THE REACTIONS TO CRIME PAPERS

CENTER FOR URBAN AFFAIRS
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND THE PRODUCTION

OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM:

THE CASE OF FEAR OF CRIME

REACTIONS TO CRIME PROJECT

CENTER FOR URBAN AFFAIRS

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To the memory of Peter McKeon.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Fear of crime is a major social problem in urban America. Surveys tell us that close to 50 percent of the adult urban population is afraid to be out at night in their own neighborhood. The media informs us through dramatic stories that fear has crippled individuals and limited their freedom to lead normal, productive lives. Government agencies at the federal, state and local levels have implemented programs to reduce the fear of crime among selected populations. Some commentators have gone so far as to label the fear of crime one of the principal causes of the decline of city life.* Yet our knowledge of that fear, and the conceptual framework through which we view it as a problem, have not, for the most part, been scrutinized very closely.

This essay attempts to explain the distribution of fear of crime in American cities and in doing so hopes to improve upon the theoretical framework which has guided the scholarly discussion of the fear of crime to date.

I approach the study of fear of crime from what I call the <u>social control perspective</u>. This perspective is adapted from the "Chicago School" of Sociology's orientation to the study of the city and urban community life. I will argue that the level of fear in a community is a consequence of the level of social disorganization perceived by its residents. If an urban community has the capacity, through its local

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*For example, "fear of crime has made life in the inner city so unbearable as to threaten the health of an entire city--especially a city like Chicago with a large and growing black population." <u>Chicago Tribune</u> editorial (August 16, 1979).

institutions (families, churches, voluntary associations, etc.), to combat the growth of the signs of disorganization then fear levels will be modified. If local institutions cannot exert social control and regulate these signs of disorganization then fear will be increased.

Through an analysis of four neighborhoods in Chicago I will demonstrate that fear levels are higher, not merely as a function of rising crime rates, but more as a result of the declining capacity of local institutions to control the social disorganization residents perceive around them.

I was drawn to this older tradition in the study of crime and its impact because of what I plan to show are the inadequacies of the contemporary, more conventional, approach to the study of fear of crime. The recent literature on fear of crime has been dominated by what I call the victimization perspective. This perspective, often implicit in the major studies, treats fear as a response to victimization. It assumes that an individual's report of being fearful is a direct consequence of experiencing crime as a victim. I will argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that this approach is too narrow and, by focusing on psychological responses to victimization, fails to take account of the political and social structures which play an important role in shaping the fears of citizens. The central issue is not that individualistic psychological perspectives are without utility, but that when they are used in a vacuum they result in a partial (some would say ideological) understanding of the issue.

The social control perspective treats fear as a consequence of the incapacity of local institutions to exert social control. It analyzes

changes in the community as the precipitant of a fearful citizenry. The victimization experiences of residents must be placed in a community context in order to understand the impact of those experiences on fear. Victimizations will only increase fear when local institutions have lost the capacity to exert social control and maintain the integrity of the local moral order.

In the chapters to follow I will describe the social control perspective and the victimization perspective and analyze their theoretical assumptions and intellectual traditions. Chapter One describes the development of the social control perspective as it emerged as a general theoretical orientation at the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology in the second quarter of the twentieth century. Particular attention is paid to the importance of urbanization and its impact on community life as the central issue of the emerging discipline of Sociology. In Chapter Two the social control perspective is applied to the study of fear of crime. Building primarily on the work of Gerald Suttles (a contemporary scholar in the "Chicago School" tradition), the concepts of "invasion," "signs of disorganization" and "provincialism" are introduced to explain how and why fear surfaces in urban communities. Chapter Three charts the intellectual decline of the social control perspective and the transition to motivational theories of crime and delinquency. I then discuss how this shift in emphasis affected the social policy initiative of the 1960's, and led to the formulation of the victimization perspective by the end of that decade. The theoretical construction of the new perspective is discussed in terms of the work of Biderman, Ennis and Reiss. I describe the underlying assumptions

which they employed and relate these assumptions to the changes in criminological theory which had taken place within the generation preceding their efforts.

In Chapter Four the discussion moves to the idea of community. Both perspectives treat the preservation of community as an important objective. I discuss the different approaches to that objective which are implicit in the construction of the two perspectives. I show how community, or the lack of it, is treated as a consequence of fear within the victimization perspective and how community is treated as a con-textual variable within the social control perspective. I then discuss the implications of these differing approaches for our understanding of the relationship between fear of crime and community solidarity. I extend this discussion of community into an analysis of the policy implications of the two perspectives. I argue that the victimization perspective has spawned a series of policy initiatives commonly referred to as Community Crime Prevention. I show how these initiatives are guided by the perspective and what the consequent design limitations are of these policies. I then discuss the contours of a policy which would be informed by the social control perspective and outline some of that perspective's policy limitations.

In Chapter Five, Six and Seven, I operationalize the theoretical discussion in an empirical analysis of fear of crime in four urban communities in Chicago. My purpose is to explore the distinctions between the perspectives by comparing their relative explanatory power in the same settings. The analysis is secondary, that is, I am using survey instruments and fieldwork data which were not designed to test

the efficacy of the two perspectives, but which can be applied to a discussion of their relative ments. My principle aim is to sharpen the distinction between the perspectives as explanations of the distribution of fear of crime. Consequently this empirical analysis should be viewed as illustrative, and informative rather than definitive.

Chapter Five describes the four communities demographically and outlines the crime problems in each of the areas. Then key concepts within the victimization perspective are operationalized and with the use of official crime reports, the amount and spatial distribution of crime is carefully described. In Chapter Six, I turn to data collected with a random digit dialing telephone survey to determine resident perceptions of specific crime problems in each community and how those assessments are related to personal risk estimates. I then compare the communities on scales of crime problems, risk assessments and amounts of crime, and find several inconsistencies in the relationships one would expect from the victimization perspective. In Chapter Seven the social control perspective is operationalized and applied to the communities. The concept of "incivility" is introduced to explain some of the discrepancies found in the previous analysis and to illustrate the relative merit of going beyond the victimization perspective to account for the fear levels in communities. Several other refinements are suggested to enhance our understanding of fear through the social control perspective.

I conclude in Chapter Eight with a discussion of fear of crime as a social problem. Guided by the sociological discussion of the construction of social problems, I analyze several of the contemporary works on fear of crime and note their concern about social control,

but their inability to link <u>conceptually</u> that concern with an analysis

of the problem. Finally, I suggest that the motivational theory implicit

in the victimization perspective, while imbedded in the mainstream of

conventional social science, is inadequate to the task of explaining fear

of crime in urban America.

CHAPTER ONE

FEAR OF CRIME AND THE IDEA OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Research interest in the fear of crime developed as a concomitant of the interest in the late sixties in assessing the "true" amount of crime in our society. Funded by the National Commission on Crime and the Administration of Justice, these studies attempted to determine both the level of crime and the level of fear Americans were experiencing. The primary interest of these scholars was in assessing "the dark figure" of crime, that is, those unreported and underreported crimes whose magnitude was not reflected in the official crime statistics of police departments. From the outset, rape, murder, burglary, robbery and assault were the crimes on which attention was focused. Fear, from this perspective, was of interest to the extent that it could be matched to the true amount of crime in an area. What emerged from this work was a series of findings which demonstrated the lack of concordance between level of fear and the amount of crime in the study sites (Reiss, 1967; Biderman, 1967). As the official crime rate began to rise in the early 1960's the Commission funded several scholars to take a closer look at the impact of this increase on urban residents. These early studies reported no simple, direct, linear relationship between victim-ization and fear. The victimization experiences of an individual did not predict his or her fear level. Building on this work, the Census Bureau initiated what have come to be known as the LEAA Victimization Surveys. These national surveys measured both the personal and commercial victim-ization levels in the major U.S. cities. Again, as a secondary considera-tion, fear of crime was measured, but here the emphasis was on the

distribution of fear among demographic groups. Analysis of these

data was limited to inter-city comparisons and reporting variations in

fear levels by demographic sub-population within large national samples.

Analysts of the victimization surveys discovered, just as their pre-

decessors had earlier, that fear of crime was often prevalent among

precisely the groups (i.e., the elderly) which were least victimized

(Skogan, 1976). While young black males consistently reported the most

victimizations and the least amount of fear, fear was highest among

older females (both black and white) who reported the fewest victimiza-

tions of any demographic group. Scholars have attempted to explain

this apparent paradox by employing more and more sophisticated analytic

techniques to the questions of both the amount of crime in the environment

and the dimensions of fear reported by respondents. Through the refine-

ment of measurement techniques and more sophisticated analytic procedures

some progress was made in explaining the apparent discrepancy between

the amount of crime to which people were exposed and the level of fear

they reported (Hindelang, Gottfriedson and Garofalo, 1978).

The work of Biderman, Reiss and Ennis set the tone for the scholar-

ship on fear of crime in the 1970's. Most of the research on fear of

crime which followed this early work found no consistent relationship

between fear of crime and the victimization experiences of the respon-

dent (McIntyre, 1967; Boggs, 1971; Conklin, 1971; Fowler and Mangione,

1974; and Hindelang, 1974). There were also a few studies which did

report a positive relationship between victimization and fear (Feyer-

hern and Hindelang, 1974; and Kleinman and David, 1973). In reviewing

this literature it becomes apparent that the implicit hypothesis that

victimizations predict fear is not substantiated. Some scholars have
begun to question whether this perspective is the most appropriate
framework for approaching the issue of fear of crime. Most recently
Garofalo and Laub (1979), after reviewing the literature, make this
point forcefully.

> All of the factors discussed above—the ambiguous
> relationship between victimization and the fear of
> crime, the indications that crime is not generally
> perceived as an immediate threat, and the mixing
> of fear of crime with fear of strangers—point
> to the conclusion that what has been measured in
> research as the "fear of crime" is not simply fear
> of crime (Victimology, p. 246).

Biderman himself hinted at a potentially more useful perspective
over a decade ago.

> We have found that attitudes of citizens regarding
> crime are less affected by their past victimization
> that by their ideas about what is going on in their
> community—fears about a weakening of social controls
> on which they feel their safety and the broader fabric
> of social life is ultimately dependent (1967:160).

Hunter was led to a similar conclusion in a more recent discussion.

> (F)ear in the urban environment is above all a fear of
> social disorder that may come to threaten the individual.
> I suggest that this fear results more from experiencing
> incivility than from direct experience with crime
> itself (1978:9).

The notion that fear may be more directly related to the issue of
social control and the local social or moral order offers the possibility
of an alternative conceptual framework. The idea of social control has
a long tradition of theoretical development in sociology and the use of
that tradition to study fear of crime may not only explain more about
that problem, but also shed some light on the role of victimization in
the fear production process.

After developing the concepts of social control and fear of crime
in some detail, I will analyze the victimization perspective and show
why the empirical findings in this perspective have been so limited.
The problems may be less a function of methodology and more an issue
of theorectical orientation.

Janowitz (1978) has recently discussed the history of the idea of
social control in sociological theory. He argues that the concept
originally was defined as "a perspective which focuses on the capacity
of a social organization to regulate itself" (p. 29). The social
control perspective became a central theoretical concept for the American
discipline of sociology in the 1920's. Park and Burgess' (1925)
assertion that "all social problems turn out to be problems of social
control," takes on new meaning in the light of Janowitz's discussion.

The social control perspective developed theoretically through the
study of city life begun in the Department of Sociology at the University
of Chicago. The perspective was part of a reaction to the evolutionary
theories of Spencer and Comte which emphasized the historical development
of society from lower forms of savagery to the present heights of
civilization. Evolutionary thinking was viewed as inherently conservative,
anti-empirical and generally incapable of explaining the poverty, vice
and human misery so prevalent in American cities at the turn of the
century. While Toennies and Durkheim extended the evolutionary tradition
into the twentieth century, a group of scholars at the University of
Chicago drew upon the metaphors of natural history and biology to
counter the pessimistic theorizing of European scholars. Reformist in
temperament, these men were developing tools to study the fast growing

metropolis which was shooting up around them, and the changes which were taking place in local urban communities. Led by Parks, Burgess and McKenzie, whose The City was published in 1925, the scholars formulated an approach to the study of society which for the next twenty-five years dominated the new academic discipline of sociology.

The "Chicago School" as they came to be known, borrowed from the evolutionary thinkers a concern about social change and the nature of community. They sought to examine the changes which were taking place in the structure of the local communities, and how these communities were accommodating themselves to the pressures of city life.

Park, Burgess, Wirth and others focused on understanding the effect urbanization (as a particular variant of social change) was having on city dwellers, particularly the newly arrived poor European immigrants. From that theorizing emerged the notion that crime was the "natural" result of the process at work in cities and that urban communities faced serious problems in maintaining social control in the face of these processes. The conceptual link between social change and social control was the concept of social disorganization. For social change in the city affected local communities in a variety of ways, disrupting social control and introducing forms of deviance (including crime and delinquency) as a consequence of that disruption. Carey (1975) gives us a good working definition of social disorganization.

> A socially disorganized community is one unable to
> realize its values. The consequences of disorganiz-
> ation (delinquency, dependency, desertion, truancy,
> high rates of mental illness, etc.) are considered
> undesirable by most of the citizens who live in the
> disorganized community--they would do something about
> them if they could. The characteristic response to
> the question, "disorganized from whose viewpoint?"
> was "disorganized from the viewpoint of the people
> who live there" (p. 107).

Social control is "the means of doing something about them" and as such plays a pivotal role in how the major social forces of city life effect the social organization of local communities.

Members of the Department of Sociology differed in how they operationalized the concept of social disorganization. Thomas and Znaniecki (1939) were among the first to discuss how communities and families became disorganized under the pressure of urban city life. Park, too, had an approach to social disorganization, specifying a process of organization and reorganization, as the capacity to regulate social life reemerged. There were a number of scholars working with the idea of disorganization (Landesco, 1929; Shaw and McKay, 1942; etc.) who treated the disorganization as an "objective" judgement about the state of the community. As Carey (1975) points out in his discussion of the "social disorganization paradigm," there were a variety of approaches to defining and measuring the concept, but they all hinged on analysis of how city life disrupted the local social order. Contrasting city life to folk ways, Wirth (1938), for example, argued that density, heterogeneity and number increased mobility, insecurity, and instability, leading to the establishment of formal controls to mitigate the personal disorganization in the city.

> The close living together and working together of
> individuals who have no sentimental and emotional
> ties fosters a spirit of competition, aggrandizement,
> and mutual exploitation. To counteract irresponsi-
> bility and potential disorder, formal control tends
> to be resorted to (1938:15).

Given this general set of factors, the social and cultural institutions at the local or neighborhood level are not capable of performing their socialization and social control functions, and criminal activity

follows. The family, church, friends and neighbors cannot counter the
dysfunctional influences of the city which lead to social disorganization
and criminal activity in the urban community.

> It is probably the breaking down of local attachments
> and the weakening of restraints and inhibitions of the
> primary group, under the influence of the urban environ-
> ment, which are largely responsible for the increase
> of vice and crime in great cities (Park, 1970:25).

Primary face to face relations, which had been the basis of social control
in less complicated societies, are inadequate control mechanisms in the
context of the urbanization process (Smith, 1979). This is especially
true for second generation immigrants (those born in the United States)
who felt less tied to the traditions of the old country (Wirth, 1933)
and are pulled towards the deviant values of the metropolis.

Crime within this theoretical orientation is the direct result of
the pressures of city life. Rather than being an aberration due to
individual character disorder, it is the anticipated consequence of the
effects of disorganization on local community. A theory of the city
"explains" criminality. For as city life disorganizes local communities,
crime increases. The Chicago scholars are clear as to how to solve the
crime problem, for that solution draws upon their general theory of
urbanization, social control, and social disorganization.

> The distinctive features of the urban mode of life
> are often seen sociologically as consisting of the
> substitution of secondary for primary contacts, the
> weakening of bonds of kinship and the declining
> social significance of the family, the disappearance
> of the neighborhood and the undermining of the
> traditional basis of social solidarity (Wirth, 1938:21).

Against this setting, the individual is forced into "voluntary
associations" to achieve his ends.

> Being reduced to a stage of virtual impotence as
> an individual the urbanite is bound to exert himself
> by joining with others of similar interest into
> organized groups to obtain his ends. This results in
> the enormous multiplication of voluntary organizations
> directed toward as great a variety of objectives as
> there are human needs and interests (Wirth, 1938:22).

Crime could only be reduced if local communities could reassert the

primacy of their values over the insidious influences of city life. The

voluntary association is particularly well suited to the exercise of

social control for it allows the community to assert its values.

Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay adapted the social control perspective

to the particular problem of crime and community. The Chicago Area

Projects which were started in 1934 built on precisely the same theoretical

construct we have been describing, only in this case the scholars left the

classroom and applied that construct in the neighborhoods of Chicago

through a series of interventions. This practical application was

informed by a series of books on delinquency which were published in the

same period (e.g., Shaw and McKay, 1942; Shaw et al., 1929).

The project "attempts to deal with crime as a natural phenomenon,"

and focuses on local community as the place to take action.

> The essential logic of the Area Project becomes, then,
> one of discovering the pertinent social processes and
> significant cultural organization of the community as
> expressed in the institutions of local residents them-
> selves, and through these, introducing values consistent
> with the standards of conventional society (Burgess,
> Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23).

The prevention of crime is a matter of working through and with

local people and institutions to strengthen the community's capacity

to enforce "values consistent with the standards of conventional

society."

> If juvenile delinquency in the deteriorated areas is a
> function of the social life characteristics of these
> situations, it seems that a feasible approach to the
> changes in the attitudes, sentiments, codes, and moral
> standards of the neighborhood as a whole (Burgess, Lohman
> and Shaw, 1937:22).

Through the Chicago Area Project the forces of urbanization can be mitigated. "Society has here an opportunity to discover and encourage forces which will make the local community, insofar as is possible, independently effective in dealing with its own problems" (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23). As Kobrin (1959) pointed out, from this perspective it is city life, not individual pathologies which generate crime. And if crime and its consequences are to be alleviated, social control, meaning the ability of the local group to control its members, has to be reinstated.

> Thus, the theory on which the Area Project program is
> based is that, taken in its most general aspect,
> delinquency as a problem in the modern metropolis is
> principally a product of the breakdown of the machinery
> of spontaneous social control (Kobrin, 1959:22).

The Chicago Area Project attempted to enlist indigenous leadership working through local institutions in the fight against crime. This emphasis on voluntary participation at the neighborhood level was central, given a definition of crime as the process of value erosion. Only by combatting social disorganization (as indicated by delinquency and crime rates) could local communities become more decent places to live.

Crime could be prevented if the community changed itself. The forces of urbanization could be mitigated by local action. This link between crime prevention and community was forged conceptually over forty years ago. It was based on a theory of social disorganization

in which the city's influence was negative; weakening social control
and leaving the individual adrift. Crime was one of many negative
outcomes of this process and it followed from the theory that preventing
crime was a function of strengthening the local community in its
attempt to assert social control. The emphasis on voluntary associations
and local citizen action followed from an analysis of social bonds
which emphasized the importance of primary social relations over the
secondary relations manufactured in the metropolis. Crime could be
curbed only if social institutions rather than criminal justice
institutions (courts, probation, police, etc.) were strengthened. To
prevent crime the impact of city life has to be mitigated by the
strengthening of socializing and controlling institutions in the
community.

This formulation of the problem has structured the discussion of
crime and community for the last fifty years. If crime is by definition
the result of the introduction of deviant values, then appropriate
values must be taught and reinforced by local institutions if crime
is to be reduced.

To summarize, the social control perspective explains the distri-
bution of crime and delinquency (as well as other forms of deviance) in
terms of the effects of city life on the local urban community's
capacity to regulate itself. Since this capacity varies in different
communities depending in part upon the external forces (demographic,
urban and economic) impinging on the community and in part on the
strength and viability of those local institutions which exert social
control, the study of crime and delinquency is often comparative,

assessing the levels of crime and delinquency in different communities in one metropolitan area. It was hypothesized that social change led to social disorganization in communities which could not exert social control. Shaw and McKay (1942) described the higher rates of delinquency they found in the communities most affected by the growth of the city, and true to the logical assumptions of the social control perspective they prescribed strong doses of local social control as the antidote to that delinquency problem.

There are three general theoretical implications of this perspective which are important to bear in mind as the perspective is applied to the study of fear of crime. First, the perspective focuses on differences between communities rather than individuals in the occurrence of criminal and delinquent behavior. The major orientation in the study of causes of crime throughout this century has been towards explaining why the individual commits deviant acts. Emphasis has been on articulating the personal motivations and influences which lead the individual to criminal activity. From phrenology through psychoanalysis, criminologists have attempted to explain the occurrence of deviance by the interaction of personal attributes and the individual's socialization experiences. As Kornhauser (1978) points out in her discussion of theories of delinquency, an over-reliance on personal motivations and sub-cultural influences has limited the explanatory power of most delinquency studies.

The social control perspective emphasizes institutional and contextual variables in explaining differences in community characteristics. This will be particularly important as the perspective is applied to the fear of crime, for the study of fear has mostly focused

on the demographic patterns of individual variations in fear rather
than the structural issue of its distribution among local communities.

Second, the social control perspective emphasizes social change
as a catalyst for the emergence of social problems. Thus, the investi-
gation must relate the structural transformation of the city to the
distribution of crime and delinquency. The differential distribution
of resources contributes to that transformation. Shifts in population,
density, business growth or decline all effect the development of social
problems. The impact of these forces is felt in varying degrees by
communities with varying racial and income compositions as well as the
more subtle influences of institutional strength and indigenous
leadership.

Finally, the criteria for assessing the extent of the social
problem are comparative. The seriousness of a social problem is a
function of the local community's capacity to cope with the relative
effects of social disorganization. Understanding the relative serious-
ness of a problem means comparing the impact of social disorganization on
differing communities. Standards for description as well as treat-
ment are derived empirically from the differing levels of deviance and
not from an arbitrary judgement based on some ideal notion of health
or normality imputed to individuals. These three features of the social
control perspective should be remembered as the discussion now turns
to applying the perspective to the study of fear of crime.

CHAPTER TWO

ADAPTING THE SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE
TO THE STUDY OF FEAR OF CRIME

Fear of crime is a problem in communities which do not have the capacity to regulate themselves. Communities which can exert social control through local institutions will have less fear than communities which cannot. For fear is the consequence of changes in the social organization of the community. As these changes are perceived by local residents they become fearful. Fear can be modified by the exertion of social control. There are many indicators of social disorganization for residents. Where these signs of disorganization go unchecked by local institutions fear increases. Where the signs of disorganization are checked by local action fear is reduced. Fearful communities are communities which cannot defend the local "moral order" in the face of social changes in the area. An example of social disorganization should help clarify the point.

Snodgrass (1976) and Molotch (1979) allude to the importance of business growth in the social control perspective. The expansion of business creates crime by disrupting the lives of city dwellers.

> Under the pressure of the disintegrative forces which
> act when business and industry invade a community,
> the community thus invaded ceases to function
> effectively as a means of social control. Traditional
> norms and standards of the conventional community
> weaken and disappear. Resistance on the part of
> the community to delinquent and criminal behavior
> is low, and such behavior is tolerated and may even
> become accepted and approved (Shaw, et al., 1929:24).

This notion of "invasion" offers an interesting, if undeveloped, insight into the process which makes crime a problem for a neighborhood.

First, this invasion implies the introduction of exogeneous influences into the life of the community. Shaw hypothesized that business and industry expanded into residential areas, weakening traditional norms. Land which was originally used and controlled by residents was not controlled by businesses, and that transfer of land destroyed in some unspecified ways the operative social controls. This hypothesis was developed in the 1920's in Chicago when the central business and commercial district was expanding. The influence of Burgess' concentric zone theory is evident in Shaw's approach (Burgess, Lohmen and Shaw, 1937). The intrusion of business into residential areas caused significant upheaval.

Suttles (1968) has drawn upon and expanded that notion of invasion in his contemporary work on the moral order of urban communities. He sees diverse ethnic groups rather than businesses as the invaders and argues that moral order is dependent upon the capacity of each host community to modify if not control access to the area which it inhabits. This shift from business expansion to population movements reflects the decaying nature of the American metropolis in general and Chicago in particular. Contemporary cities in the industrialized Northeast have seen a steady erosion of their commercial base since World War II. The massive migration of blacks to the northern cities has replaced business expansion as the social force which most directly changes the shape and composition of urban communities. Suttles reflects this change in his emphasis on ethnic conflict and accommodation. He elaborates on the methods which residents use to assert social control (e.g., ordered segmentation).

> Each ethnic section of the Addams area differs from the
> others in the extent to which it possesses a standardized
> routine for managing safe social relations. There is,
> however, a general agreement upon the social categories
> beyond which associations are not pursued. The boundaries
> of the neighborhood itself form the outermost perimeter
> for restricting social relations. Almost all the resi-
> dents caution their wives, daughters, children, and siblings
> against crossing Roosevelt, Halsted, Congress, and
> Ashland. Within each neighborhood, each ethnic section
> is an additional boundary which sharply restricts
> movement (1968:225).

Suttles argues that fear and isolation are minimized to the extent

that "standardized routines for managing safe social relations" exist.

A fearful neighborhood, then, is one in which the signs of disorganization

(e.g., invasion) give rise to the sense that community standards are

no longer enforced or conformed to. It follows that the fear level in

a neighborhood can be reduced by attempts to control these signs of

disorganization. Where efforts are underway to reverse this trend

towards disorganization fear is often reduced. Communities which have

few signs of disorganization will have very little fear. Abandoned

buildings, vandalism (disregard for property), kids hanging around and

perceived drug use (inappropriate personal conduct) all signal the

moral decline of the area. Where attempts are made to combat these

problems through collective action, fear levels are lowered. By

exerting control over land use and access to the area fear is lessened.*

Suttles (1968) has termed this capacity "provincialism." In

areas where ethnic groups have the power, both privately through home

and business ownership, and publicly through locally based community

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*As Bernard (1973:151) points out, there is no guarantee that justice
will accompany this ordering activity.

organizations, to manage access into their areas and the activities in those areas, fear may be reduced even if the signs of disorganization are evident. The reason for this is that the disorganization is not conceived of as a consequence of invasion. The disorganization is perceived as an internal problem which can be managed through channels available to the neighborhood residents.

The ability of local institutions to resist the disorganization process is a function of their capacity to assert the legitimacy of local standards and to affect those activities inside the neighborhood which are contributing to the disorganization process (Suttles, 1968). When a community cannot assert its values, its residents become fearful. The social and political organization of the local community is the first line of defense against the encroachment of the "urban environment" (Bernard, 1973). Since the assertion of those values means the power to, if not dictate, at least influence, the decision making process in the public and private sectors which affect community life. Thus in the modern metropolis the political organization of the local community is equally as important as the social organization. In a great many instances that political organization may serve as the means for expressing the social organization.

Fear of crime from the social control perspective is a reaction to the decline of an area. The signs of the decline are captured in the general physical and moral disruption of community life. Those who are fearful may in fact see their risk of victimization increasing but they see this as a consequence of the moral decay of their community brought about by the invasion of forces which disrupt the social order.

To sum up, the social control perspective offers the following

explanation of the fear of crime. Crime for residents of urban neigh-

borhoods is a problem of the undermining of the conventional moral order.

Concern about crime, for the most part, focuses on the activities of

"invaders"* or adolescents in the neighborhood as potential offenders.

Residents are concerned that the neighborhood is losing its capacity to

control its young as well as the other forces which undermine the social

value system. Residents evaluate the extent of that deterioration

through a variety of public indicators including the deterioration of

property (abandoned buildings and vandalism) and the inappropriate

behavior of adolescents (hanging out and drug use). Fear of crime is

directly related to the signs of disorganization perceived by neighbor-

hood residents in that locality. As these signs become more prevalent,

fear becomes more prevalent. There are two factors which mediate this

relationship between fear and signs of disorganization. They are the

social integration of the neighborhood and what, following Suttles,

we call the provincialism of the area. The former factor is a social

dimension and the latter is political. In neighborhoods where there is

high social integration, signs of disorganization do not usually induce

high levels of fear. Communities which are integrated while reporting

that their risk is increased by these signs of disorganization, are

not as fearful as less integrated neighborhoods. The reason for this

is that risk can be managed through knowledge of the area. Knowledge

of the boundaries between ethnic groups in conflict, as well as

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*This notion of invaders parallels the "fear of strangers" concept
in the victimization perspective.

knowledge of individuals and areas which are dangerous, allows the integrated citizen to move through the environment carefully avoiding the dangerous areas. Consequently, because he knows the people and areas he should stay away from, his assessment of risk is relatively high, reflecting that assessment, but his fear is not proportionally as high because he knows how to avoid the danger.

Provincialism also has a modifying effect on fear in areas with many signs of disorganization. Provincialism is a political factor in that the community's capacity to regulate the movement of populations and land usage and to interact with those agencies which impinge upon and affect the community (e.g., municipal building departments) empowers residents to assert control.* The capacity to regulate and provide linkage is especially effective in reducing fear when that capacity is utilized to reduce the signs of disorganization (e.g., have abandoned buildings removed). Taub, et al. (1978) point out the importance of these linkages in the evolution of community organizations and emphasize the role of "external agents" in that evolution. While we are in agreement that community organizations are more an expression of local political development than a consequence of social integration, the ability to cement those linkages is far more important for fear reduction in the community than the fact that those linkages might have been externally induced.

Fear then is a function of the signs of disorganization in an area. Where those signs are extensive, their effect can be mitigated.

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*Levi and Lipsky (1972) discuss this same capacity but from a sociology of protest orientation.

CHAPTER THREE

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF THE
SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE VICTIMIZATION PERSPECTIVE

The social control perspective has not been without its critics
and critiques. Indeed the emergence of the victimization perspective
is directly tied to the general shift in emphasis away from the social
control perspective after World War II. In this chapter I will review
that shift in criminological theory and relate it to the major social
policies initiative of the early 1960's. I will then describe the
emergence of the victimization perspective as part of this general
shift of emphasis in a period of a rapidly rising national crime rate.

By the 1950's the social control perspective had been generally
discredited (Carey, 1975). Methodological difficulties (Gutterman,
1959) along with a critique of the perspective as inherently middle-
class and conservative (Mills, 1943) led to the general disenchantment.

The critique of the perspective began by the early 1940's. In 1939
two works had appeared which offered alternative theoretical explana-
tions for the emergence of crime and delinquency. Edwin H. Sutherland
published the third edition of his Principles of Criminology in 1939.
In that edition he outlined his theory of "differential association"
which described crime as a function of value conflicts between groups.
Educated at the University of Chicago, Sutherland depicted criminal
activity as the result of the socialization to values by one group which
clashed with the values of a more powerful group in the society. "The
conflict of cultures is the fundamental principle in the explanation of

crime" (1939:52). The values of one's intimates dictated the extent to which one respected the laws. Adherence to the law was learned from one's primary relation and if one's primary group felt no bond to the statutes then the individual could not. Rather than crime being a violation of commonly held values it was the adherence to values, just not the ones expressed in the criminal code.

Robert Merton, building on the Durkheimian tradition, published his "Social Structure and Anomie" in 1938. In that piece Merton develops a general theory of crime and delinquency. Merton assumes a general agreement upon values among all members of the society and suggests that deviance follows from the differential distribution of legitimate means to achieve those values. For example, all young men agree that being rich is important but the poor lack means (e.g., education, employment opportunities, etc.) for obtaining the end. Consequently illegitimate means (e.g., criminal activity) are used to achieve the commonly agreed upon ends.

Both Sutherland and Merton develop theories of socialization in contradiction to the social control perspective. Where the control theorists emphasize how city life distorts and dilutes the values of the local community, Sutherland and Merton emphasize the learned nature of criminal activity. For Merton and Sutherland crime is a consequence of learning all too well the lesson one's community is trying to teach, while Shaw and McKay, among others, see the community's incapacity to socialize as the catalyst for crime. Kornhauser (1978) distinguishes Merton's "Strain Theory" from Sutherland's "Cultural Deviance" approach on a variety of dimensions. However, for our

purposes it is their common reliance on personal motivations and socialization in their theorizing which is most important.

Both Merton and Sutherland explain crime and delinquency in terms of the factors which motivate individuals to commit deviant acts and both perceive the local sub-culture as the transmitting agent for the particular form those motivations take. These approaches are explanations of personal behavior based on cultural influences. Both men were more concerned with the "interactive process" (Matza, 1969) in their communities than with community differences in levels of social disorganization and social control.

Merton and Sutherland take the analysis of the relationship between crime and community in two very different directions. The latter draws the scholars' attention towards the interaction between peers in the community, while the former focuses on the differential opportunities available to adolescents in the community. In neither case are the particularly urban dimensions of the early Chicago thinkers retained. Finestone (1976) points out "the fundamental concept for the analysis of the delinquency problem has become social status rather than social change" (p. 167). The changes brought about by city life in particular were no longer part of the analytic framework; rather, scholars in the 1950's focused on the interplay of values and peer pressure to explain delinquent behavior (e.g., Cohen, 1955).

There was another critique of the social control perspective which began in 1943. In that year C. Wright Mills and William F. Whyte challenged the concept of social disorganization. Whyte suggests that concern about disorganization had led sociologists to focus on

a narrow range of aspects in lower class life.

> For too long sociologists have concentrated their
> attention upon individuals and families that have
> been unable to make a successful adjustment to the
> demands of their society. We now need studies of
> the way in which individuals and groups have
> merged to reorganize their social relations and
> adjust conflicts (Whyte, 1943:34).

Building on his own work in Street Corner Society (1943), Whyte

emphasizes the newly created social bonds in immigrant communities.

> If social disorganization involves a 'decrease of
> the influence of existing social rules,' and the
> rules referred to are those of the peasant society
> from which the immigrants came, then the slum is
> certainly disorganized. However, that is only
> a part of the picture. It is fruitless to study
> the area simply in terms of the breakdown of old
> groupings and old standards; new groupings and new
> standards have arisen (Whyte, 1943:38).

Rather than focusing on the destructive forces in the community,

emphasis was placed on the institutions and habits which forged the

moral order. Reacting to the explicit bias in the social disorganiza-

tion perspective of emphasizing the deviant and pathological, Gans

(1962) and Janowitz (1967), among others, focused on the regulation of

daily life by conventional, although non-middle class, standards and

rules.

Mills (1943) challenged the criteria social scientists were using

in assessing these communities as disorganized. In his review of social

problem text books, he observed a bias which stemmed from the white,

rural, Protestant and nativist backgrounds of the scholars. That

background colored their understanding of urban, immigrant life. Social

disorganization was nothing more than the deviation from norms these

men held to be correct and that judgement had been couched in scientific

terminology. Both Whyte and Mills demonstrated that what the social control perspective described as <u>deficiencies</u> in community life were nothing more than <u>differences</u> in social organization.

The critique of social disorganization and the development of alternative theories of crime and delinquency reduced the social control perspective to an obsolete approach to the study of social problems. By the mid-1950's studies of crime and delinquency focused either on sub-culture or strain theories of motivation.

One of the most influential studies of that period was Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) <u>Delinquency and Opportunity</u>. A direct descendant of the Mertonian approach, that book was used to orient the planning of programs for delinquency prevention at the Ford Foundation and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (Marris and Rein, 1967). The authors argue that because adolescents in poor areas did not have access to the means (opportunities) to achieve their goals (status, money, recognition), they resorted to illicit activities to achieve those goals. Class differences are depicted as differences in relative access to common goals. The task for those who would prevent delinquency is to improve the legitimate access for those potential delinquents.

This can be accomplished by improving the bureaucracies which served the poor.

> The processes of assimilation were breaking down, and could only be repaired by an enlargement of opportunities. But this emancipation would only come about as the enabling institutions of assimilation--the schools, the welfare agencies, the vocational services--recognized their failure, and became more imaginative, coherent, and responsive (Marris and Rein, 1967:53).

The very institutions which the Chicago scholars had dismissed twenty years earlier as inadequate to the tasks of improving city life were given the "opportunity" of reforming themselves.

In the Chicago tradition, the city has a negative influence on community life. The problem of crime was a consequence of the social disorganization which ensued. In this newer formulation crime could be prevented if service agencies performed their functions better. Bureaucratic ineptness was the critical factor rather than urbanization.

This switch from an urban analysis to a service analysis means bureaucracies have to be changed, rather than the social and economic forces shaping the city. Foremost in this shift is a radically different notion of city life from the Chicago tradition. In the 1960's perspective the city was seen as an essentially neutral or benign background within which prevention strategies were developed.

> As a whole, the strategy of the projects seemed to assume...that urban society is essentially a benevolent anarchy. Highly competitive, the city is yet open to all ambitious enough to pit themselves in the struggle. It's harshness is mitigated by social welfare, which should not merely confront the failures, but encourage them back into the race. And its justice is protected by an educational system which should ensure to every child an equal state. The will to compete is primary, and social agencies are to be judged, above all by their ability to foster and sustain it. If their middle-class prejudices make them at times, insensitive, this is only an aspect of a more fundamental tendency towards bureaucratic introversion. Thus liberal reform, like the radical right, seems to be appealing to a tradition of individualism which bureaucracy has corrupted (Marris and Rein, 1967:52).

The delinquency prevention projects at the Ford Foundation and President's Committee saw general bureaucratic reform as their goal. The programs naively called for comprehensive planning and bureaucratic

cooperation in a world without conflicting groups or interests. It

seems as if the problems of the bureaucracy would be overcome by adding

a new bureaucracy.

> Taken together, the conceptions of a poverty cycle and
> of bureaucratic introversion explained the breakdown
> of assimilation to the opportunity structure without
> presupposing any fundamental conflict of interest. On
> both sides, the breakdown was seen in terms of irrational
> self-frustration. If this interpretation was right the
> projects could appeal to all parties to support a non-
> partisan program of reform (Marris and Rein, 1967:54),

Bureaucracies could reform themselves with the proper infusion of self-

awareness and the experimental mentality. Crime could be prevented

and community life improved by improving bureaucratic performance.

Shaw and McKay would reject this 1960's assimilationist reformism

as part of the very urbanization process which was weakening social

control in the communities. Assimilation is part of the process which

leads to crime, not part of the prevention process. Improving

assimilation, especially through bureaucratic intervention, may

exacerbate the problem it is intended to solve.

> It is assumed that the reason for rapid increase in
> crime in our large cities is due to the fact that the
> foreign element in our population has not succeeded
> in assimilating American culture and does not conform
> to the American mores. This would be interesting, if
> true, but the fonts seem to suggest that perhaps the
> truth must be sought in the opposite direction (Park,
> 1925:27).

The irony of the evolution of the crime and community tradition

should now be apparent. At precisely the point at which "community"

programs became a central component of domestic policy, the theoretical

orientation which demanded an understanding of how community factors

"created" criminals had been replaced by an emphasis on bureaucratic

ineptness. At the point at which community activists were supplied
with the resources to attack social problems, they were stripped of a
conceptual framework which potentially made sense of the urban processes
which affected those problems. While the rhetoric of these programs
demanded change, the analysis of social problems with informed
that rhetoric was inherently conservative. Or as Finestone (1976) put
it in his discussion of delinquency research, "the conceptual primacy
of the local community was replaced by that of social class" (p. 93).
The 1960's social planners had also discovered the path from local
community to social class. But a class or an opportunity structure
analysis, without a concrete understanding of how those opportunities
are shaped by the structure of the metropolis, is forced into what
Zimmerman (1972) calls a strategy for "bureaucratic democratization"
(p. 6). For instead of reforming the local community the emphasis is
on reforming the bureaucracies which service those communities. The
dynamic link between crime and community which had been developed over
fifty years ago through the social control perspective had been dis-
torted into a discussion of poverty and bureaucracy in which the
bureaucracy rather than the community was supposed to change.

By the mid-1960's, bureaucracy and poverty had replaced crime and
community as the central reform issues. The expanded definition of the
social problem coupled with the infusion of federal funds recast the issue
of crime and community. The major loss in this transformation was a
theory of urbanization which reflected the changing realities of
American metropolitan life, and indicated how these changes affected
the communities' capacity to exert social control.

While the study of crime and delinquency evolved into a critique of bureaucracy, the study of local community continued, but there was a strategic shift in emphasis. Led by William Whyte and his Street Corner Society (1943), there was a renewed interest in the aspects of lower class life which cemented social bonds.

The studies still emphasized social control, but now it was in terms of how it operated rather than in terms of its malfunction. Given this bifurcation between studies of crime and community, and the practical and conceptual dead end the community action programs had run into by the late 1960's, it is no wonder that the victimization perspective developed so readily.

The victimization perspective shifted the emphasis in crime and delinquency studies from the offender to the victim. With the official crime rates soaring by the late 1960's and the ghetto riots turning policy makers and the public against the infusion of federal funds into the black community, "innovative" concepts about preventing and controlling crime were receiving serious attention. Wilson captured and articulated the spirit of this conservative shift in interest.

> Predatory crime does not merely victimize individuals,
> it impedes and, in the extreme case, even prevents
> the formation and maintenance of community. By dis-
> rupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and informal,
> by which we are linked with our neighbors, crime atomizes
> society and makes of its members mere individual
> calculators estimating their own advantage, especially
> their own chances for survival admidst their fellows
> (Wilson, 1975:21).

The "cost of crime" issue (Miller, 1973) was seen less in terms of what offenders might lose and more in terms of the impact crime was

having on victims. Crime was destroying community.

> What these concerns have in common, and thus what
> constitutes the 'urban problem' for a large
> percentage (perhaps a majority) of urban citizens,
> is a <u>sense of the failure of community</u> (Miller, 1973:24).

I will discuss the importance of the idea of community in both

perspectives in the next chapter. It suffices at this point to begin

to understand how the victimization perspective emerged out of the

conceptual void left by the strain and cultural deviance theories of

the preceding twenty years.

Biderman (1967), Reiss (1967), and Ennis (1967) all administered

surveys funded by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and

the Administration of Justice to randomly selected populations. While

the surveys varied in their foci, all attempted to measure the amount

of fear reported by respondents. Fear, while measured differently in

each survey, was implicitly defined as anticipating the occurrence of

a crime event. Where anticipation was high, fear by definition was

high. An increase in crime was assumed to generate an increase in fear.

All three researchers took as their task documenting the level of fear

among respondents, assuming that fear was related to the amount of crime to

which respondents were exposed. Indeed, given the measures employed

by the scholars, it would have been impossible to dissociate fear of

crime from the anticipated crime events. For example, Biderman

measured "Fear of Personal Attack" by one item:

> Would you say there has been an increase in violent
> crimes here in Washington? I mean attacks on
> people--like shootings, stabbings and rapes? Would
> you say that there's now very much more of this sort
> of thing, just a little bit more, not much differ-
> ence, or that there is no more than five years
> ago? (1967:132; see also Appendix D, p. 11).

To report an increase in violent crime events is to score high on fear of crime (or in this case, attack). Reiss, while avoiding a direct discussion of fear subsumed the topic in a more general discussion of "citizen perceptions about crime in their areas." Here again antici- pation of the crime event was synonomous with fear.

> When you think about your chances of getting robbed, threatened, beaten up, or anything of that sort, would you say your neighborhood is (compared to other neigh- borhoods in town): very safe, above average, less safe, or one of the worst? (Reiss, 1967:33-34).

> Have you changed your habits because of fear of crime? (stay off streets, use taxis or cars, avoid being out, don't talk to strangers.) (1967:102-110)

These early studies highlighted two ways victimization would increase fear. The "individual fear profile approach" focuses on the correlates of fear among demographically defined groups. Emphasis here is less on the criminogenic aspects of the environment and how it is assessed and more on the demographic characteristics associated with victimization and fear of crime. This approach relies on large national samples and is generally descriptive.

The "neighborhood assessment" approach focused on the amount of crime the respondent expected the local neighborhood to produce. Both Ennis (1967) and Biderman (1967) develop measures of fear which were premised on the imputed relationship between a dangerous neighborhood and individual fear. Biderman called this measure an "Index of Anxiety" and it was composed of the following items:

> 1) What was it about the neighborhood that was most important?
>
>   (This was asked only of those residents who indicated the neighborhood was more important than the house in selecting their present residence) - Safety or moral reasons vs. convenience, etc.

2) When you think about the chances of getting beaten up would you say this neighborhood is very safe, about average, less safe than most, one of the worst?

3) Is there so much trouble that you would move if you could?

   (Again, a screen question asked only of those who did not say their neighborhood was very safe.)

4) Are most of your neighbors quiet or are there some who create disturbances? (All quiet, few disturbances, many disturbances.)

5) Do you think that crime has been getting better or worse here in Washington during the past year? (Better, worse, same) (Biderman et al., 1967:121).

Ennis (1967) distinguished between "Fear of Crime" and "Perception of Risk." He measured "fear" by the following items:

1) How safe do you feel walking alone in your neighborhood during the day?

2) How safe do you feel walking alone in your neighborhood after dark?

3) How often do you walk in your neighborhood after dark?

4) Have you wanted to go somewhere recently but stayed home because it was unsafe?

5) How concerned are you about having your house broken into? (Ennis, 1967:72-75).

Risk was measured by two items:

1) How likely is it a person walking around here at night might be held up or attacked—very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, or very unlikely?

2) Compared to other parts of the city, is a home or apartment around here much less likely to be broken into—somewhat less likely, somewhat more likely, or much more likely to be broken into? (Ennis, 1967:75-76).

Ennis distinguishes between "feeling unsafe" (the report of fear) and the assessment of the possibility that a crime will occur (risk).

But his fear measure seems as much an assessment of the neighborhood
as it is a report on the respondent's sense of dis-ease.

As Baumer (1977) has pointed out, there is little published
information on how these early measures were developed, but for our
purposes it is their content rather than their methodological limitations
which is of interest. For these early scholars developed the research
vocabulary for the study of fear of crime in the decade which followed.

The importance of this early work, for our purposes, can be found in
the assumed association between fear (as a reported internal state of
the individual) and the number of victimizations the respondent antici-
pates. Fear is assumed to be a consequence of the potential for victim-
ization and the research issue is how that fear is distributed within
a given population. The neighborhood is seen as a setting within
which that victimization takes place. If the respondent scores high as an
anticipator of victimization he is defined as fearful. A neighborhood
is fear inducing to the extent that it provides a context for criminal
activity.

The victimization perspective (as we shall call that contemporary
approach) postulates "crime" as an event experienced by the individual
as either a direct or indirect victim. Fear, from this perspective,
is a consequence, a response in time, of having had contact with crime
events. If direct victimization fails to account for particularly
high levels of fear, then indirect contact usually through the media
or personal communication is postulated as the mechanism through which
the experience of crime affects the individual. Fear then becomes an
indicator of the effect of victimization on the individual. Fear is seen

as a direct consequence of crime exposure. There is a direct linearity to this scenario which is assumed and rarely tested.

The victimization perspective shares several features with the strain and sub-cultural theories of crime and delinquency which displaced the social control perspective. The victimization perspective is an implicit theory of motivation. Fear is explained in terms of the stimuli (victimizations) which trigger the fear in the individual. Just as Sutherland and Merton (and those who followed in their footsteps) sought to explain the motivations of offenders in terms of the values of the groups to which they belonged, so the victimization scholars seek to explain fear of crime in terms of how victimization experiences generate fear in individuals. Victimizations lead to fear just as naturally as working class cultures lead to delinquency.

Ennis, Biderman and Reiss, while focusing on very different issues, all found that fear was not related to the level of victimization experienced by the individual or anticipated in the surrounding area in a direct, straightforward way. While the amount of crime in an area generally predicted the amount of fear among those area residents, there were enough inconsistencies in this finding to raise the issue of what other factors besides the level of victimization affected the level of fear among respondents.

In dealing with these anomalies, some scholars postulated the existence of various social psychological mechanisms to rationalize their findings. For example, Stinchcombe (1977) introduces the concept of "vulnerability" to help explain fear among women and the elderly.

The most commonly relied upon mechanism is the idea of fear of strangers. Faced with the disjunction between levels of fear and levels of victimization, several scholars introduce the "stranger" as that which explains the fear. As stated by Ennis (1967):

> It is not the seriousness of the crime, but rather the unpredictability and the sense of invasion by unknown strangers that engenders mistrust and hostility (p. 80).

McIntyre (1967) echoes the same thinking in her analysis of avoidance behaviors. "The precautions which people take to protect themselves indicate that underlying fear of crime is a profound fear of strangers" (p. 40). Biderman (1967) sees the relationship as being even more direct, "fear of crime is the fear of strangers," and Skogan (1976) interprets the relationship between robbery victimization and fear as a consequence of the fear of strangers. But the fear of strangers is only introduced ex post facto to interpret results and explain findings. While Skogan may be correct in attributing the relationship between robbery and fear to an intervening fear of strangers, that suggestion is pure conjecture. The fear of stranger explanation posits the existence of an intervening type of fear which has not been measured. Consequently, this attribution process is not opened to empirical testing and has no better standing then victimization itself as an explanatory factor (Blake and Davis, 1964:460).

There has been some progress made within the victimization perspective by refining measurement techniques and analysis procedures in particular. Furstenburg (1972), Fowler and Mangione (1974), Skogan (1976) and Hindelang, Garofalo and Gottfriedson (1978) have all refined the conceptualization of fear in the victimization framework. Distinctions

between fear, concern, worry and risk have helped distinguish the various attitudinal dimensions captured in the idea of fear, and these clarifications have improved the explanatory power of more recent studies.

Also refining the various types of victimization (personal/property, single/multiple, direct/indirect, etc.) used as the independent variable has led to improved results. In this vein, some scholars have attempted to develop more refined measures of the amount of crime to which respondents are exposed. Balkin (1979), for example, argued "that fear of crime is a rational response to the actual incidence of crime, and that where discrepancies appear it is because of faulty objective measures of crime incorrectly calibrating the real risk of crime."
(p. 343)

Skogan (1977), Garofalo (1977) and Hindelang et al. (1978) have all made valuable contributions to our understanding of fear of crime from the victimization perspective. Indeed, the last decade has seen much progress since the early formulations of Biderman (1967), Reiss (1967) and Ennis (1967). Many of the difficulties of the early work may be overcome by this second generation of scholars by expanding the perspective rather than rejecting it. I simply offer a different road for the reader to take. It may lead nowhere or, more likely, to a junction between the perspectives in the future. But I hope to convince the reader that the anomalies and inconsistencies which have surfaced in the findings on fear of crime throughout this decade of research are more the result of asking the wrong questions than failing to get the right answers because of methodological shortcomings.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESERVING COMMUNITY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE
VICTIMIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVES

The idea of community plays a central role within both the social

control perspective and the victimization perspective. Indeed, both

perspectives place the preservation of community at the center of the

policy initiatives which have emerged from their discussion of the

impact of fear on city dwellers. In this chapter I will outline the

meaning of community in both perspectives and show how those orientations

shape subtly different policy developments to reduce the fear of crime.

Those differences in policy development follow from treating community

as a consequency of how citizens react to crime in the victimization

perspective, while the social control perspective treats community as

the context in which crime and fear emerge.

One of the most persuasive discussions of fear of crime and

community from the victimization perspective is presented in John

Conklin's The Impact of Crime, (1975). Conklin argues that the fear of

crime is destroying our sense of community by robbing citizens of the

capacity to trust, and consequently isolating them in their own communi-

ties. Conklin applies Durkheim's concept of the functionality of deviance

to the victimization perspective on fear of crime. He argues that crime

does not bring people together as the Durkheimian approach would postulate

and that fear of crime disintegrates rather than integrates communities.

Conklin treats crime implicitly as the number of victimizations in a

community. These victimizations and the fear they foster diminish community

solidarity. Crime, and by extension the fear it generates, leads to the

decline of the community.

> Little of the material we have examined...suggests
> that Durkheim was correct in arguing that crime
> brings people together and strengthens social bonds.
> Instead, crime produces insecurity, distrust, and a
> negative view of the community. Although we lack
> conclusive evidence, crime also seems to reduce
> social interaction as fear and suspicion drive people
> apart. This produces a disorganized community
> that is unable to exercise informal social control
> over deviant behavior (Conklin, 1975:99).

This scenario is predicated on the notion that people react to crime in

individualized ways. Rather than collectively sanctioning the criminal

behavior as Durkheim would anticipate, citizens, because of fear, attempt

to protect themselves individually (e.g., buying guns and locks, not

going out, etc.), thus breaking down community cohesion. Conklin's

discussion of community hinges on the distinction he makes between

individual and collective responses to crime and these responses in

turn gather their importance from Conklin's use of the victimization

perspective. For the logic of responding individually hinges on the

salience of the victimization experience. Individual responses are

assumed to be the normal response to the fear, or experience, of victimiz-

ation. Since this relationship is assumed, the conclusion that individual

responses have negative consequences follows from the primacy of the

victimization experience. Interestingly enough, this line of reasoning

makes the response to victimization rather than the victimization itself,

the central phenomenon. When a community can respond collectively,

crime integrates; when those responses are individualized, crime dis-

integrates community ties (Lewis, 1979).

The victimization perspective defines crime as an event that is

experienced individually by a citizen. Conklin implicitly uses this

definition in his application of Durkheim's work on deviance and argues

that "crime" (victimization experiences) does not usually bring people together in a community. However, collective responses, that is, those responses which unite people in an attempt to do something about crime are by definition community building activities, for they bring people together to resist victimization. Given the reliance on victimization as the motivating factor for initiating responses, we have no sense of the process which would make collective responses an appropriate reaction. The victimization perspective draws us toward the characteristics of the particular victimizations (crime waves, dramatic incidents, etc.) in explaining when and where collective responses occur. There is no acknowledged mechanism through which these events could make for collective action. We are told that collective responses build a sense of community, but we are not aware of under what circumstances that will happen. If crime destroys the individual's sense of community by undermining each individual's imputed sense of trust and cohesiveness, how are collective responses possible in a crime-ridden community?

While Conklin does not address this issue of process, he does describe the kinds of collective responses which emerge.

> Crime weakens the fabric of social life by increasing
> fear, suspicion, and distrust. It also reduces public
> support for the law, in terms of unwillingness to
> report crime and criticism of the police. However,
> under certain conditions people will engage in
> collective action to fight crime. They may work for
> a political candidate who promises to restore law
> and order. They may call meetings of community
> residents to plan an attack on crime. Sometimes they
> may even band together in a civilian police patrol
> to carry out the functions that the police are not
> effectively performing for them. Since people who per-
> ceive high crime rates often hold the police responsible
> for crime prevention, we would expect such patrols
> to emerge where people feel very threatened by crime,

> believe that the police cannot protect them, and
> think from past experience with community groups
> that the people themselves can solve the problem
> (Conklin, 1975:185).

The collective response in the victimization perspective is an attempt to exert social control. It is _response_ to crime, but its emergence and the shape it may assume in varying circumstances is left unspecified. Since crime and fear atomize communities it is not at all clear when we should expect to see it develop, and why it emerges in some contexts and not in others. Equally troubling is the issue of _sponsorship_. Neither Conklin nor any of the other scholars working in this area (Washnis, 1976; Schneider and Schneider, 1977) discuss in any detail which groups or individuals, under what circumstances, are more or less likely to organize these collective responses. While we know something about who will participate in these activities once they are operational, very little has been suggested about which groups or individuals will emerge, either successfully or unsuccessfully, to lead these collective responses.

Within the social control perspective, Louis Wirth (1933) defines community as "group life when viewed from the standpoint of symbiosis":

> A territorial base, distribution in space of men,
> institutions, and activities, close living together
> on the basis of kinship and organic interdependence,
> and a common life based upon the mutual correspondence
> of interest tend to characterize a community (Wirth, 1933:166).

As we have discussed previously, if the community's capacity to regulate itself is undermined by social disorganization, crime and the fear of crime increase. The key problem as Janowitz (1978) points out is "whether the processes of social control are able to maintain the social order while transformation and social change take place" (p. 30).

Thus the collective response is less of a mystery within the social control perspective. All urban communities exert social control through local institutions. The need to regulate behavior by socializing residents to local values and controlling those who violate those values is an integral part of community life.

> The problem in realistic terms is one of achieving
> a new organization of life in these local deteriorated
> communities. As an objective, society can aim toward
> the development of a new and local spirit of collective
> welfare, expressed in an interest in child welfare,
> and social and physical improvement of the district
> (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:22).

That "new and local spirit of collective welfare" must be instilled in those institutions which can directly affect the values of local residents.

> Since for most group purposes it is impossible in the
> city to appeal individually to the large number of
> discrete and differentiated individuals, and since
> it is only through the organizations to which men
> belong that their interests and resources can be
> enlisted for a collective cause, it may be inferred
> that social control in the city should typically proceed
> through formally organized groups (Wirth, 1938:23).

Fear can be reduced if this new spirit can be infused into "formally organized groups." Finally, the leadership of these groups should logically come from the local citizenry.

> In recognizing the existent cultural organization one
> can identify intelligence and ingenuity in the local
> population which can be enlisted for this purpose.
> This natural leadership which is the product of a
> distinctive social life can be strategically utilized
> in giving direction of a constructive kind to the
> cultural and recreational life of the community. Young
> men and women from the local community are in a position
> to express more exactly the needs and moods of the
> people (Burgess, Lohman and Shaw, 1937:23).

Social control, if it is not to become simple coercion, must be exerted through locally led community-based organizations. The secondary institutions of the state are not equipped to prevent either crime or fear. The prevention of crime was conceived as a task that would only be achieved _outside_ of the formal agencies established to prevent crime. The placement of the prevention mechanism within community institutions led to a reformist politics premised on the inability of the criminal justice system to achieve its ends. If conventional value consensus is the key to reducing crime, then bureaucracies are by definition incapable of inculcating those values, because values are best trans-mitted by individuals with whom one has primary relations.

> What we do observe--is that control that was formerly
> based on mores was replaced by control based on
> positive law. This change runs parallel to the move-
> ment by which secondary relationships have taken the
> place of primary relationships in the association of
> individuals in the city environment (Burgess, Lohman
> and Shaw, 1937:30).

The Chicago scholars and reformers also made several assumptions about the nature of the community they were reforming. Of critical importance among these was the assumption that the community was made up of potential offenders. Their approach to crime prevention was premised on reducing crime by preventing people from becoming criminals rather than preventing people from becoming victims. The assumption embedded in this approach was that if you do something about local social control you will have an impact on crime. That criminal activity was the consequence of the way the community was organized was an assumption which derived directly from a theory of urbanization. Tannenbaum (1938) makes the point forcefully:

> The criminal is not a symptom merely, he is a product,
> he is of the very bone and fiber of the community
> itself.... The distinction between the criminal and
> the community drawn in sharp contrast—a distinction
> between good and evil—is a false distinction and
> obscures the issue (Tannenbaum, 1938:25).

The result was a strategy for crime prevention which postulated that to build a community was to deter crime.

The preservation of a viable, secure, urban community is the concern of scholars working within both perspectives. The capacity of those community residents to exert social control is linked to the reduction of fear in both perspectives, but the victimization perspective describes the weakening of community solidarity as a consequence of crime and fear, while the social control perspective treats community as a context within which fear and crime emerge given a lack of social control.

The social control perspective offers an alternative explanation for the emergence of individual responses. Rather than adding to the isolation of individuals and the decline of community solidarity, individual responses may have a far more complex relationship to fear and community.

Individual responses have been separated into avoidance and mobilization behaviors (Furstenberg, 1972). By avoidance, Furstenberg means "strategies to isolate...(oneself) from exposure to victimization," (e.g., staying off the streets at night, locking doors, ignoring strangers, etc.). Mobilization techniques in contrast involved the protection of one's property and/or self through the purchase of a product (e.g., burglar alarms, window bars, flow lights, guns, etc.). In making this distinction Furstenberg noted that Biderman had found that citizens who "avoided" didn't necessarily "mobilize," and vice-versa,

thus suggesting the independence of these dimensions. In addition while those who avoid are more afraid than those who do not, mobilization and fear are not correlated positively (Furstenberg, 1972).

Applying Suttles' (1968) work within the social control perspective, we can offer another interpretation of avoidance behaviors. Avoidance behaviors can be seen as part of a broader social process by which people in slum areas (often high crime areas) define and constitute the "moral order." Given a situation of mutual distrust and suspicion, ghetto residents create a relatively secure, stable environment by restricting their movements and relationships in space. "Public morality" is constituted through the delineation of safe areas and persons,

> ...a positive role for conflict cannot be appreciated unless it is placed in a developmental sequence. At the outset, parents, and children in the Addams area do not prescribe a definite set of persons with whom the family are to associate. Instead, they voice a variety of proscriptions: 'Don't go out of the neighborhood;' 'Don't you get off the block;' 'Stay by the house, like I told you' (Suttles, 1968:228).

These "avoidance behaviors" then are the building blocks for the "ordered segmentation" which creates a sense of order and safety in slum areas.

From this perspective avoidance behaviors function as the building blocks of community, rather than community disintegrating activities. They have both the symbolic and practical value of delimiting and thereby manufacturing a liveable social order. Avoidance behavior then is a common social practice, not explicitly as a reaction to victimization, but possibly more as an ordering phenomenon. This alternative explanation places avoidance behaviors in a general theory of ordering the environment rather than solely as a response to the perceived risk of victimization. Avoidance behaviors supply the building blocks for a liveable moral order, and this creates trust rather than distrust.

It does not follow from this discussion that <u>all</u> avoidance behaviors build community. Indeed, in areas where residents assume a safe rather than a dangerous environment, e.g., suburbs, avoidance behaviors may have the negative impact Conklin and Furstenberg suggest. The same activity can mean different things in different settings. But in urban areas it may be more useful to think of individual responses as a common ordering activity rather than a response to victimization.

Finally, the Suttles approach may provide an insight into the limited utilization of mobilization techniques. Furstenberg found that regardless of the fear level people did little to protect their homes. The finding was "puzzling" to him. But if avoidance behaviors are better understood as part of a construction of a moral order, rather than a reaction to crime, the discrepancy between the frequency with which avoidance and mobilization behaviors are employed is less startling. Mobilization behaviors may be explained more by social class (having the income to spend on protective devices) that by the anticipation of victimization or fear, and consequently their employment should not be considered a direct reaction to crime. Both perspectives do assume that communities which exert such control have less of a crime and fear problem than communities which do not. There is some evidence (Maccoby et al., 1958; Clinard and Abbott, 1976) that communities which have the capacity to exert informal social control have less of a crime problem than areas which do not have that capacity. However, the relationship between informal social control and collective responses is based more on theoretical considerations than empirical findings. In both perspectives the collective response is an intentional intervention to construct "formally" informal social controls.

Both Furstenberg (1972) and DuBow and Podolefsky (1979) have done empirical studies on citizen participation in collective responses and both report that concern about crime is not associated positively with participation in collective responses to crime. Indeed, participators in collective responses do not differ significantly on a variety of crime-related attitudinal measures from their nonparticipating neighbors. Podolefsky et al., (1979) in a separate study also demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of collective responses were oriented towards neighborhood improvement and programs for adolescents.

Theorists from both perspectives are pessimistic about the emergence and longevity of such efforts (Wirth, 1933; Conklin, 1975), although that gloom is based on very different kinds of analysis. Collective responses are the chief means of modifying the effects of crime on a community but these responses are difficult to sustain. The victimization perspective posits the isolation of citizens because of crime as the reason for this difficulty, while the social disorganization perspective identifies the general pressures of city life as working against their emergence. In both cases, collective responses helped to maintain local community as crime eroded community life, but the task is by no means automatic. The victimization perspective offers no sociological or psychological mechanism to explain the emergence of collective responses. The social control perspective posits the mechanism (local institutions preserving conventional standards) but remains skeptical of the success of the response given the pressures facing those disorganized communities (Wirth, 1933; Taub et al., 1978).

I will now turn to an analysis of the contemporary crime prevention strategies which were shaped by the idea of community implicit in the

victimization perspective. These policy developments, I will argue, are the direct result of the conceptual framework which I have described at length above.

Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue, in a general discussion of implementation, that all policies are premised on theoretical assumptions if only often implicitly so.

> Policy implies theories. Whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation between mutual conditions and future consequences. If x, then y (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:XV).

Bardach (1977) in this same vein suggests that policies may not achieve their objectives regardless of how well they are implemented, if their underlying conceptualization is faulty.

> Any policy or program implies an economic, and probably also a sociological, theory about the way the world works. If this theory is fundamentally incorrect, the policy will probably fail no matter how well it is implemented (Bardach, 1977:251).

The victimization perspective provides the theory which guides the policy initiative which is generically known as <u>community crime prevention</u>. Community crime prevention refers to an approach to crime and fear reduction which emphasizes manipulating two of the three factors necessary for a predatory victimization to occur. The three factors necessary for a victimization are a victim, an offender and a place for them to interact. If following Glaser (1971) one defines predatory victimization as illegal acts in which "someone definitely and intentionally takes or damages the person or property of another," then community crime prevention strategies aim at reducing the number of such victimizations by manipulating the potential victim and the potential place where that interaction takes place. Criminal activity can be deterred by

changing the opportunity structure for victimization rather than by directly attempting to change the offender. Since fear is hypothesized to be a consequence of victimization, then it too would be reduced as victimizations are reduced.

The victimization perspective shifts attention from the criminal to the act (victimization). Community crime prevention strategies focus on changing the behavior of potential victims and the physical environment in which the crimes are committed in an attempt to change the behavior of the criminal. Potential victims are "educated" to their potential risks and to the precautions they might take in order to avoid being victimized. Environmental design strategies attempt to change the behavior of criminals and victims by altering the physical surroundings in which they act.

While there have been projects which focus on either manipulating the behavior of potential victims or on environmental design, there has been a tendency recently to see these activities as mutually reinforcing and thus synthetic strategies which combine both are presently considered optimum. The recently completed Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention Program (1979) provides a rationale for this synthesis.

1. The crime rate in a residential neighborhood is a product of the linkage between offender motivation and the opportunities provided by the residents, users, and environmental features of that neighborhood.

2. The crime rate for a specific offense can be reduced by lessening the opportunities for that crime to occur.

3. Opportunities can be reduced by:

   a. Altering the physical aspects of buildings and streets to increase surveillance capabilities

      and lessen target/victim vulnerability, to
      increase the neighborhood's attractiveness to
      residents, and to decrease its fear-producing
      features;

  b. Increasing citizen concerns about and involvement
      in crime prevention and the neighborhood in general;
      and

  c. Utilizing the police to support the above.

4. Opportunity-reducing activities will lead not only to
    a reduction in the crime rate but also to a reduction
    in fear of crime. The reduced crime and fear will
    mutually reinforce each other, leading to still further
    reductions in both (Fowler et al., 1979:2).

Fear of crime will decrease as victimizations decrease. Victimizations will decrease as reductions are made in the opportunities afforded to criminals by police, citizens and environments to commit crimes. Fear reduction policy is a function of victimization reduction and that follows from modifications (both physical and interactional) in community life.

The Community Anti-Crime Program (CACP) offers a slightly different approach to utilizing the victimization perspective in a fear reduction strategy. Introduced in the summer of 1977, the CACP was authorized to spend thiry million dollars in direct grants to community organizations:

    To assist community organizations, neighborhood groups
    and individual citizens in becoming actively involved
    in activities designed to prevent crime, reduce the fear
    of crime and improve the administration of justice
    (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58).

The program's guidelines also describe the problems that the grants are meant to alleviate:

    The increasing social isolation of neighborhood residents,
    resulting from a fear of crime, which has destroyed the
    feelings of community necessary for social control (U.S.
    Department of Justice, 1977:58).

And the program guildlines are equally clear about what types of activities the program is meant to foster:

> The mobilization of community and neighborhood residents into effective self-help organizations to conduct anti-crime programs within their communities and neighborhoods. To encourage neighborhood anti-crime efforts that promote a greater sense of community and foster social controls over crime occurrence (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977: 58-1).

The program guidelines go even further in outlining the type of efforts which will be funded.

> Priority will be given to programs and activities that are public minded in the sense that they are designed to promote a social or collective response to crime and the fear of crime at the neighborhood level in contrast to "private minded" efforts that deal only with the actions of citizens as individuals or those that result from the provision of services that in themselves do not contribute to the organization of the neighborhood (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58-3).

The legacy of the victimization perspective is apparent in the design of this program. Victimization experiences are assumed to create fear. Fear in turn generates isolation, because citizens react individually to the threat. Crime consequently disintegrates community. "Crime occurrences" and fear can be reduced if the citizens react collectively to that threat. The CACP guidelines are quite explicit about the program's goal:

> To encourage neighborhood anti-crime efforts that promote a greater sense of community and foster social controls over crime occurrence (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58-1).

Crime events are seen as promoting the decline of community, and collective action to prevent those events is seen as the solution to the fear problem.

The Community Anti-Crime Program's approach to fear reduction
emphasizes the importance of local groups of citizens acting collectively.
Fear reduction from this perspective results from the political mobiliza-
tion of local citizens. Formulating the problem this way circumvents
the entire criminal justice system in favor of these geographically
based, for the most part, citizen oriented, voluntary associations.
This strategy alone has substantial impact on the distribution of
resources (Levi and Lipsky, 1972). Citizen groups enter the policy arena,
not as advisors in an ancillary position to the professionals but as
the formulators and implementors of policy. The authority to administer
public programs may be passed to local groups (Bell and Held, 1978).
Greenstone and Peterson (1973) highlight the importance of this point
in their discussion of OEO.

> The content of the community action controversy involved
> a critical issue of political authority: namely, which
> interests should participate in and be deferred to in
> the course of framing public policy (Greenstone and
> Peterson, 1973:XVI).

Fear reduction is not simply a matter for the professional. It
has an added political dimension, since it is necessary to mobilize
community groups and local leaders who can articulate groups' interests
and implement programs themselves (Greenstone and Peterson, 1973).
The significance of this authority shift, from professionals to citizens,
is substantial. This important shift in emphasis places community
organizations in a central position, for it serves as both the sociological
unit of analysis and the political agent of change. Knowledge of the
community and legitimacy within it becomes essential to achieving fear
reduction. A perspective which places both the problem and the solution

in a community context gives meaning to the emphasis on local leaders and dilutes local officials' claim to a professional monopoly on the knowledge necessary to reduce fear.

A fear reduction strategy which emphasizes community cohesion, local political development and a general revitalization of the neighborhood should of course be wary of the excesses and mistakes of OEO. One of that program's major design errors was to treat the urban context as a neutral environment in which poverty reduction strategies are implemented. As stated earlier, it was the movement to theories of motivation and service (as opposed to urban) analysis which undermined the theoretical integrity of OEO policy.

Earlier theories of crime and delinquency which relied on the social control perspective emphasized the importance of social change for understanding the distribution of crime and delinquency. Patterns of migration, local political development, the distribution of urban services, and the capacity for social control, all affect communities differentially. An intelligent fear prevention program must take into account the differential pressures of urban life on community, as well as the internal social control capacities of that community, if some success is to be achieved in reducing fear.

The social control perspective offers a fairly narrow range of policy initiatives. Almost all previous initiatives focus solely on reducing or preventing juvenile delinquency. From the original Chicago Area Projects through the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, controlling local adolescents was the goal of various policy develop- ments. For that same thirty year period, local initiative outside the

"control" of the traditional criminal justice bureaucracies was the sole

means for achieving this end.

> In view of the unsatisfactory results thus far achieved
> by such methods of treatment as probation, incarceration,
> and parole, experimentation in the treatment and prevention
> of delinquency seems not only highly desirable but necessary
> if society would discover a method for coping effectively
> with this important social problem (Burgess, Lohman and
> Shaw, 1937:32).

Since local initiative, voluntary participation and a delinquency

focus are essential to the social control perspective, governmental

activity at city, state or federal levels is only of supplementary

importance in the pursuit of crime prevention. However if we return

to the distinctly urban analysis of the Chicago School, one interesting,

if unpursued, policy implication emerges. Molotch (1979) points out

that if industrial and commerical activities weaken communities, citizen

action through voluntary associations seems like a woefully inadequate

response to the catalyst for disorganization. Whatever the limitations

of the zonal analysis developed by Burgess and refined for the study of

crime by Shaw and McKay, it clearly identifies the growth of commerce and

industry as the major force for the disorganization of residential

communities. Snodgrass (1976) suggests that Shaw and McKay deemphasized

this insight in the Chicago Area Projects so as not to upset their

board of directors which was made up largely of local business elites.

Whatever the reasons for not pursuing this insight, the social disorganiza-

tion of the city was created by the "natural" activities of business

interests as they expanded their physical plants and factories.

Thus, an attempt to modify the forces of urban growth (and decay)

by and for the interest of local communities might provide another route

towards crime prevention. Saul Alinsky, who worked with the Chicago
Area Projects early in his career, developed the organizational
techniques to pursue this route. Alinsky took the Chicago Area Projects
model and expanded it beyond an interest in crime prevention and coopera-
tive endeavors, towards a general community building model motored by
a conflictual analysis of local problems. The notion that urban forces
are the major factor in the decline of neighborhood stability has been
developed recently by the National Commission on Neighborhood (1979).
General policies which modify these forces may lead to decreased levels
of crime and fear in urban communities. These forces manifest themselves
in communities as signs of disorganization and to the extent that these
conditions can be eliminated it would follow that fear would decline.
This general improvement in housing and the "look" of the neighborhood
should have an effect on fear levels. (There are indications that this
is the case in the empirical analysis in Chapter Seven.) This approach
offers intriguing possibilities for theoretical and empirical development.
For example, Suttles' notion of provincialism, the link between "some
control over land usage and population movements" and the capacity to
interact with government agencies and private corporations, suggests how
communities protect the local moral order from outside forces. Govern-
ment policies which recognize the need to build this provincialism can
indirectly reduce the fear of crime in those empowered communities.
Indeed, as Taub et al. (1978) point out, those outside agencies require
some community organization to negotiate with in order to achieve their
ends within the community. Policies which enhance these linkages may
reduce crime and fear because social control increases as a latent function
of the community involvement.

CHAPTER FIVE

USING THE TWO PERSPECTIVES:
AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION

I have traced the historical and analytic development of two
perspectives which guide research into crime in general and fear of
crime in particular. The social control perspective emphasizes the
impact of city life on the capacity of urban communities to regulate
themselves. Local institutions are the key factors in moderating the
influence of city life on the values and behavior of local residents,
particularly adolescents. If these institutions can maintain their
regulating authority then crime and fear of crime will not become
major problems. If community residents perceive that their communities
are losing that capacity then fear of crime increases. This fear of
crime should be greatest in those communities in which the signs of
disorganization increase unchecked. It is the social change in the
community rather than the absolute level of victimization which should
account for the level of fear.

The victimization perspective establishes an entirely different
conceptual framework for the study of crime and the fear of crime.
Having developed in the last fifteen years, the victimization perspective
posits a theory of motivation to account for fear. Following the post
World War II tradition of attempting to explain the occurrence of a
social phenomenon in terms of the psychological factors which would lead
an individual to participate in that kind of behavior, the perspective
attempts to explain differences between individuals in their reported
fear levels.

Victimization experiences are assumed to be the catalysts for fear. The individual who experiences victimizations will be the individual who reports being fearful. Clearly, empirical research findings do not support this contention. There are far more fearful people than there are victims and often the least victimized individuals are the most fearful. Scholars have expanded and refined their notions of victimization and sharpened their measures of fear in response to these findings. The results have been more promising; but since the underlying assumptions remain the same I am pessimistic about the utility of the perspective.

In this section of the essay I will compare the efficacy of the two perspectives in accounting for the fear of crime in one city. I am informed in this undertaking by Kornhauser's (1978) intriguing question about theories of delinquency: is it necessary to specify the motivation for an experience (in this case fear) in order to explain its occurrence? The social control perspective answers this question in the negative while the victimization perspective answers it in the affirmative. By applying both perspectives to the same data sets I hope to shed some empirical light on the subject. Each perspective will be used to explain the same phenomenon, namely, the levels of fear in four Chicago communities. The reader will then have empirical evidence as well as theoretical reasons for answering Kornhauser's question as well as for assessing the utility of the two approaches.

The first task in making this comparison was to operationalize the central concepts in each perspective. Then measures were developed. Finally data were collected and analyzed. I am not claiming to have done a formal test of these two "theories," rather I apply the two

perspectives to the data. This is a modest effort. The measure I have

of fear is a single item on a survey instrument and the communities in

which the data were collected do not represent randomly selected urban

communities. Thus the ability to generalize from these findings is

limited. The strength of this particular design, that is, a comparative

case study approach, is in the multiple methods (fieldwork, surveys

and archival data) used to collect data and the variety of measures

available for secondary analysis.

In this empirical investigation I am trying to account for the

variations in the fear levels reported in the four neighborhoods. The

dependent variable in both perspectives is the fear of crime. What

varies between perspectives are the independent and intervening variables

used to account for the levels of fear in the communities.

The four communities typify four different kinds of urban living

situations: a black ghetto, a white ethnic working class community,

a gentrified area and a poor area with mixed-ethnic populations.

Finally a randomly selected city-sample was surveyed for comparative

purposes.

The victimization perspective would account for the differential

levels of fear in each community in terms of the level of victimization

in the area. Communities with more victimizations will have more fear-

ful individuals. The relationship between levels of victimization and

fear is linear and psychological. Victimization predicts fear because

the individual assesses his own probability of victimization as increased

(that is, his risk) and this cognitive assessment increases his fear.

This assessment is made on the basis of how big a problem victimizations

are perceived to be. These victimizations do not have to be experienced

directly. Conklin (1971) has suggested that the number of victimizations

within the neighborhood is used by individuals to assess their risk,

and that as crime rates rise so do fear levels. Thus neighborhood

assessments of local victimizations may also predict fear. Indirect

victimizations are difficult to measure. Official crime rates undoubtedly

underestimate the objective number of victimizations (Biderman, 1967).

Victmization surveys have rarely been analyzed below the city-level

of aggregation and generally demonstrate how few people experience

serious victimizations (Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, 1978).

Still, fear is often seen as a reflection of the amount of crime

"surrounding" the individual. The victimization perspective leads to

the following hypothetical relationship:

Time 1   Time 2
Victimization ——→ Problem ——→ Risk ——→ Fear

The individual is the unit of analysis and the central empirical

issue is the relationship between assessments of personal victimization,

potential and fear. They should be positively related.

An investigation of fear of crime from the social control perspective

should begin with the local community as the unit of analysis. For

according to that perspective, it is the community which is affected

(by becoming more fearful) as social control erodes.

Traditionally, this erosion is indicated by the signs of disorganiza-

tion residents perceive in the community. Social control is mitigated

to the extent that signs of disorganization grow. Measures of disorganization include a variety of local conditions and behaviors which signal the decline of the moral order. Fear is the predicted consequence of their emergence. When social control institutions can maintain the moral order, these signs of disorganization do not increase fear, although the signs may be perceived by residents.

A community's capacity for self-regulation is a function of, among other things, the "relatedness" of the people who live in that community. Residents who have a stake in the community will be less fearful than their unintegrated neighbors. There are two explanations for this. First, the signs of disorganization which appear in the community may have different meanings depending upon one's knowledge of the area. Male adolescents loitering in the area may be less of a sign of disorganization if those adolescents are known by name by adult residents. Their presence may be less threatening to the moral order if their place in it is known by residents. Suttles (1968) maintains they may even help constitute that order through their regulation of the "ordered segmentation" of ghettos.

Social integration may also effect fear more directly. The socially integrated are by definition home owners who report having a commitment to the area. As people with these characteristics cluster in communities, the potential for rapid social change and the concommitant signs of disorganization associated with that change are reduced. Thus, social control remains relatively unchallenged and fear is low.

The Communities

Data were collected to "test" the social control and victimization perspectives as part of the general data gathering activity of the Reactions to Crime Project at the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University. The project was funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, to undertake a long-term multi-methodological research endeavor. As part of that project data were collected in four communities in Chicago. Data collection techniques included a random-digit dialing telephone survey, fifteen months of fieldwork in each community and the use of archival data, e.g., crime data, census data, etc.

Communities have been defined in many ways. In this investigation we will follow Hunter and Suttles and define community as that piece of urban geography for which residents have a collective awareness which may be manifest minimally in symbolically shared names and boundaries (Hunter, 1974). The measure of fear used as the dependent variable is derived from one item on the telephone survey:

> How safe do you feel, or would you feel, being out
> alone in your neighborhood at night—very safe,
> somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

This item is a slight modification of the item most generally used in previous surveys to measure fear of crime (Cook and Cook, 1975). Figure 1 shows that the four communities in our sample range from a high of 54 percent to a low of 29 percent of the residents reporting fear. The city sample was 32 percent fearful.

Figure 1

FEAR OF CRIME[*]

(Percent feel unsafe in neighborhood at night)

```
55 ┤─ WICKER PARK



50 ┤─ WOODLAWN




45 ┤




40 ┤




35 ┤




    ┤─ CHICAGO CITY


30 ┤─ BACK OF THE YARDS
    ├─ LINCOLN PARK



25 ┤
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
[*]Missing values have
been excluded from
analysis.

I will now describe each community briefly, with special emphasis on specific crime problems in the areas. The neighborhood descriptions presented here are drawn largely from reports by trained fieldworkers. Interviews were conducted with residents, officials, and community leaders in each neighborhood. These interviews were designed to provide street-level knowledge of neighborhood characteristics and problems. In addition to the qualitative information from the field observations presented here, the demographic characteristics of each neighborhood are compared according to data provided by residents from the telephone survey. The result is a detailed portrait of the four neighborhoods selected.

Lincoln Park

The two areas of Lincoln Park selected for study are the western neighborhoods of Wrightwood and Sheffield. Wrightwood is a middle-class area in the northwest section of Lincoln Park, which has a reputation of being more conservative than other parts of Lincoln Park. Many residents are older whites working in trades or middle management. A number of younger families with children left in the 1960's in search of suburban schools but a new influx of younger people is dedicated to the community and similar in economic status to the older, more established residents. Most residential structures are two- and three-flat buildings. There is very little new development and virtually no vacant property in the area.

Immediately south of Wrightwood is Sheffield, a community which has changed considerably in the last ten years. The area remains primarily residential, with most commercial activity being restricted to Halsted

Chicago

LINCOLN PARK

and Armitage streets. Many townhouses have been renovated and a more

affluent, professional class of people has moved in. In 1975 residents

were successful in having Sheffield designated as a historic district

and placed in the National Register of Historic Places.

Table 1 compares the four neighborhoods with respect to a set of

social and economic indicators from our Chicago surveys. Compared to

other neighborhoods, Lincoln Park has more residents in the upper

income brackets, over $20,000 per year. Employment is also higher in

Lincoln Park than in other areas. Lincoln Park residents are young adults;

almost 70 percent are between the ages of 21 and 40. There are few

children in the area, about six for every ten households. Finally, the

black population of Lincoln Park is smaller than the city-wide average.

There are fewer blacks in Lincoln Park than in any of the communities.

Residents and police alike agree that Lincoln Park crime is not

extremely serious. Two police districts serve the area. In the 18th

district, reported crime declined 10 percent from 1975 to 1976, and

the 19th showed lower rates than all but four other districts in the

city. Day-time burglary is the most prevalent crime mentioned by resi-

dents since a great number of them work and their homes are empty

during the day. Police say that auto theft is also a serious problem

in the area. Other crime concerns mentioned by residents who were

interviewed by fieldworkers were prostitution in nearby New Town and

fights at taverns on Armitage. There is some concern over youths

hanging out on the streets; residents opposed any game rooms opening up

because they would attract youth. Policemen interviewed said there is

nowhere for young people to go and that they are often called when

Table 1

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FOUR CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS[1]

	Lincoln Park	Wicker Park	Woodlawn	Back of the Yards	Chicago
% Employed	71.8	54.8	44.4	62.2	65.5
% over $20,000	29.3	12.8	16.4	14.8	22.5
% under $10,000	22.6	32.4	29.2	19.6	24.0
Mean # Children	.63	1.28	.83	1.30	.93
% Black	8.1	14.7	95.9	21.0	39.6
Age %					
11-20	4.0	12.3	6.0	9.0	5.6
21-40	69.0	56.0	43.0	51.0	56.9
41-60	18.0	23.0	28.4	28.0	24.9
61+	8.0	8.0	22.0	12.0	12.6
% Spanish	12.8	32.1	0.0	16.6	7.5
% Own Homes	22.4	35.0	16.9	42.8	35.6
1970 Population[2]	21,329	43,081	53,814	64,761	3,369,359
1975 Population[3]	20,773	37,216	46,759	58,859	3,094,143
Δ %	-2.6	-13.6	-13.1	-9.1	-8.16

[1]Source: Except as noted, all data are estimates from neighborhood surveys. See Appendix for details.

[2]Source: 1970 Census

[3]Source: Estimates from CAGIS (1978)

groups of kids are doing nothing more than standing around on corners. Residents are also fearful of blacks who live in the nearby Cabrini Green housing project. They opposed an A & P supermarket being built in their area because they thought it would attract black shoppers to the area to buy groceries. Their feeling was that if poor blacks came into the area to grocery shop, they would begin to hang around and rob Lincoln Park residents.

Low crime rates notwithstanding, Lincoln Park does contain pockets of criminal activity. Lincoln Park residents interviewed in the field identified the Clybourn corridor and Armitage Avenue, especially near the El station, as danger areas. Official police data on reported crime in this area support the perceptions of our respondents. Table 2 compares the incidence of reported crime in Lincoln Park as a whole to those areas in the neighborhood singled out by residents, and to the city-wide rate. The first part of Table 2 shows the number of crimes in Lincoln Park and each of the danger areas identified by residents. These data are collected by the Chicago Police Department for each city block, and the rates in this table express the average number of offenses per block. In Lincoln Park as a whole, there were 24 rapes in 1976, for an average of .28 per block. This is not to imply that there was an average of .28 rapes per block in Lincoln Park. These block-level means only are reported as a way of comparing the frequency of rape in different parts of the neighborhood. The block around the Armitage El stop, singled out as particularly dangerous, reported 2 rapes in 1976, 4 assaults, 4 robberies, and 19 burglaries. Each of these is above the neighborhood-wide average for these offenses. The

Table 2--Lincoln Park

BLOCK MEANS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND DANGER ZONES

(Mean Number of Offenses Per Block[1])

	RAPE		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total
Lincoln Park Area	.28	(24)	.99	(84)	1.64	(139)	9.66	(821)
Armitage 2000 N 800-1400W	.71	(5)	1.29	(9)	1.71	(12)	15.00	(105)
The El Stop 2000 N- 1000 W	2.00	(2)	4.00	(4)	4.00	(4)	19.00	(19)
Clybourn Corridor 2000N- 1200-1400W and 2100N-1300W	0	(0)	.75	(3)	.50	(2)	3.75	(15)

(left margin label: DANGER ZONES spanning the lower three rows)

CRIME RATES PER 1000 POPULATION

	RAPE *		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total
City	.73	(1179)	3.58	(11070)	5.68	(17577)	12.50	(38661)
Lincoln Park	2.21	(24)	4.04	(84)	6.69	(139)	39.52	(821)

*Rates per 1000 women

[1] Data are collected by Chicago Police Department for each city block. These rates express the average number of offenses per block. This is not to imply that there was an average of, for example, .28 rapes per block. These means are reported only as a way of comparing the frequency of crime in different area.

perceptions of residents regarding the rest of Armitage Avenue also accurately reflected the relative incidence of crime. The average number of burglaries and rapes per block along this section of Armitage is substantially higher than the neighborhood as a whole, while the number of assaults is only slightly higher than that for the entire Lincoln Park area. Although the Clybourn corridor is seen to be a dangerous area by residents, the crime data suggest otherwise. Rates of assault, burglary, rape, and robbery are considerably lower for this four block area than for the entire Lincoln Park neighborhood. As we discuss more fully below, part of the fear residents express about this area may be attributable to the corridor's desolate surroundings: vacant lots and factories.

The second part of Table 2 compares crime rates per 1000 population for Lincoln Park to rates for the entire city. These data show that the rate for Lincoln Park is _higher_ than that for the city, especially for burglary and rape. There are about 173 rapes per 1000 females in the entire city of Chicago, while the rate for Lincoln Park is 2.2 per 1000. The burglary rate in Lincoln Park is 39.5 per 1000 residents, compared to a city-wide rate of 12.5. Robberies and assaults are also slightly higher in Lincoln Park than in the entire city, although the differences are less pronounced.

Despite this relatively high rate of reported crime in Lincoln Park, the level of fear is low. Most residents interviewed in the field observations said they were not afraid to walk on their block or in their neighborhood at night. Many residents conveyed the general impression that a certain amount of inconvenience and crime are the price one pays for living in the city.

Wicker Park

Wicker Park extends from Augusta Boulevard on the south to West Armitage on the north; from Ashland on the east to Western Avenue on the western border of the neighborhood. This neighborhood is an area of lower working class families. A high percentage of families have incomes below the poverty level according to the 1970 U.S. Census, and in 1970, 12 percent of the families were receiving public assistance. Housing is primarily two- and three-flat apartments, but there are two senior citizens' high rises on Damen and Schiller. In an area known as "Old Wicker Park" homes described as mansions are being bought and renovated by young professionals. Population has changed greatly since the early 1960's, primarily due to an influx of Latino immigrants. There is some friction between Anglo and Spanish-speaking residents. Within the Spanish-speaking community there are reports of animosity between Puerto Rican and Mexican groups.

Table 1 shows that Wicker Park is considerably below Lincoln Park on most social and economic measures. Thirty-two percent of families in this neighborhood make less than $10,000 per year, according to our survey. Compared to other neighborhoods Wicker Park has a higher proportion of its population below the age of 20. About 15 percent of residents are black, and Latinos made up about 32 percent of our sample in Wicker Park. Schools in this area have bi-lingual programs which are resented by many whites. The percentage of our respondents employed was below that for Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards.

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Chicago

WICKER PARK

The area is plagued by a great many problems, but in 1976 and 1977 arson was foremost among them. Fire Marshal records show that the area surrounding Wicker Park has far more fires than any other part of the city similar in size. Some residents estimate that in the past few years up to 1000 buildings have been lost due to fires, vandalism, and condemnations. Among residents there are competing explanations for the large number of fires. The most provocative theory offered by respondents in our field studies is that well-connected business people, city politicians, and insurance companies are conspiring to burn everything down for profit.

Several other crime problems are expressed by residents and police officials in Wicker Park. Many people mention the taverns on Division Street as locations for much of the area drug dealing. Puerto Ricans in the area are said to be the major consumers of the illicit drug traffic, and residents say dealers include local residents and pushers from the south side.

Various other areas in Wicker Park were singled out as dangerous or troublesome. Residents cite Damen and Milwaukee as an area where prostitution is centered. North Avenue and Pierce Avenue are often said to be dangerous between Damen and Western. Problems mentioned in these areas are drugs, robbery, and purse snatching. Senior citizens mention that the danger of robbery is particularly great between their high rises on Schiller and the Jewel (a supermarket) a few blocks north on Damen. North Wicker Park, from North Avenue to Armitage, is considered to be much safer. This is a high income area with fewer bars and other hazards.

These concerns are borne out by the crime data presented in Table 3. The average number of all crime types per block is lower in North Wicker

Table 3--Wicker Park

BLOCK MEANS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND DANGER ZONES

(Mean Number of Offenses Per Block[1])

	RAPE		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total
Wicker Park	.20	(20)	2.83	(280)	4.71	(466)	9.17	(908)
South Wicker	.21	(13)	3.78	(238)	6.24	(393)	10.73	(676)
North Wicker	.19	(7)	1.17	(42)	2.03	(73)	6.44	(232)

	RAPE		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
Division 1200N from 1600-2400W	.33	(3)	6.67	(60)	9.89	(89)	19.00	(171)
Damen & Milwaukee	.25	(1)	4.50	(18)	13.00	(52)	10.00	(40)
North & Pierce between Damen & Western	.30	(3)	4.40	(44)	11.50	(115)	14.70	(147)
Schiller St. 1400N 1600-2200W	.29	(2)	2.29	(16)	5.14	(36)	7.86	(55)

DANGER AREAS

[1]See note to table 2.

CRIME RATES PER 1000 POPULATION

	RAPE*		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total
City	.73	(1179)	3.58	(11070)	5.68	(17377)	12.50	(38661)
Wicker Park	1.01	(20)	7.52	(280)	12.52	(466)	24.40	(908)

*Rates per 1000 women

Park than in the southern part of the neighborhood. Of the danger spots,
Damen and Milwaukee, and the area along North and Pierce from Damen to
Western stand out as areas with a high frequency of robbery. These two
areas, together with Division Street are also higher than the neighborhood
average for burglary. Together, the three areas account for 40 percent
of all burglaries in Wicker Park, and 55 percent of the robberies.
Schiller Street does not compare with the other danger areas, even though
it was singled out as an area plagued by robbery. The six blocks along
Schiller were only slightly higher than the average frequency per block
in the neighborhood. Compared to all of South Wicker Park, where this
section of Schiller is located, robberies are less common. In general,
however, residents are able to isolate the problem areas in their
neighborhood. Their perceptions of the frequency of serious crime are
quite accurate.

The bottom of Table 3 compares the neighborhood offense rate per
1000 population for Wicker Park to the city-wide average. The number of
reported rapes per thousand women in Wicker Park is slightly higher than
that for the city. There are considerable differences between the
neighborhood and city-wide rates for assault, robbery, and burglary,
however: Wicker Park residents are about twice as likely to be victims
of these crimes compared to the city-wide average rate of reported crime.

Although we are not able to assess the perceptions of Wicker Park
residents with respect to their principal concern, arson, the available
data suggest that respondents' expressed fears regarding other crime
problems are largely justified. People indicate that they have restricted
their activities because of the crime problem, and that they try to avoid

specific danger spots. There are other crime-related problems, such as gang wars and drug traffic, which we are not able to assess with our crime data but which fieldworkers learned were areas of concern for neighborhood residents. Relationships between residents and the police from the 13th and 14th districts which serve the area are strained at best. Residents told our field observers that the district commanders and other police administrators servicing the area are insensitive to the special problems of the Wicker Park community. There are conflicts between residents and other government institutions active in the neighborhood. These factors combine to increase the feelings of isolation among many residents.

Woodlawn

The definition of the Woodlawn Neighborhood corresponds exactly with the Woodlawn community area boundary, Chicago community area #42. The neighborhood extends from Lake Michigan on the east to Martin Luther King, Jr. Drive on the west, and from 59th on the north to 67th on the south. Woodlawn is a lower class area, described by some area residents as a ghetto slum. All residents interviewed by the field staff distinguished East and West Woodlawn. People reported that West Woodlawn had more home owners who kept up their property, while East Woodlawn was consistently described as run down and deteriorated.

The demographic data on respondents in our neighborhood survey shown in Table 1 indicate that the population of Woodlawn is about 96 percent black, and that the neighborhood suffers from a high rate of unemployment.

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Chicago

WOODLAWN

60TH ST

63RD ST

67TH ST

KING DR. (400E)

COTTAGE GROVE AVE (800E)

WOODLAWN AVE. (1200E)

STONY ISLAND AVE. (1600E)

S CHICAGO AVE

About 29 percent of the families had a household income of less than
$10,000 per year, but 16 percent reported incomes in excess of $20,000.
Families in this neighborhood are predominantly renters: only about 17
percent of our survey respondents said they owned their own homes.
Woodlawn had a higher proportion of respondents over age 60 than the
other neighborhoods and, except for Lincoln Park, Woodlawn had the smallest
proportion of residents between the ages of 11 and 20. The 1970 census
reported population in Woodlawn at 53,814; the 1975 estimates from CAGIS
show the area population to be 46,759 for a net drop of 13.1 percent.

Throughout the rest of the city Woodlawn has developed a reputation
as a dangerous, high crime area, but most residents interviewed in the
field do not necessarily consider the area to be so bad. Much of Wood-
lawn's reputation seems to have developed as a result of gang warfare
in the 1960's. This problem has largely diminished according to area
residents. The fires that plagued the area in the past have also sub-
sided to a degree. The crimes which residents regularly reported were
robbery, purse snatching, mugging, and burglary. Most people were aware
that these types of crimes were far more common than the more highly
publicized offenses of murder and rape.

Many residents consider Woodlawn no more crime ridden than other parts
of Chicago, but compared to the rest of the city official police data
show that this neighborhood ranks higher than the city-wide average for
all four offense types. Table 4 shows that the number of rapes and
robberies per 1000 population is considerably higher in Woodlawn than
in the city as a whole. The differences between the neighborhood and the
city-wide rate for burglary and assault are not quite as great, but the

Table 4--Woodlawn

BLOCK MEANS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND DANGER ZONES

(Mean Number of Offenses Per Block[1])

	RAPE		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total
Woodlawn	0.43	(66)	2.68	(412)	6.57	(1012)	8.51	(1310)

DANGER AREAS

	RAPE		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
King Dr. Area	1.29	(9)	5.86	(41)	20.86	(146)	20.14	(141)
63rd St. Area	0.66	(23)	4.14	(145)	12.29	(430)	9.74	(341)
62nd-63rd St.	0.40	(6)	4.00	(60)	9.27	(139)	10.93	(164)
63rd-64th St.	0.85	(17)	4.25	(85)	14.55	(291)	8.85	(177)

[1]See note to table 2.

CRIME TOTALS AT HIGH DANGER SPOTS

	RAPE	ASSAULT	ROBBERY	BURGLARY
Intersection Area, King Dr. & 63rd St.	4	9	71	38
6300-6400S, 800E	3	16	61	24
6200-6400S, 1300E	4	26	49	51

CRIME TOTALS AT SAFE SPOTS

	RAPE	ASSAULTS	ROBBERY	BURGLARY
WOODLAWN GARDENS 6230 S. Cottage Gr. (6200S-700E Block)	1	1	7	9
JACKSON PARK TERR. 6040 S. Harper (6000S-1400E)	0	0	0	2

CRIME RATES PER 1000 POPULATION

	RAPE *		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total
City	.73	(1179)	3.58	(11070)	5.68	(17577)	12.50	(38661)
Woodlawn	2.68	(66)	8.81	(412)	21.64	(1012)	28.02	(1310)

*Rate per 1000 women

rate per thousand in Woodlawn is still about 2½ times that for the city of Chicago.

Respondents mentioned two sections of Woodlawn as especially dangerous or troublesome areas: 63rd Street from the Lake to King Drive, and all of King Drive between 59th and 67th.

People consistently expressed fear regarding 63rd Street. Most residents were afraid to visit the area, especially at night. All age groups interviewed by field observers noted serious problems on the street, especially muggings, robbery and purse snatching. Table 4 shows the average number of crimes per block for these danger areas and for the rest of Woodlawn. For the entire 63rd Street area, there was an average of .66 rapes per block compared to .43 per block for the entire neighborhood. Burglary and assault were also slightly higher along this street, and the mean number of robberies was almost twice that for the neighborhood. Table 4 shows that with the exception of burglary the average number of offenses per block was higher on the blocks beginning on the south side of 63rd Street. There was an average of 14½ robberies per block on the south side of this street, compared to a little over 9 per block on the north side.

King Drive was also mentioned as a place to avoid. The average number of offenses per block along this street is higher than along 63rd. There was an average of over 1 rape per block on this stretch of King Drive compared to less than .5 per block for all of Woodlawn, and .85 for the worst part of 63rd Street. Assaults were only slightly more common, while robberies occurred on King Drive at the rate of almost 21 per block, close to three times the neighborhood average. Together King

Drive and 63rd Street accounted for 48.5 percent of the rapes in Woodlawn, 45 percent of assaults, 57 percent of robberies, and 37 percent of burglaries in the entire neighborhood. These data suggest that residents accurately perceive specific areas in Woodlawn where crime problems are especially severe.

Parts of Woodlawn consistently reported as being particularly safe were the areas surrounding the housing projects of The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). The average number of crimes per block in the immediate areas around Woodlawn Gardens (6230 S. Cottage Grove) and Jackson Park Terrace (6040 S. Harper) supports the notion that crimes are less frequent here than in the rest of Woodlawn. In all of 1976 there were no rapes, no robberies, and no assaults in the Jackson Park Terrace area. These safety islands seem to be confined to relatively small radii since one block to the south and east of Woodlawn Gardens lies another concentration of high crime blocks.

In general people in Woodlawn believe that although some streets are dangerous, the areas surrounding their own homes are relatively safe. Since a large proportion of crime in Woodlawn appears to be concentrated along two streets, residents are probably correct in believing that crime may be high in some places in Woodlawn, but not on their block.

One final characteristic of individual reactions to crime in Woodlawn was the reported tendency of residents to say they would not report crimes to the police. Police interviewed by field observers agreed that many residents often did not report crimes. People said that crimes or incidents they had witnessed were not the business of the police. Regarding the low level of expressed fear, this might indicate that Woodlawn residents do not fear crime because they feel they can handle it

themselves. On the other hand, if residents in Woodlawn report crime less often, then the actual incidence of criminal offenses is even higher, and the disparity between fear and actual crime should be even greater.

Back of the Yards

The Back of the Yards neighborhood occupies a large area on the city's near southwest side. The neighborhood is defined by the following boundaries: Archer Avenue from Ashland to Western on the north, and Garfield Avenue from Aberdeen to Western on the south. In addition there is a small portion from Garfield to 59th between Ashland and Western, and another small area from Western to California between 50th and 54th. This is a stable, working class area including a mix of ethnic white, Spanish-speaking and black families.

Among respondents to our survey, about 17 percent were Latino, and 21 percent were black (see Table 1). Latinos get along well in the community and are accepted into the stable white lifestyle. Most black families in Back of the Yards live in the southern parts of the neighborhood, below 55th Street. Compared to the other three neighborhoods examined here, Back of the Yards has the highest percentage of home owners. Field observers report that most families plan to stay in the neighborhood. Families in Back of the Yards have a larger proportion of children between the ages of 11 and 20 than the other neighborhoods except for Wicker Park. Although it is a middle income working class area, Table 1 shows that this neighborhood had the lowest proportion of families earning less than $10,000 annually. Relative to other

Chicago
BACK OF THE YARDS

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ARCHER AVE.

35TH ST.

(3900S) PERSHING RD

(2400W) WESTERN BLVD,

(1600W) ASHLAND AVE.

43RD ST

RACINE AVE.

DAMEN AVE.

(1200W) RACINE AVE.

47TH ST

ABERDEEN AVE.

(1100W) ABERDEEN AVE.

50TH ST

(2600W) CALIFORNIA AVE.

(5500S) GARFIELD BLVD

59TH ST

neighborhoods a high proportion of respondents in Back of the Yards was

employed, second only to Lincoln Park. Population has declined somewhat

since the 1970 level of 64,761. CAGIS 1975 estimates place the neigh-

borhood population at just under 59,000, a decline of 9.1 percent.

Residents of the neighborhood are somewhat fatalistic about crime.

They say that although they are aware of crime, there is not much to be

done about it—it exists everywhere in all cities and suburbs. Residents

therefore accept crime as a fact of life in the city. There is a low

level of fear expressed by people in the neighborhood.

This low-key treatment of crime as a local problem is encouraged

by one of the most important influences in the area, the Back of the Yards

Council (BOYC). The Council's weekly newspaper does not cover crime

news. It is the stated policy of Joe Meegan, executive director of

BOYC, that stories about neighborhood crime will not be covered in order

to keep area news positive, to reduce residents' fear of crime, and to

promote neighborhood stability. The Council also supports a program

to reduce violence on television by boycotting the products of companies

which sponsor violent shows.

Compared to other neighborhoods, there are no serious crime problems

in Back of the Yards. The Juvenile Welfare Committee of BOYC conducts

a series of programs directed at neighborhood youth in an effort to

reduce truancy, runaways, and vandalism. This committee does not handle

serious cases, referring them to juvenile courts. The only other

perceptions of crime problems discerned by field observers referred to

shoplifting in area stores, primarily at the South Ashland Avenue

Goldblatt's store. People distinguish between the majority of shoplifters

who are juveniles, and adults who are generally believed to be professional thieves from areas outside the Back of the Yards neighborhood. The BOYC conducts a program against shoplifting by encouraging store owners to prosecute offenders.

Because the block level crime reports from the Chicago Police Department are available only for serious crimes, we were unable to assess the reports of Back of the Yards residents concerning the problems of vandalism and shoplifting. For the sake of comparison with other parts of the neighborhood we did isolate data for our four serious offenses in the area surrounding the Goldblatt's store. These are shown in Table 5. There were no rapes in the area near the store in 1976, and only 12 burglaries. The average number of assaults and robberies per block around Goldblatt's was somewhat higher than the corresponding average for the entire neighborhood. It is, however, difficult to conclude that there are relatively more robberies and assaults in this area. This is because we have no way of comparing the population at risk, the number of people in the area, for Goldblatt's and the entire neighborhood. It seems likely, however, that the concentration of people in space and time around the large department store would reduce the number of assaults and robberies per person to a level considerably below that for the neighborhood as a whole.

The overall rate of serious crime in Back of the Yards is comparable to that for the city as a whole. There were about .73 rapes per 1000 women throughout Chicago, and about .8 per 1000 for Back of the Yards. The rate of assaults was slightly lower here than in the whole city, while robberies and burglaries were slightly more common in Back of the Yards than in all of Chicago.

Table 5--Back of the Yards

BLOCK MEANS FOR NEIGHBORHOOD AND DANGER ZONES

(Mean Number of Offenses Per Block[1])

	RAPE		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total	Mean	Total
BOY Area	.08	(26)	.54	(178)	1.07	(353)	2.78	(915)
47th-Ashland (4600-4700S, 1500-1600W)	.00	(0)	1.75	(7)	8.25	(33)	3.00	(12)

[1]See note to table 2.

CRIME RATES PER 1000 POPULATION

	RAPE*		ASSAULT		ROBBERY		BURGLARY	
	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total	Rate	Total
City	.73	(1179)	3.58	(11070)	5.68	(17577)	12.50	(38661)
BOY	.84	(26)	3.02	(178)	6.00	(353)	15.55	(915)

*Rate per 1000 women

These findings suggest that residents and business people in the area are accurate in their perceptions of crime. They do not see it as a big problem relative to the city as a whole, and are not inclined to take drastic steps to protect themselves from crime. A few residents told field observers that they don't sit out on their porches anymore, and some shop owners said that they close their stores earlier than they used to. In general residents don't discuss crime problems, and express tolerance toward the existing level of crime.

This section has provided brief descriptions of the demographic characteristics of our four neighborhoods, and has presented an overview of the extent of serious crime in each area. The field observations have enabled us to compare neighborhood residents' perceptions about general crime problems in their area with official police reports on frequency of serious crime. In most cases, it appears that residents in our four neighborhoods have a reasonably accurate picture of the crime problem which they face. Informants who talked with our observers in the field accurately single out more dangerous areas in their neighborhoods.

This is important for the discussion of the different perspectives. The consistency with which informants and crime statistics identify the same trouble spots can be interpreted to support the rationality of citizen assessments of risk (these assessments were not systematically collected). If citizen perceptions of dangerous areas are substantiated by official records, then it can be said with some confidence that citizens can differentiate between high risk locations within their environments. I will return to this point in the discussion of the victimization perspective.

At this point it suffices to say that the four Chicago communities represent very different kinds of urban experiences. The two "high fear" communities, Wicker Park and Woodlawn, have poor non-white residential populations and show a good deal of urban decay. The two low fear communities, Back of the Yards and Lincoln Park, are mostly white, more affluent communities. In all four areas residents are capable of discerning the high risk parts of their environments.

I now turn my attention to describing the crime problems in each community.

CHAPTER SIX

CRIME IN THE COMMUNITIES AND CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS

Official police statistics discussed in the previous chapter gave an approximate picture of the incidence of serious crime in each of the four neighborhoods. These are crimes reported to police and recorded by the police as index offenses. Despite the well-known problems with using data on reported crime, official police statistics provide the most accurate estimates of the magnitude of crime to which residents in the neighborhoods are exposed. Victimization surveys may provide better estimates of the actual incidence of crime, but the number of crimes reported to the police is a better measure of the salient (the victimizations which concern residents) crime people hear about, and therefore a better base from which to compare the incidence of crime to people's fear of crime.

I have taken two distinct approaches to measuring people's perceptions of crime in our telephone surveys. For each of four offense types, burglary, robbery, assault, and rape and sexual assault, we asked respondents to indicate whether they thought it was a big problem, some problem or no problem at all in their neighborhood. Note that this question asks people to assess the crime problem based on their own criteria. It asks about people's general feelings concerning crime as an issue or a problem in their neighborhood. The second set of indicators is more specific. People are asked to estimate, on a scale from one to ten, the likelihood that they would become a victim of each of the four crime types.

This approach to analyzing perceptions of crime assumes that these three concepts--the actual incidence of crime, concern about crime, and

perceived chance of becoming a victim--are linked directly to reported
fear levels. This assumes that people's perceived risk of crime and
official crime rates are not <u>directly</u> linked, but are both related to an
intervening variable, general concern about the crime problem. In other
words, people make the judgement that a certain level of crime is a problem
and this judgement influences their assessment of risk. This intervening
step makes explicit the connection between the official crime rate and
the individual's assessment of risk.

In the following analyses the correspondence between these three
concepts for our selected neighborhoods is examined. The offense type
figures compare the actual rates of reported crime, expressed concern,
and average estimates of perceived risk for each neighborhood. If
perceptions of crime are linked to aggregate crime rates in an individual's
immediate surroundings, then concern and perceived risk should be higher
for those neighborhoods with higher rates of reported crime.

Figures 2 through 5 show scales for each of the three indicators
for each crime type. Figure 2 compares the incidence of burglary as
reported in official Chicago Police statistics, the proportion of resi-
dents who think that burglary is a big problem, and the mean perception
of risk of becoming a burglary victim in each neighborhood. The crime
data are the same aggregations of block-level statistics presented above.

Between 18 and 32 percent of residents in each neighborhood thought
burglary was a big problem. The ordering of the neighborhoods on this
variable is not entirely consistent with the reported crime rates. People
in Wicker Park expressed more concern over burglary than respondents in
other areas despite the fact that the official burglary rate in Wicker

FIGURE 2

BURGLARY

RATE PER 1000 RESIDENTS	% BIG PROBLEM	PERCEIVED RISK
50	50	5.0
		WOODLAWN 4.8
		WICKER PARK 4.7
40 — LINCOLN PARK 39.5	40	4.0 — CHICAGO 4.1
		LINCOLN PARK 4.0
		BACK OF THE YARDS 3.9
	WICKER PARK 32.2	
30	30	3.0
WOODLAWN 28.0	LINCOLN PARK 27.5	
	WOODLAWN 26.3	
WICKER PARK 24.4		
20	20 — CHICAGO 19.7	2.0
	BACK OF THE YARDS 17.9	
BACK OF THE YARDS 15.5		
CHICAGO 12.5		
10	10	1.0

range = 0 — 100%   range = 0 — 10

FIGURE 3

ROBBERY

RATE PER 1000 RESIDENTS

- 50
- 40
- 30
- WOODLAWN 21.6
- 20
- WICKER PARK 12.5
- 10
- LINCOLN PARK 6.7
- BACK OF THE YARDS 6.0
- CHICAGO 5.7

% BIG PROBLEM

- 50
- WICKER PARK 37.9
- WOODLAWN 33.6
- 40
- 30
- CHICAGO 25.1
- BACK OF THE YARDS 22.8
- LINCOLN PARK 19.9
- 20
- 10

range = 0–100%

PERCEIVED RISK

- 5.0
- WICKER PARK, WOODLAWN 4.8
- BACK OF THE YARDS 4.3
- CHICAGO 4.2
- 4.0
- LINCOLN PARK 3.8
- 3.0
- 2.0
- 1.0

range = 0 – 10

FIGURE 4

ASSAULT

RATE PER 1000	% BIG PROBLEM	PERCEIVED RISK
10.0	50	5.0
─WOODLAWN 8.8		
8.0	40	4.0
		─WICKER PARK 3.9
─WICKER PARK 7.5		─WOODLAWN 3.7
		─BACK OF THE YARDS 3.6
		─CHICAGO 3.2
		─LINCOLN PARK 3.1
6.0	30	3.0
	─WICKER PARK 25.9	
4.0 ─LINCOLN PARK 4.0	20	2.0
─CHICAGO 3.6		
─BACK OF THE YARDS 3.0		
	─WOODLAWN 13.4	
	─LINCOLN PARK 10.3	
2.0	10 ─CHICAGO 9.6	1.0
	─BACK OF THE YARDS 8.3	

range=0–100%   range =0–10

FIGURE 5

RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

RATE PER 1000	% BIG PROBLEM	PERCEIVED RISK *
5.0	50	5.0
		—WOODLAWN 4.7
4.0	40	4.0
		—WICKER PARK 3.8
		—LINCOLN PARK, CHICAGO 3.2
3.0	30	3.0 —BACK OF THE YARDS 3.0
—WOODLAWN 2.68		
—LINCOLN PARK 2.21		
2.0	20	2.0
1.0 —WICKER PARK 1.01	10	1.0
—BACK OF THE YARDS 0.84	—WICKER PARK 8.1	
—CHICAGO 0.73	—WOODLAWN 7.0 —CHICAGO 6.9 —LINCOLN PARK 5.7 —BACK OF THE YARDS 4.8	
	range = 0 – 100%	range = 0 – 10

'women respondents only

Park was below that for both Woodlawn and Lincoln Park. Lincoln Park residents were somewhat likely to express concern over burglary than people in Woodlawn, while only 18 percent of Back of the Yards residents saw burglary as a big problem. The proportion of city-wide residents in this category was 19.7 percent, so residents in three of our neighborhoods showed more concern over burglary than people living throughout the city. Overall, except for the high concern in Wicker Park, the neighborhoods are ordered on this variable relative to their objective burglary rates.

The perceived risk scale shows that respondents in Wicker Park and Woodlawn think their chances of being burglarized are higher than those in either Lincoln Park or Back of the Yards. This ordering does not follow that for the official crime statistics on burglary, nor for the way the neighborhoods rank on concern. Back of the Yards respondents estimate their risk of burglary as slightly lower than residents of Lincoln Park. This accurately reflects the relative position of Back of the Yards on the scales measuring burglary rate and concern about burglary. The absolute values of estimated risk on all neighborhoods seem rather high. Most people place their chances of being burglarized at just below the mid-point on the scale. But this does not necessarily mean people see their chance of being victimized as close to 50-50, only that they feel they are about as likely as most people to have their homes burglarized. The mean scores of Woodlawn and Wicker Park residents are above that for the city-wide sample, and above that of the other neighborhoods. Collectively, respondents living in Wicker Park and Woodlawn estimate their chances of being burglary victims as somewhat higher than people in other neighborhoods in our sample and in other parts of the city.

Figure 3 compares official robbery rates with concern about robbery and perceived risk of becoming a robbery victim. The robbery rate per 1000 residents in Woodlawn is almost twice that for the second highest neighborhood. Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards are well below the two higher areas, but both are slightly above the city-wide rate of 5.7 robberies per 1000. The large difference between Woodlawn and Wicker Park is somewhat surprising. In Woodlawn there are 21.6 robberies per 1000 residents; put another way this means that robbery victims in Woodlawn in 1976 equaled about 2 percent of the area's population. There were almost 13 robberies per 1000 in Wicker Park.

Woodlawn and Wicker Park residents expressed greater concern about the problem of robbery than people living in Back of the Yards and Lincoln Park. Once again Wicker Park residents are most likely to think that robbery is a big problem although the official incident reports show that Wicker Park is a distant second to Woodlawn in the incidence of robbery. There are almost twice as many robberies per capita in Woodlawn than in the Wicker Park area, yet almost 38 percent of respondents in the latter neighborhood thought robbery was a big problem, while less than 34 percent of those in Woodlawn expressed equivalent concern. Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards are both slightly below the city-wide average score for concern, even though they are slightly above the city-wide rate of robberies per capita.

There are also some inconsistencies regarding estimates of risk for robbery. The Woodlawn neighborhood had many more robberies than Wicker Park, but residents in the two neighborhoods saw their chances of being robbed as equal, at 4.8, just below the mid-point. This is only slightly

above the estimates for Back of the Yards and Lincoln Park despite
the fact that these latter two areas are well below Wicker Park and Wood-
lawn in the incidence of robbery. It is interesting to note that the
perceived risk for robbery in all neighborhoods is about the same as
that for burglary. Even though burglary is much more common, people
estimate their chances of becoming victims as about equal for the two
offense types. The indicator of concern about robbery shows that more
people in each neighborhood see it as a bigger problem than the more common
offense of burglary. This is consistent with previous research which
has found that robbery, as a personal crime involving confrontation and
often violence between offender and victim, is more likely to generate
fear in victims and people who hear of the robberies (Skogan, 1977;
President's Commission, 1967).

Aggravated assault is even less common than robbery. Figure 4
compares the rate of assaults per 1000 residents to our measures of concern
and perceived risk. Once again Woodlawn and Wicker Park cluster together
as high crime areas, well above Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards.
There were 8.8 serious assaults per 1000 residents in Woodlawn and 7.5
per 1000 in Wicker Park. Lincoln Park was slightly above the city-wide
assault rate with 4 per 1000 residents, while Back of the Yards reported
a total of 178 serious assaults or about 3 per 1000 residents.

Relatively few people in these neighborhoods see assault as a big
problem. About twice as many people in Wicker Park express concern over
assault as those living in Woodlawn, the runner-up on the concern scale.
This is despite the fact that there are more reported assaults per capita
in Woodlawn, and that residents of the two areas have about equal estimates
of their chances of being assaulted. More than one-quarter of the

people in Wicker Park see assault as a big problem, while the rate of
reported assault in that area is 7.52 per 1000, just under the rate for
Woodlawn. Less than ten percent of the people in Back of the Yards
and the city of Chicago see assault as a big problem, and this corres-
ponds with objective and perceived risk of assault in those areas.
Similarly, people in Lincoln Park are not too concerned about assaults.
Although they are much more likely to become assault victims, Woodlawn
residents express only slightly more concern about assault than people
in the city and in the two neighborhoods with lower official assault
rates.

The four neighborhoods cluster very closely in their mean estimates
of risk. Residents estimate their chances of being assaulted at between
3.1 and 3.9 on the ten-point perceived risk scale. Wicker Park residents
see assault as most probable, followed closely by people living in Wood-
lawn and Back of the Yards. People in Lincoln Park are somewhat below
those in other areas in their estimate of risk, and just below the city-
wide estimate of 3.2. There is considerable variation among the neigh-
borhoods in the incidence of assault, but there is not much difference
in people's perceived risk of being beaten up. The perceived risk of
assault for all neighborhoods is slightly below that for robbery. This
accuracy reflects relative frequency of the two offense types.

Figure 5 compares the four neighborhoods with respect to their
rates and perceptions about rape and sexual assault. Rape is much less
common than the other offense types we have discussed. Woodlawn and
Lincoln Park show the most rapes per 1000 resident women, well above
the rates for the other two neighborhoods and for the city as a whole.

The questions about perceived chance of victimization were asked of women only, while both males and females responded to the concern question.

Few respondents express much concern over rape and other sexual assaults. Between 4.8 and 8.1 percent of the residents in our neighborhoods saw these crimes as a big problem. This is lower than any other offense types we have examined here, and the difference between perceived risk and concern is greater for this offense than for any other. The low values for concern are consistent with the low probability of victimization, but they are at odds with women's perceived risk for this offense type. The four neighborhoods cluster very closely together in respondents' expression of concern. People in the city-wide sample express slightly more concern over sexual assault than those in Lincoln Park or Back of the Yards, and they estimate their chances of being sexually assaulted as about the same as respondents in Lincoln Park. Although this is the least common of the serious offenses examined here, women still estimate their chances of being victimized at a level close to that for other offenses. The variation across neighborhoods is most interesting. Women in Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards were considerably below those in Woodlawn and Wicker Park in estimating the likelihood of being the victim of a sexual assault, despite the fact that the rate was higher in Lincoln Park.

There are some regularities in the ordering of the neighborhoods across the four crime types. The Woodlawn area is consistently high in official crime rate, being second to Lincoln Park only in burglary. Wicker Park is just below Woodlawn in all offenses except rape. Despite this consistent ordering for official crime rates, residents of Wicker

Park expressed more concern about all crime types than people living in other neighborhoods. The average perceived risk in Wicker Park was highest for assault, and either just below or equal to that for Woodlawn in the other offense types. The differences between Woodlawn and Wicker Park on the attitudinal items are not great, but they are consistent across scales. Residents of Lincoln Park estimate their chances of being victimized as lower than the other areas except for rape and sexual assault, and Back of the Yards is lowest on the proportion of residents seeing these crimes as a big problem, except for robbery. These attitudes are consistent with the official rates of crimes in these two neighborhoods.

In sum, this analysis has shown that official crime rates and perceived risk are not related in any simple way. There appear to be some consistent relationships between the intervening variable concern and people's perceived risk of crime, but the measures of concern do not appear to be related directly to crime rates. When we relate fear to risk, concern and the local crime rates, the picture becomes even more clouded. As Figure 7 demonstrates, the relationship between the crime rates and fear levels is neither obvious nor direct. The fear rankings certainly do not parallel the crime rankings. Lincoln Park, the least fearful neighborhood, ranks second in crime rate. Back of the Yards, with approximately the same fear level as Lincoln Park has the lowest crime rate of all four neighborhoods. What is perhaps even more perplexing is that the most fearful neighborhood, Wicker Park, ranks third in crime rate, yet first in concern about crime and perceived risk.

What we are left with is a less than persuasive application of the victimization perspective. Local crime conditions do not match local fear conditions. Fear seems to be affected by more than the crime rate in a locality. Citizens clearly have the capacity to discern dangerous parts of their neighborhoods, so that it is not a lack of the capacity to make an assessment about the potential for victimization which explains the discrepancy.

It seems apparent that the victimization perspective in this form leaves as many questions unanswered as it resolves. These findings are consistent with the results of previous studies. Biderman (1967), Garofalo (1977) and Rifai (1976) all found that fear of crime was only indirectly linked to actual criminal offenses. While there is some evidence (Skogan, 1976) that individuals who have directly experienced particular types of victimizations (e.g., robbery) are more afraid than their non-victimized counterparts, there is little support for the general proposition that victimization experiences predict fear levels at the neighborhood or individual level. Indeed, given the relatively rare occurrence of serious crimes even in the most crime-ridden neighborhood, and the relatively high levels of fear in all the Chicago sites, we must look beyond victimization to account for the prevalent phenomenon of fear. For while citizen assessments of particular areas match official records of crime events occurring more often there, their general assessments of the magnitude of the crime problem in their communities and the attendant risk to themselves seem to be affected by factors beyond the rate of victimization in the community.

CHAPTER SEVEN

APPLYING THE SOCIAL CONTROL PERSPECTIVE

We will now apply the social control perspective to the same problem

of fear of crime in the four study areas. We will employ the same

dependent variable and attempt to explain the variations in neighborhood

fear levels. The social control perspective posits the signs of dis-

organization manifested in the proximate environment as the main deter-

minants of the level of fear in a neighborhood. These signs signal the

demise of the local moral order for its residents. As those signs increase,

fear increases.

What the previous discussion demonstrates is that while crimes may

be a sign of disorganization they do not account for the fear levels in

the communities. What I will show in this section is that various

behaviors and conditions which appear in these communities are associated

with fear. These conditions and behaviors signal the decline of the moral

order in general and the lack of social control in particular. There is

a transformation taking place and community institutions lack the means

to control it.

Fear of crime would increase in a community as the indicators of

that weakening process become more evident. The first issue then is to

develop indicators of that process. In an earlier work (Lewis and

Maxfield, 1980) I began that task by proposing the concept of "incivility"

to account for relative ranking of neighborhoods along the fear dimen-

sions.

I approached the question of incivility in the telephone survey of

residents. Each respondent was asked whether she/he thought the

following conditions were a big problem, some problem, or almost no

problem:

       -Groups of teenagers hanging out on the streets.
       -Abandoned or burned out buildings or storefronts.
       -People using illegal drugs.
       -Vandalism, like graffiti or breaking windows.

Figure 6 shows what proportion of respondents in each community thought

each of these conditions was a big problem. The respondents from Wicker

Park scored higher than other neighborhoods on each of these questions.

Forty percent or more of the residents in Wicker Park believe teenagers,

illegal drugs, and vandalism are big problems in their neighborhood.

This is much larger than the city-wide average for these problems, and

substantially greater than the next highest neighborhood. Relatively

few people in all areas felt abandoned buildings were a big problem,

although about 26 percent of those responding from Woodlawn, and almost

30 percent of those from Wicker Park expressed concern over this problem.

The problem evoking most concern in all neighborhoods was that of illegal

drugs, where the city-wide average was 25 percent. Many people expressed

concern over teenagers also, ranging from 18 percent in Lincoln Park

to 40 percent in Wicker Park. The city-wide total in this area was

about 23 percent. It is not surprising that Lincoln Park residents do

not express much concern about these problems. There are fewer children

and teenagers living in Lincoln Park and abandoned buildings are com-

paratively rare. Back of the Yards residents thought teenagers hanging

around were a big problem. This corresponds with information from

field observations in this neighborhood which indicate that the only

real crime problem in the area is shoplifting, where many of the

FIGURE 6

<u>CONCERN ABOUT INCIVILITY</u>

TEENS	ABANDONED BUILDINGS	ILLEGAL DRUGS	VANDALISM
		WICKER PARK 45.8	WICKER PARK 44.8
WICKER PARK 39.9			
		WOODLAWN 35.7	
BACK OF THE YARDS 31.8			
	WICKER PARK 29.6		
WOODLAWN 27.2		LINCOLN PARK 26.4	BACK OF THE YARDS 26.5
	WOODLAWN 25.8	BACK OF THE YARDS 25.9	WOODLAWN 24.7
		CHICAGO 25.2	
CHICAGO 22.9			CHICAGO 21.8
			LINCOLN PARK 20.1
LINCOLN PARK 18.2			
	BACK OF THE YARDS 15.1		
	CHICAGO 11.5		
	LINCOLN PARK 6.6		

RANGE: 0-100%

offenders are juveniles. Back of the Yards residents are also above

the city-wide average in expressing concern over abandoned buildings and

vandalism. The latter is usually a youth-related problem, and the

concern over abandoned buildings probably accurately reflects patterns

of population movement in that neighborhood.

What is perhaps most significant about the data in Figure 7 is that

Wicker Park stands out above the other neighborhoods in every category,

just as residents of this neighborhood expressed more concern than other

respondents over each of the serious criminal categories. Despite the

fact that Wicker Park has a lower official crime rate than Woodlawn in

every category, and lower than Lincoln Park for rape and burglary, Wicker

Park residents consistently express more concern over the problem of crime

and what we have called incivility which reinforce each other in the

Wicker Park neighborhood. On the other hand, despite crime rates which

are at least as high as the city-wide average, residents of Lincoln

Park express relatively low concern over problems of crime and civility.

We argued that the two problems, crime and incivility, must go hand in

hand for them to affect the perceptions of area residents and that a low

level of incivility may decrease perceived risk in a neighborhood.

Another important conclusion to be drawn from the earlier work is

that people generally see the problem of incivility as more important

than the problem of crime itself. Figure 8 compares the crime and

incivility questions directly. For each neighborhood two scale scores

are presented in Figure 8: the left side of each neighborhood scale shows

concern over crime problems, while the right hand side shows concern over

the four questions of incivility. As in the preceding scales, the

FIGURE 7

OBJECTIVE CRIME

RATE PER
1000

70 —
60 — WOODLAWN 59.9
50 — LINCOLN PARK 51.4
40 — WICKER PARK 45.0
30 — BACK OF THE YARDS 25.0
20 — CHICAGO 22.17

CONCERN ABOUT
CRIME

BIG
PROBLEM

3.0 —
2.0 — WICKER PARK 1.81
WOODLAWN 1.69
LINCOLN PARK 1.65
CHICAGO 1.59
BACK OF THE YARDS 1.56
1.0 —

range = 0 — 4
3.0 = great big problem

1 = no problem

CONCERN ABOUT
INCIVILITY

BIG
PROBLEM

3.0 —
2.0 — WICKER PARK 2.0
WOODLAWN 1.83
BACK OF THE YARDS 1.74
CHICAGO 1.65
LINCOLN PARK 1.62
1.0 —

PERCEIVED
RISK

RANGE = 0-10

5 —
WICKER PARK 4.5
4 — WOODLAWN 4.2
BACK OF THE YARDS 3.9
3 — CHICAGO 3.7
LINCOLN PARK 3.4
2 —
1 —

FEAR*

RANGE=
0-100%

70 —
60 — WICKER PARK 54.6
50 — WOODLAWN 50.4
40 —
30 — CHICAGO 31.7
BACK OF THE YARDS 29.2
LINCOLN PARK 29.1
20 —

*% feel unsafe in their
nbhd at night

scores for each neighborhood on each indicator express the proportion
of respondents who think each of the respective questions is a big
problem in their neighborhood. In all neighborhoods except Lincoln
Park the four civility related problems were of greater concern to
residents than the crimes of assault and rape. Lincoln Park was the
only neighborhood where more people expressed concern over any serious
criminal offense than the problem of drug use. Drugs, vandalism, and
teenagers were more often mentioned as big problems than all serious
crimes in Wicker Park and Back of the Yards. Except in Back of the Yards,
drug use was most often mentioned as a big problem among the incivility
variables. The residents of Wicker Park were more likely to express
concern about all of these problems than people living in any of our
other study neighborhoods, or people living throughout the city.

We concluded from Figure 8 that the neighborhood residents perceive
the problems of serious crime and incivility together. Neighborhoods
which exhibit high concern about crime also show high concern about
problems of incivility. Figure 9 shows this relationship more clearly.
This figure demonstrates the covariance between concern about all
incivility questions and concern about all four categories of serious
crime. Given available data, we cannot determine which of the two
factors, crime or incivility, is more important, but it did appear that
people express greater concern over incivility in our four study neigh-
borhoods. Drug use, vandalism, and raucous teenagers are considered to
be big problems by more than 20 percent of the respondents in the city-
wide sample and in all neighborhoods except Lincoln Park. Since the
problems of drug use and vandalism are themselves youth-related

FIGURE 8

CONCERN OVER CRIME AND INCIVILITY

range = 0 – 100%

left of scale / levels of concern over serious crime

right of scale / concern about problems of incivility

FIGURE 9

COVARIANCE BETWEEN CONCERN ABOUT CRIME AND INCIVILITY

range = 0 — 4

INCIVILITY

phenomena, the data indicate that serious crime may not be so much a problem as the presence and activities of teenagers. Fear of crime may be directly affected by concern about local adolescents. It is conceivable that the issue of the local moral order intersects the issue of inappropriate adolescent behavior around the concept of incivility.

Data on the number of teenagers living in each area lend some support to this view. Figure 10 shows the average number of children under age 18 per household in our four neighborhoods. Wicker Park and Back of the Yards have the highest average number of young people, well above the number per household in the other two neighborhoods. These two areas also show the highest proportion of people expressing concern over youth-related problems relative to the number of people concerned about serious crime. The problems of vandalism and teenagers rate below robbery for the two other areas and the city-wide sample, and below burglary for Lincoln Park. Drugs, vandalism, and teenagers were more often mentioned as big problems in Wicker Park and Back of the Yards than any crime type. Although the proportion of people expressing concern over incivility in Woodlawn is also high, it is more closely related to concern about serious crime. Lincoln Park with the lowest average number of children per household also shows the lowest proportion of people saying that incivility is a big problem in their neighborhood as well as the lowest fear of crime.

What we failed to present in the earlier analysis was a systematic perspective on why incivility and victimization had the combined effect on neighborhood residents of increasing fear. The social control perspective supplies that framework, for both victimizations and acts of

FIGURE 10

AVERAGE # CHILDREN BELOW AGE 18 LIVING IN HOUSE *

 # CHILDREN

1.5

1.4

1.3 — BACK OF THE YARDS 1.30
— WICKER PARK 1.28

1.2

1.1

1.0

.9 — CHICAGO .93

.8 — WOODLAWN .83

.7

.6 — LINCOLN PARK .63

.5

.4

.3

.2

.1

0

*source:RTC Survey Estimates

incivility are indicators to residents of the decline of the moral

order. Residents see incivility and crime increasing, and they become

convinced that the community's capacity to exert social control is

eroding. Victimization and conditions of incivility are evidence that

conventional standards are no longer controlling behavior, especially

the behavior of the young. The unsocialized (adolescents) and those who

live by other standards (the stranger) are the greatest perceived threats

to the moral order.

Assessments of crime problems within the victimization perspective

indicate cognitive reflections of objective conditions. These assess-

ments were hypothesized to motivate the individual to be fearful as he

calculated his risk of victimization. The more victimizations the bigger

the perceived problems; the greater the specific crime problems, the

greater likelihood of personal victimization and thus the higher the level

of fear. Differences between individuals are a function of differences

in objective conditions and how these conditions are "processed" psycho-

logically. If victimization and incivilities are treated as conditions,

indicating the level of disorder in a community, and if incivility

indicators are seen as more of a problem than victimizations in a community

(both because they are more apparent and because they are constant

reminders of the decline of the moral order) then fear can be accounted

for without referring to the "processing" individuals do. Communities

which have more signs of disorganization will have more fear if socal

control is not exercised. When victimizations are treated as conditions

rather than anticipated experiences, they become indicators of social

change. Victimizations and incivilities are signs of disorganization.

Signs of disorganization indicate social controls are weak. Weak social control as well as high crime are associated with high fear in a community.

In other words, victimizations, neighborhood crime problems and risk assessments are used in the victimization perspective to account for individual differences in reports of fear. The social control perspective treats victimizations, incivilities and the perceived crime problems as indicators of disorganized communities. These deficiencies in community organization account for fear levels, for those communities. The same indicators are used but they measure differing phenomena depending on the perspective operating.

The discussion of signs of disorganization in the social control perspective uses each community as the unit of analysis. To simplify this discussion, scales were generated for the incivility and victimization measures. As the reader will recall from the previous analyses, the survey respondents were asked whether four types of crime were neighborhood problems. The exact wording of the questions was:

(burglary) o What about burglary for the neighborhood in general. Is breaking into people's homes or sneaking in to steal something a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem for people in your neighborhood?

(robbery) o How about people being robbed or having their purses or wallets taken in the street. Would you say that this is a big problem, some problem or almost no problem?

(assault) o Besides robbery, how about people being attacked or beaten up in your neighborhood by strangers. Is this a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem?

(rape) o In your neighborhood, would you say sexual assaults are a big problem, somewhat of a problem, or almost no problem at all?

The response scale for these items ranged from 1 (almost no problem) to 3 (big problem). Figure 11 shows the four scales, one for each type of victimization derived from the above questions. Each scale simply ranks the neighborhoods on the percentage of residents who said that a particular victimization was a big problem in their neighborhood. The scales for assault and for rape have an expanded range in order to improve the readability of the figure.

A similar procedure was used to aggregate the incivility measures by community. Figure 6 shows the scales for each of the four signs of incivility we tapped with the four questions in the survey. The position of each neighborhood on the scales is determined by the percentage of residents who felt that the signs of incivility were big problems in their neighborhood. The aggregate level of the incivility and victimization indicators will serve as a measure of the perceived level of disorganization in a neighborhood.

The rationale behind constructing the aggregate concern about victimization and incivility scales, Figure 12, was as follows. From the social disorganization perspective, any individual victimization problem is not as important as the aggregate victimization problem across all serious crime categories because that aggregate level signals the general decline of moral order. Thus, the internal consistency of all four concerns about victimization was checked through factor analysis (all four items loaded on a single unidimensional factor accounting for 51 percent of the variance) and by calculation of Cronbach's alpha coefficient on the pooled city-wide samples. All four items were moderately correlated with the sum of the other three and together formed

FIGURE 11

PERCENT RESIDENTS WHO SAY THESE VICTIMIZATIONS ARE BIG PROBLEMS

Rape

10 — WICKER PARK
9
8
7 — WOODLAWN
6 — LINCOLN PARK
5 — BACK OF THE YARDS
4
3
2
1
0

Assault

30
25 — WICKER PARK
20
15 — WOODLAWN
10 — LINCOLN PARK
— BACK OF THE YARDS
5

Robbery

40
— WICKER PARK
35 — WOODLAWN
30
25 — BACK OF THE YARDS
20 — LINCOLN PARK
15

Burglary

35
— WICKER PARK
30
— LINCOLN PARK
— WOODLAWN
25
20 — BACK OF THE YARDS
15
10

Figure 12

AGGREGATE PROFILES

CONCERN ABOUT
VICTIMIZATION

```
50 —

40 —

30 —

      —WICKER PARK 26.6

20 — —WOODLAWN 20.4

      —LINCOLN PARK 16.1

      —BACK OF THE YARDS 13.6
```

CONCERN ABOUT
INCIVILITY

```
50 —

40 — —WICKER PARK 39.8

30 —
      —WOODLAWN 27.8

      —BACK OF THE YARDS 24.8

20 — —LINCOLN PARK 17.5

10 —
```

a scale with an alpha coefficient of .674. The position of a neighborhood on the concern about victimization scale was determined by the percentage of responses that were "Big Problems" for any of the four crimes. The aggregate scale for concern about incivility was similarly determined.

It was hypothesized that all four signs of incivility (loitering youth, drugs, vandalism, and abandoned buildings) would define a construct representing the extent to which there was a perceived problem with social disorganization in the neighborhood which went beyond problems of victimization. Accordingly, a factor analysis of the four indicators was performed on the pooled city-wide samples. All the items were unidimensionals and significantly intercorrelated. The internal consistency of these items was further checked by calculations of Cronbach's alpha coefficient. The four items formed a scale with an alpha of .755. The position of a neighborhood on the concern about the social order scale was determined by the percentage of responses that were "Big Problems" for any of the four questionnaire items.

The next step in operationalizing the social control perspective was to develop measures of the intervening variables "social integration" and "provincialism." Social integration was measured by the use of several items from the telephone survey. First, a scale was developed from three items in the survey which were thought to tap commitment to the local community. They were:

> -Difficulty of identifying a stranger in the neighborhood.
> -Whether or not the respondent felt a part of the neighborhood.
> -The number of children the respondent knew in the neighborhood.

This scale was constructed from the unweighted sum of a respondents' standardized scores on the three variables. Reliability analysis of the

scale resulted in a moderately high Cronbach's alpha of .585. It should

be remembered that the scale sums the standard scores and consequently

is a standard score itself. Actual scale scores ranged from values

of -4. up to +8.00. We collapsed these values into three categories on

the basis of a normal distribution of values, i.e., 50 percent of the

cases falling into the middle category, and about 25 percent each into

the low or the high categories. The scale was then recorded into low,

moderate and high categories. Table 6 depicts the distribution of

integrates in the four neighborhoods and Figure 13 graphically displays

the differences between high and low integrates on fear levels. Two

other items were employed to measure the impact of social integration.

Those measures are length of time living in the neighborhood (Figure 14)

and participation in community affairs (Figure 15). The social integration

scale (Figure 16) gives us multiple measures of the comparative levels

of social integration in the study areas.

Finally, the social control perspective posits the importance of

the level of provincialism manifested in the neighborhood. In neighbor-

hoods where residents can exert control over land use decisions and

interact with those agencies and institutions which are active in that

decision making process, fear is reduced. Operationalizing the concept

of provincialism calls for the use of qualitative data, for provincialism

most often manifests itself through community organizations operating

within the neighborhood. These organizations were only observed over

time through field study techniques. A qualitative analysis of the

fieldwork was done in the four Chicago neighborhoods.

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO
DEGREE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION[*]

Level of Social Integration	CHICAGO				
	Lincoln Park	Wicker Park	Woodlawn	Back of the Yards	City
Low	21.9%	14.8%	19.6%	8.5%	18.5%
Moderate	60.1%	61.0%	54.1%	57.8%	51.5%
High	18.1%	24.1%	26.2%	33.8%	30.0%
	(310)	(260)	(106)	(124)	(379)

[*]The number in the parentheses gives the total N for that neighborhood.

Figure 13

% FEEL UNSAFE GOING OUT AT NIGHT

Low Integrates	▲
High Integrates	△

Bar chart data:

- Lincoln Park: 39.3 (Low), 15.2 (High)
- Wicker Park: 69.9 (Low), 34.9 (High)
- Woodlawn: 54.7 (Low), 25.4 (High)
- Back of the Yards: 26.7 (Low), 19.2 (High)
- Chicago City: 44.6 (Low), 20.3 (High)

Figure 14

POPULATION STABILITY

LIVING IN NEIGHBORHOOD
FIVE YEARS OR LESS

```
60 ┐
   ├ LINCOLN PARK 59.2


50 ┤

                        WOODLAWN 41
40 ┤                    WICKER PARK 40

   ├ BACK OF THE YARDS 36.5


30 ┤


20 ┤


10 ┤


 0 ┘
```

LIVING IN NEIGHBORHOOD
TWENTY YEARS OR MORE

```
50 ┐


40 ┤


30 ┤


   ├ BACK OF THE YARDS 22
20 ┤

   ┤ WOODLAWN 19
   ┤ WICKER PARK 18.7
   ├ LINCOLN PARK 14.9


10 ┤


 0 ┘
```

Figure 15

PERCENT INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS

```
30 ┐

25 ┤
       ─┼─ Woodlawn

       ─┬─ Lincoln Park
20 ┤   ─┴─ Back of the Yards

15 ┤

       ─┼─ Wicker Park
10 ┤

 5 ┤

 0 ┘
```

Figure 16

LEVELS OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Percent   Percent

Low Integration   High Integration

```
50 ┐                                     50 ┐
   │                                        │
   │                                        │
   │                                        │
40 ┤                                     40 ┤
   │                                        │
   │                                        │
   │                                        ├ BACK OF THE YARDS 33.8
30 ┤                                     30 ┤
   │                                        │
   │                                        ├ WOODLAWN 26.2
   ├ LINCOLN PARK 21.9                       ├ WICKER PARK 24.1
20 ┤ WOODLAWN 19.6                        20 ┤
   │                                        ├ LINCOLN PARK 18.1
   ├ WICKER PARK 14.8                        │
   │                                        │
10 ┤                                     10 ┤
   ├ BACK OF THE YARDS 8.5                   │
   │                                        │
   │                                        │
 0 ┘                                      0 ┘
```

The level of social integration in each of the study areas indicates both the _context_ in which social control is being exerted and the social composition of the community in transition. Communities in which there are significant numbers of highly integrated residents are not only fairly stable but also have better chances of exerting social control through local institutions. Thus social integration is an indicator of community stability and the community capacity to regulate behavior. The level of provincialism in a community is tapped both by the number of high integrates in the area, for they by definition control land (their homes) and care about the future of the area, and by the activities of the local community organizations.

Wicker Park

Wicker Park is the neighborhood with the most fearful people (54%). It is also the area with the most signs of disorganization. Residents perceive both victimizations and incivility as more of a problem than residents of any other neighborhood. As Figure 8 demonstrates Wicker Park ranks first in concern about burglary (32%), robbery (38%), assault (26%) and rape (8%). Figure 6 also illustrates Wicker Park's leadership in concern about teens (39.9%), abandoned buildings (29.6%), illegal drugs (45.8%) and vandalism (44.8%). Wicker Park (see Figure 17) also has the highest percentage of residents who know a local victim of robbery (39.9%) and assault (29.5%), and ranks a very close second in knowledge of burglary victims (52.4%). The aggregate profiles (Figure 12) show Wicker Park to be the neighborhood with the most concern about victimizations (26.6%) and incivility (39.8%). Figure 12 shows clearly

FIGURE 17

PERCENT OF RESIDENTS WHO KNOW A LOCAL VICTIM

% Know About Burglary	% Know About Robbery	% Know About Assault	% Know About Rape Victim
60	40 — Wicker Pk (39.9)	40	30
	— Woodlawn (36.9)		
— Lincoln Park (53.4)	— Back of the Yards (33.4)		
— Wicker Park (52.4)			
50 — Back of the Yards (49.7)	30	30 — Wicker Pk (29.5)	20
	— Lincoln Pk (28.5)		— Woodlawn (18.1)
— Woodlawn (46.2)			
		— BOY (22.9)	— Back of the Yards (13
		— Lincoln Pk (22.9)	— Lincoln Pk (11.6)
		— Woodlawn (22.0)	
40	20	20	10
			— Wicker Pk (6.9)
30			

that residents of Wicker Park see incivility problems as being of greater magnitude than victimization problems.

The picture of perceived disorganization which emerges from the telephone survey is echoed in the fieldwork. Housing is dilapidated and residents perceive absentee landlords to be in control of most rentals. Gangs are seen to be a problem as ethnic conflict rages among older Polish whites, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, blacks, and professional whites gentrifying the area. Area bars are perceived as havens for various unsavory types who spend too much time drinking on the sidewalks. Arson is also mentioned as a continuing problem in the area. The schools are mentioned as the scenes of fights and racial conflicts. Whites continually mention bilingual education programs in resentful ways, while Latinos feel excluded from school affairs. Since most of the adolescents are Latino and black, and Polish whites are older more established residents, ethnic conflict is magnified by the generational tensions.

The general picture which emerges is a neighborhood in disarray. The streets, schools and parks are filled with the constant reminders of the disorganized state of affairs in the area. There is little confidence among residents as to their ability to affect this situation. Many leaders feel that city government is unresponsive to the community's needs and that the local deterioration which surrounds them is the result of a conscious strategy to remove lower income residents and gentrify the area for upper middle class whites.

The area is rich in organizations claiming to represent the interests of residents. There are twenty-six community based organizations and

voluntary associations operating in the area. However, the participation
of residents in these organizations is very low. As Figure 15 illus-
trates, Wicker Park with approximately 11 percent participation has by
far the lowest involvement of the Chicago neighborhoods. So while
many organizations claim to represent residents, only a few residents are
involved with their self-proclaimed representatives. Consequently,
there are few mechanisms for developing the provincialism which could
mediate the effects of social disorganization on fear of crime. Without
the political development which manifests itself in provincial neighbor-
hoods, the loss of control over the changes in the neighborhood goes
unchecked. Residents feel helpless to affect the deterioration process.
The lack of provincialism and the magnitude of the signs of disorganiza-
tion are reflected in the relation of fear to social integration. Figure
13 shows the high levels of fear reported by both low and high integrates.
Over 40 percent of the residents have lived in the neighborhood for five
years or less. However, the demographic data does not tell a uniform
story, for 35 percent of residents own their own homes and Wicker Park
ranks second in having the smallest percentage of low integrates (see
Table 6). Again reviewing Table 6, it is clear that Wicker Park does
not stand in stark contrast to the other sites. Wicker Park is only 6
percent lower than the city average in high integrates and only 4 percent
lower than the city average for high integrates (meaning there are fewer
low integrates in Wicker Park). The key to the high level of fear in the
area appears to be in the level of social disorganization perceived in
the area and the lack of the capacity of the residents to exert any
control over the forces which generate those signs of disorganization.

An elderly tenant of a public housing project summarized the situation. "The neighborhood used to be nice, but now it is bad. The sidewalks are terrible, there is garbage all over." She also identified the cause of the present situation as "the Puerto Ricans who don't keep things clean." A young resident echoed her assessment when she lamented "it feels just terrible to be walking alone around four o'clock in the afternoon."

Woodlawn

Woodlawn ranks as the second most fearful neighborhood with slightly over 50 percent of the residents reporting feeling unsafe. Woodlawn also ranks second in the signs of disorganization. As Figure 12 illustrates, Woodlawn residents perceive relatively high levels of disorganization for both concern about victimization (20.4%) and concern about incivility (27.8%). Woodlawn is only six percentage points lower than Wicker Park (26.6%) on the victimization scale while it is twice that percentage (12%) lower than Woodlawn on the incivility scale. Since Woodlawn is relatively close to Wicker Park in fear level, separated by just a few percentage points, it may be that victimization concerns are relatively more significant in generating fear than the incivility measures in this particular setting.

In comparing Woodlawn and Wicker Park on incivility and victimization concerns (see Figure 8), three of the four incivility measures rank before the first victimization measure in Wicker Park, while in Woodlawn only drugs rank before robbery. It appears that concern about incivility plays a less prominent role in generating fear in Woodlawn.

As discussed earlier, Woodlawn is a ghetto neighborhood with a
95 percent black population. The area developed a considerable reputation
in the 1960's for gang activity. This problem coupled with high rates
of youth unemployment and a substantial number of residents on public-aid
(approximately 25% in 1970) led to serious disinvestment problems.
There are dozens of vacant lots and a dearth of business in the area.
Many residents feel that Woodlawn has in fact "bottomed out" and that the
area is improving. (Some would say it had no place to go but up.) A
representative of the local community organization (The Woodlawn Organ-
ization, TWO) commented that "that feeling of hopelessness that used to
plague the area is slowly disappearing. I think people who are living
here really feel that there is a future in Woodlawn."

The community has in TWO one of the most visible community organiza-
tions in the city. Having evolved from a protest group to a community
development corporation in the last decade, TWO stands clearly as the
major force for the development of provincialism in the area. The
strength of the organization is reflected in the high level of community
participation reported by residents. Figure 15 shows Woodlawn as ranking
first (24%) among the Chicago neighborhoods in residents involved in
community affairs. It is important to note that while Wicker Park
ranks lowest on the involvement scale, it is just slightly above Woodlawn
on the fear scale. Thus participation itself is no panacea for fear.
The key to participation is that it be in support of attempting to control
and have input into land use decisions in the community. The leaders
of TWO made the conscious decision (Fish, 1973) to deemphasize the
provincial aspects of their program and build the organization's

economic base (by building housing projects and operating food stores, etc.). This lack of emphasis on provincialism coupled with the highest percentage of residents over 61 (22%) and the fewest middle-aged residents (28%) makes the impact of the signs of disorganization felt without any mediating influences. The low integrates are more than twice as fearful as the high integrates and both rank second to Wicker Park in their levels of fear.

The perceived seriousness of victimization problems and the relatively high level of perceived incivility create a fearful neighborhood. With neither the communal benefits of social integration nor the political benefits of provincialism area residents feel quite unsafe given the perceived disorder around them.

Back of the Yards

The next two neighborhoods in the study rank well below Wicker Park and Woodlawn in fear levels. Back of the Yards ranks a distant third on our fear ladder with 29 percent of the residents reporting feeling unsafe (see Figure 1). This drop of over twenty percentage points makes Back of the Yards (and Lincoln Park) relatively secure neighborhoods. Explaining this drop is the essential task of the social disorganization perspective. The signs of disorganization aggregate profile (Figure 12) places Back of the Yards third in concern about incivility (24.8%) and fourth in concern about victimization (13.6%). Interestingly Back of the Yards is only 3 percent below Woodlawn in incivility concerns and just under 7 percent below Woodlawn in victimization concerns. The drop in fear is much more dramatic than the drop in signs of disorganization.

A closer look at the signs of disorganization shows a resemblance between the rankings in Wicker Park and Back of the Yards, with the three incivility indications ranking higher than robbery as neighborhood problems and abandoned buildings following closely after burglary on the scale. The difference between the neighborhoods has more to do with the magnitude of the problem than with the relative distribution of the indicators. Indeed given the relative closeness of Back of the Yards to Woodlawn on the "signs of disorganization" scales and the relative distance between the areas of the fear measures, we must look at our intervening variables to explain the discrepancy.

Table 6 depicts the distribution of social integrates in Back of the Yards. Back of the Yards has the fewest low integrates (8.5%) and the most high integrates (33.8%) of any neighborhood in the sample. It is also important to note that the low integrates have signficantly lower fear levels (Figure 13) than any of the other low integrates in the other sites. Not only is the area scoring higher on social integration, but those who are less integrated seem to have their fear levels reduced by living in the more integrated area. Thus even though Back of the Yards ranks a close third to Woodlawn in the signs of disorganization, its fear levels, especially for its less integrated residents is substantially lower than anticipated. Low integrates in Wicker Park were 15 percent more afraid than low integrates in Woodlawn, but there is a 25 percent drop between Woodlawn and Back of the Yards. For the high integrates Wicker Park (34.9%) is 9 percent higher than Woodlawn in fear and Back of the Yards (19.2%) is 6 percent lower than Woodlawn (25.4%). Something is happening in Back of the Yards which makes the low integrates less afraid.

That something is the Back of the Yards Council. The Council was
founded over forty years ago by a coalition of church and labor leader-
ship. It has had the same executive director throughout its history.
Its longevity and continuity have made it the effective voice of the
Back of the Yards. Residents of the area can control what happens in
the area through the Council. This capacity is reflected in how the
Council responds to incivility. The Council has a program for each
indicator of incivility. For abandoned buildings, the Council has a
direct conduit into the building department for complaints, its own day
in housing court for all Back of the Yards buildings and complete records
on every building in the area. Jones (1979) reported on the success
of this particular program. For drug abuse and delinquency problems
there are distinct active efforts by the Council to combat these diffi-
culties. The Council has the capacity to affect what happens in the
neighborhood, from keeping businesses opened to stimulating the city
bureaucracies to function well. The Council offers the community an
agency for maintaining its own standards and sense of order. The Back
of the Yards residents rank third (see Figure 15) in participation in
community affairs, althought at almost twice the rate as Wicker Park
residents (20% to 11%), the least involved area. The Council itself
still has the strength and skill to speak for the area and make itself
heard. Residents of Back of the Yards have an organizational mechanism
for reacting to local problems which mitigates the impact of those
problems on fear. Where social integration and provincialism interact
to make manageable the control of local problems, there fear is reduced.

Back of the Yards has both the social and political capacity to
combat the problems of incivility which in other communities indicate
the dissolution of the moral order. Wicker Park has not developed its
capacity for provincialism and Woodlawn's community organization chose
a different strategy (community development) to combat its problems.
The Back of the Yards Council maintained its early ideological commitment
to "take the slumminess out of the slum" and the consequence has been a
secure community.

Lincoln Park

Lincoln Park ranks as the least fearful neighborhood with 29 percent
of the residents feeling unsafe at night.[*] The signs of disorganization
(see Figure 8) are perceived as being well below the levels in Wicker
Park and Woodlawn and reflect a different pattern than Back of the
Yards. Burglary is perceived as the most serious problem with drugs
ranking a close second. Lincoln Park is the only neighborhood in which
a victimization ranks above an incivility indicator as the most serious
issue and also the only neighborhood in which burglary rather than
robbery ranks as the leading victimization of concern. This distinct
constellation of problems (both in the magnitude of the problems and
in their sequencing) makes Lincoln Park appear to its residents as a
neighborhood with few signs of serious disorganization. Lincoln Park
ranks last (17.5%) in concern about incivility and third (16.1%) in

---

[*]It should be noted that this percentage reflects a considerable
number of people who are afraid.

concern about victimization. Given the relatively few adolescents in
the neighborhood (4% of the population) and the relative wealth of the
residents (29.3% with incomes over $20,000), Lincoln Park is an area
whose local moral order seems intact to its residents. With few signs
of disorganization fear levels remain comparatively low. The lack of
threatening environment has coupled with a relatively high level of
community participation (21%) in Lincoln Park. The local community
organization (The Lincoln Park Conservation Association) keeps a
watchful eye on any activity which might threaten the stability of the
neighborhood, and acts as a spokesman for the area in negotiations with
governmental agencies and institutional agencies (e.g., hospitals)
operating in the area. However, given the lack of signs of disorganization,
these activities are aimed towards the maintenance, rather than the
transformation, of the area.

As Table 6 demonstrates, Lincoln Park has the lowest level of social
integration of any area in the study. The neighborhood has the largest
percentage of low integrates and the smallest percentage of high integrates
of any area in the study. Figure 13 portrays fear level by level of
social integration and portrays the high integrates as the least fearful
(15.6%) in the study, while Lincoln Park's low integrates rank third
in fear at 39.3%, approximately midway between Back of the Yards at
26.7 percent and Woodlawn at 54.7 percent. Thus it could be argued that
even when the signs of disorganization are relatively few they still
affect the low integrates' sense of security in the area.

Lincoln Park is a gentrified area, dominated by the well-to-do
professional and relatively free of the signs of disorder which plague

most urban neighborhoods. But even here, the low integrates are likely
to feel afraid, perhaps because of their lack of familiarity with those
who share that relatively secure space. Low integrates in Lincoln Park
differ from their opposites in Back of the Yards because of the extra-
ordinarily strong community organization in the latter area. The Back
of the Yards Council's activities are so strongly felt as to make even
the more isolated feel relatively safe. Provincialism and social
integration are powerful factors in the reduction of fear.

Limitations and Implications of the Social Control Perspective

The social control perspective has serious limitations. Since
there are only four communities in the study and since these were not
randomly selected, the analysis possibilities were extremely limited,
and so is the generalizability of the findings. Second, since I am
for the most part comparing _means_ between and within communities on
one dimensional scales, there are serious limits to the comparability
of the findings. For example, if Lincoln Park scores higher on concern
about burglary than robbery, this does not demonstrate that comparatively
speaking, Lincoln Park is more concerned about burglary than robbery.
Since items were constructed without a comparative dimension (e.g.,
Are you more concerned about robbery than burglary?) the conclusion
that burglary generates more concern than robbery is only suggested
and not demonstrated. Clearly, more sophisticated analysis is needed
if the social control perspective is to be truly tested as an approach
to explaining the fear of crime.

The first step towards that more rigorous analysis is to compute multiple regression coefficients for each variable in an equation which would test the utility of <u>community</u> in explaining fear of crime. Previous research on fear of crime has identified age, sex, race and income as the demographic characteristics with the most predictive power (e.g., Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, 1978). By placing these variables in an equation with community, that is, place of residence, we can determine if community will result in an improved regression.

$$Fear = B_1 \text{ (Race)} + B_2 \text{ (Income)} + B_3 \text{ (Age)} + B_4 \text{ (Sex)} + B_5 \text{ (Community)} + C$$

If the mean fear score for each community is a simple linear combination of the demographic variables and the dummy variable of community does not improve the regression, then the social control perspective and its reliance on community as the unit of analysis may hold less attraction as an alternative approach to the issue. If the community variable improves the statistical analysis, then there is an indication that the social control perspective would be worth further consideration.

For the sake of simplicity, this approach is additive with no interaction terms. Since race, sex and income all correlate with each other when it comes to fear, it might be more useful to use a "saturation" equation in which interaction terms are included in the regression. What this precaution means for this analysis is that further work must be done before I can state with assurance just what the significance is of the community variable for the study of fear of crime. This analysis will indicate if there is any suggestion of utility.

Multiple regression coefficients were computed for each of the variables in the equation in a step wise fashion. Demographic characteristics were entered in first and evaluated, and then the community variable. Dummy variables were created to indicate the four different communities. The results are depicted in Table 7.

The correlation between fear and community of residence is sometimes stronger in magnitude than those between fear and the demographic variables. Residence in Wicker Park and to a less extent Woodlawn is associated with high fear. Residence in Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards is associated with low fear. There are significant correlations between high fear and race (black), age (older), sex (female) and income (poorer). This analysis does show the independent effect of community of residence on fear levels and leaves the clear impression that more work within the social control perspective might improve our understanding of fear of crime.

This analysis adds credibility to the community level analysis reported earlier in this section. I believe there is ample evidence to suggest the following discussion.

In the four communities, as social disorganization (as perceived by the residents) increases, fear of crime increases. I have hypothesized that the weakening social control in those disorganized areas triggers the fear. Both Woodlawn and Wicker Park are disorganized areas and both have few resources to assert control over the transformations underway. Residents of these communities have few individual resources (e.g., income, education, etc.) and the metropolitan forces at work (e.g., racial succession and commercial disinvestment) are extraordinarily

TABLE 7

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CHICAGO

Equation 1		Equation 2 (Neighborhood Move)	
	R^2		
Age	.02285		
Income	.04524		
Sex	.08389		
Race	.00808		
Total R^2 = .16005			

Neighborhoods	R^2	Neighborhoods	R^2
Lincoln Park	.00004	Lincoln Park	.01711
Wicker Park	.04118	Wicker Park	.02698
Woodlawn	.00180	Woodlawn	.00483
Back of the Yards	.00198	Back of the Yards	.00583
Total R^2 (Neighborhoods):	.04501	Total R^2 (Neighborhoods):	.05475
Total R^2 (Equation):	.20506	Total R^2 (Equation):	.05475

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

Betas for Neighborhoods		Betas for Neighborhoods	
Neighborhood	Beta	Neighborhood	Beta
Lincoln Park	.0078	Lincoln Park	-.0527
Wicker Park	.2225*	Wicker Park	.1897*
Woodlawn	.0503	Woodlawn	.1122*
Back of the Yards	.0044	Back of the Yards	-.0194

difficult to modify under the best of conditions (Molotch, 1972; Rossi and Dentler, 1961). The two less fearful communities, Lincoln Park and Back of the Yards represent two alternative paths to neighborhood security. Lincoln Park, while experiencing a relatively high level of property crime, has few signs of disorganization. This is a stable, ordered community. Its provincialism stems from the wealth of its inhabitants. Shifts in residential population, while relatively frequent, occur within stable class and racial lines. Social control is less problematic given the few adolescents in the area and the resources available to individuals residing there. Back of the Yards, while relatively secure, has a very different story to tell. The signs of disorganization (especially incivilities) are relatively common and the threat of racial succession is imminent. Yet Back of the Yards through the formal provincialism supplied by the Council and the social integration of its residents has been able to mediate the impact of social disorganization. The Council provides the community with a mechanism to combat social disorganization in general and the problem of incivility particular.

The importance of incivility in the study of fear deserves further comment. In Wicker Park, it appears that incivility may play a decisive role in increasing fear. Concern about incivility is considerably higher in Wicker Park than in any other community. These conditions are perhaps clearer, more obvious indications of the loss of social control than victimizations. Victimizations are rarer, they must be learned about in order to have impact and often they occur between friends and family. Incivilities are constant reminders that conventional values are not shared, especially by the young.

Lincoln Park is a community with few signs of incivility and a low level of fear. The lack of incivilities is in most part a function of the social and economic composition of the community. High income and few adolescents appear to mean little incivility. This lack of the constant reminder of disorganization may very well increase feelings of security among residents. Finally there is Back of the Yards. Incivilities are conditions which can be improved through the exercise of social control by strong community organization. Vandalism, abandoned buildings, loitering and perhaps even drug abuse can be combatted by the social efforts of residents. Conventional values may be reinforced by respected adult residents through Council initiatives. These initiatives have influenced local teenagers as well as the municipal building court. In other words, incivilities are actionable problems where success is a real possibility. It is less clear what if anything can be done to reduce robberies and rapes. Given the importance of incivilities in increasing fear (Wicker Park) and their absence in less fearful communities (Lincoln Park), fear reduction programs might well focus on enabling community organizations to increase their capacity to control these indicators of social disorganization.

These findings are suggestive at best. Clearly a great deal more work needs to be done to test more vigorously the social control perspective. However these comparative case studies are cause for some optimism for they point to an approach to the study of the fear of crime which relies less on the imputed motivation of individuals and focuses on the impact of social change on urban communities.

In this essay, I have operationalized both perspectives. The victimization perspective uses the individual as the unit of analysis and posits the relations depicted in Figure 18. The social control perspective uses the community as the unit of analysis and posits a very different set of relationships (see Figure 18). The former approach emphasizes differences between individuals while the latter emphasizes the deficiencies in community. The former approach attempts to explain what motivates people, while the latter examines the interplay between social change and community cohesion. They are not mutually exclusive. But clearly the findings here demonstrate the utility of reconsidering the social control perspective.

FIGURE 18

COMPARING PERSPECTIVES

Victimization Perspective

VICTIMIZATIONS ———→ CONCERN ———→ RISK ———→ FEAR
(direct or indirect)

Unit of analysis--individual

Social Control Perspective

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION ———→ LACK OF CONTROL ———→ FEAR

PROVINCIALISM

Unit of analysis--community

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Gusfield (1975) has used the metaphor of container and contained to distinguish between the social problem and its public construction. This essay has attempted to describe two containers which have been, and may be, used to describe the problem of fear of crime. While it is not necessary to take the extreme position of Kitsuse and Spector (1978) and define social problems _solely_ as the assertions groups make about putative conditions, it is important to understand that the perspectives researchers and policy makers use in studying social problems are not merely the reflection of some reality out there which they are all trying to see clearly. Wirth (1940) recognized over forty years ago the essentially reflexive nature of study in this area.

> There is a widespread belief that the problems of maladjustment of men to one another and to the world in which they live arise out of the nature of men or of things. Despite the work of a long line of social scientists who have indicated that the situations we call social problems are problematical only because they represent deviations from socially accepted norms and expectations, there is substantial evidence to indicate that the situations we call social problems are problematical only because they represent deviations from socially accepted norms and expectations, there is substantial evidence to indicate that even some contemporary sociologists continue to deal with social problems as if they did not involve evaluational elements (Wirth, 1940:472-73).

Blumer (1971), Ross and Staines (1972) and many others have emphasized these "evaluational elements" in their approach to social problems to the exclusion of concern at all with "objective conditions." While this shift in emphasis may have been a sound corrective to the "abstracted empiricism" (Mills, 1959) practiced by many social scientists,

it has added few tools to the arsenals of those studying the lives of the poor and disenfranchised.

Recent criticism of the study of fear of crime either condemned the interest as inherently racist and conservative or simply called for more attention to other matters (e.g., poverty). These criticisms proved inadequate, for "by denying the phenomena as a problem, they could not provide a competing public position" (Gusfield, 1975:290).

The social control perspective offers a "competing public position" on the issue of fear of crime (as well as predatory crime itself). The social control perspective challenges the victimization perspective's reliance on a theory of motivation to explain the distribution of fear. The victimization perspective assumes the "neutrality of context" (Marris and Rein, 1967) and primacy of victimization in order to develop a general "theory" of motivation which could be applied to randomly selected individuals. This emphasis on motivation reflects the major orientation of American Sociology after World War II. Parsons (1951) outlines his approach to the problem of order in terms of personal motivations.

> The problem of order, and thus of the nature of the integration of stable systems of social interaction, that is, of social structure, thus focuses on the integration of the motivations of actors with the normative cultural standards which integrate the action system, in our context interpersonally. These standards are...patterns of value-orientation and as such are a particularly crucial part of the cultural tradition of the social system (Parsons, 1951:36-7).

Order is possible because individuals are motivated to meet the standards of society. Wrong (1961) calls this notion the "internalization of social norms" approach (p. 185). Individuals learn social

roles and expectations and thus conform to society's values. Ellis
(1971) points out that Parsons places great emphasis on the "process
of internalization" in explaining social order. Parsons assumes value
consensus and the theoretical problem is to account for how individuals
come to share in that consensus. He identifies the sources of social
integration which explain the conformity. Order is possible because
individuals internalize values and thus conform to the standards of
society. While it is beyond my present scope to critique this approach
(see Mills, 1959; Lockwood, 1956; Gouldner, 1970), it is important to
see how this general theoretical orientation shapes the victimization
perspective. The problem in the victimization perspective is to account
for the factors by which one learns to be afraid.

Fear is a problem of socialization, a learned response to a situa-
tion. What is problematic within the perspective is to identify the
sources of fear in society, and to develop a hypothetical process by
which that source is internalized. This is why so much attention is
given to the types of victimizations associated with fear (What motivates
the fearful?) and to constitutive psychological formation (How does
that source generate the fear?).

Parsons, Merton and Sutherland all emphasize the learning process
in their explanations of social order and crime. The scholars operating
in the victimization perspective shared in this general orientation.
Kornhauser (1978) has shown the empirical and theoretical limits of
theories of motivation in delinquency research.

> The belief that behavior is always rooted in slavish conformity
> to cultural or subcultural values, which is one of the key-
> stones of cultural deviance theory, is utterly lacking in

> credibility. The belief that cultures or subcultures
> vary substantially in the content of their definitions
> of theft and violence is unsupported by any evidence.
> There is no culture known to man in which those actions
> enjoined in the core of the criminal law are or can be
> collectively endowed with value, for they have no value
> for human beings whose existence depends upon their
> safe association with one another (Kornhauser, 1978:244).

While I would not take so extreme a position, my main point about the fear of crime research is the same, namely, that fear is not learned through experience with victimization. Victimization does not have a universal meaning in all places and all times and we must go beyond general theories of motivation if we are to understand the distribution of a fearful citizenry.

Both Charles Silberman (1978) and James Q. Wilson (1975) are imbedded within the victimization perspective in their widely read discussions of fear of crime. Silberman's discussion treats fear as a universal response to the universal threat of victimization. Since we all share the potential for victimization we all are capable of the same psychological reaction. Fear is the same for all people. Differences in context are submerged into general psychological determinants.

> Ultimately, the whole fabric of urban life is based
> on trust; trust that others will act predictably, in
> accordance with generally accepted rules of behavior,
> and that they will not take advantage of that trust
> (Silberman, 1978:10).

But as we have tried to show, the fabric of urban life varies considerably from community to community. That fabric is "man-made," resulting from the distribution of values including security. Silberman may be correct that "people need to be able to make sense out of their environment" (p. 14), but that "need" is more or less easily met depending upon the political development of the community. Social control is a

function of resources and that makes the local social order a concrete
political reality, which shapes how much trust the individual can have.

Following Conklin, Silberman argues for the primacy of victimization
in undermining that order.

> Crime does more than expose the weakness in social relation-
> ships; it undermines the social order itself, by destroying
> the assumption on which it is based (Silberman, 1978:12).

But crime does not have a universal effect on that order. Indeed
the social order itself is constructed of varying materials, depending
on what is available to the community. The quality of materials has
much more to do with creating weakness than an abstract notion of
victimization.

It may be true that "our sense of self is bound up with our ability
to control the personal space in which we live" (Silberman, 1978:12).
But that ability to control is not purely a psychological mechanism.
It is a political capacity which communities develop in varying degrees
depending upon their resources. Silberman reduces fear to a matter
of individual psychology rather than a matter of the differential
distribution of community power.

Wilson (1975), while avoiding the neutrality of context problem, is
also locked into the primacy of victimization in his discussion of fear.
But again the differential distribution of the capacity to maintain
community is linked more to the crime rate and the migration of local
leadership to the suburbs.

Wilson suggests that as the leaders of local urban communities
became more affluent and moved to better areas, the neighborhood's
capacity to exert social control diminished and crime increased. Crime
then was a consequence of the decline of the moral order.

> Many of those who once headed the block clubs, ran
> the PTAs, complained of poor garbage collection,
> manned the neighborhood political apparatus, and
> kept the streets under some degree of surveillance
> had moved out. They left a void, sometimes literally
> a physical one. The growing number of abandoned
> buildings in the central parts of New York and other
> cities is grim evidence of the reduction in population
> densities and the increased purchasing power of former
> slum-dwellers.
>
> With the more affluent having departed and the community-
> maintenance functions they once served now undermanned,
> the rates of predatory crime in inner-city areas rose
> (Wilson, 1975:38).

While Wilson hypothesizes that a community's loss of leadership
leads to a loss of control which creates the conditions for more crime,
he also suggests that local control must be exerted over a wide range
of issues. His suggestion about the decline of the moral order in
general concerned urban citizens.

> What these concerns have in common, and thus what
> constitutes the "urban problem" for a large percentage
> (perhaps a majority) of urban citizens, is a sense of
> the failure of community. When I speak of the concern
> for "community," I refer to a desire for the observance
> of standards of right and seemly conduct in the public
> places in which one lives and moves, those standards
> to be consistent with--and supportive of--the values
> and life styles of the particular individual. Around one's
> home, the places where one shops, and the corridors
> through which one walks there is for each of us a
> public space wherein our sense of security, self-esteem,
> and propriety is either reassured or jeopardized by
> the people and events we encounter (Wilson, 1975:24).

Modifying these social conditions is difficult for Wilson because
the leaders are gone and because crime has isolated citizens. Silberman
recognizes the importance of local social control in reducing fear
but that fear reduction comes as a consequence of reducing crime.

> Thus the development of more effective social controls
> in poor communities can provide a far larger payoff in
> reduced crime and improved order than can the

development of more effective methods of policing,
more efficient courts, or improved correctional
programs (Silberman, 1978:429).

Echoing the founders of the social control perspective, Silberman

goes on to call for local initiative in developing that social control,

If a community development program is to have any chance
of success, those in charge must understand that the
controls that lead to reduced crime cannot be imposed
from the outside; they must emerge from changes in the
community itself, and in the people who compose it.
Hence the emphasis must be on enabling poor people to
take charge of their own lives—on helping them gain
a sense of competence and worth, a sense of being some-
body who matters (Silberman, 1978:430).

For Wilson, fear is a consequence of the lack of social control.

And it is the breakdown of neighborhood controls
(neighborhood self-government, if you will) that
accounts for the principal concerns of many urban
citizens. When they can neither take for granted
nor influence by their actions and those of their
neighbors the standards of conduct within their own
neighborhood community, they experience what to them are
"urban problems"—that arise directly out of the
unmanageable consequences of living in close
proximity (Wilson, 1975:25).

But in both cases the conceptual link between social control and

the reduction of fear is not made. We are told that control is necessary

but we are unable to generate it, given the definition of the problem.

For Silberman fear is a universal problem of individual psychology

in which only a general reduction in crime will bring relief. For

Wilson we must wait for the migration process to be completed before

order will be restored. The former analysis calls for less crime through

social control but does not tell us how to achieve it, while the latter

urges patience while the cities empty.

Concern about fear of crime in the policy arena is for Silberman

a derivative of the larger question of how to control crime. For Wilson

fear also stems from "predatory crime," but broader issues of public

behavior also enter the equation. For others (Cook and Cook, 1975) the

policy focus becomes more directly fear itself.

> The data presently available suggest that the major policy
> problem associated with the elderly and crime is probably
> not crime per se. Rather, the problem is related to the
> elderly person's fear of crime and the restrictions to
> daily mobility that this fear may impose (Cook and Cook,
> 1975:643).

Rather than reducing crime or criminal behavior this line of

thinking aims directly at reducing fear.

> If the 'fear diagnosis' is correct, it suggests that the
> policy response to victimization of the elderly should
> be targeted at alleviating fear. This response might
> well include campaigns to inform older persons that
> they are not being singled out as victims and that talk
> of a crisis of victimization is unwarranted unless it
> is understood to mean a fear of victimization (Cook and
> Cook, 1975:644).

In all these cases, the conceptual link between fear of crime and

social order is called for, but not established. Ellis (1971) and

Wrong (1961) suggest that since value consensus is assumed in motivational

theories of the social order, these theories cannot account for the

emergence of that order when consensus has broken down. Once fear of

crime erodes the sense of community an individual has developed, the

victimization perspective does not provide a method for reestablishing

that community. Since one has learned to be afraid, there is no

mechanism specified for learning to feel secure. Thus collective action

is called for but no scheme is developed to demonstrate sociologically

or politically how and why that action should occur. The victimization

perspective shares with Parsonian consensus theory an inability to

explain social order when and where that order is not already operational.

Once the individual is motivated to be afraid the perspective cannot explain the reemergence of the social order that fear destroys. Either the impetus for fear (victimizations) must be removed or the victimized individual must process victimization information differently. It is the fearful individual who must change if fear is to be overcome.

We see the social control perspective as a corrective to this situation. For this perspective emphasizes the political over the psychological, and community context over individual variations. Policy development becomes a matter of community development rather than the education of potential victims. The social control perspective offers a systematic approach to the fear of crime problem and hopefully moves the discussion of fear away from an analysis which defines citizens as potential victims and security as a matter of individual initiative. That approach emphasizes the resident's capacity to respond to the social change which constantly reshapes the community. Where political action by those residents can be mustered in the name of provincialism, their fear will be modified. But if the signs of disorganization increase unchecked and the local community institutions lack the strength to combat them then fear will result. Communities can shape their own futures but it is a difficult, time consuming task which does not come automatically. The resources of individuals are, of course, important, but they can be supplemented and augmented by the political action of residents committed to having their values count in the determination of the quality of community life.

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APPENDIX A

Interviewer's Initials: _____

Phone: _____

(Fill Out When Complete)

Telephone Number

Job 7042

OFFICE USE ONLY

NOR ID 1-4
Phone 5-11 (Label)
Area 12-17 (Label)

Northwestern University
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH CO.

REACTIONS TO CRIME/FEAR OF RAPE

	First Call	Second Call	Third Call	Fourth Call	Fifth Call	Sixth Call	Seventh Call	Eighth Call	Ninth Call	Tenth Call	Eleventh Call	Twelfth Call
Day (CIRCLE ONE)	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.	M T W Th F S Sun.
Date Month/Day												
Shift (CIRCLE ONE)	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3	1 2 3
COMPLETE Male / Female	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02	01 02
No Answer/Busy	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03
Disconnect/Not in service	04											
Household Refusal	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05
Household Informant Not Available/Arrange Call Back / Name:	06 Call Back Time:	06 Call Back Time:	06 Call Back Time:	06 Call Back Time:	06 Call Back Time:	06 Call Back Time:	06 Call Back Time:	06 No Call Back				
Eligible Respondent Not Available/Arrange Call Back / Name:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 Call back time:	07 No Call Back
Eligible Respondent Refusal	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08
Filter Out Business	09	09	09	09	09	RETURN TO SUPERVISOR	RETURN TO SUPERVISOR	SUPERVISOR	SUPERVISOR			
Filter Out Not in City	10	10	10	10	10	RETURN TO SUPERVISOR	RETURN TO SUPERVISOR	SUPERVISOR	SUPERVISOR			
Filter Out Wrong Neighborhood	11	11	11	11	11	RETURN TO SUPERVISOR	RETURN TO SUPERVISOR	SUPERVISOR	SUPERVISOR			
SPANISH return to supervisor	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12
TERMINATE QUESTION #	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
Other (Specify)	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14
	18-23	24-29 TCB 60-64 TCB	30-35 MOR 65-73 MOR	36-41 74 Cont, ID	42-47 75-76 ID	48-53 75-76 Cd # 77-80 Job	54-59 77-80 Job	18-23 48-73 MOR	24-29 MOR	30-35, ID 74 Cont, ID	36-41 75-76 Cd # 77-80 Job	42-47

Reactions to Crime/Fear of Rape

Telephone Survey

May I please speak to the man or woman of the house? (ACCEPT ANY RESPONSIBLE ADULT)

My name is _____. I'm calling for Northwestern University near Chicago. We are working on a study about how peoples' lives are affected by crime, and I would like to ask you some questions. Of course, your help is voluntary and all your answers will be kept confidential. Your telephone number was picked at random.

I. Is this a business phone, or is this a home phone?

```
                                    ┌─Family/home phone . . . . . . . . .1
                                    │ Business (FILTER OUT BUSINESS) . .2
                                    │ Other _____ . . . .3
                                    │           (SPECIFY)
                                    │       (STOP AND CHECK WITH
                                    ↓   SUPERVISOR FOR INSTRUCTIONS)
```

_____

PHILADELPHIA -- SOUTH PHILADELPHIA

II. Do you live within the city limits of Philadelphia?

```
                                    ┌─Yes (GO ON) . . . . . . . . . . .1
                                    └ No (FILTER OUT NOT IN CITY) . . .2
```
_____

In this survey we need to get the opinion of people who live in the South Philadelphia area.

III. Do you live between Morris (on the north) and Packer Avenue (on the south)?

```
                                     Yes (GO ON) . . . . . . . . . . .1
                                     No (FILTER OUT WRONG NEIGHBORHOOD)2
                                    ─Don't know (GO TO V) . . . . . . .7
```

IV. Do you live between 5th (on the east) and Vare Avenue (on the west)?

```
                                     Yes (GO TO A ON NEXT PAGE) . . . .1
                                     No (FILTER OUT WRONG NEIGHBORHOOD)2
                                    ─Don't know (GO TO V) . . . . . . .7
```

(NOTE: PACKER AVENUE IS NORTH OF FDR PARK: VARE AVENUE IS JUST EAST OF THE SCHUYLKILL RIVER.)

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ V. (IF "DON'T KNOW") Well, can you tell me which street you live on? (IF NOT  │
│    INCLUDED IN LIST BELOW, FILTER OUT WRONG NEIGHBORHOOD)                     │
│                                                                               │
│ VI. Would that address be between _____ (READ RANGE FROM LIST, IF NOT IN   │
│                                             RANGE, FILTER OUT WRONG           │
│                                             NEIGHBORHOOD)                     │
```

STREET . . . . NUMBER	STREET . . . . NUMBER	STREET . . . . NUMBER
(North-South)	(North-South)	(East-West)
Alder	1700-3000 S	Opal	1700-3000 S	Barbara	500-3000
Bailey	.	Percy	.	Bigler	.
Bambrey	.	Reese	.	Cantrell	.
Bancroft	.	Ringgold	.	Castle	.
Beechwood	.	Rosewood	.	Daly	.
Beulah	.	Sartain	.	Dudley	.
Bonsall	.	Sheridan	.	Durfor	.
Bouvier	.	Stoker	.	Emily	.
Broad	.	Taney	.	Fitzgerald	.
Bucknell	.	Taylor	.	Gladstone	.
Camac	.	Warnock	.	Hoffman	.
Carlisle	.	Watts	.	Jackson	.
Chadwick	.	Woodstock	.	Johnston	.
Clarion	.	5th	.	McKean	.
Cleveland	.	6th	.	Mclellan	.
Colorado	.	7th	.	Mercy	.
Croskey	.	8th	.	Mifflin	.
Darien	.	9th	.	Moore	.
Dorrance	.	10th	.	Morris	.
Dover	.	11th	.	Moyamensing	500-2000
Etting	.	12th	.	Oregon	500-3000
Fairhill	.	13th	.	Packer	.
Franklin	.	14th	.	Passyunk	1200-2600
Garnet	.	15th	.	Pierce	500-3000
Hemberger	.	16th	.	Point Breeze Ave.	1700-2500
Hicks	.	17th	.	Pollock	500-3000
Hollywood	.	18th	.	Porter	.
Hutchinson	.	19th	.	Ritner	.
Iseminger	.	20th	.	Roseberry	.
Jessup	.	21st	.	Shunk	.
Juniper	.	22nd	.	Sigel	.
Lambert	.	23rd	.	Snyder	.
Marshall	.	24th	.	Tree	.
Marston	.	25th	.	Vare	.
Marvine	.	26th	.	Walter	.
Mole	.	27th	.	Watkins	.
Newhope	.	28th	.	Winton	.
Newkirk	.	29th	.	Wolf	.
Norwood	.	30th	.		

(S3 NOT ASKED)

A) How many adults 18 years of age or older are presently living at home including yourself?
_____(CIRCLE IN COL. A)

B) How many of these adults are men? _____(CIRCLE IN ROW B) No. (Write-in)
No. (Write-in)

Row B	Col. A In Household	Number of Adults		
Number of Men in Household	1	2	3	4 or more
0	Woman	Youngest Woman	Youngest Woman	Oldest Woman
1	Man	Man	Oldest Woman	Man
2		Oldest Man	Woman	Oldest Woman
3			Youngest Men	Woman/ Oldest Woman
4 or more				Oldest Man

Version 2

NOTE: The intersection of Col A and Row B determines the sex and relative age of the respondent to be interviewed

For this survey, I would like to speak to the (Verbal label indicated on grid) currently living at home, in your household. Is he/she at home?

1 ... Yes - Continue with Q. 1 WITH THE CORRECT INDIVIDUAL TO BE INTERVIEWED

2 ... No - Arrange call-back, record on callback line

START _____ TIME

A. Para empezar quisiera conocer cuántos adultos de 18 y mas años viven en su familia

B. Cuántos de ellos son hombres? _____
(CIRCLE IN ROW B)

Row B	Col. A In Household	Number of Adults		
Number of Men In Household	1	2	3	4 or more
0	Woman	Youngest Woman	Youngest Woman	Oldest Woman
1	Man	Man	Oldest Woman	Man
2		Oldest Man	Woman	Oldest Woman
3			Youngest Men	Woman/ Oldest Woman
4 or more				Oldest Man

Version 2

NOTE: The intersection of Col A and Row B determines the sex and relative age of the respondent to be interviewed

Necesito preguntar a _____ (TOME EN EL CUADRICULADO) (La inter-seccion de adultos y hombres determina el sexo y la edad relativa de la persona a entrevistar). SI LA PERSONA ELEJIDA NO ESTA EN CASA, HAGA UNA CITA PARA LA ENTREVISTA O PREGUNTE CUANDO ESTARA EN CASA. TOME EL NUMERO DE TELEFONO Y LLAME PARA HACER LA CITA)

APPENDIX B

First of all, I have a few questions about your neighborhood.

1. In general, is it pretty easy or pretty difficult for you to tell
   a stranger in your neighborhood from somebody who lives there?

   Pretty easy 1-21
   Pretty difficult 2
   Don't know 7
   Not ascertained 8

2. Would you say that you really feel a part of your neighborhood or do you
   think of it more as just a place to live?

   Feel a part 1-22
   Place to live 2
   Don't know 7
   Not ascertained 8

3. Would you say that your neighborhood has   Better 1-23
   changed for the better, or for the worse   Worse 2
   in the past couple of years, or has it   Same 3
   stayed about the same?   Don't know 7
                                                  Not ascertained 8

4. How many people would you say are   A lot 4-24
   usually out walking on the street in   Some 3
   front of where you live after dark   A few 2
   -- a lot, some, a few or almost none?   Almost none 1
                                            Don't know 7
                                            Not ascertained 8

5. Do you usually try to keep an eye on   Usually keep an eye on . . . . .1 -25
   what is going on in the street in front Usually don't notice 2
   of your house or do you usually not   Don't know 7
   notice?   Not ascertained 8

6. If your neighbors saw someone suspicious trying to open your door or
   window what do you think they would do? (ASK OPEN END -- CODE RESPONSE
   BELOW -- MULTIPLE MENTIONS ALLOWED)

   Check situation 1-26
   Call police 1-27
   Ignore it 1-28
   Call someone else (Landlord,
      Janitor, etc.) 1-29
   Call me/respondent 1-30
   Other _____ 1-31
              (SPECIFY)
   Don't know 7-32
   Not ascertained 8

Cd 1

7. In the last two weeks, about how many times have you gone into a neighbor's home to visit?

RECORD TIMES_____ 34-35
(EXACT NUMBER)
Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98

8. How about kids in your immediate neighborhood. How many of them do you know by name -- all of them, some, hardly any, or none of them?

All 4-36
Some 3
Hardly any 2
None 1
No kids here (VOLUNTEERED) 5
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

9. Next, I'm going to read you some comments that people make about how other people behave. For each one I read you, I'd like to know whether you agree, disagree or are in the middle about them. (ROTATE)

	Agree	In the Middle	Disagree	(VOLUNTEERED) Not Ascertained/ Don't Know	
a. Kids are better today than they were in the past. Do you agree, disagree, or are you in the middle?	3	2	1	9	37
b. People just don't respect other people and their property as much as they used to. Do you agree, disagree, or are you in the middle?	3	2	1	9	38
c. Groups of neighbors getting together can reduce crime in their area.	3	2	1	9	39
d. There are a lot of crazy people in this city -- and you never know what they are going to do.	3	2	1	9	40
e. The police really can't do much to stop crime.	3	2	1	9	41

Now I have some questions about activities in your neighborhood.

10. Have you ever gotten together with friends or neighbors to talk about, or do something about, neighborhood problems?

Yes 1-42
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

Cd 1

11. Do you know of any community groups or organizations in your neighborhood?

Yes 1
No . . . . .2 (TO TO Q. 12)
Don't know . . . . .7 (GO TO Q. 12)
Not ascertained . . . . . .8 (GO TO Q. 12)   43

A. Have you ever been involved with any of those community groups or organizations?

Yes 1
No . . . . .2 (GO TO Q. 12)
Don't know . . . . .7 (GO TO Q. 12)
Not ascertained . . . . . .8 (GO TO Q. 12)
Inappropriate . . . . . . .9 (GO TO Q. 12)   44

B. Could you tell me their names?   (RECORD EXACT NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS)

1st mention_____

2nd mention_____   (EXACT NUMBER)
                                             Not ascertained 98
3rd mention_____   Inappropriate 99   45-46

4th mention_____

(RECORD ALL NAMES MENTIONED)

(ASK C-F FOR FIRST 3 ORGANIZATIONS MENTIONED)

(ASK FOR FIRST ORGANIZATION MENTIONED IN B)

C1. From what you know has _____ ever tried to do anything about crime in your neighborhood?	D1. Could you tell me briefly what that was?	E1. Did you take part in these activities?	F1. Do you think that the organization's efforts helped, hurt or didn't make any difference?	
Yes (GO TO D1) 1		Yes 1	helped 3	
No 2		No 2	hurt 1	47-49
Don't know 7		Don't know 7	No difference 2	
Not ascertained 8		Not ascertained 3	Don't know 7	
Inappropriate 9		Inappropriate 9	Not ascertained 8	
			Inappropriate 9	

(ASK FOR SECOND ORGANIZATION MENTIONED IN B.)   (GO TO C2)

C2. From what you know has _____ ever tried to do anything about crime in your neighborhood?	D2. Could you tell me briefly what that was?	E2. Did you take part in these activities?	F2. Do you think that the organization's efforts helped, hurt or didn't make any difference?	
Yes (GO TO D2) 1		Yes 1	helped 3	
No 2		No 2	hurt 1	50-52
Don't know 7		Don't know 7	No difference 2	
Not ascertained 8		Not ascertained 8	Don't know 7	
Inappropriate 9		Inappropriate 9	Not ascertained 8	
			Inappropriate 9	

(ASK FOR THIRD ORGANIZATION MENTIONED IN B)   (GO TO C3)

C3. From what you know has _____ ever tried to do anything about crime in your neighborhood?	D3. Could you tell me briefly what that was?	E3. Did you take part in these activities?	F3. Do you think that the organization's efforts helped, hurt or didn't make any difference?	
Yes (GO TO D3) 1		Yes 1	helped 3	
No 2		No 2	hurt 1	53-55
Don't know 7		Don't know 7	No difference 2	
Not ascertained 8		Not ascertained 8	Don't know 7	
Inappropriate 9		Inappropriate 9	Not ascertained 8	
			Inappropriate 9	

(GO TO 12)

Cd 1

12. Do you know of any (other) special efforts or programs going on in your neighborhood to prevent crime?

Yes . . . . .1 -56
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

A. Please describe these efforts or programs and/or their names.

_____

_____

_____   Inappropriate . . . .9 | 57-58
                                                                    MOR

13. In the past year, have you contacted the police to make a complaint about something or to request some kind of help?

Yes . . . . .1 -59
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

A. What was your last call to the police about? (ASK OPEN END -- MULTIPLE MENTIONS ALLOWED -- CODE BELOW)

Report crime against self . . . . .1 | 60
Report crime against somebody else . . . . .1 | 61
Report general crime in neighborhood .1 | 62
Lack of police protection/request increase . . . . .1 | 63
Complaints about specific officer or incidents . . . . .1 | 64
General request of information from police . . . . .1 | 65
Public services problem (sewer, streets, street lights, fire . . . . .1 | 66
Request ambulance . . . . .1 | 67
Other _____ . . . . .1 | 68
                        (SPECIFY)
Don't know 7
Not ascertained . . . . 8 | 69
Inappropriate 9

KP - 0 Fill   70-75 MOR
                                   76 Cd #
                                   77-80 Job #

14. Have you contacted any public
    official, other than police, in the
    past year to make a complaint about
    something or to request some kind
    of help?

Yes 1-21
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

A. What was your last call to a public official about? (ASK OPEN
   END -- MULTIPLE MENTIONS ALLOWED -- CODE BELOW)

    Report crime against self 1   22
    Report crime against somebody else 1   23
    Report general crime in neighborhood 1   24
    Lack of police protection/request increase 1   25
    Complaints about specific officer or incidents 1   26
    General request of information from a public official 1   27
    Public services problem (sewer, streets,
        street lights, fire) 1   28

    Request ambulance 1   29
    Other _____ 1   30
                      (SPECIFY)
    Don't know 7
    Not ascertained 8   31
    Inappropriate 9

KP - O Fill

32-41 MOR

Cd 2

15. Now, I am going to read you a list of crime-related problems that exist in some parts of the city. For each one, I'd like you to tell me how much of a problem it is in your neighborhood. Is it a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood? (ROTATE)

	A Big Problem	Some Problem	Almost No Problem	(VOLUNTEERED) Not Ascertained/ Don't Know	
a. For example, groups of teen-agers hanging out on the streets. Is this a big problem, some problem or almost no problem in your neighborhood?	3	2	1	9	42
b. Buildings or storefronts sitting abandoned or burned out. Is this a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood?	3	2	1	9	43
c. People using illegal drugs in the neighborhood. Is this a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem.	3	2	1	9	44
d. Vandalism like kids breaking windows or writing on walls or things like that. How much of a problem is this?	3	2	1	9	45

16. Was there ever a time in this country when crime seemed to be much less of a problem than it is now?

Yes 1-46
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

a. (IF YES) When was that? About how many years ago?
(PROBE: JUST A GUESS WILL DO. GET BEST ESTIMATE OF A SINGLE DATE OR YEARS AGO)

(YEARS AGO) _____ DATE
Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98
Inappropriate 99   47-48

(INTERVIEWER: IF GIVEN RANGE RECORD BASED ON MIDDLE YEAR E.G. 1920-1925=1922; 50's=1955)

Cd 2

17. What about burglary for the neighbor-
hood in general. Is breaking into
people's homes or sneaking in to steal
something a big problem, some problem
or almost no problem for people in
your neighborhood?

A big problem . . . . 3 -49
Some problem 2
Almost no problem 1
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

18. Do you personally know of anyone, other
than yourself, whose home or
apartment has been broken into in
the past couple of years or so?

Yes . . . . 1 -50
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

a. Did any of these break-ins happen
in your present neighborhood?

Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 7   51
Not ascertained 8
Inappropriate 9

19. About how many times do you think this
might have happened in your immediate
neighborhood in the last year?
(GET BEST ESTIMATE)

Don't know 997
Not ascertained 998

(RECORD NUMBER) _____   52-54

(READ SLOWLY)
20. Now we're going to do something a little bit different. For this next
question, I'd like you to think of a row of numbers from zero to ten. Now,
let the ZERO stand for NO POSSIBILITY AT ALL of something happening, and
the TEN will stand for it being EXTREMELY LIKELY that something could
happen.

a. On this row of numbers from ZERO to TEN, how likely do you think it is that
someone will try to get into your own (house/apartment) to steal some-
thing.   (REREAD INSTRUCTION IF NECESSARY -- GET BEST NUMBER)

(RECORD 0-10) _____

Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98   55-56

Cd 2

21. Has anyone actually broken into your home in the past two years?
(NOTE THIS APPLIES TO ALL RESIDENCES IN LAST TWO YEARS)

```
                                    Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-57
                                    No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
                                    Don't know . . . . . . . . . . 7
                                    Not ascertained . . . . . . . . 8
```

22. Which of the following three things would you say is the most important
for keeping your house safe from burglars: being lucky, being careful,
or living in a good neighborhood?

```
                                    Being lucky . . . . . . . . . .01-58/59
                                    Being careful . . . . . . . . .02
                                    Living in good neighborhood . .03
                                    Being lucky/being careful
                                       (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . . . . . 04
                                    Being lucky/living in good
                                       neighborhood (VOLUNTEERED) . 05
                                    Being careful/living in good
                                       neighborhood (VOLUNTEERED) . 06
                                    All three (VOLUNTEERED) . . . .07
                                    Other (VOLUNTEERED,
                                    _____
                                       (SPECIFY)        . . . . . 08
                                    Don't know . . . . . . . . . . 97
                                    Not ascertained . . . . . . . .98
```

23. I'm going to mention a few things that some people do to protect their homes
from burglary. As I read each one would you please tell me whether or not
your family does that?   (VOLUNTEERED)

		Yes	No	Don't Know	
a.	Have you engraved your valuables with your name or some sort of identification, in case they are stolen?	1	2	7	60
b.	Do you have any bars or special locks on your windows?	1	2	7	61
c.	Do you have a peep-hole or little window in your door to identify people before letting them in?	1	2	7	62

Now, think of the last time you just went out at night.

		Yes	No	Don't Know	
d.	Did you leave a light on while you were gone?	1	2	7	63

Now, think of the last time you went away from home for more than a day or so.

		Yes	No	Don't Know	
e.	Did you notify the police so they could keep a special watch?	1	2	7	64
f.	Did you stop delivery of things like newspapers and mail, or have someone bring them in?	1	2	7	65
g.	Did you have a neighbor watch your house/apartment?	1	2	7	66

24. How about people being robbed or having
their purses or wallets taken on the
street. Would you say that this is a
big problem, some problem or almost
no problem in your neighborhood?

Big problem . . . . 3 -21
Some problem 2
Almost no problem 1
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

---

25. How about yourself? On the row of numbers from zero to ten that we talked
about before, how likely is it in the next couple of years that someone
will try to rob you or take your purse/wallet on the street in your
neighborhood? Remember TEN means EXTREMELY LIKELY and ZERO means NO
POSSIBILITY at all.

_____ (WRITE IN NUMBER 0-10)
Don't know. 97
Not ascertained 98   22-23

---

26. Do you personally know of anyone, other than yourself, who has been robbed
or had their purse or wallet taken, in the past couple of years, or if
someone tried to do this to them?

Yes . . . . .1 -24
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

A. Where did these robberies happen? Were they in your present neighbor-
hood, someplace else in the city, or out of town?

	First Mention	Second Mention	Third Mention
Present neighborhood	1-25	1-26	1-27
City	2	2	2
Out-of-town	3	3	3
Don't know	7	7	7
Not ascertained	8	8	8
Inappropriate	9	9	9

27. Besides robbery, how about people being
attacked or beaten up in your neighbor-
hood by strangers. Is this a big
problem, some problem or almost
no problem?

Big problem . . . . .3 -28
Some problem 2
Almost no problem 1
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

---

28. How about yourself? On the row of numbers from zero to ten, how likely is
it that some stranger would try to attack and beat you up in your present
neighborhood in the next couple of years? Remember, TEN is EXTREMELY
LIKELY and ZERO is NO POSSIBILITY at all.

_____ (WRITE IN NUMBER 0-10)
Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98   29-30

Cd 3 _

29. Do you personally know anyone who has been a victim of an attack by strangers in the past couple of years, or if any stranger tried to attack anyone you know?

```
        Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31
        No . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
        Don't know . . . ._.. .._.. . . . 7
        Not ascertained . . . . . . . . 8
```

A. Where did these attacks happen? Were they in your present neighborhood, someplace else in the city, or out of town?

	First Mention	Second Mention	Third Mention
Present neighborhood	1-32	1-33	1-34
City	2	2	2
Out-of-town	3	3	3
Don't know	7	7	7
Not ascertained	8	8	8
Inappropriate	9	9	9

30. What kinds of people do you hear about being attacked; beaten up, or robbed in your neighborhood? Are the victims mostly older people, younger people, or children?

```
        Older people . . . . . . . . . 1-35
        Younger people . . . . . . . . 2
        Children . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ;
        Any combination of older,
            younger people, children
            (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . . . . .4
        Do not hear specifics
            (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . . . . . 5
        No crime here (VOLUNTEERED) . .6
        Don't know . . . . . . . . . . 7
        Not ascertained . . . . . . . .8
```

A. Are the victims generally male or female?

```
        Males . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
        Females . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
        Both (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . . . 3     36
        Do not hear specifics
            (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . . . . .4
        No crime here (VOLUNTEERED) . .5
        Don't know . . . . . . . . . . 7
        Not ascertained . . . . . . . .8
```

Cd 3

31. During the past week, about how many times did you leave your home and go outside after dark? (GET BEST ESTIMATE)   (PROBE: JUST A GUESS WILL DO)

_____(RECORD NUMBER)   Don't know 97   37-38
                                  Not ascertained 98

32. In the past two weeks, about how many times have you gone somewhere in your neighborhood for evening entertainment -- to go to a show or somewhere like that? (GET BEST ESTIMATE) (PROBE:JUST A GUESS WILL DO)

_____(RECORD NUMBER)   Don't know 97   39-40
                            Not ascertained 98

33. Now I have a list of things that some people do to protect themselves from being attacked or robbed on the street. As I read each one would you tell me whether you personally do it most of the time, sometimes, or almost never?

		Most Of The Time	Some-Times	Almost Never	(VOLUNTEERED) N.A./ Don't Know	Inapp./ Don't Go Out	
a.	When you go out after dark, how often do you get someone to go with you because of crime?	3	2	1	7	8	41
b.	How often do you go out by car rather than walk at night because of crime?	3	2	1	7	8	42
c.	How about taking something with you at night that could be used for protection from crime -- like a dog, whistle, knife or a gun. How often do you do something like this?	3	2	1	7	8	43
d.	How often do you avoid certain places in your neighborhood at night?	3	2	1	7	8	44

dd. How close to your home is the place you try to avoid? (GET BEST ESTIMATE IN BLOCKS. IF MENTION MORE THAN ONE, RECORD CLOSEST)

_____(NUMBER OF BLOCKS)
(NOTE: NO SAFE PLACES = 0)
No dangerous places 96   45-46
Not ascertained 98
Inappropriate 99
Don't Know 97

Cd 3

34. How safe do you feel, or would you feel, being out alone in your neighborhood at night -- very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

Very safe 1-47
Somewhat safe 2
Somewhat unsafe 3
Very unsafe 4
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

35. How about during the day. How safe do you feel, or would you feel, being out alone in your neighborhood during the day -- very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?

Very safe 1-48
Somewhat safe 2
Somewhat unsafe 3
Very unsafe 4
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about things you watch on television or read in the newspapers.

36. First, how many hours did you watch TV last night, between say 6 and 11 p.m.? (GET BEST ESTIMATE) (NOTE: 0.5=1/2 hr., 1.0=1 hr., 1.5=1&1/2 hr.)

_____ (RECORD HOURS)   49-50

None (GO TO Q. 37) 00
Don't know (GO TO Q. 37) 97
Not ascertained (GO TO Q. 37) . .98

a. Yesterday, did you watch any national news shows, like Walter Cronkite, John Chancellor, Barbara Walters, or the others?

Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 7   51
Not ascertained 8
Inappropriate 9

b. Did you watch any local news shows yesterday?

Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 7   52
Not ascertained 8
Inappropriate 9

c. Did you watch any shows involving police or crime? (Like Kojak, Charlie's Angels, Hawaii 5-0, Adam 12, Baretta?

Yes 1
No 2   53
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8
Inappropriate 9

Cd 3

37. In the last week, have you read any daily newspapers?

```
      ┌─ Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-54
      │  No (GO TO Q. 38) . . . . . . . . .2
      │  Can't read (GO TO Q. 40) . . . . .3
      │  Don't know (GO TO Q. 38) . . . . .7
      │  Not ascertained (GO TO Q. 38) . . 8
      ↓
```

a. Which one(s)? (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)

Chicago	Philadelphia	San Francisco	
Tribune 10	Evening Bulletin. . . 20	Examiner 30	55-56
Sun Times . . . 11	Inquirer 22	Chronicle 31	57-58
Daily News . . .12	Daily News 23	Bay Guardian . . .32	59-60
Defender 13	Tribune 24	Other _____ 33	61-62
Other _____ 14	Other _____ 25	(SPECIFY)	63-64
(SPECIFY)	(SPECIFY)	Don't know 97	
Don't know . . .97	Don't know 97	Not ascertained . 98	
Not ascer-	Not ascertained . . . 98	Inappropriate . . 99	65-66
tained 98	Inappropriate 99		
Inappropriate . 99			

38. Do you read a local or community newspaper regularly?

```
                          Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-67
                          No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
                          Don't know . . . . . . . . . . . .7
                          Not ascertained . . . . . . . . . 8
                          Inappropriate (Can't Read) . . . .9
```

39. Yesterday, did you read any stories about crime in any paper?

```
                          Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.-68
                          No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
                          Don't know/Can't remember . . . . 7
                          Didn't read paper
                            yesterday (VOLUNTEERED) . . . . 3
                          Not ascertained . . . . . . . . . 8
                          Inappropriate (Can't read) . . . .9
```

69-75 MOR
76 Cd #
77-30 Job #

40. Thinking of all the crime stories you've read, seen or heard about in the last couple of weeks, is there a particular one that you remember, or that sticks out in your mind?

```
        ┌─── Yes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-21
        │    No . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
        │    Don't know . . . . . . . . . .7
        ▼    Not ascertained . . . . . . . .8
```

┌───┐
│   │
│   a. What crime was that?   │
│   │
│   _____   │
│   │
│   _____   │
│   │
│   │
│   b. What did you read or hear about it? (Crime mentioned)   │
│   │
│   _____   │
│   │
│   _____   │
│   │
│   _____   │
│   │
│   │
└───┘

41. Considering all the sources you use to get information, what's your <u>best</u> source of information about crime <u>in your neighborhood?</u> (ASK OPEN END -- CODE RESPONSE BELOW. ONE RESPONSE ONLY)

```
                    Local community paper . . . . . . . . . . .1-22
                    City paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
                    Radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
                    TV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
                    Relative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
                    Neighbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
                    Friend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
                    Other _____0
                                    (SPECIFY)
                    Don't know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
                    Not ascertained . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
                    Inappropriate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
```

Cd 4

42. In the past week or two have you talked with anyone about crime?

```
                                      Yes . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -24
                                      No . . . . . . . . . . . 2
                                      Don't know . . . . . . . .7
                                      Not ascertained . . . . . .8
```

| a. | Who have you talked to? We don't want names, only the person's relationship to you. | (CODE FIRST MENTION ONLY) Wife/husband/spouse . . . . .1 Another family member or relative . . . .2 Someone at work/school . . . . .3 A neighbor . . . . 4 A friend . . . . .5 Anyone else/other . . . . 6 Don't know . . . . .7 Not ascertained . . . . 8 Inappropriate . . . . 9 |

25

43. What about rape and other forms of sexual assault? In the past month or so how frequently has this subject come up in conversation -- would you say never, occasionally, or very often?

```
                                      Never . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -26
                                      Occasionally . . . . . . 2
                                      Very often . . . . . . . .3
                                      Don't know . . . . . . . 7
                                      Not ascertained . . . . . 8
```

Now I have a few specific questions about the problem of rape or sexual assault.

44. In your neighborhood, would you say sexual assaults are a big problem, somewhat of a problem, or almost no problem at all?

```
                                      Big problem . . . . . . . . 3-27
                                      Somewhat of a problem . .2
                                      Almost no problem .. . . . 1
                                      Don't know . . . . . . . .7
                                      Not ascertained . . . . . 8
```

45. Do you think that the number of rapes in your neighborhood is going up, going down or staying about the same?

```
                                      Up . . . . . . . . . . . .3-28
                                      Down . . . . . . . . . . .1
                                      Same . . . . . . . . . . .2
                                      No rape here(VOLUNTEERED).4
                                      Don't know . . . . . . . .7
                                      Not ascertained . . . . . 8
```

46. About how many women would you guess have been sexually assaulted or raped in your neighborhood in the last year?   (GET BEST ESTIMATE) (PROBE: JUST A GUESS WILL DO)

_____(RECORD NUMBER)

```
                                      Don't know . . . . . . . 97
                                      Not ascertained . . . . .98
```
29-30

Cd 4

(ASK Q. 47-49 OF FEMALE RESPONDENTS ONLY)

.47F. On the zero to ten scale we have been using. what do you think your chances are that someone will try to sexually assault you in this neighborhood? Let TEN mean that your chances are EXTREMELY HIGH and ZERO mean that there is NO POSSIBILITY at all.   (GET BEST ESTIMATE) (PROBE: JUST A GUESS, 0-10 WILL DO)

____(RECORD NUMBER)

Don't know 97
Not ascertained . . . 98
Inappropriate 99

31-32

48F. Now, think about the last time you went out alone after dark in your neighborhood. How afraid or worried were you then,about being sexually assaulted or raped? Use the same numbers zero to ten.

____(RECORD NUMBER) 0-10

(VOLUNTEERED)
Does not go out alone
    after dark. 96
Don't know 97
Not ascertained . . . 98
Inappropriate 99

33-34

49F. Do you personally know of anyone who has been sexually assaulted?

Yes 1-35
No (GO TO Q.51) 2
Don't know (GO TO Q.51)7
Not ascertained/
    Refused 8
    (GO TO Q.51)

50A. Did this happen to someone you know, or to yourself?

Someone you know. . . .1
Yourself 2
Both 3
Don't know(GO TO Q.51) 7
Not ascertained(GO TO
    Q.51). 8
Inappropriate (GO TO
    Q.51) 9

36

50B. When this happened to you, did you report it to the police?

Yes 1
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained/
    Refused to answer. . 8
Inappropriate 9

37

50C. How long ago did this take place?
(ASK AS OPEN END)

Within past six months.1
Seven months-1 year . .2
Between 2-5 years ago. 3
Between 6-10 years ago.4
More than 10 years ago.5
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8
Inappropriate 9

38

50D. Where did these sexual assaults happen?   (READ CODES)

	First Mention	Second Mention	Third Mention
Present neighborhood	1 -39	1 -40	1 -41
City	2	2	2
Out-of-town	3	3	3
Don't know	7	7	7
Not ascertained	8	8	8
Inappropriate	9	9	9

KP - 0 Fill Males

Cd 4

47M. What do you think the chances are of a woman being sexually assaulted in this neighborhood? Let TEN mean that chances of rape are EXTREMELY HIGH and ZERO mean that there is NO POSSIBILITY at all. (PROBE: JUST A GUESS, 0-10 WILL DO)

_____(RECORD NUMBER)

Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98
Inappropriate 99

42-43

48M. Not asked

44 MOR

49M. Do you personally know of anyone who has been sexually assaulted?

Yes . . . . 1 -45
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

50M. Where did these sexual assaults happen? (READ CODES)

	First Mention	Second Mention	Third Mention
Present neighborhood	1 -46	1 -47	1 -48
City	2	2	2
Out-of-town	3	3	3
Don't know	7	7	7
Not ascertained	8	8	8
Inappropriate	9	9	9

KP - 0 Fill Females

Cd 4

51. There are many different opinions about how to prevent rape or sexual
     assault from happening. I'm going to mention several possible ways of
     preventing rape and we'd like to know what, in general, you think about
     each of these ideas. For each one I read, please tell me how much you
     think it would help to prevent rape, would it: Help a great deal, help
     somewhat, or help hardly at all. (READ CATEGORIES) (ROTATE)

		Help A Great Deal	Help Somewhat	Help Hardly At All	Don't Know/ Not Ascertained	
a.	Stronger security measures at home, like better locks or alarms. Would they ... (READ CATEGORIES)	3	2	1	7	49
b.	Women not going out alone, especially at night.	3	2	1	7	50
c.	Women dressing more modestly, or in a less sexy way.	3	2	1	7	51
d.	Providing psychological treatment for rapists. Would this ... (READ CATEGORIES)	3	2	1	7	52
e.	Encouraging women to take self-defense classes, like judo or karate.	3	2	1	7	53
f.	Women carrying weapons for protection, like knives or guns.	3	2	1	7	54
g.	Newspapers publicizing names and pictures of known rapists.	3	2	1	7	55
h.	Women refusing to talk to strangers. Would this ... (READ CATEGORIES)	3	2	1	7	56
i.	Stopping the push for women's rights and women's liberation.	3	2	1	7	57
j.	Rape victims fighting back against their attackers.	3	2	1	7	58
k.	Increasing men's respect for all women.	3	2	1	7	59

l. Is there anything
    else that you can
    think of that would
    help prevent rape?
    (IF YES, WHAT?)

_____

m. From all the things you can think of, which one do you feel would work best
    to help prevent rape?

_____

Cd 4

Finally, we have a few more questions for statistical purposes.

D1. How many years have you personally
lived in your present neighborhood?

Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98   60-61

____ (RECORD YEARS)

D2. Do you live in a single family
house, an apartment building with
less than 7 units or a building
with 7 or more units?

Single family . . . . . . .1 -62
Less than 7 units 2
7 or more units 3
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

D3. Do you own your home or do you rent it?

Rent . . . . 1 -63
Own (includes buying). . . 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

D4. Do you expect to be living in this
neighborhood two years from now?

Yes . . . . .1 -64
No 2
Maybe/It depends
   (VOLUNTEERED) 3
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

D5. Do you carry an insurance policy which
covers your household goods against loss
from theft or vandalism?

Yes . . . . .1 -65
No 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

D6. What is the last grade of school
you completed?

No formal education . . .00 -66/67
Grade school or less
   (Grades 1-8) 01
Some high school. 02
Graduated high school
   (Grades 9-12). 03
Vocational/Technical
   school 04
Some college 05
Graduated college 06
Post graduate work. . . .07
Don't know 97
Not ascertained/Refused. 98

Cd 4

D7. How many children under the age of 18 are currently living with you?

Don't know 97
Not ascertained. 98
(EXACT NO.)_____,_._____   68-69

D8. Are you presently employed somewhere or are you unemployed, retired, (a student), (a housewife), or what?

Working now 01
With a job, but not at work because of temporary illness, labor dispute, on strike, bad weather. 02
Unemployed 03
Retired 04
In school 05
Keeping house 06   70-71
Disabled 07
Armed service 08

Other_____09
        (SPECIFY)
Don't know 97
Not ascertained 98

a. What is your occupation?

(RECORD VERBATIM)   72-73
                                                 MOR

D9. Considering all sources of income and all salaries of people who worked last year, what was your total household income in 1976? You don't have to give me an exact amount, I'll just read some categories and you tell me which applies to your household.

Below $6,000 . . . . 0 -74
Between $6,000 and $9,999. 1
Between $10,000 and $14,999 2
Between $15,000 and $19,999 3
Between $20,000 and $24,999 4
$25,000 or over 5
Refused 6
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

---

75 MOR
76 Cd #
77-80 Job #

Cd 5
1-20 ID

D10. Besides being an American, we would like to know what your ethnic background is. For example, is it Irish, Puerto Rican, Afro-American or what?

Puerto Rican. 1	21
Mexican 1	22
Cuban 1	23
Other Latin 1	24
Polish 1	25
Italian 1	26
Irish 1	27
Croatian. 1	28
Other European. 1	29
Afro-American 1	30
Chinese 1	31
Japanese 1	32
Other Asian 1	33
Other _____ .1	34
(RECORD)	
Don't know 7	35
Refused 6	

KP - 0 Fill

D11. For statistical purposes, we would also like to know what racial group you belong to. Are you Black, White, Asian, or something else?

Black . . . . 1 -36
White 2
Asian 3

Other_____ 4
Refused 6
Don't know 7

D12. Were you born in the United States or somewhere else?

Born in U.S. . . . . . . .1 -37
Born elsewhere 2
Don't know 7
Not ascertained 8

D13. By the way, since we picked your number at random, could you tell me if your phone is listed in the phone book or is it unlisted?

Listed . . . . .1 -38
Unlisted 2
Don't know 7
Refused/Not ascertained. .8

D14. We also need to know how many different telephone numbers you have at home. Do you have another number besides this one?
(IF YES, HOW MANY)
____ (NUMBER OF OTHER NUMBERS)

Don't know . . . . 97 -39/40
Not ascertained 98

D15. What is your age?

_____
(Record exact age)

Refused 97-41/42
Not ascertained 98

Cd 5

QUALITY CONTROL ITEMS

(INTERVIEWER -- RATE INTERVIEW FOR ALL RESPONDENTS)

Q.1 Respondent's English was:

Good . . . . 1 -50
Fair 2
Poor 3

Q.2 Was interview taken in Spanish?

Yes 1-51
No 2

Q.3 Respondent was:

Very cooperative. 1-52
Fairly cooperative 2
Not very cooperative. . . .3

Q.4 Respondent seemed:

Very interested in
  interview . . . . .1-53.
Somewhat interested. . . . 2
Not interested; hard to hold
  his/her attention. . . . 3

Q.5 Do you believe the information
given to you by the respondent
is . . .

Accurate 1-54
Inaccurate 2

Please explain _____

55-75 MOR

76 Cd #
77-80 Job #

Cd 5

We know that crime is a problem in many neighborhoods. We are going
to be interviewing some people in person to discuss the ways they
protect themselves from harm, including sexual assault. It would
help us if you would talk with us. We will be able to pay you something
($10) and we could come directly to your house or meet you somewhere else
at a time that is convenient for you. Would you like to participate?

<div style="margin-left:50%">

No 1-43
Yes (GO TO TEAR SHEET) 2
Undecided/DK 7

</div>