appointment by Edward II in 1326 of officers to serve as justices-of-the-peace upset that position. Law enforcement increasingly became the responsibility of the central government, the justice of the peace--as the appointee of the King--exercised greater control over the local constables; and this relationship, the first formal separation between judge and police, set the

pattern of law enforcement that would serve for the next five hundred years.

This system served rural Britain well over the centuries, but the advent of the processes of urbanization and industrialization applied severe strain to its operation. Although other European countries had had professional police organizations since the early 1700's, England, who as a people greatly feared a national military authority (having experienced one under Cromwell in the late 1600's), attempted to control increasing civil disorder with the help of unorganized civic associations and private firms. The Bow Street Runners, an example of such an organization, was the prototype of a modern detective agency. Such groups aided (often for fees) in patrol and investigative work the official, but largely incompetent and uncoordinated "police offices" that had been appointed in the cities. As unemployment, poverty, and starvation occurred in these expanding cities with increasing frequency, crime and disorder became uncontrol-¹lable almost overnight. Especially so in London, these conditions were beyond the ability of the rural-effective English law enforcement system.

Gradually minor improvements were made in the means used to control the violence, but in 1822 Sir Robert Peel, Britain's Home Secretary, began to argue that while better policing could not totally eliminate crime, bad policing certainly could contribute to social disorder. Though there was some resistance to many of his ideas, by 1829 he had developed and carried through Parliament an "Act for Improving The Police In and Near The Metropolis". The principles with which Peel organized this 100 man force were as follows:

1. Police officers must be under strict discipline to ensure the necessary high standard of behavior.
2. The absence of crime is an index of efficiency.

3. The force should be territorially distributed.
4. The force should be divided by hours and shifts.
5. Higher positions should be filled by men from the lower ranks.
6. Police officers should wear a uniform and that a good appearance commands respect.
7. Applicants for the Police Force should be judged on their own merits.
8. Training of police officers assures greater efficiency.
9. The principle object to be attained is the prevention of crime.
10. A perfect command of temper is an essential quality.

The applicability of Peel's principles is, in most cases, as great today as ever, and it is perhaps fortunate that there was such a model after which American cities could pattern their first police agencies.

Colonial America naturally used the law enforcement structure with which they had been familiar in England of appointed constables and sheriffs, with night-watches for the larger cities. This model, as it had in England, suited the needs of rural America very well, but as it also had in England, proved to be ineffective against the disorder and violence that developed with the rapid growth of the city. As one observer noted;

New York City was alleged to be the most crime-ridden city in the world, with Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Cincinnati not far behind... Gangs of youthful rowdies in the larger cities... threatened to destroy the American reputation for respect for the law... Before their boisterous demonstrations the crude police forces of the day were often helpless.

Industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and race problems all shared responsibility with the "crude police" for the crime and rioting, and public concern was beginning to be noted. Philadelphia became, in 1833, the first city to establish a day-time police force (due to a philanthropist's donation)

to supplement the nightwatch, but it was ill-conceived and lasted barely two years before it was dissolved, and was not to be seen in the city again until 1855. Boston and Cincinnati established day-watch forces in 1838 and 1842 respectively, but this system with totally independent day and night watches did not prove very effective. In 1844, New York City established the first permanent 24-hour police force operating under a single command, and it was very carefully based on Peel's principles. New York was as successful with their new force as London had been some 20 years earlier, and the lesson was not lost on other American cities, as by 1870 there was not a large city in the United States without such a police department.

In the mid-1800's, "the aim of the police departments was merely to keep a city superficially clean and to keep everything quiet that was likely to arouse public ire".⁴ That this was all the police were attempting to accomplish probably to a large extent caused the public disrespect, the low salaries, and loose personnel standards that characterized these fledgling departments. Additional strain occurred as a result of the increasing interest among certain powerful segments of local communities for the enforcement of public morality-based laws. Yet even then the police seemed to understand "the impossible task of enforcing laws which a large part of the community did not want enforced."⁵ The ever-expanding urban environment tended to promote public involvement that was based on ethnic, racial, religious, or even economic interests, and the inevitable conflicts in a setting like that made the task of law enforcement uniquely difficult.

In the late 1800's and early 1900's, the political struggle for domination of the American police forces reached its peak intensity. The rewards for

gaining control of the police at that time included; a rich source of patronage, entry into a variety of "safe" illegal businesses, control of the enforcement of public regulations, and often control over election procedures as well.⁶ Frequent changes in department leadership, mass transfers or firings of personnel, increased graft and corruption, favoritism, and discriminatory enforcement patterns were the obvious symptoms of the intensity of the struggle for control and of the success in achieving it. As the United States entered the "Progressive Era", reform of the police authority was actually just a part of a widespread movement for reform in government, politics (especially at the local level), business, and in fact the entire social climate. The establishment of civil service patterns, hopefully to limit some of the abuses in hiring and promotion procedure, marked the beginning of this concern for efficiency and honesty in police work. Concurrent with this call for reform though, law enforcement was finding increasing difficulty in attempting to cope with the rapidly occurring social changes of the time and the various conflicting and confusing roles into which they were forced.

The period of Prohibition, a major component of the Progressive Movement, was of great consequence to law enforcement. Part of the justification for Prohibition had been to end--or at least minimize--police-political corruption in the large cities. The effect had been almost the opposite, and law enforcement found itself in serious dilemma. Shortly following its criminalization, alcohol became popular--especially in the urban areas--to an extent that it never had been before, and suddenly the police found themselves fighting good citizens" involved in "criminal" behavior that many policemen willingly participated in themselves. As Richardson warns, "the more unpopular the law,

the more pressure on the police to ignore it, and the greater the temptation to bribery and corruption".⁷ As well as causing this brutal conflict in roles and expectations for as yet untrained police forces, Prohibition contributed heavily to the levels of corruption between police, the liquor business, and the political "machinery". It also established organized crime with a solid financial base that it has never lost.

Another factor in the evolution of the American urban environment was the emergence of the automobile as a major form of transportation. The ramifications of its appearance on the urban scene provide a good example of the rapid reorientation that law enforcement was forced to undergo at that time. It caused drastic expansion of the size of police jurisdictions, provided greater mobility for all--including the criminal--and contributed heavily to the process of the physical separation between social classes and racial and ethnic groups. The implications of such changes for law enforcement are clearly powerful. As did Prohibition, the automobile brought police into conflict with the middle and upper-classes for the first time, and although the problem was only that of traffic violations, police had never had to deal with their social "betters" in a sanctioning role before.⁸

The need for reform of the policing function in America appears to have finally gained widespread attention in 1931 with the publication of the Wickersham Commission (President Hoover's National Commission on Law Enforcement and Observance) Report, which for the first time compiled research and opinion from authorities and practitioners all over the country. The Commission, noting a problem with the relationship between the police and the community, found that "the general failure of the police" to deal with crime had caused "the

loss of public respect and the respectable citizen to be afraid of the criminal class".⁹ It also noted a "lack of competent, efficient, and honest patrolmen ...and that no intensive effort was being made to educate, train, and discipline prospective officers or to eliminate those shown to be incompetent".¹⁰ The Commission suggested plainly and bluntly that police simply had too much to do with the resources they had available; too many laws to enforce, too many other unrelated duties, and too little support.

Police reformers, in answer to the above-described conditions, began to stress the specialization of the various police functions, the use of a structured-hierarchy organizational model, the development of a centralized bureaucracy, and greater operational efficiency.¹¹ The fact that first, the criticisms of police by the Wickersham Commission are, in many ways, as true today as then, and second, that the above "reform" measures were almost totally accepted by the law enforcement community is obvious at even a casual glance at modern police departments. Kenney makes the point that the suggested organizational model: "the consolidation of all functional activities into structures of field operations, services, and investigations", is the model for almost all police organization since the 1930's, though in recent years had been added the function of "administration".¹²

Although police were originally opposed to this reform as a threat to the department's independence, it became rapidly apparent that such change added to the agency's freedom from outside pressures by ensuring the development of a bureaucracy considerably less accessible to the public or local political forces. Such reform led to and encouraged "administrators like Chief William Parker of Los Angeles and Commissioner O. W. Wilson of Chicago who would

brook no political involvement in their professional decisions".¹³

If corruption and political entanglements typified turn-of-the-century police, and concern for progressive reform described the era of the police through the 1930's, then bureaucratic centralization and professionalization describe the evolution of police work since then. An argument frequently proposed to defend this new autonomy was that police work, as it was making the transition to a true "profession", was not suited to review and evaluation of its performance and personnel by outside--hence by definition insufficiently expert--interests. Arthur Niederhoffer, a veteran of the New York Police Dept., believes that this trend began following the Great Depression when, for the first time, college-educated men began to turn to police work as a career and sought the development of professional abilities and a distinct body of knowledge.¹⁴ While this was occurring, the bureaucracy was becoming successful in insulating its operations from outside critical review, and to a large extent tended to reinforce the development of this new "professionalization".

This "professional" style has come to emphasize the law enforcement function of the police officer, and as such he is taught to go by the book--to become impersonal and totally efficient in his enforcement of the law. Chief Parker of Los Angeles believed the law enforcement mission to be a "war" against crime and the criminal element, and accordingly that the best personnel, training and equipment should be devoted singlemindedly to that task. He saw this most effectively occurring in a quasi-military role structure, with crime suppression and deterrence as its chief objective. This conception, at least until very recently, has permeated most textbooks and training

programs in law enforcement.

To sum thus far, the evolution of the American police function to its present state has not been a smooth one. As Skolnick has noted, "the police services in the United States have never really enjoyed the opportunity to develop in an orderly and consistent fashion", but instead have grown haphazardly, tending to mirror the social, economic, and political conditions of the time.¹⁵ This is fairly apparent in each of the major shifts of the law enforcement concept since the first actual police force more than 100 years ago. The most recent significant change in police practice--the shift from the "watchman" style operation to the efficient bureaucratic-professional model--was the result of the reaction to the weaknesses of the earlier model, and specifically to the influence of politics in police operation and the likelihood of corruption in the decentralized organization.¹⁶

Certainly the problem had been substantial and the solution appeared to hold great promise, but only recently have we begun to note the real impact of these changes. As the National Advisory Council on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals noted about this shift to the "professional" orientation, "the benefits of increased flexibility in responding to calls for services and reducing opportunities for corruption were accompanied by a reduction in police responsiveness to individual needs and community identification".¹⁷ Clearly such a change in the policy--if not the philosophy--of law enforcement could not help but dramatically alter the relationship between the police and the local community, and even with society as a whole. Never before had law enforcement consciously moved to reduce the levels of public or political involvement in its operations, and the next two sections will attempt to examine

some of the effects of this bureaucratic-professional style of policing that have been noted so far.

POLICE COMMUNITY TENSION

To begin on the professional model's own terms, it is fairly clear that it has not even been successful at carrying out its main objective; that of controlling crime. By anybody's estimate the crime rate has been going up consistently over the past two decades, and the rate of increase in our major metropolitan areas has been the greatest. The response of law enforcement to this rising level of crime has been a continuing cry for "more"; more personnel, equipment, technology, and even plain money. Governments at all levels--especially the Federal--have largely agreed with that analysis and have tried to provide those resources. Spending on the entire Criminal Justice System (with the police receiving ever larger shares) has more than doubled in the last twenty years, but there is increasing evidence that we are not investing this money wisely.¹⁸

If the increasing crime rate in the face of increasing expenditure was the only failing of our modern model of law enforcement and we could imagine no other structure that might do better, then perhaps concern with its reform would not be justified. But it is becoming increasingly apparent that there are other costs associated with our present police system--perhaps

less tangible or readily quantifiable--but certainly no less serious in terms of harm to our society.

There has, in the past two decades, developed an increasing body of statistical and case data that indicates a degree of hostility between the community--especially lower-class or ghetto areas--and the police. As James Baldwin wrote in 1961 to describe the plight of a policeman in Harlem, "... yet he is facing, daily and nightly, the people who would gladly see him dead, and he knows it. There are few things under heaven more unnerving than the silent accumulating contempt and hatred of a people".¹⁹ Baldwin's description may sound harsh, but the work done by the National Opinion Research Center showed that "non-whites, particularly Negroes, are significantly more negative than whites in evaluating police effectiveness". They also see police to be appreciably more discourteous, dishonest, and likely to misconduct themselves than do whites.²⁰ And when the poor and youth were similarly questioned, their answers were similarly negative in terms of their perceptions of police behavior. Very importantly, though non-whites tend to be more negative about the quality of their local police, they are also much more likely to acknowledge their need for police protection.²¹

This last point is, I think, an indication that the hostility or lack of confidence described above is not the result of law enforcement per se, but only the result of the current practice of it, and gives hope that the relationship between the police and the community need not remain in its present state. It is quite ironic that those citizens who fear and mistrust the police are very often the same citizens who most readily acknowledge the need for law enforcement and police services in their communities.

The decade of the 1960's was the period in which this accumulating hostility and tension finally began to surface and boil over. Mass eruptions of violence in the black urban areas of New York City, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Washington, Newark and Detroit displayed vividly the tension that existed in these communities prior to the actual outbursts. The police, carrying out "crime-control" policy in the areas where the greatest volumes of crime existed, were in such frequent--and usually hostile--contact with the residents of these depressed and deprived areas that, given the already existing levels of tension, violent confrontation was likely.

Evidence that tension was already high in the urban ghetto is noted in the fact that the police were not considered to be solely responsible for creating this hostility. As the Kerner Commission noted, "Virtually every major episode of urban violence in the summer of 1967 was foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances by ghetto residents against local authorities(not always the police). So high was the resulting underlying tension, that routine and random events, tolerated or ignored under most circumstances (such as the raid on the "blind pig" in Detroit or the arrest of the cab driver in Newark) became the triggers of sudden violence".²² While there was this variety of tension-creating problems that stimulated the actual outbursts, it is true that in almost all cases it was some sort of police action (often, as the Kerner Commission noted, a completely legal and innocent act) that provided the spark that touched off the rioting.

While race-related disorder was a fact of history in American cities, the student rebellions of the Sixties were a new phenomenon. Several communities in major University cities exploded into riot and violent confrontation with

the police. Though the specific issues that resulted in the student disturbances were clearly different than those underlying the urban riots(at a most basic level, both did involve the condemnation of certain American social, economic and /or political conditions), there was a similarity in rapid development of the cycle of action-reaction of increasing tension and hostility between students (or ghetto residents) and the police. The police, never having experienced the support and trust of the minority communities, had always turned to the middle and upper classes for support and reassurance, and suddenly finding themselves confronted by youth from these higher social and economic classes in hostile situations made for a bewildering problem.

Percieved by both of these "alienated" groups as the defense mechanism of the institutions from which they felt this separation, the police were naturally going to be confronted with the brunt of this hostility. Society had clearly placed police in the middle of nearly impossible situations, although law enforcement, except in a few isolated locations, did little to soothe this tension and in many cases actually fueled it further. "As in Chicago during the Democratic convention, the police encouraged and indulged in violence rather than controlling it. This lack of discipline and restraint created riots".²³ Similar statements were made about police misconduct following almost everyone of the urban riots and student outbursts, and it is clear that while perhaps not singlehandedly inciting these disorders, the police frequently added to their intensity.

UNDERLYING FACTORS IN POLICE COMMUNITY TENSION

In discussing the factors that led to the development of the tense relationships between the law enforcement community and the lower-class and youth communities, it should become clear that the "professional"-style of police work is in large measure responsible, though certainly there were other problems beyond the influence of law enforcement. Changing social and economic conditions, the continuing processes of urbanization and suburbanization, and greater minority group awareness and solidarity are all movements that have made their contribution to the distressed state of present law enforcement. It appears that such movements have, in recent years, become more demanding and urgent--as well as volatile--and this trend deserves attention. The social problems that are so often related to crime and violence--notably poverty, unemployment, poor education, alcoholism, etc.--are largely if not totally beyond the ability of the police to correct or even control. Accepting this, a significant question for discussion is whether the police are being maximally effective at reducing both personal and social damage resulting from these conditions. As Rocky Pomerance, the Chief of Police in Miami at the time of the Republican National Convention in 1972, so aptly stated, "The police can't win--they can just lose as gracefully as possible."²⁴

The emphasis of the professional orientation toward police work on crime-control and suppression as its main purpose inevitably stimulates pressure for quantitative evidence indicating success. Richardson points out how "this pressure for police productivity forces the police to be anti-democratic and anti-civil liberties. They cannot do their jobs as they and most of society perceive those jobs without infringing on the rights and liberties of

citizens."²⁵ This pressure is the sort that has caused the recent cries to take the "handcuffs" of Constitutional protections and limitations off the police and let them get on with their "war against crime". Stops and/or searches without probable cause, lengthy, strenuous and often coercive interrogations, questionable undercover enforcement procedures, marginally legal wiretapping, aggressive saturation patrols and discriminatory field interrogations are all tools that the "professional" police community has believed required for use in combatting and controlling the criminal element.

As both public and internal pressures for "production increase" in the face of a rising crime rate, there is a tendency to use these methods of enforcement that are just barely, if at all, legal. Though these efforts may in fact lead to increased investigations and a greater number of arrests (ignoring for the moment the difficulties inherent in police-generated statistics), there will also certainly be a development of antagonism between the police and the community in which the bulk of this "crime-control" procedure is carried out. This tension or even open hostility is not really relevant to the statistics generated by the professional model of law enforcement, and ironically, it will probably be considered only to justify a recommendation that more police should be hired and that more intensive patrol is necessary. By failing to recognize this effect, police all over the country have found themselves in a vicious spiral of increasing hostility, antagonism and potential (or actual) violence, and often further increases in the level of crime itself. As police would react to the hostile environment that they had helped create, further antagonism often resulted that led to a stronger reaction yet by the police--and all too often the culmination of this process was severe disturbance or violence.

One result of this "numbers game" of the "crime-control" model of enforcement is that much of the above described police behavior has tended to occur in urban center-city and ghetto areas. This was to be expected, as those neighborhoods seemed to have the highest levels of crime which was the prime target of this style of policing. For reasons discussed elsewhere, police were already not particularly welcome in these neighborhoods, but the behavior that resulted from the need to prove their crime-fighting effectiveness could and should have been predicted to generate antagonism all by itself.

This overriding concern for quantifiable performance may in actuality be only a symptom of the true cause of the apparent inability of this model of police work to do much about crime or to avoid tension with the community. The process by which this style of law enforcement came in to existence is fairly clear, and will offer insight into its real flaw. In response to a law enforcement system that was characterized by underqualified and poorly trained personnel, corrupt relations between officers at all levels and many parts of the community, and a very negative public image, concern was stimulated among "progressive" police administrators to bring about a rise in the status of police work to make it a true profession. In the process of doing so, inadequate attention was paid to questions of what police really spend their time doing, and this process of professionalization began to occur with the control of crime coming into focus as the first concern of law enforcement. In this model, "the policeman should be the incorruptible crime-fighter who uses the most advanced technological and scientific devices to bring criminals to justice."²⁶ Naturally, anything distracting the officer's attention from this role was simply not the business of the "professional"

police officer.

This view of police work may make for dramatic television, but in terms of the reality of the police mission, it is destructive myth. There is increasing empirical evidence that a great percentage of police work is spent on activity at best remotely related to "crime-fighting". One study of several major police departments showed that of more than 800,000 calls to the police, only 16% were crime-related.²⁷ From the analysis of other such studies, one writer believes that enough data exists to show conclusively that "uniformed police personnel in large urban areas typically spend less than 30% of their working time dealing with crime or other enforcement duties".²⁸ Other studies have reached similar conclusions, though frequently showing an even smaller proportion of time devoted to crime-stopping.²⁹ Significantly, this ratio seems to hold true even in a largely black, poverty-stricken urban ghetto area as noted in a study of such an area in Baltimore completed in 1970.³⁰

Instead, what police spend most of their time doing is carrying out service and peace-keeping pursuits that involve encountering a wide range of human behavior. Controlling bar brawls, calming family disturbances, keeping order at fires and providing emergency response of all sorts are among the roles that police have carried out for years, and yet have refused to acknowledge as their prime concern. Many of these roles, to be sure, have fallen to law enforcement by default, in that some type of social assistance is required in many situations, and the police are the only twenty-four hour rapidly responding social service agency available. A crucial point that Richardson notes is that such service-related calls are "performed most effectively when no arrests are made. The policeman who can maintain and restore

order without involving the formal processes of the law has achieved a valuable social result."³¹ This points to, in my opinion, the major failing in the professional crime-control approach to law enforcement.

By stressing the crime-control function of police, training and orientation toward the service and order-maintenance components of the total role will be ignored, leaving the line officer both unprepared and unmotivated to do such work. The role of the "crime-fighter" conflicts, in almost every case, with the role of order maintenance, because for the former, arrest is the appropriate resolution of an encounter while for the latter role, arrest is in fact the least desirable alternative. What then occurs is that the police pursue a single objective while most of their time is spent doing things unrelated to that objective. Compounding the problem, the public accepts this orientation and fails to recognize the actual service-oriented nature of the police responsibility. Ironically, the number of calls for service from the public seems to continue to increase.

By failing to acknowledge the true complexity of their role, the police are hurled in to serious dilemma. Because of inconsistent public expectations and demands and the internal conflicts that develop, "the policeman lives on the grinding edge of social conflict, without a well-defined, well-understood notion of what he is supposed to be doing there."³² This may lead to frustration in two ways. While police are usually well-trained in the techniques of crime-control, Rubin makes the point that calls for service tend to generate anxiety and insecurity in the officer. "Policemen are untrained to intervene effectively in family fights, they have no medical background, they have few links with the medical, welfare, and social service resources in the community; and they have no real power to act (short of arrest) in many citizen

disputes. Therefore, when asked to perform a community service ..., they feel unable to do it effectively."³³

This feeling of ineffectiveness and the awareness of an inability to provide meaningful assistance in such situations coupled with frequent hostility from the community even when real community service is being provided (a function of the public's misconception about police work) is a definite source of additional tension for the police. This frustration will lead to anger or impatience with the community, which is, as stated earlier, usually lower-class and minority group populated. This combination of negative responses certainly does little to encourage the provision of high-quality sympathetic community service by the officer.

Rubin explains the other manner in which this crime-fighter myth is a source of frustration for the patrol officer; "... even the coveted crime-fighter role is filled with frustration and disappointment for the policeman. He may think of himself as primarily a crime-fighter, but he does little of it, and he views that little as relatively ineffective."³⁴ Examining this view of the modern policeman--the frustration with the perceived role plus the feeling of inadequacy in coping with the actual major function of police work--reveals a combination that does not bode well for that officer's dealings with the community.

Increasing attention is being given the fact that the law enforcement community is not really capable of doing much about the problem of crime, at least using means that would be acceptable to our society. Crime prevention and control might be achieved through repressive--ultimately totalitarian means--but such would not be tolerated here. With a growing awareness that crime is linked to a complex web of social, economic and political

conditions over which the police have no control, perhaps attention is due a reprioritization of police activity toward objectives more readily accomplished. James Q. Wilson compares police in the crime-fighter role to the staff of mental hospitals and notes striking similarities. Both are under constant criticism for maltreatment of their clientele and ineffectiveness at preventing or curing the "problem". Yet the fact remains that while the "treatment" may become more humane with sufficient resources and appropriate training of personnel, we still do not know how to cure mental illness--nor do we know how to stop crime.³⁵ To allow continued emphasis on this professional model of the policeman-crimefighter as is required by that particular orientation to police work does a clear and major disservice to the police officer and to the community he serves.

As well as the tensions and difficulties caused by the conflicting roles and various demands and expectations with which the police must deal, there was a recently noted trend which had a powerful impact on law enforcement. According to the Kerner Commission in an examination of the factors leading to the urban disorders of the 1960's, there was, in many of the large urban areas, "a widening gap between human needs and public resources and a growing cynicism regarding the commitment of community institutions and leadership to meet these needs."³⁶ Though such changes in America's urban centers did not occur over night, there had been in the previous 10-15 years an increasing intolerance among residents of the alienating and inhuman conditions of the urban ghetto environment, and an increasing militancy about the need for change.

The Kerner Commission found several reasons for this growing intolerance. First, they noted a widening "gulf in communications between local government and the residents in these areas that caused a profound sense of alienation

programs actually intended to improve their plight. A major factor in this regard is that as increasing affluence reduces the need for welfare and other public services for most of the urban (and suburban) population, the needs of the center-city residents for such services is expanding. But these people find themselves without power--with no local allies to form an interest or pressure group and then demand and expect to receive attention from the government. The fact that the ghetto resident--especially if from an ethnic minority--is not easily able to gain an elected or appointed office in the city administration has not gone unnoticed by the people of our deprived urban centers.

The Kerner Commission concludes;

These conditions have produced a vast and threatening disparity in perceptions of the intensity and validity of Negro dissatisfaction. Viewed from the perspective of the ghetto resident, city government appears distant and unconcerned, the possibility of change remote. As a result, the tension rises perceptibly; the explosion comes as the climax to a progression of tension-generating incidents. To the city administration, unaware of the growing tension or unable to respond to it effectively, the outbreak of disorder comes as a shock.³⁷

It is clear that even if police were highly respected and appreciated in these communities they would have difficulty working in an environment like that described above, but being perceived as the "defender" of the status quo the police will be despised automatically by all who believe that their treatment at the hands of that "system" to be unjust. Misconceptions by both the police and the public about the true role of law enforcement and the resulting antagonism, when stirred by the increasing intolerance of those social and economic conditions that allow little chance of escape from the deprivation

of this environment for many of our poorest citizens adds up to an extremely volatile mix. When police are then recognized as the defenders--often the only defenders--of these intolerable policies and practices, the true fragility of the state of relations between the police and the community becomes crystal clear.

APPROACHES TO POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IMPROVEMENT

While this problem of police-community relations reached critical immediacy in the 1960's, it had been a topic of concern to some police administrators for several decades as evidenced by early attempts to consciously elicit community confidence in the police. As early as the 1930's police officers were involved in such activities as visiting schools to meet with children, handing out literature, and generally offering the message that the "policemen are your friends", which was community relations in its most primitive form.³⁸ This sort of image enhancement work has been the mainstay of attempts by the police to improve their reputation in their communities ever since that time. This sort of activity though, because it smacks of the advertising and "selling" to the public of a "product" and not really concerned with the establishment of a two-way working relationship and information flow, is more properly called public relations in order to distinguish such an approach from actual community relations--the concern with understanding and attempting to better

serve the client community.

This distinction is best explained with a definition presented by Paul Whisenand that police-community relations is the "development and retention of attitudes and behavior on the part of police that create supportive relationships between their agency and the community."³⁹ Clearly the image-building public information campaign is not concerned with developing these "attitudes and behaviors" on the part of the officers that would lead to confidence and trust by the community. Instead, it is founded on the judgement that the police are doing the "right" things and that the problems they experience with the community are the result of the public being improperly informed about the requirements of their work. From this frame of analysis, all that is needed to repair relations with the community is more information and a better vehicle of distribution. Compared to sincere efforts to uncover and resolve often well-founded grievances in hostile communities, the contrast becomes obvious. This, though, is certainly not to say that such public information programs are ill-advised, only that they constitute a narrow focus on a much broader concern.

Awareness of this deeper problem in the police-community relationship than could be solved with "advertising" alone led in the 1940's to the development of the first structured training programs that were oriented toward "human relations", but this occurred in only a few of America's most progressive police departments. Such topics as race relations and racial tension, the status of minority groups in society, and the causes of violence in the broader social context were addressed. As such, these programs were the first recorded attempts by the police to attempt to locate and deal with the specific needs of the community.⁴⁰

This direction for training was clearly to be of value in terms of the general ability of the police community to deal effectively with their increasingly complex responsibilities. It was nevertheless a new direction for law enforcement, and it had not yet begun to focus on resolving the tension between the police and the community generated by a growing intolerance of existing social conditions and worsened by the development of the crime-fighter method of response. As example of the factors leading to this tension-ridden relationship, one writer pointed out how the Brown v. Board of Education desegregation decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954 added "fuel" to this process. As lower-class neighborhood received this sort of extra justification for their intolerance and dissatisfaction, the police rapidly found themselves in a losing situation. Naturally their concern for the relationship with the community began to be noted at that time, as the effect of the decision was bound to be profound.⁴¹

The St. Louis Police Dept. established, in 1956, a unit in the department designed with the sole responsibility of handling this new problem of police-community relations--the first such effort in the country. The St. Louis Community Relations Unit "consisted of a number of citizen committees, based in the precincts, but coordinated by a central office. Its activities included youth councils, school visits, cruiser tours, a speaker program, a newsletter, and other image building efforts."⁴² Clearly the public relations role was incorporated here, but there was also the beginning of the effort to develop channels of communication that would allow--for the first time--a two-way flow of information and ideas. It was at this time--in St. Louis as well as in some of the other agencies experimenting with the concept---that human relations training began to be stressed as an integral part of the entire

community relations mission.

Evidence that this innovation had in fact taken hold in America's larger cities was noted in a survey conducted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the U.S. Conference of Mayors in 1964. They found that, in police agencies serving populations of 30,000 or more, better than one-third had established a formal police-community relations unit, while more than 60% had implemented specific Human Relations training.⁴³ It is very likely, though, that this movement should not be accepted as positive evidence that police were singlemindedly concerned with the establishment of good community relations. Another movement following the new police-community relations involvement that would have further served to open communications and identified the police as willing to become accountable to the community was met with almost unanimous opposition from the police. This served notice that the apparent objective of an open and honest relationship with the client community was not the first goal of the police at that time.

This movement that met with such unanimous negative reaction was the series of attempts in many of our major cities to establish Civilian Review Boards or similar such bodies. While perhaps being accepted and defended by a few of America's top police executives (notably Howard Leary of Philadelphia and New York), it was criticized by most administrators and thoroughly condemned by almost all lower-ranking officers as an unnecessary and dangerous infringement on police autonomy and authority. Over this unanimous resistance by police, few such boards ever came into existence, despite extreme pressure from civil rights and minority groups. Even those few that were established met with such continual opposition from police personnel that their operation was seriously hampered.

Regardless of the potential value of such a board, the conflicts that resulted from community--again, especially lower-class and minority areas-- efforts to force such review on the police caused real damage to already existing efforts in police-community relations. The community, as it perceived unwillingness on the part of police to allow outside review of their behavior-- apparently denying that the public had any right to criticize police action-- naturally experienced that feeling of alienation from their law enforcement machinery, and that spiral of the tension-generating behaviors was again fueled. An irony noted more than once is that this cycle of tension was very likely to result in the sort of behavior with which the Civilian Review Board would have been concerned.

A few short years after the development of the notion of formal community relations units, these units--and police in general--were confronted with the unrest of the 1960's described earlier which in some places had been aggravated by the conflict over the question of civilian review of the police. Due to the variety of social, economic, and political factors that led to these urban outbursts, it was clear that even had the police been properly and progressively focused with their new community relations work, they had not been doing it either long enough or well enough. As a result of the riots even in the face of such community relations work, "the police response to the disturbances had become a matter of broad public concern. It attracted the attention of four Presidential and numerous local commissions; it was the subject of countless studies, articles, books, and speeches. As a result of this pressure, U.S. police departments began to adopt Community Relations programs on a whole-sale basis."⁴⁴ But the question of whether or not this was in fact the most effective way to approach the entire problem, despite

all this attention, had not yet received straight-forward attention.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is fairly simple to note that most of these crisis-born programs, despite formal titles, really had little to do with the complex questions of police-community relations. Almost a throw-back to an earlier decade, these programs were again concerned with little more than image. The operant belief still seemed to be that law enforcement should continue as before, and that proper information and public awareness would reverse the negative public opinions that had unaccountably sprung up. Accordingly, this new supply of "community relations" was to be little more than a cosmetic endeavor. Two factors allowed this view to dominate. First, as police and city officials conceived the community relations effort as necessary only to relieve the immediate pressures, their commitment to a thorough and far-reaching change was questionable.

Second, because of the hasty manner in which many of the new programs were implemented, they frequently began with cloudy objectives and weak or non-existent evaluation procedures. The only goals stated for many of these projects were such generalities as "improving the state of the relationship between the police dept. and citizens", or "giving citizens a greater appreciation of the police department and increasing their willingness to cooperate in attaining its objectives."⁴⁵ Clearly the evaluation of success in reaching such objectives is all but impossible, so right from inception these new units were hampered by the lack of effectiveness-checking and self-correcting mechanisms.

If such misguided development were solely the responsibility of the local police agency, the difficulty might be understood more easily, but through the five years of intensive study by the variety of investigative bodies, little

was done or written to alter the above conception of proper police-community relations activity. In fact review of their conclusions and recommendations seems to indicate that they encouraged this narrow view of its role.⁴⁶ Although each of the major Commissions made recommendations about image-building and tension--soothing activities that police could promote, it has been readily apparent that the state of police-community relations in the years following the period of violence has not improved, and in many jurisdictions has deteriorated further.

A major problem has been the establishment of a centralized community relations Unit working out of the dept's. headquarters separate from the more traditional police functions. The officer assigned to this unit, in addition to those contradictory role expectations he carries from his patrol or investigative work, soon finds himself strapped with a new set of requirements. His status in the department as well as in the community has been altered. To be faithful to his community relations role, especially if his is a "professional" model dept., he must renounce the traditional "police view", and Niederhoffer explains in detail what that means in terms of personal conflict:

The Police Dept.:

1. prefers the status quo
2. believes in secrecy
3. seeks autonomy
4. policy is to go by the book
5. is defensive about criticism
6. views the ghetto with hostility

The Community Relations Officer:

1. must work for change
2. works to open lines of communication
3. wants to involve community groups in the operation of the Dept.
4. bypasses rules and operates on an informal level
5. learns to accept and work with criticism
6. works to establish friendships⁴⁷

As a result of these vast differences in orientation, plus the fact that the other officers in the department do not view community relations work as "real police work", the specialist in community relations is effectively alienated from a large segment of his agency. Yet, as a policeman, he faces the hostility in the community, and this is a difficult set of reactions within which to work productively. Obviously the odds against this particular organizational structure providing effective police-community relations are great.

More basic yet than these practical concerns with the implementation and function of the Unit itself though, James Ahern offers a pointed criticism of the whole concept of a centralized unit to carry out these efforts. "Community relations units and Tactical squads are both admissions of the failure of police professionalization. The creation of a community relations squad says that the police department cannot relate to a community through decent and fair responses to that community's problems as a whole and that it must create a gimmick to gloss over its deficiencies."⁴⁸ If Ahern makes a correct analysis, it is clear that any sort of community relations work that does not make specific provision to deal with hostility-generating police behavior--both in the short and long-range--is capable of doing no more than easing symptoms of disorder without approaching the underlying cause. Lipsky makes a similar criticism about the value of Citizen Advisory Boards and other such bodies in stating that unless the Board or Council has actual policy-making authority, they may even tend to inhibit institutional change by dealing only with the symptoms and effects of misconduct, while smoothing the tensions that may have led to real change.⁴⁹

Noting the continued erosion of police-community relations and the

growing realization that the traditional efforts had not been successful, it appeared that, following volumes of evidence and scores of recommendations, law enforcement was still under the impression that the problem of community relations would be solved by a higher quality and greater quantity of information flowing from the department (or the special unit) to the public. Its responsibility then, was limited to informing the public about how it carried out its duties and--when required by extreme public pressure--to allow advisory input into its policy-making procedures.

The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals finally denied this approach from an "official" level in 1973 when it stated that "...the unique relationship between the people and the police requires that the police be answerable to the public if their authority is to be accepted and respected by the people."⁵⁰ While sounding vaguely similar to much of what had been written in the previous decade, the force of this finding in fact called for a major reorientation to the whole field of police-community relations. As police--from the decades of the Progressive Era present--have striven to separate themselves in terms of review and accountability from their client communities, the reversal of policy required by the Commission's findings and recommendations is plainly a significant overhaul.

To sum this section then, the first attempts at improving police-community relations were little more than efforts directed at building a positive image of the policeman and the department. Information was developed and distributed by a "specialist" in public relations working from a central office, and this, in many cases, was the extent of the police department's community relations concern. Admittedly, human-relations oriented training had been incorporated into police training in many agencies during the late 1950's

and 1960's, but the urban demonstrations and riots of the middle and late Sixties made it clear that the police in many of our large cities were totally out of contact with the public there. Following these disturbances, a rash of community-relations' units sprang up in police departments around the country as a result of the findings of the various investigative bodies and advisory commissions that had examined the disorder, but little was recommended or sought in the way of a fresh approach to police-community relations.

As the state of relations did not improve (and may in fact have worsened) as a result of the major attention the question had received following the period of urban violence, it became clear that the police, instead of needing to do more of the image-building activity--as many of them believed--had actually been taking a faulty approach to the entire problem. It was exactly this approach that the National Advisory Commission flatly rejected with the radical proposal that the police must become responsible to their community. It became immediately apparent that if such a recommendation was a realistic one, then the "professional" law enforcement model would require drastic change. Its emphasis on the largely autonomous centralized bureaucratic structure was incompatible with the objective of increasing community involvement in the policing function. It had become evident too, that the crime-control orientation itself actually had a negative and hostility-generating impact on police-community relations.

Accordingly, the revitalization and renewal of the relationship between the police and their clientele was clearly to require much more than the cosmetic attempts of earlier decades. The reform suggested by the above findings indicates a series of interrelated policy changes initiated by the police. First, the agency must accept the conclusion that police-community relations

is not the sole responsibility of a separate centralized unit within the department, but rather the responsibility of the entire department in all its activity. Next, a reorientation of the police department toward the community--implying the development of channels of dialogue and a mechanism for citizen input in the agency's policy making process--is required. Finally--perhaps the most important objective and possibly the most difficult to achieve--the police profession itself must acknowledge the true role law enforcement serves in the community. Doffing the crime-fighter role in favor of a service and conflict manager role responds to the reality of the present day police mission.

STEPS TO REORIENTATION

As this reorientation involves a major reversal of law enforcement policy in America, it must be a process that is well conceived and cautiously carried out. A first step--one easily overlooked but crucial to success--is concern with the proper direction for the change. A careful grasp of what the concept of police-community relations entails and what objectives the individual department should have are both vital considerations that if not properly attended to might be expected to derail the change process. Brandstatter and Radelet propose a very thorough view of the concept of police-community relations that, if accepted and internalized by a police department,

would clearly outline the course this reorientation would have to follow:⁵¹

Police-community relations in its generic sense means the variety of ways in which it may be emphasized that the police are indeed an important part of--and not apart from--the communities they serve. Properly understood, police-community relations is a concept for total police organization, functionally speaking--a total orientation, not merely the preoccupation of a special unit or bureau within the dept. It bears upon administrative policy, it bears upon supervision, it bears upon every aspect of personnel practices, it bears upon records and communications, it bears upon complaint procedures, it bears upon all aspects of internal and external relations, it bears upon planning and research, and perhaps most significantly, it bears upon line service through the uniformed patrol division.

In short, this model requires that police-community relations is not something the police do to the community, but rather something the police are for the community.

As police accept the notion that community relations is not only the business of a special unit at the headquarters, but an orientation for the work of the entire department, the next step is the reorientation toward the community itself. By community, we mean a region with certain characteristics or norms peculiar to that area that, when recognized and accepted, may allow the police to "individualize" their service. To properly identify and effectively serve this community, two things must occur. First, lines of communication--both formal and informal--must develop between the police and the citizens of the community. Second, citizens must have a direct input on policy-making processes when the effect of a policy in any way will be felt in the community (as it inevitably will). Recognition that such procedures are integral in an honest relationship with the community will ensure that they are developed and properly maintained.

It should be apparent then, that a police department able to understand the true scope of police-community relations as described above and then willing to open communications with the people of the community in order to provide better service will be forced to reprioritize its very objectives. As Fink and Sealy have aptly noted; "Community, no matter how we define it, will react positively to police activity that protects its interests and negatively when police activity is either a nuisance or a real intrusion on personal freedom."⁵² As described earlier, the public demands significant amounts of service, order maintenance, and conflict management, and the "professional" model of law enforcement is simply not primarily concerned with such activity. A community oriented police will acknowledge these social services as its prime purpose and stress the continued improvement of their delivery.

Accepting the above as basic objectives of this reorientation of police toward the community requires that attention turn to the process by which it may best be achieved. The police must first have a way of identifying the unique interests of the local community or neighborhood, and then must allow feedback to reach the department concerning the public's reaction to police practices. The question to be answered then, is how best might police structure their activities to recognize the "interests" of a community and achieve the desired positive reaction from it. R. Myren believes that "present (police) policies to which neighborhoods react negatively, particularly ghetto neighborhoods, can be made responsive to neighborhood wishes only through political decentralization and through citizen participation in setting police practices"⁵³

Decentralization is a process by which authority--hence accountability--for the making and carrying out of administrative policy will be transferred from the level of the entire jurisdiction to officials specifically responsible to the citizens of the sub-units of the entire body. The obvious result is a greater responsiveness to the unique needs of the community to which the official must account. What this would accomplish, in effect, is the stripping away of layers of bureaucracy insulating the municipal government from the special requirements of any particular segment of the governmental jurisdiction. Such decentralization will at minimum allow for--and hopefully will stimulate--the greater degree of citizen participation in police policy making. If for no other reason, this will occur because decisions that affect the community will be made at a level much more accessible to the residents of that community.

TEAM POLICING: POTENTIAL FOR REFORM

Recognizing that police-community relations is an orientation to the total activity of the department and that decentralization is perhaps the only means for the police to develop and maintain an effective relationship with the community has led to one experiment in police organizational reform that appears to serve these principles. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals advised in 1973 "that every police agency examine and test the Team-Policing concept to determine its value in improving the agency's efforts to reduce crime, improve the quality of police services, and enhance police-community relations".⁵⁴ This innovative approach to police service appeared to have the potential for dealing with the various conflicts that had been occurring with depressing regularity between the police and the public, and it is to this concept that I turn my attention.

The assumptions upon which team-policing is based, as described so completely by Myren, are that;⁵⁵

... street patrolmen and their first-line supervisors are capable of shouldering a great deal more responsibility than has been given them in the past; that support of the citizens living and working in the many discrete neighborhoods of our metropolitan areas, which is absolutely necessary for successful policing, can best be achieved by having a police sub-unit permanently assigned to each neighborhood; that the personnel of these subunits must get to know the people in the neighborhood through positive efforts to promote continuous dialogue in both formal and informal settings; and that assistance to the people, both in handling their crime problems and in helping them to make contact with the proper agencies to handle the myriad other problems of big city living, is the best means of achieving respect for, and support of, police operations.

These assumptions are clearly different than those that would underly the "bureaucratic-professional" model of police work, so it is vital to

understand how they might best be turned into practice.

At a basic level, the team policing model involves elements of modern progressive law enforcement combined with certain characteristics reminiscent of an earlier era in police work. As Gerald Caplan, the past director of the National Institute of Law Enforcement, has noted, "the concept of Neighborhood Team-Policing has attracted much interest as a method of combining the specialized services and equipment of large urban departments with the more personal contact of smaller departments."⁵⁶ In so combining these values, it is clear that a central bureaucracy with a decentralized authority and service-providing structure is required. Decentralization, as described in the earlier section, may be a key in the efforts of police to become more responsive to their communities, so it is important to look at what efforts in this direction will accomplish in terms of the police organization and mission.

Team Policing generates objectives for reform in four areas. First, in terms of organizational development, team-policing emphasizes the decentralization of the delivery of police services by increasing the management and operational responsibility of team leaders, first-line supervisors, and even the patrol officer himself. Since the desire is to establish accountability at the lowest possible level, team operations usually encourage participatory decision-making by all members. This service decentralization is best accomplished by the assignment of a relatively stable team to be responsible for a certain specific area.

Second, the role and responsibility of the line officer undergo significant expansion. The model for team-policing operations has been to a "generalist" officer who, as well as providing service response as a primary

responsibility, is also capable of providing certain technical services that were formerly the sole domain of department specialists. This expansion of the officer's responsibility is expected to increase the total level of service to the community as well as stimulating interest in--and the improvement of--police training programs.

Third, it is hoped that the team-policing concept will serve to reduce the level of crime in the community, as this is continually cited as an objective of any proposed police reform. Team-policing may have this effect by increasing the degree of officer-supervisor-investigator communication and coordination because of the closer interaction implied by decentralization. Also, the improvement of workload management (patrol allocation, personnel assignments, investigative priorities, etc.) may be expected as team leaders are able to identify the needs of the client community. An extra factor may be an increased willingness on the part of citizens to become actively involved in crime prevention as a result of closer contact with their police. Decentralization of the police organization, while not guaranteeing such an effect on the crime rate, appears, by its very nature, to encourage such trends.

Finally, concern for community relations poses objectives for the team-policing operation. Encouraging and rewarding attempts to develop these channels of information--again both formal (crime prevention programs, advisory councils, review boards, etc.) and informal--will be much more readily accomplished within the context of the decentralized police operation and the specific local neighborhood. Clearly here too the most significant feature is the decentralization that the team-policing concept requires, as these same

objectives--without the unique structure of team-policing--have all been sought before, though rarely achieved.⁵⁷

Objectives in the four areas described above, while characteristic of most team-policing proposals, have taken widely varied shapes as these proposals become operational. This, I think, speaks as explicitly as anything could to the fact of the individualization of the team-policing operation per the specific requirements of the community it serves. Accordingly, there have developed several different theoretical models of team-policing, as well as an array of practical models that have actually been implemented. The total number of available models seems to get larger each time a new agency establishes a neighborhood team-policing operation within its jurisdiction, but to emphasize, this points to a value in the concept, not a flaw.

For example, the Police Foundation noted seven general characteristics of team-policing in a study it conducted in 1973. These characteristics, all of which serve to achieve the objectives described above, are as follows:⁵⁸

1. Geographic stability of patrol; i.e. permanent assignment of teams of police to small neighborhoods
2. Maximum interaction among team members, including close internal communication among all officers assigned to an area during a 24-hour period, seven days a week
3. Maximum communication among team members and the community
4. Unity of supervision
5. Lower-level flexibility in policy-making
6. Unified delivery of services
7. Combined investigative and patrol functions

The Foundation carefully examined seven team-policing programs and found each of these characteristics operationalized in different ways. Significantly,

it also noted that of these programs, all clearly team-policing operations in style and objective, only two exhibited all seven characteristics. This again points to the necessity of the individualization of these programs.

To briefly examine this history of this particular reform, it was seen for the very first time in Aberdeen, Scotland, in 1948. Because of the emphasis even then, ⁵⁸ decentralizing authority and encouraging citizen involvement in police practice, it was very similar to the modern programs in the United States. Team-policing made its way to the United States very slowly and did not appear here until the city of Syracuse attempted the innovation in 1968. Finding success in several ways, team-policing was tried in several other cities over the next few years, and finally achieved national recognition. With the recommendation of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, encouraging consideration of team-policing and the publication of the series of case studies by the Police Foundation in 1973, it became obvious that the basic concept would achieve wide attention as a means to solve many of the problems law enforcement was facing at the time. ⁵⁹ Later that year, the National Institute of Law Enforcement published a "Prescriptive Package" as a guide to the implementation of team-policing, and more agencies began experimenting with such programs. ⁶⁰ In fact, the National Sheriff's Association estimated that in 1976, more than 60 police agencies in the country were using a variety of a team-policing operation. ⁶¹

While, as stated above, there are as many different models of team-policing as there are operational programs, the basic concept of decentralization has remained the same, and accordingly, evaluations of effectiveness have been made and compared. Most team-policing programs that have been implemented have

have included an evaluation of sufficient thoroughness and quality to warrant generalizations. As one of the first attempts to compile these evaluation reports indicated, "While some evaluations have been conducted, . . . results that have been reported are generally not scientifically satisfactory. However, some important facts have emerged from the nation's early attempts to use neighborhood teams."⁶²

These results and findings, many being anecdotal in nature, still have underscored some important characteristics of team-policing groups in the cities of New York, Albany, and Cincinnati began to demand that their neighborhoods receive team-policing, and the police departments of St. Petersburg, Florida, and Holyoke, Massachusetts, also felt compelled to expand their programs. There had not yet been a disastrous failure and in fact only one effort had been discontinued--due primarily to the dislike of the entire concept by the new Commissioner of Police there.⁶³ This review found that the programs appeared to have a minimal effect on crime rates, but made mention of the possibility that, as citizen cooperation increased, a greater percentage of actual crime might be reported, hence, possibly worsening the crime rate.⁶⁴ This was the sort of problem that hampered many of the early attempts at evaluating the concept. As stated, the data reported had not yet been sufficient to validate any conclusions about team-policing, but the findings developed at this time were encouraging.

A much more thorough review of the entire subject was undertaken in 1976 by the National Sheriff's Association. They began with a similar criticism of the quality of earlier evaluations, but went on to discuss the real problems with conducting a thorough and scientifically valid evaluation of a team-policing unit. First, a real inadequacy in the standard measures

of goal attainment was noted. Objectives such as a reduced crime rate, improved community relations or increased citizen involvement made measurement very difficult. Second, the described problems with interviewing variables confounding possible results. Frequently a team-policing operation would be established concurrently with other major changes in a department, and to attribute either success or failure to the team-policing program would be a mistake. In at least one city, Albany, New York, the study noted a severe crime displacement, from a team-policing area, but evaluation methodology did not allow for a definite conclusion as to the cause.⁶⁵ Third, the cost of a truly scientific evaluation was very high. The Police Foundation spent more than \$800,000 on three years of evaluation of the team-policing program in Cincinnati, which the Sheriff's Association admitted had been a model program evaluation. It stated though, that despite the rigor and validity of data development and collection, certain slight "trade-offs" were still required.⁶⁶ The National Sheriff's Association also described political constraints that could affect the quality of the evaluation actually conducted, as well as limiting any potential impact of the findings.⁶⁷

The above problems are clearly of a magnitude that for all practical purposes preclude the local agency from conducting a valid evaluation of its own program. This study went on to say though, that a lack of scientifically validated conclusions could not be taken to mean that there were not benefits to such innovation. While noting the limitations on its findings, the National Sheriff's Association generated much more solid support for the concept of team-policing than had the earlier study by the National Institute of Law Enforcement. Among its findings were:⁶⁸

1. The simplified command structure stimulated better leadership and closer personal relationships among team members
2. The teams became very cohesive and coordinated, almost sometimes to a fault
3. Increased citizen cooperation with law enforcement efforts had been noted in certain areas
4. The relationships between officers and detectives improved dramatically
5. Increased levels of service began to occur

These statements were very encouraging for the future of community-oriented policing, and seemed to offer evidence that the original objectives of decentralization were perhaps being achieved, though possibly to varying degrees in different locations.

A study funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement of nineteen team-policing operations was completed in March, 1977, and it presented more specific findings and comparisons among the cities than had previously been attempted. This study found a marked increase in perceptions of support for police from the communities serviced by a neighborhood team-policing operation. Those programs that stressed non-crime related service reported an increase in the number of such calls that were handled. Several agencies reported reduced crime rates (especially those with a crime-specific prevention program), and significantly, almost every reporting agency claimed that their relationships with their client community had been improved as a result of team-policing. These encouraging findings, while being stated much more conclusively than had been done before, were highly suspect in the view of James Edgar, a police specialist at the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, who termed the methodology so flawed as to constitute a "waste of time."⁶⁹

These studies, while methodologically suspect in terms of making valid conclusions or comparisons among programs, nevertheless offer hope that the team-policing model of organization for law enforcement has solid potential for dramatically improving the state of police-community relations in the near future. Lacking sufficient expertise or resource to support the type of scientific evaluation that would be broadly applicable across the law enforcement community, local agencies may be expected to continue to experiment with these efforts in team-policing in this "haphazard" manner, and so bring about change. The basic principle of decentralized authority and a service orientation together with the individualization of the program to the unique requirements of a community still will underlie almost any form a team-policing operation will take, and this more than anything else may be the real value of the concept. The various police-community relations problems discussed in earlier sections are clearly much closer to resolution when approached this way, and therein may be the main support for neighborhood team-policing--the realization of open and trustful police-community relations.

CONCLUSION

In the course of this paper, I have attempted to show, from an historical context, how the state of police-community relations has reached its present state. In attempting to correct abuses in the politically vulnerable law enforcement structure earlier this Century, reforms were carried out that served to insulate police from political manipulation. In the process, though, the police lost communication and contact with their client communities at a fairly substantial cost in terms of its relationship with the community as witnessed by the disorder, hostility and tensions of the past decade. Clearly law enforcement is not capable of affecting in a material way those social conditions that lie at the root of this problem, but they are totally responsible when actions they take further aggravate the situation that already exists. Yet, police administrators have been unwilling to accept this role. At minimum, they should be doing nothing to make matters worse, and ideally--as the community's "servants"--should be taking positive steps to ameliorate these tensions.

Team-policing, in that it combines the advantages of decentralized police authority and accountability, with the benefits of a centralized and professional administrative structure, seems to offer hope as the "best-of-both-worlds". Though with the basic concept of neighborhood team-policing I could not agree more, I have avoided discussing the variety of models of team-policing that have sprung up for two reasons. First, there is a real lack of valid information that one model may in fact be more valuable than another, so to discuss their relative strengths would be largely a theoretical exercise that may tend to camouflage the values of the basic concept.

Second, what evidence there is suggests that the most important factor in successful implementation of a team-policing unit is a complete analysis of the department's--and the community's needs and objectives and the careful consideration of what specific policies will best meet them. Individualization is the key to success with a team-policing operation, and over-concern with specific models might cause merely duplication instead of individualization--probably a costly mistake.

It must be noted here too, that the case I have presented to support further experimentation and implementation of neighborhood team-policing, while hopefully conclusive, is certainly not complete, and I will mention briefly other theories and/or evidence that, with further explanation and analysis, might also support the concepts team-policing is based upon. First, in dealing with the question, from a community perspective, I have ignored the questions of "social isolation," "solidarity," and other internal "defense" mechanisms among police--both singly and collectively--that Skolnick describes so well.⁷¹ The Task Force Report also made the connection that such characteristics are probably involved in the difficulties of police-community relations, and accordingly, may be resolved somewhat with team-policing style operations.⁷²

Then, on a more theoretical side, Katz and Kahn offer some insight into what types of earlier roles are truly compatible with a semi-military, hierarchical bureaucracy as most of our police departments have been. There are clear implications here to police work in general. McGregor, his discussion of "Theory X" vs. "Theory Y" values, gives real recognition to the actual task of police in our society, and as such, his work is applicable to this topic of team-policing. On a philosophical level, Reiman argues the case

that the question of whether police should allow themselves to be "controlled" by their community is an irrelevant one, as he believes, and I think with solid foundation, that communities have the moral right to control their police.⁷³ To properly present and defend a case for neighborhood team-policing, theories such as those above, evidence such as that presented by Skolnick and the Task Force, and the values described in the body of the paper, should all be included and developed.

And even if the weight of all this would not be enough, Dante Andreotti offers one final argument that may make a difference,⁷⁴

"Neighborhood control over the police might or might not work. It might produce far more citizen cooperation with the police and far better control of crime, or it might result in confusion and inefficiency. However, past performance dictates that something new must be tried."

FOOTNOTES

1. Folley, V., p. 48. "The worst slums or ghettos of today cannot begin to match the conditions then existing in Great Britain."
2. Brown, Douglas G., The Rise of Scotland Yard, p.82-86., in Folley, p. 51.
3. Coe, A.C., The Irrepressible Conflict, in Task Force Report: The Police, p. 4.
4. Schlesinger, A.M., A History of American Life, vol. 10, in Task Force Report: The Police.
5. Richardson, p. 29.
6. Richardson, p. 46.
7. Richardson, pp. 107-111.
8. Richardson, p. 90.
9. Wickersham Commission, p. 1.
10. Task Force Report: The Police, p. 1.
11. Platt and Cooper, p. 64.
12. Kenney, p. 19.
13. Richardson, p. 131.
14. Neiderhoffer, 1969, pp. 17-18.
15. Skolnick, J., "Professional Policing in A Free Society".
16. Wilson, James Q., Varieties of Police Behavior.
17. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, in Whisenand, Police-Community Relations, p.385.
18. Platt and Cooper, p. 7.
19. James Baldwin, in Fink and Sealy, p. 41.
20. Task Force Report: The Police, pp. 146-147.
21. Ibid., p. 148.
22. Kerner Commission, p. 147.
23. Stark, pp. 125-131.
24. per Niederhoffer, p. 10.
25. Richardson, p. 151.
26. Ibid., p. 150.
27. T. Bercal, "Calls for Police Assistance", in American Bar Assoc., p. 36.
28. G. Misner, reported in American Bar Assoc., p. 35.
29. for example, a study by Wilson of the Syracuse Police Dept. showed barely 10% to be "crime-fighting" calls. Parnas, studying the Chicago Police showed 17%.
30. Wallach, Police Function In a Negro Community: 1970, p. 6, reported in Goldsmith, p. 132.
31. Richardson, p. 150.
32. Campbell, p. 291.
33. Rubin, "Police Identity and the Police Role", in Goldsmith, p. 134.
34. Ibid., p. 138.
35. Wilson, J.Q., in Whisenand, p. 9.
36. Kerner Commission, p. 147.
37. Quotes in this section all from Kerner Commission, pp. 148-155.
38. Wasserman, et.al., p. 1.
39. Whisenand, p.vii.
40. Michigan State University, p. 3.
41. Ibid., p. 4.
42. Wasserman, et.al., p. 1.
43. Brown, p. 43.
44. Wasserman, et.al., p. 1.
45. Ibid., p. 4.


46. Ibid., p. 2.
47. Niederhoffer, p. 19.
48. Ahern, p. 221.
49. Lipsky, p. 400.
50. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, p. 18.
51. Brandstatter and Radelet, Police and Community Relations: A Sourcebook, in Niederhoffer, p. 3.
52. Fink and Sealy, p. 23.
53. Myren, p. 729.
54. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, p. 78.
55. Myren, p. 721.
56. National Sheriff's Assoc., Neighborhood Team Policing: An Assessment, p. vii.
57. Ibid., p. 8.
58. Sherman, et.al., pp.3-7.
59. Ibid.
60. Bloch and Specht.
61. National Sheriff's Assoc., Issues in Team Policing, p. 11.
62. Bloch and Specht, p. 1.
63. in Detroit, Mich.
64. Bloch and Specht, pp. 1-5.
65. National Sheriff's Assoc., Neighborhood Team Policing: An Assessment, p. 105.
66. Ibid., pp. 72-74.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., pp. 23-111.

69. National Evaluation Program--Phase One Summary Report: Neighborhood Team Policing.
70. Personal interview, April 8, 1976 at NCJRS.
71. see Skolnick, Justice Without Trial.
72. Task Force Report: The Police, pp. 145-151.
73. see Katz and Kahn, Social Psychology of Organizations, also McGregor, Human-Side of Enterprise, also, Reiman, "Police Authority vs. Police Autonomy", in Goldsmith.
74. in Brown, p. 40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ahern, J., Police In Trouble, Hawthorne Books, 1972.
2. American Bar Association, The Urban Police Function, American Bar Association, 1973.
3. Bloch and Specht, R., Neighborhood Team Policing--A Prescriptive Package, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S.G.P.O., 1973.
4. Brown, L., Police Community Relations Evaluation Project, NILECJ, U.S.G.P.O., 1970.
5. Fink, J. and Sealy, L., Community and the Police--Conflict or Cooperation?, Wiley and Sons, 1974.
6. Fox, et.al., Introduction to Criminal Justice, Prentice Hall, 1975.
7. Folley, V., American Law Enforcement, Holbrook Press, 1973.
8. Goldsmith and Goldsmith, The Police Community, Palisades Publishers, 1974.
9. Gay, W., Neighborhood Team Policing: Summary Report, National Evaluation Program--Phase I, NILECJ, U.S.G.P.O., 1977.
10. Kenney, J.P., "Team Policing Organization--A Theoretical Model", Police Magazine, August, 1972, pp. 17-22.
11. Lipsky, M., "Street-Level Bureaucracy", Urban Affairs Quarterly, June, 1971, pp. 391-409.
12. McGregor, D., Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw-Hill, 1961.
13. Michigan State University--Center of Police-Community Relations, National Survey of Police and Community Relations, U.S.G.P.O., 1967.
14. Multnomah County, Oregon, Dept. of Public Safety, Team Policing Proposal, unpublished, found in NCJRS Library, 1976.
15. Myren, R., "Decentralization and Citizen Participation in the Criminal Justice System", Public Administration Review, October, 1972, pp. 718-732.
16. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report (The Kerner Commission), U.S.G.P.O., 1968.
17. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Final Report, U.S.G.P.O., 1973.
18. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Vol. 13, The Police (The Wickersham Commission), U.S.G.P.O., 1931.
19. National Sheriff's Association, Issues in Team Policing, NILECJ, U.S.G.P.O., 1976.
20. National Sheriff's Association, Neighborhood Team Policing: An Assessment, NILECJ, U.S.G.P.O., 1976.
21. Niederhoffer, A., New Directions in Police Community Relations, Rinehart Press, 1974.
22. Platt and Cooper, Iron Fist and Velvet Glove, Garrett Press, 1975.
23. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Police, U.S.G.P.O., 1967.
24. Public Safety Research Institute, Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing: Planning for Implementation, NILECJ, U.S.G.P.O., 1975.
25. Richardson, J. F., Urban Police in the United States, Kennikat Press, 1974.
26. Sherman, L., et al., Team Policing--Seven Case Studies, The Police Foundation, 1973.
27. Skolnick, J., Justice Without Trial, John Wiley and Sons, 1966.
28. Stark, R., Police Riots, Wadsworth, 1972.
29. Wasserman, P., et al., Improving Police-Community Relations, NILECJ, U.S.G.P.O., 1973.
30. Whisenand, P., et al., Police-Community Relations, Goodyear Publishing, Inc., 1974.
31. Wilson, J. Q., Varieties of Police Behavior, Harvard University Press, 1968.
32. Wilson, O. W., and McLaren, R., Police Administration, McGraw-Hill, 1972 ed.

┌
└



END