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
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

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THE URBAN INSTITUTE

Neighborhood Team Policing in
Boulder, Colorado:
A Case Study

by

Thomas W. White
Robert A. Gillice

December 1977

Contract Report 5054-11

NCJRS

JUL 29 1981

ACQUISITIONS

THE URBAN INSTITUTE
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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PREFACE

In 1975, the Office of Technology Transfer (OTT), part of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), awarded grants to six demonstration sites to demonstrate the concept of "full service neighborhood team policing." Generally speaking, this concept involves decentralizing police work to the community level, where groups of 20 to 40 officers become familiar with area residents and handle cases from start to finish. The assumption is that the law enforcement officials can then prevent and control crime better.

The sites LEAA chose for this demonstration were Boulder, Colorado; Elizabeth, New Jersey; Hartford, Connecticut; Multnomah County, Oregon; Santa Ana, California; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

In 1975, The Urban Institute received a grant to evaluate this project. Between the last quarter of 1976 and the third quarter of 1977, the Institute visited the sites several times and evaluated their implementation of team policing.

Eight separate reports document the evaluation. Six are case studies of each site that describe background and setting, planning and implementation of team policing activities, and program results. The seventh report describes how OTT designed and ran the team policing program, and the last report summarizes evaluation findings for all sites.

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The eight Urban Institute reports are:

● White, Thomas W. and Gillice, Robert A. Neighborhood Team Policing in Boulder, Colorado: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-11, December 1977.

● Regan, Katryna J. Neighborhood Team Policing in Elizabeth, New Jersey: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-12, December 1977.

● Bell, James and Horst, Pamela. Neighborhood Team Policing in Multnomah County, Oregon: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-13, December 1977.

● Regan, Katryna J. Neighborhood Team Policing in Hartford, Connecticut: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-14, December 1977.

● Bell, James and Horst, Pamela. Neighborhood Team Policing in Santa Ana, California: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-15, December 1977.

● White, Thomas W. Neighborhood Team Policing in Winston-Salem, North Carolina: A Case Study, Contract Report 5054-16, December 1977.

● White, Thomas W.; Horst, Pamela; Regan, Katryna J.; Bell, James; and Waller, John D. Evaluation of LEAA's Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing Demonstration: A Summary Report, Contract Report 5054-17, December 1977.

● Horst, Pamela. LEAA's Fielding of the Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing Demonstration, Contract Report 5054-09, December 1977.

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Of the six sites participating in the LEAA-sponsored national demonstration of the Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing concept, Boulder has the smallest population, took the shortest planning period and proposed one of the most extensive lists of changes for a team policing program. Near the end of the demonstration in January 1977,[1] Boulder announced that the team policing prescription was "either too strong or the wrong one"[2] for the department, but later continued with a modified form of team policing.

In fact, the central team policing concepts had been largely abandoned some six months earlier. It is important to note, however, that the consensus of the department seems to be that the concepts themselves are sound. They just were not properly implemented in Boulder. Chief Barber, who operationalized team policing, resigned in May 1976. David Voorhis, a five-year member of the Boulder County Sheriff's Department, was appointed chief of police.

The major part of Boulder's р .к to implement team policing originated with either the city-sponsored report by Peter G. Ossorio which was submitted in February 1975 or the so-called "Hill Task Force" which started in March 1973 and worked in Boulder's "Hill" neighborhood.

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1. The grant officially ended March 31, 1977.
2. Moore, Sergeant Gordon C. "Neighborhood Team Policing, A Viewpoint--The Boulder Experience," January 1977.

In the review of the material upon which LEAA designed the FSNTP program, The Urban Institute identified 20 elements which form the FSNTP model.[3] Plans were originally made to implement 19 of the 20 elements.

Chief Barber ordered the patrol division to start operating in a team policing mode in July 1975. The city was divided into a North Team area and a South Team area. The University of Colorado Police Department continued to have jurisdiction over the university campus which is in the center of Boulder.

The element that called for the detectives to be assigned to teams was the only one not implemented. All other elements were either implemented some time during the demonstration period or an attempt was made to implement. By January 1977, the major elements of team policing were still under study by Chief Barber's replacement, Chief David Voorhis, who assumed command in May 1976.

Chief Voorhis returned the patrol division to the previously used watch system and abolished the team policing neighborhood boundary line.

The main outcome objectives listed in Boulder's grant application were:

- to improve community relations
- to increase officer job satisfaction
- to increase Part I arrests
- to decrease Part I Crime
- to decrease citizen fear

Part I Crime decreased by 12 percent (1976 as compared to 1975) and arrests for Part I Crime increased. The changes cannot be attributed to team policing.

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3. See Chapter III.

Boulder police found that the demand for community programs such as crime prevention talks and Operation Identification (ID) was high, but the department did not have enough manpower to meet the operational goals that specified the magnitude of the community relations work.

Police officer job satisfaction probably suffered a net decline. The basic concepts of team policing were accepted by the majority of officers; however, the mode of implementation was generally unpopular. Consequently, job satisfaction did not rise as predicted by team policing theory.

II. THE BOULDER SETTING AND BACKGROUND

A. THE BOULDER SETTING

Boulder, a city of 63,000, is located on the eastern edge of the Rocky Mountains about a thirty-minute drive northwest of Denver. The median income is $15,000 per year. This reflects the presence of the major employers in the area: a large IBM manufacturing facility north of the city; a Rockwell International atomic plant south of the city; and numerous government research facilities within the city including the National Center for Atmospheric Research, units of the National Bureau of Standards, and the University of Colorado. The population is 92.3 percent white with the non-white groups being 4.8 percent chicano, 0.9 percent black and 1.4 percent other.[1] Education level in the adult population is high: 93 percent have completed high school, 36 percent have completed college and 16 percent have two graduate degrees.[2] In 1975, there were 79 UCR Part I crimes per 1,000 population[3] in Boulder which is higher than the national average of 64[4] for cities in the population range of 50,000 to 100,000. Part I Crime dropped 12 percent in 1976 as compared to a 30 percent increase in 1975 and an 11 percent decrease in 1974.

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1. Boulder Department of Human Resources.
2. Urban Institute telephone survey.
3. Assumes 4,992 Part I crimes in 1975 and a population of 63,000 for the city.
4. Crime in the United States, 1975, Uniform Crime Reports. Issued by Clarence M. Kelley, Director, FBI, and released August 26, 1976, p. 160.

B. THREE TEAM AREAS

In 1975 Boulder's population was 63,000 contained within a land area of 12.9 square miles. The city surrounds the University of Colorado, a one-square-mile land area with a maximum campus-based population of 27,000. Because one of the criteria stated by LEAA for selecting demonstration sites was a municipal police department serving a population between 100,000 and 500,000, the City of Boulder Police Department (BPD) and the University of Colorado Police Department (CUPD) prepared a joint grant application that specified a team policing program serving a combined population slightly less than 100,000. Three police teams were formed: North, South and Campus. The "North" and "South" teams were staffed by BPD personnel and serviced the northern and southern halves of the city. The "Campus" team was staffed by CUPD personnel and serviced by the University. The experiences of the Campus team are discussed in Chapter IV.

C. THE OSSORIO REPORT

In 1974, the composition of the Boulder City Council, formerly characterized as having a "conservative" majority, changed to a "liberal" majority. The police department was one city operation that received close scrutiny by the new officials. In October 1974, they commissioned Peter G. Ossorio of the Linguistic Research Institute in Longmont, Colorado, to "provide information which would be of some value to the city and to the police department and its operation."[5] Chief Donald Vendel, described by current

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5. Ossorio, Peter G.; Bush, Earlene; and Lasater, Lane. "Values and Implementations for the Boulder Police Department," Final Report submitted February 17, 1975, p. 1.

Boulder officers as extremely conservative, retired in November after 25 years with the department.

The Ossorio report was submitted to the city in February 1975. At that time, Vendel's replacement had not yet been selected. The report presented the findings from surveys of local citizens and police officers. A list of 51 suggested changes for the Boulder Police Department were offered. The first suggested change was that "at the direction of the chief, the entire departmental structure would be converted to conform to the team policing concept."[6] The Ossorio report suggestions are summarized in Table 1 along with a brief description of the police department response. Some members of the department felt that John Barber, former Chief of Police, University of California at Santa Cruz, was appointed to replace Vendel only after Barber agreed to implement team policing.[7] The text of the Ossorio report's section on team policing is contained in an Appendix in Part IX.

Chief Barber learned of the federal demonstration program for team policing shortly before the deadline for submitting a grant application. Until the first site visit to Boulder in March 1975 by LEAA Washington officials, the city did not know it was being considered as a demonstration site. Five members of the department worked quickly for two weeks and submitted a 151-page grant application on April 15, 1975.

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6. Ossorio, et al., op. cit., p. 37. The full text of the suggestion to implement team policing is contained in Appendix B.
7. Barber was hired in March 1975, one month after the Ossorio report was released.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF OSSORIO REPORT SUGGESTIONS AND POLICE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE

Summary of Ossorio Report Suggestions	Police Department Responses[a]	
	Accepted Yes/No	Comments
1 Establish Team Policing	Yes	Implemented July 1, 1975
2 Experiment in Part of City with Team Policing	No	Team policing citywide
3 Police to Transport Walking Injured to Hospital	No	Insurance and training costs high
4 Police to Enter Public Service Tasks in Log	Yes	Implemented July 1, 1975
5 Create Citizens Policy Advisory Board	No	Decision left to City Council
6 Citizen Complaints Handled by Citizens Board	No	" " "
7 Citizen Complaints on Officers Handled by Citizens Board	No	" " "
8 Apply for LEAA Funds and Start Community Relations Program	Yes	Funds from team policing grant
9a Increase Staff for Training	Yes	Increased from one to three officers[b]
9b Increase Property Personnel	Yes	One officer
9c Increase Secretarial Staff	Yes	Funds from team policing grant
9d Increase Number of Patrol Officers	No	Not needed under team policing[c]
9e Increase Number of Detectives	No	" " "[c]
9f Additional Records Secretary	Yes	Funds from team policing grant[d]
10 Van for Crime Scene Investigation	Yes	Converted from jail van[e]
11 Acquire Crime Scene Investigator	Yes	One officer assigned duty
12 Training Officer to Handle Personnel	Yes	Officer assigned duties
13 Hire Police Attorney	Yes	Promised[e]
14 Get Tape Recorders for Officers	Yes	Purchased March 1975 for detectives.[f]
15 Incentives for Education	Yes	Salary increases for college degree
16 Program for Recruiting at Colleges	No	Chief will handle recruiting
17 City Answers Own Phone Calls	Yes	New switchboard
18 Construct Firing Range	Yes	Will share range with sheriff
19 Establish Hiring Standards	No	
20 Computerize Records	Yes	Consolidated with sheriff's office
21 Establish Traffic Division	Yes	Got grant funds for program
22 Eliminate Dog Control Unit	Yes	Transferred to Humane Society
23 Require Polygraph Test for New Hires	Yes	Effective May 1, 1975
24 Use "911" for Emergency Calls	No	Cost Too High
25 Stricter Enforcement of Bicycle Laws	Yes	Assigned to team policing
26 Eliminate Hill Task Force (Officers)	Yes	Disbanded
27 Allow Officers to Drop "Dead End" Complaints	Yes	Minor incidents require only simple report
28 Create Position of Desk Officer	No	Due to costs, civilian will continue this duty[g]
29 Yearly peer review process	Yes	Under team policing[e]
30 Hire Civilian Administrator	No	Deputy chief will fill role
31 Change Way of Recruiting Captains and Deputy Chiefs	No	Chief will hire
32 Develop Written Evaluation Form for Officers	Yes	To be developed
33 Create Warrant Detail	No	Team policing officer's duty
34 Create Fugitive Detail	No	Already handled by detectives
35 Separate Complaint and Arrest Forms	Yes	Simplified form under study
36 Expand Training	Yes	Funded by team policing grant
37 Make Detective Position Higher, More Rewarding	Yes	Under discussion[e]
38 Put a Lieutenant in Charge of Records	Yes	Has been assigned
39 Develop a Policy Manual for Department	Yes	Committee working
40 Create Research and Development Unit	No	Already part of training unit
41 Reduce Use of Reserve Officers	Yes	Will operate only with regular officers
42 Give Press Greater Access to Records	Yes	Press passes issued
43 Limit Investigative Work		
44 on	Yes	Team policing will follow new procedure
45 Automobile Accidents		
46 Alter Management of Detective Bureau, Do Not Rotate Back to Patrol	Yes	Detailed recommendation followed
47 Alter Management of Patrol Division	Yes	Team policing
48 Establish Procedures for Hiring and Firing	Yes	Wrote new policy manual
49 Representative of DA's Office Assigned to Police	No	Police will handle task
50 Participate in Regional Training Academy	Yes	
51 Create Court Notification Process	Yes	New legal officer[e]

a. Extracted from memorandum dated May 23, 1975, from Police Department to City Manager.
b. Decreased to one sergeant after three months.
c. Decision of chief.
d. Planned, but not implemented. Grant funds covered costs of three team sergeants but not record clerks.
e. Subsequently not implemented.
f. Patrol officers did not get any recorders.
g. Filled by officers during most of grant.

D. PERSONNEL

The Boulder Police Department employed a total of 131 personnel (99 sworn plus 32 non-sworn) in 1976. In January 1976, the Boulder Police moved from a temporary facility to the Criminal Justice Center which contains city police, county sheriff, courtrooms and jail. About 83 percent of $2,175,984, the police budget for FY 1975-1976, was allocated for personnel costs. Per capita expenditures in Boulder for law enforcement were $34.50 per year based on the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 budget which is just about in the middle of the distribution of cities arranged by per capita expenditures shown in Figure 1. Exact yearly budget figures were not readily available; however, the slow growth in personnel between 1974 and 1976 as shown in Table 2 reflects the relative stability of the budget in recent years. Compared to other departments in 1974 and 1975, the growth of the department in Boulder was slightly above average as indicated in Figure 2.

TABLE 2: BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

Year	Total Boulder Police Department Personnel
1974	113
1975	120
1976	131

E. GRANT BUDGET

The $179,000 federal grant to Boulder and the University Police Department for their team policing programs covered an 18-month period. Assuming the Boulder department got two-thirds of the funds, the grant represented less

FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF CITIES ACCORDING TO PER CAPITA
EXPENDITURES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, 1974-1975

FIGURE 2: GROWTH IN NUMBER OF BOULDER POLICE PERSONNEL AS
COMPARED TO GROWTH IN OTHER CITIES, 1974-1975

Source: City Government Finances in 1975, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, No. 4.

than 4 percent of the department's expenses during the grant period. The

budgeted and actual expenditures of grant funds is shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3: TEAM POLICING GRANT FUNDS IN BOULDER
(NORTH, SOUTH AND CAMPUS TEAMS)

ITEM	BUDGETED	EXPENDED as of April 15, 1977
Personnel*	59,219	62,408.11
Operating**	75,012	76,746.47
Travel	15,242	12,450.39
Equipment+	6,140	3,922.87
Professional Services++	23,387	21,645.31
TOTAL	179,000	177,173.15

  * Includes one analyst/evaluator and three clerk typists.
 ** Largely for overtime for officers attending training. Some for
    rental of storefront office.
  + Primarily for office equipment.
 ++ Consultants for training

F. TASK FORCE EXPERIENCE

The team policing grant application authors referred extensively to a

special task force that Chief Vendel formed in March 1973 to combat a serious

crime problem in Boulder's so-called "Hill" area.[8] The Hill is a small area

adjacent to one side of the university campus. It contains small stores

and private housing occupied predominantly by university students. In the

summertime, the Hill area filled with 10,000 to 15,000 transients, many of

whom stayed on through the year. Radical individuals advocating the violent

overthrow of the government also frequented the Hill. There was a heavy

traffic in drugs on the streets in addition to bombing incidents.

8. As evidence of the success of the task force, a 35 percent reduction
in street crime was reported for the first year of the task force's operation.
Street crime was measured by reported cases of assault, robbery and burglary.

The task force differed from the grant period teams in many aspects such as personnel turnover, services provided, and dress. The task force had nine positions which were filled with specially selected officers; however, only after considerable turnover did a smoothly working team develop. Team policing teams had 25 to 30 positions and, since all patrol officers were assigned to one team or another, there were limited options for special selection of team members. During the demonstration period, there was no turnover on the teams except when vacancies were filled with new hires. Task force officers were not permitted to answer any routine calls so that they could concentrate on regular community meetings, burglary prevention, and foot patrol in one neighborhood. The two team policing units answered all the routine calls and were also expected to conduct community meetings, crime prevention programs and patrol on foot. The task force officers wore standard uniforms with the exception of a pocket patch identifying them as task force personnel. Team policing officers wore standard uniforms. The task force used saturation patrol against specified crimes while the regular officers would patrol the area. Saturation areas could be changed from day to day.

G. PLANNING PERIOD ELIMINATED

The Ossorio report suggested that the city be divided into four areas for team policing and that one area--preferably the downtown business section--be used as an experimental neighborhood for team policing, while the remainder of the city would operate in the traditional mode. The grant application specified that the city would be divided into a northern half and

a southern half with one team assigned to each after a six-month period for planning and training between July 1975 and December 1975. Contrary to the plans presented both in the Ossorio report and the grant application, Chief Barber announced that team policing would be implemented July 1, 1975; hence the planning period was completely eliminated. In preparation during June 1975, 42 designated team members each attended one of two team policing orientation sessions (June 9 or 12) lasting 1-1/2 to 2 hours. The objectives, pitfalls and benefits of team policing were discussed and a videotaped presentation by Chief Barber was run. In June, trainers from the Public Safety Research Institute, St. Petersburg, Florida, gave a 3-day orientation to ten team members. On June 25-27, organizational development sessions were held for midmanagement. The dispatchers were briefed on methods for stacking calls for service on a priority basis and the need for confining team assignments to team areas.

H. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

1. SUMMARY

Prior to July 1975, the Boulder police were organized along a traditional design. Under a patrol captain, there were three shifts, each with one lieutenant, one sergeant and the patrol officers. Under team policing numerous organizational changes were made. In general, a patrol captain commanded two teams and a traffic unit, each of which was headed by a lieutenant. The teams were divided into three shifts. A pre- and a typical post-team policing organization chart are contained in Figure 3, which reflects the following changes:

BOULDER ORGANIZATION PRE-TEAM POLICING

```
                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │    Chief     │
                          │ Deputy Chief │
                          └──────────────┘
         ┌───────────────────────┼────────────────────────┐
 ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
 │   Captain    │        │   Captain    │        │     Captain      │
 │   Records    │        │    Patrol    │        │  Investigations  │
 └──────────────┘        └──────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
         │                      │  ┌────────────┐           │  ┌────────────┐
         │                      ├──┤  Property  │           ├──┤  Juvenile  │
         │         ┌────────────┼────────────┐  └──────┘    │  └────────────┘
 ┌──────────────┐  │            │            │              ├──┤ Narcotics  │
 │    Clerks    │┌────────────┐┌────────────┐┌────────────┐ │  └────────────┘
 │    Lab       ││ Lieutenant ││ Lieutenant ││ Lieutenant │ │
 │    Radio     ││ 1st Shift  ││ 2d Shift   ││ 3d Shift   │ │
 └──────────────┘└────────────┘└────────────┘└────────────┘ │
                 ┌────────────┐┌────────────┐┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
                 │  Sergeant  ││  Sergeant  ││  Sergeant  │ │  Lieutenant  │
                 │  Patrolmen ││  Patrolmen ││  Patrolmen │ │  Sergeant    │
                 └────────────┘└────────────┘└────────────┘ │  Detectives  │
                                                            └──────────────┘
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
TYPICAL

BOULDER ORGANIZATION UNDER
TEAM POLICING

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
RADIO
(Separate From Department)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │    Chief     │
                          │ Deputy Chief │
                          └──────────────┘
         ┌───────────────────────┼────────────────────────┐
 ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
 │   Captain    │        │   Captain    │        │     Captain      │
 │Staff Services│        │    Patrol    │        │  Investigations  │
 └──────────────┘        └──────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
         │         ┌──────────┬──────────┐            ┌──────────┬──────────┐
 ┌──────────────┐┌──────────┐┌──────────┐┌──────────┐┌─────────┐┌─────────┐
 │   Records    ││Lieutenant││Lieutenant││Lieutenant││   Lt.   ││   Lt.   │
 │   Training   │└──────────┘└──────────┘└──────────┘│   Sgt.  ││   Sgt.  │
 │   Property   │┌──────────┐┌──────────┐┌──────────┐│ Detec-  ││ Detec-  │
 │   Lab        ││North Team││South Team││ Traffic  ││ tives   ││ tives   │
 │   Juvenile   ││          ││          │└──────────┘│         ││         │
 └──────────────┘│1st Shift ││1st Shift │┌──────────┐│PROPERTY ││PERSONS  │
                 │2d  Shift ││2d  Shift ││  Crime   │└─────────┘└─────────┘
                 │3d  Shift ││3d  Shift ││Prevention│
                 └──────────┘└──────────┘└──────────┘
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
FIGURE 3: COMPARISON OF BOULDER ORGANIZATION CHARTS BEFORE AND AFTER
TEAM POLICING WAS IMPLEMENTED

BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT

PRE-TEAM POLICING ORGANIZATION

FIGURE 4: ORGANIZATION CHART #1, PRE-TEAM POLICING

16

- The patrol officers were moved from a citywide, three-shift organization into two teams, each with three shifts. Each team covered its half of the city.

- A separate traffic unit and a crime prevention unit were added to the patrol division.

- The radio dispatch unit was taken out of the Boulder Police Department, and is now part of a combined city-county dispatch center.

- The juvenile unit moved from "investigations" to "staff services."

In addition, the detective bureau increased from 14 personnel (pre-team policing) to 21 (with team policing).

2.   CHRONOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The organization charts illustrate the numerous changes in the management during the grant. The frequency of these organization changes hindered implementation of neighborhood team policing.

a.   THE PRE-TEAM POLICING PERIOD

The pre-team policing organization chart is shown in Figure 4 as Organization Chart #1. Prior to team policing, the department organized in the traditional separation of patrol and investigative functions. The patrol division was divided along a traditional time sequence of three shifts, each shift managed by a lieutenant or shift commander.

At this time, the department had divided the city into 13 geographical districts, but officers were not permanently assigned to districts.

b.   THE FIRST ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The first team policing organization, in effect July 1975 through September 1975, is shown in Figure 5. The city was divided into three

CHIEF OF
POLICE

ASSISTANT CHIEF
OF POLICE

CAPTAIN
STAFF SERVICES

CAPTAIN
PATROL

CAPTAIN
INVESTIGATION

LT.
RECORDS

LT.
TRAINING

LT.
TEAM A
Sgts. (4)
Officers
(25)

ADMINIS-
TRATIVE
LT.

LT.
INVESTI-
GATION

LT.
CRIME
PREVENTION

RECORDS

TRAINING

SPECIAL
UNIT

RESERVES

SGT.
PERSONS

SGT.
NARC/VICE

PROPERTY
EVIDENCE

PLANNING

LT.
TEAM B
Sgts. (4)
Officers
(25)

Analyst
Evaluation

SGT.
PROPERTY

SGT.
JUVENILE

CRIME
LAB

RESEARCH

FIGURE 5:   ORGANIZATION CHART #2,   JULY 1975 TO SEPTEMBER 1975

17

geographical areas: Team A, Team B and Team C. [Team C was the University of Colorado Police Department which is not shown in the organizational charts.]

Team leaders of Teams A and B answered directly to the Captain of Patrol, who was also the Project Director for team policing. Team leaders had 24-hour responsibility for their geographical areas.

At this time, all investigative functions were under the authority of the Captain of Investigations. The Administrative Lieutenant's position was not filled. Had it been filled, it may have alleviated a number of coordinative problems between the two teams.

The special unit which was "ghosted" from Team A was in reality the Narcotics/Vice Unit delineated in investigations under the authority of the Crime Prevention Lieutenant. The unit was intended to offer special resources and manpower to the teams for either operational or training needs.

Note that this general organizational development was instituted in July 1975 at the time when, according to the grant guidelines, the department was to have maintained a traditional structure in order to accomplish the planning and training necessary to implement team policing on the target date of January 1, 1976.

Even though the investigative aspects remained separate from the teams, the allocation and deployment of manpower along team policing lines at this time required that the Project Director (captain of patrol) and the Team Leaders (lieutenants) not only deal with the operational problems of such an organizational construct, but also attempt to provide training and planning at the same time.

Planning, training and research located under the Lieutenant of Training had no personnel.

c. CHANGES IN THE FALL OF 1975

Organization Chart #3 is shown in Figure 6 which depicts the department from October 1975 through November 1975.

The patrol or team function was placed under the control of two captains. Each captain was in control of not only his respective team, but also of a specialized unit.

One captain supervised the lieutenant of the North Team (formerly Team A) and the Special Traffic Enforcement Program (STEP). STEP was a unit born out of a grant which mandated a specialized unit whose function was to emphasize target driving offenders such as the drunk driver. This specialized unit came about at the time when much discussion, planning and training revolved around the generalist concept and the need for de-specialization. The institution of this specific program did much to add to the confusion of mid-level management and line officers in the department and brought about concerns as to departmental commitment to team policing. The Captain of Patrol-North was also Project Director for team policing. However, his functional authority extended to only half of the division.

The captain in charge of the South Team (formerly Team B) also was in charge of the Mobile Resource Team (MRT). The MRT was to function as a group of officers and detectives who could provide specialized resources to the teams in the areas of narcotics and surveillance, as well as provide uniformed patrol personnel to the teams so that each team could, as a team, move into training and organizational development.

The necessity of the MRT was mandated by the fact that team policing implementation was effective July 1975 and that the department had not provided adequate team policing training.

FIGURE 6: ORGANIZATION CHART #3, October 1975 to November 1975

The MRT was nominally under the supervision and command of the Captain of Patrol-South. Yet the MRT continued to function in an investigative mode for the majority of the time. The MRT was yet, by MRT preference and training, a unit of the investigative division. The MRT had two supervisors; the Captain of Patrol-South for those functions falling under patrol, and the Captain of Investigation for those functions which fell under investigative/vice/narcotics areas.

A Juvenile Specialist was assigned to each team during this time. The Juvenile Specialists had geographical limitations similar to those of each team. The Juvenile Specialists were intended to act as resource and training officers for each of their respective teams. However, the training mode was not implemented due to operational requirements and caseloads. The Juvenile Specialists, like the MRT, experienced two lines of supervision: one through the team leaders and the other through the investigative division. Both of these lines of supervision were nominal, however, and the Juvenile Specialists functioned primarily on their own.

At this point, all investigations (either initial or follow-up) were being handled by specialists located in the teams (Juvenile Specialists, etc.) or located in the investigative division.

d.   FINAL CHANGES IN 1975

The structure during December 1975 is shown by Organization Chart #4 in Figure 7. During this month the department moved back to one Captain of Patrol. This position also carried with it the title of Project Director.

The Traffic Lieutenant was in charge of the STEP program and parking enforcement. Note that the Special Unit (formerly the Mobile Resource Team) was moved under the investigation captain.

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                               │ OF POLICE    │
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│    CAPTAIN     │            │   CAPTAIN    │ │ Analyst  │    │   CAPTAIN     │
│ STAFF SERVICES │            │   PATROL     │ │Evaluation│    │ INVESTIGATION │
└───────┬────────┘            └─────────┬────┘ └──────────┘    └────────┬──────┘
    ┌───┴─────┐            ┌────────┬───┴────────┐          ┌────────────┴──────┐
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│ LT.   │ │ LT.    │  │ LT.    │ │RESERVES│ │ LT.   │  │ LT.    │      │ LT.      │
│RECORDS│ │TRAINING│  │ NORTH  │ │      │ │TRAFFIC │  │INVESTI-│      │SPECIAL   │
│ Sgt.  │ │ Sgt:   │  │ TEAM   │ └──────┘ │ Sgt.   │  │GATION  │      │UNIT      │
└───┬───┘ └───┬────┘  │Sgts. (4)│         └────────┘  └───┬────┘      │Sgt.      │
    │         │       │Officers │                         │           └──────────┘
┌───┴────┐┌───┴────┐  │ (25)    │              PART I CRIMES
│TRAINING││RECORDS │  └────┬────┘                     ┌────┴───┐
└────────┘└────────┘  ┌────┴────┐                     │PERSONS │
                      │JUVENILE │                     │Sgt.    │
┌────────┐┌────────┐  └─────────┘                     └────────┘
│PLANNING││ CRIME  │  ┌─────────┐
└────────┘│ LAB    │  │ LT.     │
          └────────┘  │ SOUTH   │                     ┌────────┐
┌────────┐┌────────┐  │ TEAM    │                     │PROPERTY│
│RESEARCH││PROPERTY│  │Sgts. (4)│                     │Sgt.    │
└────────┘│EVIDENCE│  │Officers │                     └────────┘
          └────────┘  │ (25)    │
          ┌────────┐  └────┬────┘
          │INTERNAL│  ┌────┴────┐
          │AFFAIRS │  │JUVENILE │
          └────────┘  └─────────┘
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FIGURE 7:   ORGANIZATION CHART #4, DECEMBER 1975

22

During the latter part of November 1975, personnel of the MRT were permanently assigned to the investigative division, thereby increasing the personnel size of the investigative division by some eight officers and one supervisor. This change occurred at a time when the department should have been preparing to deplete the personnel strength of the investigative division in anticipation of the teams incorporating some investigative functions within the scope of team duties.

At this time, there was a sergeant in charge of training. The sergeant was also the nominal supervisor of the Juvenile Specialists who were, on paper, assigned to the teams.

e.   ORGANIZATION DURING FIRST THREE
     QUARTERS OF 1976

From January 1976 until September 1976, the department operated under Organization Chart #5 shown in Figure 8.

During this phase of team policing, the Juvenile Specialists were moved to Staff Services Division under the command of the Juvenile Sergeant (who at this time also functioned as the Training Sergeant).

A Crime Prevention and Analysis Unit (CPAU) was formed in February 1976 to serve as resource to both teams. The CPAU functioned as a resource and coordinative unit to the teams. As delineated in Organization Chart #6, Figure 9, personnel assigned to the CPAU consisted of:

- Crime Prevention Coordinator (CPC)
- Crime Analyst
- Two Crime Scene Investigators (CSIs)

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                          │    POLICE    │
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                          │ DEPUTY CHIEF │
                          │  OF POLICE   │
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CHIEF OF POLICE

DEPUTY CHIEF OF POLICE

CAPTAIN STAFF SERVICES

CAPTAIN PATROL

CAPTAIN INVESTIGATION

LT. RECORDS

SGT. JUVENILE

LT. TRAINING

LT. NORTH TEAM Sgt.

LT. CRIME PREVENTION

LT. TRAFFIC Sgt.

LT. PERSONS Sgt.

LT. PROPERTY Sgt.

TRAINING

PLANNING

RESEARCH

RECORDS

CRIME PHOTO

PROPERTY EVIDENCE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

LT. SOUTH TEAM Sgt.

FIGURE 8:   ORGANIZATION CHART #5,   JANUARY 1976 TO SEPTEMBER 1976

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                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │              │
                    │   CAPTAIN    │
                    │              │
                    └──────┬───────┘
           ┌───────────────┼───────────────┐
    ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
    │ NORTH TEAM   │ │    CRIME     │ │ SOUTH TEAM   │
    │──────────────│ │   ANALYSIS   │ │──────────────│
    │              │ └──────────────┘ │              │
    │ Lieutenant   │  ◁ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ▷   │ Lieutenant   │
    │              │                  │              │
    │ Sergeants    │                  │ Sergeants    │
    │              │                  │              │
    │ Officers     │                  │ Officers     │
    │         CSI  │                  │         CSI  │
    │         CPO  │                  │         CPO  │
    └──────────────┘                  └──────────────┘
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FIGURE 9:   ORGANIZATION CHART #6, FEBRUARY 1976

The CPC functioned as a channel for all community and neighborhood crime prevention programs and presentations and coordinated community crime prevention efforts for the department and specifically for the teams.

The Crime Analyst provided crime analysis and statistical data to the teams to insure deployment and allocation of officers on a demand/need basis.

The CSIs functioned to provide expertise and training to team members in the area of crime scene, initial investigation and followup investigation of residential burglaries. In Feburary 1976, teams became responsible for investigation of all residential burglaries. Through September 1976, the CSIs continued to provide this expertise to their respective teams. However, the training aspect of the CSI function was never fully implemented despite training classes and changes in departmental procedures. The CSIs continued to provide the bulk of the investigation, rather than the team members. It was hoped that, over time, team members would pick up the investigative aspects of this crime category and eventually replace the CSIs.

A possible reason for the lack of team member response to CSI attempts to involve them in crime scene investigations may be the fact that officers often did not take such changes seriously especially in light of the numerous changes which had occurred previously for short durations of time.

f. CHIEF VOORHIS' FIRST CHANGES

In September 1976, the new Chief Executive determined that the team concept as envisioned by the Boulder Police Department was unwieldly, unstable, lacking in communications, and failing to provide the basic law enforcement functions for which it was instituted. Accordingly, the CSIs' functions were

relegated to the investigative division—as the CSIs had functioned as team investigators despite their efforts to train officers in the use of investigative techniques.

The communications difficulties encompassed in the team leader approach were mitigated by instituting a more traditional organization based on time with a commander of each shift responsible for that shift.

Specific geographical assignments continued to be utilized based on crime analysis of need/demand, although the line dividing the North and South Teams became less of a "brick wall" than previously and team members were allowed to cross the team boundary lines.

g. POST-GRANT CHANGES

Organization Chart #7, shown in Figure 10, depicts the department as of April 4, 1977 after the team policing grant.

With the exception of a four-person Major Crime Squad, all detectives were placed within the Patrol Division under the operational command of the Shift Supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants). The detectives continue to function as the primary investigative resource to the patrol officers. It is anticipated that the placement of the investigators directly with the patrol officers will facilitate the flow of information and will illuminate to a large degree the traditional lack of communication between patrol officers and detectives.

Each shift is divided into two "work groups" composed of patrol officers, detectives and a supervisor. The "work group" will maintain the same working schedule (days off, times of shift) to allow the "work group" to function as a working team. All officers and investigators will be on duty on Wednesdays. This will allow the department to conduct training, organization development

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                          │    CHIEF     │
                          │  OF POLICE   │
                          └──────────────┘
               ┌──────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐
               │  INSPECTOR   │    │    D.A.      │
               │              │    │  LIAISON     │
               └──────────────┘    └──────────────┘
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| CAPTAIN SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION — Bookkeeper | CAPTAIN OPERATIONS — Admin. Sgt., C.P.C., 1 Sec., 2 Clerks | CAPTAIN COMMUNICATIONS — Lieutenant |

| LT. RECORDS | SGT. TRAINING | LT. FORENSIC EVIDENCE PROPERTY | SGT. STAFF INSPECTIONS BUREAU Officers(2) |

LT. SHIFT 1	SGT.	2 Det., 6 Officers
	SGT.	2 Det., 5 Officers
LT. SHIFT 2	SGT.	1 Det., 4 Officers
	SGT.	1 Det., 5 Officers
LT. SHIFT 3	SGT.	2 Det., 5 Officers
	SGT.	2 Det., 5 Officers
LT. SHIFT 4	SGT.	7 Officers
	SGT.	7 Officers

RESERVE POLICE — Chief Corrie

LT. MAJOR CASE SQUAD — Sgt. (1), Det. (4), Officer (1)

CRIME ANALYSIS

RADIO

RECORDS Clerks (8)

COMPUTER DESK Officers (3)

FIGURE 10: ORGANIZATION CHART #7, APRIL 1977

training, patrol meetings, and formalized information processing meetings be-
tween investigators and officers of other shifts.

The "work group" or team is defined by time rather than geography. This
is not to say that geographical boundaries will not be instituted in the fu-
ture. The Boulder Police Department is experimenting with the Patrol Car Al-
location Model utilizing geographical boundaries determined by the Hypercube
Simulation Model.

As envisioned, this particular organizational deployment is closely
aligned to neighborhood team policing concepts as implemented in Multnomah
County, Oregon; Winston-Salem, North Carolina; and Hartford, Connecticut.
Additionally, the investigators of each shift will handle all investigations
of the department, save those assigned to the four-member Major Case Squad.

The Major Case Squad related directly to the concepts delineated in the
Rand Corporation Report: The Criminal Investigation Process, Volume 1:
Summary and Policy Implications. Cases will be assigned to the Major Case
Squad on the basis of their severity and/or complications. The Major Case
Squad will investigate as a team rather than as individuals who are assigned
a crime category. Members of the Major Case Squad will be cross-trained to
insure that all members have the necessary training and expertise to carry
out investigations of any major crime.

A captain has been assigned to the District Attorney's Office to coordi-
nate case preparation and investigation, and act as liaison between the Police
Department and the District Attorney's Office. This comes as a result of a
perceived need to increase the quality of investigations for prosecution and
as a result of findings and recommendations contained in the Rand report.

With the exception of the latest changes (Organization Chart #7), the brief organizational history depicted above indicates the lack of organizational stability. Further it indicates the numerous different and often mutually exclusive sets of direction taken by the department.

h. DISCUSSION OF THE IMPACT OF
    ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

Specifically, for the time span July 1975 to September 1976, the previous historical perspective emphasizes points brought out in team policing literature and expressed by department personnel:

(1) Commitment of Chief Executive to team policing:

--From July 1975 to September 1976, with the exception of the CSI program, all changes within the department were mandated by Chief Barber. The Project Director and the team leaders often objected.

--All levels of the organization soon began to question the commitment of the Chief. Many of the changes had a debilitating effect on team leaders, sergeants and team members in that they visualized their efforts towards team policing implementation as being counterproductive to the changes mandated at the top.

--A crisis of confidence soon developed whereby all changes were viewed as paper changes only.

(2) Autonomy/Authority of Team Leaders.

--Team leaders found that their authority was not commensurate with their responsibility. To a large extent, the team leaders had little control over the functions, deployment, and programs of their teams, due to on-going changes mandated by the previous Chief.

--Compounding this problem was the fact that the previous project director was virtually "hamstrung" in determining the direction which the department should take.

(3) Autonomy/Authority of the Previous Project Director and Placement of That Function Within the Hierarchical Structure of the Department.

--The previous project director was placed in a position of having to countermand grant budgetary decisions made by the Chief Executive which did not meet grant guidelines.

(4) Planning for Change.

--The department, by implementing immediately, and by its constant changes, could not effectively plan for change.

--It became apparent, due to the number and nature of changes, that any planning was subject to changes in priorities.

(5) Training for Implementation.

--The lack of a full-time Training Coordinator, as well as the double-duty required of Training personnel to function in other areas, obviated effective training.

--By implementing immediately, the ability of personnel to train team members was diminished due to operational requirements inherent in any large scale change of operational methods and deployment.

--The frequency and type of organizational change made it difficult to determine what type of training was needed, especially if the requirements for training were to change at frequent intervals.

The Boulder Police Department is now beginning to implement several elements of their version of team policing, but it has required a new Chief, extensive changes of personnel and a planning period of approximately six months (from September 1976 to April 1977) to bring this change about.

The changes have been made in consultation with all personnel. Extensive "off-site" meetings were held to determine the optimal method of work schedules, shift assignments, personnel allocation and deployment at all levels of the organization, and revised duties and responsibilities.

I. TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS

The Urban Institute identified 20 elements associated with the various versions of team policing. These elements were extracted from the literature on team policing cited by LEAA's Office of Technology Transfer. (See Part II

for details.) Boulder planned to implement 19 out of the 20 elements; the only element not planned was the assignment of detectives to teams. At least nine of the elements had been suggested in the Ossorio report and the department had some operational experience with at least eight elements from the Hill Task Force. Despite this prior experience, the decision to implement team policing required extensive changes within the department.

The following sections discuss the elements of team policing, how they were incorporated into the implementation and operation of Boulder's team policing program, and what outcomes were observed. A short summary of data availability and use is presented to provide an overview of the primary data sources used in the analysis of Boulder's program.

J. DATA AVAILABILITY

The objective of this evaluation was to address two major types of questions:

- What was implemented?

- What was the outcome?

A summary of the primary data sources—excluding interviews with department personnel—is shown in Table 4. The data collection suffered from one serious constraint: Team policing was implemented in Boulder three months before the evaluation grant was received by The Urban Institute and before the first survey of officers and a survey of citizens could be administered. Data on the conditions prior to team policing were therefore limited.

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES--BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT

Type of Data	Desired Use	How Used In Evaluation?
Telephone Survey of Citizens (by The Urban Institute)	Original design called for a comparison of pre- versus post-survey results to measure changes in citizen attitudes, etc.	First wave (N=100) administered Jan. 1976 (six months after start of team policing implementation). No second wave.
Patrol Officer Survey (By The Urban Institute)	Original design called for comparison of pre- versus post-survey results to measure changes in job satisfaction, etc.	First wave (N=42) administered Jan. 1976 (six months after start of team policing implementation). No second wave.
Officers Logs	To ascertain changes in mix of tasks performed during an officer's working hours	Reporting system changed in fall 1976. Old reports judged unreliable.
Department Budget	To measure changes in overall budget under team policing	Budgets for previous years (pre-1975-1976) not readily available. Use number of personnel as proxy for budget.
Organization and Personnel	To ascertain changes in department structure and strength	Used as planned.
Quarterly Progress Reports	• To document grant expenditures by type • To ascertain progress on reaching locally formulated goals	Quarterly reports proved to be an excellent data source.
Grant Application	Source for plans for implementing team policing elements and statement of locally formulated goals	Grant application thoroughly covered plans and goals.
Ossorio Report	• Documented source for city push for police department change • Citizen survey • Police department personnel survey	Ossorio report proved valuable source for conditions prior to team policing.
Notebook of Local Evaluator (Robert Gillice)	Serendipitous	Gillice kept a notebook in which he put numerous scraps of data he gathered. Much of the data were used in this report.
UCR Crime and Arrest Statistics	To ascertain changes over time	Only aggregate figures used.

Outcome questions were addressed primarily by using results from:

- survey of citizens (both by the Ossorio group in 1974 and The Urban Institute in 1976); and

- UCR crime and arrest statistics.

Implementation questions were addressed primarily by using data

extracted from:

- the patrol officer survey conducted in 1976 and the department survey conducted by the Ossorio group in 1974;

- department budgets;

- records of organizational structure and personnel assignments;

- officer logs;

- quarterly progress reports;

- the Ossorio report;

- the grant application; and

- the notebook of miscellaneous data and mini-studies compiled by the local evaluator (Robert Gillice).

In addition to the sources listed above, extensive interviews were conducted

with personnel from the Boulder and the Campus Police Departments.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS
IN NORTH AND SOUTH TEAMS

A. SUMMARY OF ELEMENTS

Twenty elements identified by The Urban Institute in a review of the

team policing literature are used to describe team policing aspects planned

and implemented in Boulder. These 20 elements are listed in Table 5 along

with a brief answer to each of the following questions.

- <u>Was the element operational prior to the team policing grant application?</u> This gives a measure of how many team policing concepts were already in operation prior to the demonstration period. In Boulder, the task force provided experience in a number of the twenty elements.

- <u>Was there a plan to implement the element during the demonstration period?</u> This question prompts a measure of what the federal officials considered adequate intent compliance with the "full-service team policing" concepts. Boulder's plans called for implementation of 19 out of the 20 elements.

- <u>What was the source of the plan?</u> This provides an indication of whether the federal demonstration program was responsible for the plan or the local police officials had a plan to adopt the element prior to the discussions with LEAA about the team policing demonstration program. In addition to the Ossorio report's general recommendation to implement team policing, the report contains recommendations to implement 9 of the 20 elements. Plans for the remaining eleven elements were contained in the grant application which filled in many details not contained in the Ossorio report.

- <u>Was the element implemented during the demonstration period?</u> Of the 19 elements planned for implementation, Boulder is known to have either implemented or attempted to implement 17 elements. Some elements required subjective judgment to decide whether or not the element had been implemented, especially those elements for which the team policing theory does not clearly define what constitutes implementation.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS

Element No. in Federal Model	Description of Elements In Federal or Local Team Policing Model	Was The Element Operational Prior To Team Policing Grant Application?	Was There A Plan to Implement The Element During The Demonstration Period?	What Was The Source Of The Plan?	Was The Element Implemented During The Demonstration Period?	What Are Plans For Post Grant Use Of Element?	Comments
1	Define Neighborhood Boundaries for Team Areas	Yes--Only For Task Force	Yes	Ossorio Report	Yes	Discontinued	Entire city covered by two teams.
2	Establish Teams of 20 to 40 Personnel	No	Yes (2 teams of 30 each)	Grant Application	Yes	Discontinued	
3	Teams Deliver Services in Neighborhood Only	-NA-	Yes	Grant Application	Yes	Discontinued	Restriction believed to have increased response time to calls for service.
4	Training for Team Policing	No	Yes	Ossorio Report	Yes	Continued	Originally scheduled amount judged insufficient.
5	Assign Detectives to Teams	-NA-	No	-NA-	No	Implemented	Detective unit was increased during grant, decentralized after #1.
6	Detectives Train Team Officers	No	Yes	Ossorio Report	Yes	Discontinued	Training for Patrol Officers to investigate residential burglaries.
7	Team Officers Conduct A Degree of Investigation	No	Yes	Ossorio Report	No	None	Team officers refused to do followup investigations, felt detectives had more time.
8	Make Linkages With Social Services	Not Determined	Yes	Grant Application	Yes	Continued	New referral book prepared.
9	Make Systematic Referrals	Yes	Yes (increase referrals)	Grant Application	Yes	Continued	
10	Emphasize Service Activities	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes (increase emphasis)	Ossorio Report	Yes	Continued	Strong emphasis on Operation Identification and community meetings.

36

TABLE 5 CONTINUED: SUMMARY OF BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING ELEMENTS

Element No. in Federal Model	Description of Elements In Federal or Local Team Policing Model	Was The Element Operational Prior To Team Policing Grant Application?	Was There A Plan to Implement The Element During The Demonstration Period?	What Was The Source Of The Plan?	Was The Element Implemented During The Demonstration Period?	What Are Plans For Post Grant Use Of Element?	Comments
11	Use Street Stops, Field Interrogations Sparingly	No	Yes (but vague)	Grant Application	Could not determine	Don't Know	"emphasize non-aggressive patrol"--grant.
12	Emphasize Foot Patrol	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes	Task Force Experience	Yes	Continued on Demand	"walk and talk" implemented in downtown area.
13	Encourage Community Contacts	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes	Ossorio Report	Yes	Continued, Decreased Rate	
14	Establish Continuity of Assignment to Teams	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes	Ossorio Report	Yes	Modified	During time teams existed, no personnel changed teams.
15	Deploy Personnel Based On Crime and Service Demand	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes (increased effort)	Grant Application	Yes	Yes	Monthly reports prepared for team commanders to use in deployment decisions.
16	Decentralize Authority/ Accountability to Team Leader	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes	Ossorio Report	Yes	Discontinued	Frequent conflicts with Chief Barber.
17	Eliminate Quasi-Military Style of Command	No	Yes	Grant Application	Attempted	Discontinued	
18	Use Participative Management to Set Objectives, Plan and Evaluate Team Performance	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes	Ossorio Report	Attempted	None	Team meetings became unruly.
19	Set Incentives Compatible With Team Policing	No	Yes	Grant Application	Yes	Don't Know	
20	Increase Team Interaction and Information Sharing	Yes--In Task Force Area	Yes	Task Force Experience	Attempted	Continued	

37

● <u>What are the post-grant plans for the element?</u> This provides a
direct measure of success in the opinion of the police officials.
Although Boulder disbanded the North and South teams, some of
the elements have been retained.

Even though the police department was having serious conflicts between

the chief, the city and the patrol division during the team policing grant,

there were bright spots in the city. Reported Part I Crime dropped by 12

percent and clearance by arrest rates increased 13 percent during the 12-month

operational period of the grant (January-December 1976). An Urban Institute

telephone survey of 100 citizens conducted early in 1976 showed that generally

residents felt safe being out alone at night in their neighborhood[1] and rated

police services as good or very good.[2] In the next section, a discussion

of team policing elements in Boulder provides more details.

Table 5 contains a summary of the Boulder experience with the 20 imple-

mentation elements. The following sections will specify in detail how each

element listed in the table was interpreted by Boulder's planners and what

happened when the elements were implemented.

B. ARAPAHOE AVENUE BOUNDARY LINE (ELEMENT #1)

The first element in Table 5 specified that neighborhood boundaries be

established. Arapahoe Avenue divides Boulder on an almost straight east-west

1. In response to the question, "How safe do you feel being out alone
in your neighborhood at night—very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat unsafe,
or very unsafe?," the answers were 38 percent very safe, 38 percent reason-
ably safe, 14 percent somewhat unsafe, and 10 percent very unsafe.
    2. In response to the question, "When you think about all the police
in your neighborhood, would you say that, in general, police are doing a
very good job, a good job, a not so good job, or a poor job?," the answers
were 30 percent very good, 61 percent good, 2 percent not so good, 1 percent
poor and 6 percent don't know.

line. Team areas were formed to the north and south of this division, as shown

in Figure 11. The Hill area where Chief Vendel's task force operated, as well

as the "mesa" and "baseline" neighborhoods, comprised the South Team area.

The North Team area also contained several recognized neighborhoods such as

"Wonderland Hills" (an affluent section situated on some of the city's desir-

able high ground), the Pearl Street business area (Boulder's original shopping

area) and the San Juan del Centro housing project (a low-rent neighborhood

down in the flatland). The University of Colorado Campus is composed of three

pieces carved out of the South Team area, as shown in Figure 11.

The Ossorio report suggested dividing the city into four sectors with a

lieutenant in charge of each sector. However, since there are approximately

fifty patrol officers in the department, dividing the city into four team areas

would have resulted in teams numbering less than the minimum size of twenty

recommended in the literature.[3] Even with only two teams, the third shift

was sometimes manned by as few as one or two patrol officers on a team.

Hence, with the available number of patrol officers, scheduling problems[4]

prohibited dividing the city into more than two team areas if each area were

to be patrolled by at least one officer at all times. The smallest team

areas compatible with scheduling constraints were considerably larger than

the areas considered neighborhoods by both police officers and citizens of

Boulder. For instance, the North Team contained at least four separate

"neighborhoods" within less than half its total area.[5]

In March 1977, after the grant period, the city was divided into three

zones. The boundaries run east-west along Mapleton Street and Baseline

3. Bloch and Spect, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 2.
    4. Patrol officers typically worked four 10-hour days per week.
    5. Woodland Hills, San Juan del Centro, Goss-Grove, and the central
business district.

FIGURE 11:

BOULDER STREET MAP

WITH TEAM BOUNDARIES

Road. Officers are assigned to one of the three zones. The University of Colorado police retain jurisdiction over their area. In the future, the plans call for the zones to be further subdivided by using data on demand for services.

Following the grant period, Boulder officials concluded that team boundaries or dividing lines must be based on natural boundaries. Boulder's team boundary dividing north and south teams actually divided one readily identifiable neighborhood. The teams did not schedule members for optimal utilization of existing manpower even though it equalized population, area and crime occurrence rates for each team.

For purposes of Operation Identification, the concept of neighborhoods can be limited to one street or a cul-de-sac rather than the police department's concept of "neighborhood." Neighborhood group meetings based on this limited definition have been very successful for the specific purpose of Operation ID and a very limited form of "Neighborhood Watch."

C. TEAMS OF ABOUT 30 OFFICERS EACH FORMED
(ELEMENT #2)

The federal model prescribes that teams of 20 to 40 personnel be established. The original composition of Boulder's North and South Teams is shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6: NUMBER OF TEAM PERSONNEL (JULY 1975)

	North Team	South Team
Team Commander (Lt.)	1	1
Clerk	1	1
Sergeants	4	4
Officers	25	23
Total	31	29

In addition to the personnel listed above, there was one crime prevention officer between February and June 1976 and a team policing evaluator-analyst who worked closely with the two crime analysts and two crime scene investigators. The grant application had specified that there would be two teams of 30 members each so that the plan was closely followed.

The South Team commander was a newly appointed lieutenant and the North Team commander had commanded the Hill Task Force. A notice was posted which requested that patrol officers submit their preferences for team assignment. According to one of the team commanders, the officers determined their preference on the basis of where they thought they would get the best working hours and days off and not on the basis of preference for an area of the city.[6] Almost all preferences were honored.

According to an early planning meeting between the patrol commanders and Chief Barber, members of the former Hill Task Force were supposed to be reassigned to the patrol division (i.e., teams). Within minutes following the meeting, a departmental bulletin was circulated that reported that the task force members had been reassigned to the detective division. This chain of events is said to have exasperated the patrol officers.

The implementation of team policing required additional sergeants. Five of the eight team sergeants were new; one reported that he put on his stripes after only one week of training. When Boulder returned the patrol division to the traditional shift structure, six rather than eight sergeants were required: two per each of the three shifts rather than four per each of the two teams.

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6. Those who wanted to get away from "team policing" tended to choose the night shift. Members of this shift informally called themselves the "night fighters."

After the grant period, the patrol and detective personnel were reorganized. On April 4, 1977, four shifts or details were established within the patrol function. Each detail is divided into two teams or "Work Groups." The work groups are composed of a sergeant supervisor, patrol officers, and investigators. All members of the work group maintain the same work schedule as to the times of day, days on duty, and days off duty.

By maintaining the same work schedule for the team or work group, there will hopefully be a greater capability for facilitating information sharing among officers and investigators; peer evaluation; effective deployment; and vertical and horizontal communications. It is anticipated that the work groups will eventually be capable of functioning as a decision-making group. The work groups have been assigned on the basis of time rather than geography. The work groups then will determine the geographical assignments on the basis of demand factors.

Patrol officers and investigators are now assigned to the same work area of the Criminal Justice Center Building. It is anticipated that the removal of any physical barriers will decrease the traditional officer/investigator schism. Such an arrangement is designed to facilitate the flow of information between groups.

D. CONTINUITY OF TEAM ASSIGNMENT
(ELEMENT #14)

The team policing theory specifies that assignments to teams should be for long periods so that officers can become familiar with their neighborhoods. Boulder was successful in following the theory. During the team policing period, no patrol officers switched teams. Vacancies were filled with new

hires rather than transfers within the department, especially inter-team transfers.

After the grant period, assignment to details and work groups have been made on a permanent basis, to include supervisors and investigators. The ideal of developing work groups as decision-making bodies can only come with interaction between a reasonably stabilized group membership. While the work group assignments are stable as to time, geographical distribution of personnel within a specified area is not constant.

E. SERVICE DELIVERY IN TEAM AREAS
(ELEMENT #3)

Team policing theory says that all services for a neighborhood should be provided by the neighborhood team and there should be very few incidents of team members leaving the area or non-team personnel coming in. According to Boulder's proposal, team members were to be dispatched out of the team areas only in emergencies; however, not all services could be provided by team members because the detectives and the traffic units were not incorporated into the teams.

The dispatching duties for both the Boulder city and county areas are handled by a consolidated dispatch unit administered by the Regional Communications Authority. (The campus police have their own dispatch unit.) Calls for service from the city area would be identified according to team area by the dispatchers.[7] About one-half of all complaint calls received by the

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7. The dispatchers would say "the call is North" or "the call is South" according to which team area the call came from.

dispatchers were for the Boulder Police Department as can be observed in Table 7, which lists calls by agency. The rest of the calls were directed to other agencies.

The creation of two team areas caused polarization among the patrol officers. The Arapahoe Avenue boundary line was referred to as "the brick wall." For one team what happened on the other side of Arapahoe Avenue was considered the other team's problem except for emergencies such as bank alarms, personnel injury accidents, and officer-needs-help calls. For these, patrol officers crossed Arapahoe Avenue.

Under team policing Boulder officials believed that the response time to calls for service increased. Three principal reasons could cause the increase:

- By dividing the city into two teams, the pool of potential cars that might respond to a call was cut in half. Consequently, the percentage of calls that had to wait for a car increased.

- The number of officer-initiated events increased, thereby decreasing the availability of cars to answer calls.

- The number of patrol cars decreased due to maintenance requirements of an aging fleet of patrol cars.

In the fall of 1975, the department was averaging about 88 complainant-initiated calls for service per day. Depending on the day of week, the average number of calls for which a patrol car was not immediately available varied between about 10 and 20 for each team (i.e., 20 to 40 for the entire city). Approximately 22 percent to 44 percent of the complaint calls occurred when all the cars in the team area of the call were busy. Had all cars from both teams been able to respond, the percentage of calls for

TABLE 7: NUMBER OF CALLS HANDLED BY BOULDER REGIONAL AUTHORITY
IN NOVEMBER 1976

	Type of Dispatch Call		
Agency	Complaint Initiated	Department Initiated	TOTAL
Boulder Police Department	2,962	4,990	7,952
Boulder County Sheriff's Office	1,158	2,897	4,055
Lyon Police Department	110	189	299
Lafayette Police Department	295	1,266	1,561
Nederland Marshall	72	322	394
Boulder City Fire Department	251	204	455
Boulder County Fire Department	210	29	239
Other City Agencies	486	287	773
Other County Agencies	288	12	300
TOTAL	5,832	10,196	16,028

Source: Boulder Regional Communications Authority Daily Status Card Summary

which no car was available would have been approximately 5 percent to 19 percent depending on the day of week.[8]

The number of complaint calls per month changed little between the fall of 1975 and the fall of 1976 as shown in Table 8. Accurate data on department-initiated calls are not available; however, one-day samples indicate that

TABLE 8: NUMBER OF CALLS PER DAY HANDLED BY
BOULDER CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

	Average Number of Calls Per Day		
Sample Period	Complaint Initiated	Department Initiated	Total
Oct. 6-12 and Nov. 25-30, 1975	88	Unknown	Unknown
Nov. 1-30, 1976	99	166	265

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8. The reasoning being, if the probability is "p" that no cars are available in a team when a call is received, then the probability is "p^2" that no car is available from either team. Hence,

$$(.22)^2 = .048 \approx 5\% \text{ and } (.44)^2 = .194 \approx 19\%$$

there was little change. One Boulder officer commented that under team policing, the delay time for answering calls sometimes got up to two hours during the day shift because the officers were busy talking to the citizens as specified by the team policing concept (or, as another officer said, "talking to a honey at a car stop"). During the fall of 1975, the average waiting time for a patrol car to become available for non-expedited stacked calls was between 4 and 46 minutes, depending on team and shift (see Table 9). After midnight the average waiting time was the lowest: four minutes in the North and ten minutes in the South.

TABLE 9: WAITING TIME FOR STACKED CALLS

TEAM	Average Waiting Time For Stacked Calls--Minutes		
	Shift 1 (Day)	Shift 2 (Evening)	Shift 3 (Night)
North	36	25	4
South	46	30	10

A vehicle availability study for the patrol division was conducted by the Boulder evaluator, Robert Gillice, in August 1976. His data show that during July 1976 there were somewhere between 14 and 16 days when the number of available vehicles was insufficient for the available manpower. The patrol division had 11 marked cars; however, due to mechanical or radio failures, the number of usable cars has dropped to as low as two on the worst occasion. When car availability dropped, two-man patrol units were often used rather than the usual single officer. There were 14 days when there were not enough available vehicles for the regular patrol officers, and with the addition of reserve officers, there were two more days with an insufficient number

of cars. Among the 93 shifts in July 1976 an average of 14 percent (or 1.54 vehicles) was not available per shift.

In the fall of 1976, the Arapahoe Avenue boundary line was abandoned. The large fraction of calls that had to wait for a patrol car to become available was cited as a primary reason, although the Arapahoe line was probably only one of many factors that caused the increase in response time.

F. GOALS FOR TRAINING HOURS MET
(ELEMENT #4)

Since the LEAA grants for team policing demonstration sites were all approximately the same amount ($179,000) and Boulder has the smallest patrol force of the six demonstration sites, Boulder potentially had the most money to spend per patrol officer for training. Boulder announced in the final quarterly report that the training objectives of providing 2,500 student hours of initial training in organizational development and team policing concepts plus 5,000 student hours of on-going training were accomplished. In spite of having met the original training objectives, the amount of training was considered insufficient by many Boulder personnel.

The total reported student training hours during the grant period was almost 8,000 hours for the North and South Teams and over 3,000 hours for the Campus Team. As shown Table 10 below, the actual training hours exceeded the goals expressed in the grant.

A summary of timing, content and attendance for the initial training is shown in Table 11. Since the North and South Teams have approximately 30 personnel each, the amount of initial training which was conducted between June 1975 and December 1975 averaged about 45 hours per officer. Between

TABLE 10: REPORTED STUDENT TRAINING HOURS DURING GRANT PERIOD IN BOULDER

Type of Training	Goal As Stated In Grant	Student Hours* (all 3 teams) Actual		
		Boulder	Campus	Total
Initial Training for Organizational Development and Team Concepts	2500	3233.5	631	3864.5
On-going Training	5000	4648.5	3644	8292.5
TOTAL	7500	7882.0	4275	12157.0

Source: Quarterly Progress Reports from Boulder

January and December 1975, on-going training was given to team officers. On the average, there were about 80 hours of on-going training per team officer. A summary of the on-going training is shown in Table 12.

A systematic evaluation of whether the training imparted the desired skills to the team members is not available. The grant proposal mentioned that an evaluation instrument would be built into the training program, " . . . to measure the effectiveness of the training in terms of the goal realization."[9] Careful records were kept on the number of hours of training given but the evaluation instrument mentioned above was evidently rarely implemented.[10] However, other indications of the coverage and impact of the training are available.

The Urban Institute survey of patrol officers given in January 1976 indicated that many patrol officers did not feel that they had received adequate training. At the time of the survey, all of the initial training, as shown in Table 11, had been completed. Each officer had received an average

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9. Boulder Proposal, p. A-42.
10. A notable exception was a 40-hour Family Crisis Intervention seminar completed by Dr. F. Barry Schreiber. His report, in the form of a Ph.D. Thesis, included pre- and post-attitudinal surveys, evaluation of effectiveness of coursework, statements as to implementation of course elements learned by officers, and development of implementation or practitioner's guidelines and resource data.

TABLE 11: INITIAL TRAINING—ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TEAM CONCEPTS

DATE	TYPE OF INSTRUCTION	STUDENT HOURS		
		North Team	South Team	Campus Team
June 9, 1975	23 South Team members received orientation training on team policing. (2 hours per student) Discussed pitfalls and benefits. Watched videotaped presentation by the Boulder and Campus chiefs.	—	46	—
June 12, 1975	19 North Team members received same subject as above, but in 1.5 hours per student.	28.5	—	—
June 16-18, 1975	Mitre Team Policing Orientation for 10 members (8 hours each) from each team.	80	80	80
June 25-27, 1975	One-week course for 9 sergeants. Supervisory training. Communication skills and participatory management.	100	100	163
June 25-27, 1975	Management-level orientation for 6 people. Sessions on group problem solving and team building.	94.5	94.5	—
July 1975	Interpersonal communication for 9 management people.	—	—	288
Sept. 11-12, 1975	Mitre Team Policing Seminar for 12 mid-management team members. Discussed manpower requirements, organizational configuration and both successful and unsuccessful experiences of other departments.	24	24	60
? 1975 [3d qtr]	Basic crime scene investigation course 2 sergeants and 2 officers.	80	80	
? 1975 [3d qtr]	Operation Identification training conducted at roll call for 7 patrol officers.	?	?	
? 1975	Dispatchers briefed on how to stack calls.			
1975	Team meetings, generally once a month. Forum for training and participatory management.	?	?	
Oct. 20-24, 1975	20 officers: communication in stress situations. Alternatives to power-based problem solving.	800		
Nov. 3-7, and	Same as above for 20 officers.		800	
Nov. 10-14, 1975	Same as above for 21 officers.	420	420	
Nov. 1975	Classes on interviews and interrogations for 20 patrol officers.			40
Dec. 1975	21 officers in classes on crisis intervention: intoxicated persons, family crises, hostages.			42
Dec. 1975	5 mid-level staff in a seminar on team building.	40	40	
	SUBTOTAL	1,667	1,726.5	631

NOTE: By December 31, 1975, Boulder had reached the goal of providing 2,500 student hours of organizational development and team concept training to line and staff members.

Source: Quarterly Progress Reports, Boulder

TABLE 12: ON-GOING TRAINING

DATE	TYPE OF ON-GOING TRAINING	STUDENT HOURS	
		NORTH AND SOUTH TEAMS	CAMPUS
February 1976	Roll call training in crime scene techniques: • securing the area • use of camera • sketching • fingerprinting	93.5	
March 1976	Roll call training in juvenile psychology, Colorado Childrens Code, alternative referrals to group homes, child abuse Campus Team—content not known	390.5	
April 1976	Sex crime investgation, criminal law	76.75	
May 1976	Crime code, crime scene investigation, crime prevention, evidence/search, crisis intervention	45.75	
June 1976	Crime code, family crisis, crime prevention	214.5	
April-June 1976	Communication, forensic science, rape prevention, community relations, organizational development		802
July-September 1976	Search and Seizure Code, organizational development, management by objective, community resources, family crisis, crime prevention, management procedures		1,516
July-September 1976	Family crisis, Colorado Criminal Code, Fingerprinting	2,122	
October-December 1976	Organizational development, legal and civil rights, probable cause, search and seizure	1,828	
October-December 1976	Organizational development, supervisory management training, family disturbances, legal and civil rights, probable cause, search and seizure, crime prevention, community relations		1,106
TOTAL		4,771	2,644

Source: Quarterly Progress Reports, Boulder

of 40 hours of training. Seventy-two percent of the patrol officers responded "no" to the question, "Have you been provided as much information as you would like concerning full service neighborhood team policing?"

At least 13 out of the 20 training topics listed in the grant proposal as being goals for training were known to have been addressed.[11]

One of the team commanders commented that there were no objective tests to gauge whether or not the training taught something to the officers. Furthermore, in his opinion, "tests would stimulate strong objections from trainees "because the trainees preferred unpressured training sessions over the normal routine of work."

Plans to have detectives train officers to conduct residential burglary investigations were implemented but did not achieve the objective of having patrol officers eventually take over the investigation. This subject is discussed in more detail in Section G which follows.

The turning point in the relations between Chief Barber and his staff may have occurred when the patrol division commanders attended an organizational development training program.[12] After the training, the commanders formed a more solid bond and presented a united front in the face of administrative resistance to the team policing program. Barber had actively

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11. The following training areas were listed as needed in the grant proposal and were addressed by the training delivered: organizational development, communications techniques, management by objective, patrol operations and analysis, crisis intervention, department orientation, general psychology, community agencies and resources, juvenile procedures, crime prevention, collection and preservation of evidence, techniques of investigation, and scientific aids to investigations. The following were listed in the proposal and it is not known if the topics were addressed by training: confrontation management, community dynamics, techniques of interview and interrogation, narcotics and dangerous drugs, physical training, report writing, and criminal case preparation.

12. Conducted by Dr. Wayne Boss of the University of Colorado Graduate School of Public Administration.

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supported the application for the team policing grant, but was not viewed by the patrol division as a man who provided them continuing support.

In January 1977, Sergeant Moore of the North Team wrote a paper on the team policing experience. In that paper, he stated that very little of the training had been accomplished--evidently meaning that even though the training goals were met, the expected impact was not felt. Sergeant Moore said, "Some sensitivity training has been attempted, but the officers were in such a state of turmoil by this time that the classes generally evolved into a team complaint session . . . . Organizational development, sorely needed at all levels of the department, could not get past the command staff and the Chief."

G. DETECTIVE BUREAU EVENTUALLY DECENTRALIZED (ELEMENT #5)

The grant application specified that Boulder would not follow the federal prescription of assigning detectives to the teams. Decentralization occurred after the grant. Boulder was typical of many departments in that any move from the detective division to the patrol division would have been considered a demotion by a detective. Detectives have higher status. The decision about the detectives appears to be consistent with the recommendations in the Ossorio report. Under Chief Barber, the detectives were a politically powerful group within the department. This is illustrated by the background of those attending the regular department staff meetings.

o Chief Barber--homicide detective for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's department prior to being chief at the University of California at Santa Cruz
o Deputy Chief Lowell Friesen--former commander of detectives
o Captain Ted Kozanecki (staff services)--former detective
o Captain Kelly Gaskill--investigations commander
o Captain Clint Fullen--patrol division commander

However, decentralization of detectives occurred after the grant period. As of April 4, 1977 a Major Case Squad had been formed. The function of the Major Case Squad is to investigate major, serious, and organized crime. Four detectives have been assigned to the squad. All other investigators have been assigned to "work groups" or teams under the supervision of patrol sergeants and shift or detail lieutenants. This model follows the general guidelines found in the Rand report.[13]

The investigators work with patrol officers and maintain the same work schedule under the supervision of a patrol supervisor. Investigators assigned to work groups function to assist the officer in the investigation of crimes not requiring specialized investigations: homicide, sexual assault, forgery. By inculcating the investigator within the work group, communications should be enhanced between the two functions. While there is the possibility that investigators can provide investigatory training to officers, this function has not been specifically planned for implementation.

H. DETECTIVES TRAIN PATROL OFFICERS
(ELEMENT #6)

The grant application specified that two experienced detectives would be assigned to a special unit that would "assist a team requesting their expertise in order to help solve a particular problem." Almost one year later, about April 1, 1976[14] (9 months into the demonstration), one detective and one former detective were assigned to work with the Boulder teams to train

13. Greenwood, Peter W. and Petersilia, Joan. The Criminal Investigation Process, Volume 1: Summary and Policy Implications, The Rand Corporation, (DATE).

14. There is some uncertainty about the date. One Crime Scene Investigator cited a date of March 1.

and support team personnel in the investigation of residential burglaries. The two were called Crime Scene Investigators (CSIs) and were to perform the following tasks:

STEP 1   One or more team members respond to the scene of a residential burglary. The responding officers might consist of either a one- or two-man patrol car, a CSI and a shift supervising sergeant.

STEP 2   The preliminary investigation is conducted.

STEP 3   If there is an on-scene resolution (i.e., suspect arrested or property recovered), the investigation stops; otherwise, it goes on to Step 4.

STEP 4   The preliminary investigation report is sent to the CSI, the crime analyst (who was also the local evaluator), the team commander, and the central detective unit.

STEP 5   Within 24 hours of the initial call, the victim is telephoned by the crime scene investigator to inquire about any additional information and to inform the citizen that the case is being investigated.

STEP 6   The responding officer and/or the CSI conduct a followup investigation of any leads generated during the preliminary investigation.

STEP 7   Within five days of the crime, the responding officer is required to personally contact the victim, recanvass the neighborhood for new witnesses and ask the victim if a neighborhood crime prevention meeting could be held.

STEP 8   If the victim accepts the request, he or she is asked to assemble the neighbors for the meeting.

STEP 9   At the meeting (typical attendance was eight to nine people) a crime prevention officer (one was assigned to each team) makes a one- to two-hour presentation which includes a lock display, a film about home security, and a description of the "Operation ID" program.

Prior to team policing, the patrol officers did not perform the followup activities described above for residential burglaries. In a discussion with one CSI on April 22, 1976, the CSI explained this job in much the same terms as listed above. Since on a typical day there were only one or two residential burglaries per team, there was limited opportunity for patrol officers to

investigate residential burglaries. If the residential burglary investigations
were divided equally among the team officers, each officer would handle between
one and two per month. Hence, the opportunity for patrol officers to learn
investigative techniques was limited. Furthermore, not all patrol officers
were interested in learning investigative techniques.

The South Team commander believes that the "one-on-one" training for
residential burglary investigations was best. He offered his opinion that
not all patrol officers are properly motivated or have the aptitude for con-
ducting investigations. The flow of paper associated with investigations
caused coordination and continuity problems. For example, the records
of five-day recalls (see Step 7 above) were sometimes not maintained.

I. PATROL OFFICERS DROP FOLLOWUP INVESTIGATIONS
(ELEMENT #7)

The Boulder experiment of having patrol officers conduct followup inves-
tigations of residential burglaries was abandoned. Sergeant Moore (North
Team) characterized the use of CSIs as an attempt by the team commanders to
make up for not having detectives assigned to teams. Considering the fact
that the number of opportunities per shift to investigate residential bur-
glaries is low, it is not surprising that the CSIs ended up answering calls
for service in addition to their crime scene work. The team officers eventu-
ally requested to stop performing the followup investigation. The CSIs were
withdrawn and once again the investigative functions were centralized in the
detective unit. The reason cited for the return to centralization was that
the patrol division felt that the increased detective staff would be better

equipped to handle the investigations rather than the patrol officers who
were already being asked to expand their duties to include such services
as crime prevention, foot patrol, etc., to Boulder citizens.

J. LINKAGES AND REFERRALS TO SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES
(ELEMENTS #8 AND #9)

The grant application outlined the plan that training would be provided
to team members on the uses and benefits of various social service agencies.
The goal was an increase of 10 percent in the number of social service agency
referrals made by team officers during the 18-month grant period. The plan
was executed and the limited available data indicate that the goal was
surpassed.

In 1976, a new pocket-size book on social service agencies was written[15]
and distributed to team members in conjunction with training on how to handle
family crisis calls. Team members were already aware of the availability
of the service agencies; however, the new booklet provides a more convenient
listing. Each team member is authorized to arrange for emergency housing
and food for those determined to be in need. Many agencies are not available
at night or on weekends—periods when officers often require the assistance
of such agencies.

The local evaluator examined the feasibility of using data from both
police department and referral agencies' records and found that data on refer-
rals are not readily available except for mental and alcohol cases. Officers

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15. The authors are Judy Middle, Barry Schreiber and Dan Thomann.

are supposed to record referrals on their daily logs, but frequently do not record such activities. Daily logs only noted alcohol and mental referrals and no other types. Furthermore, records at referral agencies usually do not specify whether or not a client was referred by the police.

The number of mental and alcohol referrals reported on the officers' logs are displayed in Table 13 below. Comparing the four quarters in 1975 to those in 1976, the number of "mental holds" increased in three out of the four quarters. A similar pattern is present for referrals to the Alcohol Recovery Center. During 1975, there were 102 recorded mental or alcohol referrals as compared to 306 in 1976. If this same pattern held true for other types of referrals, it is highly likely that the Boulder Police Department reached or surpassed its goal.

Additional indicators of objective measurement were gleaned through a Crisis Intervention Training Program conducted by F. Barry Schreiber. Generalized conclusions reached by Schreiber in his thesis[16] are as follows:

- The average number of reliable agencies utilized by officers increased from 6.6 agencies prior to the training to 9.1 after training.

- The proportion of reliable agencies to agencies known to be utilized by officers for referral increased slightly from 50 percent prior to training to 55 percent after training.

- The percent of referrals decreased after training from 22 percent to 9 percent. The use of mediation techniques by officers showed a slight increase, however. (It is theorized that officers felt more competent in abilities and required referrals less.)

- Schreiber attributes some of the lack of changes in referrals to the pre-training level of expertise of the officers.

16. Schreiber, F. Barry. Thesis entitled, Design, Implementation and Evaluation of a 24-Hour Crisis Intervention Training Program for Police.

TABLE 13: MENTAL AND ALCOHOL REFERRALS MADE
BY BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT

TYPE OF REFERRAL	1975 Quarter				1976 Quarter			
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th
Mental	2	1	15	11	10	25	0	38
Alcohol Recovery Center	27	35	36	26	18	48	55	61

In addition to making referrals themselves, Boulder police made an effort to make citizens more aware of the social service agencies. The San Juan del Centro housing project is considered by Boulder officials to be a successful example of the police department's representative in a "storefront office" explaining to residents how to make contact with social service agencies. The Spanish-speaking secretary hired with grant funds provided a reliable resource in dealing with the large faction of Spanish-speaking residents in San Juan del Centro.

K. EMPHASIS ON SERVICE ACTIVITIES AND COMMUNITY CONTACTS (ELEMENTS #10 AND #13)

An intent of the demonstration program was to increase the amount of service activity provided by the neighborhood police. The Boulder grant proposal responded by noting that one method of improving community attitudes is to increase the amount of service provided by Boulder police. Recommendation number four of the Ossorio report suggested that officers note on their log sheets any public service activity so that data could be used as part of the officers' regular evaluation. One of the expected benefits was that officers would be more inclined to emphasize community service.

The grant application set forth two goals related to service activities for the city and campus teams:

- hold 180 community presentations such that total attendance is at least 20 percent of the total population; and,

- enroll 80 percent of the residents and 90 percent of the businesses in Operation Identification.

The community presentation goal was almost reached; the Operation Identification goal was unrealistic.

In the second quarterly report[17] (dated January 14, 1976), a request was made to reduce the grant period Operation Identification enrollment objective to 25 percent for residences and 35 percent for businesses enrolled.[18] No reply to the request was recived by the Boulder Police Department which estimated that if every patrol officer did nothing but Operation ID for 1976, the original objective could not be achieved.

Calls from citizens for Operation ID service were originally planned to be handled as regular calls for service.[19] However, due to the large citizen response, team members could not keep up with the demand during their regular duty hours. Late in 1975, the task was then shifted to an overtime activity. However, the limited amount of overtime monies and volunteers to work overtime resulted in a smaller than planned Operation Identification program.

Approximately 900 Operation Identification enrollments (perhaps about 5 percent of all residences) were conducted by Boulder teams between June 1975 and December 1976, as shown in Table 14 below. The original plan was to conduct Operation ID and security checks on a one-to-one basis; however,

17. Sent by Captain Clinton Fullen, Team Policing Project Director in Boulder, to Division of Criminal Justice, State Services Building, Denver, Colorado.
18. Quarterly Report, p. 10.
19. Dispatchers were instructed to stack requests for Operation ID service on a prioritized basis until a team member became available.

TABLE 14: COMMUNITY MEETINGS BY NORTH AND SOUTH TEAMS

Date	Number of Community Meetings	Total Attendance	Number of Operation Identifications
June – September 1975	over 50	over 1,000	128
October – December 1975	9	238	235
January – March 1976	37	2,333	266
April – June 1976	55	1,123	110
July – September 1976	52	1,410	111
October – December 1976	28	899	53
TOTAL	over 231	over 7,003 (a)	903

(a) About 10 percent of the population in the city.

that approach was dropped because it was too expensive. One crime prevention officer could only complete seven to ten individual presentations per day.

The model for Boulder's Operation Identification program and home security check was the experience of the Hill Task Force. The task force targeted an area containing 483 residences for an Operation Identification program and achieved the results shown in Table 15.

TABLE 15: SUMMARY OF TASK FORCE OPERATION IDENTIFICATION
PROGRAM PARTICIPATION

	Number of Residences
• participated in Operation Identification	339 (70 percent)
• not interested	33
• residents in transition	13
• didn't have Operation Identification	98
TOTAL RESIDENCES	483 (100 percent)

If the city is assumed to have a population of 63,000 with between three and four people per household, then there are somewhere between 16,000 and 21,000 potential households that could participate in Operation Identification. Even assuming all 903 "Operation Identifications" shown in Table 14 were residential,

which is unlikely, then approximately 5 percent at best of the target population

was reached during the team policing demonstration program. Clearly the task

force, by concentrating in a small area with a much higher ratio of officers

per population, achieved a much larger participation rate in Operation Identi-

fication than did the whole patrol division covering all the city.

L. STREET STOPS AND FOOT PATROL (ELEMENTS #11 AND #12)

The team policing theory states that foot patrol should be emphasized

while street stops and field interrogations should be used sparingly.

Boulder's proposal does not specify what emphasis would be placed on street

stops and field interrogations, but does say that "park and talk" as well as

"walk and talk" would be encouraged.

Two shifts of foot patrol operated in the downtown area where the

central part was being converted from a street to a pedestrian mall early in

1977. Downtown merchants have from time to time requested that the police

take action to get rid of hippies panhandling on the downtown streets. The

North Team commander elaborated that "panhandling as practiced by these dudes

is equivalent to strongarmed robbery." During the days of the Hill Task

Force, which routinely used foot patrol, a primary objective was to keep the

hippies out of Boulder.

The downtown foot patrol area contains a range of establishments from ex-

pensive little boutiques and restaurants to Shannons Bar which was considered

to be a rough place by Boulder police—motorcycle riders, cowboys, students,

and hippies all contribute to the atmosphere of the bar. Hence, there is a

potential conflict between different classes of people in the area and the

police are expected to intervene.

The Urban Institute citizen survey in January 1976 found that 52

percent of the citizens recalled having seen a police officer patrolling in

their neighborhood in the previous week and, among citizens who saw patrol-

ling officers, no one recalled observing an officer on foot patrol.

Although while in Boulder the authors observed a number of officers in

the "park and talk" mode of operation, a quantitative estimate of this

activity could not be obtained from the obvious source: the officers' daily

logs.

The problems with using officer logs as a data source on foot patrol

are as follows:

- Old logs were often destroyed which makes it impossible to compare the "pre" team policing period with the "during" period.

- The logs were abandoned late in 1976 and a new recording system is being implemented.[20] The logs were thought to be unreliable for management purposes.

- "Foot patrol" as such is not coded as a type of activity.

Officer log data are useful for examining field interrogation and public

relations contacts however. An analysis of a sample of officer log data from

the South Team in March 1975 was conducted and is summarized below.

The South Team contained 4 sergeants, 23 officers, and 1 clerk. A

picture of an average day at work for an officer has been compiled from the

"officer's monthly log" maintained by the department.[21]

---

20. A computerized "Daily Field Activity Report."
21. Logs for 19 of the 23 officers were available for the month of March 1976, and consist of the number of events per officer by day and shift. Twenty-six types of events are recorded. The data cover 245 officer shifts distributed among the 93 possible shifts during the month of March. Data are missing for only two shifts: the second shift of March 26 and 27; all other shifts have data recorded between one and five officers.

TABLE 16: AVERAGE NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND CALLS BY SHIFT--
SOUTH TEAM, MARCH 1976

Shift	Time	Average Daily Number Officers Recorded	Average Number of Calls Recorded
Day	0700 to 1700	3.19	25.8
Evening	1600 to 0200	2.29	25.4
Night	2200 to 0800	2.41	11.1

The day shift has the highest average number of officers as shown in Table 16.

The day shift also contains the largest number of events. A total of 1,933

events were recorded in the March data and are summarized in Table 20, which

shows the distribution of events by type and shift. The average number of

events per officer shift is also shown in Table 17 on the right side. On the

average, in the South Team during March 1976, an officer recorded 7.89 events

per shift, of which 2.13 were "incident reports" events, 1.05 were "complaint

report" events, 2.10 were some type of traffic events, and the remaining 2.61

events scattered among the remaining types.

M. DEPLOYMENT ACCORDING TO DEMAND
(ELEMENT #15)

The Boulder proposal follows the theory that patrol personnel should be

deployed according to the time and location of crimes and calls for service.

The local evaluator also functioned as a crime analyst and prepared maps show-

ing the location and type of crime. The maps were given to the teams.

The South Team commander reported that he used the maps to assist in the

assignment of officers to beats. Starting in January and February 1976, pa-

trol officers in both teams were deployed on the basis of an analysis of

crime by area, time and type of crime.

TABLE 17: SUMMARY OF SOUTH TEAM OFFICER ACTIVITY IN MARCH 1976

	Total Number*				Average Per Officer Shift			
	Shift #1	Shift #2	Shift #3	All Shifts	Shift #1	Shift #2	Shift #3	All Shifts
Officers	8	6	5	19	---	---	---	---
Officer Shifts Recorded	99	71	75	245	---	---	---	---
Complaints	105	107	45	257	1.06	1.51	0.60	1.05
R Accidents	55	42	7	104	0.56	0.59	0.09	0.42
E Incidents	186	196	141	523	1.88	2.76	1.88	2.13
P ARC Holds**	1	0	0	1	0.01	0	0	0.00
O Burglary Prevention	3	0	0	3	0.03	0	0	0.01
R Alarm Cards	7	6	13	26	0.07	0.08	0.17	0.11
T Impounds	18	16	4	38	0.18	0.23	0.05	0.16
S Mental Holds	1	2	0	3	0.01	0.03	0	0.01
T								
R A - Tickets	42	16	7	65	0.42	0.23	0.09	0.26
A P - Tickets	79	51	31	161	0.79	0.72	0.41	0.66
F S - Tickets	10	12	1	23	0.10	0.17	0.01	0.09
F PA - Tickets	15	12	11	38	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.16
I Warnings	108	70	9	187	1.09	0.99	0.12	0.76
C "10-46"***	22	16	2	40	0.22	0.23	0.03	0.16
A								
R Misd.--Self Initiated	6	19	1	26	0.06	0.27	0.01	0.11
R Shoplift	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E Felon--Self Initiated	0	0	1	1	0	0	0.01	0.00
S Misdemeanor--Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T Felony--Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S								
Misc. P/R Residential	7	3	1	11	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.04
S								
E P/R Business	17	137	2	156	0.17	1.93	0.03	0.64
R P/R Pedestrian	1	0	0	1	0.01	0	0	0.00
V S/P or F/I	8	12	3	23	0.08	0.17	0.04	0.09
I Assists	59	52	61	172	0.60	0.73	0.81	0.70
C 72 Hour Starts+	35	1	2	38	0.35	0.01	0.03	0.16
E follow-ups++	15	18	3	36	0.15	0.25	0.04	0.14
S								
Total Events	800	788	345	1933	8.08	11.10	4.60	7.89

*South Team Shift #1 = 0700 to 1700, Shift #2 = 1600 to 0200, Shift #3 = 2200 to 0800.
**Alcoholic Recovery Center
***Traffic Assists
+Abandoned Cars
++On complaints--probably indicates followups on residential burglaries performed by patrol officers.

65

Some South Team officers requested that the local evaluator try to ascertain whether the number of burglaries at night changed as a result of patrol activities that evidently were conducted according to the crime analysis maps. The data were inconclusive and the local evaluator stated that there was "little change in the commercial burglary rate. Thus, any changes in the types of patrol tactics would seem to have little effect in preventing crime." However, since night burglaries averaged 21 per month in the south, only large changes in the burglary rate could be detected with only a few months of data.

Union rules constrain shift assignments. The rules demand that shift assignments are made on a permanent basis based on seniority. If police managers want to make a change, the rules require that the least senior officer on a shift be the first one assigned to a new shift. Thus changing shift assignments to match demand is not a simple task.

In Boulder, patrol manpower appeared to be allocated in proportion to demand by day of week and shift with one exception: The night shift was not as busy. Two measures are available on how well patrol resources are scheduled in response to workload. The percentage of clock time when all units in a team are out of service measures how often no units are immediately available to answer a call for service. Table 18 contains the percentages by day of week and shift for a one-week sample period in November 1975. During the third shift (night) and on Sunday, there was a much lower chance that a call would have to be queued until a patrol car became free to respond.

TABLE 18: PERCENT OF CLOCK TIME WHEN ALL UNITS IN A TEAM WERE OUT OF SERVICE (11/4/75-11/10/75)

DAY	SOUTH TEAM	NORTH TEAM
MON	8%	24%
TUES	11%	22%
WED	24%	34%
THUR	15%	37%
FRI	23%	25%
SAT	25%	18%
SUN	11%	6%
SHIFT		
1 (Day)	28%	37%
2 (Evening)	20%	27%
3 (Night)	2%	7%

The second measure of how well manpower is matched to workload is the percentage of a patrol officer's working hours that is spent answering calls or on performing administrative tasks. As with the first measure, the second also shows that the third shift (night) is not as busy as the first two shifts. Hence, relative to demand, there are more officers on duty during the third shift. (See Table 19.)

TABLE 19: PERCENT OF PATROL OFFICER'S WORKING HOURS SPENT ANSWERING CALLS FOR SERVICE OR PERFORMING ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS (BOULDER NORTH AND SOUTH TEAMS)

Month	Shift 1	Shift 2	Shift 3
April 1976	58%	55%	37%
May 1976	61%	57%	45%
June 1976	64%	73%	44%
July 1976	74%	70%	46%

Depending on the shift, the average number of officers on duty per team varied from about three to four in May 1976 as computed from the data in Table 20. This table also shows that, for any shift, the number of officers

on duty changes from day to day, but usually only plus or minus one officer away from the average. On Shift 1, there are some days when a team has only two patrol officers on duty versus seven officers on another day. The reasons for the variations in officers on duty has not been fully explored; however, the data indicate that the teams were partially successful in matching patrol personnel to the workload. The smallest number of officers on duty occurs on the third shift (night) when the workload per officer is lowest.

TABLE 20: NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN A TEAM AREA ON DUTY BY SHIFT
(DATA FROM MAY 1976)

Number of Officers On Duty	Percent of Shifts with Given Number of Officers On Duty		
	Shift 1	Shift 2	Shift 3
1	0	1.7%	1.7%
2	3.4%	10.3%	25.9%
3	24.1%	32.8%	41.4%
4	46.6%	46.6%	29.3%
5	17.2%	8.6%	1.7%
6	6.9%	0	0
7	1.7%	0	0
TOTAL	100% (N=58)*	100% (N=58)	100% (N=58)
Average Number Officers on Duty	4.05	3.50	3.03

*Data were missing for 2 of the 31 days in May 1976 for both teams, so that with two teams the sample size is 2 x (31-2) = 58.

N. CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT STYLE
(ELEMENTS #16, #17, #18, #19)

According to team policing theory, certain management characteristics should be adopted:

• authority should be decentralized to the team commander (Element #16)

• any quasi-military style of command is eliminated (Element #17)
• commanders use participative management techniques (Element #18)
• incentives are compatible with team policing (Element #19)

The Boulder proposal stated that the team commander would have 24-hour responsibility for the team area. Team commanders at times were given 24-hour responsibility. The North Team commander worked a varied schedule to get a sample of each shift as well as a mix of inside and outside assignments. Both North and South Team commanders reported that team meetings became unruly and were not worth the cost (i.e., about $500 per meeting for wages). The South Team stopped having formal meetings and the North Team turned to "shift meetings" consisting of 5 to 7 officers and sergeants. The smaller meetings were favored by the team commander because, in his words, "There is less bitching and more serious discussion about accomplishing team objectives." Even though the lieutenants did not enjoy the smaller team meetings, they felt the meetings gave patrol officers an opportunity to unload their complaints, a process that usually took about 45 minutes at the start of the meeting. The South Team commander found that three very simple rules improved the meetings:

• raise your hand if you want to talk

• only one person talks at a time

• no shouting

The meetings did open up communications between the patrol officers and the lieutenants. Officers came to their commanders to discuss problems that they previously would have kept to themselves.

Although the proposal stated that one goal of the organizational training effort was "to reduce the problems caused with the transition from a

para-military structure to a more participative approach," little data are available on how much "quasi-military" management style was eliminated. Team policing theory holds that decreases in quasi-military management should increase job satisfaction of officers. Patrol officers and their superiors, at least in private meetings, conversed on a first-name basis. However, the feeling of the patrol division in general was that Chief Barber issued too many orders without enough planning or consultation. The patrol division's respect for Chief Barber fell because they thought he made too many snap decisions and voiced too many promises that were often reversed or reformulated at a later date.

The objective of using techniques of participative management was stymied from the first official day of team policing in Boulder. In spite of a planned 6-month startup period, Chief Barber announced that, on July 1, 1975, the patrol division would start operating in the team policing mode. The original planning period was to have been from July to December 1975. Team members had ample reason to conclude that participative management was just rhetoric. The teams apparently never set their own objectives; hence could not evaluate their own performance against their own objectives. Had the team policing program in Boulder been put to a vote, it would have been defeated by the patrol officers. In the January 1976 survey of patrol officers, the response to the question, "Has neighborhood team policing improved things in your police department?" was 31 "no" versus only 10 "yes."[22]

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22. The response to this question in Boulder is similar to the responses in all other team policing demonstration sites except for Santa Ana. Actual percent "no" responses are as follows: Boulder 76 percent; Santa Ana 11 percent; Multnomah 88 percent; Elizabeth 70 percent; Hartford 81 percent; and Winston-Salem 87 percent.

On the positive side, there is evidence that some "participative management" occurred between team officers and their immediate supervisors.

Compared to the other five team policing demonstration departments, Boulder officers fall about in the middle of the range of how much influence officers say they have about decisions influencing their jobs. Two questions in the January 1976 patrol officers survey indicate some degree of participative management was used. However, without a pre/post team policing comparison, the results are only suggestive. Team policing started in Boulder before the first patrol officer survey could be conducted. The distribution of officers responding is shown below.

- Do your immediate supervisors ask your opinion when a problem comes up which involves your work?

They always ask my opinion	1 officer
Often ask	18 officers
Sometimes ask	13 officers
Seldom ask	9 officers
They never ask my opinion	1 officer
Total	42 officers[23]

- In general, how much do you participate in decisions affecting the carrying out of your work?

Almost always	3 officers
Frequently	11 officers
Occasionally	14 officers
A little	13 officers
Almost never	1 officer
Total	42 officers[23]

Even though the majority of officers feel they do participate in decisions affecting their work, a wide majority feel that they are poorly informed by management, as indicated by the responses shown below:

---

23. One officer did not respond to these questions.

● Management keeps us in the dark about things we ought to know.

Strongly agree	16 officers (37%)
Agree	17 officers (40%)
Agree somewhat	6 officers (14%)
Disagree somewhat	2 officers (5%)
Disagree	2 officers (5%)
Strongly disagree	0 officers
Total	43 officers

Among the other five team policing demonstration departments, the percent of officers who responded "strongly agree" to the above question ranged between 1 percent (Santa Ana) and 31 percent (Hartford). Hence Boulder had the worst record of "management" keeping officers informed. A more detailed discussion of organizational changes is contained in Section H, "Organizational Changes."

P. COMPATIBILITY OF INCENTIVES
(ELEMENT #19)

Under the team policing theory, incentives are supposed to be compatible with other team policing concepts. The proposal stated that "The Boulder and CUPD shall revise their organizational reward systems in order to re~ ~ze and validate the police service functions which will meet the full ser~ ~ criteria for quality police performance."

In general, Boulder personnel can receive pay increases for the following reasons:

- exceptional performance as identified through a merit rating system;
- college courses passed with a grade of "C" or better;
- firearms proficiency; and,
- longevity.

The details are discussed in the following paragraphs. Incentives are not very closely linked to team policing.

Pay and incentive schedules are spelled out in the agreement between the Boulder Police Benefit Association and the City of Boulder dated October 31, 1975. The agreement contains the following highlights:

- All new employees are subject to a six-month probation period.

- The normal work week is 40 hours. Employees who are detectives are paid $80 per month as compensation for all overtime worked other than court appearances. Patrol officers are paid for the amount of overtime they actually work.

All officers hired after January 1, 1976 will receive increases in pay according to the new merit system.[24] An annual review will determine which merit increase will apply. There are five levels ranging from no increase for "unsatisfactory" performance up to 9 percent for "exceptional" performance.

Sergeants are paid and receive increases in a manner similar to officers and detectives.

When employees reach the maximum salary level for at least one year, they then become eligible for additional merit step increases of either 1 percent or 2 percent, based on individual performance as determined by the chief.

Employees can receive salary adjustments from $30 to $50 per month according to how many college course credits they pass with a grade of "C" or better.

A salary adjustment from $20 to $25 per month can be earned by proficiency with firearms as determined by monthly "shoots."

A uniform allowance of $20 per month is paid for employees required to wear "street" clothing. Patrol officers are furnished all required equipment with the exception of shoes, boots and undergarments.

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24. Copies of the rating forms are contained in an Appendix in Part IX.

P.   INFORMATION FLOW
(ELEMENT #20)

According to theory, team policing is supposed to result in team inter-action and information sharing. The Boulder proposal suggested that the Hill Task Force could be used as a model where team briefings were used to trans-mit ideas, information, philosophy and techniques.

In the opinion of the local evaluator in Boulder, there was no positive change in information sharing. Furthermore, a decrease may have occurred. One reason for thinking that information sharing decreased was the widely held belief that the Arapahoe Avenue line not only stopped officers from moving into the other team areas, but also stopped the transmission of information between teams. Within teams, the team meetings were probably too infrequent to have significantly changed the information flow among patrol officers. Information has always been exchanged at roll calls which have been conducted from the pre-team policing period to the present. The officers' own assessment of whether team policing increased the flow of information about criminal activity is mixed. Officers in the January 1976 survey expressed widely divergent opinions about the flow of information as shown by the re-sponse to the following statement:

- Under the neighborhood team policing program, officers will be provided with more accurate and timely information about area problems and criminal activity.

Strongly agree	3 officers (7%)
Agree	7 officers (17%)
Agree somewhat	16 officers (38%)
Disagree somewhat	7 officers (17%)
Disagree	6 officers (14%)
Strongly disagree	3 officers (7%)
Total	42 officers (100%)

The pattern of responses to this question in other cities exhibits wide dif-ferences across the other demonstration sites; Boulder officers are rela-tively pessimistic that team policing will result in better information about criminal activity.[25]

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25. The percent of officers who responded "strongly agree" or "agree" are as follows: Boulder 29 percent; Elizabeth 59 percent; Hartford 44 per-cent; Multnomah 4 percent; Santa Ana 75 percent; and Winston-Salem 47 percent.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF TEAM POLICING
IN THE CAMPUS TEAM

A. BACKGROUND

The University of Colorado Police Department (CUPD) is responsible for
enforcing university regulations and Boulder municipal ordinances as well
as state and federal laws on the campus which is located in the middle of
the city of Boulder. CUPD had a budget of $695,807 in FY 1975-1976. Over
90 people were employed by CUPD; however, many were on a work/study plan. The
organization chart as of March 1976 is shown in Figure 12. The Campus Team
in the Boulder team policing experiment was carved out of the field opera-
tions unit shown on the organization chart of March 1976. In the late spring
of 1976, the department was reorganized along the lines shown in Figure 13.

The attempt to implement team policing in CUPD was overshadowed by a
labor dispute that erupted early in 1976 when an officer was fired. A griev-
ance was filed in February 1976 by a majority of the patrol and dispatch per-
sonnel. A year later the campus police were "just recovering" according to
one of the patrol sergeants. Chief Towle in January 1977 summarized his feel-
ing about team policing in a two-day conference to describe Boulder's team
policing experiences to representatives from other police departments in the
Denver Region. Pointing toward a copy of the Prescriptive Package on team
policing,[1] he said, "Don't use the prescription unless you have [first] diag-
nosed the problem: I have seen a lot of people hurt badly, a lot of human

1. Bloch, Peter and Spect, David. "Neighborhood Team Policing,"
U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1973.

```
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │     CHIEF       │
                    │ John S. Towle   │
                    └────────┬────────┘
                             ├──────── Secretary
        ┌────────────────────┼─────────────────────────┐
┌─────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐
│ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES│ │FIELD OPERATIONS │ │  ASSISTANT CHIEF    │
│   Lt. Woodward      │ │   Lt. Evans     │ │ PARKING & TRAFFIC   │
└─────────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │   Lt. Gerhardt      │
        ├─secretary           ├──── secretary └─────────────────────┘
        └─2 work/study        └──── sergeant
```

Budget ( )	Communications (1 sgt.; 7 dispatchers)	1 sergeant

Budget   (   )
Community
 Relations   (1 sgt.)
Training   (1 sgt.)
Records   (5 people)

Communications
(1 sgt.;
 7 dispatchers)
Investigations
 (5 sgts.;
Patrol
 (2 sgts.;
 13 officers;
 3 hourly
   employees)
Security
 (1 sgt.;
 2 guards;
 .20 work/study
 1 hourly)

1 sergeant
3 clerks
3-5 hourly
1 officer
4 guards
13 work/study
2 hourly
  students

```
┌─────────────────────┐
│  TOTAL EMPLOYEES    │
│     1 chief         │
│     3 lieutenants   │
│     8 sergeants     │
│    14 officers      │
│     5 guards        │
│ 61 to 63 others     │
│ 92 to 94 TOTAL      │
└─────────────────────┘
```

FIGURE 12: ORGANIZATION CHART AS OF 3/5/76 FOR THE
            UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO POLICE DEPARTMENT

PUBLIC SAFETY ADM II

ASSISTANT TO CHIEF — ASSISTANT TO CHIEF

STAFF & SUPPORT OPERATION BUREAU
Pub. Safety Adm. I

FIELD OPERATIONS BUREAU
Public Safety Admn. I

Records

Traffic

Dispatch and Equipment

Chief Admn Clerk

5 Public Safety Dispatchers

Lt. Patrol & Security

Lt. Investigations

2 Sergeants P.S. Officer(s)

Traffic Records

Traffic Enforcement Sgt.

2 Admn Clerks (A & B)
1 Clerk B

1 Pub. Safety Off.
3 Pub. Safety Guards
15 Hourly

1st SHIFT
Patrol P.S. Sgt.
Patrol P.S. Sgt.

2nd SHIFT
Patrol P.S. Sgt.
"   "   "

3rd SHIFT
Patrol P.S. Sgt.
Security P.S. Sgt.

P.S. Officers

P.S. Officers

P.S. Officers
P.S. Guards

FIGURE 13: ORGANIZATION CHART OF UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO POLICE DEPARTMENT AS OF APRIL 1976

casualties . . . and now we are holding the wake." Trying to implement team

policing in a troubled department proved to be ill-advised.[3]

B. THE LABOR DISPUTE LIMITS ANALYSIS

The analysis of the CUPD experience with team policing has been limited in

this report for a number of reasons. The primary reason is that the labor dis-

pute had more influence on the department than did any combination of "team

policing" concepts. A formal grievance was filed February 26, 1976 charging

the department with harassment and intimidation. The firing of a patrolman

on February 8, 1976 was reported as a central issue in the grievance.

The patrolman was fired for the only reason allowed under the Colorado

State personnel system (which applies-to officers in the campus police de-

partment): inability to perform his job. Joe Evanoski of the Colorado As-

sociation of Public Employees aided in the filing of the grievance and was

quoted as saying "they [Chief Towle and his staff] . . . had it in for him."[2]

Evanoski reported that some officers had demanded that Chief Towle be

suspended.

The University supported the Chief who stayed on the job. A police de-

partment spokesman explained that he thought the department had hired some

unqualified personnel. These personnel were said to be unnecessarily rough

with suspects and to have blatantly ignored university policy and local law.

This is supported by opinions expressed by some Boulder Police Department

personnel who reported that some patrol officers from the campus department

had applied to the city for police department jobs, but were rejected.

2. *Silver and Gold Record*, April 20, 1976, p. 7. Published by The
University of Colorado Faculty and Staff Councils.

In retrospect, the results of the survey of CUPD officers conducted in

January 1976 could have warned of the approaching labor rift.[3] Twenty-three

members of the campus team filled out the questionnaire. The most striking

pattern is the clear splits in responses indicating that there were two op-

posing factions. For example, 65 percent of the officers responded that they

were "well satisfied" with their job versus 26 percent who responded "very

dissatisfied." No one was "neutral" and only 7 percent were "a little

dissatisfied."

By a 9 to 1 margin, the officers supported the team policing concept,

but responded 6 to 4 against the proposition that the team policing program

had improved things in the department. When asked, "Are you actively look-

ing for another job at present?," about 4 in 10 responded "yes." Officers'

opinions about their supervisors tended to be either very positive or very

negative. Neutral responses were rare.

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF ELEMENTS

Largely because of the fact that CUPD is a small department, it already

conformed to seven of the twenty team policing elements listed in Table 5.

"Define Neighborhood Boundaries" (Element #1)—They already existed
since the entire university area became the "neighborhood team area."

"Establish Teams of 20 to 40" (Element #2)—The "team" already existed
in the sense that the officers were already working in the "team area."

3. When The Urban Institute personnel returned to Boulder in April 1976
and reviewed the results of the January 1976 survey with (then) Lt. and (now)
Capt. Bill Woodward, he chastised The Urban Institute for not reporting the
survey results to him sooner. Between the time the survey was conducted and
the time the summary results were returned to CUPD, the labor problems had
surfaced. Woodward indicated that the survey could have provided a useful
warning about brewing trouble.

"Deliver Services in Neighborhood Only" (Element #3)—The department already confined itself to the campus which became the "team area."

"Training in Team Policing" (Element #4)—organizational development was already a part of the training program. The grant allowed training to be expanded as shown in Section F, "Goals for Training Hours Met." After the grant period, the department shifted emphasis and started training for specialization rather than have each officer be a generalist.

"Assign Detectives to Teams" (Element #5)—The detectives already worked in the "team area."

"Emphasize Foot Patrol" (Element #12)—Foot patrol was a previous practice.

"Establish Continuity of Assignment" (Element #14)—The officers had already worked primarily in their "team area."

Other team policing elements were being implemented when the labor dispute erupted; for example,

- "Detectives Train Officers" (Element #6)—The detectives started training patrol officers to investigate both Part I and Part II Crime.

- "Officer Conducts a Degree of Investigation" (Element #7)—The detectives did assign some cases to patrol officers which allowed the detectives to concentrate on a few important cases. The detectives feared that they were being phased out. Patrol officers were not enthusiastic about doing followup investigation.

- "Make Linkages With Social Service Agencies" (Element #8)—Chief Towle issued a reference guide in February 1976. Previously CUPD had checked out all listed agencies in order to confirm the type of referrals each agency handled and what hours each one operated.

- "Make Systematic Referrals" (Element #9)—It may reasonably be assumed that referrals were made, although systematic data were not analyzed. The number of referrals for alcoholic treatment increased which resulted in a dramatic drop in arrests for misuse of alcohol. (See arrest data in Table 24.)

- "Emphasize Service Activities" (Element #10)—Chief Towle stated that service was to be emphasized and dispatch records indicate numerous service activities had been performed.

- "Use Street Stops and Field Interrogations Sparingly" (Element #11)—The CUPD always has been under informal peer pressure to be mellow while policing the campus and not act aggressively to members of the university community.

- "Encourage Community Contacts" (Element #13)—Department policy and practice emphasized community contacts prior to the grant.

- "Deploy Officers Based On Crime and Service Demand" (Element #15)—The CUPD has a computer facility that printed maps and data so as to allocate manpower by hour of day, day of week and location.

- "Decentralize Authority To The Team Leader" (Element #16)—CUPD had to centralize the command of detectives, dispatchers and patrol officers to form the "team."

- "Use Participative Management to Set Objectives, Plan and Evaluate Team Performance" (Element #18)—This was not implemented and there is no plan to implement it in the future.

- "Set Incentives Compatible With Team Policing" (Element #19)—Plans were set to use Donald Cawley's "Evaluation Guide" modified for use in CUPD. Since the state of Colorado sets salary, there is no clear method for linking team policing performance with pay.

The campus police were enthusiastically implementing a very complete set of team policing concepts when the labor dispute shifted priorities from implementing team policing to saving the department. By the end of the grant period, the number of patrol officers had been reduced by about half due to officers being fired or quitting.

D. IMPACT ON CRIME AND ARRESTS

In spite of the turmoil within the police department, the level of serious crime remained at about the same level as in previous years. Table 21 contains a summary of offenses and persons charged. The reported number of serious crimes increased 4 percent in 1975 as compared to a 0.2 percent decrease in 1976. The number of persons arrested or summoned for serious crimes decreased about 9 percent per year between 1974 and 1976. This decrease contributed to a drop in the ratio of arests to offenses which went from 12.4 per 100 in 1974 to 10.2 per 100 in 1976.

Less serious offenses decreased dramatically from 1974 to 1976 as did the

number of arrested or summoned persons, as shown in Table 22. Judging from

the arrests, the majority of offenders on campus are now non-students.

TABLE 21: SUMMARY OF OFFENSES AND PERSONS CHARGED--UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1974-1976

	Serious Offenses*			Less Serious Offenses		
Year	Number of Reported Offenses	Number of Persons Arrested or Summoned	Average Number of Persons Arrested or Summoned Per 100 Offenses	Number of Reported Offenses	Number of Persons Arrested or Summoned	Average Number of Persons Arrested or Summoned Per 100 Offenses
1974	988	123	12.4	1175	511	43.5
1975	1028	111	10.8	834	488	58.5
1976	1026	105	10.2	469	167	35.6

*Rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft (no homicides reported)

TABLE 22: NUMBER OF PERSONS ARRESTED OR SUMMONED (ALL OFFENSES)

	STUDENTS		NON-STUDENTS		TOTAL	
Year	Number	(%)	Number	(%)	Number	(%)
1974	351	(55%)	283	(45%)	634	(100%)
1975	277	(47%)	322	(53%)	599	(100%)
1976	118	(43%)	154	(57%)	272	(100%)

A detailed breakdown of serious crime betwen 1974 and 1976 is shown in

Table 23.

TABLE 23: UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO POLICE DEPARTMENT: NUMBER OF SERIOUS CRIMES, 1974-1976

	Reported Offenses							
Year	Criminal Homicide	Forced Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Auto Theft	Total
1974	0	2	0	49	97	814	26	988
1975	0	2	2	40	172	793	19	1028
1976	0	0	6	37	73	890	20	1026

The large drop in burglary in 1976 was accompanied by a marked increase in

larceny. The total of burglary and larceny remained almost constant between

1975 and 1976 and increased only 6 percent between 1974 and 1975.

The statistics on so-called "less serious crimes" exhibit dramatic

decreases in the annual rates shown in Table 24. The declines might be ex-

plained by the following factors.

- Due to the serious decrease in patrol manpower starting at the end of April 1976, the amount of patrol decreased which may have decreased the opportunity for the police to observe crimes involving drugs and animals--a substantial number of the "all other" crimes between 1973 and 1975 involved dogs and other animals. Foot patrol and coverage of dormitories increased.

- Emphasis on marijuana offenses was reduced.

- One patrol officer commented that "the hard noses left the department."

The decreased emphasis on drug law enforcement is reflected in the arrest

statistics shown in Table 24.

TABLE 24: UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO POLICE DEPARTMENT: NUMBER OF PERSONS CHARGED (ARRESTED OR SUMMONED), 1974-1976

| | NUMBER OF PERSONS CHARGED (ARREST OR SUMMONS) | | | | | | | | | |
| | Serious Offenses | | | | | Less Serious Offenses | | | | |
Year	Burglary	Larceny	Auto Theft	Crimes Against Persons*	Total	Drugs and Liquor	Drunk Driving	All Other	Total	Total All Offenses
1974	17	97	1	8	123	86	24	401	511	634
1975	20	77	0	14	111	80	73	335	488	599
1976	1	73	16	15	105	15	13	139	167	272

*Rape, robbery, assault (no homicides have been reported)

V. BOULDER OUTCOME CHANGES

In the review of the team policing theory, The Urban Institute identified eleven beneficial outcomes expected to result from implementing team policing. The eleven outcomes are listed in Table 25 along with a summary of the apparent results in Boulder. The Boulder grant application stated objectives for eight out of the eleven elements. Specific measures were cited in the grant application for six of the eight elements. The trends for two of the six measures were positive: clearance rates by arrest increased 13 percent and Part I Crime dropped 12 percent. The improvements in arrests and crimes cannot be attributed to team policing.

As indicated in Table 28, three out of the eleven desired outcomes in the federal model were not listed in the Boulder grant application and are only briefly discussed below.

The three outcomes involve improvements that are supposed to result as a consequence of team policing; namely, improvement in

- productivity (Outcome #3)
- effectiveness of law enforcement (Outcome #8)
- community services (Outcome #11)

Since the workload (calls for service and officer-initiated calls) increased while the patrol force held relatively constant, productivity increased by necessity. Since crime has dropped in Boulder and a large number of community meetings have been held by patrol officials, it would appear that the effectiveness of law enforcement in Boulder has increased with the increase in referrals to social service agencies made by the police. The evidence supports a conclusion that the police have acted to improve community services.

TABLE 25:   SUMMARY OF BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT EXPERIENCE WITH OUTCOME CHANGES

Outcome Change in Federal Team Policing Model	Was Element Stated As a Local Objectives	What Were The Types Of Measures For The Change Used In The Local Objective	Considering the Number, Timing and Magnitude Of The Implementation Changes, Is A Significant Outcome Change Plausible?	What Data Were Collected To Measure Change?	Do The Data Indicate A Change? What Direction?
1 Improve Police Community Relations	Yes	Citizen Attitudes Before And During The Program	Perhaps	Officer and Citizen Surveys Only One Wave	No Change
2 Increase Officer Job Satisfaction	Yes	Patrol Officer Survey Responses Before and During The Program	No	Officer Survey	Team Policing and Possible Decrease in Job Satisfaction
3 Increase Productivity	No	-NA-	No	Demand for Service & Manpower	Possible Increase
4 Increase Flow of Crime-Related Information to Police, Increased Reporting Rate of Crime	Yes	Increase in Clearance Rates	Perhaps	Number of Arrests	Arrests Per Part I Crimes Increased 26%
5 Increase Quality and Quantity of Investigations, Increase Number of Criminals Apprehended and Prosecuted	Yes	Arrests for Part I Crimes	Perhaps	Arrest Rates	"
6 Improve Police Service	Yes	"Overall Level of Police Service"	Perhaps	Indirect Indicators	-NA-
7 Improve Crime Prevention and Control	Yes	"Greater Citizen Involvement in Crime Prevention" Reach 20% Population With Community Presentations	Yes	Number of Community Presentations, Attendees	Almost 20% of Population Reached
8 More Effective Law Enforcement	No	-NA-	-NA-	-NA-	-NA-
9 Decrease Crime Rates	Yes	A 10% Reduction In Part I Crime	No	UCR Crime Rates	Part I Crimes In 1976 Dropped 12% After Changes Of +30% and -11% In Previous Years
10 Decrease Citizen Fear	Yes	Not Specified	No	Citizen Survey	Citizen Fear Of Crime is Low In Boulder
11 Improve Community Services	No	-NA-	-NA-	None	-NA-

88

A. POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS
(OUTCOME CHANGE #1)

The proposal states that improvements in community attitudes towards po-
lice were expected and the expectation could be tested with data from The
Urban Institute community survey which was originally planned to include two
waves of interviews (100 interviews per wave) with Boulder citizens. The
survey was limited to just the first wave administered in January 1976 after
team policing had been implemented. In general, the survey indicated that
Boulder citizens were quite satisfied with their police department although
they had little contact with the police and were unaware that Boulder had
a team policing program, and infrequently had an opinion as to how the de-
partment's operations should change.

Lacking results from two waves of the same survey to detect changes, the
alternative is to use data from two different citizen surveys and two dif-
ferent police department personnel surveys to provide insights on changes in
police/community relations. In October 1974, the Ossorio group completed a
survey of 175 citizens (representing a 70 percent response rate to a mailed
questionnaire). In January 1976, The Urban Institute telephone survey
reached 100 households in Boulder. The questions used by the two surveys
were not the same; however, certain questions are similar enough to permit
comparisons. The January 1976 Urban Institute survey of officers was also
compared to the Ossorio survey of officers conducted in 1974. Again, the
questions were not identical, but certain questions are similar enough to
allow comparisons.

In the October 1974 Ossorio survey, there were numerous questions that
covered aspects of police/community relations and the general indication was

that citizens were either satisfied or had no opinion. For example, the citizens were asked to rate the police department in 15 areas of which 6 can be interpreted as indicators about community relations:

TABLE 26: CITIZEN RATINGS OF POLICE DEPARTMENT'S ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNITY RELATIONS: SELECTED INDICATORS FROM 1974 SURVEY

Area	Percent Distribution of Responses						
	Very Poor	Poor	Average	Good	Very Good	Don't Know	Total*
Responsiveness to Citizens	3%	10%	26%	34%	13%	14%	100%
Accessibility to Citizens	2%	9%	26%	33%	11%	20%	101%
Community Relations	5%	10%	35%	23%	2%	25%	100%
Public Image	7%	15%	35%	25%	3%	14%	99%
Community Service Other Than Law Enforcement	4%	13%	20%	13%	2%	48%	100%
Respect for Citizens' Rights	7%	11%	27%	24%	10%	20%	99%

*May not always sum to 100 percent because of rounding errors.
Source: Ossorio survey, October 1974 (N=175).

Note that only 15 percent of the citizens rated the department below average on "community relations" and ratings for the other areas exhibited similar distributions.

The Ossorio group asked the citizens to "rate the department in regard to differential enforcement of laws dealing with different groups of the community" and the responses were as shown below.

TABLE 27: CITIZEN RATINGS OF HOW DIFFERENT POPULATION GROUPS ARE TREATED BY THE POLICE

Group	Percent Distribution of Responses					
	Harassed By Police	Harsh Enforcement	Impartial	Lenient Enforcement	Don't Know	Total*
Students	10%	13%	32%	16%	28%	99%
Off-Duty Police Officers	1%	5%	16%	18%	60%	100%
"Street People"	12%	19%**	17%	27%	25%	100%
Chicanos	5%	10%	31%	14%	40%	100%
Blacks	3%	6%	36%	14%	41%	100%
Businessmen	0%	1%	32%	33%	34%	100%
Professional Persons	1%	2%	33%	28%	37%	101%
Low-Income Residents	3%	8%	41%	4%	43%	99%

*May not add to 100% due to rounding errors.
**A parallel survey of police officers showed that 41 percent rated enforcement as "harsh" for street people which was the highest percent given for the "harsh" rating among all eight groups of citizens. Police and citizens agree on who receives the harshest treatment.

Source: Ossorio Report, February 1975.

Note that street people and students appeared to have fared the worst with 31 percent and 23 percent respectively of the citizens responding that these groups are treated harshly or harassed by the police, but that the general indication is that Boulder citizens are treated well by the police. In view of the riot of street people in 1971 and a student antiwar riot in 1972 in Boulder, it is not surprising that citizens responded as shown on the questions about street people and students.

Even though citizens were generally satisfied with the police according to the Ossorio survey, they expressed a desire for more direct interaction

between police and citizens and for a community relations program. The

relevant survey results are shown below.

TABLE 28: CITIZEN OPINION ON SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

	Percent Distribution of Citizen Responses						
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know	Total*
Police Officers Should Have More Direct Interaction With Citizens	20%	47%	14%	7%	2%	10%	100%
The Department Should Initiate a Community Relations Program**	22%	56%	8%	2%	2%	10%	100%
The Community Relations Program Should Include Community Relations Training For Officers	28%	46%	5%	3%	2%	17%	101%
The Department Needs More Financial Support From The City	11%	22%	12%	7%	3%	44%	99%

*May not add to 100% due to rounding errors.
**The Ossorio survey of police officers in Boulder showed that 51 percent "strongly agree" and 37 percent "agree" with this statement. Hence, the police seem to be even more inclined to a community relations program than citizens who strongly support the idea.
Source: Ossorio Survey.

The Urban Institute survey of 100 citizens was conducted by a random

digit dialing procedure in January 1976. The large majority of citizens (91%)[1]

rated police services "good" or "very good" which compares with 61 percent of

the citizens (excluding "don't know" responses) who rated the overall func-

tioning of the police department "good" or "very good" in the Ossorio survey

in 1974. The data suggest a possible improvement in the ratings given to the

1. Compared to the other sites in the team policing demonstration, this is the highest rating observed. Elizabeth was 86 percent; Hartford 77 percent; Multnomah 83 percent; Santa Ana 78 percent; and Winston-Salem 81 percent.

department by citizens even though the surveys were administered differently

and did not have identical questions.

The level of respect for police by citizens and vice versa was high accord-

ing to the 1976 survey: 88 percent of the citizens responded that the police

in their neighborhood had some or a great deal of respect for citizens. This

can be crudely compared to the 61 percent of the citizens in the Ossorio survey

who thought that the police respect for citizens' rights was average, good

or very good. From this rough comparison it would be difficult to argue that

respect has declined. Furthermore, respect for police as indicated by survey

results in the other five demonstration sites showed no significant variation

among sites. From this one can conclude that overall citizen respect for

police is very insensitive to actions taken by the local police department.

The direct contact between police and citizens in Boulder is infrequent,

which indicates that the citizens have limited direct experience which might

influence their opinion of the police department. For example, in January

1976, citizens responded that only—

- 17 percent had talked informally with a police officer in their neighborhood during the past month or so. Of those who talked, the majority said the experience had no effect on their opinion of the police.[2]

- 27 percent lived in a household where someone had called the police for any reason in the previous 6 months.

- 32 percent had seen a police officer or detective investigating a crime in the past six months

2. Combining results from the citizen surveys in all six demonstration sites shows that of those citizens who talked informally with police, 43 percent said the experience caused their opinion of police to be more posi-tive versus only 5 percent who said the experience caused a negative shift in opinion. The remaining 53 percent said it had no effect.

By the end of the team policing grant, the estimate is that at most 20 percent of all Boulder citizens attended community meetings where police personnel were present.

The January 1976 citizen survey described team policing as a program "where police are assigned to small areas in the hope that they will get to know the people, understand their problems, provide better police service and control crime." Sixty-nine percent of the citizens said they thought this type of program would work in their neighborhood, but 73 percent said that to the best of their knowledge this type of police program was not operating in their neighborhood. Another 10 percent said they didn't know, while only 17 percent said "yes" the program was operating in their neighborhood.

The fact that the citizens had limited direct contact with the police and were not aware that the police were in the "team policing" mode supports the argument that there is little reason for the citizen survey to detect changes caused by team policing.

The conclusions about community relations are that the citizens in Boulder have generally been satisfied with the performance of the police department. Citizen opinion of the police was high prior to team policing and it is unrealistic—considering the amount of contact citizens have with the police—to expect a sample survey of all citizens to reveal any marked improvement in how citizens rate the police department.

Both citizens and police are in favor of community relations programs. However, the citizens do not support increases in police budgets and the police say that they only have enough manpower to reach a small percent of all Boulder citizens each year through community relations programs that emphasize crime prevention, referrals to social service agencies, and informal communications such as occur during foot patrol or a "ridealong" (a citizen rides

along with an officer in a police car). Boulder has about one patrol officer per every 1,400 residents in the city. Hence, if each patrol officer spent, let us say, 10 percent of his working hours working on community relations, he could spend less than 10 minutes per resident per year.

B. JOB SATISFACTION
(OUTCOME CHANGE #2)

Contrary to both the team policing theory and the expectations expressed in the grant proposal, there are strong indications that patrol officer job satisfaction has been moderately good all along but did not increase during the team policing grant period. However, many factors other than the introduction of team policing concepts contributed to an apparent lack of improvement in job satisfaction. These factors include:

- Chief Barber's management style which culminated in his resignation from the department.

- The expectations expressed by OTT officials about team policing which were viewed as unrealistically optimistic by Boulder patrol personnel.

- A decline in manpower and vehicles assigned to the patrol division as compared to an increase in the detective unit.

According to the original evaluation plan, there were to be two waves of officer surveys so as to compare the pre-team policing period with the during period. Since Boulder team policing started before The Urban Institute patrol officer survey was administered, other less direct approaches for measuring changes in job satisfaction had to be used.

The most direct comparative measure of job satisfaction before and after
the start of team policing is provided by the January 1976 patrol officer
survey. (See Table 29.) Officers were asked to rate how they felt in Jan-
uary 1976 in comparison to a year earlier.

TABLE 29: OFFICER JOB SATISFACTION

Job Satisfaction	Current Year As Compared To Previous Year		
	Much Better Or Better	Same	Much Poorer Or Poorer
My Happiness In My Work	43%	17%	40%

Source: Urban Institute Survey, 1976 (N=100)

The conclusion is that whatever changes occurred in job satisfaction,
the contribution from team policing was either negative or smaller than the
changes induced by other factors.

In support of the conclusion that team policing had either a negative
impact or less of an impact on job satisfaction than other factors, the pa-
trol officer survey in January 1976 showed that the officers are evenly split
(agree versus disagree) on the statement that "The neighborhood team policing
program represents no real change in the department's policy or procedures."
Ninety-five percent of the officers surveyed agreed with the statement, "If
neighborhood team policing succeeds, it will be largely the result of putting
more men and equipment on the street." Since the number of men and amount of
equipment on the street did not increase and the officers were unsure whether
team policing caused any real change in the department, the causal link be-
tween team policing and increased job satisfaction seems weak when compared
to the other factors. For example, police officers expressed strong dissatis-
faction with dispatchers but tended to think the situation was improving. Of-
ficers were almost unanimous in their belief that the amount of overtime pay
significantly contributed to overall satisfaction.

Officers placed high importance on "crime fighter" type activity such as
responding to a robbery in progress or making an arrest. They placed low im-
portance on "social work" type activity emphasized in team policing such as
attending neighborhood meetings, handling a family fight or a drunk passed
out on the street.

Compared to the previous year, officers in January 1976 felt that their
chances for "getting ahead on my job," "satisfaction with my progress" and
"advancement on the basis of ability" had dropped significantly. When faced
with the statement "there are so many changes going on here you never know
what is going to happen next," 91 percent of the officers said they "strongly
agreed" while the rest said that they "agreed." No officer disagreed.
Clearly, the management style and changes were bothering the officers.

The strongest evidence from the patrol survey that team policing had a
negative impact on job satisfaction was that 72 percent of the officers sur-
veyed responded "no" to the question, "Has the neighborhood team policing pro-
gram improved things in your department?" The reasons cited by those offi-
cers who answered "yes" most often centered around the additional training
provided by the grant and the increase in input by citizens and officers.
The negative comments centered more around how the program was implemented
rather than on team policing concepts.

Officers frequently stated that team policing would require more man-
power than was available in Boulder. One team officer noted that "the
program is basically a good idea, but it is so poorly managed and adminis-
tered that it has severely hurt morale and efficiency."

In January 1976, one Boulder officer was distressed enough with the pro-
gram to write to LEAA with copies to members of Congress. The writer stated

that if Boulder's original team policing objectives "are compared with current operations and attitudes, LEAA evaluators will be disappointed to find a wide gap between reality and the words written for the sake of $179,000 of Federal money." The writer correctly predicted the major shortcomings in the Boulder program: lack of training prior to implementation and inept decisions "from the department's highest office." The writer was still optimistic and stated that "It is my hope that the program evaluation . . . will expose the mismanagement of a program that might otherwise be one of the most successful team policing attempts to date."

C. ARRESTS INCREASE
(OUTCOME CHANGE #5)

The grant proposal links two outcomes by suggesting that the goal of increasing the flow of crime-related information from citizens to team officers (Outcome Change #4) be tested by observing changes in the clearance rates for crimes (Outcome Change #5). The proposal specified that the goal was to increase the clearance rate by arrest from 19 percent to 24 percent. In the last quarterly report, Boulder claimed that the goal was accomplished since the number of _arrests_ for Part I crimes in the last quarter of 1976 was 13 percent higher than the last quarter of 1975. The increase in arrests was achieved even though the number of crimes that could produce arrests decreased. The numbers of arrests are shown below on Table 30. Changes in arrests can be converted into changes in the arrest clearance rate by normalizing for the number of Part I crimes.

TABLE 30: CITY OF BOULDER--ARREST FOR PART I CRIMES

	1975	1976
January	52	65
February	53	59
March	77	76
October	54	87
November	53	67
December	113	95

Since Part I Crime in the last quarter of 1976 were 11 percent less than the last quarter of 1975, the number of arrests per crime was 27 percent higher the last quarter of 1976 as compared to 1975.[3]

While the clearance by arrest rate for the Boulder Police Department showed a slight increase during the grant period, it would appear that Team Policing had little to do with that increase. Patrol officers did not act as investigators on any large or medium scale.

D. FLOW OF CRIME-RELATED INFORMATION
(OUTCOME CHANGE #4)

Although the increase in arrests is impressive, a clear argument attributing the increase in arrests to team policing cannot be made because certain links remain unexplained. The patrol officer survey in January 1976 showed that the officers were split (62 percent agreeing versus 38 percent disagreeing) on the statement that the team policing program will provide officers "with more accurate and timely information about area problems and criminal activity." Citizens in the January 1976 survey only indicated that they would

3. $\dfrac{1976 \text{ Arrests}}{1976 \text{ Crimes}} = \dfrac{1975 \text{ Arrests} + 13\%}{1975 \text{ Crimes} - 11\%} = \dfrac{1975 \text{ Arrests}}{1975 \text{ Crimes}} + 27\%$

usually, but not always, help the police by reporting crimes and identifying criminals. There is ample room for improvement according to the survey result of the citizens:

- Do you think residents in your neighborhood would help police identify criminals?

	Boulder	Range For Other Sites
56 percent responded "usually"		38% to 80%
17 percent responded "occasionally"		7% to 21%
12 percent responded "seldom"		4% to 22%
15 percent responded "don't know"		8% to 22%
100 percent total		

- Do you think residents in your neighborhood would report crimes they observe to the police?

	Boulder Citizens	
73 percent responded "usually"		Responses in
12 percent responded "occasionally"		five other cities
7 percent responded "seldom"		are not significantly
8 percent responded "don't know"		different
100 percent total		from Boulder.[4]

Boulder did not perceive the linkage between team policing and the decrease in Part I Crime along with an increase in arrests for Part I Crime as strong enough to continue the experiment. An audit of the arrest cases could isolate what factors contributed to the increase in arrests. For example,

- How many arrests were made by patrol officers as compared to by the detectives? This could explain whether the increase in the number of detectives contributed to the increase in arrests.

- How many arrests were made "on-scene" versus those made as the result of an extended investigation? This could explain whether citizens gave patrol officers better leads during the preliminary investigation that produced an arrest.

- Has the quality of the arrests remained the same as measured by how the prosecutor and courts reacted? This could explain whether or not the increase in arrests was accomplished by making arrests based on flimsier evidence.

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4. Chi square test not significant at .05 level of significance.

- Did the reports on the cases resulting in arrests in 1976 contain significantly more information from citizens than was presented in the previous year? This could explain whether or not changes in the information provided by citizens made a significant contribution to the increase in arrests.

- Did the 1976 opening of the new criminal justice center with its luxury jail trigger any increase in the number of inmates? This could explain whether or not there was any increase in jail capacity.

E. IMPROVEMENTS IN POLICE SERVICE AND CRIME PREVENTION (OUTCOME CHANGES #6 AND #7)

The proposal stated that an improvement in the "overall level of police service" was expected and proposed measures for quantifying the quality of police service included:

- reduction in use of force;
- greater citizen respect for police; and,
- greater citizen satisfaction with police service rendered.

The goal of "greater citizen involvement in crime prevention" as stated in the grant proposal received a substantial fraction of the patrol division resources. The specific goal was to hold 180 community presentations[5] with a total attendance of no less than 20 percent of the total population. As previously stated, actual performance fell slightly short of the goal.

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5. Community presentations included the following types of events:
- A crime prevention "fair" with four local law enforcement agencies participating and an estimated 1,500 citizens attending
- Chamber of Commerce Crime Prevention Task Force which cosponsors crime prevention fairs, workshops and publicity
- Operation Identification
- Sexual Assault Awareness Seminars
- Neighborhood Association programs to promote crime watch concepts
- Crime prevention presentations to business, social and other miscellaneous groups
- School-level crime prevention programs

As mentioned previously, Boulder citizens were found to have high respect

for the police and felt generally satisfied with police service according to

the Ossorio survey in 1974 and the January 1976 Urban Institute survey as well.

On the topic of citizen respect for the police, data from the Ossorio

survey of citizens are indirect, but show citizens respect the department.

For example:

- Only 5 percent of the citizens rated the "overall functioning" of the department as "poor" or "very poor" as compared to 51 percent who gave a rating of "good" or "very good."

- Citizens opposed by a 2 to 1 ratio a suggestion that "the city should consider bringing in high-ranking officers from the outside instead of only promoting from within."[6]

The Urban Institute survey, unlike the Ossorio survey, contained a question on citizen respect for police. The January 1976 response to the question, "How much respect to you think citizens in your neighborhood have for police officers?" was as follows:

48 percent responded "a great deal"
44 percent responded "some"
6 percent responded "not much"
2 percent responded "don't know"

The results to this question when asked to citizens from the other five

sites are not significantly different from those in Boulder. The amount of

citizen respect for police apparently is only weakly related to the local police.

Since The Urban Institute survey was conducted after the team policing

program started in Boulder, the only pre-comparison of citizen attitude data

comes from the Ossorio survey. One comparison of responses from the two sur-

veys is shown in Table 31, which shows the pattern of responses when citizens

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6. With hindsight, it is interesting to note that had the city followed police and citizen opinion on this subject, they would not have hired Chief Barber, a Californian, early in 1975 and Chief Barber might not have had to resign about a year later. The police also opposed bringing in outsiders and by a margin of 2.3 to 1 as compared to a 2 to 1 margin in the citizen survey.

TABLE 31: COMPARISON OF CITIZEN ATTITUDE--
1974 VERSUS 1976

Urban Institute survey of citizens, January 1976, "When you think about all the police services in your neighborhood, would you say that, in general, police are doing a very good job, a good job, a not so good job, or a poor job?"		Ossorio survey of citizens in November 1974, "Please rate the police department" on "overall functioning."	
30%	Very Good	Very Good[7]	9%
61%	Good	Good	42%
		Average	28%
2%	Not So Good		
2%	Poor	Poor	3%
		Very Poor	2%
6%	Don't Know	Don't Know	16%
100% (N=100)	Total	Total (N=175)	100%

were asked to rate "police services" in 1976 and "overall functioning" of the

police department in 1974. Considering the fact that the questions were stated

differently and the response scales were different, the response patterns do

not exhibit any striking differences. Excluding the "don't know" responses,

97 percent of the citizens in 1976 rated police services better than "poor"

versus 94 percent of the citizens in the 1974 survey. Part of the improve-

ment in citizen ratings between the 1974 and the 1976 surveys may be explained

by the critical tone of the Ossorio survey which asked citizens to respond to

statements such as:

- "In order to minimize excessive secrecy and abuse of power, there should be a small committee of distinguished citizens who would act as a police review group."
- "The present military structure should be replaced by a more democratic one."
- "The department is too traditional in its mode of operation."

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7. In the Ossorio survey, the choices were arranged starting with "very poor" and continuing on to "very good" and ended with "don't know."

The Urban Institute could be characterized as having the opposite bias; namely, usually stating the questions in a tone favorable to the police. For example, comparing the two questions on Table 32, The Urban Institute list of possible responses started with the most favorable (namely, police services are "very good") while the Ossorio survey was just the opposite. The options started with the "very poor" rating. [In Table 32, the order of choices in answer to the question have been rearranged from that used in the Ossorio survey.]

A variety of questions on both the Ossorio survey and The Urban Institute survey touched on citizens' rating of police service rendered. One example concerned response time. In spite of the fact that the Boulder police believed that response times got longer, a comparison of the 1974 and the 1976 survey results showed no marked decrease in citizens' rating of how quickly the police arrived.

TABLE 32: COMPARISON OF POLICE RESPONSE TIME--
1974 VERSUS 1976

Urban Institute survey (January 1976), "When police are contacted in your neighborhood, do they usually arrive . . ."		Ossorio Survey (November 1974) rating on "quick response to calls."	
		very good	9%
		good	42%
42%	very quickly	average	28%
24%	somewhat quickly	poor	3%
5%	not too quickly	very poor	2%
29%	don't know	don't know	16%
100% (N=100) Total		Total (N=175) 100%	

The citizen survey in January 1976 attempted to measure how citizens rated police services for which they had gained firsthand experience. Unfortunately, the value of the survey is low because the frequency with which citizens gain firsthand knowledge of how police services are delivered is low. For example, the 1976 survey showed that in the six months prior to the survey--

- 27 percent of households contained a person who had called the police for any reason;

- 10 percent of the citizens had seen the police handling a drunk or disorderly person;

- 32 percent of the citizens claimed they had seen the police investigating a crime;

- 21 percent of the citizens said they had seen the police aiding a person who was sick or injured;

- 38 percent of the citizens had seen an incident where police were either arresting someone or questioning a suspect.

Excluding the tiny sample of ten incidents where citizens observed the police with a drunk or disorderly person, the percentage of incidents for which the citizen gave a "not so good" or "poor" response to the question, "How good a job do you think the police did in handling [the incident]?" was very low as shown below:

- 7 percent for the "call police for any reason" incidents;

- 3 percent for the "investigating a crime" incidents;

- 5 percent for the "sick or injured" incidents;

- 10 percent for the "arrest" or "questioning a suspect" incidents.

The vast majority of the incidents received a "very good" or "good" rating by citizens.

The only likely conclusions are either (1) the ratings were high both prior and during the team policing period or (2) the ratings were lower during the prior period and rose during the team policing period. The weight of the available evidence supports the first conclusion.

The police officers are ambivalent as to whether the team policing program is a better way to improve the quality of police services. Only 22 percent of the officers either "agree" or "agree strongly" with the proposition that the team policing program "is a better way for police to try to

improve the quality of police services than any other method" of organizing

the police department while a near equal percent "disagree" or "strongly dis-

agree." The overall pattern of response follows:

        22 percent "agree" or "strongly agree"
        35 percent "agree somewhat"
        20 percent "disagree somewhat"
        24 percent "disagree" or "strongly disagree"

The police also gave very mixed ratings to the services they were provid-

ing in January 1976. The survey posed the question: "When you think about

all the police services in your neighborhood, would you say that in general

police are doing a good job, a satisfactory job, or not so good a job?" The

response pattern of officers surveyed was:

        28 percent responded "a good job"
        42 percent responded "a satisfactory job"
        30 percent responded "not so good a job"

F.   PART I CRIME DROPS
(OUTCOME CHANGE #9)

The goals of reducing Part I Crime by 10 percent and reducing citizen

fear of crime [by an unspecified amount] were stated in the grant proposal.

Part I Crime in 1976 was 12 percent lower than in 1975. Boulder's decrease

in Part I Crime compares favorably with the decreases observed in 100 other

cities with populations in the 100,000 to 250,000 population range.[8] About

7 percent of the cities had larger decreases than Boulder, while the remaining

93 percent had either an increase in Part I Crime or a decrease smaller than

in Boulder as shown by the data in Figure 14. The drop in 1976 Part I Crime

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8. Boulder's population is about 63,000 in the city and very near
100,000 including the campus population. Data for change in the 50,000 to
100,000 population group were available only for the years prior to 1976.
However, using 1974-1975 data there was no statistically significant differ-
ence among cities above and below 100,000 population when comparing the
distribution of percent changes in Part I Crimes.

FIGURE 14: BOULDER, COLORADO COMPARED TO OTHER CITIES: PERCENT CHANGE IN PART I CRIMES
FOR 1975-1976 IN 100 CITIES POPULATION 100,000 TO 250,000

SOURCE: UCR Crime Reports

was a sharp contrast to 1975 when the number of Part I crimes was 30 percent

higher than in 1974. The 1973-1974 Boulder increase was larger than occurred

in 90 percent of all cities in the 50,000 to 100,000 population range. Hence

Boulder can claim both a large increase in crime prior to team policing and

a large decrease during the team policing grant period.

Figure 15 contains a graphic representation of the change in Boulder's

Part I Crime for 1974 to 1975 as compared to other cities under and over

100,000 population. The two distributions shown in Figure 15 do not have

any statistically significant difference.[9]

Some Boulder officials have expressed the explanation that crime dropped

because so many criminals had been put in jail. But whatever the reasons for

the drop in crime may have been, they were clearly not so strongly associated

with team policing that Boulder officials continued the experiment. Perhaps,

as shown in Table 33, a comparison of the drop in the 1976 Part I Crime with

changes in previous years shows the recent drop is nothing out of the ordinary

in Boulder.

TABLE 33: DROP IN PART I CRIME,
1973-1976

| Year | Percent Change In Part I Crimes Over Previous Year | |
	Boulder	Nationwide
1973	− 1%	+ 1%
1974	−11%	+16%
1975	+30%	+11%
1976	−12%	+ 2%*
*First nine months.		

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9. According to a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the hypothesis
that the distributions are different must be rejected even at the 0.10 level
of significance.

FIGURE 15: 1974-1975 CHANGE IN PART I CRIME: BOULDER COMPARED TO OTHER CITIES

The citizen survey in January 1976 shows that, in spite of the large increase in Part I Crime between 1974 and 1975, only 31 percent of the respondents believed that crime in their neighborhoods had increased in 1975. Forty-nine percent believed there was no change, 6 percent said crime decreased and 14 percent didn't know.

Furthermore, the increase in Part I Crime apparently did not influence those three citizens in four who believed that the chances of being robbed or attacked in their Boulder neighborhoods were the same in 1975 and 1974. Citizen fear of crime in Boulder does not appear to be at all closely correlated with reported levels of crime.

Boulder citizens generally were not very afraid of crime. For example, three out of five citizens felt their belongings were safe if they went out for an evening and left their homes unlocked.[10] Three out of four citizens felt safe being out alone at night in Boulder.[11] Because of the low level of fear, the lack of sensitivity to changes in reported crime, and the fact that the great majority of citizens were unaware that team policing was going on in Boulder, there is scant reason to believe that team policing had any significant effect on citizen fear of crime in Boulder.

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10. In this respect, Boulder citizens feel significantly safer than the citizens surveyed in all the other team policing demonstration sites.

11. Boulder citizens feel significantly safer than citizens in all the other sites surveyed.

G. COMMENTS FROM BOULDER ON LESSONS LEARNED

This section summarizes the reactions to team policing by Boulder personnel translated into a "lessons learned" format by the local evaluator and the chief.

- Prior to making a decision on whether or not to move towards NTP, the line level of the organization should be queried in order to determine if they (the line) are interested in having their jobs enriched or enlarged. In other words, it would be advisable to ask officers if they wish to participate and if they desire to participate in neighborhood team policing.

- The planning and training time necessary prior to implementation of neighborhood team policing should be at least 18 months.

- The concept of neighborhood team policing should be viewed as a progression or series of changes over an extended period of time. Even though the grant terminated March 31, 1977, changes in the Boulder Police Department service delivery system will continue. For example, on April 4, 1977 the Boulder Police Department was reorganized. This realignment entailed placing investigators in each patrol division shift under the supervision of patrol supervisors. The detective division was changed into a Major Case Squad. Each shift was subdivided into working groups. The personnel (officers, detectives, and supervisors) of each working group will maintain identical working schedules to insure the continuity of the work group.

- The implications of jurisdiction-wide implementation of neighborhood team policing versus Pilot Project or partial jurisdiction implementation of neighborhood team policing are critical.

  If a pilot area of the jurisdiction is chosen for implementation, the team members may be selected for their desire to experiment with a new form of service delivery.

  Boulder's experience with a department-wide plan of neighborhood team policing implementation brought about many problems, chief of which was the problem of attempting to utilize all department personnel in the project.

  Unwillingness by numerous officers to try neighborhood team policing or the neighborhood team policing roles hindered implementation.

- Planning for team policing should involve the "task force" concept which would utilize all levels of the organization.

  --Boulder's planning task force was composed primarily of mid-level administrators. Once the grant was written, the task force disbanded.

--Inasmuch as a significant number of department personnel were not involved in the task force, but would have appreciated being asked, there was animosity towards the program and specifically the methods of planning and implementation prior to grant funding.

Commitment by the Police Association is extremely important if the project is to succeed. This was not accomplished in Boulder and, as a result, there was opposition from the Police Association.

Team leaders should be allocated sufficient authority to insure that they can accomplish the tasks set for them and by them.

--Team leaders in Boulder were oftentimes co-opted as to the latitude they were given.

--The net effect was to diminish the effectiveness of the team leader in the eyes of subordinates who questioned who was actually the team leader, and how much authority the team leader had.

FIGURE 1: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATING FORM--ENFORCEMENT GROUP

BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATING FORM
SECTION A - OCCUPATIONAL REVIEW FACTORS
SUPERVISORY/MANAGERIAL

Name _____   Type of Review

Position _____

Review Period: Merit   Semi-Annual   Special

From _____   Date employed/promoted _____

Through _____   Date last Evaluation _____

                                      Date last Merit Raise _____

                                      Date Due _____

Factor Rating:

Well Above Standard 5   Above Standard 4   Standard 3   Below Standard 2

Well Below Standard 1   Does Not Apply 0   Not Observed N

Job Knowledge		Work Habits		Other Related Factors
Technological Knowledge		Organization		
Scheduling		Punctuality of Assign.		
Co-ordinating		Effect Under Stress		
Evaluating Subordinates		Operational Economy		
Decision Making		Supervisory Control		
Knowledge/Application of Law		Community Involvement		
Current Events		Impartiality		
Training				
Communications		Work Environment		
Public Speaking		Promotes Healthy Work Envir.		
Conference Techniques		Promotes Safety Practices		
Written Presentations		Traffic Safety		
Interviewing		Firearms		
Radio Procedures				

FIGURE 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATING FORM--SUPERVISORY/MANAGERIAL

BOULDER POLICE DEPARTMENT   EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT   SECTION B
(Supplementary Narrative)

Employee:	Employee #	Position	Division/Assignment	Date of Report

SECTION B: Supplementary Narrative

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Rater: Reviewer: Employee: Page _____
                                                        of _____

FIGURE 3: EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT--SUPPLEMENTARY
NARRATIVE

FIGURE 4: EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT--RATING SHEET

SUGGESTED CHANGE #1
(TEAM POLICING)
FROM OSSORIO REPORT*

The organizational structure of the police department would be changed from one characterized by a hierarchical, para-military structure to one in which teams are used to perform the police functions. The team concept is typically characterized by the following:

1. teams of generalists who are decentralized to work in a specified, permanent geographic area,
2. a co-ordination and information section which provides administrative and staff functions, and
3. a division which performs specialized functions such as investigations, juvenile, and traffic functions.

Implementation

At the direction of the chief, the entire departmental structure would be converted to conform to the team policing concept.

Expected Results, Pro:

1. Team policing may bring about a better use of patrol time.
2. Team policing would keep the detectives out in the field.
3. In that in team policing officers are assigned to permanent districts, the department may be better able to keep abreast of the needs and wants of the community.
4. The permanent assignment of officers to districts may increase communication with members of the public.
5. People in the districts would be more apt to report a crime if they have a personal relationship with the officer.
6. In that in typical team policing general officers conduct investigations of minor crimes, team policing may take a load off the investigative unit.
7. Team policing may cut down on the crime rate because people in the neighborhood would be willing to report crimes to the police.
8. Typically in team policing decision-making responsibilities are left to members of the department which may cause the members to take more pride in their work.
9. Team policing may decrease the need for additional manpower in the line areas.

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*Ossorio, Peter G.; Bush, Earlene; and Lasater, Lane. "Values and Implementations for the Boulder Police Department," Final Report submitted February 17, 1975, p. 37-40.

10. Productivity may increase because the officers would take more pride in their work.
11. The Department may have more adequate investigations, crime fighting, and crime prevention because officers would have more time to devote to those aspects of police work.
12. The ideas and suggestions of the officers would be given more credence.
13. The conviction rate may increase as a result of better investigations.
14. Team policing would promote better relations with the public.
15. Team policing may have a positive effect on the Department's image.
16. Team policing would bring about better law enforcement because the team would be able to clearly define law enforcement goals in their particular area.
17. It would be less expensive to investigate a crime scene because a special investigator would not necessarily have to be called out.

Expected Results, Con:

1. Being assigned to one district permanently gives an opportunity for the development of corruption among officers.
2. Team policing would require more equipment because each person on the team would have to have his own equipment.
3. It might be easy for a police officer to become complacent if he knows a district too well.
4. There is the possibility that some favoritism would be shown to persons in the district to which the officer is assigned.
5. It would require a re-orientation of many officers who tend to think in the traditional terms.
6. It would require a great deal of training in order to broaden the horizons of the officers.
7. Team policing would be difficult to "sell" to the sergeants and captains.
8. Team policing may create conflict within the Department between the general officers and the investigators.
9. The Department may have to add three sergeants which would approximately involve $100.00 per month.
10. Team policing would involve a great deal of public education.
11. In team policing, there is a possibility that the Department would lose control over the officers.
12. Under team policing, there would be no uniformity throughout the Department.
13. It would require extensive training of the officers which might include training at specialized schools.
14. Team leaders may not accept responsibility as does a supervisor.
15. Morale would drop because the team leader would rate himself high on the evaluations so he will look good.
16. Supervisors would lose their identity.
17. Team policing may lead to "empire building" and the teams may not exchange information among themselves.
18. Some present officers might quit.

Commentary:

I see the city divided into four sectors. The lieutenant would be responsible for all police services in that sector. They would administer whatever programs are needed including community relations. There should be one detective per district. The remainder of the bureau would be resources to the rest of the Department. They could respond to major crime scenes. They could work with the patrol officers, and then the patrol officers could then apply their new-found knowledge to minor investigations.

The officers might resist title changes. Lakewood went to a form of team policing and did a title change. They found difficulties in communicating with other departments. It is more convenient to retain the traditional titles in communicating with other agencies as well as with the public. Titles do serve a useful function.

I would like to see a small substation in each sector. This would cut down on the mileage per car.

The change to team policing needs to be based on research and education to gain support. It should be backed by the administration and the supervisors.

Team policing increases the possibility of the police officer's job becoming a full-fledged profession.

People holding middle-management positions will probably have the biggest adjustment to make in order to understand why their positions are unnecessary.

The traditional training method used in police academies is inadequate to prepare employees for the decision-making responsibilities they will encounter. Police personnel must have a broad education that emphasizes their decision-making abilities.

The Department should make the public fully aware of what it is doing and how team policing will work. There should be community meetings and the members of the community should be encouraged to participate.

The district concept should be changed to divide the City according to geographic problems. Each district ought to be homogeneous. The same team would work a given district. There should be interaction between the teams and their geographic areas. There should be a unity of supervisors, and their job should not be an 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. assignment.

Lakewood tried the team policing and just last month went back to their earlier form of organization. Their experiment didn't work because a department needs areas of expertise. One person can't know everything he needs to know about handling a crime scene. Lakewood's biggest problem was training. They couldn't keep up with the training. Too much money was spent to make everyone competent in every area. Since they started team policing, Lakewood has tripled their staff and tripled their budget. They went from a staff of eighty to a staff of two hundred forty. Their arrests, recoveries and clearances have all gone down.

In Lakewood, the officers got good training, then they quit and went to other departments to get rank for themselves. They used Lakewood as a training ground.

The shift to team policing could be made immediately by assigning permanent districts to the officers during times when problems are anticipated.

They would have to be a complete change and not just an experiment. This is the type of change which is called for by many officers now.

In team policing, there is the possibility of a weak lead person.

Cost and Feasibility Comments:

Feasibility is dependent on the decision of the chief to implement a reorganization of the Department.

No feasibility problem, in principle.

Some unknown but appreciable cost for the following:

1. public education;
2. training of officers;
3. additional equipment;
4. promotion of three persons to the position of sergeant ($100.00 per month additional);
5. time spent by officers in intraorganizational communications and training programs and meetings; and,
6. additional support personnel.