National Criminal Justice Reference Service

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
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Governmental Responses to Crime

Executive Summary

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Governmental Responses to Crime

Executive Summary

Herbert Jacob
Robert L. Lineberry

June 1982

U. S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

National Institute of Justice

ABSTRACT

The Governmental Responses to Crime Project investigated the growth of crime and local governmental responses to it during the period 1948-1978. A great deal of the information collected relies upon primary source material from ten American cities: Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Houston, Texas; Indianapolis, Indiana; Minneapolis, Minnsota; Newark, New Jersey; Oakland, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Pheonix, Arizona; and San Jose, California. These cities vary enormously in their regional locations, growth patterns, and political structures.

The summary focuses on four major findings. (1) Rising crime rates are a national rather than local phemonenon. (2) Crime became the leading item on urban agendas. (3) Local governments responded to crime by increasing criminal justice agency budgets and personnel rosters but these agencies were unable to convert these additional resources into effective crime fighting activities. Crime rose more rapidly than police resources but court resources kept ahead of rising arrest rates. (4) Legislative responses took the form of altering the description of prohibited behaviors by criminalizing some and decriminalizing others and also increasing penalties for offenses. However, despite a massive data collection effort, the study makes clear that a continuous effort to collect relevant information about crime and criminal justice policies needs to be initiated in a handful of communities if we are to improve substantially our understanding of how and how well governments respond to crime.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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work. Ms. Marjorie Carpenter of the Northwestern University Interlibrary Loan Department helped us borrow thousands of reels of microfilmed newspapers, a project of unprecedented dimensions for her small staff. Ms. Mina Hohlen and other consultants at Vogelback Computing Center answered countless questions.

One other group of individuals, most of whom we have never met, has aided our work in important ways. These are the local officials who helped our field directors secure access to data. Our staff rarely encountered a reluctant official from whom we sought information. It was far more common to find people who went out of their way to help us track down sometimes esoteric sets of information. A sizeable number of individuals also helped us by agreeing to be interviewed as "knowledgeables," shedding light on the patterns of the governmental process in their cities.

It is not uncommon for grantees to complain about bureaucratic nitpicking or meddling from their granting agencies. It is particularly important, therefore, for us to record here our very deep gratitude to the National Institute of Justice and to Dr. Richard Rau, our project monitor. Far from giving the common impression of a rule-bound bureaucracy, they were unflagging in their devotion to expediting our work, respecting at the same time our scholarly independence and integrity, even when disagreeing with some of our conclusions.

The list of persons who have given us aid and comfort is quite a long one. However, we make clear that what follows in this Executive Summary is our reponsibility and that neither the National Institute of Justice nor any others should be saddled with its contents. We remain, however, very much in their debt.

Herbert Jacob
Evanston, Illinois

Robert L. Lineberry
Lawrence, Kansas

December 31, 1981

A. Introduction

Studies of the criminal justice system in the United States typically describe single communities over short periods of time. The Governmental Respones to Crime Project was designed to overcome such limitations. It examined crime trends and governmental responses to crime in ten major cities spread across the United States for a 31 year period from 1948 to 1978. It provided an unprecedented opportunity to examine the ways in which crime grew, how it took a leading place on urban agendas and how government responded to it. The principal findings are reported in three Technical Reports: Crime on Urban Agendas, Crime and Governmental Responses in American Cities, and Legislative Responses to Crime.

The project's major findings are:

Rising reported crime rates are national, not local phenomena. Local characteristics are not closely related to them.

Crime was the major item on the urban political agenda during the 1970's.

Police and court expenditures and personnel increased in apparent response to rising crime rates, but police activities and court dispositions did not show a corresponding rise.

Police resources, although increasing, lagged behind the rise of crime during the 31 years studied but resources for courts and prosecutors have grown more rapidly than the rise in arrests.

Cities rarely amended their criminal ordinances but when they did, the net effect was to criminalize more behaviors and increase potential penalties. Over time, state legislatures played an increasingly active role in defining

offenses and penalties and in reducing discretion in sentencing processes.

B. Research Approach and Data Sources

1. <u>Research Questions</u>. The project addressed four principal concerns:

    a. What characterized the rise of crime in the United States during this period?

    b. How did attentiveness to crime change over the period?

    c. What were the connections between the structures and patterns of urban governments and their responses to crime?

    d. How did the urban communities' principal responses to crime change over time?

2. <u>Research Sites</u>. Our focus was primarily, though not exclusively, on the local community. In the United States, local governments have always possessed the major responsibility for responding to crime. Police slowly evolved from the unpaid watch system of colonial times. At no point were state or national governments entrusted with substantial responsibility for policing. Despite a steady growth in federal expenditures on criminal justice, only 12.4 per cent of all criminal justice expenditures in 1978 were made by the federal government. An additional 27.7 per cent were made by states but 59.4 per cent came from local governments (Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Flanagan, 1981: 7). Even elements of the system which are funded and managed by state and national officials are physically located in, and often influenced by, local communities. Our focus, though mainly on city governments, did not preclude investigations of some county, state, and national responses to crime, though it is their implementations at the city level upon which we concentrated.

Our analysis did not attempt to study superficially all local communities. Rather we drew heavily upon intensive studies of ten American cities. We tracked their crime problems, their attentiveness to crime, their political and governmental processes, and the policies chosen by those processes. These ten cities were:

Atlanta, Georgia
Boston, Massachusetts
Houston, Texas
Indianapolis, Indiana
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Newark, New Jersey
Oakland, California
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Phoenix, Arizona
San Jose, California

These cities do not constitute a representative sample of American communities, but they represent a broad spectrum of American urban life. They represent distinct clusterings on particular dimensions of cities which are theoretically and practically interesting to us. Three cities, Newark, Atlanta, and Oakland, elected black mayors during the period. Three others, Minneapolis, Houston, and Philadelphia, are noted for their politically active police departments and two of these (Minneapolis and Philadelphia) elected police officials as mayor. Three cities (San Jose, Oakland, and Phoenix)) are "reformed" local governments with a city manager plan, while the others are not.

Moreover, these ten cities vary considerably with respect to their fiscal strength. Many indices of fiscal conditions have been proposed in recent years (Schneider, 1975; Louis, 1975; Nathan and Adams, 1976; Bunce and Glickman, 1980). Regardless of the index used, the ten cities exhibit enormous diversity. Table 1 reports, for example, the scores from Harold Bunce and Norman Glickman's "needs index" for 58 cities with 1970 populations larger than 250,000 (Bunce and Glickman, 1980). This is probably the most influential of the various city ranking efforts, largely because it was developed to evaluate HUD's allocations of Community Development Block Grant moneys. The "needs index" is a factor score composed of more than 20 indicators of community age and decline, density, and poverty. As Table 1 indicates, the ten cities selected for this project anchor both ends of the spectrum. Newark is the worst-off American city by this calculation; Atlanta, Boston, and Oakland are among the twelve most distressed cities. At the other end of the ranking are three more of our ten cities, Phoenix, Indianapolis and San Jose, scoring as the three best-off cities among the 58. Minneapolis scored almost at the median.

Other indices, constructed for somewhat different purposes, array large cities in different ways, but confirm the "spread" of our cities on various dimensions. Two of these indices are reported in Table 2. One is Nathan and Adams' (1976) ranking of central city "hardship", the degree to which the central city is disadvantaged in relationship to its

suburbs. Another is Arthur Louis's (1975) popularized and often-cited ranking of the quality of life among 50 large cities. His assessments represent the average ranking of 24 separate indicators ranging from parkland to Who's Who listings from the city. The third and final index, listed in Table 3, is particularly useful for our purposes, because it is the only one to provide rankings at two points in time. Fossett and Nathan (1981) developed an "urban condition index" score for large cities in 1960 and 1970. Among our cities Boston and Newark rank as the most distressed while San Jose and Phoenix were relatively well off in both years.

All of these indices demonstrate that our ten cities vary widely as places to live, work, or govern. In comparison with other large American cities, these ten communities are not concentrated in a narrow band with respect to key variables. They provide us with ample variations in key socioeconomic dimensions, regional location, and the overall measures of the quality of urban life.

The period of our study was chosen to capture the years when reported crime rose rapidly in the United States. The year 1948 was selected as the beginning point because by then most of the temporary dislocations caused by World War II had passed and the nation was electing its first post World War II, post FDR president. The year 1978 was chosen to mark the end of a decade of federal grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and because it was the most recent year for which data could be obtained during the time that the study was funded.

3. Data Sources. Much can be learned about the rise of crime and the policy choices of urban governments from standard sources. But a good deal of information, especially qualitative, historical, and contextual information, can only be retrieved by on-site research. To secure this primary source material, the Principal Investigators retained the services of one or two Field Directors in each of the ten cities. Each of these Field Directors was a local social scientist, typically one with some experience in urban studies, criminal justice, or both. These Field Directors were normally employed by the Project on a half-time basis during the summer of 1979 and the academic year 1979-1980. The availability of these social scientists for considerable periods of time enabled us to draw upon their services not only for primary data collection tasks, but also for the equally important task of deepening our understanding of the complex processes of local governmental response to crime.

A great deal of statistical and descriptive data were collected from the ten cities. These data included information over the full 31 year period on changes in the activities, focus, and resources of local police departments, courts, prosecutorial systems, and correctional institutions. Of

course, annual, quantitative measures cannot capture fully the complex process of governmental responses to crime. Elements of decision-making about crime vary from one city to another and from time to time in a city. Therefore, a substantial component of our field work involved an effort to reconstruct urban political histories in a systematic way. Our method here relied heavily on the use of local "knowledgeables," informants who were each asked a series of closed and open ended questions. To capture the rich and varied histories of these cities, though, systematically coded data are not sufficient. Thus we also asked our field directors to prepare an "urban profile" for each city. These documents were based on standard historical sources, interviews with urban leaders, and the statistical and descriptive information compiled for each city. Some of these profiles will be published separately (Heinz, Jacob, and Lineberry, forthcoming).

Not all of the research tasks of the Governmental Responses to Crime project were conducted in the field. The central office staff was responsible for three main efforts. The first of these was the preparation of a very large "baseline" data set with which the ten cities could be compared to other cities in the United States. To accomplish that, we collected information on all cities that had a population of 50,000 or more in 1950, 1960, or 1970. The data file we created is unique for both its length and its breadth. We collected Uniform Crime Report data on Part I offenses for each of these 396 cities for the 31 year period. In addition, we obtained data from the U. S. Census Bureau on various characteristics of their population. Finally, we also obtained annual information on several indicators of police resources for each of the baseline cities.

A second central office task was the analysis of attentiveness to crime and criminal justice issues in newspapers. This content analysis involved nine of the ten cities. Because newspapers are both a barometer and, quite possibly, a cause of public worries about and attention to crime, we investigated whether there were systematic links between newspaper attentiveness and the crime rate, as well as local responses to crime.

Finally, we investigated one of the most obvious and important, but also one of the most neglected, public policy responses to crime, changes in laws and ordinances. These laws and ordinances are not only themselves responses to crime, but they also constrain the behaviors of actors in the criminal justice system. By systematically coding changes in local ordinances and in state law, we were able to focus on two key dimensions of legal change: criminalization or decriminalization, and the severity of the penalties.

Figure 1 summarizes the intersection between our different data sources and some of the principal research questions

addressed in this Report. As the figure indicates, almost every question is addressed by two or three sets of data. This triangulation strategy was one of the key features of the project.

C. The Nationalization of Crime

1. Reported Crime Rates and Their Correlates. Because cities vary considerably along demographic and political dimensions, it seems plausible that their rates of crime and changes in their rates of crime should also vary accordingly. Surprisingly, relatively little research has attempted to link the various social characteristics of whole cities with their rates of crime or changes in their crime patterns over time. Our understanding of changes in reported crime comes from analyses of the base line data set which is composed of information from 396 cities with populations exceeding 50,000 in 1950, 1960, or 1970. We are concerned with reported crime rates in this study even though they reflect the actual incidence of crime only imperfectly. The most important reason for using such rates is that governments respond primarily to reported crime. In addition, no more accurate information about the incidence of crime exists for individual cities over a period of time. Prior research has suggested a number of city characteristics which may be associated with reported crime rates. Our data permit a test of these effects based on a comprehensive set of cities. We first look at cross-sectional bivariate relationships between crime rates and population change, race, youthful population, population size, poverty, and income inequality. Then we examine the multivariate relationships, and finally we analyze these effects in the framework of the 31 year time series that our data constitutes.

Our principal concern in this analysis is to choose between two alternative perspectives on crime. The first sees crime as the correlate of the particular characteristics of the cities we are examining. The second sees crime as the correlate of national trends which erase individual city differences and produce relatively uniform consequences throughout the country.

2. Population Size and Reported Crime. Examining only the 32 largest American cities, Skogan (1977) found that population size was inversely related to crime rates until about 1960; thereafter it was very moderately related in a positive direction. That there is a relationship and that it is increasingly important, especially for violent crime, is suggested by Figures 2a and 2b. The cities in these figures are grouped according to their 1970 populations; the same relationship exists if we used 1950 or 1960 population data. For almost every year larger cities had higher rates than the next smaller category of city. This relationship holds both for property crime rates and for violent crime rates. However, when we calculate the correlation coefficients between city size and crime rates, we discover that they are very small. As Figure 2 suggested, the relationship is stronger for violent than for property crime rates. The correlation coefficients range from .07 (violent crime) and −.02 (property crime) in 1948 to a high of .35 in 1969 for violent crime and .12 in 1968 for property crime. The range of coefficients is in every case smaller than that which Skogan reported for the 32 largest cities.

3. Population Change and Reported Crime. Our data also allow us to systematically examine the effects of population growth and decline on crime rates. Decline in urban America conjures up the images of St. Louis, Cleveland, and Newark among many others; all suffer from what appears to be substantially higher than normal crime rates. Growth suggests such cities as San Jose or Phoenix which to outsiders appear to be safe cities.

Our data provide only partial support for the hypothesis. Figures 3a and 3b show our 396 cities grouped by the amount of population change between 1950 and 1975. As we would expect, the relationships are unclear in the early years of the period before most of the population change had occurred. However, by the mid 1960s the two groups of declining cities had the highest violent crime rates and by 1970 those cities which maintained more or less stable populations ranked third. The three groups of growing cities are clustered very closely together with lower crime rates which, however, also show increases. This suggests that as we hypothesized, population decline is more strongly related to the rise of violent crime than is population growth.

The relationships are quite different for property crime rates as Figure 3b shows. All cities show almost the same growth pattern. However, by 1960 two groups of cities -- those with the most decline and those with the most growth -- had especially high property crime rates. The high growth cities retained their high position until 1976 when they fell into the pack of all the other cities. Clearly, the differences between declining and growing cities are not as large for property crime rates as for violent crime rates. Thus our hypothesis that growing cities would be especially vulnerable to property crime is not confirmed.

4. Race and Reported Crime.

The relationship between race and crime has often been investigated (for a thorough review of this literature, see Silberman, 1978: 117-166). Although there is much controversy about the causes of the association, it is clear that blacks are disproportionately involved in crimes of the sort measured

by the UCR. Our data permit us to investigate the extent to which a city's crime rates are related to the proportion of its population that is non-white (which for most cities means black). The relationship between the size of the non-white population in cities and the property and violent crime rates is shown in Table 4. Two things are evident from these data. The relationship between the proportion non-white and the reported violent crime rate is much stronger than the relationship between the size of the non-white population and the reported property crime rate. Secondly, although both relationships have increased between 1950 and 1970, the association with violent crime rates has increased much more than that with property crime rates. In the latter instance, the percent non-white in a city's population accounted for almost 50 per cent of the variance in violent crime rates among the 396 cities. The fact that a city had a large proportion of non-whites in its population was apparently much more closely related to its violent crime rate in 1970 than in 1950 when no other demographic characteristics are taken into account.

These data allow us to conclude that when we look only at the bivariate relationship of race to crime, cities which have large fractions of their population that are non-white generally have higher rates for violent crimes. There are numerous exceptions to that rule because the correlation is far from perfect. There are many more exceptions to the association between the non-white population and property crime rates.

5.   Youth and Crime.   There has also been considerable speculation about the covariation of reported crime and the size of the youthful population because most arrested offenders are under the age of 25 (Wilson, 1975: 17-22; Silberman, 1978: 49). Cities vary in the size of their youthful populations. The mean for the 396 cities in 1950 was 15 per cent with a standard deviation of 3.5 per cent; in 1970, the mean was 18.2 per cent with a standard deviation of 4.1 per cent. The bivariate relationship between the proportion of youth in a city and crime was, however, small for the entire period as shown in Table 5. At no time did the proportion of the youthful population account for as much as five per cent of the variance in either violent or property crime rates. For both, the relationship was slightly stronger in 1950 than the decade before or the decade after. This analysis leads us to conclude that the size of the youthful population was not by itself significantly related to the reported crime rates in cities during this period.

6.   Poverty and Crime.   Crime has also been attributed to poverty. Poverty is both an absolute and relative concept. People are poor because they lack the income needed to sustain themselves decently; they may also feel poor because they live in an area where others are much more affluent. Thus we can deal with poverty both in terms of the proportion of persons in a city who have poverty-level incomes and in terms of the income inequality of the metropolitan area in which they live. As Table 6 shows, neither our measure of absolute poverty nor the two Danziger measures of income inequality demonstrate a substantial relationship between them and crime. The number of poor people in a city is only marginally related to either property or violent crime; only in 1970 does it account for a substantial proportion of the variance -- 33 per cent. The measure of inequality which is based on metropolitan-wide distribution of income shows even less of a relationship. Cities in metropolitan areas with much income inequality or a substantial increase in income inequality do not regularly have higher crime rates than other cities. The lack of relationship between crime rates and poverty supports Braithewaite's earlier (1979) analysis. However, he suggests that income inequality has a much larger effect and we do not find that. Our finding also conflicts with Danziger's (1976) which concludes that income inequality is related to robbery and burglary rates in an analysis of 222 SMSA's in 1970. The difference between our findings and his may be due to a different crime rate measure, to our focus on cities rather than whole metropolitan areas, and to our use here of bivariate tests.

7.   The Combined Effects of Demographic Variables on Reported Crime Rates.   All of these demographic characteristics, of course, exist together. One should, therefore, examine their joint relationship on reported crime rates. Using a backward, step-wise regression technique, however, we find that only some of them are related to crime when all the others are taken into account.

First, we examine the relationships for all cities without the income inequality measure which is available only for some of them. Table 7 shows these analyses for three census points: 1950, 1960, and 1970 for both violent and property crime rates. For reported violent crime rates, the proportion non-white is always the most significantly related variable; it is paired with city population size. By 1970, these two variables account for half the variance between cities. The proportion of the population that is youthful has a small statistically significant beta only in 1960; poverty is not statistically significant at any of the time points.

Different sets of variables are significiant for reported property crime rates but they account for much less of the variance. Race is again always the most powerful variable. It is not teamed with city population size but with poverty in 1950 and with youth in 1970. It is important to note that poverty in 1950 is inversely related to property crime rates. For that year the more affluent a city, the higher its reported property crime rate, indicating that opportunity to steal may have been a more powerful influence on property crime rates than the proportion of poor people who might become offenders. In any case, even the best equation (for 1970) accounts for

only a tiny 12 per cent of of the variance.

When we add Danziger's measure of inequality for 1960 and 1970 as in Table 8 for the smaller number of cities for which we have it, the proportion of the variance explained is increased for both violent and property crime rates. Although inequality is not statistically significant for violent crimes in 1960, its marginal effect makes youth a statistically significant factor; in 1970, inequality itself just misses statistical significance. Race and population size remain the more important factors. For property crime, inequality is just below statisical significance in 1960 but well above it in 1970. With it, we now account for almost 30 per cent of the variance by 1970.

These regression models are weaker although generally consistent with those that have been developed by others including Danziger (1976). They show the importance of examining multiple factors simultaneously. They indicate that individual city characteristics are modestly successful in accounting for inter-city variation in reported crime rates. However, none of these characteristics are subject to much control by city governments. Only the size of the city is sometimes subject to its direct control; cities can regulate their growth by zoning and annexation policies. They have less control over population decline. Racial composition, the proportion of youth, the amount of poverty, and the extent of income inquality in the metropolitan area are all factors fundamentally beyond the control of city officials. Many are the consequences of national population movements and economic trends which affect individual cities differently even though they swing through the nation as a whole.

8. _Crime Rate Changes Over Time_. Figures 2a and 2b show more than rising crime rates. They also show a markedly similar rise in the reported crime rates for cities with quite different characteristics. Both the Newarks and the Houstons of the United States have experienced substantial rises in their reported crime rates. Those increases, moreover, occurred at about the time and with the same velocity for all kinds of cities. The results are the same when we inspect similar figures (not presented here) for cities categorized by the size of their non-white population, by the size of their poverty level population, or by the size of their youthful population.

An analysis of this change using demographic characterstics is quite unsuccessful as Table 9 shows. Only a fraction of the variance is accounted for by change in demographic traits. Increasing violent crime rates are slightly related to racial change and decreases in poverty. Increasing property crime rates are slightly related to racial change and population decline. Changes in the youthful population and income inequality are not related either to changes in violent or property crime rates. This does not mean that race, age, and poverty are unrelated to changing crime; it does mean that such characteristics cannot differentiate between the various cities of the United States.

In part this may be the result of dramatically declining differences between cities over the 31 years we studied. Table 10 shows that the variability of city crime rates declined over the period we studied. In each decade the coefficient of variation declined even though we have data from more cities in the later periods than in the earlier ones. By 1978, variability for crime rates was only two-thirds what it had been in 1948.

9. _The Nationalization of Crime_. One conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis is that the rise of reported crime is more a national than a local phenomenon. It was neither isolated to one kind of local community nor was it apparently driven by local characteristics that could be controlled at the local level. This conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the experiences of individual cities. All of the ten cities we studied experienced considerable rises in their reported crime rates. The situation was worst in Newark where property crime rates increased by a factor of seven and violent crime rates by more than a factor of eleven. Yet even the booming cities of San Jose and Phoenix experienced more than a doubling of their property crime rates and more than a quadrupling of their violent crime rates. We get the same results when we look at the Cleveland suburb of Lakewood, a place called by one author, "America's safest city" (Franke, 1974: 15). Lakewood's violent crime rate rose by a factor of six while its property crime rate increased more than Newark's. However, in 1978 as in 1948, Lakewood was among the cities with the lowest crime rate of all those with more than 50,000 inhabitants. Although some cities experienced a sharper rise of reported crime than others, the dominant fact is that the rise occurred everywhere. It was a national rather than a local phenomenon.

The national character of the rise in reported crime rates may well be the result of nationwide changes in the conditions that nurture crime. The work of a research team at the University of Illinois (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cohen, Felson and Land, 1980; Cohen and Cantor, 1980) has suggested that crimes occur when three conditions coexist: first, there must be property or persons who might be the object of a crime; second, these possible targets must be vulnerable to attack; and third, a person inclined to commit an offense must be present. Cohen, Felson, and Land concentrate their efforts on identifying changes in the availability of targets and their vulnerability during the last 30 years rather than on an increase in the number of persons who are criminally inclined. They show that two variables go far in accounting for the rise

of several offenses. These are the size of the youthful population which produces not only more potential offenders but also more potential victims since victimization surveys indicate that the young are the most likely to be victimized. Secondly, they compute a "household activity ratio" which is based on the number of women in the work force who leave homes unprotected during the work day. Unprotected homes make much property vulnerable to burglars. They find these two variables are powerful predictors of burglary, robbery, non-negligent homicide, rape, and aggravated assault.

As shown above, we did not consistently find the proportion of youths in cities to be related to crime rates. But when we relate the national household activity ratio and another indicator of opportunity -- the percentage of households with televisions -- to the crime rates of our ten cities, we obtain striking results, as we show in Table 11. In eight of our cities, more than half of the variance in property crime rates is accounted for. As we would expect, the measures for opportunity for theft have a lower relationship to violent crime although seven of the cities with satisfactory auto-correlation corrections have an r-square above .5. Note that the results reported in Table 11 are achieved by applying <u>national</u> data for the household activity ratio and television ownership to <u>city</u> crime rates. One would expect substantial error in the goodness-of-fit. In fact, however, there is very little slippage. The success of using <u>national</u> opportunity indicators in accounting for <u>local</u> crime rates supports the view that the rise in crime between 1948 and 1978 was fundamentally a national rather than a local phenomenon.

10. <u>The Nationalization of Crime in Newspaper Portrayals</u>. Another dimension of the nationalization of crime was the greater focus of newspapers on non-local crime news during much of this period. A principal way in which citizens and public officials obtained news about crime and other public problems was through the newspaper. Attentiveness to crime is likely to be heavily influenced by the coverage of crime in the other major media of mass communication, but there is no way of retrieving past levels of local crime news coverage on television and radio. Accordingly, we analyzed a random sample of 21 newspaper front pages over each of the 31 years for nine of the ten cities (Newark newspapers were not coded). A great deal of information was coded about each crime-related story, including the nature and location of the incident, the stage of the criminal justice process it represented, and whether it was a personal crime of a predatory nature or a public and political one. In addition, information was coded about crime-related editorials, public statements about crime, and policy changes related to crime.

As Figure 4 shows, state-national news took an increasing portion of the crime news coverage until 1974 by which time more than 60 per cent of all crime incidents on the front page

concerned events outside the metropolitan area. The proportion then dropped to 45 per cent and began rising again. Thus casual newspaper readers saw more news about crime elsewhere than in their home city for most of the period.

The exposure to national crime news was quite substantial in absolute as well as relative terms. Figure 5 shows the average front page crime coverage over the 31 years. Some cities (not necessarily those with less police recorded crime) had less coverage than others. In general, between one-seventh and one-fifth of all front page stories concerned crime and 40 to 60 per cent of that was about national crime incidents. Moreover, the share of newspaper stories devoted to crime increased over the period examined here. In percentage terms, the increase is not large, but the front page, of course, is of fixed size and must devote space to competing stories. Thus, by the end of our period, there was more crime news, more of it was about violent crime, more of it was about crime in the public or political arena, and more of it was about crimes outside the local community. This, too, suggests a nationalization of the crime problem.

D. The Crime Issue in Local Politics

Coverage in newspapers and other media is not the only way in which a community's attention can be focused on crime. Crime can and did become a significant issue on the urban political agenda. City political systems themselves underwent a significant set of changes during this period. New groups became activated, many of them spurred by the civil disorders of the 1960s and by federal anti-poverty programs. The problem of crime was an important issue to many of these groups and, of course, to local politicians.

We analyzed political responses to crimes largely by focusing on mayoral incumbencies for our ten cities. This is not a perfect unit of analysis, but one can recapture information about patterns during a particular incumbency more reliably than for periods such as years or decades. There were 55 of these incumbencies over the period in the ten cities. For all but one of them, we were able to collect information through knowledgeable informants on four aspects of a community's political system: urban elections, the configurations of community power, attributes of city mayors, and the urban issue agendas and the place of crime upon them.

The period 1948-1978 included the emergence of a "law and order" period in the American city and the nation as a whole. The patterns of urban elections confirm the importance of crime as a local issue. Figure 6 shows the distribution of all issue-mentions in newspaper descriptions of mayoral campaigns. Of all the issues mentioned during the election period, only

one overshadowed the law and order in mayoral campaigns. This was the somewhat catchall category of "mayoral leadership." The issue of law and order figured far more frequently in local campaigns than such problems as race, economic growth, governmental reform, and municipal corruption. Mayors were elected on campaign pledges to control or reduce crime, and two of our cities, Philadelphia and Minneapolis, elected former police officials as mayors.

We come to the same conclusion if we examine the issues on the urban agendas. We reconstructed local political agendas from our interviews with knowledgeables. We asked them to rate the importance of 13 issues for the mayoral incumbency they were describing. Table 12 shows some of our results. In the early years of our period, crime was not the most salient issue. Instead, tax policies, the local economy, and the quality of municipal services attracted the most attention. By the second portion of our period, crime was tied in second place with economic issues. After 1974, it was the most salient issue.

Political coalitions, however, vary over time and from city to city and one would expect that crime would not be equally prominent in all situations. Different groups may have differential influence in a particular city or at a particular time. The mix of community power and influence patterns comprise what we have called the urban power configuration. Variations in power configurations from one incumbency to another can be compared systematically. The axes of urban influence vary along two dimensions, as shown in Figure 7. One dimension is the source of power and the other is the number of persons exercising it. Where few exercise political power we find political elitism, i.e., where elected officials have disproportionate power. Where few in the private sector exercise power, we have business elitism, i.e., where local business leaders are described as quite influential. Where many exercise political power, we have a bureaucratic-centered system, in which local administrative agencies operate with a high degree of autonomy. Finally, where many exercise power based on the private sector, we find a pattern identified as pluralism, in which strong groups vie with one another for the ability to control public policy. In our incumbencies, business elitism seemed to be the most prevalent type of urban power, but bureaucratic influence increased steadily over time, while pluralism surged during the 1960s and then diminished again. These power configurations seem to be related to variations in the prominence of the crime issue. The correlation coefficients in Figure 7 show that the more bureaucratic or pluralistic a city's political structure was, the more likely it was that crime was a salient issue. No such relationship existed for political elitism or business elitism.

Reported crime rates appear to be related to the place of crime on the political agenda and the composition of the urban crime agenda. Table 13 shows the simple correlation coefficients between reported crime rates and several aspects of urban issue agendas. All but one of the relationships is statistically significant and moderately strong. Both violent and property crime appear to be equally closely related to the placement of crime on the crime agenda. However, much of the variance in the salience of crime on the political agenda remains unaccounted for in this analysis.

These findings suggest strongly that any simple "stimulus-response" model of governmental reactions to crime is insufficient. While there was a rough correspondence between the rise of reported crime and the increasing saliency of crime as a political issue, the political agenda does not automatically react to crime merely because the crime rate goes up. Local political considerations play an important role in shaping the level and the nature of the responses.

E. Criminal Justice Resources and Activities During an Era of Rising Crime

1. Police Expenditures. The high placement of crime on the urban agenda and its key role in election campaigns have been linked with demands to devote more resources to policing cities. Yet public expectations about the way police should, can, and actually do respond to crime often diverge from the realities of policing. Only a small part of police energies can be devoted to conventional law enforcement functions related to crime (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978: 35). The resources devoted to police departments are, to be sure, on the increase. As Figures 8a and 8b demonstrate, both police expenditures in 1967 dollars and police officers per 1,000 population increased over the period for cities in all the population categories shown. Moreover, the upward trend is similar for all the cities. Not only did the number of police officers increase, but their numbers per 1,000 population increased. In 1948, cities over 50,000 population maintained an average of 1.33 police officers per 1,000 population, while by 1978, 1.96 officers were employed for every 1,000 people. These increases, however, are small in comparison to the increases in police costs, even when those costs are measured in constant dollars. Over the 31 year period, police officers per 1,000 population increased less than one and a half times, but police expenditures in constant dollars increased 25 times.

Figure 9 presents the data on standardized per capita police expenditures for the ten case study cities for the entire 31 year period. As the figure illustrates, expenditures rose only slightly in six of the ten cities (Atlanta, Houston, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Phoenix, and San Jose), most of which grew in size between 1948 and 1978. After 1970 per capita expenditures began to rise more rapidly in this group of

cities, with Atlanta and Phoenix recording the sharpest increases. In the remaining four cities which also experienced declining populations -- Boston, Newark, Oakland, and Philadelphia -- standardized per capita police expenditures rose substantially throughout most of the period. Figure 3.1 also shows that in the latter part of the period studied (after 1974) police expenditures, when adjusted for inflation and population, declined in five of the ten cities (Atlanta, Boston, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Newark). Per capita police expenditures fell most sharply in Newark, declining from $80.60 in 1976 to $55.81 in 1978.

The first column of Table 14 reports the results of our analysis of the effects of Part I crime rates on police expenditures. Since the coefficients reported were obtained by controlling for the lagged value of the dependent variable, these coefficients may be interpreted as the effect of a one unit increase in the Part I crime rate upon annual changes in the amount of per capita dollars allocated for police protection, independent of any trends in prior levels of police expenditure. In eight of the ten cities (all but Indianapolis and Newark) significant positive associations were found between the level of crime and changes in police expenditure. Our analysis indicates that Boston and Philadelphia appear to be the most responsive cities to changes in the crime rate. For example, in Philadelphia a ten unit increase in the Part I crime rate is associated with an increase of $2.21 per capita in police expenditures, net of any trends in prior levels of expenditure. Similarly, an annual increase of ten units in the Part I crime rate in Boston is associated with an additional $1.91 in per capita police expenditures. In Oakland, police expenditures were less responsive to increases in the crime rate. In that city, a ten unit increase in the Part I crime rate is associated with only an additional 31 cents per capita in police expenditures, net any trend in previous per capita police expenditures.

In addition, both Figure 9 and Table 14 suggest both regional and growth/decline distinctions among the ten cities. For example, the three cities with the greatest per capita police expenditures throughout the entire period are older, Northeastern cities (Boston, Newark, and Philadelphia). Of the remaining seven cities, Oakland and Atlanta -- cities that more closely resemble the older, declining cities of the Northeast than the growing central cities of the South and West -- consistently spent more for policing. In short, the neediest cities (Atlanta, Boston, Newark, Oakland, and Philadelphia) exhibit the highest level of per capita police expenditures during the post war era and generally show larger mean annual changes, although in the latter 1970s expenditures in these cities declined or leveled off whereas expenditures in the growth cities (particularly Houston and San Jose) continued to increase substantially.

2. Police Officers. Although there is a relatively strong relationship between police expenditures and police officers, more dollars for policing does not necessarily imply that a city has hired more police officers. However, perhaps the most common local governmental response to the soaring crime rate was the hiring of more police officers. Figure 10 displays the data on the number of police officers per 1,000 population for the ten case study cities for the period 1948-1978. Overall, the figure suggests two quite distinct clusters of cities -- Boston, Newark, and Philadelphia on the one hand and the remaining seven cities on the other. While the data suggest that cities have roughly the same proportion of police officers to population in 1978 as in 1948, there are a few noticeable distinctions. Newark and Philadelphia both substantially increased the size of their police forces when adjusted for population. In Philadelphia police officers per 1,000 population rose from 2.34 in 1948 to 4.72 in 1978. Similarly, police officers per 1,000 population rose from 2.64 to 4.59 between 1948 and 1978 in Newark. The size of the Newark police force increased most rapidly during the period 1972-1974 when Newark was a participant in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's (LEAA) High Impact Anti-Crime Program. However, as Newark's participation in this program came to a close the city was forced to dismiss a number of police officers it had previously hired with federal funds. Overall, the city's police force increased from 1,266 officers in 1972 to 1,603 in 1974 and then declined to 1,453 police officers by 1978. Boston, which had the highest ratio of police officers to population throughout most of the period, illustrates a steady and dramatic decline beginning in 1970 as police officers per 1,000 population dropped from 4.36 in 1970 to 3.31 in 1978, a 24 per cent decline. However, because Boston was also losing population during this period, the actual decline in the size of the city's police force was much greater (over one-quarter) as the number of sworn officers declined from 2,798 in 1970 to 2,102 in 1978.

Atlanta shows a distinct break from the cluster of the other seven cities in 1970 as the proportion of police officers to population steadily increased between 1970 and 1974, a period in which the size of the Atlanta police force increased by more than 600 officers. Much of the growth in the size of the Atlanta Police Department during this period was made possible by the city's selection as one of eight cities to participate in LEAA's High Impact Anti-Crime Program (Jordan and Brown, 1975). Of the 18 million dollars in federal funds received by Atlanta through this program, nearly two-thirds (11.3 million dollars) was allocated to the city's police department where it was used to fund, among a number of other things, several specialized crime prevention units (for example, burglary, robbery, and rape) and to increase preventive patrol manpower in two high crime areas within the city. The subsequent decline in departmental manpower begun in 1974 appears to be the result of two factors: a court case over

hiring practices which froze police hiring for several years and the completion in 1976 of the federally-funded projects and activities. By 1978, the Atlanta police department had 468 fewer police officers than in 1974, which represents nearly a one-third reduction in the size of the Atlanta police force.

Clearly, what we have is a set of cities -- Boston, Newark, and Philadelphia -- which appear to have "labor intensive" police departments. Even when Boston's ratio of police officers to population declined significantly in the latter years, it remained well ahead of the other seven cities in the ratio of officers to people. Toward the end of the period, Atlanta came closer to membership in this list of labor-intensive departments. The three Northeastern cities have lost significant numbers of people over the years, but they have nonetheless managed to maintain relatively high ratios of police officers to population, much higher levels in fact than the more rapidly growing cities in other regions. Our evidence shows that police forces grew with the rise in reported crime.

Examination of the second column of Table 14, which reports the effects of the Part I crime rate on the number of police officers per 1,000 population, shows that this relationship was statistically significant in eight of the ten cities (all but Newark and Philadelphia). In two of the eight cities with significant relationships (Boston and Indianapolis), the association between changes in the crime rate and changes in the number of police officers per 1,000 population was negative. This is the result not only of smaller changes in years in which the crime rate increased but also of an actual decline in the ratio of police officers to population in years in which the crime rate increased. In Indianapolis, for example, the ratio of police officers to population declined in 16 of the 31 years. In Boston, this ratio has declined steadily since 1971. Among the cities with positive associations, Atlanta, Houston, and Minneapolis responded similarly to increases in the crime rate. In each of these three cities each additional 1,000 offenses reported to the police is associated with an increase of more than five additional police officers. A similar increase in Oakland is associated with only one additional police officer.

3. Summary: Police Resources and the Crime Rate. Thus far we have shown that each of the ten cities increased their level of police expenditures, when adjusted for population and inflation, and that nine of the ten cities (all but Indianapolis) reported a mean annual increase in the ratio of police officers to population. Furthermore, when we controlled for the previous level of resource commitment and examined the effect of crime on resource allocation, we generally found that this relationship was both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that cities indeed were responding to increases in the rate of serious crime. The question that

remains, therefore, is how substantial was this response? In other words, have resources kept pace, fallen behind, or actually exceeded the rise in reported crime?

Increases in police resources look quite different when we compare them to the incidence of reported crime. In 1948 there were 3.22 police officers for every violent crime and .11 police officers for every property crime, on the average, among the 396 baseline cities. Thirty-one years later, the number of policemen per violent crime had dropped to .5 and for property crimes to .03. Thus, in relation to the crime problem as measured by recorded offenses, police officers dropped to one-sixth of their 1948 strength for violent crimes and one-quarter for property crimes. Clearly, the rise in the number of police officers did not keep pace with the rise in crime. Similarly, police expenditures also did not keep pace with the rising crime rate. In constant 1967 dollars, police expenditures fell from 15 cents to six cents per violent crime while expenditures per property crimes fell from .6 cents to .4 cents between 1948 and 1978.

Another way of examining whether or not police resources kept pace with crime is to examine the mean annual percentage change, 1948-1978, in the crime rate, standardized per capita police expenditures, and police officers per 1,000 population. Figure 11 presents these data for each of the ten case study cities. The figure highlights a number of important points. First, the figure suggests that the ability of a city's police resources to keep pace with increases in the crime rate is largely a function of the rate of increase of reported crime. Expenditures exceeded the crime rate in cities where the crime rate increased relatively slowly. Thus, in all four of the cities with a mean annual percentage increase in the crime rate of less than five per cent (Indianapolis, Philadelphia, Phoenix, and San Jose) the mean annual percentage change in standardized per capita police expenditures rose faster than crime. Figure 11 clearly illustrates that in every city the crime rate far outpaced the mean annual percentage rate of change in the number of police officers per 1,000 population. In sum, our analysis of police resources indicates that while cities have allocated additional funds for police protection and manpower, these increases have been outpaced by the soaring rate of serious crime.

4. Police Activities and Rising Crime Rates. To impact on crime the resources of departments must be translated into activities. To measure police activities we examined the arrest-offense ratio, arrests per police officer, moving violations per officer, and the police focus on violent, as opposed to property crimes.

Over the time period, there is a small decline in the arrest-offense ratio for all of the ten cities except Oakland, Philadelphia, and Phoenix. Thus in most of our cities, total

arrests increased, but they did not keep up with the rise in offenses.

Over the period of the study, the number of arrests for serious offenses made annually by the average police officer ranged from a high of 15 to a low of less than three arrests, as shown in Figure 12. But there is a great deal of variation from city to city in the number of arrests made by the average officer. In the three "labor intensive departments," Philadelphia, Boston, and Newark, arrests per officer are consistently lower than in the other departments. In Atlanta, the number of arrests per officer dropped sharply. In Table 15, we show the effects of the Part I crime rate on three measures of police activity as estimated by regression equations which hold constant the previous year's level of those activities. Very few of the effects are statistically significant. Where the relationship is statistically significant, the arrest/offense ratio appears to have declined with the rise of crime, but arrests per police officer increased. No statistically significant relationship exists for the crime rate and police focus on violent crimes. This lack of a consistent response to rising crime rates by police activities is not associated with increasing traffic enforcement. Nor did police departments with relatively larger forces arrest more offenders per officer on serious charges than departments with smaller forces.

Our findings on police activities suggest that departments were more successful in winning larger budgets and personnel rosters from city councils than in transforming these resources into changes in the kinds of activities we measured. This may be the consequence of diseconomies of scale and bottlenecks in the law enforcement process. In our opinion, however, it most probably reflects the lack of an effective technology for combatting crime which would permit the police to use their greater resources to better advantage.

5. <u>Expenditures and Personnel for Courts and Corrections</u>. The courts, prosecutorial, and correctional systems of local government could almost be described as a "lost world." Very little systematic information is collected about them, and very little of that is available on a longitudinal basis. We were indeed less successful in obtaining information about them than about the police.

It has become commonplace to argue that courts and prosecutors have consistently been underfunded and understaffed over the post World War II period. The picture commonly painted is that these local criminal justice agencies are beset by severe criminal case backlog in the courts, and by understaffing of local courtrooms and district attorneys' offices. It was this image that we sought to examine as we explored changes in the resources and activities of courts and prosecutors.

There are many constraints on this effort, of course. Data are often fragmentary. Even when available, jurisdictional differences preclude the exact matching of arrests and police activities with courts and prosecutorial trends.

Despite these difficulties, we examined a variety of indicators of resources and activities of these local criminal justice agencies. For the courts, we collected information on the number of felony judges, court support personnel, defendents processed, and cases closed. For prosecutors, we collected information on the number of assistant district attorneys and their salaries. For correctional institutions, we gathered data about expenditures and average daily jail populations.

While stressing the cautions which must be associated with these analyses, we nonetheless found that the resources of these local criminal justice agencies had increased. That the numbers of personnel have gotten larger, of course, is not surprising. More important was to compare these changes to two indicators of demand on the courts and prosecutorial systems. The crime rate is one measure of the work load. Even more significant, though, is the arrest level, because none of these institutions begin their work until an arrest is made. Figure 13 shows the changes in prosecutors, judges, and court support personnel relative to the arrest rate. Despite the widely publicized image of the court and the prosecutorial systems falling farther and farther behind in their work because of lagging resources, the figure shows that actual resource levels typically kept pace with, or even exceeded, crime and arrest rates. On the other hand, the indicator of defendants processed, increased only very slowly in relationship to the crime rate and the arrest rates. Our regression analysis as shown in Table 16 indicate that far less than one defendant was processed for each additional arrest in those cities where we have sufficient data. Of course, not all arrests lead to trial, but this analysis shows that despite increasing resources, courts fell further behind in their work. In other words, each case demanded increasing resources over the years to bring it to conclusion despite the fact that most cases were closed with a dismissal or guilty plea.

Table 17 reports the results of our analysis of the impacts of Part I offenses and arrests on correctional expenditures. All expenditure figures are in constant (1967) dollars. As the table reveals, the impact of both Part I crimes and arrests on probation budgets is positive and statistically significant in a majority of cities for which data are available. For example, an annual increase of 636 additional Part I crimes is associated with an increase of over 600,000 dollars in the probation budget of Atlanta. For Phoenix, an annual increase of 410 additional serious crimes "produced" an additional one million dollars of probation

expenditure. With respect to jail budgets, fewer significant coefficients are observed. While all but one of the coefficients are positive, only two are statistically significant. These occur with respect to the effect of Part I crimes in Boston and Part I arrests in Newark.

How significant we believe the changes that we found are depends on what we compare them to. In per capita terms, resources increased. In comparison to docket backlogs, resources lagged. They contrast in an important way with changes in police resources. Over the 31 year period, police resources fell behind increases in the principal measure of demand, the official crime rate. Over the same period, the resources of courts and prosecutors stayed even with, or actually increased faster than, the demands on them, measured by crime and arrest rates.

F. Changing the Law as a Response to Crime

Changing the law is one of the most direct ways by which governments respond to crime. By making decisions which define criminal behavior and assess punishments, state legislatures and city councils make a variety of instrumental as well as symbolic responses. Policy options which might maximize deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution may be initiated by changing the law.

State and local legislative bodies do not operate in vacuums. Increased legislative activity was related to the place of crime on urban agendas. The selection of particular policy options may be driven by national patterns in the criminal law toward greater specification and differentiation. In addition, court decisions may structure the policies adopted by the legislative bodies. While most of this study focused on the city as the unit of analysis, the study of changes in the law must examine both state and local levels because city police enforce both state law and city ordinances and because city ordinances can operate only in those areas specified by state law. Generally, states have the primary responsibility for defining crimes and setting penalties. Cities, however, can also act independently to elaborate or supplement state authority in particular areas.

Changes in state and local laws were examined in each of the ten cities for offenses involving disorder, morality, and public safety. For eleven such offenses, we traced changes in statutory definitions at the city level for six of the eleven offenses, changes in state definitions were also examined. Our scope measure counts the number of empirically-derived descriptors of the offense which are addressed in the language of the statute or ordinance and thus describes the variety of acts which are defined as offenses. A summary criminalization index assesses the direction and magnitude of the intervening changes. It describes the effect that each definitional change has in making more or fewer behaviors criminal. The penalty severity index indicates whether a penalty change increased or decreased the severity of the punishment which might be imposed. When a law decreased judicial or administrative discretion in sentencing, it was scored as increasing the severity of the law. To show trends in the content of the legal changes, the net effect of each change was added to create a cumulative net criminalization and penalty severity score.

The ten cities of our study varied markedly in the scope of behaviors which were defined as criminal. The initial variation is shown in Table 18 which displays the scope index we constructed for each of the ten cities and nine states in our study. The scope scores among the cities differed much more than among the states, indicating in part the variability in the power of the cities to define offensive behavior. States had more comprehensive criminal codes and made more changes in their provisions than their cities, even for order maintenance offenses which are usually classified as petty.

The complexities of the relationship between city and state are illustrated by gun control legislation. Three cities adopted significant restrictions on the sale and possession of guns. All were located in states with modest state-level control provisions of their own. In two states, Pennsylvania and Arizona, however, the state legislature subsequently revoked local power to regulate guns.

At the state level, the scope of offenses was gradually expanded over the 1948-1978 period. In only one state did the number of acts defined as an offense decrease. But the variability across states in statutes diminished over time, suggesting a national trend toward greater specification of the law.

Across the nine states there was also a trend toward greater criminalization of behavior and increasing severity in the penalty policies as shown in Figure 14. However, magnitude of the trends varied markedly across the states. For several of the states the early 1950s were times of modest increases. Seven of the nine states made major moves to further criminalize certain types of behavior in the late 1960s, the time of rapidly increasing reported rates of crime and increased attention to crime on the political agenda. Another important development at the state level was the reduction of judicial and administrative discretion in sentencing. The introduction of mandatory minimum sentences and, even more, determinate sentencing have resulted in assigning formal sentencing decisions to legislatures rather than to judges, prosecutors, and correctional officials. Between 1976 and 1978, four of the nine states in which half of the cities in our study were located adopted some form of determinate

sentencing; another state adopted such a law in 1979. Here, too, is evidence for some nationalization of governmental responses to crime.

Such changes, however, were not a regular event nor were more minor amendments of criminal statutes frequent. During the whole 31 year period, only Atlanta and Minneapolis adopted more than an average of one change in all the statutes combined per year; Boston passed only seven changes and Indianapolis, eight. On the average, a change in criminal ordinances occurred in these ten cities only once every two years. Although a relatively inexpensive policy choice, code changes often incurred significant political costs. Clearly, in part for political reasons, passing a law was not a major response to crime at the city level.

G. Implications

We are often told by social researchers that appearances are misleading, that things are not what they seem to be. Crime and governmental responses to it are no exception. Our research has shown that if we look at the development of crime over the past generation and the ways in which local governments have sought to cope with it, we find some unexpected features.

Of transcendant importance is our finding that crime has become a national problem. We draw this conclusion not on the basis of the interstate movement of criminals, although there may be some of that. We do not depend on the growth of interstate links between criminals in so-called mafia families, although some of that also occurs. Rather, we have shown that the crime problem has grown more serious in all kinds of communities in the United States over the past generation. Like unemployment, crime affects people living in a particular locale; like higher prices, it is felt at particular locations. But like unemployment and inflation, crime is the result of national forces which are mostly beyond the control of local governments. The growth of crime appears to be the result of fundamental changes in the life styles of Americans. It is the result of the greater affluence of Americans which made more valuable goods available for theft, a condition which was aggravated by the greater propensity of Americans to leave goods unguarded in empty homes and to expose themselves to dangerous situations in travelling around their cities. It is also the consequence of there being a larger pool of potential offenders for reasons that are not well understood by criminologists. The consequence of these developments is that crime has surged everywhere in the United States regardless of local efforts to stem the flood tide. Whether local officials engaged in herculean efforts or none at all, the crime wave affected their community. Indeed, even newspapers have reflected this phenomenon by reporting an increasing number of crimes from other places, so that the reading public has been exposed to more national crime and relatively less local misbehavior.

The rhetoric of law enforcement continues to stress local responsibility. We believe that this misleads both the general public and the policy making community. Our research does not pinpoint policies which might succeed in controlling crime. To some degree, past traditions and structures make some cities relatively safe, but even these are subject to the same pressures that the most dangerous places face. Local efforts cannot change life style trends that are national in scope; indeed, it is unclear whether the national government can alter them. Consequently it is unlikely in our opinion that local law enforcement activities by themselves can succeed in decreasing the growth of crime. If it declines, it will do so as a response to macro level social changes.

Efforts to contain crime have involved greatly increased expenditures and the commitment of more personnel both for the police and for the courts. Police expenditures have grown enormously in constant dollars, that is, they have grown much more than the rate of inflation. The number of police officers per capita has risen more modestly. The number of judges, assistant district attorneys, and court support personnel have also risen. Nevertheless, when we compare these increased outlays with the rise in reported crime, we find that police expenditures and police personnel have fallen behind the reported crime rate. Court outlays have stayed abreast or pulled ahead of the volume of arrests, but court dockets have fallen further behind. Clearly, more has not been enough. Even the period during which federal aid to law enforcement efforts through LEAA grants rose significantly did not fundamentally alter the situation. One plausible explanation of these failures is that the police and courts lack an appropriate technology to transform the additional resources into effective actions. Consequently, the additional resources may have produced little else than extra slack.

We should know from past experience that additional expenditures alone will not reduce reported crime rates. What are needed are fundamental, step-level changes in the ways which Americans cope with crime analogous to the creation of organized police departments in the nineteenth century which for a time stemmed the rise of crime. We do not know what solutions to propose.

It may be tempting for others to suggest in the light of our analysis that an appropriate solution might be a national police force or more intrusive electronic devices to stem the upsurge of crime. No evidence from our studies support either measure. Indeed, it is more likely that in the absence of plausible solutions, the problem will suffer from benign

neglect which may lead people to be more accepting of a relatively high level of crime. Individually, they may also take more precautions with themselves and with their property. It is unlikely, however, that such individual private actions will overcome the national trends which seem to generate crime.

There is also a popular impression that the way in which Americans attack a problem is to throw legislation at it. Our examination of state and local law-making shows that such an assessment is widely off the mark. City councils, and to a lesser degree state legislatures, do not often change the ordinances regulating disorderly or dangerous behavior. Nor can one simply summarize law making activity as being directed to increasing the harshness of criminal sanctions. That has been one ingredient, but at the same time, law makers have also decriminalized certain activities, narrowed the scope of other laws, and reduced the discretion granted court and administrative agencies. The result is a mosaic of activities which give the impression of additional harshness but which do not always move in that direction.

The link between the crime problem and governmental policies -- whether they be expenditures, reorganizations, or different laws -- is the political process. Our analysis indicates that crime has become the most prominent issue in local politics and that it is most salient in cities which are characterized by a pluralistic or bureaucratic political process. However, because of fiscal constraints and because cities know of no certain solutions to the crime problem, the link between city politics and city actions is a weak one. On the basis of what we have learned, we cannot recommend any particular reforms of city government to make cities more effective in combatting street crime.

Our detailed examination of ten cities over 31 years has impressed on us the limitations of our knowledge. We know so little about crime because it is a complex set of phenomena and because our information about it and about the actions of criminal justice agencies remains so rudimentary. Many public agencies kept poor records in the past; few maintain consistent records over a long enough time period to permit careful analysis of their activities and their effect on crime.

If the nation really wants to learn more about how governmental programs affect crime, we must designate some locales as study centers so more information will be systematically and routinely collected from ongoing activities of governmental agencies over the next generation. Such a research program requires great patience. We cannot accelerate social developments as geneticists can speed up their research by using mice or monkeys. It will take almost a generation before the data will prove their worth. Many will call such an idea impractical. However, the "practical" alternative is to continue basing public policy about crime on misleading and

incomplete information.

TABLE 1

NEED SCORES AND NEED RANKINGS, CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OVER 250,000

Rank	City	Need Score[a]	Rank	City	Need Score[a]
1	Newark	1.448	30	Kansas City	0.042
2	New Orleans	1.166	31	Los Angeles	0.017
3	St. Louis	1.022	32	Denver	−0.030
4	Cleveland	0.782	33	Fort Worth	−0.117
5	Birmingham	0.777	34	St. Paul	−0.134
6	Baltimore	0.764	35	Sacramento	−0.142
7	Washington	0.663	36	Portland	−0.160
8	Detroit	0.626	37	Columbus	−0.165
9	Atlanta	0.590	38	Toledo	−0.168
10	Boston	0.556	39	Baton Rouge	−0.178
11	Cincinnati	0.543	40	Long Beach	−0.202
12	Oakland	0.524	41	Seattle	−0.221
13	Chicago	0.521	42	Oklahoma City	−0.242
14	Buffalo	0.513	43	Dallas	−0.249
15	New York	0.507	44	Charlotte	−0.260
16	Philadelphia	0.495	45	Jacksonville	−0.331
17	Louisville	0.485	46	Houston	−0.356
18	Pittsburgh	0.484	47	Wichita	−0.363
19	San Antonio	0.467	48	Albuquerque	−0.365
20	Miami	0.459	49	Omaha	−0.389
21	Norfolk	0.341	50	Austin	−0.399
22	El Paso	0.322	51	Tucson	−0.435
23	Memphis	0.316	52	Honolulu	−0.476
24	Rochester	0.299	53	San Diego	−0.510
25	San Francisco	0.219	54	Tulsa	−0.517
26	Tampa	0.155	55	Nashville-Davidson	−0.556
27	Milwaukee	0.060	56	Phoenix	−0.564
28	Minneapolis	0.059	57	Indianapolis	−0.567
29	Akron	0.048	58	San Jose	−0.892

[a] The average need score for the population of the 483 metropolitan cities included in the needs analysis is zero. Large cities as a group are somewhat needier than average.

Source: Bunce and Glickman (1980: 525)

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TABLE 2

RANKINGS OF GRC CITIES ON CENTRAL CITY HARDSHIP INDEX AND "WORST AMERICAN CITY" INDEX

	Nathan-Adams Ranking of Central City Hardship (55 cities ranked)[a]			Louis Ranking of "Worst American City" (50 cities ranked)		
	City	Rank	Hardship Score	City	Rank	Score
Most Disadvantaged	Newark	1	422	Newark	1	41.6
	Atlanta	7	226	Philadelphia	12	31.0
	Philadelphia	14	205	Atlanta	15	30.0
	Boston	15	198	Boston	17	29.6
	San Jose	18	181	Houston	23	27.4
	Minneapolis	32	131	Oakland	25	25.9
	Indianapolis	36	124	Phoenix	30	23.3
	Houston	46	93	Indianapolis	35	20.6
Least Disadvantaged	Phoenix	47	85	Minneapolis	43	18.8
				San Jose	47	15.6

Sources: Nathan and Adams (1976: 51-52); Louis (1975: 71).

[a] Oakland was not included.

33

TABLE 3

FOSSET-NATHAN URBAN CONDITIONS INDEX

	CITY	1960 SCORE	1970 SCORE
Most Disadvantaged ↑	Boston	201.0	193.2
	Newark	196.3	207.0
	Philadelphia	166.2	168.5
	Minneapolis	144.5	154.7
	Oakland	120.7	106.6
	Atlanta	70.7	67.0
	Houston	40.2	27.7
	San Jose	27.7	13.3
Least Disadvantaged ↓	Phoenix	9.8	18.5

Source: Fossett and Nathan (forthcoming, Table 1). Indianapolis is not included in this ranking.

TABLE 4

RELATION BETWEEN PROPORTION NON-WHITES POPULATION AND VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME RATES 1950 - 1978.

YEAR	%NON-WHITE AND VIOLENT CRIME RATE	%NON-WHITE AND PROPERTY CRIME RATE
1950	.51[**]	.08
1960	.60[**]	.25[**]
1970	.70[**]	.32[**]

[**] $p < .01$

TABLE 5

RELATION BETWEEN CRIME RATES AND PROPORTION OF
POPULATION AGED 15 - 24

ZERO ORDER PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

YEAR	VIOLENT CRIME RATE	PROPERTY CRIME RATE
1950	.13**	−.02
1960	.18**	.15**
1970	.03	.13**

**P < .01

TABLE 6

RELATION BETWEEN PROPORTION POOR AND MEASURE OF INEQUALITY
AND CRIME RATES: ZERO-ORDER PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

	1950	1960	1970
%Poor and Violent Crime	.33	.00	.58
%Poor and Property Crime	−.03	−.03	.35
Income Inequality in 1965 and Violent Crime	Not Available	Not Available	.09
Income Inequality in 1965 and Property Crime	Not Available	Not Available	.17
Change in Income Inequality 1959-69 and Violent crime	Not Available	Not Available	.02
Change in Income Inequality 1959-69 and Property Crime	Not Available	Not Available	.00

TABLE 7

MULTIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (EXCLUDING INEQUALITY)
AND CRIME RATES, 1950-1970, FOR CITIES OVER 50,000 POPULATION
(STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS)

	VIOLENT CRIME RATES			PROPERTY CRIME RATES		
	1950	1960	1970	1950	1960	1970
Population size	.12*	.21**	.14***	NS	NS	NS
Race	.50**	.55**	.72**	.17**	.23**	.38**
Youthful pop.	NS	.09*	NS	NS	NS	.13*
Poverty	NS	NS	NS	-1.6	NS	NS
Constant	.43	.13	1.82	17.79	17.67	37.84
R^2	.27	.41	.50	.02	.08	.12
F	57.15	60.45	114.24	3.69	16.78	15.3
Sig	.000	.000	.000	.026	.000	.000
N	298	364	343	298	364	343

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

38

TABLE 8

MULTIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES (INCLUDING INEQUALITY)
AND CRIME RATES, 1960-1970, FOR CITIES IN SMSA'S
(STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS)

	VIOLENT CRIME RATES		PROPERTY CRIME RATES	
	1960	1970	1960	1970
Population	.19**	.19**	NS	NS
Race	.66**	.72**	.31**	.44**
Youthful Pop	.15**	NS	.14*	.26**
Poverty	NS	NS	NS	NS
Inequality	NS	NS	NS	.19**
Constant	-2.09	-3.69	-7.33	-46.82
R^2	.61	.63	.15	.29
F	58.65	104.49	11.76	24.80
Sig	.000	.000	.000	.000
N	201	185	201	185

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

39

TABLE 9

THE RELATION BETWEEN CHANGE IN DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF CITIES AND CHANGES IN REPORTED CRIME RATES, 1950-1970 (STANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS)

	CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME RATES	CHANGE IN PROPERTY CRIME RATES
Pop Change	NS	-.24**
Race Change	.29**	.21**
Youthful Pop Change	NS	NS
Poverty Change	-.15*	NS
Inequality Change	NS	NS
Constant	8.55	2.98
R^2	.11	.12
F	9.02	16.3
Sig	.000	.000
N	233	233

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

TABLE 10

THE DECLINING VARIABILITY OF CITY CRIME RATES: COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATIONS* 1948-1978 FOR 396 CITIES WITH POPULATIONS EXCEEDING 50,000

	PROPERTY CRIME RATE	VIOLENT CRIME RATE
1948-57	54.2	111.5
1958-67	47.0	100.3
1968-78	36.0	82.5

*Coefficients in table are the mean coefficients for each time period. The number of cities included in the calculation varies each year according to missing data; it ranges for a low of 271 in 1948 to 389 in the late 1970s.

TABLE 11

REGRESSION OF PROPERTY AND VIOLENT CRIME RATES FOR TEN
CITIES WITH HOUSEHOLD ACTIVITY RATIO AND PER CENT HOUSEHOLDS
WITH TV, 1950 - 1977, CORRECTED FOR AUTO CORRELATION

	PROPERTY CRIME RATE		VIOLENT CRIME RATE	
	R^2	DURBAN-WATSON	R^2	DURBAN-WATSON
Phoenix	.84	1.477	.52	1.684
Oakland	.48*	.869*	.88	1.95
San Jose	.52	1.473	.84	1.934
Atlanta	.88	1.565	.54*	1.182*
Indianapolis	.46	1.420	.63	1.780
Boston	.86	1.338	.77*	1.238*
Minneapolis	.82	1.628	.79	1.60
Newark	.66	1.657	.60	1.59
Philadelphia	.87	1.79	.57	1.40
Houston	.95	1.741	.29	1.371

* Unsatisfactory correction for auto-correlation. To be satisfactory
the Durban-Watson statistic should be not less than 1.28 and preferably
exceed 1.57. Correction was accomplished by using estimate of rho for
each variable as outlined by Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 217ff.

TABLE 12

POLITICAL AGENDA ISSUES OVER TIME[a]

ISSUE	1948-62 (n=23)	1962-74 (n=18)	1974-78 (n=13)	1948-78 (n=54)
TRANSPORTATION	3.74	4.00	4.92	4.11
ENERGY	1.13	1.50	3.00	1.70
EMPLOYMENT	3.43	3.61	4.46	3.74
PUBLIC EDUCATION	3.30	3.89	4.31	3.74
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION	2.17	4.28	3.46	3.19
QUALITY OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES	4.61	4.44	5.00	4.65
CIVIL DISORDERS	1.35	4.50	3.00	2.80
BUDGET AND TAX PROBLEMS	4.91	4.78	5.54	5.02
CRIME	3.43	4.78	5.77	4.44
ECONOMY	4.65	5.28	5.38	5.04
RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS	2.65	4.67	5.08	3.91
GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION	3.35	2.44	2.92	2.94
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT	3.43	4.78	4.85	4.22

Key: 1 = not an issue of significance

7 = a very salient issue

[a] Agenda issues appear in the order in which they were presented to the
knowledgeable informants.

TABLE 13

PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN POLITICAL ATTENTIVENESS
TO CRIME AND REPORTED CRIME RATES[a]

	VIOLENT CRIME RATE	PROPERTY CRIME RATE	OVERALL CRIME RATE
CRIME AS A SALIENT ELECTION ISSUE	.34*	.21	.24*
CRIME ON THE POLITICAL AGENDA	.58**	.54**	.56**
CRIME AGENDA DENSITY	.45**	.40**	.42**
VIOLENT CRIME ON THE CRIME AGENDA	.53**	.53**	.55**
PROPERTY CRIME ON THE CRIME AGENDA	.42**	.56**	.56**

[a] The rate of rape is excluded from both the violent and the overall crime rates due to missing data.

n = 54

* p < .05

** p < .01

TABLE 14

THE EFFECT OF PART I CRIME RATE ON STANDARDIZED PER
CAPITA EXPENDITURES, 1948-1978[a]

ATLANTA	.100**
BOSTON	.191**
HOUSTON	.051**
INDIANAPOLIS	.035
MINNEAPOLIS	.046**
NEWARK	.121
OAKLAND	.031**
PHILADELPHIA	.221**
PHOENIX	.078*
SAN JOSE	.060*

* p .05

** p .01

[a] Coefficients reported in the table are unstandardized regression coefficients. They were obtained by regressing standardized per capita police expenditure (time t) on its lagged value (time t-1) and the Part I variable (time t).

TABLE 15

EFFECTS OF PART I CRIME RATE UPON POLICE ACTIVITIES[a]

	ARREST OFFENSE RATIO	ARRESTS PER POLICE OFFICER	FOCUS ON VIOLENT CRIME
ATLANTA (1965-78)	-.0030**	-.048	-.0037
BOSTON (1959-78)	-.0004**	.016**	-.0029
HOUSTON (1966-78)	-.0008	-.024	.0037
INDIANAPOLIS (1960-78)	-.0019*	.041*	-.0031
MINNEAPOLIS (1958-78)	-.0003	.034**	.0010
NEWARK (1958-78)	-.0004*	.010	-.0031
OAKLAND (1969-78)	-.0015	.038	.0018
PHILADELPHIA (1958-78)	.0002	.048**	-.0012
PHOENIX (1958-78)	-.0005**	-.014	.0015
SAN JOSE (1965-78)	-.0018	-.035	-.0154

* p .05
**p .01

[a] Coefficients reported are understandardized regression coefficients. They were obtained by regression police activity variables (time t) on their lagged value (time t-1) and the Part I variable (time t).

TABLE 16

THE EFFECT OF ARRESTS ON COURT OUTPUT INDICATORS

	CASES CLOSED	DEFENDANTS PROCESSED
ATLANTA	.02	.21
BOSTON	-	.16
HOUSTON	-	.16
INDIANAPOLIS	-	-
MINNEAPOLIS	.08*	-
NEWARK	.14*	.14*
OAKLAND	-	-
PHILADELPHIA	.07	-.05
PHOENIX	-	-
SAN JOSE	-	-

[a] Coefficients reported are unstandardized regression coefficients. They were obtained by regressing the court variables (time t) and their lagged value (time t-1) and the Part I variable (time t).

TABLE 17

THE EFFECT OF PART I OFFENSES AND ARRESTS ON
CORRECTIONAL EXPENDITURES, 1948 - 1978 [a]

CITY	PART I OFFENSES PER 1000 POP		PART I ARRESTS	
	PROBATION BUDGET	JAIL BUDGET	PROBATION BUDGET	JAIL BUDGET
ATLANTA	657,262.0 *	--	6846.0 *	--
BOSTON	2,333,946.0	1,629,964.0 *	44,698.0 *	17,785.0
HOUSTON	--	--	--	--
INDIANAPOLIS	152,243.0	--	275.0	--
MINNEAPOLIS	148,607.0	-1881.0	1489.0	2933.0
NEWARK	458,606.0	607,947.0	7928.0	9123.0 *
OAKLAND	4,166,619.0 *	--	--	--
PHILADELPHIA	6,587,623.0 *	670,292.0	12,392.0	37,067.0
PHOENIX	1,374,007.0 *	--	101,796.0 *	--
SAN JOSE	1,051,873.0 *	--	49,449.0 *	--

[a] Coefficients reported in the table are unstandardized regression coeffcients.
They were obtained be regressing the correctional variable (time t) on its
lagged value (time t÷1) and the Part I variable (time t). All expenditure
variables are in real (1967) dollars.

* $p < .05$

TABLE 18

Characteristics of Offenses Specified in City Ordinances and State Codes as Per Cent
of All Characteristics Potentially Mentioned, 1948

	City Ordinances Characteristics Specified			State Codes Characteristics Specified	
	Per Cent	Rank		Per Cent	Rank
Atlanta	58	1	Georgia	71	7
Phoenix	55	2	Arizona	65	9
Minneapolis	39	4	Minnesota	68	8
Houston	39	4	Texas	77	3
Oakland	39	4	California	76	4
San Jose	30	6			
Indianapolis	25	7.5	Indiana	72	6
Newark	25	7.5	New Jersey	85	1
Boston	16	9	Massachusetts	80	2
Philadelphia	3	10	Pennsylvania	75	5

FIGURE 1

A Summary Linkage of Principal Research Questions and Major Data Bases

Research Questions	Data Bases						
	Baseline Data	Statistical Data	Descriptive Data	Newspaper Content Analysis	Knowledgable Interviews	Code and Ordinance Analysis	Urban Profiles
1. In what ways and to what degree did crime rates change over the period?	X	X					
2. How were social and economic changes related to both crime and policy responses?	X	X					X
3. What was the attentiveness to crime and its position on the urban policy agenda?				X	X		X
4. What was the structure of government and the policy-making process and how were they related to policy responses?			X		X		X
5. What were the major policy changes in urban policing?	X	X	X		X		X
6. What were the major policy changes in courts, prosecutional systems, and corrections?		X	X		X		X
7. What were the major legislative policy responses to crime?						X	

FIGURE 2a
MEAN VIOLENT CRIME RATE BY YEAR FOR CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO POPULATION

POPULATION
(in thousands)

— 50-99
-⊞- 100-249
-+- 250-499
-◈- > 500

FIGURE 2b
MEAN PROPERTY CRIME RATE BY YEAR FOR CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO POPULATION

POPULATION
(in thousands)

— 50-99
-⊞- 100-249
-+- 250-499
-◈- > 500

51

FIGURE 3a   MEAN VIOLENT CRIME RATE BY YEAR FOR CITIES
GROUPED ACCORDING TO POPULATION CHANGE 1950-1975

CHANGE
—— Large decline
-⊖- Small decline
-+- Stable
-◇- Small growth
-△- Large growth
-※- Explosive growth

FIGURE 3b   MEAN PROPERTY CRIME RATE BY YEAR FOR CITIES
GROUPED ACCORDING TO POPULATION CHANGE 1950-1975

CHANGE
—— Large decline
-⊖- Small decline
-+- Stable
-◇- Small growth
-△- Large growth
-※- Explosive growth

52

FIGURE 4
STATE-NATIONAL CRIME NEWS

Y-axis: PERCENT OF ALL CRIME INCIDENTS — Reported on Front Page

Values: 100, 80, 60, 40, 20, 0

X-axis: YEAR — 48, 52, 56, 60, 64, 68, 72, 76

FIGURE 5

front page crime news in nine cities

crime news coverage

**31-Year Average Per Cent Crime Stories of All Front Page Stories**

54

FIGURE 6

SALIENT LOCAL ELECTION ISSUES: 1948-1978

NUMBER OF TIMES EACH ISSUE WAS MENTIONED AS A SALIENT ELECTION ISSUE[a]

a For 54 local elections; three possible issues per election.

FIGURE 7

A TYPOLOGY OF POWER AND INFLUENCE [a]

SOURCE OF POWER

		Political	Private
	Few	Political elitist (.01)	Business elitist (.06)
NUMBER EXERCISING POWER	Many	Bureaucratic (.28*)	Pluralistic (.37*)

* $p < .05$

[a] The numbers in parentheses represent zero-order correlation coefficients between the type of power and the salience of crime on the political agenda.

GROWTH IN POLICE EXPENDITURES IN U.S. CITIES

PER CAPITA POLICE EXP IN CONSTANT DOLLARS

Cities By
Population Size
—⊖—50-99 thous
—+—100-249 "
———250-499 "
—×—Over 500 "

57

FIGURE 8b

POLICE OFFICERS PER CAPITA

Cities by
Population Size
-⊖- 50-99 thous
-+-100-249 "
—— 250-499 "
-X- Over 500 "

FIGURE 9.   STAND. PER CAPITA POLICE EXPENDITURES.

LEGEND
⊖ PHOENIX
⊟ OAKLAND
+ SANJOSE
✕ ATLANTA
✳ BOSTON
◆ MINNE.
△ NEWARK
✳ PHILA.
✦ HOUSTON
✦ INDIAN.

FIGURE 10   POLICE OFFICERS PER 1000 POPULATION.

LEGEND
⊖ PHOENIX
⊟ OAKLAND
+ SANJOSE
✕ ATLANTA
✳ BOSTON
◆ MINNE.
△ NEWARK
✳ PHILA.
✦ HOUSTON
✦ INDIAN.

FIGURE 11

Mean Annual Percentage Change in the Crime Rate, Standardized
Per Capita Police Expenditures, and Police Officers per 1000 Population,
1948-1978, By City.

FIGURE 12

ARRESTS PER POLICE OFFICER.

LEGEND
- PHOENIX
- OAKLAND
- SANJOSE
- ATLANTA
- BOSTON
- MINNE.
- NEWARK
- PHILA.
- HOUSTON

FIGURE 13

Annual mean change in arrest rate, assistant prosecutors, court support personnel and felony judges, 1948-1978.

FIGURE 14

## CUMULATIVE NET CHANGE IN CRIMINALIZATION AND PENALTY SEVERITY PER OFFENSE FOR NINE STATES[a]

Cumulative net change in
-criminalization (1948-78): b=.81
-penalty severity (1948-78): b=.52

b = .67

b=.85

STATE CRIMINALIZATION

b = 1.12

b=.33

STATE PENALTY SEVERITY

b=.65

b=.74

UNIT OF CHANGE

26

22

18

14

10

6

2

0

[a]b=slope of
cumulative
net change
line (unstan-
dardized re-
gression co-
efficients)

1948   1961   1971   1978

YEAR

63

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