


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
FACTORS RELATED TO CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT
IN PERSONAL, HOUSEHOLD, AND NEIGHBORHOOD
ANTI-CRIME MEASURES

COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION PAPERS

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FACTORS RELATED TO CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT
IN PERSONAL, HOUSEHOLD, AND NEIGHBORHOOD
ANTI-CRIME MEASURES

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN UNDERSTANDING CITIZEN CRIME PREVENTION

The notion that people either by themselves or as a group, can prevent future events from happening is implicit in the manner most of us live our lives. The *concept of prevention* follows from the assumption that performance of Action X lessens the likelihood of Event Y. Such actions occur throughout our daily repertoire of activities, with most persons appearing "instinctively" able to avoid perceived imminent danger.

For the public policy-maker, social service practitioner and applied social scientist, preventive actions which require explicit decisions to avoid future aversive events are of special importance. Take for example the decision to "buckle-up for safety" or the decision not to smoke cigarettes. Here the adage, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," becomes relevant. The extent to which citizens lead careful lives by eating nutritiously, exercising, not smoking, driving defensively, not overloading electrical sockets, etc. is assumed to have a significant impact on our nation's quality of life. It can also be assumed that a society whose citizens routinely engage in "preventive behaviors" will be able to more efficiently expend its public and private resources.

The critical role that the American Public *qua citizens* plays in controlling the level of crime in our nation, and thereby directly and indirectly contributing to their own safety and security, has long been talked about. The Presidential Commission of 1967 explicitly noted the need for an active and involved citizenry, both in improving the performance of the Criminal Justice System, and in reducing the circumstances and situations in which crimes are most likely to be committed.

In establishing LEAA, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 acknowledged "that crime is essentially a *local* problem that must be dealt with by state and local governments if it is to be controlled effectively." Yet a careful reading of that act finds rather nonspecific directive about *the citizen's* proper role in crime control at the local level. The 1968 Act specified that funds could be allocated to educate the public about crime prevention and law enforcement. Funds could also be spent to employ community service officers (civilians) at the local level to encourage "neighborhood participation in crime prevention and public safety efforts." Other than those two instances, nothing else is said about citizen involvement in crime prevention: Furthermore, both these statements are non-specific concerning parameters of the citizenry's crime prevention responses.

In 1971, the administrator of LEAA appointed a commission "to formulate for the first time national criminal justice standards and goals for crime reduction and prevention at the state and local levels." One of the six reports of this National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals dealt with Community Crime Prevention.* For the most part that volume made recommendations for community-based programs to get at the "root" causes of crime: youth service bureaus; drug abuse programs; employment, education, recreation, and religious programs. In an absolute sense only a very small portion of this lengthy document addressed the proper role of the "average citizen" in crime prevention. One instance was a statement on the reduction of criminal opportunity:

Combating crime is not solely the responsibility of law enforcement agencies. Crime reduction can come about only if the community, criminal justice personnel, and individuals work together. Law enforcement agencies have a responsibility to inform citizens of ways to protect themselves, their homes, and their families. Such programs, however, will have little effect unless citizens take such elementary precautions as locking their doors and windows, or reporting suspicious or criminal activities in their neighborhoods. *Citizen participation in crime prevention begins at home.* (pp. 201-202).**

In this statement and in an appendix on existing "community crime prevention" programs, the Commission suggested that proper citizen anti-crime measures included:

- locking home doors and windows;
- reporting suspicious/criminal activities;
- increasing the "target hardness" of the home (e.g. installing special locks);
- increasing informal surveillance of one's neighborhood and participating in "blockwatches";
- engraving personal property with an I.D. number; and
- patrolling neighborhoods via walking, driving, with/without CB radios.

It is interesting to note that all these recommendations

* Community Crime Prevention. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1973. Stock #2700-00181.

** Italics added.

were made in the *total absence* of valid evaluation research on the effectiveness of any of these methods in preventing crime. In fact, this knowledge gap was later documented by the National Evaluation Program studies, performed in the mid-1970's for NILECJ. While those NEP studies provided considerable evidence that there was a great amount of involvement in anti-crime activities on the part of the citizenry, very little was known about the *efficacy* of such anti-crime efforts.

While the Crime Control Act of 1973 did not include any new mandate for citizen crime prevention, the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs was established by the Crime Control Act of 1976: This office was authorized to "enable community and citizen groups to apply for grants to encourage community and citizen participation in crime prevention." The 1976 Act also made funds specifically available for "the development and operation of programs designed to reduce and prevent crime against the elderly," and "crime prevention programs in which members of the community participate, and including but not limited to 'blockwatch' and similar programs."

In interpreting the 1976 Act, the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs chose to build its funding priorities around the following distinction:

Priority will be given to programs and activities that are *public minded* in the sense that they are designed to promote a social or collective response to crime and the fear of crime at the neighborhood level in contrast to "*private minded*" efforts that deal only with the actions of citizens as individuals or those that result from the provision of services that in themselves do not contribute to the organization of the neighborhood (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:58-3).*

While we will discuss this distinction again, here it is important to note that such a statement seemed to suggest that certain types of citizen anti-crime activities were preferable to others; at least in the sense that they would receive funding priority.

Most recently, in its reorganization of LEAA, the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 continued to cite the importance of supporting "neighborhood and community anti-crime efforts," in part through the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs and through its Discretionary Grants program. Furthermore, under its authorization of Formula Grants for states and units of local government, the 1979 Act specified the proper use of funds to include:

*Italics added.

- establishing or expanding community and neighborhood programs that enable citizens to undertake initiatives to deal with crime and delinquency; and
- improving the police utilization of community resources through support of joint police-community projects designed to prevent or control neighborhood crime.

Here again is found a commitment to the notion of an "involved citizenry," but worded in a nonspecific manner.

Thus from the perspective of the U.S. public laws that have been written to address law enforcement and criminal justice needs, it is not at all clear, *in specific terms*, what official policy exists on the proper role of the citizenry in crime prevention. What is clear is a continued, if ambiguous, reference to the importance of the involvement of "citizens and the community."

In the absence of a detailed declaration of what citizens should do and be encouraged to do to prevent crime it is useful to step back and review the scope of citizen anti-crime activities from the perspective of *the citizenry*: The American Public engages in a host of activities in an attempt to lessen the absolute magnitude and severity of crime, and to lessen the likelihood and impact of criminal victimization on their lives. Some citizens never venture outside the perceived protection of their homes to avoid personal victimizations. Others fortify their homes in an attempt to ward off home invaders. Still others escort children and the elderly along routes where danger is thought to loom. Some unite with fellow residents to patrol their neighborhood, while others volunteer time and resources to provide non-criminal activities for potentially delinquent youth.

While public funds support formal law enforcement agencies to control and prevent crime, it is in the above-mentioned capacities that the citizenry can be thought of as *co-producers* of our nation's safety and security (cf. Pennel, 1978; Percy, 1979; and Rosentraub and Harlow, 1980). In fact as Yin (1979) suggests, citizens may play *the* major role in the control and prevention of crime. It is therefore of clear importance to understand the anti-crime activities that citizens engage in, and the motivational factors associated with these "preventive responses."

This then is the expressed purpose of our research. The past decade has seen much rhetoric and millions of dollars focused on involving the citizenry in crime prevention. While a good deal of evaluation research has been conducted to investigate the efficacy of these approaches to crime prevention, very little systematic research has been performed to fully understand "what citizens do to be safe from crime," and as importantly,

"why they do it?"* Without a full understanding of the extent to which citizens (on their own) engage in crime prevention, public policy will be formulated in somewhat of a vacuum. Furthermore, without a clear understanding of the "natural" processes that lead some citizens to engage in certain anti-crime measures while other citizens do not, crime prevention programs may fail to mobilize citizens because of a misunderstanding of the underlying dynamics.

As a first step in an investigation of these issues, it was incumbent upon us to carefully select the range of citizen anti-crime measures which would be investigated. To do this past conceptualizations of citizen/community crime prevention were reviewed.

A. Review of Past Conceptualizations of Citizen/Community Crime Prevention

1. Avoidance/mobilization. Furstenberg (1972) made the first serious attempt to conceptualize citizen crime prevention measures by separating these activities into *avoidance* behaviors and *mobilization* techniques. By avoidance, Furstenberg meant "strategies to isolate... (oneself) from exposure to victimization," e.g., staying off the streets at night, locking doors, ignoring strangers, etc. Mobilization techniques in contrast involved the protection of one's property and/or self through the purchase of a product (e.g., burglar alarms, window bars, flood lights, guns, etc.). In making this distinction Furstenberg built on the earlier findings of Biderman et al. (1967) that citizens who "avoided" didn't necessarily "mobilize," and vice versa; thus suggesting the independence of these dimensions. While this conceptualization is interesting and logically appealing at first glance, a closer reading leaves one uncertain of the construct validity of the avoidance and mobilization concepts. Furstenberg stated that the items which made up his "index of avoidance" were all highly intercorrelated, but did not provide statistical evidence to document their internal consistency. Without such evidence one cannot be confident that the separate behaviors making up these indices form valid avoidance or mobilization dimensions.

2. CPTED. An alternative conceptualization of citizen crime prevention measures follows from work related to "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" (Tien, Reppetto, &

* The research associated with the LEAA-funded Reactions to Crime Project (e.g., DuBow, McCabe, & Kaplan, 1979) at the Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University represents the first systematic and comprehensive, albeit exploratory, work on these issues, and served as the knowledge-base upon which the current research program was built.

Hanes, 1976). Building upon earlier works linking crime and the physical environment (e.g., Jeffery, 1971; and Newman, 1972) CPTED implied that citizens' preventive measures could be categorized as *access control*, *surveillance*, and *territoriality*. Access control refers primarily to target-hardening responses (e.g., burglar alarms, special locks, fences, etc.) intended to limit unlawful entry. Surveillance, as a crime prevention activity, refers to the citizenry's ability and propensity to be vigilant towards crime (both personal and property). The domain of surveillance includes formal/informal neighborhood patrols (both walking and driving), being alert to and reporting suspicious/criminal activity, and modifying the physical environment to make it easier to "see what's going on," e.g., increasing outdoor lighting and removing visual obstructions. Territoriality is not completely independent of access control and surveillance. It refers to citizen behaviors which demonstrate a proprietary demeanor in some given environment, e.g., one's home or neighborhood. Unfortunately, the work associated with the CPTED program did not provide any data to test the validity of these categories of preventive reactions to crime.

3. Individual/collective. Conklin (1975) provided a different perspective for conceptualizing the behaviors that citizens engaged in to prevent crime. He divided them into *individual* and *collective* responses. Individual responses referred to crime prevention activities which citizens take alone; collective responses were those which citizens did as groups. Here again there was no evidence to support the construct validity of the individual-collective distinction: Were collective responses those which could only be performed by groups of citizens (e.g. a neighborhood patrol), or did they also include individual behaviors (e.g., property marking) that a group of neighbors agreed to engage in? Based on *a priori* reasoning, it appears that this distinction is ambiguous when it comes to categorizing an anti-crime measure as a measure, and more appropriately describes the *context* within which the anti-crime measure occurs.

4. Public-minded/private-minded. Explicit in the work of Schneider and Schneider (1978) was a conceptualization somewhat similar to Conklin's individual/collective dichotomy. They categorized preventive reactions to crime as *private-minded* or *public-minded*:

...approaches to prevent burglaries or other residential crimes can be divided into those designed to reduce the likelihood of victimization for the individual household ("private" prevention) and those designed to reduce the probability of victimization for the immediate neighborhood where the individual lives ("collective" prevention). By definition, target-hardening approaches result in private crime prevention since these increase the security of the individual household through the

use of locks, alarms and so on. Other approaches can be geared toward increasing the social cohesion of the neighborhood, the degree of protective neighboring, the extent of bystander helpfulness, and other types of "public-minded" crime prevention. (p.5)

Here again was an interesting and, at first glance, logically appealing way of conceptualizing citizen crime prevention measures. But once more no statistical evidence was provided to support the validity of combining "individual" responses together to form a private-minded index, or combining "collective" responses together to form a public-minded index. In fact, Wilson and Schneider (1978) explicitly avoided combining behaviors to form preventive dimensions and instead treated each of a set of anti-crime measures as *separate* dependent variables:

The assumption of independence in the adoption of many of these protective activities--based upon low inter-item correlation and differences in the effects of the independent variables--leads one to conclude that these protective activities are, in large part, neither substitutable (choosing one rather than the other) nor complementary (choosing one leads one to choose the other). If these choices were substitutes strong negative correlations would be expected. If these choices were complementary strong positive correlations would be expected. (p.38)

5. The NEPs. Finally, one could look at NILECJ's apparent working definition of what constitutes "citizen/community crime prevention" by an examination of the national evaluation projects that were funded in the mid-1970's: (a) property marking, "operation I.D.," (Heller et al., 1975); (b) security surveys and target-hardening measures (Girard et al., 1976); (c) surveillance and citizen crime reporting (Bickman & Lavrakas et al., 1977); (d) neighborhood patrols (Yin et al., 1976; and (e) street lighting (Tien et al., 1976). Yet from first hand experience with these evaluations, it is known that each "generic-type" encompasses a variety of specific and often overlapping citizen anti-crime measures.

6. Conclusion. After reviewing the ways in which citizen crime prevention measures have been (implicitly and explicitly) conceptualized in the past, the utility of any of those distinctions as valid categorizations of anti-crime measures remained uncertain. While each distinction could be supported on *a priori* grounds, no empirical evidence existed to support or refute their validity. This then became an early priority for the present research: To develop empirical evidence on which to base a conceptualization of citizen crime prevention measures.

B. An Identification of Dependent Measures for the Present Research Program

In an attempt to carry out a comprehensive, yet manageable investigation of citizen anti-crime measures, it behooves a researcher to sample a robust set of dependent measures from the universe of preventive responses. Not being able to investigate each and every anti-crime measure which the citizenry employs, while at the same time not wanting an arbitrary set of measures, we needed some empirically-based systematic approach to choosing our dependent measures. To this end secondary analyses were performed on four large criminal justice survey data sets which measured various citizen anti-crime measures. These data sets, analytic methods, and statistical findings are presented in "The Conceptualization and Measurement of Citizens' Crime Prevention Behaviors" (Lavrakas & Lewis, 1980). Here we present only a synthesis of the results.*

1. Avoidance. Furstenberg's avoidance dimension held up well, but in somewhat narrower terms than originally advanced. The secondary analyses suggested that there is a reliable cluster of anti-crime behaviors whereby persons restrict their actions, or avoid performing some behavior, that under perceived safer circumstances they would presumably engage in. These restrictions on personal behaviors include: not going out at night; not going out alone; driving rather than walking; not frequenting certain local areas, avoiding strangers, etc.

2. Access control. There was a variety of weak, but suggestive evidence that indicated an access control type of dimension or dimensions. These measures seem somewhat similar to Furstenberg's mobilization dimension, but ones limited to purchasing target-hardening products. There also was evidence that these anti-crime measures are associated with other efforts that do not actually make unlawful access more difficult, but are aimed at reducing its occurrence (e.g., stopping deliveries while on vacation, or asking a neighbor to watch an unoccupied home).

3. Surveillance. No firm, consistent evidence was found to support the existence of a generalized surveillance dimension.

4. Territoriality. Specific territoriality items were not included in these surveys. This is not surprising since attempts

* It is acknowledged that these data provided a limited operationalization of anti-crime activities that have a "group" or "collective" nature to them. Nonetheless the analyses did provide us with preliminary empirical evidence of the type that was heretofore missing.

to measure human territoriality as it relates to crime are very recent (e.g., Patterson, 1977). But there was evidence that attendance at a neighborhood crime prevention meeting was related to engraving valuables and displaying a crime prevention sricker at home. All of these can be thought to represent a proprietary demeanor in one's home and neighborhood.

5. Other crime prevention measures. There appeared to be a number of preventive behaviors that are employed, for the most part in an independent fashion e.g., owning a gun for protection, having a watchdog, or purchasing theft insurance. Along with these there is a host of "programmatic" responses to crime that were not measured in these data sets e.g., neighborhood patrols, escorts, or blockwatch programs, that must be considered to be part of the universe of citizen crime prevention measures.

6. Conclusion. Based on these analyses and our own *a priori* reasoning, it was concluded that the following set of anti-crime responses would provide a broad representation of the universe of preventive measures. They represent strategies that citizens appear to take to protect their own person, their household (family and property), and their neighborhood/community:

- imposing behavioral restrictions to avoid exposure to criminal victimization;
- installing burglar alarms, window bars, and/or special locks at home;
- installing outdoor lights at home;
- owning a hand gun for protection;
- using an indoor timer;
- asking neighbors to watch an unoccupied home;
- engraving valuables;
- purchasing theft/vandalism insurance;
- reporting suspicious/criminal activities to police;
- attending neighborhood crime prevention meetings;
- taking part in organized neighborhood patrol;
- participating in neighborhood escort program;
- participating in local blockwatch or a similar type of crime prevention program (e.g. Beat Rep); and
- taking part in WhistleSTOP.

These constitute the set of dependent variables for the present research. In an admittedly exploratory sense it was our purpose to understand the extent to which citizens engaged in the various anti-crime measures, and to investigate the processes that lead to differential levels of involvement among the citizenry. We were specifically interested to determine whether different motives were associated with different anti-crime responses.

C. Preliminary Conceptual Framework

A preliminary conceptual framework was developed to guide our investigation of the *hypothetical processes* that lead to differential citizen involvement in crime prevention. This conceptual framework represents an integration of past findings in (a) citizen/community crime prevention, (b) voluntary action and social participation (specifically the neighborhood movement) and (c) other precautionary behaviors against health, traffic, and fire hazards.*

Two themes are central to the framework. First is the hypothesis that there is a "preventive action or risk-avoidance" path that brings citizens to engage in crime prevention. Second, is the hypothesis that there is a "social participation or voluntary action" path that leads citizens to anti-crime activities. In each instance it is assumed that there are basic *individual differences* among citizens that are influenced by *contextual factors* to produce certain *individual behavioral dispositions*. It is then assumed that these dispositions are mediated by an *opportunity structure* which ultimately determines whether a citizen will engage in crime prevention. This hypothesized process is shown in Figure 1.1.

Specifically, it is assumed that there are important differences among citizens that are related to (a) a predisposition to avoid risks, and (b) a predisposition to participate in voluntary action, not necessarily of an anti-crime nature. These differences included socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., sex, age, race, income, homeowner status, number of children), personality traits (e.g., introversion-extraversion, and locus of control beliefs), and victimization experiences including past instances of being victimized and also knowing others who have been crime victims (i.e., vicarious victimization).

These individual differences are hypothetically influenced by certain contextual factors, most importantly the neighborhood. One's neighborhood is often the environment within which personal decisions about vulnerability to crime are made. A neighborhood

* Appendix A contains summaries of three literature reviews that were written for the present research.




Figure 1.1. BASIC RESEARCH MODEL FOR INVESTIGATING CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION

with a reputation for high crime rates should lead a resident to a different assessment of risk, than a low crime neighborhood. One's neighborhood is also thought to influence citizen crime prevention behaviors by providing a set of social norms, and by serving as the setting for many personal experiences. Neighborhoods have different patterns of social participation (cf. Suttles, 1972): The extent and nature of social participation in a neighborhood is assumed to influence citizens' attitudes about voluntary action in their community.

1. Risk-avoidance disposition. A disposition to avoid risks is assumed to be determined by three psychological (cognitive) factors: (a) perceived vulnerability to victimization, (b) perceived seriousness of victimization, and (c) perceived efficacy of crime prevention alternatives. This three-factor approach has been used successfully to study preventive health behaviors (e.g., Rosenstock, 1966; and Langlie, 1977).

For the present research perceived vulnerability is the extent of risk a citizen associates with being a crime victim (i.e., an estimate of the likelihood that he/she will be victimized) and the attendant fear associated with the threat of victimization. This risk and fear have been found to differ by type of crime (Baumer, 1980). The second factor, perceived seriousness, refers to the amount of harm (physical, financial, psychological) a citizen would suffer from being victimized. This too is expected to differ by type of crime. The final factor refers to how efficacious a particular preventive action is thought to be.* Efficacy refers to its ability to prevent crime, i.e., does it work? Yet for a variety of reasons, citizens will not want to engage in all of the crime prevention behaviors they judge to be efficacious. For example, one may regard a gun as an effective anti-crime measure, but nonetheless may not want to own one.

2. Social participation or voluntary action disposition. Individual differences and contextual factors are also hypothesized to contribute to the attitudes a citizen holds about social participation in formal voluntary organizations. The conceptual framework proposed here hypothesizes that a citizen holds a positive, neutral, or negative disposition toward participation in such organizations. This disposition is formed through the citizen's general and specific attitudes relevant to voluntary action (Smith and Reddy, 1972, p. 233). This disposition to participate in a voluntary organization is considered only to lead to a "readiness," which is later mediated by other factors in the opportunity structure.

* It is implicit that citizen must first be aware of a crime prevention alternative before a judgement is formed about its efficacy.

3. Opportunity structure. The opportunity structure hypothetically includes: (a) personal resources; (b) perceived incentives and disincentives; (c) social networks; (d) community organizations; and (e) formal crime prevention programs and local law enforcement agencies. These factors are not exclusive of one another, and it would be difficult to understand their relative importance for any one individual citizen. Here we are interested in the role they play across the general population.

Two key resources which should influence the initiation of various citizen crime prevention measures are *discretionary income* and *time*. Each anti-crime measure has some "cost," it requires the expenditure of money and/or time for its purchase and installation (e.g., special door locks), or the expenditure of time for its performance (e.g., neighborhood patrolling).

Wilson (1973) provides a typology for investigating incentives related to citizen activity: material incentives (i.e., tangible rewards such as money, goods, or services), expressive incentives (e.g., gaining a sense of fulfilled commitment or enhanced personal worth). For the most part direct material incentives are not assumed to play a significant role in motivating citizens to engage in anti-crime activities. On the other hand, expressive and instrumental incentives are assumed to be important to the initiation and maintenance of anti-crime activities, especially those that are associated with some formal voluntary organization. Disincentives are the opposite of incentives (e.g., loss of money, prestige, and/or felt self-worth), and may operate as barriers to citizens' involvement in crime prevention.

The opportunity structure is also hypothesized to comprise the social networks a citizen is a member of. If a citizen is entirely unattached to his/her neighborhood social environment it is unlikely that he/she will become involved in a neighborhood-based crime prevention effort (e.g., blockwatch). Social networks also provide consensual validation for "appropriate" and "inappropriate" anti-crime actions. Where social networks extend into formal community organizations, a citizen's "crime prevention" disposition may be channeled through such groups. DuBow and Podolefsky (1979) suggest that much of the neighborhood-based anti-crime activities in which Americans participate results from their membership in community groups, and the opportunity to take part in "anti-crime" activities such groups often provide.

Finally, another significant component in the opportunity structure is the Community Crime Prevention Programs that originated in the 1970's. These programs are often sponsored by local police departments and law enforcement agencies. It is assumed that these programs contribute to the dispositions that citizens hold toward crime prevention, and also provide the vehicle through which these dispositions can be channeled.

4. Initiation vs. maintenance. The last issue addressed in our conceptual framework is the difference between the initiation and maintenance of anti-crime responses. It is assumed that after a citizen initiates some anti-crime measure he/she receives some feedback, which is most likely to be a perception of the costs and/or benefits of employing the anti-crime measure. To the extent citizens perceive the anti-crime measures they employ as preventing criminal victimizations, then it is assumed they will continue these preventive measures providing they would feel otherwise vulnerable if said anti-crime measures were absent or stopped. For example, experience suggests that crime prevention measures are often undertaken in the face of some perceived increase in crime or a "crime wave." When the threat of crime wanes often so does the citizenry's maintenance of anti-crime measures.

D. Scope of Present Research

This preliminary conceptual framework had not heretofore been tested, nor was it expected that this research program could test the validity of the entire framework. Rather, the model was developed to serve as a comprehensive and intergrated, albeit hypothetical way of viewing the processes that lead to the differential involvement of citizens in anti-crime measures.

We have hypothesized that there are two basic motives that lead citizens to engage in preventive responses to crime. First, it is reasoned that citizens "avoid risks" by engaging in prevention-oriented activities. This risk-avoidance disposition is thought to be clearly linked to "fear of crime" and victimization experiences. Second, we have reasoned that citizens become involved in anti-crime activities, not because of any personal assessment of being at risk or any past experiences with victimization, but rather as part of their participation with formal voluntary organizations in their community. These two dispositions may lead citizens to employ the same anti-crime activities, while then again they may lead citizens to different preventive responses. *This is an empirical question that the present research program was planned to address.*

We want to acknowledge that this research program was not viewed as testing hypotheses in a formal (experimental) sense. Rather it was designed to be a systematic exploration guided by an explicit *a priori* model (preliminary conceptual framework): research that could most likely serve the purposes of hypothesis clarification (cf. Crane and Brewer, 1973). With this purpose in mind we decided that data should be collected that would be representative of a broad cross-section of information sources and in a manner that would enhance the external validity of our findings. As much survey methods were chosen to gather information about various aspects of the conceptual model from citizens, community organization leaders, and local law enforcement officers.

1. The citizenry. A survey of the public would provide a robust picture of what, if anything, is being done by various types of citizens to enhance safety and security. A telephone survey was the most feasible and cost-effective approach to collecting these data, and as discussed in the following chapter on methodology, some evidence was found to support the notion that what citizens report via telephone about their anti-crime activities is generally reliable and valid. A telephone survey would also allow for a comprehensive set of variables to be gathered from each citizen related to our conceptual model. These data included socio-demographic characteristics, personality traits, victimization experiences, attitudes and perceptions related to crime and non-crime hazards (traffic, health, fire), attitudes and experiences related to participation in voluntary organizations, and the extent to which a citizen did or did not engage in various preventive responses to crime and non-crime hazards. And from a cost efficiency standpoint, a survey of the public was judged to be the best way to find preliminary answers to the questions "what do the citizens do to be safe from crime?" and "why do they or don't they do it?" Such a telephone survey also allowed for a very broad sampling of the public to provide a fair and robust representation of the diversity of traits, attitudes, experiences, and behaviors.

2. Community organization leaders. A survey of community organization leaders was planned to learn more about the role such groups play in the "opportunity structure." Furthermore, these leaders have expert knowledge about what facilitates and inhibits the initial involvement and maintained involvement of citizens in such organizations. Therefore, plans were made to gather data through in-person interviews to learn what leaders perceive were the reasons certain citizens become involved while others don't, and why certain members stayed involved while others don't, i.e. what were the incentives and disincentives for participation to citizens. In addition, these interviews could provide information on a number of organization variables including, original and current goals, history, issues addressed, funding, staffing, and activities/programs, including recruitment strategies.

All of this information would yield an insight into the role of the community organization in the opportunity structure *from the perspective of the organization.* As such it could be compared with certain information gathered directly from citizens to identify correspondences/divergences of perceptions and experiences.

3. Local law enforcement officers. Local police can be thought to play an important role in determining whether citizens will initiate and/or maintain various anti-crime measures. As both "experts" and "authority figures" the police help shape public knowledge and opinions about what citizens should and should not do to "help fight crime." A survey was planned to determine which citizen anti-crime measures are encouraged/discouraged by

police. Having knowledge on this issue would allow for a comparison of what the citizenry is doing vs. what the police would like them to do, and thereby provide a clearer understanding of the current functioning of the police in the opportunity structure.

E. Overview of the Report

We have found that although there is a clear and continuing commitment to "citizen involvement" in crime prevention, as reflected by the public laws and government policy of the past twelve years, it is not at all clear what *specific* anti-crime measures citizens should engage in. The citizenry as a whole engages in a host of preventive responses which may play *the* major role in the prevention and control of crime in our nation. While previous research has documented the extent to which various subgroups in the population employ certain anti-crime measures (e.g., Reiss, 1967; Biderman 1967; Furstneberg, 1972; Kleinman & David, 1973; Kelling, 1974; Schneider and Schneider, 1978; Mangione and Noble, 1975; Garofalo, 1977) most of these studies were conducted for other purposes and as a whole constitute a rather "fragmented" knowledge-base (see DuBow et al., 1979, p.66). Furthermore, none of the work was conducted for the expressed purposes of investigating the processes that lead to differential citizen involvement in preventive responses to crime. Thus, the present research was planned to begin to close these knowledge gaps: First, by surveying a large and heterogeneous sample of the public to determine the levels at which citizens engage in a comprehensive set of anti-crime measures. And second, by investigating motives for involvement from the perspective of the citizenry, community organizations, and the police.

This research comes at a time when there is continued programmatic and research interest in citizen crime prevention. As reflected by LEAA programs (Community Anti-Crime, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Comprehensive Crime Prevention), the LEAA/Action/HUD Urban Initiatives Programs, and the national Anti-Crime Media Campaign,* millions of dollars continue to be committed to foster the prevention and control of crime by citizens at the local level. Basically, this is being done in the *absence* of definitive knowledge of (a) how to get citizens involved and (b) what actually prevents crime. It is the first of these points the present research is oriented toward. By better understanding why citizens do (do not) engage in various anti-crime measures, policy makers and practitioners should be able to make more informed decisions about citizen crime prevention.

Chapter II documents the specific information gathering techniques we employed. Following that, the third chapter presents our findings about the two dispositions, risk-avoidance and social

* "Take a Bite Out of Crime."

participation. In trying to understand the role that perceptions of risk, seriousness, and efficacy play in determining the anti-crime responses citizens engage in, we also collected information related to non-crime hazards (traffic, fire, and health). This allowed for a larger investigation of preventive response in general, not only those related to crime. Second, to determine the role that social participation in voluntary organizations plays in relation to anti-crime responses, we collected information from citizens about their "organizational life." This provides a broader understanding of how one's social participation profile relates to crime prevention activities.

Chapter IV presents our findings on the relationship of community organizations and the police to citizen crime prevention. We have investigated the role that community organizations play in the neighborhoods where they operate, and the incentives and opportunities they provide local citizens a part of the opportunity structure. The information we have gathered from the police describes their opinions about various citizen anti-crime measures. By understanding what they encourage/discourage citizens to do we can infer how they may influence the quantity and type of preventive responses in which citizens engage.

Following a presentation of results related to the opportunity structure, Chapter V contains our findings related to (a) behavioral restrictions as a form of personal anti-crime response, (b) household-based anti-crime measures, (c) neighborhood/community based crime prevention efforts, and (d) moving to escape to safer environs. It is in this chapter that we present the findings of this research specifically addressing the questions of what citizens do to be safe from crime and who does or doesn't do each anti-crime response. In addition, we attempt to infer why some citizens engage in certain of those preventive measures, while others do not.

The report finishes with Chapter VI by acknowledging the limitations of the employed methodologies, summarizing the research findings, and discussing the findings as they relate to the preliminary conceptual framework. Based upon an assessment of this updated state of knowledge, questions are posed that remain to be answered by future research. And finally, a section is presented that discusses the issues and implications of our research for both crime prevention policy makers and practitioners.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter describes the methodologies that were employed to gather information for our research program. These include (a) literature reviews and key person interviews; (b) secondary analysis of four criminal justice survey data sets collected in the 1970s; (c) two small telephone surveys of residents in Chicago (n=144) and Evanston (n=137) to help develop a metropolitan area telephone survey; (d) a random-digit-dial telephone survey of 1803 residents of the metropolitan Chicago area (both city and suburbs), which in turn was supplemented by contextual data (e.g., official crime rates, population density, media per capita income, etc.) gathered for each respondent's community area; (e) inperson interviews with one representative (leader) of 153 community organizations in Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco (approximately 50 in each city); and (f) a mail survey of 167 local law enforcement agencies. Table 2.1 presents the various parameters for each data collection endeavor.

A. Literature Reviews and Key Person Interviews

Our work began with an extensive review of literature on community crime prevention, citizen participation in voluntary action--specifically community action, citizen involvement in the environmental movement, and citizen prevention behaviors related to traffic, health, and fire hazards. The findings from the review of community action literature were incorporated into a monograph "Neighborhood Activists and Community Organizations: A Critical Review of the Literature" (Emmons, 1979). A report was also prepared on citizen involvement in environmental issues based on a review of literature, and inperson interviews with representatives from nine national environmental organizations (e.g., National Wildlife Federation and the Sierra Club): This report is entitled, "Public Participation in the Environmental Movement" (Rosencrantz, 1979). And lastly, a review was performed of past research on precautions which individuals take against health, traffic, and fire hazards (e.g., regular exercising, stopping smoking, wearing seatbelts, owning fire extinguishers, etc.): This was summarized in a monograph, "Health Maintenance, Traffic Safety and Fire Prevention: A Literature Review of Selected Prevention Behaviors" (Normoyle, 1979).*

Additionally, to supplement the community crime prevention literature review, informal in-person interviews were conducted

*See Appendix A for summaries of these monographs.

Table 2.1

SUMMARY DETAILS OF THE FIVE SURVEYS

Survey	Method	Sampling Population	Sample Size	#Interviewers	#Variables	Length	Date
Pilot I	telephone interviews	144 Chicago respondents to 1977 RTC survey	57	five	20	5 minutes	Dec. 1978
Pilot II	telephone interviews	137 suburban residents known by police to have engaged in anti-crime measure	88	five	40	10 minutes	Jan. 1979
Metro Area Residents	random-digit dial telephone interviews	All households with telephones in metropolitan Chicago area	1803	Interviews conducted by Survey Research Lab, Univ. of Ill. by approx. 20 interviewers	180	25 minutes	June-July, 1979
Organizational Leaders	inperson interviews	Leaders of community-type organizations in San Francisco, Chicago, Philadelphia	153	One interviewer in each city	130	90-120 minutes	Sept. 1979-Jan. 1980
Law Enforcement	mail survey	170 Chicago metropolitan area law enforcement agencies	167	-----	60	-----	July-August, 1979

with key persons in national anti-crime organizations (e.g., National Council in Crime and Delinquency, National Sheriffs' Association, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Crime Resistance Office, and The Police Foundation).

The information gained from these efforts was used to develop our aforementioned preliminary conceptual framework and to identify key measurement points on which to collect data.

B. Secondary Analyses

Four criminal justice survey data sets in the Reactions to Crime Project archives were reanalyzed to further investigate the conceptualization and measurement of crime prevention behaviors (see Lavrakas and Lewis, 1980). These included a 1972 Kansas City survey (Kelling et al., 1974), a 1974 Portland survey (Schneider, 1975), a 1975 Hartford survey (Mangione & Noble, 1975), and a 1977 Philadelphia/Chicago/San Francisco survey (Skogan, 1978). Each survey included items which measured various citizen crime prevention behaviors. A factor analysis and internal consistency check were performed on the relevant set of items from each survey. The findings from these analyses were discussed in Chapter I of the current report, and provided some empirical evidence on which to base our conceptualization of citizen anti-crime measures. These results were also helpful in planning the survey instrument that was used in our metropolitan Chicago area telephone survey.

C. Telephone Surveys of Citizens

In order to maximize the type and quantity of information that could be gathered about citizens' preventive responses to crime and related characteristics, traits, experiences, perceptions and attitudes, we decided to employ a telephone survey as our major data collection method. We reasoned that it was most appropriate for our needs for several reasons: First, a telephone survey was the most feasible and cost-effective way of obtaining information from a large heterogeneous sample of the citizenry. Second, it was the most cost-effective approach to producing a representative ("random") sample from the population. These aspects, in turn, would enhance the external validity (generalizability) of findings: And since it was expected that there would be considerable differences among citizens in the extent to which they engaged in crime prevention, it was paramount to employ a method that would yield a diverse, yet representative sample.

At the start of the current research program (September, 1978) we had thought to perform a panel study using the 1977 Reactions to Crime telephone survey respondents as a Time-1 pool

of citizens to sample from.* It was reasoned that this might be an especially good approach to gathering information about citizens' maintenance (stability) of various crime prevention behaviors and activities.

1. Pilot study I. To test the feasibility of conducting Time-2 interviews for a panel study, a pilot study was conducted in December, 1978. This involved attempts to recontact and interview 144 Chicago residents who had been interviewed approximately fourteen months earlier as part of the RTC survey. A second purpose of this pilot study was to learn about the extent to which citizens report they have maintained various crime prevention behaviors. The maintenance issue was part of our research interests, and these findings would also provide some insight into the reliability (test-retest) of self-reports (via telephone) by citizens about their anti-crime responses.

In planning this pilot study RTC respondents from Chicago were grouped into one of three categories on the basis of the types of useful information that was known about them for call-back purposes: (a) knew name of respondent; (b) knew age and sex of respondent, but not name; or (c) knew only sex of respondent. Although other descriptive information was known about respondents (e.g., education, race, type of residence), it was reasoned that name, age, and sex were the most viable identifiers to use in an interview's introductory screener.

A sample of 144 respondents was drawn: for 53 the name was known; 48 had both sex and age information; while 43 had only sex known.** Each respondent's telephone number was processed until a Time-2 interview was completed, or it was otherwise disposed (e.g., not in service; respondent unavailable, unknown, or moved; refusal; no answer and/or busy after five call-backs, etc.). In the end, Time-2 interviews were completed with approximately half of the "name" and "sex and age" groups. In contrast, less than one-fourth of the "sex-only" group was successfully reinterviewed. A total of 57 of the 1977 respondents provided Time-2 interviews.

In general, the success rate of reinterviewing 1977 RTC telephone survey respondents was not overwhelming. At best, it appeared that a success rate of 50 percent could be achieved from

*This was a random-digit-dial telephone survey of 540 residents of San Francisco, Chicago, and Philadelphia, with a total sample of 1620 (Skogan, 1978).

** For the entire RTC Chicago city sample 51.7% had provided their names; an additional 41.1% had given age but not names; and 7.2% had provided neither name nor age; sex was known for all respondents.

reinterviewing respondents whose names were known and/or whose sex-and-age was known.

A second purpose of this pilot study was to ask respondents about their crime prevention behaviors. The 1977 RTC telephone survey contained 16 items related to citizen crime prevention: and during the second interview these questions were asked again. The data were merged with the appropriate data from the 1977 survey to produce a Time 1 (1977) and Time 2 (1978) data set (n=57). (To our knowledge this was the first time citizens had been reinterviewed about their crime prevention behaviors.) The purpose of reinterviewing was to judge the maintenance of these behaviors. Yet to the extent that these self-reported data were unreliable (i.e., if people do not provide accurate answers), comparisons of Time 1 and Time 2 data to determine maintenance would also be unreliable.*

With this caveat in mind, it was still of value to examine these data. For the most part, 70-90 percent of the respondents who said they engaged in some anti-crime measure at Time 1 gave the same response in the second interview. This can be interpreted as indicating fairly high maintenance. Exceptions to this pattern were the relatively low levels of maintenance reported for: (a) being involved in a group with an anti-crime effort (47%); (b) notifying the police when away from home (25%); and (c) reporting a suspicious or criminal activity to the police in the last year (54%).

Despite this the overall results indicated a fairly high level of maintenance in self-reported crime prevention behaviors. If citizens were not consistently misrepresenting their behavior, these findings provided some evidence of the reliability (test-retest) of these types of behavioral self-reports via telephone. On the other hand, the completion rate of at best 50 percent, did not encourage the notion that performing Time-2 interviews with former RTC respondents would yield a sample for the panel with good external validity.

2. Pilot Study II. A second pilot study was conducted in January, 1979 to investigate the validity of *self-reported* crime prevention behaviors gathered via a telephone survey. A second purpose of this pilot study was to compare the efficiency of open-ended vs. closed-ended questioning in eliciting information from citizens about their crime prevention behaviors. Results from this pilot study were also used to plan the metropolitan Chicago area telephone survey.

*An ideal measure of maintenance of citizen crime prevention behaviors would include observational checks to gauge the accuracy of the self-report data at Time 1 and Time 2.

With the cooperation of a local police department a list was assembled of 137 citizens known to have engaged in one of three anti-crime activities in the past three years; hosting a neighborhood crime prevention meeting; having a security survey of their home; or borrowing an engraving tool from the police department to mark their valuables. (Interviewers did not know that each respondent was *known* to have engaged in some specific crime prevention behavior, i.e., interviewers were "blind" to the purpose of the interviews.)

Overall 88 interviews were completed (64% of the total sample). The remaining 36 percent resulted in other final dispositions (most frequently no answer/busy or disconnected). Concerning the validity of self-reported crime prevention behaviors, a high proportion of respondents reported (via closed-end questions) that they had performed the behavior which they in fact *were known* to have performed. Overall we observed 88.5% accuracy in these self-reports. This was especially encouraging considering the known behaviors had occurred six months to two and one-half years prior to this pilot study. It was also encouraging because past experience suggested that some citizens may be reluctant to provide information about preventive measures they have taken at home, and thus may not give out accurate information to an unknown telephone interviewer. While these findings do not represent a definitive statement on such issues as recall and veracity, they do serve as some support for the validity of self-reported anti-crime behaviors.

A second purpose of this pilot study was to compare the efficiency of open-end vs. closed-end questions in eliciting information about crime prevention behaviors. As shown in Table 2.2, close-ended questions provided a great deal more information.

3. Sampling considerations. On the basis of the results of the first pilot study, we were not sanguine about the efficacy of conducting a Time-2 survey of RTC respondents. Given an expected success rate of at best 50 percent at recontacting original respondents, the representativeness of the resultant panel for purposes of external validity would be questionable. Furthermore the first pilot study suggested that the "maintenance" issue might not be a high priority research question, and therefore a panel study became less relevant.

Therefore we decided to field a new survey of citizens that would increase the external validity of our findings by including an entire metropolitan area (both city and suburbs). To our knowledge all previous surveys related to citizen crime prevention had been limited to the urban population/setting. While crime problems are unquestionably of greater severity in urban environs, the suburbs' problems are escalating (New York Times, 1980). The greater heterogeneity of data that a metropolitan sample would

Table 2.2
 COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED BEHAVIORS
 VIA CLOSED-ENDED AND OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

Behavior	# affirmative via closed-ended	# affirmative via open-ended
Engrave Property	57	13
Doors with Special Locks	78	48
Use Timer when away	53	8
Burglar Alarm	7	3
Windows with bars or special locks	50	4
Have neighbors watch home	75	6
Security survey	34	9
Away - lock windows	88	27
Don't go out alone	41	7
Drive don't walk at night	48	6
Carry whistle	8	4

Note. N=88

yield was of clear benefit to our research interests. For example, we could investigate the processes leading citizens to employ anti-crime measures in high, moderate, low, and "crime-free" neighborhoods.

It was decided that the most cost/effective way of gathering the data would be via telephone. Furthermore to enhance the representativeness of the sample we chose a random-digit-dialing technique to ensure reaching households with unlisted numbers.* We therefore began by establishing the desired geographical dimensions of the sampling area: Generally this was defined by the "commuting basin" of Chicago, and excluded independent cities and their suburbs on the northern and western fringes of that area, (e.g., Aurora, Waukegan, and Joliet), and all areas in Indiana. All of the operating three-digit telephone prefixes serving that region were then inventoried. Haines reverse directories and other aids were used to identify prefixes which served only commercial and institutional establishments, and these were excluded from this list; prefixes which were estimated (on the basis of listings) to be less than ten percent full were also excluded.** Working from this edited prefix list, Haines directory listings for each prefix, were examined to further identify large ranges of numbers *within* a prefix which were confined to nonresidential use. The resulting compendium of prefixes and ranges of numbers potentially open for use was processed by a special computer program which randomly generated sample telephone numbers using that information. This procedure could be called "modified random digit dialing with enrichment." It retains the advantages of the RDD procedure, which gives nearly equal selection probabilities to households with telephones regardless whether they are listed in published directories, while reducing the proportion of survey calls which reach nonworking and other out-of-scope numbers.

Since Northwestern University does not have a survey research department an RFP was sent to local survey research firms to conduct the actual interviews. On the basis of the quality of the proposals and cost considerations Survey Research Lab, University of Illinois, was chosen to conduct the telephone interviews.

*As of December 1978, Illinois Bell Telephone statistics indicated that 41.8% of all telephone numbers in the city of Chicago were unlisted, as were 35.5% in the Chicago metropolitan region.

**If there is a pattern to unfilled exchanges, (e.g., primarily new suburban developments), then their exclusion would reduce the true representativeness of the sample, but probably not in any serious way.

A selection matrix was employed for each household to systematically stratify *respondent* selection along sex and age. Utilizing various versions of the selection matrices, one English-speaking adult member (19 years or older) of each household was chosen as the appropriate respondent. Furthermore, the interviewing contract specified that any refusal, whether at the household or respondent level, would be followed up to attempt a conversion from a refusal to a completed interview. All of these procedures were undertaken in an attempt to maximize the representativeness of the final sample.

4. Survey instrument development. Development of the survey instrument began with the preliminary conceptual framework. Following this *a priori* model, a list of constructs was assembled to be considered as the "content" of the survey instrument. Once this preliminary list was agreed upon, survey items were generated to operationalize constructs. Wherever possible, an attempt was made to use items that had been judged to have good construct validity from past experience. After a number of revisions a draft survey instrument was taken to SRL for pilot-testing.

A debriefing session after the pilot test was held between SRL and members of our research staff. On the basis of this session a revised instrument was formulated and sent to NILECJ (Community Crime Prevention Division) for their review. And after an in-person discussion with the Institute staff, a final survey instrument was assembled and submitted to a short pilot test by SRL (approximately ten households). The instrument was then finalized and formulated according to SRL's standard procedures. (This final instrument appears in Appendix B.)

A detailed interviewer training session was held, at which our research staff was represented. Approximately twenty adult females, nearly all of which had interviewing experience with SRL, were trained as interviewers for this survey. Interviewing began in early June, 1979 and was completed in early August, 1979. In all a total of 1803 interviews were completed. Throughout the field period, personnel for our research staff visited SRL on a weekly basis to monitor the interviewing. As interviews were completed, they were individually edited and prepared for key punching by our staff. In every stance where we found a "completed" interview that was missing some important data, we returned it to SRL for additional interviewing. Throughout the course of the interviewing, supervisors at SRL verified approximately ten percent of all completed interviews to support the validity of the data: No problems were encountered with interviewing quality.

5. Disposition of sample numbers. In the process of completing 1803 interviews with metropolitan area residents

5346 computer-generated numbers were dialed a total of 15,744 times. A predetermined call-back sequence was followed to establish the status of "ring no-answer" numbers and to reach "hard-to-find-at-home" respondents. Almost 48 percent of the sample numbers were called only once; the bulk of them were not working numbers, or reached commercial establishments or institutions. On the other hand, almost 7 percent of the sample numbers had to be called back nine more times in order to try to find someone at home, select a respondent, and complete an interview. Over seventy percent of the sample numbers were disposed of by at least the third call.

The final disposition of each sample telephone number is summarized in Table 2.3. Almost equal proportions of numbers resulted in completed interviews and turned out to be nonworking, testifying to the utility of the sample enrichment procedures. On the other hand, almost 11 percent of the sample numbers still served businesses or group quarters, indicating that many were not screened out by our check of reverse directory listings. Only 2.7 percent of these numbers were still of undetermined status after ten calls. Finally, only 2.5 percent required foreign language interviews, and thus were lost to the sample.

The completion rate for the survey depends upon the denominator of the fraction, in which the 1803 completed interviews is the numerator. Many surveys (such as NORC's General Social Survey) define their target population as "English speaking," and discount respondents who cannot be interviewed, in households which cannot be screened, in English. Our experience in this and the 1977 RTC survey in Chicago indicates that this is about 7 percent of central-city households; for the metropolitan area as a whole the figure probably is about half that amount. If we subtract the 132 households in which we could not complete interviews due to language difficulties, and subtract the 146 "ring no answers," our completion rate is 66.5 percent.

While this completion rate is lower than what is generally thought desirable, it is a good one relative to the 1977 RTC telephone survey: The completion rate there was about 50 percent, which the commercial firm that conducted those interviews (Market Opinion Research) considered average from their experience. The completion rate of good household surveys is thought to average 75-80 percent. The 66.5 rate for the present survey is below that level, and probably reflects the region that was sampled, and the more "sensitive" nature of the issues, rather than a poor quality of interviewing.

Nevertheless it must be recognized that 33.5 of eligible numbers were non-completions, and constitute one potential source of bias in the data. As seen in Table 2.3 the largest source of difficulty was the refusal of the first adult reached by telephone (the "household respondent") to cooperate. Once contact proceeded far enough to select a specific respondent,

Table 2.3

FINAL DISPOSITION OF SAMPLE TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Final Disposition	Number	Percent of all numbers called	Percent of all eligible numbers
Numbers not in Service	1765	33.0	not eligible
No answer after 10 calls	146	2.7	not eligible*
Business and group quarters numbers screened out	571	10.7	not eligible
Needed foreign language interviewers	132	2.5	not eligible
No one 19 yrs. or older	19	.3	not eligible
No household respondent reached	33	.6	1.2
Refusal by household respondents	337	6.3	12.4
Selected respondents never reached	224	4.2	8.3
Refusal by selected respondents	216	4.0	8.0
Breakoffs during interview	98	1.8	3.6
Completed interviews	1803	33.7	66.5
Other final dispositions	2	--	--
	N=5346	100.0%	100.0%

*In RDD surveys there inevitably remain many sample numbers which ring but never are answered, almost regardless of the number of times they are dialed. While some of those may be connected to households in which the residents are seldom at home or are away on vacation, our experience indicates that the bulk of them are more likely to be coin telephones, telephones in warehouses and other non-residential locations, and others not of interest for this survey: therefore in our judgement they are most likely numbers that are not eligible for interviews.

refusals were less common. It is interesting to note that a majority of the noncompletions that were due to "breakoffs," occurred during the sequence of questions about home security measures.* This suggests that a small proportion of the citizenry is reluctant to divulge information about home security to a stranger via telephone, despite any reassurances an interviewer can provide about the survey's legitimacy.

6. Sample characteristics. The sample of 1,803 completed interviews was weighted by the inverse of the number of different telephone numbers in each household, in order to correct for the increased probability of reaching a household with multiple phone lines. This yielded a weighted sample of 1,656. Table 2.4 provides a description of the demographic characteristics of the weighted sample. While we will have to await the release of the 1980 Census data to arrive at the best estimation of the representativeness of this sample, in our judgment the sample appears to be a good one. Comparisons with the 1970 Census are dated, but generally supportive: For the Chicago SMSA in 1970, 47.3 percent of the population was male; this compares with 45.7 percent males in the sample. In 1970, 10.6 percent of the total population was 65 years or older, compared to 10.2 percent of the adults in our sample. Non-whites made up 18.7 percent of the 1970 population, compared to nearly 25 percent of the sample. All of these comparisons are consistent with expected population changes since 1970. An acknowledged limitation of the sample though is the underrepresentation of Latino households in the city of Chicago. There are no current reliable figures for comparison here, but we do not regard the three percent of the sample identifying themselves as Latinos as an accurate reflection of their true numbers in the population.

It is important to note the success of RDD in reaching households with unlisted telephone numbers. Nearly 40 percent of the entire sample reported that their telephone number was unlisted; these individuals would have been missed had we not employed RDD. This would have been a serious threat to the external validity of our findings, since analysis of these data show that it is not the upper middle class white suburbanites who are stereotypically assumed to have unlisted numbers. Rather individuals/households with *unlisted* numbers are significantly more likely to be located in the city (Chicago), be younger, female, minorities, and have lower incomes than those whose telephone number is listed. Furthermore, while 66.6 percent of those individuals who reported feeling very safe in their neighborhood had a listed number, only 51.3 percent who felt

*This was determined by a first-hand inspection of the 98 breakoff questionnaires.

Table 2.3
 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF WEIGHTED
 RDD TELEPHONE SURVEY SAMPLE

Characteristic	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency
<u>Place of Residence</u>		
Chicago	787	47.52
Suburban	869	52.48
<u>Sex</u>		
Females	900	54.35
Males	756	45.65
<u>Age</u>		
19-29 yrs.	486	29.35
30-49 yrs.	666	40.22
50-64 yrs.	321	19.38
65 yrs. +	169	10.20
<u>Race</u>		
Black	302	18.24
White	1252	75.60
Other	89	5.37
<u>Household Income (1978)</u>		
Less than \$6001	208	12.56
\$6001-\$10000	226	13.65
\$10001-\$15000	254	15.34
\$15001-\$20000	268	16.18
\$20001-\$30000	415	25.06
More than \$30000	287	17.33
<u>Telephone Number</u>		
Listed	987	59.60
Unlisted	620	37.44

Note. Missing data are responsible for some of the absolute frequencies not equaling 1656. In these instances the relative frequency is less than 100%, but for the most part there was a negligible amount of missing data.

unsafe had a listed number. It is clear that without an RDD procedure, these individuals who are most likely to be exposed to crime problems would have been underrepresented in our sample.

Finally, and in line with this discussion of the types of persons with unlisted numbers, it should be noted that not everyone has a telephone. While no reliable estimates exist, their numbers are no doubt small. Yet we can assume that these "invisible" citizens are especially likely to be exposed to crime and its related problems.

7. Missing data and analytic considerations. As with all surveys, not all respondents would or could answer every item. Items that measured perceptions of risk and the seriousness of various hazards had about five percent of the sample respond "Don't Know." A few items that assessed the neighborhood social environment had about ten percent "Don't Know" responses. On the other hand, with the exception of the income question, about 1 percent or less refused to provide demographic data. For the 13 percent of our sample who refused income, one of our research staff (J. Normoyle), with eight years of IRS experience, assigned each missing-income respondent to an income category, based on other known characteristics about each respondent/household. Correlations between this "complete" income variable and various descriptive, experiential, perceptual, and behavioral variables were, for all intents and purposes, identical to correlations between the "missing" income variable and those same other variables. Thus the "complete" variable was used in all analyses involving income.

All analyses reported in this report were performed with SPSS. All multivariate procedures used the "case-wise" deletion for missing data. Thus if a respondent had missing data on one or more variables in the analysis, the case was *not* included. While the absolute value of the statistic that results from this procedure is different than what would result from the same sample with no missing data, the differences are likely to be very small and of no substantive importance.

A final analytic point regards the individual respondent as the unit of analysis. By selecting one adult per household, the probability of any one citizen being selected is inversely proportional to the number of adults in the his/her household. This factor could recommend that analyses of individual data be weighted by the number of adults in the household. *This was not done.* For the most part our analyses explore the interrelationship among variables, and are not meant to provide valid point estimates of rates in the population. While we cannot say what the exact effect of our decision has had on results, an empirical comparison showed little differences in the size of the correlations with and without this weighting procedure. For example, correlations between sex and felt safety following the two procedures were $-.3615$ ($n = 1635$) vs.

-.3413 (n = 3559), and correlations between sex and behavioral restrictions were .3929 (n = 1654) vs. .3854 (n = 3592).

8. Additional contextual data. To supplement the information that was gathered from each respondent during the actual interview, we assembled contextual data for each suburb or Chicago community area in which respondents lived. These contextual data (e.g., crime rates, density, per capita income, etc.) provide a "gross" *objective* measure of each respondent's neighborhood environment, in comparison to the subjective self-reported perceptions of the neighborhood obtained during the interviews. The city of Chicago is sectioned into seventy-six community areas which are fairly comparable in size and homogeneity to suburban municipalities. During the interviews information was gathered from each respondent which later allowed us to identify her/his suburb or Chicago community area of residence. The following contextual data were gathered for each area of residence using various local planning agency documents:

- distance from the central city ("the Loop")
- square miles
- 1960 population
- 1970 population
- 1976 population estimates
- estimated 1975 mean per capita income
- estimated percentage nonwhite population
- 1976 estimated burglary rate
- 1976 estimated assault rate
- 1976 estimated robbery rate.

The appropriate set of contextual data were then added to each respondent's computer file.

9. Validity of self-reported survey data. The data that were collected during the interviews are recognized to reflect what people say they do, feel, think, etc. Survey items are technically never of perfect precision in measuring the construct they purport to operationalize. Furthermore people in responding to a survey of this sort are never perfect in the accuracy of their responses. Much attention was paid to the issue of construct validity as we planned the survey and the instrument. Items were chosen based on past experience from other surveys and the results of the two pilot studies (while not definitive) were encouraging. Nevertheless, these data are not perfect

reflections of the experiences, perceptions, and behaviors they represent, and a careful appraisal of our findings should recognize this.

D. Community Organization Inperson Interviews

To complement the information we gathered directly from citizens via the telephone survey, we wanted to elicit information about citizens participation/nonparticipation in community organizations from persons with "expert" knowledge, i.e., from organization leaders. This information gathering effort was aimed at learning more about the "social participation" pathway in the preliminary conceptual framework. Leaders of formal voluntary community organizations were reasoned to have a wealth of experience to form perceptions on why certain citizens get involved, while others don't?; why certain members stay active, while others drop out?; how to get citizens to become members?; etc. It was these perceptions of leaders that could supplement various data collected directly from citizens relating to their social participation (voluntary action).

1. Sampling considerations and organization characteristics. Ideally, we would have wanted to sample leaders from organizations that citizens in our telephone survey belonged to. This was not feasible, because of practicality, timing and cost: It is not likely that citizens in the telephone interviews would or could have given us the name and contact telephone number for a "leader" of an organization they might belong to. Furthermore, if we had been able to assemble a reasonable sample from citizens the delay in first processing the telephone survey data to form the leader sample would have pushed the inperson interviews too late along our funding cycle. Finally, all this extra effort would have been of unknown cost-efficiency.

Instead we chose to interview leaders from a representative sample of community organizations in the three RTC cities: Philadelphia, Chicago and San Francisco. A pool of organizations in each city was assembled from: (a) organizations named by respondents in the 1977 RTC telephone survey that they were members of; (b) community organizations identified by RTC field workers in each of the ten RTC study-neighborhoods*; and (c) other well-known and/or city-wide organizations in each city.

*In Philadelphia the RTC study neighborhoods included Logan, West Philadelphia, and South Philadelphia; in Chicago, they included Lincoln Park, Wicker Park, Back of the Yards, and Woodlawn; and in San Francisco they included Mission, Sunset, and Visitation Valley.

One interviewer in each city was trained over the course of two days by a member of our research staff (G. Salem). Each on-site interviewer had a bachelors degree in a social science discipline and had previous interviewing experience. It was decided in discussions with NILECJ staff that approximately fifty interviews would be completed in each city. The local interviewer used the list of local organizations we provided to schedule an inperson interview with a leader of each organization i.e., either the president or executive director. The interviews were conducted during the months from September 1979 through January 1980. All in all, in-person interviews were conducted with a representative of 54 Philadelphia, 46 Chicago, and 53 San Francisco community organizations for a total sample of 153.

The types of organizations that were interviewed included: block clubs (n = 8), community groups (n = 99), city wide coalitions and locally based umbrella organizations (n = 30), and single issue voluntary action groups (n = 16). Approximately half of the groups had been in existence five years or less; and 82 percent were less than twenty-five years old. Membership size varied widely as did the geographic areas the organizations claimed to represent: Memberships ranged from ten in some block clubs to over 1,000 in some coalitions and umbrella groups. Demographic data on the membership is based on estimates of the organization leaders and must be considered with that in mind; but our sample represents all major SES groups generally found in urban areas. Table 2.5 indicates that while block clubs have a predominantly lower and working class constituency, all status groups are served by the other organization types. Most neighborhood groups appear to be socio-economically homogeneous with only coalitions and single issue groups exhibiting a largely heterogeneous membership.

Because it was difficult for the leaders to estimate the ethnic, sex, and age distributions of their general membership, we present these characteristics only as they apply to the "active core" of members. Table 2.6a presents the ethnic distribution of the active organizational members. Again we note all ethnic groups are represented in the major organization types, with the exception of the block clubs, which appear to be a primarily black phenomenon. Although we cannot say that the distribution of our groups accurately reflects all groups in the cities surveyed, the paucity of Latino and Asian groups in our sample is due to our inability to identify them, and reflects informed opinion that few such groups exist. Their greater representation in the umbrella/coalition category reflects a more frequent association with neighborhood service agencies, which often belong to such coalitions.

Table 2.5
 SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF MEMBERSHIP
 BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Organizational Type	SES Class				N
	% Lower	% Working	% Middle	% Mixed	
All Groups	18.1	36.2	33.3	12.3	118
Block Clubs	28.6	71.4	-	-	7
Community Orgs.	8.0	40.0	46.7	5.3	75
Umbrella/Coalition	18.2	31.8	13.6	36.4	22
Single Issue Groups	14.3	28.6	28.6	28.6	14

Note. Group sample sizes do not sum to 153 due to missing data.

Table 2.6a
 ETHNICITY OF ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP
 BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Type of Organization	Ethnicity						N
	% Somewhat Heterogeneous	% Heterogeneous	% Homogeneous White	% Homogeneous Black	% Homogeneous Latino	% Homogeneous Asian	
Block Clubs	25.0	37.5	-	37.5	-	-	8
Community Orgs.	14.8	15.9	59.1	9.1	-	1.1	88
Umbrella/Coalition	5.9	35.3	17.6	29.4	11.8	-	17
Single Issue Groups	23.1	15.4	30.8	7.7	7.7	15.4	13

Note. Group sample sizes do not sum to 153 due to missing data. The "somewhat heterogeneous" classification refers to groups with a minority membership ranging from 15 to 25 percent. Those with a minority membership of over 25 percent are classified as heterogeneous and those with 85 percent or more members in one ethnic category are labeled homogeneous.

Table 2.6b and 2.6c show the distribution of active members by sex and be age. We see that men and women appear to be equally active in most of these groups. All age groups are represented among the most active core with a slight preponderance in the forty to sixty category. The participation literature (e.g., Verba and Nie, 1972) has consistently found a significantly higher level of participation for this age category.

Our groups vary in complexity both in terms of their internal structures and external associations. The less complex structures include block clubs which frequently function under the leadership of only one block captain, and coalition boards with no officers which perform a primarily coordinating function. The more complex groups range from those with officers but no boards, to the more differentiated organizations including officers, boards, standing committees, task forces and in some cases staff. Additional complexity is introduced by the variations in membership categories. Some groups have only individual members, others serve as coalitions for one specific type of groups such as the city-wide neighborhood organization coalitions, others serve as umbrellas for such diverse groups as block clubs, churches and service agencies, and businessmen's associations, and some recruit both individuals and groups as members.

2. Interview schedule and coding of data. These interviews were planned to gather information about the initiation and maintenance of citizen involvement from the perspective of the organizations. An interview schedule was developed to allow primarily for structured open-ended questioning, with some closed-ended items. The nature of this information gathering effort was meant to be exploratory and to produce rich qualitative data for hypothesis identification and clarification purposes, not for formal hypothesis testing. This open-ended style of questioning was also used because in most instances there was not readily available, reliable closed-ended items that could be employed, and we did not have the time available to adequately develop them ourselves.

Following from the conceptual framework a list of constructs was developed to gather information. These constructs were related to structural and operational aspects of organizations, goals and activities, nature of membership involvement, and perceived incentives/disincentives for the initiation and maintenance of citizen participation. A draft interview was developed and pilot tested in Chicago and San Francisco with approximately ten organizations. The instrument was revised and sent to NILECJ for government input. On the basis of this feedback, a final interview schedule was developed, and is included in Appendix C.

Each interview lasted about 90-120 minutes and was tape recorded. At some point after each interview was completed, the interviewer went over the schedule and with the aid of the tape reviewed the information that had been written down. Also following the completion of each interview a thank you letter was

Table 2.6b
 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP BY SEX
 AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Type of Organization	Sex of Active Membership			N
	% Mostly Male	% Mostly Female	% Mixed	
Block Clubs	--	25.0	75.0	8
Community Orgs.	7.8	13.3	76.7	90
Umbrella/coalitions	--	33.3	66.7	15
Single issue Groups	25.0	16.7	58.3	12

Note. Group sample sizes do not sum to 153 due to missing data. "Mostly" means that 70 percent or more of the active core memberships in each group were made up of a single sex.

Table 2.6c
 DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP BY AGE
 AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Type of Organization	Age of Active Membership				N
	% Mostly Under 40	% Mostly 40-60	% Mostly Over 60	% Mixed	
Block Clubs	25.0	25.0	-	50.0	8
Community Orgs.	16.9	19.1	2.2	59.6	89
Umbrella/Coalition	12.5	31.3	-	56.3	16
Single Issue Groups	33.3	16.7	8.3	41.7	12

Note. Group sample sizes do not sum to 153 due to missing data. "Mostly" means that 70 percent or more of the active core memberships in each group were made up of a single age category.

written to each leader from our offices in Evanston. While we had no reason to doubt that our interviewers had been honest about their work, it is useful to note that no response was received to the thank you notes indicating that an interview had not been completed. In fact, many leaders wrote back expressing an interest in being informed of our findings.

After the 153 interviews were completed, a sample of 15 completed interviews was drawn from each city. These 45 interviews provided the basis for development of a coding scheme to transcribe the mostly open-ended information on the interview schedules to quantified data. This coding form is also presented in Appendix C.

E. Local Police Survey*

In the conceptual framework it was hypothesized that local police may play an important role in determining whether citizens will initiate and/or maintain various preventive responses to crime. In order to better understand the processes that lead citizens to engage in crime prevention activities we felt it would be informative to learn more about local police policy regarding these activities. In the absence of past findings, we specifically wanted to know: (a) what kind of crime prevention activities are encouraged or discouraged by the police; and (b) how local police (implicitly) conceptualize citizen crime prevention.

To explore these issues, a mail survey was planned of local law enforcement agencies serving communities in the Chicago metropolitan area to examine the extent of their endorsement of various protective responses undertaken by citizens. One hundred and seventy-one (171) state, county, and local police departments were identified as having jurisdiction in the metropolitan communities where our RDD telephone survey was fielded.

Each police department was contacted by telephone in the summer of 1979 to briefly introduce the planned survey and determine the appropriate officer to receive the questionnaire. A copy of an endorsement letter from the Illinois Crime Prevention Officers Association, a questionnaire, and self-addressed stamped envelope were subsequently mailed to each department. Followup by telephone occurred within one to two months to secure the officer's cooperation when an initial questionnaire was not returned. Of the 171 agencies contacted, 166 ultimately responded with a completed survey, for a return rate of 97 percent.

*Work on this survey was funded in part by the present grant, but was also conducted as unfunded research for the Illinois Crime Prevention Officers Association by J. Normoyle.

The survey questionnaire was developed with the assistance of crime prevention officers from the Evanston, Illinois police department.* The majority of items (51) involved behaviors performed by citizens to avoid victimization, such as "carrying a whistle when outdoors" or "using a timer on indoor lights when away from home." Each officer rated each of the 51 crime prevention measures, using a 5-point Likert response format ranging from Strongly Discouraged (1), to Strongly Encouraged (5), according to his/her department's policy. If the department had no policy (positive or negative) about a measure, the officer was instructed to rate it with a "3".

F. Strengths and Limitations of Research Methods

The methodologies that were employed by the present research programs were chosen to provide a broad, comprehensive, *albeit preliminary and exploratory* investigation of the processes that lead citizens to become involved in crime prevention. It is readily acknowledged that the research designs/methods employed here are not meant for formal hypothesis testing, but rather are the type suited for hypothesis clarification and identification. Given the state of knowledge on citizen crime prevention that existed prior to our research (as we judged it), formal hypothesis testing with experimental designs was premature: Not enough was known about the issues at hand to devise and choose the meaningful treatments/interventions. Rather cross-sectional survey methods were chosen because of the need of information from a large and diverse sampling of citizens, community organizations, and police departments.

Survey research is a cost-effective means of gathering needed information from large numbers of respondents. Here we employed surveys over the telephone, in person, and via the mail. Given the need for a large, yet representative sample of citizens, the RDD procedure was an efficient method to randomly sample a truly diverse population.

The information (both amount and type) that was gathered from organization leaders necessitated in-person interviewing. Open-ended questions were used so as not to lose any of the richness and diversity of responses and while their subsequent transcription to quantified data is less reliable than with closed-ended items, these individuals had more to say than could reasonably and practically been captured via a closed-ended instrument. In a sense, each leader had a story to tell about citizen involvement/noninvolvement in community organizations. The open-ended form allowed our interviewers the flexibility that was critical to

*We wish to thank Officers Henry White and Frank Kaminsky for their help in constructing the questionnaire.

rapport building and information flow during the one-and-a-half to two hours they spent with each leader. We acknowledge that the information that we report from these in-person interviews is not as "hard" as that which could have been collected with a more structured closed-ended instrument.

On the other hand, the mail survey of local law enforcement agencies suffered none of the response rate problems typical of mail surveys: there we achieved a 97 percent completion rate. While there is bound to be some discrepancy between how each officer responded to the items, and what he/she and other officers actually say to citizens, we have no reason to expect this gap to be a wide one. As will be seen when these data are presented later in this report, there were no "surprise" findings. What this survey effort represents is the first (to our knowledge) empirical attempt to address the question of recommended citizen anti-crime measures from the "expert" perspective of the police.

A major limitation to all of our research methods, and to surveys in general, is that they never produce data that is completely valid or even completely reliable. Had we been able to afford in-person data collection from citizens, including observations of their anti-crime behaviors, we would have a more valid measure of the variables of interest. In the absence of this approach, painful care was taken (including two pilot tests) to collect the most rigorous data possible. Because of time constraints, and the "sensitive" nature of some questioning, the data collected especially from the citizens, falls short of a rigorous operationalization and measurement of each construct. Nevertheless it was our explicit purpose to focus as broadly as possible on the hypothetical processes in the preliminary conceptual framework, and our methods were chosen accordingly.

As a final caveat to a reading of the results presented here, the data we report are what people "say" they do, feel, have experienced, etc. They are nothing more than this...and nothing less. In our judgment this should not be a major concern in interpreting and evaluating these results; others of course may disagree.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN CITIZEN CRIME PREVENTION

What leads some citizens to engage in crime prevention while others do little or nothing? In our preliminary conceptual framework it was hypothesized that there are two major "paths" that bring citizens to engage in crime prevention: a risk-avoidance disposition and a social participation or voluntary action disposition. While it has often been assumed that citizens are motivated to employ anti-crime measures primarily because they have been victims and/or fear of future victimization, the work of the Reactions to Crime project suggests that many citizens engage in anti-crime measures due to their social participation (voluntary action) in their community, and not from some personal assessment of their own vulnerability to victimization (cf., Dubow et al., 1979; Podolefsky and Dubow, 1980).

As discussed in Chapter I, Conklin (1975) suggested that citizens' preventive responses to crime can be viewed as either "individual" or "collective." Furthermore, Schneider and Schneider (1978) viewed individual responses as "private-minded" and collective responses as "public-minded." It was argued in Chapter I that those distinctions are ambiguous when it comes to categorizing the anti-crime behavior/measure itself. As such, they were not used as a basis for choosing the set of preventive responses that would serve as our dependent variables. Furthermore, without extensive evaluations research it is impossible to judge whether the impact of some anti-crime action benefits only an individual or his/her private household, or benefits some larger public. Yet despite our reservations about employing these distinctions to describe *behaviors* and their consequent *impacts*, the individual/collective and private-minded/public-minded terminologies are appealing ways of viewing the motivations that underlie citizen involvement in crime prevention measures.

The notion that individuals engage in prevention-oriented measures to reduce their own risk to various hazards is similar to the individual and private-minded concepts. Following from research done on public health, we have hypothesized that an individual holds some sort of disposition to avoid risks: based on an assessment of his/her likelihood of being victimized, the seriousness of being victimized, and the effectiveness attributed to prevention measures. For example, it is assumed that a man who thinks he is likely to get lung cancer given his

*I would like to acknowledge the comments of Dr. Robert K. Yin that have helped the conceptualization of issues in this chapter, and elsewhere in this report.

current smoking, sees cancer as a serious outcome, and regards stopping smoking as an effective preventive response, should in fact be more likely to terminate his use of cigarettes than another individual who smokes but doesn't see himself at risk, doesn't regard lung cancer as especially serious, and/or doesn't think stopping would make any difference.

Many of the precautions individual citizens take to directly prevent their own victimization or that of their own household property, appear to stem from these "individual/private-minded/risk-avoidance" motives. On the other hand, many of the anti-crime measures in which individual citizens within a neighborhood or community join together to perform *as a group*, appear to be more closely associated with "collective/public-minded/social participation" motives. Thus it was hypothesized (building primarily on the work of F. Dubow and others with the Reactions to Crime project) that what certain citizens do to prevent crime results directly from their association with formal voluntary groups in their neighborhood (e.g., community organizations). As described in Chapter I, this disposition for "social participation or voluntary action" is thought to encompass: basic demographic and life style differences, general and specific attitudes towards formal voluntary groups and perceived incentives/disincentives for participation in such groups.

At the start of our research it was not clear whether these different motives lead to different anti-crime measures, or whether they lead to the same anti-crime measures. This then became a major issue that our data could address. In the present chapter results are presented from our exploration of the two dispositions themselves. Data were collected from citizens in the RDD telephone survey about their perception and behaviors related to both crime and non-crime hazards: here it was of interest to understand "reactions to crime" within a larger context of reactions to hazards *in general*. Secondly, data were gathered from both citizens and organization leaders about citizen participation in formal voluntary organizations, not necessarily anti-crime in nature: here it was of interest to investigate voluntary action *in general* in order to provide a broader understanding of its relationship to citizen crime prevention.

A. Risk-Avoidance Disposition

Citizens encounter numerous real, perceived, and potential hazards in the environment; the array is diverse and touches every aspect of one's life. The efficacy with which citizens cope with such problem situations has been the concern of research by governmental, private, and public agencies in recent times; yet rather little is really understood about the individual citizen's response to everyday hazards.

We explored three aspects of citizens' reactions to common hazards. They included:

- The degree to which an individual perceives the chances of victimization as likely;
- The degree to which an individual perceives the consequences of victimization as serious;
- The degree to which certain "preventive" measures are viewed as efficacious.

Tables 3.1a-c show results from the telephone survey of citizens regarding their judgements of risk, seriousness, and efficacy.

1. Perceived risk. Citizens' evaluations of their own risk were assessed in a series of items concerning selected crime, fire, traffic and health hazards. They included:

- having a fire in the kitchen,
- being robbed on the street by a stranger,
- having a minor car accident,
- being burglarized when no one is at home,
- developing heart trouble, and
- being attacked by a stranger.

A four category response format was used to indicate the chances of victimization, which ranged from Very Unlikely (1) to Very Likely (4).*

On the average, with the exception of involvement in a minor car accident, citizens said they viewed their chances of victimization by fire, health and crime as somewhat unlikely (see Table 3.1a). Although the differences between means are rather small, a kitchen fire was seen as the most improbable, heart trouble and an attack by a stranger as a little more probable, exceeded by robbery and burglary of the home. The

*This four category verbal response format was chosen after experience with a 0-10 numerical response scale indicated that its reliability and validity were questionable. That numerical scale asked respondents to imagine a row of numbers from 0 to 10. Each endpoint was anchored with a verbal label (no possibility vs. extremely likely). We concluded from our pilot testing of the present survey instrument that the variance lost by collapsing to four verbal response categories (very likely, somewhat likely, somewhat unlikely, very unlikely) was balanced off by its greater reliability and feasibility of use over the telephone. None the less we had 5-10 percent of the respondents who didn't provide data on these perceived risk items (and those rating perceived seriousness and efficacy) because they "didn't know", or found it upsetting to think about and therefore refused to answer.

Table 3.1a
ASSESSMENTS OF RISK

Hazards	Relative Frequencies (%)				Mean Assessment	Standard Deviation	N
	1. Very Unlikely	2. Somewhat Unlikely	3. Somewhat Likely	4. Very Likely			
Fire in Kitchen	48.9	27.3	18.0	2.3	1.73	.85	1598
Minor Car Accident	18.5	17.4	42.2	16.2	2.60	.99	1567
Heart Trouble	44.6	19.6	18.9	7.7	1.89	1.01	1503
Home Burglary	29.4	29.6	29.6	7.6	2.16	.95	1531
Robbery by Stranger	31.8	26.8	28.7	7.9	2.13	.96	1578
Attack by Stranger	31.4	28.5	22.1	6.0	1.96	.94	1556

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Table 3.1b
ASSESSMENTS OF SERIOUSNESS

Hazards	Relative Response Frequencies (%)				Mean Assessment	Standard Deviation	N
	1. Not At All Serious	2. Not Too Serious	3. Serious	4. Very Serious			
Fire in Kitchen	4.0	21.9	37.7	34.5	3.05	.86	1624
Minor Car Accident	8.1	47.8	26.0	14.6	2.49	.85	1598
Heart Trouble	4.3	9.2	28.5	53.0	3.37	.84	1573
Home Burglary	4.5	23.6	38.3	31.6	2.99	.87	1623
Robbery by Stranger	3.4	19.4	39.4	35.1	3.09	.83	1609
Attack by Stranger	3.0	10.2	33.4	50.2	3.35	.79	1602

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Table 3.1c
ASSESSMENTS OF EFFICACY

Prevention Measure	Relative Response Frequencies (%)				Mean Assessment	Standard Deviation	N
	1. Not At All Helpful	2. Not Too Helpful	3. Helpful	4. Very Helpful			
Smoke Detectors	.3	2.4	24.2	67.9	3.7	.54	1570
Seat Belts	4.2	9.5	33.2	45.7	3.3	.83	1532
Regular Exercise	1.9	3.2	28.2	61.7	3.6	.66	1572
Locks, Bars, Alarms	3.0	12.6	38.6	42.3	3.2	.80	1597
Have NBRS Watch Home	3.7	12.7	35.6	45.9	3.3	.82	1620
Avoid Certain Places/People	1.4	7.1	28.7	59.3	3.5	.70	1599
Patrol Neighborhood	4.4	10.5	37.7	38.2	3.2	.83	1503

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incidence of a minor car accident was noticeably viewed as more possible, though not what might be termed certain. In sum, citizens generally do not say that they consider these potential dangers in the environment as very likely. Never the less there is a good deal of differences among citizens, as shown by the standard deviations in Table 3.1a.

Furthermore, there appears to be some regularity in the way an individual rates a certain amount of likelihood of victimization in one area (health, for example) perceives similar probabilities in other areas (traffic, fire, and crime). The internal consistency found in people's responses across the six hazards (alpha coefficient of .73) argues for a general disposition to feel at risk.*

To evaluate this general disposition to feel at risk, the likelihood ratings for each of the six hazards were added together and their sum divided by six: the measure of overall perceived risk ranged from 1-4, with "one" representing little perception of being at risk and "four" reflecting high risk. *On the average*, citizens say they perceived themselves as being somewhat at risk to these hazards (mean = 2.07). However, the standard deviation of .63 was of enough magnitude to suggest that there is variability among individuals in the extent to which they assess their chances of victimization.

As shown in Table 3.2, those who viewed themselves as being at risk to victimization were significantly more likely to be

- female,
- younger,
- Black or Latino,
- in a lower income bracket,
- a Chicago resident, and
- renters rather than homeowners.

Neither education nor marital status were found to be associated with perceived risk.

Beliefs about the contingencies between one's behavior and its outcomes are thought to be internal, stable and enduring traits. Following our *a priori* reasoning, those who perceived

*This could also be due, in part, to some response bias on the part of respondents.

Table 3,2
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
PERCEIVED RISK

		n	\bar{X}	SD	r	p
Sex	Male	750	2.02	.62	.08	.001
	Female	894	2.12	.64		
Age	19-29 yrs.	484	2.09	.59	-.08	.001
	30-49 yrs.	663	2.11	.64		
	50-64 yrs.	319	2.04	.65		
	65 + yrs.	166	1.90	.67		
Race	Black/Latino	398	2.18	.71	-.10	.001
	White	1247	2.03	.60		
Income	LT \$6001	205	2.09	.74	-.06	.02
	\$6001-10000	225	2.12	.69		
	\$10001-15000	250	2.11	.64		
	\$15001-20000	267	2.13	.62		
	\$20001-30000	412	2.01	.58		
	\$30001-50000	209	2.04	.56		
	GT \$50000	77	1.96	.54		
Area	Chicago	781	2.18	.66	-.17	.001
	Suburbs	863	1.97	.59		
Own Home	No	665	2.15	.67	-.11	.001
	Yes	980	2.01	.60		

themselves to be at greater risk

- felt less responsibility for what happens in their home ($r = -.06$, $p < .01$),
- thought that chance plays an important role in their lives ($r = -.09$, $p < .001$), and
- perceived themselves as having little influence over the course of their lives ($r = -.05$, $p < .03$).

The expectation that one cannot exercise control, and a belief in the potency of chance may reflect a perception that the environment operates in an arbitrary manner where one is unable to act effectively (cf. Normoyle, 1980). As a consequence the environment is viewed as holding more risk for those maintaining these beliefs. Yet while these correlations are significant, their magnitudes are quite small: this may be due to our weak operationalization of these constructs by employing only one item to measure them.

2. Perceived Severity. A second aspect of people's response to hazards that we examined was the extent to which the consequences of victimization are perceived to be serious (see Table 3.1b). With the exception of a minor car accident, when victimization involves property damage or loss, the expected consequences are generally perceived to be serious in nature. Although the mean differences are quite small, robbery is viewed as the most harmful, followed by a fire in the kitchen and a burglary of the home. A minor accident is still seen to be somewhat serious. On the other hand, events which directly threaten the physical well-being of the individual, such as developing heart trouble or being attacked by a stranger, are perceived as having the most serious consequences. In general, then while citizens do not tend to report that they view their chances of victimization as particularly likely, should an adverse event occur, the expected consequences are reported to be problematic.

Similar to what was found with perceptions of risk, there appears to be some regularity in the way an individual perceives the consequences of being victimized: The consistency found in people's seriousness ratings across six hazards (alpha coefficient of .81) argues for a general disposition to expect serious outcomes.* Therefore, the ratings for the seriousness of each of the six hazards were added together and their sum divided by six: A score of one represented the perception that being victimized has few or no consequences for the individual (not at all serious); a score of four reflected the expectation of severe outcomes. *On the average*, respondents perceived victimization as leading to serious consequences (mean value of

*Again, this could be due, in part, to some response bias.

3.05). However, their standard deviation of .61 was of enough magnitude to suggest that there is a good deal of variability among individuals in the extent to which they say they expect the results of an adverse event to be serious.

As shown in Table 3.3, those who viewed the consequences of victimization as relatively more severe were significantly more likely to be

- female,
- younger or older,
- Black or Latino
- in a lower income bracket,
- a Chicago resident, and
- renters rather than owners of their homes.

Once again, education and marital status were not found to be associated with the expected outcome of being victimized.

As highlighted in Table 3.3, the demographic differences in overall perceived severity were often slight, but significant. A clear exception is the pronounced effect of sex of respondent on the expected outcome of victimization: Males are clearly less likely than females to foresee the consequences of an adverse event as serious in nature. There are several arguments which are often used to explain these sex differences in perceived severity. Traditionally it has been thought that women see themselves at a greater disadvantage in adversity and less well able to withstand hazards: Their smaller and often weaker size is thought to work against being able to defend themselves against threats to their physical well-being. Their generally lower income or traditional dependence on others for support (fathers and husbands) make the replacement of damaged or lost property more difficult. Another explanation lies in the woman's traditional primary responsibility in the care of the children. In an indirect way, then, an adversity to a woman may also jeopardize innocent or helpless children; the scope of damage is far broader and, thus, more serious.

The data available in the present study allow preliminary tests of these arguments. When the separate effects of marital status, income, and number of children are controlled, the relationship between sex of respondent and perceived severity remains relatively unchanged ($r = .30$, $r = .28$, $r = .30$, respectively). Neither their economic disadvantage, dependence on others, nor role obligations as mothers seem to account for their high perception of seriousness. Compare these findings with what is found when the effects of physical stature (height

Table 3.3
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN
PERCEIVED SEVERITY

		n	\bar{X}	SD	r	p
Sex	Male	756	2.85	.60	.30	.001
	Female	886	3.22	.56		
Age	19-29 yrs.	485	3.11	.58	.06*	.004
	30-49 yrs.	663	3.03	.57		
	50-64 yrs.	317	3.01	.66		
	65 + yrs.	164	3.08	.67		
Race	Black/Latino	399	3.15	.67	-.10	.001
	White	1242	3.02	.58		
Income	LT \$6001	206	3.10	.68	-.12	.001
	\$6001-10000	222	3.16	.63		
	\$10001-15000	247	3.10	.58		
	\$15001-20000	266	3.08	.63		
	\$20001-30000	414	2.99	.57		
	\$30001-50000	210	2.94	.55		
GT \$50000	77	2.88	.61			
Area	Chicago	782	3.08	.64	-.05	.03
	Suburbs	859	3.02	.58		
Own Home	No	667	3.08	.61	-.04	.04
	Yes	975	3.03	.61		

*This reflects the curvilinear correlation between the young and old groupings versus the middle age groupings.

in inches) are controlled: The relationship between sex of respondent and perceived severity is noticeably reduced, though remaining significant ($r(1630)=.20, p < .001$). This suggests that women's view of themselves as likely to experience serious outcomes is apparently mediated by their smaller, weaker size, which precludes adequately protecting themselves from danger.

As also seen in Table 3.3, the relationship between age and perceived severity is curvilinear. Both young adults (19 to 29 years) and the elderly (65+ years) appear to perceive the consequences of victimization to be slightly greater than adults in mid-life. One may speculate that young adults would perceive a victimization as a harmful setback at a time when they are just beginning their mature lives. A deteriorating physical condition (heart disease) or injury due to assault may change their career and social outlook. Damage to property may occur at a time before savings or other financial cushions have been established, seriously affecting immediate or future economic health. Victimization when one is elderly also comes at a time when it can be least easily absorbed. Income is often strained just to meet basic needs of food and shelter. Although Medicare is available, older bones often suffer greater and more painful damage in a fall or beating. Never the less these differences between age and perceptions of seriousness are not large.

The inverse relationship between income and perceived seriousness is in keeping with the notion that people who have fewer resources stand to lose proportionately more when victimized and find recovery more difficult to attain. The association between race, owning one's home, and area of residence to perceived seriousness may also be understood, at least in part, by their colinearity with income.

3. Perceived efficacy. Citizen's assessments of the value of different preventive measures included efficacy ratings of

- regular exercise in preventing heart trouble,
- alarm systems, window bars, or special locks in protecting homes from burglary,
- seat belts in preventing traffic injuries,
- avoiding certain places and people in protecting against robbery or assaults,
- smoke detectors in preventing injuries from fires,
- asking a neighbor to watch one's home when away to protect against burglary, and
- people patrolling their own neighborhoods to prevent crime.

A four category response format was used to indicate the helpfulness of these measures in averting victimization, ranging from Not At All Helpful (1) to Very Helpful (4).

As shown in Table 3.1c, the activities which were thought to be helpful, *on the average*, included the installation of target hardening devices, the utilization of seat belts, asking neighbors to watch one's home when away, and organizing a patrol of one's neighborhood. Regular exercise, certain behavioral restrictions, and smoke detectors are perceived as even more worthwhile in preventing harm.

In every case, the number of people endorsing an activity as "very helpful" was greater than for any of the other less favorable ratings. However, even as the most popular response, there was some degree of variation. The number of individuals evaluating an activity as "very helpful" ranged from approximately 38 percent for patrol to almost 68 percent for smoke detectors. No particular pattern readily emerges. Product- and people-oriented measures are about as likely to receive a 40 percent "very helpful" endorsement as they are to receive 60 percent. With barely 15 percent (or less) perceiving little or no value to these measures, differences seem to be only one of degree--helpful vs. very helpful. In addition these ratings of efficacy show no significant relationships with demographics and personality characteristics. Of final interest is the internal consistency among the efficacy ratings: here it was found that there is a moderate within-person correspondence in judging the helpfulness of these preventive measures (alpha coefficient of .63).

4. Summary and conclusion. In general, our analyses of these data support the notion that there are generalized responses to life's hazards. Certain people say they feel especially at risk to all sorts of hazards, while others appear to regard themselves as invincible. Some individuals expect dire consequences if they become victims, while others appear to see themselves coping successfully with various types of victimization. Finally, while most people believe in the efficacy of all sorts of prevention measures, some consistently do not. This leads to a conclusion that an individual's responses to crime may reflect his/her own reactions to threat *in general*. Furthermore we have found the same general pattern of individual difference factors related to reports of feeling at risk and regarding victimization as serious: It is those subgroups in the population who for one reason or another have been traditionally regarded as "at a disadvantage." Thus we find that females, younger (and sometimes older) adults, Blacks and Latinos, those in lower income brackets, renters, and central city residents are the ones most likely to say they see themselves at risk and perceive the consequences of their victimization as serious.

These findings must be considered preliminary, until they are replicated by more detailed and methodically rigorous data collection procedures. The survey approach used here could suffer from a response bias in judging risk, seriousness, and efficacy. It is possible that this has contributed to the internal consistency we observed in ratings related to both crime and non-crime hazards. Yet it appears reasonable to find that there are consistent individual differences in reactions to life's hazards. We have hypothesized that it is this risk-avoidance disposition that motivates individual citizens to employ various anti-crime measures. Whether risk-avoidance relates to all preventive responses to crime or only some is an issue that is investigated in Chapter V of this report.

B. Voluntary Action and Social Participation Disposition

As previously mentioned we have hypothesized that in addition to "risk-avoidance" there is another major route via which citizens may be led to engage in crime prevention: the social participation or voluntary action pathway. In order to better understand this pathway we investigated the citizenry's general disposition for social action/participation in formal voluntary organizations (FVOs).

1. Who belongs to FVOs? Information was gathered from citizens in the telephone survey to determine whether they were members in a group at their church or synagogue, a PTA or local school council, a block-club or neighborhood-based community group, and/or any other kind of group. Data were also collected on the total number of hours per month a member generally devoted to group activities.

Roughly one-third (31.9%) of the telephone survey sample reported that they were church- or synagogue-based group members. This estimate of religious group membership rate is slightly less than that obtained in a national survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center which indicated that in 1975 approximately 40 percent of the general population belonged to church-affiliated groups. About 17 percent of the telephone survey sample reported belonging to PTA or local school council groups. This estimate of school-related group membership rate is comparable to that obtained by the National Research Center in a 1975 national survey (14%).

Roughly 17 percent of the telephone survey sample said they belonged to a block club or neighborhood-based community group.* This membership rate estimate is slightly less than that obtained

*Nearly 20 percent of our Chicago sample belonged to this form of FVO, compared to 16 percent of our suburban sample.

from the Reactions to Crime Chicago telephone survey conducted in 1977. Those data indicated that approximately 25 percent of City of Chicago residents had been involved in community organizations or groups in their neighborhoods (Podolefsky and DuBow, 1980). However, the inclusion of "community organizations", which tend to represent larger geographic areas than the neighborhood, in the actual RTC survey item may have increased that estimate of membership in such groups.

In addition to being questioned about memberships in church or synagogue groups, school-related groups, and neighborhood groups, citizens in the telephone survey were asked whether they belonged to *any other kind* of groups: Slightly over one-fourth of the respondents (27.8%) said "yes." Analyses of these data suggest that these "other groups" may be professional associations and labor unions, recreational/athletic clubs, and social clubs. The 1975 NORC survey indicated that: 12 percent of the population belonged to professional or academic societies; 16 percent belonged to labor unions; 19 percent were members of sports groups; 11 percent were fraternal group members; 9 percent belonged to literary, art, discussion or study groups, and 9 percent were hobby or garden club members. Thus our pooled estimate of membership in "other groups" seems reasonable.

Across the entire sample, we find that a majority of citizens say they are members of at least one formal voluntary organization; i.e., only 41.7 percent indicated no group memberships. The bulk of the members (32.6 percent of the entire sample) reported membership in one type of FVO. The proportion of citizens who report multiple membership declines thereafter: 17.6 percent are members of two types; 6.9 percent are in three types; and only 1.3 percent report membership in four (or more) types.

In the telephone survey, respondents, who were a member of one or more of the four types of FVOs discussed above, were asked how many hours per month they spent, *in toto*, in activities related to this/these group(s). In other words, information concerning activity level was not obtained for each type of membership, but rather for all types (combined) to which respondents belonged. Hours spent per month in group-related activities thus, represents a measure of *general* activity in formal voluntary organizations.* For analytic purposes, members were classified as "passive" (4 hours or less per month spent in group activities), "moderately active" (5-10 hours per month spent in group activities) and "very active" (more than 10 hours per month

*Because of constraints on the length of our survey instrument, we gathered only one measure of activity level from each respondent who indicated at least one type of membership. While 56% of 966 respondents who were members indicated membership in only one type of group, there was no regularity (cont. bottom next page)

spent in group activities).

As seen above, about 42% of the sample did not indicate that they held an FVO membership. Of the 966 respondents who said they were members of at least one FVO, 43.4 percent reported being "passive" members, 28.2 percent were "moderately active," and 26.2 percent were "very active."*

Shown in Tables 3.4a and 3.4b are correlations between group membership and activity level with demographic, motivational and attitudinal characteristics. Many of these bivariate relationships are significantly related to membership and activity level in ways that support past research findings. This plethora of results becomes more focused when viewed in a multivariate context. Table 3.5 displays the results of multiple regression analyses on these reports of voluntary action and various individual factors.

Within this multivariate perspective, home ownership was found to relate significantly to membership in religious groups and neighborhood-based groups: homeowners were more likely to be such members than renters. We assume that an investment in the neighborhood or community in terms of owning a home plays a major role in promoting social participation.

Race also was significantly related to membership in neighborhood-based and religious groups: Blacks were more likely than Whites to participate in block clubs or neighborhood-based, and church groups. Also, in terms of general activity level, Blacks reported being more active in the groups they belonged to than Whites.

to the pattern of multiple memberships. About three-fifths of the persons (58.9%) who were church group members were also members of other groups; 74.9% of the school-related group members were also members of other groups; and 57.7% of members of the "other" category also held additional memberships. In lieu of this varied pattern of multiple memberships, we choose not to perform the current analyses for each subgroup of respondents who held only one type of membership, so as to circumvent a problem inherent in the data set. For example, while we could analyze the question of who comprises the "active core" of church group members who are only church group members (41.1% of all church group members), we could not analyze the important question of who comprises the "active core" of all church group members, including those with multiple memberships.

*The remaining 2.3% of members did not provide information concerning how active they were in the group(s) to which they belonged, and are not included in the analyses that follow on activity level.

Table 3.4a
CORRELATIONS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIPS WITH DEMOGRAPHICS

	Church or Synagogue	PTA or Local School Council	Block Clubs or NBHD-Based	Any Other Kind of Group	Activity Level
Area of Residence	-.01	.02	-.04	.09**	.02
Length of Residence	.11**	.02	.01	.02	.01
Home Ownership	.09**	.10**	.11**	.11**	-.02
Race	.08**	.04	.09**	-.11**	.05
Age	.14**	-.11**	-.05	.03	-.05
Sex	.05	.10**	-.03	-.11**	-.08*
Marital Status	.05*	.13**	.08**	.01	-.04
Number of Children	.06*	.37**	.09**	-.01	-.01
Education	.04	.10**	.14**	.22**	.07
Employment Status	-.11**	-.04	.04	.07*	.03
Income	-.01	.11**	.13**	.17**	.04

**p < .001 *p .01

Area of Residence (1=Suburb, 0=City);
Length of Residence (5 categories ranging from less than 1 year to 21 years or more);
Home Ownership (1=owner, 0=renter);
Race (1=Black, 0=Whites, Asians, Latinos and others);
Age (in years);
Sex (0=Male, 1=Female);
Marital Status (0=living with someone as married, widowed, divorced, separated, and never been married, 1=married);
Number of Children (4 categories ranging from none to 3 or more children under 19 years of age living in the household);
Education (5 categories ranging from less than high school grad to Grad school degree);
Employment Status (0=not fulltime, 1=fulltime);
Income (7 income categories ranging from less than \$6,000 to more than \$50,000 representing 1978 gross annual income).

Note. N=1656, except for activity level analyses, in which only the 966 respondents with group membership were included.

Table 3.4b
CORRELATIONS OF GROUP MEMBERSHIPS WITH DISPOSITIONAL
AND ATTITUDINAL CHARACTERISTICS

	Church or Synagogue Groups	PTA or Local School Council	Block Clubs or NBHD- Based Groups	Other Kinds of Groups	Activity Level
Expressive Motives	.18**	.10**	.14**	.19**	.18**
Instrumental Motives	.08**	.11**	.22**	.11**	.07
General Helpfulness of Neighbors	.09**	.05	.11**	.02	.02
Number of Families Can Ask a Favor of	.14**	.13**	.22**	.14**	.10**
Territorial Attitudes About the Home	.01	.04	.06*	.05	-.01
Territorial Attitudes about the Neighbor- hood	.01	-.04	-.09**	-.05	-.01
Personal Control Over Life's Events	.01	.03	.10**	.04	.10**
Influence of Chance On Life's Events	-.03	-.01	-.01	-.03	-.08*

**p<.001 *p<.01

Expressive Motives (5 categories ranging from nonexpressive to expressive);
Instrumental Motives (5 categories ranging from noninstrumental to instrumental);
General Helpfulness of Neighbors (1=go own way, 2=in the middle, 3=help out);
Number of Families can Ask a Favor of (in absolute numbers);
Territorial Attitudes About the Home (feel responsibility for what happens in my home; 4 categories ranging from never to always);
Territorial Attitudes About the Neighborhood (feel that what happens in the neighborhood is none of my business; 4 categories ranging from never to always);
Personal Control Over Life's Events (feel that has a strong influence over what happens in my life; 4 categories ranging from never to always);
Influence of Chance Over Life's Events (feel that chance luck play an important role in my life; 4 categories ranging from never to always).

Table 3.5
 RELATIONSHIPS OF DEMOGRAPHIC/DISPOSITIONAL FACTORS
 WITH GROUP MEMBERSHIPS AND ACTIVITY LEVEL:
 REGRESSION ANALYSES

	Standardized Beta Weights				
	Church or Synagogue Group Membership	PTA or Local School Council Membership	Block Club or NBHD- Based Group Membership	Other Kind of Group Membership	Generalized Activity Level Index
Area of Residence	.00	.00	-.04	.03	.03
Length of Residence	.02	.04	-.05	.00	.02
Home Ownership	.06*	.03	.08**	.04	-.02
Race	.12***	.04	.14***	-.05	.10*
Age	.12***	.00	.03	.10***	-.03
Sex	.02	.13***	.02	-.09***	-.09*
Marital Status	.04	.01	.02	-.09**	-.08*
Number of Children	.04	.35***	.03	.03	-.02
Education	.11***	.12***	.10***	.18***	.04
Employment Status	-.06*	-.01	.01	.00	-.05
Income	-.03	.05	.08*	.10**	.06
Expressive Motives	.15***	.06**	.09***	.19***	.17***
Instrumental Motives	.06*	.08***	.20***	.11***	.05
Neighbors' General Helpfulness	.03	-.01	.02	-.04	.01
Number of Families Could Ask Favor of	.08**	.06*	.16***	.06*	.05
Territorial Attitudes Toward the Home	.00	.03	.02	.03	.01
Territorial Attitudes Toward Neighborhood	.02	.01	-.02	-.01	.01
Personal Control	.01	.01	.06*	.00	.08*
Influence of Chance	-.04	.00	-.01	.01	-.09**
Multiple R	.32***	.44***	.39***	.38***	.28***
Total Variance Accounted For	.10	.19	.15	.15	.08
***	N=1496	N=1496	N=1496	N=1496	N=859
p<.001					
**					
p<.01					
*					
p<.05					

Age was significantly related to participation in religious groups and other kinds of groups: older persons (those 50 yrs. and over) were more likely to belong to such groups than younger people. With regard to sex, females were significantly more likely to participate in PTA's or local school councils, while males more frequently participated in other kinds of groups. Additionally, among group members in general, males were more active than females.

Some household characteristics are also related significantly to group participation within this multivariate perspective. Non-marrieds were more frequently members of "other" groups, and were significantly more active in groups to which they belonged than were marrieds. Regarding this last finding, it is possible that non-marrieds have less family commitments and may have more free time to spend in activities outside the home than married people.

Another family characteristic, number of children living at home, was strongly associated with membership in PTA or local school council. Not surprisingly, this factor alone almost totally "explains" membership in school groups.

Education, employment status, and income level, as indicators of socio-economic status, were related to some types of group membership but did not relate to members' activity level. More educated people were significantly more likely to belong to all types of groups than persons with less education. Additionally, people who were not employed full-time were members of religious-sponsored groups perhaps because they are older (retired) and have more free time to devote to such activities. People who reported higher rather than lower household incomes were more likely to belong to "other groups" and neighborhood groups.

As shown in these multivariate analyses, some dispositional characteristics were also related to group participation and generalized activity level. Expressive motivations for joining groups (i.e., reporting that you're a "joiner" primarily because you really enjoy groups) were related to membership in all types of groups. Similarly, members who indicated expressive motives for group involvement, were more active in general than those without expressive motivations. On the other hand, instrumental motivations did not relate to members' activity level. Thus, it appears that people who report joining groups primarily for social affiliation are most likely to be "hard workers," and may be the most productive members regardless of the expressive or problem-solving orientation of the specific organizations to which they belong: That is, social ties among members may contribute to the overall success and maintenance of an organization.

Instrumental motives, though, were related to membership in all types of groups, but especially important for block club

or neighborhood-based groups. People who believe that the group approach to problem-solving is best (instrumental motivation) are more likely to belong to such groups than people who do not hold such beliefs. This finding suggests that neighborhood organizations may not be predominantly social clubs; rather we can infer that they are organized at the local level to address community problems. (This last point is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.)

With one exception neighborhood social cohesion measures, territorial attitudes, and beliefs in personal control do not appear significantly related to membership in formal voluntary organizations. The exception being the number of families one can reportedly ask a favor of: It may be that social cohesion and group membership influence each other, so that social cohesiveness leads to group membership, while group membership then increases social cohesion. Members' activity level was significantly related to feelings of personal control and beliefs that chance or luck do not play an important role in life. Here, the notion that such people are "doers", and thus are likely to become actively involved in groups directed toward goals of interest is supported. Members who expressed either of these attitudes reported being more active in groups than were members who reported having a lower sense of personal control or who were more likely to believe chance has some effect on life's events.

2. Why do/don't citizens participate in community organizations? From the inperson interviews that were conducted with leaders of community organizations, a variety of information was gathered on their perceptions of why citizens do/don't initially get involved in their organization. Tables 3.6a and 3.6b display what organization leaders say are the reasons for citizens' participation and nonparticipation in community groups. A majority of leaders perceive citizens as being initially motivated to join such groups for instrumental reasons (e.g., to solve problems). A small proportion of the leaders see expressive motives as prompting voluntary participation in community groups (e.g., desire for social affiliation).

For the most part, organization leaders see many citizens as uninterested or apathetic when it comes to joining community groups. This contrasts somewhat with the reasons that citizens in the telephone survey gave for generally not joining voluntary organizations: Approximately one-third of those who describe themselves as "nonjoiners" said they don't have the time, while another third generally don't join because they don't enjoy such groups. Very few citizens (10%) indicated a lack of interest or apathy as a reason for not joining.

3. Summary and conclusion. The present results have generally supported our hypotheses and past research relating socio-demographic characteristics, personality traits,

Table 3.6a

REASONS GIVEN BY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES
FOR WHY PEOPLE INITIALLY
GET INVOLVED IN ORGANIZATIONS

Reasons	Percent*
To Solve Their Own Problems	51.4
Commitment to the Community	29.7
Desire for Social Affiliation	22.5
Positive Image of Organization	18.1
Commitment to Involvement	10.1
Threats to the Physical Nature of the Neighborhood	10.1
To Receive Services	8.7
Concern about Crime	7.2
Miscellaneous**	34.1

Note. N=138

* These percentages represent the proportion of respondents who gave each type of response. Since multiple responses were allowed, they do not sum to 100.0%.

** These responses were idiosyncratic or could not be collapsed into broader, meaningful categories.

Table 3.6b

REASONS GIVEN BY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES
FOR WHY PEOPLE DO NOT JOIN FORMAL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Reasons	Percent*
Lack of Interest	65.9
Conflicting Obligations (No Time)	20.7
No Perceived Need	10.4
Negative Image of Organization	10.4
Policy/Member Conflicts	10.4
Language/Cultural Barriers	10.4
Mistrust Neighbors	8.1
Unaware of Organization	6.7
Miscellaneous**	34.8

Note. N=135

* These percentages represent the proportion of respondents who gave each type of response. Since multiple responses were allowed, they do not sum to 100.0%.

** These responses were idiosyncratic or could not be collapsed into broader, meaningful categories.

attitudinal factors to voluntary group involvement. The findings concerning various motivational factors are also noteworthy. As expected, material incentives (anticipated receipt of goods or services) appear not to play much of a role in motivating citizens to participate in FVOs. The relative importance of expressive and instrumental incentives as motivating forces toward differential participation is evident. Of special importance is the finding from our telephone survey that instrumental motives for general participation is in fact most strongly related to membership in block clubs or neighborhood-based community groups, while expressive motivation is significantly related to members' activity level.

By investigating the citizenry's "organizational life," we have formed a clearer understanding of social participation in formal voluntary organizations. To the extent that citizens become involved in crime prevention because of their involvement with FVOs, an understanding of the disposition for social participation is central to our research interests; since it appears to represent the collective, public-minded motives that others have suggested are linked to certain crime prevention responses. Also it appears *qualitatively distinct* from risk-avoidance motives for crime prevention that seem to have more an individual, private-minded focus.

Whether those two motives lead to separate anti-crime measures is an empirical question that is investigated in Chapter V and discussed in Chapter VI. Before presenting those sections though, the next chapter looks at two parts of the Opportunity Structure that we specifically gathered information about: local law enforcement agencies, and community organizations.

CHAPTER IV.

THE STRUCTURE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR CITIZEN CRIME PREVENTION: THE POLICE AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

An individual citizen can be positively disposed toward prevention-oriented activities because of risk-avoidance and/or social-participation motives, yet still fail to do so. We have hypothesized that there is an "Opportunity Structure" which impacts on the dispositions held by citizens. In some cases its impact is thought to facilitate a citizen's employment of or engagement in some anti-crime measure. In other instances, it may inhibit a citizen's initiation of an anti-crime measure; either by directly discouraging the measure or by not providing the citizen an opportunity to actualize his/her disposition.

Local law enforcement agencies and community organizations are reasoned to be two key components in the Opportunity Structure. The police, through formal Community Crime Prevention Programs and through their day-to-day contact with residents, act as one of the agents by which crime prevention information is disseminated and opportunities for involvement in crime prevention are provided. In a separate vein, the 1970s have seen a growing number of "grass roots" neighborhood/community groups spawned by the perceived inability or unwillingness of government bureaucracies and major private institutions to deal effectively with the problems that have long confronted urban neighborhoods, and are beginning to crop up in suburbs. These organizations often concentrate on rehabilitating homes, cleaning up the neighborhood, combatting crime/delinquency, and strengthening social ties. These groups provide local residents with numerous opportunities to help solve/prevent local problems, including "doing something about crime." As such, we have gathered data directly from the police and community groups to learn more about their role in getting citizens involved in crime prevention.

A. The Police

Encouraging the positive involvement of citizens in crime prevention activities has become a clear part of Federal, state and local public policy in the 1970s. Police, as "experts" and "authority figures," help shape public knowledge and opinions about what citizens should and should not do to "help fight crime". Furthermore, through the formal and informal community crime prevention programs they conduct, the police provide citizens direct opportunities to become involved in crime prevention. The police make contact with citizens about crime prevention primarily in three ways: First, when a citizen has been victimized the investigating officer often makes recommendations to prevent future victimization. Second, some police departments take proactive approaches to community crime prevention by contacting individual households to offer

a security survey. Third, the police may be asked by a group of neighbors to attend a neighborhood meeting to discuss crime prevention; or in other instance the police themselves may organize these neighborhood/community meetings. Yet our own personal experience suggests that whether the police have contact with citizens on an individual level or as a group, it seems that much of what they discuss and recommend to citizens regarding crime prevention deals with what the individual *qua individual* can do to protect his/her person and/or household, not what groups of citizens *as collectives* can do. This perception is not based on empirical evidence, because very little is known about what kind of citizen crime prevention activities are encouraged or discouraged by police, and how police conceptualize citizen anti-crime measures.

To explore these issues, a mail survey was conducted of local law enforcement agencies servicing communities in the metropolitan Chicago area to examine the extent of their endorsement of various anti-crime measures undertaken by citizens. As mentioned in Chapter II, one-hundred and seventy-one departments/agencies were identified as having jurisdiction in the target areas where our telephone survey of citizens was fielded; 167 completed survey forms were returned, yielding a completion rate of 97 percent. For each department, one officer judged each of a list of fifty-one citizen anti-crime measures on the extent to which it was encouraged or discouraged by his/her department.* With the exception of two items dealing with citizen patrols, the set of anti-crime measures did not include anti-crime measures related to group efforts.

Table 4.1 presents the ratings of the various anti-crime measures, rank-ordered by their mean (average) endorsements. A number of general patterns were found. First, while almost half of the crime prevention measures were at least somewhat encouraged, only a few activities were actually discouraged to any appreciable extent. There was also a considerable number of measures which law enforcement agencies were neutral toward or without a department police. The variability in the way police departments responded to single measures (indicated by the standard deviation) is also of interest. For the most part, police departments demonstrated the greatest consensus about which activities to strongly encourage. But with the variation

*These ratings were done using a five-point likert response format ranging from "1", strongly discouraged, to a "5", strongly encouraged. If a department had no policy (positive or negative) toward a particular measure, the officer was instructed to rate it with a "3". It is acknowledged that officers may or may not be consistent with department "policy" when they discuss crime prevention with citizens. This could limit the generalizability of these ratings.

Table 4.1

RANK-ORDERED MEAN ENDORSEMENTS OF CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES

	Mean	SD	Strategy
1. Lock doors when away from home	4.98	.17	First Rules
2. Report victimizations to police immediately	4.96	.23	First Rules
3. Report suspicious activities to police	4.95	.25	First Rules
4. Lock windows when away from home	4.92	.31	First Rules
5. Ask neighbors to watch home when vacationing	4.87	.46	First Rules
6. User timer on indoor lights when away from home	4.86	.38	Home Protection I
7. Stop deliveries and mail when vacationing	4.83	.57	First Rules
8. Be alert at all times	4.82	.46	Other
9. Ask police to watch home when vacationing	4.75	.60	Home Protection II
10. Install double cylinder deadbolt locks at home	4.74	.58	Home Protection II
11. Have peephole or small window in front door at home	4.70	.62	Home Protection I
12. Engrave valuables kept at home	4.69	.58	Home Protection I
13. Don't carry a lot of cash or unnecessary credit cards	4.44	.81	Street Protection
14. Install extra outdoor lighting at home	4.39	.81	Home Protection I
15. Keep trees and bushes around home well-trimmed	4.39	.81	Home Protection I

Note. Ratings were made on a five-point Likert scale with 5=strongly encouraged, 1=strongly discouraged and 3=neutral or no policy. N=167.

Table 4.1 (continued)

	Mean	SD	Strategy
16. Remove valuables before leaving home for vacation	4.37	.80	Other
17. Attempt to scream if accosted or assaulted and no weapon is visible	4.34	.94	No Weapon Present
18. Keep an eye on street in front of home for suspicious persons	4.30	.82	Home Protection I
19. Lock doors when at home	4.28	.81	Home Protection II
20. Have security survey of home	4.21	.98	Home Protection I
21. Display crime prevention or anti-theft sticker at home	4.19	.95	Home Protection I
22. Don't look or act like an easy victim	4.12	.97	Other
23. Leave radio or TV on when away in evening	4.02	.93	Home Protection I
24. Attempt to break away if accosted or assaulted and no weapon is visible	3.83	1.19	No Weapon Present
25. Purchase theft insurance	3.77	.96	Home Protection II
26. Carry a purse with straps rather than a clutch bag	3.65	1.13	Other
27. Carry whistle when outdoors	3.59	.90	Street Protection
28. Learn simple self-defense techniques	3.58	.98	Street Protection
29. Install audible burglary alarm systems at home	3.57	.94	Home Protection II
30. Lock windows when at home	3.57	.90	Home Protection II
31. Install silent alarm systems at home	3.53	1.05	Home Protection II
32. Have dog at home for protection	3.48	.87	Home Protection II

Table 4.1 (continued)

	Mean	SD	Strategy
33. Drive to destination rather than walk at night	3.46	.82	Street Protection
34. Don't go out alone at night	3.34	.99	Street Protection
35. Avoid certain locales	3.30	1.11	Street Protection
36. Don't wear high heels or constricting clothing which makes running difficult	3.28	.95	Street Protection
37. Avoid walking near certain people on the street	3.27	.92	Street Protection
38. Carry something that can be used for protection when outdoors (e.g., cane, etc.)	3.24	.88	Street Protection
39. Walk with dog for personal protection when outdoors	3.14	.85	Street Protection
40. Take part in walking patrol of neighborhood with neighbors	3.11	1.05	Patrol
41. Take part in driving patrol of neighborhood with CB radio	3.11	1.12	Patrol
42. Attempt to fight back if accosted or assaulted and no weapon is visible	2.97	1.20	No Weapon Present
43. Learn formal self-defense techniques (Karate, Judo, etc.)	2.78	.85	Street Protection
44. Install bars on windows at home	2.41	.96	Radical
45. Don't leave home at night	2.19	.92	Radical
46. Attempt to scream if accosted or assaulted and weapon is visible	2.13	1.17	Weapon Present
47. Carry chemical spray when away from home	2.04	1.04	Radical

CONTINUED

1 OF 4

Table 4.1 (continued)

	Mean	SD	Strategy
48. Attempt to break away if accosted or assaulted and weapon is visible	1.93	1.06	Weapon Present
49. Have gun at home for protection	1.83	.96	Radical
50. Attempt to fight back if accosted or assaulted and weapon is visible	1.47	.85	Weapon Present
51. Carry gun or other weapon when away from home	1.17	.54	Radical

across police departments it is quite conceivable that residents in adjacent communities could receive conflicting information about certain crime prevention measures.

Rather than deal with each anti-crime measure on an individual basis, we endeavor to identify reliable clusters of measures that underlay the entire set of judgements: Through factor analysis, it was found that these endorsements of anti-crime measures could be reliably summarized along eight dimensions, (many of which show similarities with the dimensions of citizen crime prevention behaviors discussed in Chapter I). The dimensions that were identified are listed in the "Strategy" column of Table 4.1, indicating where each measure clustered.

As seen in Table 4.1, there were six measures that received almost universal endorsement. These included:

- reporting victimizations to police immediately,
- reporting suspicious activities to police,
- locking doors when away,
- locking windows when away from home,
- asking a neighbor to watch the home when vacationing, and
- stopping deliveries when vacationing.

Approximately 90 percent or more of the officers strongly recommended taking each of these courses of action. The strong and positive consensus about these measures indicated that they are considered the *First Rules* of community crime prevention.

The *Home Protection I* grouping consisted of the following household-based protection techniques:

- use timer on indoor lights when away,
- have peephole or small window in front door,
- engrave valuables,
- install outdoor lighting,
- trim trees and bushes around home,
- keep eye out on street in front of home,
- have security survey,

- display anti-crime sticker
- leave radio/TV on when away at night.

Several of these measures involve altering physical features of the home environment, while the remaining are simpler and routine e.g., keeping alert to happenings around one's home. The distribution of endorsements was highly skewed, as evidenced by the prevailing use of the "Strongly Encouraged" category. All but one measure was highly recommended by at least 50 percent of the officers. Further, in judging the various courses of action, no distinction seemed to have been made between changes to the environment (peepholes or outdoor lighting, etc.) and simpler crime prevention measures (keeping an eye on the street, or engraving valuables). In general, these home protection measures are consistently highly encouraged by local police.

A second cluster of household-based protection measures was identified as *Home Protection II*. These measures tended to center on more traditional target hardening responses:

- install deadbolt locks,
- lock doors when at home,
- lock windows when at home,
- install audible burglary alarm,
- install silent alarm at home,
- keep watchdog,
- ask police to watch home when away, and
- carry theft insurance.

Having police watch one's home when vacationing and installing deadbolt locks were strongly recommended by the vast majority of police departments (about 80 percent). Half of the departments strongly encouraged locking doors when at home. However, the installation of alarms, purchase of theft insurance and other locking behaviors were, for the most part, neither consistently encouraged nor discouraged. As a set the Home Protection II measures are somewhat encouraged.

The presence or absence of a weapon seemed to be the discriminating factor in judging responses to imminent personal assault. More than 80 percent of the officers discouraged trying to scream, break away, or fight when faced with an armed assailant (*Weapon Present*). On the other hand, endorsements were reversed for an assault situation in which no weapon is visible (*No Weapon Present*); here preventive responses (e.g.,

screaming) were more likely to be encouraged. Fighting back was the least favored, being strongly discouraged for an armed assault by 47 percent of the officers, and marginally discouraged when no weapon is apparent. The police apparently feel that a victim should not take the initiative to *physically* try to deal with the offender under any circumstance.

A patrol cluster (*Patrol*) was defined by the involvement of citizens in walking and/or driving (CB) patrols of their neighborhood. Over half of the police indicated that their department had no official policy toward citizen patrols. The remaining ratings were split between encouragement and discouragement of patrolling activities.

A number of anti-crime measures were associated with other strategies citizens might personally undertake to protect themselves from street crime. Endorsements of these measures formed a reliable cluster, *Street Protection*:

- don't carry cash or unnecessary credit cards,
- carry whistle outdoors,
- learn simple self-defense,
- drive rather than walk at night,
- don't go out alone at night,
- avoid certain locales,
- women should dress in nonconstricting ways,
- avoid certain people on street,
- carry something for protection e.g. cane,
- walk with dog, and
- learn formal self-defense (karate).

Among this cluster, learning formal self-defense techniques was slightly discouraged overall, while carrying little cash was strongly recommended by 62 percent of the respondents. However, the most prevalent response (45 percent to 66 percent) was to neither encourage nor discourage the activities. In general, local police policy appears consistently neutral and/or undefined toward these street protection measures.

Another cluster of anti-crime measures can be regarded as "extreme" protection strategies. These measures have been labeled *Radical* in Table 4.1 and include:

- installing bars on windows,
- don't leave home at night,
- carry chemical spray,
- have gun at home, and
- carry gun or other weapon.

Activities strongly discouraged include carrying a gun (by 90 percent of the officers), having a gun at home (52 percent), and carrying chemical spray (41 percent). Other extreme responses were not consistently encouraged nor discouraged by the majority of police departments. Yet overall, extreme citizen responses to crime are somewhat to strongly discouraged by local police.

Four behaviors did not cluster significantly and/or meaningfully with any of the other dimensions. They included:

- carrying a purse with straps rather than a clutch bag,
- not looking or acting like an easy victim,
- removing valuables before leaving home for vacation, and
- remaining alert at all times.

Table 4.2 presents a summary of these findings. Local police departments and law enforcement agencies strongly encourage citizens to engage in the "first rules" of crime prevention. A variety of household-based protective measures are also consistently encouraged. Initial resistance to an assailant is encouraged only if no weapon is apparent. Police policy toward neighborhood patrols and various personal precautions against street crime was generally found to be neutral and/or undefined. On the other hand, resistance to an *armed* assailant, and extreme protective responses were consistently discouraged. In sum, police say they would prefer the citizenry to engage in passive, indirect forms of crime prevention (e.g., installation of deadbolt locks and reporting of crimes) rather than more aggressive, direct anti-crime measures (e.g., gun ownership and neighborhood patrols).

The role of the police in the Opportunity Structure of citizen crime prevention is contingent on the amount of contact they have with citizens and the legitimacy citizens attribute

Table 4.2
RANK-ORDERING OF POLICE RATINGS OF
CRIME PREVENTION DIMENSIONS

Strategy	Recommendation	Mean	Standard Deviation
First Rules	Strongly Encouraged	4.92	.33
Home Protection I	Encouraged	4.44	.45
Home Protection II	Encouraged	3.95	.44
No Weapon Present	Encouraged	3.73	.80
Patrol	Neutral	3.14	.92
Street Protection	Neutral	3.08	.47
Radical Responses	Discouraged	1.93	.55
Weapon Present	Discouraged	1.84	.78

Note. N = 167

to their opinions and recommendations. If the police make an "outreach" to their communities, it would be expected that they would impact significantly on the amount and types of anti-crime activities the citizenry engages in. Most likely this impact would be greatest in increasing the extent to which citizens target harden (e.g., with deadbolt locks). It seems less likely that the police can effectively discourage the use of certain anti-crime measures (e.g., guns, and other weapons). And it is uncertain what effect if any they have on those anti-crime measures for which no consistent policy exists (e.g., citizen patrols).

B. Community Organizations

The citizen participation literature, as well as RTC analyses of ten neighborhoods in Chicago, San Francisco, and Philadelphia indicates that community organizations can play an important role in enhancing a neighborhood's problem solving capacity and in serving as a linkage mechanism between neighborhood residents and city service bureaucracies. In this way, they provide their members opportunities for involvement, including those dealing with the problems of crime and delinquency.

The apparent advantages of the neighborhoods served by effective community groups suggests that we need to know more about such groups and their relationship to the communities in which they conduct their affairs. The 153 inperson interviews that were conducted with organization leaders in the three RTC cities gathered information to help address the questions of (a) what role these organizations play in their communities, and (b) what forces enhance and impede the effectiveness of these organizations. We have reasoned that by better understanding the organizations themselves, a clearer picture of the opportunities they provide their members will emerge.

Resource constraints limited our investigations to one respondent per organization. The data therefore must be understood to reflect the views of organization leaders, which may or may not be consistent with those of the general membership and others in the community who are tangentially associated with the group in question. The 153 organizations for whom a leader was interviewed included: 1) block clubs ($n = 8$); 2) community groups associated with a specific geographical area ($n = 99$); 3) coalitions of such groups which may be specific to a wider area, or city-wide and umbrella groups which bring together a wide range of neighborhood institutions such as block groups, churches and social service agencies ($n = 30$); and 4) single issue groups which may be either autonomous and locally based or city area wide coalitions dealing with housing rehabilitation, youth problems, or crime ($n = 16$).

1. Membership size and boundaries. Groups with more extensive boundaries are able to attract a larger membership, to some extent. Yet the relationship of the size of the area represented compared to the size of the general membership is somewhat curvilinear. Organizations with boundaries encompassing three square miles or less show an increase in average membership as the area represented increases. For groups whose boundaries extend beyond that point, however, the relationship does not hold, suggesting that for them enlarging the area to be represented may not be a fruitful strategy for increasing membership. Furthermore, the size of the "active core" of members seems relatively independent of organization type, size of area represented, or size of general membership: i.e., regardless of how many total members a group claims, how big an area it claims, or whether it is a block club, community area group, coalition/umbrella group, or single issue group the majority of organization leaders said their active core included *forty members or less*. Within this context, the data suggest that only for very small groups will increasing the size of the general membership have a positive effect on the size of the active core of members.

2. Personnel and financial resources. An organization's capacity to achieve its goals is to a large extent related to the number of "person" hours elicited either from volunteers or paid staff and the financial resources supporting its activities. To assess the resources of our groups we gathered information on annual budgets, funding sources, and staff size. Volunteer size in most instances is relatively low because most leaders identified only those who volunteered their services for organizational maintenance and administrative tasks, and excluded those engaged in programmatic activities.

Budget sizes range from under \$100 to over \$100,000. Block clubs understandably have the smallest budgets. Coalition groups exhibit the largest. Small budget organizations belonging to coalitions, however, have access to resources, such as xeroxing, staff support, and public relations services, that their own budgets could not provide. If we examine the relationship of budgets and the sources from which organizational funds are derived, we find that groups with budgets under \$1,000 derive their funds primarily from internal sources such as membership dues, individual contributions, and fund raising affairs; whereas those with larger budgets get support from government grants and private foundations. A large membership does not necessarily engender substantial funds for neighborhood groups; no significant relationship was found between membership size and annual budget ($r(135) = -.03$, n.s.). On the other hand, organizations with staff tend to have larger budgets: Clearly an organization hiring staff must have funds to support them. However, it is probably true that once staff is hired, it plays an important role in writing grant proposals and other fund raising activities.

Thus organizations with superior resources have a better chance of eliciting even more support, whereas those with more limited resources are also constrained in that respect.

Thirty-eight percent of our groups have the support of some paid staff. Of these, 17 percent have full time help, 6 percent have part time help, 15 percent have both. If we examine the distribution of staff by organization type, we see that all block clubs and most community organizations have no staff at all. A majority of coalitions and about half the single issue groups claim some professional support. These are the groups with the larger budgets, most likely to get funding from external sources, and for that reason able to mount more ambitious projects.

In sum, these groups are as diverse in resources as the populations they serve. They do, however, appear to have a common purpose, which is to take care of whatever segment of the community they claim to represent, and to deal with those local problems which the political and bureaucratic agencies in the cities either cannot or do not address. The resources available to these groups as well as the membership served should dictate the more specific goals set by these organizations, as well as the strategies devised to reach them. To get a more precise view of the roles played by these organizations in the communities they serve, we examine next a number of issues which will clarify the relationship of these groups both with their communities and with the external agencies whose support is required for the resolution of the problems they set out to address.

3. Neighborhood organizations and their communities. The orientation of neighborhood organizations can be seen in the substance of what they do. Why were they created? What are their goals? What specific issues do they address?

Looking first at the circumstances which prompted their formation, it can be noted in Table 4.3 that the highest percentage of all groups were responding in one way or another to the physical conditions of their neighborhoods. Leaders said that their organizations were interested either in maintaining conditions with which they were essentially satisfied or, as more often was the case, with which they were dissatisfied and working for improvement. Another 18 percent of all organizations were created in response to what was seen as a threat to the physical environment in their areas. This was engendered by either the expansion of private institutions (e.g., hospitals and universities) or by government projects (e.g., highways or urban renewal programs). When these responses are added to the neighborhood maintenance responses we find that almost half (47.2%) of the leaders said their group was forced to protect or enhance the physical environment of the residents they represent.

Table 4.3

CIRCUMSTANCES PROMPTING FORMATION OF GROUPS
BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

Type of Organization	Circumstances Prompting Formation					N
	Maintain or Improve Neighborhood	Gov't or Institutional Expansion in Area	Social Problems	Political or Ideological Motivation	Social Cohesion	
All groups	29.4	17.8	27.3	10.3	4.8	146
Block Clubs	37.5	--	12.5	--	25.0	8
Community Orgs.	27.6	23.4	23.3	10.6	4.2	94
Umbrella/coalitions	39.2	14.2	57.1	14.2	--	28
Single issue Groups	18.7	--	12.5	6.2	6.2	16

Note. Group sample sizes do not sum to 153 due to missing data.

By examining the original goals of these organizations, an even more prominent position for the physical maintenance issue is found: Well over one half of all the organizations (68.8%), and regardless of type, identify neighborhood maintenance or improvement as an original goal. Again if we add the organizations whose original goals included fighting institutional expansion we find that fully 72 percent of the groups planned to deal in some way with the physical environment in which they conduct their affairs.

While goals often represent abstract intentions, this same pattern was found when leaders were asked what specific issues their organization was currently trying to do something about. The most frequent responses fall into the neighborhood environment category (38%). Groups addressing this general issue dealt specifically with: 1) housing problems; 2) zoning; 3) traffic and parking; 4) general neighborhood maintenance; and 5) the perceived threats to the integrity of their neighborhoods posed by institutional expansion, government projects, and the redlining practices of lending institutions which kept mortgage money out of the area. Running a close second to environmental maintenance as an issue to address are a range of social problems frequently affecting urban neighborhoods: These include crime, problems associated with racial transition, and a number of problems which we call "signs of incivility" (cf. Lewis & Maxfield, 1980) that are viewed as disruptive to community life. Many of these such as vandalism, drug use, and alcohol abuse are more often associated with young people and were specifically designated by the leaders as youth problems.

Only one fourth of the community groups and only 12 percent of the block clubs and single issue groups noted that social problems were instrumental in *prompting* their creation. However, over half of the umbrella/coalition groups were formed at least in part to address these issues. The dominance in these latter groups might well be due to the fact that addressing complex social problems requires more resources than the smaller organizations can generate.

Whatever the difficulties confronted, leaders made it clear that the formation of neighborhood groups is primarily viewed as a mechanism for coping with local problems. Approximately three-fourths of our groups mentioned problems that fall into the three categories we have discussed (physical maintenance neighborhood environment, institutional expansion, and social problems). Many others were idiosyncratic to specific areas or were reflected in more vague terminology suggesting that there was "a need in the neighborhood".

The questions on organizational formation, goals, and issues, allowed for multiple responses from leaders. Among those we found responses reflecting either an ideological or political

dimension, and others referring to an abstract neighborhood ideal. This latter ideology is a commitment to community or, in a few instances, a commitment to the idea of involvement. Leaders citing this spoke of the importance of community attachments and the value to both the individual and the community when residents are "involved". Others (10%) spoke explicitly in political terms: they saw their groups as instruments for fighting political oppression, and for eliciting political responses to the neighborhood needs.

Community groups do not always adhere to their original goals. However, only one fifth (30) of our groups reported changing goals. Whereas neighborhood maintenance predominates among the original goals, those groups that changed are more likely to focus on social problems. This is also reflected in an increase in the provision of services to residents as a new goal, which often reflects a commitment to alleviating social problems.

One might speculate that the change in emphasis is due to the organizational maturity of the groups adopting the new goals. The initial urge to organize generally comes in response to a salient concern. Physical conditions in an area are typically more evident than social problems. Involvement in neighborhood problem solving activities, however, tends to enhance awareness of other less prominent difficulties, and thus might lead to the new directions these groups plan to take. In addition, organizational maturity might well raise confidence levels and thus encourage the organizations with more experience to take on the more difficult tasks (e.g., social problems).

The latter may explain the research on organized group responses to crime (DuBow and Podelefsky, 1979) which shows that groups involved in anti-crime activities were generally created for other purposes. Our data support these findings: We find twice as many responses from leaders indicating a commitment to do something about crime among the new goals, in comparison to the number who mentioned original goals that dealt with crime.

The circumstances prompting the formation of these groups, the original and new goals adopted, and the issues addressed, all support the suggestion that *community groups see themselves primarily as problem solving agencies*. This view finds additional confirmation in the leaders' perception of those who join their organizations. When leaders were asked why people joined their groups, 75 percent mentioned some kind of difficulty in the neighborhood. Fifty percent of these explicitly stated that people are attracted to their organization because they need help with problems.

In reviewing these findings and the problem solving strategies that leaders reported are used by their organizations (e.g.,

direct political pressure tactics, lobbying by mail, drafting legislation, watchdog activities, etc.) we find that although community groups do not *initially* see themselves as either instruments of representation or political power, they take on an overtly political role as they seek to solve the local problems which prompted their formation.

Because of their potential for having a positive impact on the community they represent, it behooves us to learn more about how these groups effectively involve residents and maintain themselves as organizations. In seeking explanations for the differences in organizational effectiveness we looked first at the building strategies used to form the groups, then at the participatory opportunities available to their members, and finally at the communication channels used to maintain contact with them.

4. Organization building. Eighty percent of the organizations actively recruit members. Of these, two-thirds identified some obstacles to their efforts. These were associated either with deficiencies in the organization or with the characteristics of those whose involvement is sought. The former includes primarily inadequate financial resources or an inadequate number of active members to undertake the recruitment tasks. Less frequently mentioned, but nonetheless important factors for some groups, were a negative image in the community and intra-organizational conflict. The individual characteristic most frequently mentioned as a recruitment barrier was citizen apathy. For some minority groups, however, language and cultural differences were the major deterrents. Leaders were almost evenly divided between the two categories, with organizational deficiencies given a slight edge (41.6%) over citizen characteristics (37.7%).

Efforts to overcome these obstacles are reflected in a range of recruitment strategies including inperson canvassing, mailings to a select group of residents, telephone solicitations, mass solicitations in flyers, social events, and organizational meetings. Over half of all the groups use door to door canvassing as a recruitment strategy. Ranking a close second and third are mailings (40.5%) and mass solicitations (35.5%). Most groups tend to use more than one recruitment strategy. Over one third of our groups use two and another 20 percent use three or four. The effectiveness with which such strategies might overcome the obstacles posed by the major organizational deficiencies identified by the leaders, was addressed in a regression analysis: Controlling for the size of the area represented, we sought to determine the impact of budget size, the size of members in the active core, and the number of recruitment strategies used on membership size. Thirty percent of the variation in membership size was explained by these three variables. However, neither budget size nor the number of recruitment strategies used were significantly related to our dependent variable (membership

size).

This suggests that extensive recruitment may not be an effective vehicle for increasing the number of organizational members. Groups seeking to achieve this end, might concentrate instead on measures designed to increase the number of individuals in the active core. Instead of seeking inducements to attract new membership, these groups might be better served by exploring ways to keep their current members active and involved. This issue is addressed next.

5. Maintaining membership involvement. In order to determine what membership means to the people who join these groups we examine first the participatory opportunities leaders said were offered, and secondly, the communication channels leaders told us were used to keep the membership in touch with organizational affairs. Eleven different activities falling into five general categories were mentioned by the leaders. These include: 1) organizational support activities such as attendance at regular meetings, serving on standing committees, and working on publications and neighborhood recruitment drives; 2) specific issue activities focusing on crime, youth, housing, health and social welfare services; 3) political activities involving mostly attendance at public meetings and hearings; 4) educational seminars and workshops; and 5) social events.

No group claimed to offer more than seven different activities. The majority (60%) offered either three or four. Another third of the groups offered one or two, and only eight percent offered more than five. Differences between group types were for the most part insignificant, but community groups are likely to offer more varied opportunities for participation than any of the other groups (e.g., block clubs, or coalitions).

If we look more closely at the types of opportunities offered, we find a preponderance of organizational support activities (81.9%). The others, in declining order of frequency are social events (47.7%), political activities (35.6%), issue specific activities (22.7%) and educational programs (6.5%). The relatively low frequency of the issue specific activities seems somewhat at odds with the perceptions of the leaders about why people join. Thus those who come to these groups with specific issues in mind might well be disappointed by the relative paucity of opportunities to directly address these issues in their organizational work.

Although we have no data on actual participation levels in most of these activities, we can report on assessments of attendance at general membership meetings. Ninety-one percent of the groups hold regular membership meetings: about half of these (53.6%) occur on a monthly basis, with a smaller proportion holding quarterly (18.6%), semi-annual (5.7%), and

annual (14.3%) membership meetings. Over forty percent of the groups reported low attendance rates at their general membership meetings. One fourth (25.8%) reported moderate, and 29 percent reported high attendance.* An examination of attendance by group size indicates that small groups do proportionally better than those with a larger general membership.

Members who neither attend meetings nor participate in other organizational activities, can still maintain contact with groups that have regular channels of communication with their membership. Three-fourths of our groups keep in touch with their members on a regular basis: Almost half of them (46.5%) do so monthly, another fourth (24.8%) contact members quarterly, and a smaller percentage do so semi-annually (7.2%), or annually (19.7%). A very few coalition/umbrella and single issue groups report keeping in touch with their members on a weekly or biweekly basis.

Leaders reported that the means most frequently used for member contact are flyers, which can be distributed door to door at minimal cost; over half of all the groups use this strategy. Ranking second among all groups are newspapers or newsletters. Approximately half the single issue and umbrella/coalition groups, and a little under one third of the community groups send out mailings, and a little under twenty percent of them distribute annual reports. There is some variation in the number of communication channels reportedly used: close to 40 percent of the groups use two, a little less than one third use one, and 26 percent use three or four different communication channels.

Our attendance data confirms the accepted wisdom of community organizers who note the difficulties faced by those attempting to retain the ongoing involvement of their current membership. Over ninety percent of the leaders report that they make some active effort to keep their members involved. Well over half of them use three or four different strategies. Almost all of the respondents report contacting delinquent members in person or on the telephone. Many (62.3%) ask the more active members in the group to make the solicitations. Social events and mailings are both used frequently, by three-quarters of all groups.

6. Conclusion. We have found that community groups see themselves as major problem solving agencies at the local level. And although they do not define themselves in political terms,

*In classifying membership attendance, those meetings attracting 25 percent or less of their membership were ranked as low, those with a 26-49 percent attendance rate as moderate, and those with an attendance of 50 percent of the membership or more as high.

they clearly take on a political role as they seek to address the problems which prompted their formation. An increasingly important aspect of this role is the linkage function performed by the groups that serve as mediating agencies between local residents and the city's service bureaucracies. When such groups come to define crime as a local problem that the government agencies cannot or will not control, they can provide their membership with opportunities to do something about crime. It is in this way that community organizations are an important part of the Opportunity Structure for citizen involvement in crime prevention.

C. Summary

We have hypothesized that while citizens may hold risk-avoidance and/or social participation dispositions to become involved in crime prevention, the Opportunity Structure for involvement can play an important and determining role in whether a citizen does or does not employ/engage some anti-crime measure/activity. Local law enforcement agencies (police) and community organizations are assumed to constitute key aspects of the Opportunity Structure.

We have found that police holding varying opinions about the types of anti-crime measures the citizenry should employ: For the most part, they seem to endorse indirect and passive citizen crime prevention (e.g., reporting suspicious situations, marking property, locking doors, etc.) and seem not to endorse more direct and aggressive means (e.g., fighting back if assailed, carrying a gun, citizen patrols, etc.). The police are often viewed by citizens as a legitimate source of expert knowledge about crime prevention. As they disseminate knowledge to the public regarding anti-crime measures, they are providing options for citizens to expand their repertoire of crime prevention activities. Furthermore, through their "outreach" attempts, e.g., contacting citizens for security surveys and organizing neighborhood crime prevention meetings, they are providing direct opportunities for citizens to engage in crime prevention.

Community organizations are important because of their problem-solving orientation. A citizen is concerned about some specific local problem (e.g., crime), but feels there is little he or she can do about it alone, can be given an opportunity to do something as part of a group. Community organizations also provide opportunities for their current members to engage in crime prevention, when crime and delinquency problems become part of their organizational agenda. Members who may not have joined or remained active because of a crime-related experience or concern, are in this way involved in anti-crime activities.

The following chapter provides our detailed findings of what citizens do, as individuals and as groups, to be safe from crime. In the chapter we will come back to address the role

of the police and community organizations as they relate to the citizenry's anti-crime activities.

CHAPTER V

WHAT CITIZENS DO TO PREVENT CRIME

There is a wide range of behaviors, products, strategies, etc. that citizens employ in an attempt to lessen the absolute magnitude and severity of crime, and/or to lessen the likelihood and impact of criminal victimization on their lives and on the lives of those they care for. In an attempt to perform a comprehensive (yet manageable) investigation of these citizens crime prevention measures, we chose a set of dependent measures from the universe of preventive responses to crime that citizens employ. As explained in Chapter I the measures we have investigated include ones that citizens appear to take to protect their own person, their household (family and property), and their neighborhood/community.

In an exploratory sense it is our purpose to try to understand the extent to which citizens engage in various anti-crime measures, and to understand the processes that lead to differential levels of citizen crime prevention. As discussed in Chapter III we have assumed that there are two basic motives that lead citizens to engage in crime prevention. The risk-avoidance motive is thought to be similar to the "individual" or "private-minded" motives that others have written about. On the other hand, the social participation motive seems similar to "collective" or "public-minded" motives. While it has traditionally been assumed that these different motives lead citizens to different (independent) anti-crime measures, this has been based on *a priori* reasoning, not empirical evidence. The present research addresses this problem. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter IV, the police and community organizations, as part of the Opportunity Structure, are assumed to be important factors that influence the quantity (amount) and quality (type) of citizen crime prevention. The present chapter also seeks to present a further understanding of their role.

A. Personal Anti-Crime Measures: Self-imposed Behavioral Restrictions

Much of what individual citizens appear to do to protect themselves from personal crimes (robbery, assault, rape, murder) involves limiting their own behaviors in specific ways. Furstenberg (1972) described these efforts as "avoidance", since they appear to be used to *avoid exposure*, in space and time, to potentially dangerous circumstances. It is implicit that by avoiding exposure to such dangers a person strives to reduce her/his chances of becoming a crime victim. Extreme examples of this form of personal protective measures are persons who literally lock themselves in their own homes rarely, if ever, venturing outside especially at night. While this example may be atypical, there is considerable evidence bolstered by common sense, that a large segment of the population has given up at least some of their freedom of movement (in space and time)

due to their avoidance of circumstances they perceive as potentially dangerous. Regardless of actual danger, there can be little argument that many urban business areas, for example, are explicitly avoided by consumers due to fear of victimization (Lavrakas, Maxfield, & Henig, 1978).

Following the reasoning that many crimes are ones of "opportunity" it can be argued that when persons limit their behaviors, thus avoiding exposure, they are reducing the sum total of opportunities for crime; thereby preventing *crime* (and not merely their own victimization) by "stopping it before it begins." If large numbers of crimes are actually being prevented through self-imposed behavioral restrictions, citizens are playing an important role in controlling the volume of crime the Criminal Justice System would otherwise have to deal with (and further stagger under). Here is an instance where private citizens appear to be "co-producers" of safety and security.

Past findings that women and the elderly are most fearful of crime, while at the same time relatively less likely than men and young adults to be victims (Baumer, 1978) may be explained by the behavioral restrictions phenomenon. What has heretofore been viewed by many as *discrepant* fear of crime on the part of women and the elderly when compared with their "objective risk" to crime (as measured by their victimization rates), may simply reflect the fact that their fear leads them to reduce their exposure, which in turn lowers the rate at which they are victimized. This appears to be an example of the risk-avoidance disposition in action.

Here then is an important phenomenon via which large numbers of the citizenry may be engaging in "crime prevention." While it is unfortunate that this form of personal protection reduces the freedom of many Americans, it nonetheless must be reckoned with as a citizen crime prevention strategy that is routinely encouraged by parents, neighbors, law enforcement officers, and simple common sense.

Table 5.1 presents findings from three previous surveys that measured some behavioral restrictions: (1) a 1972 Kansas City survey (Kelling et al, 1974); (2) a 1975 Hartford survey (Mangione & Noble, 1975); and (3) a 1977 Philadelphia Chicago San Francisco survey (Skogan, 1978). All three surveys assessed the extent to which persons avoid going out of their homes by themselves at night. This is often assumed to be the most common restriction people employ to limit their exposure to possible victimization. Those that employ this form of protection must plan necessary activities (e.g. shopping) during the daytime or find someone to accompany them at night. While not going out alone at night restricts freedom of movement in time, avoiding being in certain areas restricts movement in space. This anti-crime measure often forces people to use only certain "safe" areas for their personal activities (e.g. work, shopping,

Table 5.1

FINDINGS FROM PAST SURVEYS ON BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS

Restriction	1972	1975	1977
	Kansas City	Hartford	Philadelphia/ Chicago/ San Francisco
Avoid going out alone at night	53.7%	76.6%	42.7%
Avoid certain areas	67.7%	----	41.3%
Drive, don't walk to local destinations	----	63.8%	62.2%
survey N	1200	556	1369

entertainment)*. Driving, rather than walking is another form of behavioral restriction that reduces exposure in space and time. By driving, people move through an environment quickly within the protective shell of an automobile. People who use this measure must put up with the inconvenience of parking, but this apparently is an acceptable trade-off for the enhanced security they experience by not having to walk through their neighborhood.

The proportions in Table 5.1 suggest that a sizable number of the adult urban public (probably a majority) restricts their own activities in an attempt to reduce their chances of becoming crime victims. Our telephone survey of citizens gathered data on several measures necessary to provide a robust investigation of the behavioral restriction phenomenon. These items included:

- in your neighborhood, how often do you avoid being outside alone at night because of crime?
- in your neighborhood, how often do you avoid walking near certain types of strangers?
- in your neighborhood, how often do you avoid carrying a lot of cash on you because of crime?
- are there any places in the Chicago Metropolitan Area you avoid *specifically because of crime?* (If yes: "which ones?")

The first three items, above, asked about behavioral restrictions in one's own neighborhood, while the final item assessed a restriction of movement within the entire metropolitan area. Two-fifths of the respondents (41.1%) report that they avoid going outside alone at night at least sometimes. Over half avoid walking near certain strangers (52.1%) and carrying a lot of cash (58.1%). In addition, 71.3 percent avoid certain places in the metropolitan area because of crime. Of the entire sample, 6.6 percent avoid *all* of Chicago, 13.7 percent avoid downtown Chicago's business/shopping district ("the Loop"), 15.3 percent avoid the Chicago's westside and 33.2 percent avoid the Chicago's southside. These last two areas are lower income minority sections of Chicago.

The sizable extent to which residents of Chicago differ from suburban residents in restricting their behaviors is shown in Table 5.2. An interesting pattern emerges, with city dwellers vastly more likely than suburbanites to engage in behavioral restrictions in their own neighborhoods, while suburbanites

*This can have an obvious impact on business in areas perceived to be "unsafe" and thus avoided.

Table 5.2

URBAN VS. SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS

Restriction	Proportion of Chicagoans	Proportion of Suburbanites	Significance of Diff.
Avoid outside alone at night in NBHD	57.5%	26.2%	.001
Avoid walking near strangers in NBHD	66.9%	38.8%	.001
Avoid carrying a lot of cash in NBHD	69.8%	47.5%	.001
Avoid places in Chicago Metro Area	69.7%	76.5%	.01

Note. Weighted sample included 787 Chicagoans and 869 suburbanites.

are significantly more likely to avoid certain places in the metropolitan region because of crime. This is not surprising since the places avoided are in the city of Chicago, not in the suburbs; this in turn supports the common perception that it is the city that has more crime and is thus unsafe. It also supports the notion that suburbanites who are predominantly white (94%) stay away from areas of the city with high concentrations of minorities (cf. Silberman, 1978). This tendency of suburbanites to avoid places in Chicago probably has little effect on their quality of life; rather it is residents of these "avoided" areas and people who limit their behavior *in their own neighborhood* whose quality of life is most impaired.

1. Neighborhood-based behavioral restrictions. As stated earlier it is hypothesized that behavioral restrictions are manifestations of fear of crime or risk-avoidance motivation. Baumer (1978) in his review article of fear of crime research, concluded that "sex consistently emerges as the most powerful predictor of fear of personal crimes" (p. 255). If fear of crime provides the motivational dynamics for behavioral restrictions, then women should exhibit a much greater tendency than men to restrict their own behavior. This is clearly borne out in Figure 5.1. Regardless of place of residence, females are overwhelmingly more likely than males to say they avoid being outside alone at night, avoid walking near strangers, and avoid carrying a lot of cash. Yet to further highlight differences between living in the city vs. the suburbs, it should be noted that urban males restrict their behavior at levels very similar to suburban females. In sum, urban women, followed by suburban women and urban men, are the citizens who bear the brunt of behavioral restriction for personal protection.

It is commonly observed that as people advance in the life cycle they generally become less physically active: This in itself would suggest that age will be related to behavioral restrictions. In addition, most researchers have found age to be positively correlated with fear of crime (Baumer, 1978), which should also lead to limiting behaviors as a protective measure. Figure 5.2 shows that there are age differences related to behavioral restrictions, but not as large or consistent as those associated with sex differences. While the elderly (65 years and older) are more likely than their younger counterparts to avoid being outside alone at night in their neighborhood, age differences are not as clear-cut for other types of restrictions. Furthermore, young adults (19-29 yrs.) are consistently more likely than those in the middle of the life cycle to limit behaviors as a protection from personal crime. Statistically speaking, there is an overall positive linear trend between age and behavioral restrictions, yet there also are some curvilinear relationships suggested by these data.

Table 5.3 presents zero-order correlations between demographic

Figure 5.1. SEX DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS




Figure 5.2. AGE DIFFERENCES IN BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS




Table 5.3

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL CORRELATES OF BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS

	Zero-Order Correlations with Beh. Restrictions			Partial Correlations with Beh. Restrictions		
	Avoid Outside at Night	Avoid Strangers	Avoid Carry- ing Cash	Avoid Outside at Night	Avoid Strangers	Avoid Carry- ing Cash
Sex	.370**	.307**	.255**	.370**	.309**	.244**
Age (in years)	.115**	-.024	.026	.093**	-.035	.022
Race	-.257**	-.221**	-.184**	-.140**	-.120**	-.104**
Education	-.129**	-.070*	-.070*	-.078**	-.024	-.040
Household Income	-.314**	-.258**	-.241**	-.221**	-.185**	-.180**
Perc. NBHD Crime	.322**	.248**	.213**	.242**	.168**	.153**
Perc. NBHD Incivility	.275**	.224**	.217**	.209**	.158**	.170**
Local Robbery Rate	.284**	.214**	.178**	.145**	.088**	.071*
Local Assault Rate	.291**	.234**	.180**	.170**	.120**	.074*
Area (city/suburb)	-.318**	-.282**	-.230**	---	---	---

**p < .001

*p < .01

Note. Partial correlations when controlling for area had casewise deletions of missing data (N=1518). Zero-order correlations had pairwise deletion of missing data; sample size ranged from 1601 to 1647.

and contextual variables with behavioral restrictions. Also displayed in this table are partial correlations between the same variables, after controlling for place of residence (city/suburb). Paralleling most past fear of crime studies, race, education, and income are also significantly related to behavioral restrictions. Minorities, persons with less education, and persons with less income are more likely to restrict behaviors than their counterparts. As Baumer (1978) points out, "the effects of these variables (on fear of crime) has usually been explained through their general colinearity with the spatial distribution of crime and the greater probability of victimization within these subgroups" (p. 256). It can be assumed that this explanation may also hold for these correlations with behavioral restrictions. When place of residence is controlled for, race and income remain significantly correlated with behavioral restrictions, though the magnitude of the correlations are reduced. After controlling for area, education correlates significantly (albeit weakly) only with avoiding being outside alone at night. In sum, the notion that these personal attributes are related to behavioral restrictions because of the contextual effect of place of residence is, in part, supported.

The effect of the environment on behavioral restrictions is another important consideration. Attributing rationality to most citizens suggests that people will restrict their behavior when, and if, there are cues of "danger" in the environment. That is, if faced with crime and incivility in one's neighborhood (cf. Lewis & Maxfield, 1980) a rational protective response would be to restrict one's behaviors accordingly. As shown by the significant correlations in Table 5.3 people are more likely to restrict their behavior if they perceive their neighborhood as having crime problems and incivility problems. Reported crime rates for robbery and assault are also correlated with behavioral restrictions in an expected manner: the higher these crime rates for the Chicago community area or suburb where a person lives, the more likely he/she is to restrict behaviors. These relationships between the magnitude of crime (real and perceived) and behavioral restrictions remain significant (albeit of smaller magnitude) when area is controlled for (see partial correlations in Table 5.3).

Following the reasoning advanced earlier, the victimization rates in certain neighborhoods could well be much higher than present levels, if many individuals did not restrict their behavior, thereby reducing their exposure to crime. It is in this sense that behavioral restrictions may "prevent" crime in a community.

2. Behavioral restrictions: a multivariate perspective.
Our telephone survey instrument gathered data on a variety of variables linked to our conceptual framework. With the contextual data on each suburb and Chicago community area that were gathered to supplement the data provided by respondents, we can perform

a robust test of the dynamics underlying behavioral restrictions. It is hypothesized that both personal characteristics and experiences combine with neighborhood contextual factors to define a perceived level of danger in one's neighborhood. This perception of danger is in turn mediated by the three cognitive factors hypothesized to form a risk-avoidance disposition:

- *perceived likelihood of victimization*, i.e., an individual's subjective estimate of the likelihood that he/she will be victimized, and feelings of safety;
- *perceived seriousness of victimization*, i.e., an individual's assessment of the amount of harm that would result from being victimized; and
- *perceived efficacy of behavioral restrictions*, i.e., how effective an individual regards these protective measures in preventing personal victimization.

It is reasoned that the greater a person sees her/his chances of being victimized, the more unsafe he/she feels, the more harmful the person thinks victimization would be, and the more effective a person thinks behavioral restrictions are as protection from personal crime, the more likely that person will impose restrictions on his/her own behaviors.

The full model is shown in Figure 5.3. Here various contextual factors define the "environmental context" of the neighborhood, specifically its relationship to levels of crime/victimization. These contextual variables include: official robbery and assault rates; mean per capita income; racial composition (percentage nonwhite); population density; distance from central city; and whether it is in an urban or suburban community area. It is expected that dangerous or unsafe neighborhoods are more likely to be those with higher official crime rates, lower per capita income, more minority residents, higher population density, closer to the central city ("the Loop") and thus urban, rather than suburban, communities.

A variety of individual characteristics are also included in the model (Figure 5.3); in terms of physical traits it is hypothesized that women, older adults, minorities, and persons of small physical stature are more likely to perceive their neighborhood as "dangerous", have greater fear of crime, and thus restrict more of their behaviors (cf. Clemente & Kleinman, 1977; and Lavrakas, 1979). Socio-economic traits, such as income, education, and marital status, are expected to correlate negatively with exposure to crime and incivility (real and perceived), fear of crime, and behavioral restrictions (cf. Garofalo, et al., 1977; Gordon & Riger, 1978). Finally, holding a strong belief in one's personal control of events, strong territorial attitudes, and being familiar with one's neighborhood environment





Figure 5.3. HYPOTHESIZED MODEL OF UNDERLYING DYNAMICS FOR BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS.



are expected to relate negatively with behavioral restrictions (Kidder & Cohn, 1977; Lavrakas, 1979; Patterson, 1977; and Normoyle, 1980): A person who perceives himself/herself as generally capable of controlling various outcomes in life should be less motivated to rely on behavioral restrictions to avoid potentially dangerous circumstances. Similarly people who take a proprietary or territorial demeanor toward their neighborhood would be expected to manifest this attitude by not restricting their behaviors in time or space, but rather to behave in ways that "lay claim" to their use of the neighborhood. Persons who are unfamiliar with their own neighborhood may perceive it as "unknown", and thus potentially threatening.

These individual characteristics and the contextual factors are hypothesized to contribute to citizens' crime-related experiences and perceptions. Where crime is actually more prevalent, there should be greater direct and indirect (vicarious) exposure to victimization on the part of residents (cf. Skogan & Maxfield, 1980). Perceptions of the extent to which one's neighborhood has crime and incivility* problems will also relate to individual characteristics and contextual factors. These neighborhood crime experiences and perceptions, in turn, will define (in part) the level of danger in the neighborhood, against which an individual must assess his/her own abilities to cope. As mentioned earlier, this coping ability is reflected by the "risk-avoidance disposition" made up of fear of crime (perceived risk and safety)**, perceived seriousness, and perceived efficacy.

To test the model shown in Figure 5.3, a causal analysis was performed with the set of 23 predictor variables and a Behavioral Restrictions Index as the criterion (dependent) variable.*** The results from this analysis are shown in Table 5.4. Here, the zero-order correlations between the predictor variables and the criterion are shown under the *total effects* column. The results from the multiple regression analyses are shown in the direct, indirect, and unexplained effects columns. The *direct effects* column contains standardized beta weights from the multiple regression equation that entered all 23 predictor variables simultaneously. The *indirect effects* column contains

*By incivility, we mean vandalism, disorderly behavior, youth problems, etc. (cf. Lewis & Maxfield, 1980)

**Normoyle (1980) defines perceived risk as the cognitive component of fear of crime, and perceived safety as the affective component of generalized fear.

***The behavioral restriction index was formed by combining responses from the three neighborhood-based restriction items discussed earlier. This three-item index has an internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach's alpha, of .73.

Table 5.4
CAUSAL ANALYSIS:
SELF-IMPOSED BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS

Predictor Variables Subject Variables	Total	Type of Effect		Unexplained
		Direct	Indirect	
Feelings of safety in neighborhood	-.623**	-.415**	-----	.208
Perc. risk for street crime vict.	.306**	.072**	.037	.197
Perc. seriousness of street crime vict.	.247**	.054*	.024	.169
Perc. efficacy of restrictions	.072*	.062**	-----	.010
Perc. crime problems in neighborhood	.306**	-.050	.089	.167
Perc. incivility in neighborhood	.267**	.052	.054	.161
Knowledge of other crime victims	.167**	.017	.038	.112
Crime victim	.129**	.028	.034	.067
Attuned to neighborhood	.111**	.034	.033	.044
Territoriality in neighborhood	-.132**	-.007	-.020	-.105
Personal control	-.101**	-.013	-.016	-.072
1978 household income	-.372**	-.109**	-.057	-.206
Education	-.193**	.000	-.058	-.135
Married	-.189**	.010	-.047	-.132
Height	-.363**	-.030	-.033	-.300
Age	.164**	.069**	.077	.018
Race	.271**	.077*	-.003	.197
Sex	.403**	.154**	.202	.047
Contextual Variables				
Distance from central city	-.317**	-.045	-.061	-.211
Percent nonwhite population	.285**	.010	.073	.202
Per capita median income	-.194**	.003	-.013	-.184
Robbery/assault rate	.312**	.022	.062	.228
Population density	.253**	.024	.039	.190
Urban/suburban	-.321**	.007	-.193	-.135

**p < .001

*p < .01

Note. N = 1588

R² = .480

a value that represents the difference between a predictor variable's standardized beta when all variables are in the equation, compared to its beta when variables hypothesized to mediate its effect have been removed. Finally, the *unexplained effects* column shows the amount of zero-order correlation (the total effects column) that cannot be attributed to a direct effect or an indirect effect, and thus remains unexplained (possibly spurious).*

All of the predictor variables correlate significantly with Behavioral Restrictions in the hypothesized direction. Individuals who restrict their own behavior the most are more likely to be citizens who:

- feel unsafe alone at night in their neighborhood;
- perceive themselves at greater risk to street crime;
- perceive being victimized by street crime as more serious;
- regard behavioral restrictions as more efficacious;
- perceive greater crime and greater incivility problems in their neighborhood;
- know local crime victims;
- have been street crime victims themselves;
- are not familiar with their neighborhood;
- feel less proprietary (territorial) about their neighborhood;
- do not feel personal control over their lives;
- have less education;
- have less income;
- are not married;
- are of smaller physical stature;
- are older;
- are Black or Latino;

*See Land (1969) for full technical discussion of the decomposition of shared variance into various effects within the context of causal (path) analysis.

- o are female;
- o live closer to the central city;
- o live in an area with nonwhite residents;
- o live in a lower income area;
- o live in an area with a higher combined robbery and assault rate;
- o live in a more densely populated area; and
- o live in the city vs. suburb, .

than were individuals who engaged in little or no behavioral restrictions.

The overall multiple regression analysis indicated that as a set, these 23 predictor variables, account for 48 percent of the variance in Behavioral Restrictions [$F(24, 1563) = 60.26, p < .0001$]. Furthermore it can be seen in Table 5.4 that Feelings of Safety has a sizable direct effect on behavioral restrictions (-.415) i.e., the less safe a person feels the more restrictions he/she places on his/her behavior. The other three variables that make up the hypothetical "risk-avoidance disposition" (perceived risk, seriousness, and efficacy) also have significant, but rather weak direct effects. That is, the more a person feels at risk, the more serious a victimization is perceived, and the more efficacious behavioral restrictions are regarded, the more behavioral restrictions one engages in. Four demographic characteristics (sex, income, race, and age) also have significant direct effects on behavioral restrictions, but the size of these effects is rather small compared to the magnitude of their observed bivariate correlations with the criterion variable. This suggests that the relationship between these characteristics and behavioral restrictions are to some extent mediated by other intervening variables (i.e. indirect effects), or that the relationships may be spurious. The nature of these direct effects also follows *a priori* expectations: females engage in more behavioral restriction, as do lower income persons, Blacks, and older adults. Finally, it is important to notice that while all of the contextual variables were found to be significantly correlated with behavioral restrictions, none of them has any direct effect on these restrictions. This suggests that the effects of contextual variables are either mediated by individual level perceptions (as predicted in our model), or that these correlations are spurious or represent

some unidentified effects.*

Table 5.4 also shows the indirect effects of each of the predictor variables.** Inspection of the indirect effects column shows that sex, and place of residence (city/suburb) have rather sizable indirect effects. The indirect effect of being female (.202) on behavioral restrictions is a positive one, as is its direct effect. This indirect effect apparently works as follows: women are less likely to be married, are of smaller physical structure, and have less income, feel less territorial toward their neighborhood, see themselves at greater risk, regard personal victimization as more serious, and ultimately feel less safe, all of which leads them to restrict their behaviors more than men. Area of residence (city/suburb) has an indirect "contextual" effect (-.193) with city residents being more likely to live in a community closer to the central city, with a greater nonwhite population, a higher combined robbery and assault rate, a lower per capita income, and a higher population density. All of these contextual variables in turn are hypothesized to be mediated by certain individual variables: thus, city residents are more likely to know local crime victims, perceive greater crime and incivility problems in their neighborhoods, see themselves at greater risk, and feel less safe than suburbanites. All this leads Chicagoans to restrict their behavior more than their suburban counterparts.

Finally, a small but positive indirect effect (.089) was found for perception of crime problems in the neighborhood on Behavioral Restrictions. The more that crime is perceived to be a problem in one's neighborhood, the more risk one sees to self, and the less safe one feels, all leading to increased restrictions.

From this causal analysis we can conclude that those groups traditionally viewed in our society as "at a disadvantage" are most likely to have the quality of their lives further lessened by a perceived need to impose various restrictions on their own behaviors for protection: this includes women,

*Since the individual perceptions measured in our telephone interviews were asked within the context of each person's "neighborhood", our contextual data (based on areas much larger than neighborhoods) are clearly less than perfect measures of the neighborhood environment. This may explain why each of the contextual variables correlates significantly in an expected manner with variables such as Behavioral Restrictions, Safety, Risk, NBHD Problems, and Vicarious Victimization, but were not found to have large direct or indirect causal effects.

**No indirect effects were hypothesized for feelings of safety or perceived efficacy.

minorities, older adults, and the poorer strata of society. We have found that being a member of these subpopulations has not only significant direct effects on behavioral restrictions, but also some indirect effects in that these traits are mediated by other intervening variables (e.g., feelings of safety). These differences are further highlighted by comparing average Behavioral Restrictions Index scores for various subpopulations, as displayed in Figure 5.4. Here it can be seen that those with household incomes less than \$10,000, 65 years of age and older, and minority group members (as subgroups) are likely to restrict their behaviors nearly "most of the time." On the other hand, those with household incomes of greater than \$20,000, males, and suburbanites, on the average, restrict their behaviors even less than "sometimes."

The variables associated with the central "risk-avoidance" disposition have significant direct effects, but with the exception of Feelings of Safety these effects are quite small. The observed correlation between perceived efficacy and behavioral restrictions was found to be mostly a small direct effect; while the larger total effects of perceived risk and perceived seriousness were found to be mostly unexplained covariation. On the other hand the Feelings of Safety measure constituted the largest direct effect, accounting for most of the explained variance in Behavioral Restrictions by itself. These findings are further highlighted by inspection of subgroups average Behavioral Restrictions Index scores in Figure 5.5. Persons who feel very unsafe (approximately 10% of the entire sample), on the average, almost always engage in behavioral restrictions to protect themselves from crime in their own neighborhood. On the other hand, those who feel very safe in their neighborhood (approximately 40% of respondents) almost never, on the average, restrict their behaviors.

3. Motivations for Behavioral Restrictions. The overriding motive for engaging in Behavioral Restrictions seems clearly to be risk-avoidance: It is the proto-type of the "individual" or "private-minded" anti-crime response. By avoiding exposure to circumstances that are perceived as dangerous many citizens spare themselves the enormous anxiety they would otherwise feel. If, as discussed earlier, women and the elderly are actually reducing their victimization rates by restricting their behaviors, then these self-imposed anti-crime measures play an important role in crime prevention.

In a crime-free (utopian) society, individual citizens would have no need to consider behavior restrictions as a preventive measure. Unfortunately, the harsh reality of our times often recommends these restrictions as simply common sense. If we agree that there *are* times when citizens need to restrict behaviors, then it is useful to ask what disincentives seem to operate against these preventive measures.




Figure 5.4. SUBGROUPS' MEAN BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS SCORES




Figure 5.5. SUBGROUPS' MEAN BEHAVIORAL RESTRICTIONS SCORES FOR FEELINGS OF SAFETY, PERCEIVED RISK, PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS, AND PERCEIVED EFFICACY OF RESTRICTIONS.

First, there is the "natural" human expression of freedom of movement (strongly reinforced by our culture) that operates as a socio-biological disincentive for behavioral restrictions: The natural desire to go where and when one wants clashes with the perceived need to impose restrictions on oneself. Added to this, is the normal need for individuals to move freely in space and time related to work, shopping, recreation, etc. These disincentives seem to be most manifested in the behavior of males. It is very likely that the traditional sex role acculturation and expectancies of males serves as a strong disincentive against their employing behavioral restrictions as preventive measures. Males are more likely than females to be acculturated to perceive themselves as invincible to crime (Lavrakas, 1979). This includes the notion that they are capable of "taking care of themselves", which conflicts with the need to avoid "dangerous" places and persons. In sum, when behavioral restrictions are deemed prudent it is young and middle-aged males who are least likely to rely on these approaches to crime prevention, while women and the elderly will "risk-avoid" by limiting their own behaviors.

B. Household-Based Anti-Crime Measures

Many of the anti-crime measures citizens engage in involve efforts to protect against unlawful entry into their homes to preclude the loss of property from burglary*, and as discussed in Chapter I may be termed "access control." Traditionally, the measures assumed under the access control heading have been referred to as "target hardening". In a strict sense target hardening has been thought to include actual technological modifications to make *physical* access more difficult e.g., special locks, window bars, fences, etc. Other "hardware" type improvements (e.g. outdoor spot lights and alarm systems) are often thought of as target hardening. In addition, one might include the purchase of a weapon (gun) and/or a watchdog as target hardening.

While most target hardening measures are assumed to be effective because they make unlawful entry physically more difficult, and thus less desirable to the potential offender, another set of household anti-crime measures aim to restrict/control access by creating *psychological* barriers to offenders. The use of a timer on indoor lights or a radio creates an impression that the home is occupied, presumably negating its attractiveness to

*It may be argued that these protective strategies are employed by the citizenry to also protect their "person", even though most "personal" crimes occur outside the home. Whether such household based measures are meant by citizens to protect property and/or person is beyond the scope of the present research.

would-be burglars. Complementing attempts to make it appear that a home is occupied are measures taken so as not to call unusual attention to an unoccupied home, e.g. stopping mail and newspaper deliveries*, or having a neighbor cut the grass. In addition to these is increasing surveillance of one's home while away; i.e. asking neighbors and/or police to watch one's home.

A different type of household anti-crime measure involves efforts to minimize the *real* loss of property to a burglar. Included in this would be engraving property with some identification to facilitate return of recovered property, and the "bottom-line" security that theft insurance provides.

To put the findings from the present research in some national perspective, it is informative to review findings from other surveys on the extent to which the citizenry engages in these various household-based protective measures. In the 1970s there were a few large-scale criminal justice-related surveys which included questions that speak to this issue. Table 5.5 presents relevant findings from six surveys conducted in major, diverse population centers: Washington D.C. (Clotfelter, 1977); Kansas City (Kelling et al., 1974); Portland, Oregon (Schneider, 1975); San Francisco/Chicago/Philadelphia (Skogan, 1978); Rochester/Tampa-St. Petersburg/St. Louis (Percy, 1979); and Fort Worth (Rosentraub and Harlow, 1980). Here it can be seen that the vast majority of the public reports that they rely on locking doors and windows, and leaving lights on to secure their homes. A smaller, but none the less large proportion of citizens take other traditional access control measures: installing special locks on doors and windows, and owning a watchdog. Most persons also own theft insurance, stop deliveries, and notify neighbors when away. A smaller proportion of individuals reportedly have engraved their property, own a gun, notify the police when away, and have installed window bars. These various figures provide a rough, yet robust sense of what proportion of the citizenry engages in these various household-based preventive measures.

Included in our telephone survey of citizens were items measuring the following eight types of household-based anti-crime measures:

- installing an alarm system, window bars, or special locks to prevent breakins (36.6%),
- installing special outdoor lights to make it easier to see what's going on outside,

*Recently a counter-argument has been proposed against stopping deliveries, by suggesting that burglars may easily identify vacant homes if they have access to lists of vacationers who have stopped deliveries.

Table 5.5
 PROPORTION OF CITIZENRY ENGAGING IN VARIOUS HOUSEHOLD-BASED
 ANTI-CRIME MEASURES

Protective Measure	1971 Washington D.C.	1972 Kansas City	1974 Portland	1977 San Francisco/ Chicago/ Philadelphia	1977 Rochester/ Tampa-St. P./ St. Louis	1979 Ft. Worth
Lock doors when Home/Away	85/-	-	73/94	-	-	-
Lock windows when Home/Away	-	-	89/92	-	-	-
Install special door locks	43	38	-	-	52	47
Install window locks/bars	-/6	22/-	-	45/-	-/8	-
Install burglar alarm	3	6	6	-	7	7
Install special outdoor lights	-	32	49	-	-	-
Own gun	-	35	-	-	13	29
Own watch dog	12	36	36	-	22	27
Use timer on lights or radio	-	-	-	-	22	-
Leave on lights when away	66	-	89	82	-	-
Have NBRs watch when away	-	-	-	76	-	-
Stop deliveries when away	-	-	-	56	-	-
Notify police when away	-	-	-	10	-	-
Engrave valuables	-	-	27	31	29	30
Own theft insurance	-	-	72	65	-	-
Survey sample sizes	1077	1200	3916	1369	12054	2945

801

- having a hand gun at home at least in part for protection (15.9%),
- using a timer on indoor lights or a radio when away for a couple of days (40.4%),
- having a neighbor watch the home when away for a couple of days (59.8%),
- engraving valuables to help recover them in case they are stolen (30.0%),
- having an insurance policy which covers household property against loss from theft or vandalism (75.2%), and
- anything (else) done at home to protect against burglary (17.8%).

The percentages in parentheses, indicate the proportion of metropolitan Chicago area residents that indicated these measures have been taken at their household. Most of the persons who indicated having done "something else" to protect against burglary specified that they had a dog at home for protection; this constituted 58 percent of the "something else" responses, and constituted 10.3 percent of the total sample.

In order to better understand *why* some citizens employ these various anti-crime measures, while others do not, it is informative to answer the questions, "*who* employs these household-based protection measures?" In a demographic sense this asks for a comparison of age, race, income, residential status, etc., with the use of the various protective measures.

From Table 5.6 it can be seen that home ownership consistently correlates most strongly with these household-based measures. This is not surprising for two important reasons: It is owners that are most economically committed to their homes, and it would be expected that this vested interest should manifest itself through a greater likelihood to protect ones' property than renters. Furthermore, owners have greater freedom than renters to engage in self-initiated protective measures at home. Within reason, owners can do what they want (and can afford) to their home. Renters on the other hand often cannot, nor are they likely to be motivated to make capital improvements to property they do not own.

Because of its overriding importance in apparently determining the decision to employ these various protective measures (with the exception of owning a gun for protection) the owner/renter distinction will be retained in the presentation of results that follows. Table 5.7 displays partial correlations of demographic characteristics with the various household protection

Table 5.6

CORRELATIONS OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES WITH DEMOGRAPHICS

	Age	Race	Educ.	Income	Married	Home Owner	Area
Alarms/Bars/Locks	-.093**	-.114**	.082**	.047	.052	.085**	-.089**
Outdoor Lights	.027	.001	-.030	.097**	.153**	.264**	.103**
Hand Gun	-.077**	-.066*	-.038	.070*	.055	.021	-.014
Timer	.098**	.067*	-.003	.064*	.119**	.174**	.088**
NBRS Watch	.014	.045	.035	.090**	.127**	.151**	.083**
Engrave	.115**	-.012	.064*	.066*	.073**	.068*	.015
Insurance	.079**	.252**	.138**	.364**	.292**	.540**	.256**
Dog	-.004	-.097**	.023	-.084**	.050	.103**	.036

110

**
p<.001
*
p<.01

Age in years;
Race (1=Whites/Asians, 0=Blacks/Latinos/Others);
Educ. (5 categories ranging from less than H.S. Grad to Grad School Degree);
Income (7 categories ranging from less than \$6000 to more than \$50000);
Married (1=yes, 0=no);
Home owner (1=yes, 0=renter);
Area (1=suburb, 0=city).

Note. N=1656. Correlations were based on pairwise deletion of missing data. Sample sizes ranged from 1614 to 1656.

Table 5.7

PARTIAL CORRELATIONS OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES WITH DEMOGRAPHICS
CONTROLLING FOR HOME OWNERSHIP

	Age	Race	Educ.	Income	Married	Area
Alarms/Bars/Locks	-.108**	-.139**	.078**	.013	.021	-.121**
Outdoor Lights	-.017	-.057	-.046	-.014	.058	.025
Hand Gun	-.082**	-.073*	-.039	.067*	.051	-.021
Timer	.071*	.027	-.013	-.008	.057	.038
NBRS Watch	-.040	.009	.026	.031	.076**	.039
Engrave	-.128**	-.029	.060*	.042	.051	-.006
Insurance	-.011	.151**	.128**	.185**	.109**	.115**
Dog	-.021	.075**	-.029	.046	.012	.005

**
p < .001*
p < .01

Note. Correlations were based on case-wise deletion of missing data.
Sample sizes ranged from 1603 to 1639.


measures after controlling for home ownership. For the most part the effects of partialling out homeownership eliminates the pattern of significant zero-order correlations between income, marital status, place of residence, and the protective measures. On the other hand, controlling for homeownership does not much alter the significant zero-order relationships between age, race, education, and the various protective measures.

1. Alarms/Bars/Locks. Homeowners are significantly more likely than renters to report that they have installed traditional target hardening devices ($p < .001$). Forty percent of owners have installed an alarm system, window bars, and/or special locks to help prevent breakins at their homes. This compares with 31.6 percent of renters, who report employing at least one of these measures.* After controlling for homeownership significant relationships remain between age, race, education and place of residence ($p < .001$). In Figure 5.6 it can be observed that age plays a greater role in renters than owners in relation to use of alarms, window bars, or special locks. Renters, 50 years of age and older, are the least likely to employ these devices; with elderly renters (65 yrs. and older) by far the extreme low group.

Also from Figure 5.6 it can be noted that Blacks and other minority households, are significantly more likely to say they use these target hardening devices compared to Whites and Asians. This trend holds up regardless of homeowner/renter status, with minority homeowners the most likely to employ these measures, followed by minority renters. It could be reasoned that Blacks, Latinos, and other disadvantaged minorities are exposed to greater burglary rates than Whites and Asians, thus accounting for their increased propensity to target-harden their homes with alarms, window bars, and/or special locks. But this apparently is not the reason, for the relationship between race and use of these devices remains significant even after simultaneously controlling for (a) homeownership, (b) respondent's perception of the local burglary problem, and (c) actual burglary rate of the respondent's community/suburb ($r(1583) = -.122, p < .001$). Thus, it is not that Blacks and Latinos see burglary as more likely or more serious that explains their greater likelihood to target harden. As also can be noted in Figure 5.6, regardless of owner/renter status, increased education is positively and significantly related to greater use of these target hardening devices. Finally, as shown in Table 5.7 city residents are significantly more likely to use alarms, window bars, and/or special locks, than their suburban counterparts, regardless of ownership status.

*Due to the nature of this survey item, we cannot separate the proportion of respondents who employed one, two, all, or any combination of these measures.

Figure 5.6. USE OF ALARMS/WINDOW BARS/SPEC. LOCKS




2. Outdoor lights. After controlling for homeownership, none of the other demographic characteristics relate significantly with installing special outdoor lights to make it easier to see what's going on outside one's home. While 39 percent of homeowners say they have employed this protective measure, only 14.6 percent of renters apparently have done so. This marked difference is not surprising given the relative lack of control renters have over the premises of their building external to their apartment: At best, renters might band together to pressure a landlord to increase outdoor lighting.

During the 1970s the city of Chicago replaced all street lights with high intensity bulbs. It could be reasoned that good street lighting might preclude the need for residents to install their own outdoor lights. Our survey included an assessment of the brightness of street lighting in front of each citizen's home (as perceived by each respondent). Since 55 percent of our Chicago residents describe the lighting in front of their home as very bright, versus 30 percent of our suburbanites, and since 54.5 percent of our Chicago residents are renters, versus 25.1 percent of our suburbanites, it is possible that the observed significant correlation between homeownership and employment of outdoor lights may be an artifact of place of residence and street light brightness. But this is clearly not the case since the relationship between homeownership and installations of outdoor lights remains significant ($r(1645) = .246, p < .001$) even when simultaneously partialling out the effects of perceived street light brightness and place of residence.

3. Hand Guns. Approximately one-sixth (15.9%) of the respondents said they had a hand gun in their household, at least in part for protection. This was our only household-based anti-crime measure that did not relate to homeowner/renter status. Gun ownership for protection did correlate significantly with age, race, and household income. Figure 5.7 shows that the elderly are least likely to report having a hand gun at home for protection, and, for the most part, age is inversely related to hand gun ownership. Blacks and Latinos are significantly more likely than Whites and Asians to report keeping a hand gun at home for protection. This holds true despite the findings that lower income households are significantly *less* likely to say they own hand guns. In fact, it is higher income Blacks and Latinos who are mostly likely to report having a hand gun at home for protection (27.3%)*: In contrast, 17.1 percent of White and Asian homes with 1978 household income over \$15,000 report owning a hand gun. Paralleling our findings that disadvantaged minority groups show a significant proclivity to use traditional hardening devices (e.g. special locks) is this finding that they also are most likely to report engaging in this more severe form of "target hardening"...hand gun ownership.

*Our weighted sample included 150 Black, Latino or other non-Asian minority adults with 1978 household incomes of over \$15,000.



The validity of self reports about hand gun ownership may be questioned: For example, Wright and Marston (1975) assume that lower status respondents are more likely to own guns illegally, and thus may underreport having them. While it is likely that underreporting of handgun ownership occurs, the size of the underreporting is unclear. For the most part our results on hand gun (pistol) ownership correspond with those of Wright and Marston. Using the 1973 NORC General Social Survey of the adult U.S. population they found that as SES increased so did gun ownership, and concluded that "weapons ownership is primarily a middle-class, not a working class phenomenon" (p. 97). Despite this support of the present findings, it is important to acknowledge these results as being of a nonconclusive nature.

4. Indoor timer. Approximately two-fifths of all households (40.4%) use a timer on indoor lights or a radio when the home is unoccupied for a few days or more; homeownership correlates most strongly with this tendency ($r(1656) = .174, p < .001$). Controlling for the effects of homeownership, age remains the only demographic characteristic significantly related to using a timer ($p < .01$), and it is the elderly who use timers most: approximately 44 percent of elderly renters and 61 percent of elderly homeowners use a timer on indoor electrical devices while away from home for a few days or more.* This compares to 25 percent of renters and 48 percent of homeowners under the age of sixty-five.

5. Asking neighbors to watch home. Nearly 60 percent of respondents indicated that they usually ask neighbors to watch their home when away for a few days or more. Homeownership, again, was the most strongly related demographic characteristic; 68.2 percent of owners, versus 47.4 percent of renters, rely on neighbors as a home protection measure. With the exception of marital status, other demographic characteristics (income and place of residence) do not remain significantly related to asking neighbors when homeownership is controlled for. It may be reasoned that married, as opposed to non-married adults, are more likely to have developed closer social ties in their neighborhood, thus accounting for their greater reliance on neighbors to watch their homes when away. This trend is further highlighted by comparing adults who live alone (and without children) to adults who do not live alone.** While 55.5 percent

*In the weighted sample there are 71 elderly renters and 98 elderly homeowners.

**Of the 211 females in the sample who live alone, 56% are 50 years of age or older; of the 145 males who live alone, 71% are less than 50 years of age.


of single women have neighbors watch their unoccupied homes, only 38.3 percent of single men do so; both these figures are less than other households. The findings of Riger and Lavrakas (1980) support the notion that single adults, especially males, without children in the home are least socially integrated into their neighborhood, thus providing a possible explanation for the present findings.

6. Engraving valuables. The engraving of valuables with some owner identification number has been encouraged throughout the 1970s, principally as part of a nation-wide campaign, "Operation I.D.". This protective measure may serve an access control function if would-be burglars are discouraged from unlawful entry because a resident has engraved her/his valuables, and has posted notice to this effect by displaying a "crime prevention" sticker in home windows/doors.* Engraving valuables may also help reduce real losses to burglary if recovered stolen property can be returned to owners who are traceable via the I.D.

Similar to the findings of past surveys (see Table 5.5) a little less than one-third of all households (30.0%) indicated that they have engraved at least some of their valuables to help recover them in case they are stolen. Home owners, once again, are significantly more likely to say they have engraved valuables than are renters ($p < .01$). Once homeownership is controlled for, age and education remain as significant correlates of engraving valuables. As shown in Figure 5.8 young adults are most likely to have employed engraving valuables as a protective measure. The proclivity to engrave valuables significantly decreases with age ($p < .001$) with elderly renters least likely to do so (9.1%). This inverse relationship between age and engraving remains significant even when controlling for homeownership, household income, and education ($r(1628) = -.105, p < .001$). Thus, it is apparently not because elderly renters are poorer and less educated that only 9.1% have engraved any of their valuables. Education, by itself is positively related to engraving valuables ($p < .01$), with non-graduates of high school least likely to use engraving as a household-based protective measure (see Figure 5.8). In sum, it can be concluded that homeowners, the better educated, and younger adults are the citizens who are most likely to report engraving their valuables.

7. Property insurance for theft/vandalism. Owning an insurance policy which covers household property against loss from theft or vandalism, can be thought of as a "bottom-line" protection measure. It is not meant to prevent burglaries, but rather to

*Anecdotal evidence indicates some households display the sticker *without* marking valuables.



reduce the real losses associated with property crime. Some have suggested that property insurance may undermine the motivation to take other protective measures. This follows the reasoning that if household property is insured, financial loss from a burglary will be minimal. In the lexicon of Wilson and Schneider (1978) property insurance may be "substitutable" for other protective measures. If so, one would expect to observe negative correlations between insurance and other household protection measures. Looking ahead to Table 5.10 (p. 130), it can be noted that insurance correlates *positively* and significantly with each of the other household protective measures; thus it apparently does not function as a substitute for other protection measures, in the general population.


While three-quarters of all households (75.2%) report that they carry insurance against property loss to theft/vandalism, an overwhelming 95.6 percent of all home owners have such a policy. This compares to only 49.1 percent of renters. It is not surprising that homeowners are nearly twice as likely as renters to have such insurance; their homeowners insurance almost certainly includes such coverage. Figure 5.9 illustrates that when homeownership is controlled for, race, education, and income remain significant correlates of theft/vandalism insurance for renters. On the other hand, these demographics play a very small role in differentiating homeowners' proclivities to be insured.

Among renters, Whites and Asians (55.3%) are significantly more likely ($p < .001$) to carry household property insurance than are Blacks and Latinos, (38.2%). Non-graduates of high school are least likely to have this form of insurance in comparison to renters with more formal education ($p < .001$). Similarly, renting households with total income under \$10,000 are significantly less likely to be insured than higher income renters ($p < .001$).

It is possible that the observed covariation between race and renters carrying insurance ($r(665) = .165, p < .001$) may be explained by Whites and Asians having more income and being better educated. Yet while controlling for renters' education and income does reduce the size of the correlation between race and insurance ($r(663) = .098, p < .01$), the relationship remains significant. Whites and Asians are simply more likely to reportedly carry household insurance than other racial groups. While this is beyond the scope of the present data to test, this may reflect a socio-cultural reluctance on the part of certain minority groups to employ an "establishment type" protective option, such as theft/vandalism insurance. On the other hand, it may reflect the greater cost of such insurance policies in "high risk" areas where urban minority groups are likely to live.

8. Watch dog. The information available in the present survey to measure the proportion of metropolitan area households that employ watchdogs for home protection is less than ideal.

Figure 5.9. PROPERTY INSURANCE FOR THEFT/VANDALISM



While the survey included items that explicitly asked respondents about each of the seven aforementioned protective measures, there was no item that asked specifically about dogs. Rather, an open-ended item elicited information about "anything (else)" respondents may have done at home to protect against burglary. Nearly one-fifth (18%) replied affirmatively, with approximately 60 percent of these individuals stating they had a dog for protection.*

Once again homeowners were the ones most likely to have a dog for protection ($p < .001$). Whites and Asians are significantly more likely than Blacks and Latinos to report owning dogs for protection. But because of the manner that these data were gathered, one cannot be confident of the reliability of these findings, nor the reliability of any of the other findings related to dog ownership that come later in this section.

Apart from the traditional demographic profiles that have now been presented, the present data can shed light on the following questions:

- Are single-person households more likely than others to rely on anti-crime measures at home?
- How does personal experience with and perceptions of neighborhood crime relate to the employment of these measures?
- Are attendees of crime prevention meetings more likely than non-attendees to engage in certain forms of household-based anti-crime measures?

9. Single-person households. Approximately 21.5 percent of all persons surveyed live by themselves (without children or other adults). Of these 356 single-person households, 145 were male and 211 were female. While over half of these females were 50 years of age or older (56%), nearly three-quarters of single males (71%) were less than 50 years of age. Most of these individuals are renters (70.2%), three-quarters are White or Asian, two-thirds had a 1978 income of under \$15,000, and 61 percent live in Chicago.

It can be reasoned that persons who live alone, especially women, may be more anxious about unlawful entry to their homes and its consequences. If so they may be especially motivated

*Of the entire weighted sample 10.3% or 171 persons mentioned owning a dog for protection.

to employ access control measures.* On the other hand, given our previous findings concerning demographic correlates of household-based protection measures, one might expect that these single person households are no more likely than other older, lower income renters to employ such measures.

Figure 5.10 shows the proportion of single females and single male households vs. other households that employ various protection measures. With the exception of single males being more likely to report having a hand gun, single males and females are *less likely* than non-singles to employ various home protective measures. On the other hand, single women are consistently *more likely* than single men to have household-based protective measures (with the exception of hand guns). Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that living by oneself, even for women, leads to greatly increased reliance on home protection measures.

10. Crime-related experiences and perceptions. Each citizen in the telephone survey who indicated that his/her household had at least one home protective measure was asked *why* these measures had been employed; this constituted 88 percent of all respondents.** Of the total sample, 11.3 percent indicated they had been burglary victims in the past, and subsequently took these household-based anti-crime measures. On the other hand, nearly seventy-percent (69.7%) had employed such measures not because they had been victims, but specifically to avoid future victimization. The remaining seven percent gave non-crime related reasons, e.g., "our mortgage requires insurance", when asked why they had employed these measures.

Table 5.8 shows the proportion of individuals who employ these home protective measures, because they have been burglary victims (i.e. Reactive Motivation) compared to those who have not been victims and do so to avoid future victimization (i.e. Proactive Motivation). With the exception of owning theft/vandalism insurance and owning a dog, burglary victims are more likely than non-victims to employ the household-based protection measures. The largest differences are observed for alarms/bars/locks,

*It is interesting to note that singles, whether male or female, do not differ significantly from non-singles in their perception of the likelihood that their home will be broken into in the future [$F(2,1590) = .80$, N.S.]. On the other hand, single-household women do perceive a breakin at their home as significantly more serious than single males and non-singles [$F(2,1620) = 14.54$, $p < .001$].

**That is, only 11.9% of the sample reported they had not employed any home protection measure.

Figure 5.10. SINGLE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD USE OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES




Table 5.8

PERCENTAGES WHO TOOK PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR
REACTIVE VS. PROACTIVE MOTIVES

	Reactive * Motivation	Proactive ** Motivation	Significance *** of Difference
Alarms/Bars/Locks	61.6	41.8	.001
Outdoor Lights	35.8	33.4	N.S
Hand Gun	27.8	17.7	.002
Timer	49.1	44.1	N.S.
NBRS Watch	70.1	67.1	N.S.
Engrave	46.9	34.6	.002
Insurance	76.5	87.4	.001
Dog	10.9	11.8	N.S.

* There were 187 respondents who stated they had taken various home protection measures because they had been burglarized in the past.

** There were 1155 respondents who stated they had taken various home protection measures to avoid future victimizations and not because they were past burglary victims.

*** Significance of chi-square statistic, d.f. = 1.

hand gun ownership, and engraving valuables. In each instance burglary victims are significantly more likely to employ these protection measures than non-victims. The single greatest difference applies to the traditional target hardening response of using alarms, window bars, and/or special locks to prevent unlawful access. Here, 61.6 percent of burglary victims have subsequently employed these measures, versus 41.8 percent of non-victims. It may be that for certain individuals a personal experience with burglary is necessary to overcome the inertia associated with taking anti-crime measures, especially those that require money and/or time. Furthermore, it can be assumed that law enforcement officials who investigate attempted breakins and burglaries typically recommend to victims that they increase the security of their homes by adding special locks and other access control devices, and by engraving their valuables to facilitate recovery.

Apart from direct (personal) experience with burglary, there are many individuals who have indirect (vicarious) exposure to burglary. Findings of the Reactions to Crime project (Skogan & Maxfield, 1980) suggest that knowledge of local crime victims, other than oneself, helps determine perceptions of neighborhood crime problems: In other words, "if it happens to my neighbor, it may happen to me." This suggests that knowing a person in one's neighborhood who has had a breakin or an attempted breakin, should increase the likelihood that household-based anti-crime measures will be taken. While not a causal test of this relationship, Table 5.9 supports this notion: Here it can be seen that with the exception of owning insurance, respondents who know burglary victims in their neighborhood are more likely to live in households with various protective measures, than respondents who do not know of local victims. The largest difference again pertains to an increased tendency to have alarms, window bars, and/or special locks. Slightly less than one-half of those persons who know local victims live in households with these access control devices compared with one-third of the households in which a respondent did not know a neighborhood victim. Vicarious victimization is also significantly related to higher rates of using timers, asking neighbors to watch a vacant home, engraving valuables, and owning a dog.

A final crime-related variable concerns the extent to which citizens perceive burglary as a crime in their neighborhood. It can be reasoned that persons who live in neighborhoods with more burglary will be more likely to protect their household. An increased usage of alarms, window bars, and/or special locks is the only protective measure significantly related to increased perception of the magnitude of the neighborhood burglary problem

Table 5.9
KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL CRIME VICTIMS AND HOUSEHOLD
PROTECTIVE MEASURES

	Knows Local Burglary Victim *	Doesn't Know Local Victim	Significance** of Difference
Alarms/Bars/Locks	45.3	32.8	.001
Outdoor Lights	31.0	28.3	N.S.
Hand Gun	18.1	15.5	N.S.
Timer	43.4	39.3	.01
NBRS Watch	66.5	57.0	.001
Engrave	34.8	28.0	.006
Insurance	74.9	77.2	N.S.
Dog	13.2	9.1	.02

*There were 501 respondents (30.4%) who knew someone in their present neighborhood who had their home broken into or an attempted break-in in the past few years. The remaining 1148 respondents (69.6%) did not know other local crime victims.

**Significance of chi-square statistic, d.f.=1.

($r(1596) = .124, p < .001$). * Only 32.2 percent of those individuals who saw no or almost no burglary problem had these access devices at home. On the other hand, 40.5 percent of those that saw burglary as "some problem", and 52 percent of those that perceived it as a "big problem" employed these protective measures.

In sum, crime-related experiences and perceptions are related to the reported deployment of certain household-based protective measures. These results indicate that having been a burglary victim, knowing other local burglary victims, and perceiving burglary to be a local problem relates significantly to a marked increase in the use of alarms/window bars/special locks. The results also indicate that those experiences are significantly related to engraving one's valuables, and that victims of burglary are more likely than non-victims to report the purchase of a hand gun for home protection.

11. Neighborhood crime prevention meeting attendance. During the 1970s many citizens met with other residents in their neighborhood to discuss local crime/delinquency problems and prevention-oriented solutions. Many of these meetings were a one-time "educational" experience, in which a police officer or other local law enforcement official discussed home and personal security, usually emphasizing target hardening and engraving measures. In other instances, crime prevention meetings occur as part of an on-going neighborhood group/organization process in which residents (attendees) may formulate some group (collective) plan for action, rather than merely make their own household more secure. While attendance at those meetings is discussed in much more detail later in this chapter, it is of interest here to investigate the relationship between crime prevention meeting attendance and household-based anti-crime measures.

Nearly ten percent of the respondents (8.4%) reported attending at least one anti-crime meeting in their neighborhood in the past few years**: approximately two-thirds attended more than one such meeting and 85.6 percent stated that a law enforcement officer was involved with the meeting they attended. Furthermore, three-quarters of these attendees reported that these crime prevention meetings were connected with an organized neighborhood or community group in their locale.

*Approximately 57 percent of all respondents perceived burglary to be no problem or almost no problem, 32 percent saw it as some problem, and 8.2 percent considered it a big problem in their neighborhood. The remaining 3.5 percent did not know the extent of their local burglary problem.

**This proportion corresponds closely to the 1977 Reaction to Crime survey results of random samples of San Franciscans, Chicagoans, and Philadelphians.

From Figure 5.11 it can be seen that persons who have attended neighborhood crime prevention meetings are in every instance more likely to say that they employ the various home protection measures, and with the exception of owning a dog these differences are significant. It is most interesting to note that the largest absolute differences between attendees and non-attendees exist for engraving valuables (52.8% vs. 28.1%), installing alarms, window bars, and/or special locks (55.9% vs. 34.8%), and asking a neighbor to watch an unoccupied home (79.3% vs. 58.6%). These findings correspond closely to the impact that would be expected from neighborhood crime prevention meetings: Especially when a law enforcement officer is present participants at these meetings have traditionally been instructed (encouraged) to watch out for each other's homes, increase home security through access control devices, and to engrave valuables.

With the present data there cannot be a definitive test of whether attending the meeting caused these individuals to employ certain home protection measures. While 40 percent of the attendees indicated that the meeting had led them to do something different for crime prevention reasons (with half of them specifically mentioning some access control measure), the nature and sequence of questioning, and time constraints on the survey, precluded an in-depth and fully reliable examination of this issue.

Yet *in toto* the pattern of results indicates that attendees certainly differ from nonattendees in the extent to which they employ home protection measures, and it is quite likely in our judgment that the meeting, itself, contributed to these differences.

12. General disposition for household-based anti-crime measures. The foregoing discussion has focused on household-based anti-crime measures one by one. It is now time to investigate whether there is a general disposition to employ these protective measures: that is, are some citizens (households) likely to employ many of these measures, while others take few or not precautions against burglary. Before a valid Home Protection Index could be computed it was important to examine the interrelationship among the eight protective measures. Table 5.10 presents these inter-correlations. As mentioned earlier Wilson & Schneider (1978) suggest that if precautionary measures are "substitutable" then the intercorrelation matrix will have negative correlations; indicating that taking one type of a precautionary measure would preclude, replace, or substitute for the need of other measures. On the other hand, if precautionary measures are "complementary", the intercorrelation matrix will have positive correlations; indicating that persons who employ one measure are likely to employ other measures. While the absolute sizes of the actual correlations are not large they are, with one exception, all positive and most are statistically significant. This suggests that there is a general disposition to employ anti-crime measures at home.

Figure 5.11. CRIME PREVENTION MEETING ATTENDANCE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES




Table 5.10

INTERCORRELATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD-BASED PROTECTIVE MEASURES

	Outdoor Lights	Hand Gun	Timer	NBRS Watch	Engrave	Insur- ance	Dog
Alarms/Bars/Locks	.219**	.118**	.144**	.133**	.198**	.099**	.016
Outdoor Lights	--	.077**	.132**	.151**	.174**	.213**	.110**
Hand Gun		--	.082**	.069*	.103**	.040*	.107**
Timer			--	.340**	.109**	.190**	-.006
NBRS Watch				--	.125**	.174**	.042*
Engrave					--	.140**	.062*
Insurance						--	.076*
Dog							--

** p < .001

* p < .01

Note. Each correlation was calculated with pair-wise deletion of missing cases. Sample size ranged from 1592 to 1654.

Closer inspection of the pattern of intercorrelations shows that owning a hand gun and owning a dog for protection have the lowest internal consistency within the entire set of correlations. (This may be due in part to their extremely skewed frequency distributions and the open-end manner in which information about dog ownership was obtained.) Through calculation of Cronbach's alpha coefficient it was determined that these measures do not contribute to the total internal consistency of a Home Protection Index that would include all eight measures. This analysis indicated that the most reliable index would be made up of the remaining six protection measures (alarms, etc.; lights; timer; NBRs watch; engrave; and insurance). A Home Protection Index was therefore computed which represented the number of these six home protection measures reportedly taken by each household. This index ranged in value from "0" (none) to "6" (all); its internal consistency is .51.

Table 5.11 presents the frequency distribution of the Home Protection Index (HPI). The modal number of measures reportedly taken was two (2), with the average number taken 2.70. Relatively few households have none of these protective measures (7.4%), a majority employ three or more measures (53.4%), and only a small number report doing all six (3.7%). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that over half of the 265 households taking *only one* home protective measure (57%), have theft/vandalism insurance, and nothing else.*

So as to take a multivariate perspective on the issue of what circumstances lead individual households to employ vs. not employ protection measures, a stepwise multiple regression analysis was performed to identify the most parsimonious set of predictor variables (from our general conceptual framework) that would account for the most variance in the criterion (i.e., the Home Protection Index); Table 5.12 provides the results from this analysis.** Eight variables were identified as accounting for the most variance ($R^2 = .27$) in the most parsimonious manner [$F(8,1251) = 57.22, p < .001$]. Of greatest

*A further check to investigate whether households on the low end of the Home Protection Index are unusually likely to say they own a gun and/or a dog for protection, indicates that this is *not* the case. Only 8% of households with "0" on the HPI and 8.3% of those with a "1" in the HPI have a hand gun at home for protection. Similarly, only 5.8% and 8.0% of households with "0" or "1", respectively, on the HPI have a dog for home protection.

**This stepwise multiple regression analysis was performed with an initial pool of 34 predictor variables including basic demographics, personal dispositions (control, territoriality), burglary experiences and perceptions, perceptions of neighborhood, perceived risk, seriousness, and efficacy variables, and contextual variables (e.g., local burglary rate, city/suburbs).

Table 5.11

HOME PROTECTION INDEX (HPI) FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION*

No. of Home Protection Measures Taken	Actual Freq. of Households	Relative Freq. of Households
None (0)	118	7.4%
One	265	16.6%
Two	358	22.4%
Three	337	21.1%
Four	292	18.3%
Five	169	10.6%
All (6)	58	3.7%
	<u>N=1612</u>	100.0%

* Fifty-eight households (respondents) in the entire sample (3.5%) had missing values on at least one of the six measures, and thus were not assigned a value on the Home Protection Index.

Table 5.12

STEPWISE REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH HOME PROTECTION INDEX (HPI)

Entry Order of Predictor Variables	Standardized Beta Weights	Zero-order r with HPI
1. Home Ownership	.338**	.411**
2. Perceived efficacy of home protection measures	.206**	.240**
3. Attendance at NBHD crime prevention meeting	.139**	.176**
4. Perception that NBRs help each other out	.110**	.210**
5. Married	.090**	.251**
6. Victim of Burglary	.056*	.025
7. Community area mean per capita income	.056*	.095**
8. Knowledge of local burglary victims	.049*	.051*

$R^2 = .27$

**p<.001

*p<.05

Note. Analysis was performed with 1260 cases due to case-wise deletion for missing data on any of the thirty-five variables in the analysis.

importance is the distinction between homeowners and renters. This supports the findings from the univariate analyses presented earlier, that owners have more personal incentives and suffer from fewer constraints than renters to employ home protection measures. Of second importance is the efficacy to prevent burglary which people attribute to specific home protection measures; people who perceive target hardening devices and asking neighbors to watch unoccupied homes as very effective means to prevent burglary are most likely to employ more home protective measures. Next in importance is attendance at a neighborhood crime prevention meeting; it too is associated with heightened use of home protection measures. Fourth, individuals who perceive fellow residents in their neighborhoods as generally the kind that "help each other out" rather than ones that "go their own way" have higher scores on the Home Protection Index. Fifth, households with married couples (and cohabitators) are more likely than households with single, separated, divorced, or widowed adults to employ these measures. Next, households that have been broken into or had an attempted breakin are more likely than those without direct exposure to burglary to use protective measures. Seventh, households in higher income communities employ more home protection measures than ones in lower income areas. And finally, households that have had vicarious exposure to local burglary (through personal knowledge of neighborhood victims) are more likely to use home protection measures, than those without such exposure.

13. Summary and Conclusions. As seen here, and in earlier surveys of the urban populace, there is great variation among American households in the extent to which they employ home protection measures. In our telephone survey data was gathered on eight forms of home protection: (1) alarms, window bars, and/or special locks; (2) special outdoor lights; (3) hand guns; (4) timer for indoor lights or radio; (5) asking neighbors to watch an unoccupied home; (6) engraving valuables; (7) theft/vandalism insurance; and (8) other.

Two consistent findings emerged across all the analyses. First, homeowners are much more likely than renters to take household-based protective measures. This follows no doubt from the greater control they can exercise over their property, and because of their greater investment (financial and psychological) in their home. It is not idrectly due to their greater income, because once home ownership is controlled for, household income does not relate significantly with most property protection measures. Second, there is a somewhat weak, but reliable, disposition to employ protective measures at home; certain households are likely to employ many or all measures, while others employ few or none. Furthermore, there was no evidence that any one type of protective measure "substitutes" for others. That is, in the general population we surveyed, there was no indication that the employment of one form of home protection served a sufficient condition for security, precluding the desire for other

forms. Rather, these measures appear "complementary" or cumulative; not in a strict statistical sense*, but in the sense that certain households employ a number of varied measures, rather than a specific combination of a certain few. Assuming at least some effectiveness of these measures to reduce a household's chance of loss to burglary, then there are significant differences among households in the extent to which they are protected against burglary.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the primary incentives for employing household-based protective measures are to protect one's property from loss and to protect the sanctity of one's home. Complementing this is the facilitation provided by control over physical modifications of one's home, and the resources (\$) necessary to do so. The maxim, "a man's home is his castle" seems understandably more applicable to *homeowners* than renters. It is owners that have more "wealth" invested in their home, and thus more to lose (financially and psychologically) to a home invasion. Thus if they perceive some possibility of burglary they will experience a greater motivation than renters to employ protective measures at home. On the other hand, if they perceive no reasonable risk of burglary, they will still employ insurance for protection against that "one-in-a-million" chance.

It appears very likely that residents do not solely base their decisions to protect their home on some rational assessment of danger in the environment. As have been shown here, crime-related experiences and perceptions are somewhat related to protective actions, but they should by no means be viewed as the only determinants of household-based protective measures. It is probable that through the acculturation process certain individuals learn "what you do for household safety purposes". Cultural norms become common sense behaviors for those exposed to the various norms.

The efficacy that individuals attribute to protective measures was generally found to be positively related to their employment. To the extent that this is a causal relationship, it can be concluded that persons will be motivated (i.e., have an incentive) to employ measures they perceive as efficacious, and be dissuaded from employing measures that are perceived as ineffective. Yet given the nature of our cross-sectional data it may rather be that people employ anti-crime measures without regard to efficacy, and later come to hold perceptions that are consistent with their behaviors.

Peer influence and consensual validation through exposure to neighborhood crime prevention meetings appear also to operate

*That is, they do not form a reliable Guttman continuum.

as facilitators in encouraging the use of protective measures; specifically, engraving valuables, installation of access control devices, and reliance on neighbors for protection. These meetings appear not only to have an instructive impact upon attendees by teaching them what to do, but also an emotional impact by arousing attendee's perceived need for protection via vicarious victimization.*

In conclusion, it appears that the decision to employ home protection measures is best viewed as a function of an acculturated (internalized) need for these measures. This relationship seems to describe the findings across the general population. It does not negate the fact that each household has idiosyncratic reasons for employing many, few, or no anti-crime measures. Nor does it negate the finding of reliable and consistent differences among subgroups of the general population in the extent to which certain household anti-crime measures are employed, or that these differences are associated with the personal characteristics, experiences, and perceptions of occupants. Yet it should be noted that while all of these anti-crime measures seem associated with individual/private-minded motives, the "risk-avoidance" disposition (at least as we have conceptualized and measured it) does not account for a great amount of the variance in these behaviors.

C. Neighborhood/Community-Based Anti-Crime Efforts

Apart from crime prevention measures that citizens employ for themselves, their families and households, there are a number of activities that involve *groups* of neighbors (and community residents) working together to prevent crime. The Community Crime Prevention programs that developed in the 1970s are of this genre: Most often these group anti-crime efforts have been thought to start with citizens attending local "crime prevention" meetings to discuss or plan courses of action. The results of such meetings are varied. Some groups never meet again and leave having aired concerns, but with no intention of marshalling a collective response. Other times these meetings provide the forum for the organization of some group anti-crime effort. Neighbors may agree to increase surveillance and crime-reporting through a "block watch" program or a citizens' patrol. An escort program might be organized to provide "safe" passage for the elderly and/or children on their way to school. Safe-Haven homes might be identified for those who are faced with some imminent threat while outside in the neighborhood; or a WhistleSTOP program may be organized. Neighbors may also (or rather) choose

*Much of what commonly transpires at these meetings entails the exchange of information and stories about crime in the neighborhood.

to formulate some group response that does not focus on the prevention of criminal events per se, but focuses on the "root" causes of crime. Following this tact, recreation or employment programs for youth may be developed.

Almost all (85.6%) of the organizations included in our inperson interviews reportedly have done something to prevent crime/delinquency. These cover a wide range of activities (see Table 5.13). Nearly half (45.8%) have coordinated their efforts with city-wide crime prevention organizations such as Beat Rep (in Chicago), SAFE (Safety Awareness for Everyone-San Francisco), and CLASP (Citizen's Local Alliance for a Safer Philadelphia). One-third (31.3%) of the organizations sponsored blockwatch programs, helped form neighborhood block clubs, or were actually block club groups engaged specifically in anti-crime efforts. Over one-fourth (28.2%) had taken steps to better police-community relations as a crime prevention strategy. Anti-crime efforts of an indirect nature were undertaken by roughly one-fifth (22.9%) of the organizations: these groups sponsored youth recreation or employment programs, drug rehabilitation services, neighborhood clean-up projects and so forth, which were believed to play an important role in crime reduction. A similar proportion (17.6%) engaged in more active "on-the-street" anti-crime activities, such as neighborhood patrols and escort programs.

A few of the organizations undertook other crime prevention strategies including: requests for more service from police, such as increased patrolling or better enforcement of certain laws; hosting crime prevention meetings for local residents; sponsoring operation I.D. and WhistleSTOP programs; encouraging target hardening efforts such as use of special locks and alarms, in their neighborhoods; promoting the use of private security forces for specific groups or businesses; and petitioning for better lighting in their neighborhoods to make the areas safer at night.

In response to our questioning about the outcome of their organization's anti-crime efforts, nearly half of the leaders (46.6%) believed their organizations had produced positive results against crime. Approximately 20 percent indicated that their efforts had a partial success, no impact, or even a negative impact on neighborhood crime. The remaining one-third felt it was "too soon to tell", or were uncertain of the effect of their anti-crime efforts.


Leaders' perceptions regarding the extent of neighborhood crime problems were evenly distributed across three categories; that is, roughly one-third (30.7%) of the organization leaders indicated there were slight or no problems with crime in their organization's area, another third (35.4%) felt they had moderate crime problems, and the remaining third (33.9%) believed the extent of neighborhood crime was a big problem. Yet as evidenced in Table 5.14, the perceived extent

Table 5.13

ORGANIZATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES

Anti-Crime Effort	Proportion Doing Activity
Coordinate efforts with/join City-Wide Crime Prevention Organization (e.g., Clasp, Beat Rep, Safe)	45.8
Promote Block Watches/Form Block Clubs	31.3
Promote Police-Neighborhood Relations	28.2
Indirect Efforts (e.g., youth recreation programs, drug rehab services)	22.9
Coordinate NBHD Patrols and Escort Programs	17.6
Request More Service From Police	14.5
Crime Prevention Meetings	6.9
Operation ID	6.9
WhistleSTOP	6.1
Target Hardening	6.1
Hire Private Police	3.1
Request Better NBHD Lighting	2.3

Note. These proportions are of the 131 organizations whose leaders provided these data. Multiple responses were coded, thus these percentages do not sum up to 100.0%.



CONTINUED

2 OF 4

Table 5.14

PERCEIVED EXTENT OF NBHD CRIME AND TOP FIVE ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS

Perceived Extent of Neighborhood Crime		
Slight or No Problem	Moderate Problem	Big Problem
Coordinate efforts with/Join City-Wide Crime Prevention Organization (51.3%*)	Coordinate efforts with/Join City-Wide Crime Prevention Organization (42.2%)	Coordinate efforts with/Join City-Wide Crime Prevention Organization (46.5%)
Promote Block Watches/Form Block Clubs (33.3%)	Promote Block Watches/Form Block Clubs (31.1%)	Promote Police-NBHD Relations (32.6%)
Promote Police/NBHD Relations (30.8%)	Indirect Efforts (26.7%)	Promote Block Watches/Form Block Clubs (30.2%)
Indirect Efforts (20.5%)	Coordinate NBHD Patrols and Escort Programs (22.2%)	Request More Service from Police (23.3%)
Operation ID or Coordinate NBHD Patrols and Escort Programs (12.8%, respectively)	Promote Police-NBHD Relations (20.0%)	Indirect Efforts (20.9%)
N=39	N=45	N=43

* Percentages represent proportion of organizations which engaged in each activity listed. Multiple responses were coded, therefore these percentages do not sum to 100.0%.

Note. Four of the 131 organizations which had engaged in some anti-crime activity did not rate the extent of neighborhood crime and are therefore missing from these analyses.

of neighborhood crime did not differentially relate to the type of anti-crime efforts most organizations undertook. Roughly half of the organizations rating the problem as slight, moderate or great had coordinated their anti-crime efforts with or had joined city-wide crime prevention organizations. Promoting block-watch programs or forming block clubs, encouraging police-community relations, and indirect efforts (such as providing youth services or drug rehabilitation programs, and neighborhood clean-up projects) were also frequent responses to crime, regardless of the perceived extent of the problem. In contrast to what might be expected (and not shown in Table 5.14), proportionally more organizations for which the extent of crime was described as slight or moderate, than organizations in "big crime problem" areas had engaged in direct-action efforts, such as neighborhood patrols and escort programs. It is possible that this reflects the successful reduction of the crime problem in those neighborhoods.

It has often been assumed that citizen involvement in these group anti-crime efforts stems directly and solely from their experiences as crime victims, perceptions of neighborhood crime problems, and fear of crime. Yet the findings of the Reactions to Crime project suggest that crime and fear may not be the primary motivating agents for citizen involvement in group anti-crime efforts (Dubow & Podelsky, 1979; Podelsky & DuBow, 1980; Kidder, 1978; and Lewis et al., 1979). Instead, that research indicated that participation in group crime prevention efforts often followed *directly* from citizen involvement in neighborhood and community groups, not necessarily anti-crime in nature.

Our conceptual framework (Chapter I) was developed to incorporate these two perspectives. And the information that was gathered via our telephone survey of citizens provides for a comparative analysis of the processes which lead citizens to participate in these neighborhood/community-based anti-crime efforts. Logic dictates that before actual participation can occur a citizen must recognize an opportunity for his/her participation. Community organizations and Community Crime Prevention programs try to provide that opportunity by making the citizenry aware of their existence and purposes, and encouraging citizen involvement (cf. Bickman & Lavrakas, 1974). We, therefore, can identify a logical process (flow) that must occur before an individual can become involved in a group anti-crime effort:

- the effort must first exist (or be in a formulative stage),
- the individual must be aware of its existence, and
- the individual must perceive an opportunity to become involved.

This opportunity for involvement includes both personal factors (e.g., time) and cognitions that his/her participation will be permitted, or rather is welcomed.

Figure 5.12 presents the actual page from our telephone survey instrument that was developed to collect data relevant to this process (awareness → opportunity → participation). Because of its importance to the present discussion and its complexity, an explanation of its use is presented: Respondents were first asked if they were aware of any of seven possible crime prevention efforts taking place *in their neighborhoods* in the past couple of years. Each "yes" was followed up with an inquiry of the circumstances that prompted the efforts (proactive vs. reactive), whether the individual had been given an opportunity to participate, and whether the individual had been given an opportunity to participate, and whether he/she had done so. Those who had not participated were asked why they hadn't participated; and those that did participated were asked a series of follow-up questions not shown in Figure 5.12 (but discussed later in this chapter).

1. Citizen exposure to group anti-crime efforts. As shown in Figure 5.12 respondents in the telephone survey were asked about seven different group anti-crime activities:

- neighborhood crime prevention meeting
- citizen patrol of the neighborhood
- neighborhood escort program
- blockwatch/neighborhood watch program
- Beat Representative program*

*The Beat Rep Program (Beat Representative) is a neighborhood based anti-crime effort sponsored by the Chicago Police Department. Its goal is to promote positive citizen-police interaction whereby the citizenry will become the "eyes and ears" on the street for their local beat officers. This program is structured to coincide with the division of patrolling districts into beats, with Beat captains responsible for the recruitment of Block captains on blocks within their beat. Block captains are responsible for recruitment of residents on their block to participate in the surveillance effort.

Figure 5.12

NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES SURVEY ITEMS

BEGIN CARD 03

26a. Have you heard or read about any of the following kinds of activities taking place in your neighborhood in the past couple of years?

(ASK A FOR 1-7, BEFORE ASKING B)

(IF YES TO "A")

(ASK "E", IF NO TO "D")

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	Yes		No		b. Was (this) to keep crime from becoming a problem or was it that crime had already become a problem in your neighborhood?			c. Were you given an opportunity to attend/take part? Did anyone ask you, or did you see a notice or poster?		d. Did you attend/take part in (this)?		e. Why didn't you attend/take part in (this)?	
	1	0	1	0	Keep From	Already	Don't Know	1	0	Yes	No		
(1) a neighborhood crime prevention meeting?	1	0	8		1	2	7	15	1	0	16	(1) 1 0 17 (ASK PINK)	(1) _____
(2) a citizen's patrol of your neighborhood?	1	0	9		1	2	7	18	1	0	19	(2) 1 0 20 (ASK BLUE)	(2) _____
(3) an escort program in your neighborhood?	1	0	10		1	2	7	21	1	0	22	(3) 1 0 23 (ASK BLUE)	(3) _____
(4) a blockwatch or neighborhood watch program?	1	0	11		1	2	7	24	1	0	25	(4) 1 0 26 (ASK BLUE)	(4) _____
(5) a Beat Representative program?	1	0	12		1	2	7	27	1	0	28	(5) 1 0 29 (ASK BLUE)	(5) _____
(6) a WhistleSTOP program?	1	0	13		1	2	7	30	1	0	31	(6) 1 0 32 (SKIP TO WHITE)	(6) _____
(7) any other crime prevention program in your neighborhood?	1	0	14		1	2	7	33	1	0	34	(7) 1 0 35 (SKIP TO WHITE)	(7) _____

(IF ALL NOS, SKIP TO WHITE)



- WhistleSTOP program*
- any other neighborhood crime prevention program

Table 5.15 displays the proportions of respondents who indicated that these anti-crime efforts have occurred in their neighborhoods. Chicago residents are far more likely to report some group anti-crime effort having taken place in their neighborhoods than are suburbanites. But before we discuss contextual factors associated with the communities where these efforts have occurred it is important to investigate whether citizens who reported being "unaware" of organized anti-crime efforts in their neighborhoods did so because there were in fact none such efforts, or if these citizens simply did not realize (or recall) that such an effort actually had taken place.

To provide a definitive answer to this issue we would need to document every Chicago metropolitan area neighborhood crime prevention meeting that was held in the past few years, and then compare this information to each of our respondent's place of residence; clearly this is an impossible task. In the absence of such a definitive answer we can advance a reasoned estimate by examining the correlates of being aware/unaware of a neighborhood crime prevention meeting. To the extent that contextual variables correlate with "awareness" we reason that this item is measuring the actual existence of these neighborhood crime prevention meetings. On the other hand, if individual-difference variables correlate with awareness it would appear the item may be measuring the extent to which people are "in touch with" or recall happenings in their neighborhood. Therefore, correlations were calculated between respondents' awareness of neighborhood crime prevention meetings and socio-demographic and contextual variables; see Table 5.16. None of the socio-demographic variable correlations are of significant magnitude. Specifically, there is no evidence that older persons or less educated persons were less aware of neighborhood crime prevention meetings, which might be expected if the item were measuring "recall." Furthermore, there is no evidence that the number of children in a household is correlated with awareness; this would be expected if the item

*WhistleSTOP is an anti-crime program started in two Chicago neighborhoods that has spread elsewhere within the area and to other states. It involves an organized attempt to encourage the purchase and use of whistles by citizens in a neighborhood when they observe some suspicious/criminal event or when they hear another whistle blowing. A multitude of blowing whistles is assumed to increase the risk a potential offender perceives while attempting a crime, thereby stopping crime from occurring and/or aiding a potential victim.

Table 5.15

CITIZEN AWARENESS OF NEIGHBORHOOD ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS

Anti-Crime Effort	Total Sample		City Sample		Suburban Sample	
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)
Crime Prevention Meeting	412	24.9	256	32.6	156	18.0
Neighborhood Patrol	192	11.6	120	15.3	72	8.3
Escort Program	74	4.4	47	6.0	26	3.0
Blockwatch Program	142	8.6	86	11.0	55	6.4
Beat Rep Program	79	4.8	70	8.9	9	.6
WhistleSTOP Program	144	8.7	118	14.9	27	3.1
Other Crime Prevention Programs	57	3.5	14	1.8	43	5.0
	Total <u>N</u> = 1656		<u>N</u> = 787		<u>N</u> = 869	

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Table 5.16

CORRELATION OF SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
WITH AWARE/UNAWARE OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PREVENTION MEETINGS

Subject Variables	Aware/Unaware
<u>Socio-Demographic</u>	
Sex	.004
Age	-.016
Race	.041
Education	.020
# of Children	.018
Income	.033
Married	-.008
Own Home	.015
<u>Contextual Variables</u>	
Area	-.169*
Extent of NBHD Problems	.179*
Robbery Rate	.084*
Assault Rate	.074*
Burglary Rate	.062
Density	.108*
Pct. Nonwhite	.044
Distance from Loop	-.151*
Median Income	-.082*

*p<.001

were measuring "being in touch" with one's neighborhood, as children are often the critical linkage between adults and neighborhood happenings (Riger & Lavrakas, 1980).

In contrast, most of the contextual variables correlate significantly in an expected manner with respondents' awareness of neighborhood crime prevention meetings. Given the fact that it is just these types of neighborhoods that one would expect to have the need for anti-crime meetings, we have reasoned that the awareness variable is measuring the occurrence of neighborhood crime prevention meetings, and thus respondents' *actual exposure* to this group anti-crime activity.*

Another type of comparison we can make on the validity of our "awareness/exposure" measures involves the Beat Rep Program. The Beat Rep program was initiated in Chicago on a proposed city-wide basis during 1976. Yet as often happens with large-scale federally funded community anti-crime projects, the Beat Rep Program had considerable start-up problems (Bickman, Maltz, & Lavrakas, 1976). Citizen awareness and contact with the program were assessed through two telephone surveys conducted in 1977 and 1978 as part of an ILEC-funded evaluation (Melaniphy & Associates, Inc., 1978). This impact evaluation estimated that 15.0 percent of Chicago residents had heard of the Beat Rep program by 1977. The follow-up survey indicated that awareness had increased to 16.8 percent by 1978. In comparison, 8.9 percent of our 1979 Chicago respondents were aware of Beat Rep programs operating *in their neighborhood*. The evaluation study had found that 5.3 percent and 10.3 percent of the aware respondents in 1977 and 1978, respectively, reported that they had attended a Beat Rep meeting. In contrast, 30.5 percent of our Chicago respondents, who indicated awareness of a neighborhood Beat Rep program reported they had participated. These differences in the reported percentage of respondents indicating awareness and actual participation in the Beat Rep program, between the Melaniphy & Associates study and the present survey, are not surprising. The Beat Rep evaluation assessed awareness and participation in very general terms, whereas our telephone survey collected data specifically with reference to the *neighborhood* in which respondents lived. It seems reasonable that more people may have heard of Beat Rep in general, than were aware of it operating in their own neighborhoods. It is also reasonable that of those aware that Beat Rep programs exist (anywhere) in Chicago, proportionally fewer indicated they had actually participated (Beat Rep evaluation study), in comparison to proportionally more of our aware respondents who reported participation in a

*It is readily acknowledged that this is not a perfect (true) measure of exposure, but rather one that appears adequate to allow for meaningful analysis.

neighborhood Beat Rep program. In sum, the findings of Beat Rep awareness and participation levels in the present survey do not appear incompatible with the independent findings of the evaluation study. And thus we conclude that the validity of our data on Beat Rep should not be suspect.

2. Community context of group anti-crime efforts. Using the community-level contextual data that were gathered to supplement the data provided by the telephone survey instrument, we can investigate which environmental factors are associated with the presence and absence of these group anti-crime efforts.* Respondents from neighborhoods where these efforts were reported to have occurred are significantly ($p < .01$) more likely to perceive neighborhood crime and incivility problems, than are people in neighborhoods without these group crime prevention responses (see Table 5.17). Differences in the actual crime rates of respondent's Chicago community area or suburb shows this pattern even more strongly: burglary, robbery and assault rates are all significantly greater in areas where these efforts reportedly exist. Note in Table 5.17 that robberies are 503 and 480 per 100,000 in communities where Beat Rep and WhistleSTOP programs exist, respectively, compared to 261 and 253 per 100,000 in communities where these anti-crime programs appear not to have developed. We also find that *all* group anti-crime efforts are more likely to occur, on the average, in more densely populated, lower income areas with a relatively greater proportion of nonwhite residents. In sum, the results indicate that these type of community crime prevention efforts *are* initiated in higher-risk communities. This supports the reasoning in our conceptual framework: crime (victimization) provides the external (environmental) impetus for the development of community crime prevention programs. Yet it appears to be more a *necessary* rather than a sufficient condition for their origin.

3. Formulation of a group anti-crime effort *vis-a-vis* crime. To further investigate the processes that lead to the formulation of neighborhood anti-crime programs our respondents were asked whether the group efforts in their neighborhoods were formulated "to keep crime from becoming a problem, or was it that crime had already become a problem in your neighborhood?" For each of the anti-crime efforts, a majority of respondents said it was to keep crime from becoming a problem, i.e., a proactive response by the neighborhood/community (see Table 5.18). Over two-thirds of the escort and blockwatch programs were reportedly formed in communities for proactive reasons, i.e., crime had not yet become a problem (as judged by our respondents). About 60

*No information was collected about the nature of the "other neighborhood crime prevention program", therefore no further analyses on this measure will be presented.

Table 5.17
MEAN CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES AND NBHD ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS

MEANS								
Anti-Crime Efforts	NBHD *Perceived Crime Prob.	NBHD *Perceived Incivility	Area Burglary Per 100000	Area Robbery Per 100000	Area Assaults Per 100000	Area Percent Non White	Area Population Density	Area Median Income \$
Crime Prevention Meetings								
NBHDs without	1.33	1.38	1005	252	201	16	11506	6130
NBHDs with	1.53	1.58	1084	336	241	19	14605	5818
Citizen Patrol								
NBHDs without	1.36	1.40	1007	261	204	16	11938	6110
NBHDs with	1.54	1.62	1161	355	261	21	14857	5615
Escort Program								
NBHDs without	1.37	1.42	1021	263	206	16	12159	6072
NBHDs with	1.50	1.62	1108	472	316	25	14812	5622
Blockwatch Program								
NBHDs without	1.37	1.42	1012	264	207	17	11981	6077
NBHDs with	1.54	1.57	1158	367	256	19	15483	5786
Beat Rep. Program								
NBHDs without	1.36	1.41	1018	261	206	16	11922	6083
NBHDs with	1.80	1.77	1166	503	293	24	19376	5446
WhistleStop Program								
NBHDs without	1.36	1.41	1005	253	202	16	11599	6085
NBHDs with	1.64	1.59	1228	480	303	29	19393	5709

*Perc. Crime Problems and Perceived Incivility Problems are indices that range from "1" (almost no problem) to "3" (big problem).

Table 5.18
 FORMULATION OF ANTI-CRIME MEASURES FOR
 PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE MOTIVES

Anti-Crime Measure	Total Freq.	Proportion* Proactive	Proportion** Reactive
Crime Prevention Meeting	412	62.7	37.3
Neighborhood Patrol	192	57.8	42.2
Escort Program	74	67.5	32.5
Blockwatch Program	142	70.3	29.7
Beat Rap Program	79	55.2	44.8
WhistleSTOP Program	144	61.7	38.3

* Proactive means "to keep crime from becoming a problem."

** Reactive means "crime had already become a problem."

percent of the crime prevention meetings, neighborhood patrols, and WhistleSTOP programs were also started to keep crime from becoming a neighborhood problem. The formation of Beat Rep Programs were associated with the highest level of "reactive" responses (44.8%). These results suggest that crime as a potential problem must be salient before organized community responses develop; but that they often do develop *before* the extent of the crime problem crosses the "serious" threshold.

These findings are further documented by comparing areas in which the anti-crime measures reportedly originated for proactive vs. reactive reasons, on contextual characteristics. Nearly half (49%) of the crime prevention meetings that respondents said were formulated to keep crime from becoming a problem occurred in the suburbs. On the other hand, 83 percent of the meetings that were held *after* crime was a problem, took place in the city. Again, about half (46%) of the proactive citizen patrols were in the suburbs, while three-quarters (75%) of the reactive patrols were in Chicago. Proactive escort programs were equally likely to occur in the suburbs vs. the city (48% vs. 52%), but nearly all reactive escort programs took place in Chicago (91%). Less dramatic differences are observed for the location of blockwatch programs: 57% of those proactive in nature took place in a Chicago neighborhood, and 72% of reactive blockwatch programs were Chicago-based. (Since Beat Rep is a City of Chicago program comparisons here are not meaningful.) Finally, more of the reactive WhistleSTOP programs occurred in the city (89%), compared with the 67% of the proactive ones. In sum, a differential pattern is consistently found between the city and suburbia: city neighborhoods are apparently more likely than suburban neighborhoods to have a crime problem *before* trying to do something about it.* Suburban neighborhoods, where community crime prevention efforts exist, seem to take more of a proactive stance toward crime i.e., try to "nip it in the bud".

Further underscoring these findings are results in Table 5.19. Serving as sort of a validity check on our proactive vs. reactive measures we find that perceptions of neighborhood problems (crime and incivility) and actual reported crime rates (especially for robbery and assault) are significantly higher in communities where the respondent attributed a *reactive* motive to the formulation of the anti-crime efforts. In general, it is the more densely populated and lower income areas, with a higher concentration of nonwhite population where crime apparently becomes a problem *before* an organized community response is marshalled.

*In fact it is probable that relatively high levels of crime in city neighborhoods *predate* the existence of community crime prevention programs.

Table 5.19
 MEAN CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES AND FORMULATION MOTIVES

Formulation Motives of Anti-Crime Efforts	MEANS							
	NBHD *Perceived Crime Prob.	NBHD *Perceived Incivility	Area Burglary Per 100000	Area Robbery Per 100000	Area Assaults Per 100000	Area Percent Non White	Area Population Density	Area Median Income \$
Crime Prevention Meetings								
Proactive Motive	1.32	1.39	996	238	184	15	11955	5993
Reactive Motive	1.91	1.95	1259	521	349	28	19399	5414
Citizen Patrol								
Proactive Motive	1.34	1.37	1132	301	223	19	13094	5730
Reactive Motive	1.84	1.99	1210	444	312	25	17731	5434
Escort Program								
Proactive Motive	1.32	1.43	1041	387	275	20	11619	5659
Reactive Motive	1.92	2.04	1204	620	368	37	22604	5451
Blockwatch Program								
Proactive Motive	1.38	1.42	1158	346	232	19	13704	5750
Reactive Motive	1.86	1.94	1102	389	292	17	19323	5849
Beat Rep. Program								
Proactive Motive	1.54	1.56	1095	411	251	25	15739	5268
Reactive Motive	2.12	2.05	1310	666	373	24	24656	5517
WhistleStop Program								
Proactive Motive	1.44	1.44	1139	366	239	27	16879	5708
Reactive Motive	1.96	1.83	1376	656	399	30	23120	5714

*Perc. Crime Problems and Perceived Incivility Problems are indices that range from "1" (almost no problem) to "3" (big problem).

While these findings are preliminary in nature, they do suggest something about the environmental correlates of differential community tolerance of crime: It appears that crime becomes a salient issue, around which some neighborhood-based group response is formulated, at much lower levels in the suburbs than in the city. City residents apparently (have to) adapt to higher levels of crime as part of daily life, and it is often not until crime has reached relatively serious proportions that some urban communities see organized attempts to stop it.

4. Opportunity for involvement in group anti-crime efforts. While a citizen must be aware that a community crime prevention program exists before he/she can engage in it, we have reasoned that participation rates are also a function of the opportunities the individual perceives for involvement. Unless the citizen feels that his/her involvement is permitted (preferably welcomed), it is unlikely that actual participation will ensue. This logic is supported by the pattern of results shown in Table 5.20. Nearly 80 percent of those who were aware of a crime prevention meeting in their neighborhood reportedly were given an opportunity to attend; and about one-third did so. In comparison, less than 60 percent of those who knew of a citizen patrol in their neighborhood were given an opportunity to get involved; of these about one-third did. A very similar pattern is found for participation in an escort program; about 60 percent were given an opportunity and one-third got involved. Approximately 70 percent of those aware of Blockwatch, Beat Rep, or WhistleSTOP programs were given an opportunity to become involved, and a relatively large proportion did; 54 percent in Blockwatch, 40 percent in Beat Rep, and 60 percent in WhistleSTOP.

These results indicate that opportunity for participation seems highest with anti-crime programs that require relatively low levels of involvement from citizens. This carries over to actual participation levels; the more that involvement requires of the individual (e.g., time), the lower the reported participation rates. Thus citizen patrols and escort programs have the lowest participation rates among those who are aware, and among those who have been given an opportunity to participate. In contrast, WhistleSTOP and Blockwatch, which actually require rather minor "commitment" from participators have the highest participation rates. Purchasing a whistle and blowing it when necessary (i.e., WhistleSTOP), and increasing informal surveillance in one's neighborhood (i.e., Blockwatch) demand relatively passive involvement from citizens. In contrast, patrols and escort programs require much more active participation, and not surprisingly show lower rates of involved citizens.

5. Nonparticipation in group anti-crime efforts. The majority of citizens who are aware of community crime prevention efforts in their neighborhood appear *not* to get involved. Each of our "aware" respondents who indicated that he/she did *not* participate was queried about the reason for not taking part: Table 5.21

Table 5.20

OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN GROUP ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS

Anti-Crime Effort	Opportunity					
	No Opportunity		Did Not Participate		Did Participate*	
	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Crime Prevention Meetings	83	20.2	212	51.5	117	28.3
Citizen Patrol	83	43.3	72	37.7	36	19.0
Escort Program	27	36.2	32	42.8	16	21.0
Blockwatch Program	42	29.6	46	32.4	53	38.0
Beat Rep Program	22	28.7	33	42.6	22	28.7
WhistleSTOP Program	40	28.2	41	28.6	61	43.2

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* One respondent indicated participation, but no opportunity, for meetings, patrol, Beat Rep, and WhistleSTOP. Each is included in the "did participate" column.

Note. Percentages are proportion of subsamples who indicated awareness of anti-crime efforts in neighborhood.



Table 5.21

REASONS FOR NON-PARTICIPATION IN GROUP ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS,
AMONG "AWARE" RESPONDENTS

Anti-Crime Effort	Proportion of Reasons for Non-participation				
	Total Non-participants	No Time	No Interest	No Opportunity*	Others**
Crime Prevention Meeting	295	49.6	21.3	14.1	14.9
Citizen Patrol	155	38.2	17.8	31.9	12.1
Escort Program	59	36.2	27.6	19.0	17.2
Blockwatch Program	88	36.7	23.3	27.8	12.2
Beat Rep Program	55	43.9	22.8	22.8	10.5
WhistleSTOP Program	81	30.1	31.3	28.9	9.6
Total Proportions		39.1	24.0	24.1	12.8

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** Other reasons for non-participation included lack of transportation, sickness, someone else in family participated, etc. None of these responses were of significant frequency to justify a separate category.

* Respondents who were earlier asked if they were given an opportunity to participate (Item 26c, Figure 5.12), did not always give this as their reason for non-participation. Thus this column differs from the "no opportunity" column in Table 5.20.

presents these findings. People most frequently stated that "lack of time" precluded their involvement; this varied only for WhistleSTOP, where slightly more citizens indicated "lack of interest". In general, about two-fifths of the citizenry who are exposed to community anti-crime efforts reportedly do not participate because of time priorities; they apparently have more important things (self-defined) to do. About one-fifth to one-fourth of potential participants don't get involved because of their lack of interest; this reason was given by a relatively higher proportion of nonparticipants for escort programs and WhistleSTOP. In contrast, fewer individuals expressed lack of interest as the reason for not patrolling their neighborhood; relatively more stated that they were simply not given an opportunity to patrol (32%). In sum, these preliminary findings suggest that group anti-crime efforts may be most successful in increasing citizen participation by providing more "opportunity" for participation. While persons who have "no time" or "no interest" will probably require considerable incentives to change their minds about participation, nonparticipants who didn't participate because of lack of opportunity may be the ones most easily "converted" by organized anti-crime efforts.

It is interesting to compare these findings with opinions of organization leaders that were gathered via our inperson interviews. When asked why citizens didn't get involved with their organization these leaders most frequently attributed it to "lack of interest" (cf. Table 3.6b). In contrast only a few (7%) felt it was because citizens were unaware of the organization, and none stated that nonparticipation was linked to lack of opportunity.* This difference in the perception of what keeps people from participation and the reasons citizens themselves give for nonparticipation also suggests that participation rates may most easily be increased if organized community programs and anti-crime efforts paid more explicit attention to actively providing specific opportunities for participation.

6. Differences between participators and nonparticipators. Who are these citizens who reportedly become participators in neighborhood crime prevention meetings, patrols, WhistleSTOP, etc.? And how do they differ from those who know about these anti-crime efforts but reportedly didn't get involved?

To provide an answer to these questions, the six forms of neighborhood crime prevention activities that were measured were recategorized, as they were recognized to differ in the nature of the "participation" required from citizens. First,

*Of course, it is possible that "lack of opportunity" meant different things to citizens and organization leaders.

all persons who attended some form of crime prevention meeting formed an "attend meetings" category; approximately eight percent of the total sample said they attended a meeting or meetings, and another 18 percent knew of meetings in their neighborhood but did not attend. Participation in WhistleSTOP formed a second category, including all those who had apparently purchased whistles with the intent of blowing them when proper circumstances dictated: This included about four percent of the total sample, and an additional five percent indicated knowledge of WhistleSTOP but chose not to participate. Third, citizens exposed to and/or involved in Blockwatch and Beat Rep programs were grouped, since both of these anti-crime efforts are essentially organized, but *informal* surveillance programs meant to encourage the quantity and quality of information reported to the police about criminal/suspicious activities. Approximately four percent of the entire sample participated in this type of community anti-crime effort, and another seven percent who knew of these efforts did not participate. Finally, participation in patrols and/or escort programs was grouped as it constituted the most active and direct form of group crime prevention effort. Less than three percent of our respondents said they had patrolled or escorted in their neighborhoods; but an additional twelve percent knew of such local activities but didn't get involved. Table 5.22 presents the demographic characteristics of those who do not participate vs. those who do participate. With the exception of WhistleSTOP, the majority of nonparticipants are women, and the majority of participators are men. This is especially true for taking part in a patrol or escort program: nearly 70 percent of those reported participators are males. On the other hand, over 60 percent of people who said they have taken part in WhistleSTOP are females (63%). These participation patterns are compatible with the findings from Chapter III and with traditional male and female sex roles. Patrolling and escorting are more active and direct anti-crime activities, in line with the active role men have traditionally assumed in providing protection for society. WhistleSTOP, a more passive and indirect anti-crime activity, apparently has lower appeal for men than women, i.e., carrying a whistle for "protection" may not be viewed as appropriate masculine behavior.

In general, the elderly (65 yrs. +) make up a very small proportion of those who participate in neighborhood/community anti-crime efforts. WhistleSTOP is an exception, where about 17 percent of participants are elderly, which is greater than their estimated 10 percent of the adult population. Younger adults under 50 years of age, constitute the vast majority of those that get involved in these anti-crime efforts. It is not surprising that the largest proportion of participators are adults in their thirties and forties: It is these individuals who are at a stage of the lifecycle where vested interest in the safety and security of the neighborhood is probably greatest. Yet it is of interest to note that a clear majority of nonparticipants are also of the under 50 age group.

Table 5.22

DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTICIPATORS AND NON-PARTICIPATORS
IN NBHD ANTI-CRIME EFFORTS

Characteristics	Proportions Who Did and Did Not							
	Attend Meetings		WhistleSTOP		Informal Surveillance		Patrol/Escort	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sex								
Male	43.3	50.7	54.2	36.5	39.3	51.7	44.5	68.2
Female	56.7	49.3	45.8	63.5	60.7	48.3	55.5	31.8
Age								
19-29	29.6	33.3	36.1	35.5	39.4	32.1	36.9	41.1
30-49	40.7	49.5	37.3	36.6	40.4	54.4	37.8	49.2
50-64	18.6	9.8	15.7	10.8	12.7	9.5	13.9	6.4
65 +	11.1	7.5	10.8	17.2	7.5	4.0	11.3	3.4
Educ.								
Less than H.S.	19.6	8.5	14.0	23.4	14.7	10.8	15.5	7.0
H.S. Grad.	28.4	34.0	23.8	18.8	37.7	29.8	25.7	28.5
Some College +	52.0	51.6	62.2	57.8	47.6	59.4	58.8	64.5
Race								
Black-Latino Other	22.6	42.7	32.5	46.3	36.7	39.6	32.6	51.7
White-Asian	77.4	57.3	67.5	53.7	63.3	60.4	67.4	48.3
Income								
Less than \$15000	41.4	29.2	42.2	56.9	45.6	30.6	41.5	36.4
More than \$15000	58.6	70.8	57.8	43.1	54.4	69.4	58.5	63.6

Note. Proportions sum to 100% down columns for each characteristic.

Individuals with less than a high school education appear more inclined toward nonparticipation, than participation. Again, WhistleSTOP is an exception; nearly one-quarter of those who take part in WhistleSTOP never completed high school. In contrast a majority of those who participate in each of these four types of anti-crime efforts have attended college. College attendees also constitute a majority of those who choose *not* to participate.

Race is the characteristic that shows the most striking differential patterns between participators and nonparticipators. Considering their numbers in our total sample (23%), "disadvantage" minorities are consistently *over-represented* as participators. More than two-fifths of those people who do WhistleSTOP and informal surveillance are minorities, as are over half of those who have patrolled or escorted. Whites (and Asians), in contrast, make up the vast majority of nonparticipators, regardless of the anti-crime activity. These findings also support our previous findings (Chapter III) that show Blacks reporting higher levels of general participation in community-based groups than Whites, and to be more likely than Whites to say they employ certain property protection measures (e.g., alarms, window bars, and/or special locks).

To find that the majority of those who have patrolled or escorted are nonwhites may indicate a contextual and socio-cultural interaction effect. Following from the civil rights activities of the 1960s Blacks have an activist tradition to build upon. Furthermore, Blacks are more likely to live in high-risk areas which may call for more direct and aggressive anti-crime responses from the citizenry e.g., patrolling and escorting. Blacks have also been thought to have less confidence in the ability of the police to combat crime; this may further motivate them to assume responsibility for crime prevention, *themselves*.

Persons from households with income of over \$15,000 constitute about two-thirds of participators in crime prevention meetings, informal surveillance programs, and in patrols/escorts. In comparison, a majority of WhistleSTOP participators are from lower income households (less than \$15,000). A majority of nonparticipators are from higher income households, which indicates that individuals from higher income households (over \$15,000) are generally more likely to be exposed to (aware of) those anti-crime efforts. This may indicate a contextual effect: while community anti-crime efforts are most likely to occur in relatively lower income areas (cf. Table 5.17), it appears that "upper" lower income areas are more likely than "lower"

*Blacks, Latinos, and other non-Asian minority group members.

lower income areas to see the inception of such efforts. Furthermore, it seems that it is individuals from relatively higher income households *within* a community who are most likely to participate.

Apart from demographic characteristics, we gathered information on certain personality/attitudinal characteristics that were hypothesized to relate to participation and nonparticipation in these anti-crime efforts. In general we expected that participators would demonstrate more personal control, greater territorial attitudes, and attribute more responsibility for crime prevention to citizens (i.e., themselves) than nonparticipators. Furthermore we expected that instrumental motives for general participation vs. expressive motives would be more strongly related to involvement in the different types of group anti-crime measures.

Those who chose to attend neighborhood crime prevention meetings hold a significantly stronger territorial attitude toward their neighborhood than those that do not attend ($p < .05$). They are also significantly more likely than nonparticipators to attribute responsibility for community crime prevention to the citizenry (i.e., themselves), and to be more positively disposed toward voluntary action for both expressive and instrumental motives ($p < .001$). In fact, 37 percent of crime prevention meeting attendees described themselves as "joiners" for instrumental purposes, while one quarter said they generally joined group activities for expressive reasons.

WhistleSTOP participants did not differ significantly from nonparticipators, except in expressing more instrumental motivation for general social participation ($p < .05$). This seems consistent with the nature of the WhistleSTOP program, which usually involves no planned group activities i.e., no organized social contact. Rather a citizen who participates in WhistleSTOP makes an informal pledge to blow her/his whistle when another distress whistle is heard: The commitment made to WhistleSTOP is basically a purposive (instrumental) one specifically to achieve the goal of security.

Participation in informal neighborhood surveillance e.g., Blockwatch and Beat Rep, has potentially both instrumental and expressive experiences and benefits. Participators were significantly more likely than nonparticipators ($p < .05$) to describe themselves as "joiners": over one-third (35%) of these participators described themselves as generally joining group activities for instrumental reasons, while another one-third (29%) said they joined groups primarily for expressive reasons. People who have participated in Beat Rep or Blockwatch are also significantly more likely to attribute responsibility for crime prevention to citizens and to express a stronger territorial attitude toward their neighborhood ($p < .05$). A strong territorial attitude in one's neighborhood also significantly

discriminates persons who get involved in neighborhood patrols and escort programs from those that do not ($p < .01$). This follows the reasoning that territorial attitudes and manifested by behaviors (e.g., patrolling) that demonstrate a proprietary demeanor in some given environment.

In sum, it can be concluded that while none of these relationships are great in absolute terms, there are (significant) individual differences between people who get involved in neighborhood-based anti-crime efforts and those who are aware of these organized activities *but do not participate*. We have also shown that people are reportedly more likely to participate in communities where crime and incivility problems are worse: an apparent contextual saliency effect. One could ask whether these differences also relate to the personal saliency of crime in the environment (neighborhood). That is, do those who choose not to attend a crime prevention meeting, buy a whistle, surveil, or patrol/escort in their neighborhood merely perceive less personal reason (e.g., danger) to do so?

DuBow and Podolefsky (1979) suggest that fear of crime, a component of the risk-avoidance disposition, has little to do with participation in organized group anti-crime efforts. Our data allow for an exploration of this issue by comparing participators' and nonparticipators' perceptions of the risk and seriousness of personal victimization, and past experiences as crime victims. These analyses generally support the DuBow and Podolefsky findings. Neither feelings of safety in the neighborhood, perceived risk to burglary, robbery, or assault, nor perceived seriousness of different types of criminal victimizations significantly differentiate participators from nonparticipators in meetings, informal surveillance, or patrols/escorts. Regarding past experiences as a crime victim, participators were somewhat more likely than nonparticipators to report having been a victim of crime in the past few years (27% vs. 21%); yet this difference is small and only marginally significant. WhistleSTOP participants feel significantly less safe in their neighborhoods ($p < .01$) and perceive significantly more risk to street crime ($p < .05$) than nonparticipators. This is most likely linked to the greater preponderance of women who do WhistleSTOP, since women generally see themselves at greater risk to street crime. Thus the available data indicate that the personal saliency of crime does not largely account for why people do or do not get involved in neighborhood/community-based group anti-crime efforts. Rather concern for crime (and incivility) as a neighborhood social problem appears to provide the stronger impetus for citizen participation. This finding is consistent with the notion that it is social participation (or "public-minded") motives that lead citizens to group (collective) anti-crime activities, rather than risk-avoidance (or solely "private-minded") motives.

7. Community-organizations and group anti-crime efforts.

Building upon the work of the Reactions to Crime project (DuBow et al., 1979; and Podolefsky & DuBow, 1980) we have hypothesized that citizens participation in neighborhood-based anti-crime efforts often follows directly from involvement with some formal voluntary organization in the community. To explore this issue further each of our respondents who attended a crime prevention meeting was asked additional information about the meeting(s), whether it was connected with a community organization, and what connection the respondent had with the organization. Respondents were also queried about their participation in patrolling, escorting, blockwatch, or Beat Rep (in that order).* One hundred and seventeen respondents (weighted sample) attended at least one neighborhood crime prevention meeting and were asked additional questions, as were the eighty-three respondents (weighted sample) who patrolled, escorted, did Blockwatch, and/or Beat Rep.

Nearly two-thirds (63%) of those who said they had attended neighborhood crime prevention meetings indicated they had done so more than once in the past few years. A median number of reported attendees at these meetings was forty-five persons, with responses ranging from two to five hundred persons. The most frequently mentioned attendance was fifty persons. Additionally, nearly all respondents (86%) reported that a law enforcement officer was involved in meetings they had attended. Respondents were also asked to describe what the meeting(s) they had attended dealt with. Approximately two-thirds of the meetings (64%) were reported to be of an educational nature, 25 percent were held as general discussions of neighborhood problems, and the remainder served as a forum for solving specific local problems (10%).

Over three-quarters of the attendees (77.2%) indicated their meeting was connected with an organized neighborhood or community group, and 61.5 percent of these organizations reportedly had crime prevention as a major goal. Nearly all of the attendees at meetings connected with an organized group, said they had been given an opportunity to become a member (83.2%). A majority of these persons (57.2%) were current members of these organizations; an additional six percent were former members of the organization. All in all, these findings provide strong support for the notion that involvement in neighborhood-based group anti-crime efforts (e.g., crime prevention meetings) is linked with participation in formal voluntary organizations in the community.

*If a respondent had participated in all four of these activities he/she was queried only about the patrol. If he/she had not participated in a patrol, but had participated in an escort program, information was gathered about the escort only, regardless if he/she participated in Blockwatch and/or Beat Rep. And so on. In the end, additional information was gathered from 133 persons who attended crime prevention meetings, 52 people who patrolled, 10 who escorted, 33 who did Blockwatch, and 9 who participated in Beat Rep.

Participation in other neighborhood-based group anti-crime efforts (e.g., patrolling, escorting, blockwatch, or Beat Rep) varied considerably. The median number of times participants said they had done their specific anti-crime activity was about five times. Individual responses ranged from once to over one hundred, but in general there were very few persons who indicated they were engaged in crime prevention efforts on a week-in week-out basis. There was large variation in the number of other citizens who were reportedly involved in these anti-crime efforts: This ranged from three to an estimated four hundred, with median and modal responses in the 20-25 range. Nearly three-quarters of these anti-crime efforts (72.7%) were conducted with the involvement of a law enforcement officer.

As was the case with the crime prevention meetings the vast majority of these anti-crime efforts (71%) were connected with a formal voluntary organization in the community, half of which had crime prevention as a major purpose. Nearly every participant in these organization-related anti-crime efforts was given an opportunity to become a member (93.4%); and over two-thirds (68.3%) were current members. An additional eleven percent had formerly been members of the community organization. Here again, we find strong evidence that participation in neighborhood-based group crime prevention efforts is very much related to voluntary participation in community organizations.

8. Summary and conclusions. In sum, the results of our telephone survey indicate that most adults say they have never participated in any form of group anti-crime effort in their neighborhood (or probably elsewhere, for that matter). It appears that only about ten percent of the populace (as reflected by our metropolitan area sample) has done so. This corresponds closely to organized anti-crime participation levels found in Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco by the Reactions to Crime random-digit-dial survey. This figure (10%) should probably not be considered low, as the vast majority of Americans still live in neighborhoods that are quite safe and secure. And it appears likely that neighborhood problems (crime and incivility) must reach some magnitude before they become a salient factor which provides the impetus for certain individuals to marshal and take part in group anti-crime efforts. It is also quite likely that fear of crime, because of its ultimate debilitating effect* does not reliably serve as a motivating factor for citizen involvement in group anti-crime efforts of the type discussed in this chapter.

Furthermore, there is considerable evidence here that community crime prevention efforts which involve groups of neighbors in

*That is, fear seems to manifest itself in behavioral restrictions, and not to add new behaviors to a citizen's anti-crime repertoire.

some organized anti-crime activity are generally not originating from spontaneous and/or informal voluntary action. Rather the preponderance stem from the workings of on-going community organizations, many of which have crime prevention as a major purpose. Yet we can surmise that most of these organizations were not initially formed for crime prevention reasons. Past RTC findings and our present inperson interviews with organizational leaders suggest that neighborhood/community revitalization, improvement, and/or stabilization are the general goals of these organizations. Anti-crime activities become part of an organization's agenda, depending on the perception of neighborhood crime/delinquency as a problem. We have found that most citizens who participate in these neighborhood-based anti-crime efforts do so apparently as part of their participation with some formal voluntary organization in their community. In fact *the majority* of individuals who have attended neighborhood crime prevention meetings, and/or participated in informal surveillance (e.g., Blockwatch or Beat Rep) and/or more active group anti-crime efforts (e.g., patrolling or escorting) are current members of a block club or neighborhood-based community group (see Table 5.23). In direct contrast the majority of nonparticipants in these anti-crime efforts *are not* members of a neighborhood group/organization. Participants in WhistleSTOP are also more likely than nonparticipants to be community group members.

While the nature of our data do not allow us to conclusively link participation/nonparticipation in the group anti-crime efforts with the specific community group(s) our respondents claimed membership in, our findings provide a strong indication of the high probability of this direct linkage. This suggests to us that the "social participation" pathway is the route whereby most citizens become involved in neighborhood/community-based anti-crime efforts.

D. Moving: A Protective Response to Crime?*

Hirschman (1970) has suggested that when faced with neighborhood problems, such as crime, citizens can respond with "exit, voice, and loyalty." If citizens do not have the desire, ability, or wherewithal to achieve a tolerable level of safety in their neighborhood via citizen anti-crime measures (i.e., loyalty) or via vocal protests to local government (i.e., voice), there is another way they can deal with the threat of crime: by fleeing their neighborhoods in search of greater security (i.e., exit). If this is the case, then "exit" may serve as a *substitute* for anti-crime measures an individual would be motivated to employ were he/she not to move.

*An expanded presentation of this section also appears in RTC Volume I report, "Coping with Crime" (Skogan & Maxfield, 1980), Chapter 14.

Table 5.23

PROPORTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
FOR PARTICIPATORS AND NON-PARTICIPATORS

Anti-Crime Effort	Proportion Community Org. Members	
	Participants	Non-Participants
Attend Crime Prevention Meeting(s)	53.9	34.9
WhistleSTOP	39.8	24.1
Informal Surveillance	65.6	23.7
Patrol/Escort	63.2	20.9

Research on the role of crime in precipitating flight from urban areas is far from definitive. The issue is complex, for it appears that residential relocation is a two-stage process: certain factors induce people to move, while other factors shape the direction and distance they migrate. For the most part, past findings suggest that crime and safety is more related to a *reported desire to move*, and yet do not play a major role in influencing the actual decision to move (cf. Duncan and Newman, 1976; Garofalo, 1977; Reiss, 1967; Rifai, 1976; Droettboom, et al., 1971; Kasl and Harburg; 1972; and Frey, 1979).

Yet, what is generally missing from past research is data on relocation which can be linked to fears and assessments of risk. In our telephone survey each respondent was asked "where did you last live before you moved to your present neighborhood?" These responses were categorized as central city locations (49 percent), suburban places (27 percent), elsewhere in the United States or abroad (16 percent), and those who were lifelong residents of their neighborhood (8 percent). Our measure of "residential relocation" is based on the difference between this and the location of their current residence. Those who continued to live in the central city were classified as "city-stayers", while suburbanites who previously lived in the central city were classified as "city-fleers."*

City-stayers vs. city-fleers. People who remained in the city are poorer: over 40 percent of the stayers had household incomes of less than \$10,000, while only 16 percent of those that left were in this low income bracket. However, the most substantial correlate of residential relocation, is race: A little over half of those who moved, yet remained in the city were Whites; in contrast nearly all (94%) of those who fled were Whites. In short, the issue of flight to the suburbs is one of "white flight". Thus, it is within the white population that our data allow us to look for the relationships of crime, anti-crime measures, and moving.

Table 5.24 shows that there are no significant differences

*Of the 893 persons involved, 74 percent remained city dwellers and 26 percent left for the suburbs. This is a far-from-perfect indicator of suburban flight. Most notably, because we could ask only about the *last* place people lived before their current location we misclassified those who did flee the city but since have made one or more intra-suburban moves. Those who moved from the city and left the metropolitan area entirely were lost from our sample area as well. The best evidence is, however, that extra-SMSA migration is precipitated by radical changes in employment or lifestyle preferences, and not by comparative assessments of cities and their suburbs (Frey, 1979).

Table 5.24

RATINGS OF PROBLEMS IN ORIGINAL NEIGHBORHOOD
BY CURRENT RESIDENTIAL LOCATION, FOR WHITES

Extent To Which A "Big Problem" In Original Neighborhood	Residential Location	
	Proportion City-Stayers	Proportion City-Fleers
Quality of Public Schools	14	16
Kind of People Living There	18	15
Convenience to Work	4	7
Crime and Safety	20	21

Note. Number of cases approximately 503 for each comparison. None of these differences are significant (p<.05).

in assessing aspects of their former neighborhoods, between city-stayers and city-fleers. Yet, assessment of crime problems in one's former neighborhood does relate significantly to residential relocation by higher income households: among Whites reporting current household incomes in excess of \$20,000 per year, more of those recalling crime problems in their former city neighborhoods had fled to the suburbs (see Table 5.25).

Our survey also indicated that crime and safety were the most important overt consideration shaping White's residential relocation, among the "pull" factors that were measured. Respondents were asked to rate "how important" various aspects of their current neighborhood were in choosing where to move: the quality of public schools was rated "very important" by 37 percent, "the kind of people living there" by 48 percent, "convenience to work" by 49 percent, and "crime and safety" by 64 percent.

Some inferences can also be drawn from the survey on the outcome of the decision to stay or flee the city. Table 5.26 shows the extent to which these two groups of Whites report that problems exist in their current neighborhoods. As can be seen, differences in the conditions each group reportedly faces as a result of moving or staying are considerable. Building abandonment, street robbery, assault, and arson are three or four times more frequently cited as problems by city stayers. Vandalism, burglary, and teenagers often present difficulties for city-fleers, but still are significantly greater problems for city-stayers. By these measures, those who left the city appear to have achieved a great deal.

With all these findings in mind, we can ask whether the relatively greater security reportedly achieved by city-fleers vs. city-stayers is associated with differential levels in the extent to which they employ various crime prevention measures. If the decision to employ crime prevention measures is predicated on an assessment of the safety and security of the environment, then city-fleers would be expected to resemble suburbanites who have not moved from the city (suburban-stayers). On the other hand, if city living "conditioned" city-fleers to take certain preventive measures, even after having fled the city, then we would expect their patterns of preventive responses to resemble those who stay in the city.

Table 5.27 presents the proportions that city-stayers, city-fleers and suburban-stayers engage in various anti-crime measures. In general, those who left the city are quite similar to persons who already lived in the suburbs, in the extent to which they employ personal and household-based protective measures. Regardless of where they lived prior to their last move, white

Table 5.25

INCOME, NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PROBLEMS,
AND RESIDENTIAL RELOCATION, FOR WHITES

Current Household Income and Extent Crime a Problem in Original Neighborhood	N	Percent Moved to Suburbs	Significance of Difference
Under \$10,000			
Not a problem	79	38	
Some problem	30	20	.17
Big problem	36	28	
\$10,000 to \$20,000			
Not a problem	106	47	
Some problem	50	50	.89
Big problem	34	46	
More than \$20,000			
Not a problem	124	47	
Some problem	76	66	.01
Big problem	48	67	

Table 5.26

RATINGS OF PROBLEMS IN CURRENT NEIGHBORHOOD,
FOR WHITES

Extent To Which A "Big Problem" or "Some Problem" In Current Neighborhood	Residential Location	
	Proportion Stayed in City	Proportion Moved to Suburbs
Buildings or storefronts sitting abandoned or burned out	18	4
Fires being set on purpose	17	5
Vandalism-like kids breaking windows or writing on walls or things like that	48	37
People breaking in or sneaking into homes to steal something	53	33
Groups of teenagers hanging out on the streets	49	29
People being robbed or having their purses or wallets taken on the streets	45	10
People being attacked or beaten up by strangers	28	8

Note. Number of cases approximately 585 for each comparison. All differences are significant ($p < .01$).

Table 5.27

PROPORTIONS OF CHICAGO-STAYERS, CHICAGO-FLEERS, AND SUBURBAN-STAYERS WHO EMPLOY CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES, FOR WHITES

Anti-Crime Measures	Stayed in Chicago	Moved to Suburbs	Stayed in Suburbs
Avoid outside night alone	48.3	21.8	22.4
Avoid walking near strangers	58.6	37.5	37.9
Avoid carrying alot of cash	66.1	53.2	44.1
Avoid certain places	76.9	78.3	77.0
Use indoor timer	54.9	67.7	61.6
Ask NBRS watch home	78.4	80.6	78.3
Carry theft insurance	75.3	90.2	86.2
Install outdoor lights	25.1	40.0	32.0
Install alarm/bars/locks	38.8	31.5	31.6
Hand Gun	15.1	13.4	16.4
Engrave valuables	27.4	31.3	30.3
Other home protection	22.2	20.1	19.3
Attend crime prev. meeting	10.6	2.9	3.6
	<u>N=311</u>	<u>N=273</u>	<u>N=403</u>

Note. These analyses are for whites only: 311 respondents resided in Chicago prior to and after their last move (this includes 60 persons who are lifetime residents of Chicago); 273 respondents resided in Chicago prior to their most recent move (to the suburbs); and 403 respondents resided in the suburbs prior to and after their last move (this includes 44 persons who are lifetime residents of their suburbs).

suburbanites are less likely than white city residents to restrict their behaviors in their own neighborhoods. Yet those who came from the city are more likely to restrict the amount of valuables on their person, than are suburban-stayers. Regardless of moving history Whites show similar patterns in the extent to which they avoid certain places in the Chicago metropolitan area. As discussed earlier, this avoidance of specific locations appears mostly an avoidance of disadvantaged minority areas by Whites: this apparently holds true regardless of where Whites currently live and/or previously lived.

City-fleers are slightly more likely than suburban-stayers to use an indoor timer when they leave their house unoccupied (68% vs. 62%), who in turn are more likely than Whites who remain in the city to do so. On the other hand, no difference is apparent in the extent to which these groups ask neighbors to watch their homes. Since moving to the suburbs mostly involves moving into an *owned home*, it is not surprising to find city-fleers' high level of theft insurance ownership.

It is interesting to note that city-fleers are most likely to say they have installed special outdoor lights at home to help make it easier to see what is going on: two-fifths have done so. While we cannot perform a definitive test of the motivations operating here, it can be suggested that former city residents are accustomed to Chicago's brighter street lighting, and find their suburb "uncomfortably" dark. The legacy of city-life does not seem to carry over though when it comes to employing traditional target-hardening devices, e.g., alarms, window bars, and/or special locks. City-fleers are no more likely than suburban-stayers to target-harden their homes.

The only remaining difference of any magnitude relates to attendance at crime prevention meetings. Those who have remained in the city are about three times more likely to engage in this group anti-crime measure. This city-suburb difference most likely reflects the lesser need for such meetings in the suburbs, and the generally less active role of suburban vs. Chicago police in organizing such meetings.

While these data do not provide a robust test for the issue of whether fleeing the city "substitutes", or replaces the need, for certain anti-crime measures, the patterns of results are consistent with that hypothesis. Fleeing the city to the apparent security of the suburbs *does* relate to different levels at which people engage in crime prevention measures, compared to those who have not left the city. It would have been surprising to find otherwise, since we have posited that a "rational" model underlies the initiation of anti-crime measures. Those who have left the relative danger of the city for the increased security of the suburbs, now live in a lower-risk environment; yet it remains possible that their use of crime prevention measures stems from other individual difference factors

and not their move. Our telephone survey data allow for a rough test of this issue:

As reported earlier, household income was a primary determinant of whether Whites become city-stayers or city-fleers. If it is income that accounts for levels at which people employ anti-crime measures, then statistically controlling for it should reduce the size of correlations that are observed between "type of mover" (city-stayer vs. city-fleer) and various citizen crime prevention measures. This would indicate that differences between those who stayed in the city and those who left are associated with differential income and not where they moved. Table 5.28 displays these results. While controlling for income does attenuate some of the correlations, the general magnitude of the relationships and pattern of significance remains unaltered. This provides further evidence for the conclusion that it is the *movement* of Whites from the city to the suburbs that accounts for the differential extent to which they employ or engage in various anti-crime measures.

Yet, there is an irony in suburban flight as a protective response to crime: it is probably most effective when only a few people take advantage of it. If flight becomes more pervasive and heterogeneous in character, and as new cities and employment centers spring up on the metropolitan fringe to provide for that new life, the comparative advantages of suburban relocation will probably decline. In that case, we would expect to see an increase in the extent to which suburban residents restrict their movements in time and space, employ traditional target hardening devices, and engage in neighborhood/community based anti-crime efforts.

E. Comparison of Police Policy and Actual Levels of Citizen Anti-Crime Measures

After previously identifying local police policy toward various citizen/community anti-crime measures (in Chapter IV), it is of interest to compare these endorsements with the actual levels that anti-crime measures are reportedly employed by the citizenry (see Table 5.29). Despite the fact that the data sets we have available to make these comparisons are not perfect for this purpose, some notion can be gleaned of the level of congruence between what the police recommended and what the citizenry actually does.

While the police strongly recommended reporting victimizations and suspicious incidents to the police, it is well documented that many incidents go unreported. Our data do not provide information about the reporting rate in the general population. All that is known is that 28.2 percent of the respondents from the telephone survey said they had called the police in the past year or so to report a crime or some suspicious activity. It is hard to judge whether this figure is low or high: we can simply

Table 5.28

ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS (CONTROLLING FOR INCOME) BETWEEN TYPE OF MOVER AND CITIZEN CRIME PREVENTION MEASURES, FOR WHITES

Anti-Crime Measure	Type of Mover	
	Zero-order Correlation	Partial Correlation
Avoid outside at night	-.240**	-.190**
Avoid walking near strangers	-.196**	-.148**
Avoid carrying alot of cash	-.143**	-.097**
Avoid certain places	.017	-.013
Use indoor timer	.113**	.101**
Ask NBRS to watch home	.034	.022
Carry theft insurance	.195**	.135**
Install outdoor lights	.159**	.144**
Install alarms/bars/locks	-.076*	-.087*
Hand gun	-.024	-.038
Engrave valuables	.043	.031
Other home protection	-.025	-.045
Attend crime prev. meeting	-.149**	-.163**

**
p<.01

*
p<.05

Note. Type of mover is coded 1=City-Stayer, 2=City-Fleer.

Table 5.29

POLICE ENDORSEMENT AND CITIZEN EMPLOYMENT OF ANTI-CRIME MEASURES

Anti-Crime Measure	Police Endorsement	Proportion Employment*
Report incidents to police	Strongly Encouraged	28.2
Ask NBRS to watch home	Strongly Encouraged	59.8
Use indoor timer	Strongly Encouraged	40.4
Be alert at all times	Strongly Encouraged	51.4
Install special locks	Strongly Encouraged	36.3
Engrave valuables	Strongly Encouraged	30.0
Don't carry alot of cash	Encouraged	58.1
Install outdoor lighting	Encouraged	29.1
Carry theft insurance	Encouraged	75.2
Carry whistle	Encouraged	3.8
Watchdog at home	Neutral	10.3
Don't go out alone at night	Neutral	41.1
Avoid certain places	Neutral	71.3
Avoid certain people	Neutral	52.1
Patrol neighborhood	Neutral	1.9
Gun at home	Discouraged	15.9

*Proportion of respondents in Chicago Metropolitan Area survey who employ the anti-crime measure.

conclude that a good number of individuals *do* report criminal/suspicious incidents to the police.

Coinciding with the strong positive endorsement by police, most households report asking neighbors to watch their homes while away (59.8%), and report carrying theft insurance policies (75.2%). Moderate levels of the citizenry say they try to be alert at all times and avoid carrying an excessive amount of valuables; these measures are also encouraged by the police. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the police would prefer it if more citizens would use indoor timers, install special locks, install extra outdoor lighting, engrave their valuables, and carry whistles than the current levels at which the citizenry apparently employs these anti-crime measures.

Many citizens restrict their own behaviors by avoiding night time activities (41.1%), and avoiding certain places (71.3%) and certain people (52.1%). We found that police policy is apparently unformulated about these crime prevention measures. This is somewhat surprising because of the "common sense" nature of these restrictions, and may more reflect an unwillingness on the police to officially admit that such restrictions are necessary.

Police policy toward citizen patrols was for the most part neutral and/or unformulated, with a small proportion of positive and negative endorsements. As reported in our survey of citizens very few individuals (1.9%) have participated in a patrol of their neighborhood. Here, journalistic evidence (Sixty Minutes, 1978) suggests that police are uncomfortable about citizens engaging in their own "preventive patrols". The spectre of vigilantism seems to overshadow any perceptions the police might have of potential benefits from citizen patrols. Yet evaluation research has found no evidence that citizens engaged in formal neighborhood surveillance are routinely "taking the law into their own hands." (Yin et al., 1976; and Bickman & Lavrakas, 1976).

A small proportion of the citizenry indicated they had a gun or a watchdog at home for protection. While police policy toward watchdogs is a neutral one, police consistently discourage gun ownership. This clearly follows their first-hand experience with dangers associated with an "armed public".

In sum, these comparisons suggest that the levels at which citizens employ various crime prevention behaviors do not closely correspond to what is recommended by police. We assume that the police would prefer the citizenry to engage in *passive* and *indirect* forms of crime prevention, such as the installation of deadbolt locks and reporting of crimes, to a much greater extent than is currently done. Similarly the police say they do not encourage more aggressive and direct citizen anti-crime measures, e.g., gun ownership and neighborhood patrols.

An understanding of the interface between the citizenry and the police as it relates to crime prevention can be enhanced by exploring attitudes held by each regarding "who is responsible for crime prevention". Consistent with our conceptual framework, it is reasoned that unless the citizenry feels some personal responsibility for crime prevention they cannot be expected to engage in anti-crime measures. LEAA policy reflects an awareness of this issue by their recent sponsoring of the public service advertising campaign, "Take A Bite Out Of Crime." Here, an animated dog serves as the vehicle whereby citizens are to be educated about their "proper" role in crime prevention.

Experience teaches that the police are often times "blamed" for a community's crime problems, and held solely accountable for the control and prevention of crime. Exposure to our media seems linked to these public opinions about crime prevention. Too often the more vocal members of a community are those who responded to crime problems (real and perceived) by only demanding, "why aren't the police doing something (or doing more)?" The impact of this vocal segment of the citizenry seems clearly reflected in the way police, themselves, perceive citizens' attitudes toward the police: Nearly ninety percent of the police officers we surveyed indicated that in their jurisdictions, residents expect police to solve problems, rather than trying to solve their own communities' crime problems.

Findings from our telephone survey of citizens suggest that the police are likely to be exposed mostly to an "unrepresentative", but vocal, segment of their citizenry. The telephone survey included the following item that provides a comparison with police perceptions of citizen attitudes:

- when it comes to the *prevention* of criminal behavior in a neighborhood, do you feel that it's more the responsibility of the *residents*, or more the responsibility of the *police*?

While one-third of the residents attributed primary responsibility for crime prevention to the police, 36 percent responded that it was the responsibility of *both* the police and residents, and 29 percent placed the primary responsibility with residents.

Table 5.30 shows how these different attributions relate to the levels citizens engage in various anti-crime measures. While attributions of responsibility for prevention are generally not associated with large differences in the extent to which citizens employ or have engaged in anti-crime measures, there are some notable findings. There is a clear trend for citizens who attribute primary responsibility for crime prevention to residents to be more likely than others to employ anti-crime measures. The largest differences are associated with attendance at a crime prevention meeting, patrolling, and gun ownership. Nearly three times as many people who view residents as responsible for crime prevention vs. those who hold the police responsible, report

Table 5.30
 PROPORTION EMPLOYING ANTI-CRIME MEASURES BY
 ATTRIBUTIONS OF CRIME PREVENTION RESPONSIBILITY

Anti-Crime Measures	Attributions to		
	Police	Both	Residents
Attend NBHD crime prevention	3.8	9.7	12.3
Report incidents to police	28.3	25.8	32.1
Ask neighbors to watch home	54.2	62.5	64.6
Use indoor timer	38.8	40.5	41.9
Be alert at all times	47.1	52.2	57.4
Install special locks	33.9	36.5	39.6
Engrave valuables	24.2	34.0	33.0
Don't carry alot of cash	56.3	57.8	61.0
Install outdoor lighting	28.5	31.6	26.3
Carry theft insurance	75.6	79.8	73.6
Carry whistle	2.9	3.0	5.2
Watchdog at home	7.6	11.7	11.9
Don't go out nights alone	41.9	38.7	42.1
Avoid certain places	73.9	73.9	72.3
Avoid certain people	51.3	50.0	55.6
Patrol neighborhood	.3	.7	1.0
Gun at home	12.3	14.8	22.5

having attended a neighborhood crime prevention meeting and patrolling their neighborhood; also, nearly twice as many say they own a gun for protection (22.5% vs. 12.3%). While it cannot be concluded that these data demonstrate a causal link between attitudes and behaviors, they do provide support for the notion that citizen attributions are consistent with their anti-crime behaviors: People who view residents as playing the key role in preventing crime are most likely to employ a variety of anti-crime measures. Yet it should be noted that people may simply be reflecting attitudes that have subsequently become consistent with their own behaviors i.e., "if I do alot to try to prevent crime, I must think that I'm responsible for crime prevention."

In conclusion and as stated in Chapter IV, we hypothesized that the police can play an important role in shaping the extent to which citizens employ anti-crime measures. The relative lack of correspondence we have observed between "what the police recommend" and "what citizens actually do" may reflect a general absence of contact between the two. Neighborhood crime prevention meetings appear to be the point where police policy is most likely to have an impact on citizen behaviors. These meetings are a relatively recent innovation in many communities, and are virtually nonexistent in others. If the police, other local law enforcement agencies, and state and federal anti-crime efforts continue to actively "reach out" to promote cooperation from and involvement of citizens, it would be expected that more of the public will initiate the anti-crime measures they endorse.

F. Anti-Crime Measures and Non-crime Preventive Measures

While the primary focus of our research has been prevention-oriented measures against crime, we also gathered information from citizens about other non-crime related preventive measures they might employ. This was planned to broaden our understanding of the processes that lead to differential involvement in crime prevention. The non-crime prevention behavior that data were collected on include:

- wearing a seat belt while driving or riding in a car, for safety pruposes (46%),
- having a smoke detector inside the home (52%),
- planning an escape route from the home, in case of fire (64%),
- regular exercising to keep healthy (82%),
- not smoking for health reasons (61%),
- watching one's diet to keep healthy (83%), and
- having a voluntary medical check-up (81%).

The percentages in parentheses, above, are the proportion of the telephone sample that said they took a precaution at least some of the time. Table 5.31 shows demographic correlations with each of these seven prevention measures. While a single demographic profile of the precautionous individual does not readily emerge, several factors are clearly important. The data suggest that women and older citizens prefer prevention activities that differ from the alternatives practiced by men and younger individuals. There is also a fairly consistent trend for the better educated to more often report engaging in prevention-oriented measures. Higher income, being White, and being married seem to be predictive in some cases. And in general these findings support previous research on correlates of health, fire, and traffic safety (see Appendix A).

Here we are especially interested in how these prevention measures relate to anti-crime measures. If there is a general preventive demeanor that develops and is practiced by some individuals, but not others, then we would expect to find positive correlations between health, traffic, and fire prevention measures and anti-crime measures. Table 5.32 displays these correlations: most are of small magnitude, but none the less many are significant and almost all are positive. This overall pattern suggests that there may, in fact, be a general preventive demeanor. But these findings are much too tenuous for a confident judgement. It is attractive to speculate that the motivation for crime prevention is the same as the motivations for approaching life in a safe and cautious way. Yet as we have shown, there is a wide range of anti-crime measures with what appears to be different underlying motives.

Table 5.31

DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES:
HEALTH, TRAFFIC SAFETY AND FIRE PREVENTION MEASURES

	Sex	Age	Education	Race	Income	Marital Status
Seat Belt	-.027	.054**	.199***	.098***	.087***	.048*
Smoke Detector	-.031	-.044*	.113***	.107***	.144***	.139***
Fire Escape Plan	-.050*	.071**	.027	-.007	.030	.064**
Regular Exercise	-.049*	-.125***	.074***	.022	.027	.006
Avoid Smoking	.061**	.103***	.140***	.039*	.029	.030
Medical Check-ups	.174***	.059**	.034	.021	.006	.017
Careful Diet	.125***	-.027	.155***	.013	.023	-.009

p<.001

**
p<.01

*
p<.05

Sex (Male=0; Female=1);

Age in years;

Education (5 categories ranging from less than H.S. Graduate to Graduate School degree);

Race (1=Whites/Asians; 0=Blacks/Latinos/Others);

Income (7 categories ranging from less than \$6000 to more than \$50000);

Marital Status (1=Yes, 0=No).

Table 5.32

INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG ANTI-CRIME MEASURES
AND TRAFFIC, FIRE, AND HEALTH MEASURES

Anti-Crime Measures	Non-Crime Measures						
	Seatbelt	Smoke Detector	Escape Plan	Regular Exercise	Don't Smoke	Volunteer Check-up	Watch Dog
Avoid Being Out At Night Alone	-.01	-.02	.03	.01	.08*	.08*	.08*
Avoid Certain People	.03	.03	-.01	.03	.02	.03	.03
Don't Carry Cash	-.01	.00	.01	.03	.02	.06*	.07*
Indoor Timer	.11*	.10*	.03	.04	.04	.08*	.05
Ask NBRs to Watch Home	.10*	.11*	.09*	.04	.03	.11*	.03
Carry Insurance	.08*	.10*	.05	.04	.06*	.05	.01
Outdoor Lights	.00	.05	.06	.05	-.02	.10*	.01
Alarms/Bars/Locks	.04	.07*	.03	.02	.00	.08*	.05
Hand Gun	-.07*	.01	.05	.01	-.08*	.02	-.03
Engrave Valuables	.10*	.12*	.12*	.08*	-.06*	-.05	.06
Attend CP Meeting	.03	.03	.06*	.05	.01	.06	.03
Behavioral Restrictions Index	.03	-.07*	-.02	-.06*	-.06*	.11*	.06
Home Protection Index	.12*	.16*	.11*	.07*	.02	.14*	.06*

*p <.01

Note. N ranges from 1573 to 1652 due to pair-wise deletion of missing data.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings that have been presented in these chapters provide a detailed look at the data we gathered during the course of the last twenty-four months. The focus of our research program has been a systematic *exploration* of citizen involvement in crime prevention. We began by developing a preliminary framework to conceptualize the processes that lead citizens to take anti-crime measures. This conceptual framework provided the "big (hypothetical) picture" out of which our research components stem. It represented a synthesis of past findings in the areas of voluntary action and social participation, community crime prevention and citizens' preventive responses to crime, and other precautionary measures the citizenry engages in against traffic, fire, and health hazards. By integrating these different literatures, we tried to incorporate differing (sometimes competing) explanations about citizen involvement in crime prevention into a single unified model.

This is the first time, to our knowledge, that a unified effort has been made to focus directly on "*what* citizens do to be safe from crime, and *why* they do it?" Wherever possible our research was built upon the findings of the Reactions to Crime project, themselves preliminary in nature. Serious research interest in the citizenry's role in crime prevention can be traced back only a decade or so. While the 1970s witnessed millions of dollars and person-hours committed to the implementation and conduct of community crime prevention programs, these anti-crime efforts have often lacked a sound, empirically-based conceptual underpinning (cf. Lewis, 1979). Only slowly have empirical findings emerged which began to define the state of knowledge about citizen crime prevention. Our research program has attempted to advance that state of knowledge. It does not constitute (nor was it meant to) *the* definitive or final work needed to fully understand this topic area.

The methodologies that we employed were chosen to provide a broad, comprehensive, *albeit preliminary and exploratory* investigation of the processes that lead citizens to become involved in crime prevention. We readily acknowledged that the research methods employed here are not meant for formal hypothesis testing, but rather are the type suited for hypothesis clarification and identification (cf. Crano & Brewer, 1973). Given the state of knowledge existing prior to our research (as we judged it), formal hypothesis testing was premature. Rather cross-sectional survey methods were chosen because we wanted information from a large and diverse sampling of citizens, community organizations, and police departments: We tried to collect data that would allow us to

"paint a big picture" of the citizen crime prevention landscape, and to some extent that picture remains blurred.

Survey research is a cost effective means of gathering needed information from large numbers of persons. Here we employed surveys over the telephone, in person, and via the mail. Given the need for a large, yet representative sample of citizens, the random-digit-dial procedure was an efficient method to randomly sample a diverse population via telephone, especially those with unlisted numbers. The information (both amount and type) that was gathered from organization leaders necessitated in-person interviewing. Open-ended questions were used so as not to lose any of the richness and diversity of responses, and while their subsequent transcription to quantified data are less reliable than that produced by closed-ended items, these leaders had more to say than could have reasonably been captured via a closed-ended instrument. The mail survey of local law enforcement agencies suffered none of the response rate problems of typical mail surveys. While there is bound to be some discrepancy between how each officer responded to the survey items and what he/she and other officers actually say to citizens, we have no reason to expect this gap to be a wide one.

A major limitation to all our research methods, and to surveys in general, is that they do not produce data that are completely valid or even completely reliable.* Were we able to afford in-person data collection from citizens, including observations of their anti-crime behaviors/measures, we would have more confidence in our results.

We hypothesized that there are two basic motives (paths) that lead citizens to engage in preventive responses to crime. First, it was reasoned that citizens "avoid risks" by engaging in prevention-oriented activities. This risk-avoidance disposition was thought to encompass "fear of crime" and victimization experiences. Second, it was reasoned that citizens may become involved in anti-crime activities, not because of any personal assessment of being at risk or any past experiences with victimization, but rather as part of their participation with formal voluntary organizations in their communities. *At the start of our research it was unclear whether these two dispositions led citizens to employ the same anti-crime activities, or whether they led citizens to different preventive responses.*

We decided that data should be collected that would be

*Although our two pilot studies did provide some encouraging evidence about the reliability and validity of crime prevention information collected from citizens via telephone surveys.

representative of a broad cross-section of information sources and in a manner that would enhance the external validity (generalizations) of our findings.* A telephone survey of 1,803 citizens (households) provided a broad picture of what, if anything, was being done by various types of citizens to enhance their own safety and security. These data included socio-demographic characteristics, personality traits, victimization experiences, attitudes and perceptions related to crime and non-crime hazards (traffic, health, fire), attitudes and experiences related to participation in voluntary organizations, and the extent to which a citizen did or did not engage in various preventive responses to crime and non-crime hazards. In-person interviews with 153 leaders of community organizations were conducted to learn about the role such groups play in the "opportunity structure." These leaders had "expert" knowledge about what facilitates and inhibits the initial involvement and maintained involvement of citizens in such organizations. In addition, these interviews provided information on a number of organizational variables including, original and current goals, history, issues addressed, funding, staffing, and activities/programs, and recruitment strategies. Finally, officers from 167 law enforcement agencies responded to a mail survey that measured which citizen anti-crime measures were encouraged/discouraged by police. With these data we were able to compare what the citizenry is doing about crime vs. what the police would like them to do; and thereby formed a clearer understanding of the current functioning of the police in the opportunity structure.

A. Summary and Discussion of Findings

Along with the development of the preliminary conceptual framework, we began our research by reviewing past conceptualizations of citizen crime prevention behaviors/measures. There had been a number of previous conceptualizations, both explicit and implicit, that could be supported on *a priori* grounds, but no empirical evidence existed to support or refute their validity. So that we could sample a robust and representative set of citizen crime prevention behaviors (i.e., our dependent variables), we conducted secondary analyses of past criminal justice survey data sets. From these analyses and our own *a priori* reasoning, we concluded that what people do to be safe from crime could be thought of as measures taken to protect (a) their own person, (b) their household (family and property), and (c) their neighborhood/community.

For the most part, "avoidance" or behavioral restrictions appear to be the most prevalent response to prevent personal

*This is why we expanded our sample of citizens to include suburbanites.

victimization: This was reasoned to be employed by individual citizens to promote their own security (i.e., private-minded motivation). Regarding the employment of prevention measures at home, it appeared that measures taken to reduce unlawful entry, "access control", were most typical. While the intent of household-based prevention measures seemed clearly a private-minded one, it was not clear whether citizens employed these measures because they feared burglary, had been burglary victims, were encouraged by police and/or community crime prevention programs to do so, or for some other reasons. Finally, there appeared to be a distinct set of territorial anti-crime efforts that citizens engaged in *as a group*. But again it was not clear what brought citizens together to engage in these "collective" responses and whether these had "private-minded" and/or "public-minded" motivations. To capture and investigate this seemingly critical private/public, individual/collective distinctions, it was hypothesized that private motivation appeared to center around individual efforts to "avoid risks," while public motivation seemed linked to a propensity to take action on a broader public-scale, i.e., "social participation."

Our analysis of perceptions of risk, serious, and efficacy of preventive responses related to crime, traffic, health and fire hazards supported the notion that these may reflect *generalized responses*. This in turn led to a preliminary conclusion that an individual's responses to crime may reflect her/his own orientation to threat in general. Furthermore, we found a general pattern of individual difference factors related to reports of feeling at risk and regarding victimization as serious: females, younger (and sometimes older) adults, Blacks and Latinos, those in lower income brackets, renters, and central city residents are the ones most likely to report feeling at risk and perceiving the consequences of victimization as serious. Therefore, it is in these population subgroups that one most likely would expect to find "risk-avoidance" serving as the motivation for anti-crime measures.

We found that a majority of citizens (58.3%) reportedly hold membership in at least one formal voluntary organization. The pattern of individual difference factors related to membership supported, for the most part, past findings on correlates of voluntary action. Of special interest were the results that Blacks, and homeowners, were significantly more likely than Whites and renters to report being a member of a block club or neighborhood-based community group. Blacks were also found to be significantly more active than Whites in the groups they belonged to, as were males and single adults. Furthermore, problem-solving motives for joining groups (instrumental) were most strongly related to membership in a neighborhood group, while social affiliation motives (expressive) were significantly related to the reported activity level of members. These findings were somewhat similar to what was learned

from community organization leaders: A majority perceived citizens as being more likely to initially join their groups in order to solve problems, than for expressive reasons (e.g., social affiliation). On the other hand most leaders felt it was a commitment to a community that kept members active and involved. Fewer leaders saw success at solving local problems (32%) or the desire for social affiliation (31%) as a primary reason for members' maintained involvement. Thus it appears that leaders may underestimate the importance of social affiliation incentives in keeping members active and involved. In sum, by investigation citizens dispositions for social participation and their involvement in FVO's (e.g. community organizations) we tried to learn more about what has often been referred to as collective and/or public-minded motives.

While a citizen can be personally disposed toward prevention-oriented activities because of risk-avoidance and/or social participation motives, these dispositions may be affected by the "opportunity structure," of which the police and community organization were reasoned to be two key factors. Our mail survey of police officers found that their departments reportedly hold varying opinions about the types of anti-crime measures the citizenry should employ: for the most part, the police seem to endorse indirect and passive citizen crime prevention (e.g.; reporting suspicious/criminal circumstances, engraving valuables, locking doors and windows, etc), and do not endorse more direct and aggressive means (e.g., defending oneself if assailed, owning a hand gun for protection, citizen patrols, etc.). Community organizations were found to have a primarily problem-solving orientation, and thus can provide opportunities to a citizen who is concerned about some problem (e.g., local crime or delinquency), but feels impotent on his/her own. It was found that community organizations provide opportunities for citizens (members) to engage in crime prevention activities when crime and delinquency problems become part of their organizational agenda.

The first type of anti-crime measure that we investigated was self-imposed behavioral restrictions. Furstenberg (1972) described these measures as "avoidance" since they appeared to be used to avoid exposure to circumstances perceived to be dangerous. It was found that a sizeable proportion of the citizenry reported that they limit behaviors in their own neighborhood (> 50%), especially those living in the city. The tendency to place restrictions on oneself because of crime, was most directly related to feelings of safety, then to being female, Black or Latino, elderly, and having a low income. The overriding motive for restricting one's behavior seems clearly to be risk-avoidance; and as such is the prototype of the "individual/private-minded" crime prevention measure that citizens rely on.

As found here, and in earlier surveys of the urban populace, there is great variation among American households in the extent to which they employ home protection measures. Two consistent findings emerged across the analyses: *First*, homeowners are much more likely than renters to take household-based protective measures. This follows no doubt from the greater control they can exercise over their property, and because of their greater investment (financial and psychological) in their home. It is not directly due to their greater income, because once home ownership is controlled for, household income does not relate significantly with most property protection measures. *Second*, there is a weak, but reliable, disposition to employ protective measures at home; certain households are likely to employ many or all measures, while others employ few or none. There was no evidence that any one type of protective measure "substitutes" for others, rather these household anti-crime measures appear "complementary" or cumulative.

A number of other *significant* relationships were found between personal characteristics, experiences and perceptions and the employment of certain home anti-crime measures:

- Alarms, window bars, and/or special locks have been installed by over a third of the metropolitan area households. Blacks, Latinos, and other non-Asian minorities are most likely to use these target-hardening devices. On the other hand, the elderly, especially elderly renters, are least likely to target harden. Increased education is related with greater use of these devices.
- Nearly a third of the households have installed special outdoor lights to make it easier to see what is going on outside. It was determined that perceived brightness of street lights in front of one's home was not related to the installation of outdoor lights.
- Nearly one-sixth of all households report having a hand gun, at least in part for protection. In the Chicago metropolitan area it was found that minority households were most likely to report owning hand guns. Higher income households were also more likely than those with lower incomes to have guns. The main effects of race and income are cumulative, with higher income Blacks most likely to say they have hand guns at home.
- Timers are used on indoor electrical devices (lights, radios) by 40 percent of households. The only significant difference in use of timers (other than homeowners) is associated with the elderly being most likely to employ this form of protection.

- Nearly 60 percent of all households ask neighbors to watch their home when it is unoccupied for a couple of days or more. Married couples are more likely than other types of households to access neighbors as a home precautionary strategy. This may reflect the greater extent to which marrieds are generally integrated into their neighborhood social environment.
- Closely paralleling population estimates from past surveys about one-third of households reportedly have engraved valuables to help in their recovery in case of burglary. Young adults and better educated citizens are most likely to engrave household property. This may reflect that these individuals are more aware of protective measures (e.g., engraving) that have been popularly advocated by law enforcement agencies and other organizations throughout the 1970s. These individuals may also be more open to trying new and innovative protective measures compared to older and less educated citizens.
- While three-quarters of all households have theft/vandalism insurance, almost all homeowners carry such policies. Among renters, Whites and those better educated are most likely to have the protection that insurance provides. It is possible that some socio-cultural differences exist between Whites vs. minorities that may account for this finding. On the other hand, minorities may well face insurance rates that they perceive as too high to justify the expense for an insurance policy.
- One-person adult households, whether male or female, are consistently less likely than other households to employ household-based protective measures. Single adult women are more likely than single males to protect their homes, with the exception of owning a hand gun.
- Direct and vicarious experience with burglary are related to use of home protection measures. Burglary victims are more likely than non-victims to install access control devices, purchase a hand gun, and engrave valuables. Knowing victims of burglary in the neighborhood (vicarious victimization) is also related to an increased usage of protective measures. Yet defining neighborhood burglary as a "big problem" is related only to increase use of alarms, window bars, and special locks.
- Neighborhood crime prevention meetings appear to play their intended function to encourage persons to increase protection of their home. Specifically, attendees of

such meetings are especially more likely to engrave valuables, install access control devices, and ask neighbors to help in watching their home than nonattendees. These findings closely parallel what would be expected given the nature of the recommendations law enforcement officers typically make at such meetings.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the primary incentives for employing household-based protective measures are individual/private-minded ones, i.e., to protect one's property from loss and to protect the sanctity of one's home. Complementing this is the facilitation provided by control over physical modifications of one's home, and the resources necessary to do so. It appears very likely that residents do not base their decisions to protect their home solely on some "rational" assessment of danger in the environment. As have been shown here, crime-related experiences and perceptions are somewhat related to have protective actions, but they should by no means be viewed as the only determinants of household-based protective measures. It seems more probable that through the acculturation process certain individuals learn "what you do for household safety purposes". As such, the "risk-avoidance" disposition (at least as we have conceptualized and measured it) does not account for a large amount of the variance in these behaviors.

In addition to the anti-crime measures that citizens employ for themselves, their families and households, we investigated several activities that involve *groups* of citizens working together to prevent neighborhood crime. We found that most adults have never participated in any form of group anti-crime effort; in fact, only about 10 percent claim to have done so. In the past it was often assumed that citizen involvement in these group anti-crime efforts grew directly and solely from their fear of crime and experiences as crime victims. But because of its ultimate debilitating effect (as shown by its manifestation as behavioral restrictions) fear of crime most likely does not serve as a motivating factor for involvement in group anti-crime efforts. In contrast, the findings of the Reactions to Crime project had indicated that participation in neighborhood-based group crime prevention efforts often follows directly from citizen participation (voluntary action) with community groups.

Our findings support those of the Reactions to Crime project. There is considerable evidence here that territorial measures which involve groups of neighbors in some organized anti-crime activity are generally not originating from spontaneous and/or informal voluntary action. Rather the preponderance stems from the workings of on-going community organizations, many of which have crime prevention as a major purpose. Yet, we can surmise that most of these organizations were not initially formed for crime prevention reasons. Our inperson interviews with organizational

leaders suggests that neighborhood/community revitalization, improvement, and/or stabilization are the general goals of these organizations. Anti-crime activities become part of an organizations' agenda, depending on the perception of neighborhood crime/delinquency as a problem. We found that most citizens who participate in these neighborhood-based anti-crime efforts do so as part of their participation with these community organizations and not due to fear of crime. In fact, the majority of individuals who attended neighborhood crime prevention meetings, and/or participated in informal surveillance (e.g., Blockwatch or Beat Rep), and/or more active group anti-crime efforts (e.g., patrolling or escorting) were found to be current members of a block club or neighborhood-based community group. In direct contrast the majority of nonparticipants in these anti-crime efforts were not members of a neighborhood group/organization.

In addition to these major conclusions we encountered a number of other *significant* findings of a more specific nature.

- group anti-crime efforts are more likely to occur in more densely populated, lower income areas, with a relatively greater proportion of nonwhite residents. This suggests that crime (victimization) provides the external (environmental) impetus for the development of community anti-crime efforts. Yet, it appears that crime is more a *necessary* rather than a sufficient condition for their origin.
- a differential pattern between city and suburban group anti-crime efforts was found. Residents of the city were more likely to report that local community crime prevention started because "crime had already become a problem" (i.e., reactive), while suburbanites were more likely to state that these efforts were "to keep crime from becoming a problem" (i.e., proactive).
- opportunity for participation seems to be highest with anti-crime efforts that require relatively low involvement levels from citizens. This pattern carries over to actual participation levels; the more that participation requires of the individual, the lower the participation rates.
- the majority of citizens who are aware of group anti-crime efforts in their neighborhood do *not* get involved. Two fifths of these citizens stated that "lack of time" precluded their involvement. About 20-25 percent of other potential participants reported they didn't get involved because of lack of interest. And a similar proportion indicated that they simply were not given an opportunity.

- Blacks were consistently over-represented as participants compared to their percentage of the total population. While community anti-crime efforts are more likely to occur in relatively lower income areas, it appears that it is individuals from relatively higher income households, within a community, who are more likely to get involved.

These then are the major findings of our research. In sum, we conclude that citizen involvement in crime prevention is best viewed as three *qualitatively different* types of responses. First, citizens *qua* individuals attempt to prevent their own victimization through various personal protective measures, but most typically by restricting their own behaviors. Risk-avoidance, specifically fear, appears to be the motivating factor here. Second, citizens *qua* individuals attempt to prevent property losses to burglary (and possibly personal confrontations with a home invader) through a variety of measures primarily those limiting unlawful access: these access control measures are meant to create both physical barriers (e.g., special locks) and psychological barriers (e.g., leaving indoor lights on when gone) to potential offenders. It appears that in many instances citizens employ these household-based measures due to their internalized norms about household safety, in other cases due to risk-avoidance, while in still other cases it seems that involvement in organized crime prevention meetings as part of their social participation led to increased levels of household anti-crime measures. *Third*, citizens *qua* community residents work together with neighbors to prevent crimes and incivilities in their community directly through patrolling, escorting, block-watching, etc., and indirectly through programs that address the presumed "root" causes of crime. These neighborhood-based group crime prevention measures take a decidedly "territorial" stance, i.e., it is groups of residents behaving with a semi-proprietary demeanor to ensure the safety and security of their "turf". Social participation, and not personal risk-avoidance, seems to be the primary motivational factor for these collective efforts. And since the focal point of these efforts is larger than the individual citizen or his/her household, it can be argued that there is some degree of "public-mindedness" to these motivations.

We have found that these three "generic" approaches (personal, household, neighborhood) are quite different, and mostly independent anti-crime responses. That is not to say that there is no overlap in the extent to which citizens engage in each type: Yet for the most part, there *more heterogeneity* among citizens in their crime prevention activities, than there is homogeneity. And as shown by our data these differences appear closely associated with a variety of resources available to the individual citizen. Where the approaches seem to link is the finding that involvement in group efforts is associated with

increased levels of household-based anti-crime measures.

B. Revised Conceptual Framework

In lieu of our findings a revised conceptual framework can be proposed. A model of this framework is shown in Figure 6.1. This revised framework is based on the findings of our research and associated inferences, i.e., it represents those parts of our preliminary framework that were investigated. Its purpose is to integrate our findings in a systematic, comprehensive manner.

Behavioral restrictions to protect individual citizens from personal victimization seem linked to risk-avoidance motives. These motives, especially perceptions of risk, seriousness, and fear of crime, are related to assessments of danger in the local neighborhood environment including both crime and incivility (e.g., vandalism). The risk-avoidance motives and the perceptions of local danger are also related to personal characteristics (primarily sex, age, race, and income) and to direct and vicarious exposure to victimization: Being female, young or old, black, poor, a past victim, and knowing other local victims are, for the most part, associated with greater fear of crime, increased perceptions of risk and seriousness, and greater concern for local crime and incivility. The local neighborhood provides the context for these problems to develop and also is the setting within which the individual encounters crime-related experiences and develops crime-related perceptions.

Household-based anti-crime measures seem linked to both risk-avoidance and social participation. While we have no compelling findings to suggest that fear of crime, perceptions of risk and seriousness are strong determinants of taking household prevention-oriented measures, past experience as a burglary victim, knowledge of local burglary victims, and concern for local crime do appear to lead some individual citizens to household crime prevention. In addition, individuals who appear to become involved in group anti-crime efforts following from social participation motives, show a greater tendency to employ certain of these household measures (special locks, etc.; engraving valuables; and asking neighbors to watch their home when unoccupied). This conclusion must be a qualified one though, because the actual chronological sequence of this process was not measured by our data.

Neighborhood/community-based group anti-crime efforts are linked primarily to social participation motives. Crime and incivility provide the contextual cues for the need of such measures, it appears that they have a direct impact on community organizations (and the police), who in turn provide the "opportunity" for citizens to become involved in this form of crime prevention. It is probable that in some instances individual risk-avoidance motives lead citizens to get involved in group




Figure 6.1. REVISED CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME PREVENTION

anti-crime efforts, but the overall pattern of results from the present research indicates that it is social participation motives that explain much more about what citizens do collectively to be safe from crime.

Finally, although we did not test the effects that these three forms of anti-crime measures have on the individual and the local environment (neighborhood) we can infer that there is some impact. This is shown by the feedback loops in Figure 6.1. Neighborhoods may become more cohesive, safer, and have less crime. Individuals may experience similar positive effects. But then again, none of this may happen: This is an issue that other current/future research must answer (e.g., Taub, et al, 1979; and Taylor & Gottfriedson, 1979).

C. Unanswered Issues for Future Research

Because our methodologies technically have not produced results with high degrees of *internal validity*, we can not draw firm conclusions about the causal structure underlying the question, "why citizens do/do not engage in crime prevention." We have used our data to form logical (nonexperimental) inferences about the motivational dynamics associated with citizen participation in crime prevention. This is why we explicitly acknowledge that our research program does not constitute the definitive or final work on this topic.

The model laid out in our conceptual framework needs more comprehensive and intensive testing. We were not able to operationalize all of the constructs, nor were all the constructs we did operationalize done so in a robust manner. Most notably, more thorough investigation is needed on the relationships (direct and indirect) between beliefs in personal control, territorial attitudes, and anti-crime measures across the lifecycle. Not enough is known about the "origins" of these personality traits and thus we do not understand their role in the development of a "preventive demeanor."* Furthermore, additional information is needed linking introversion/extraversion with participation in FVOs, specifically ones with anti-crime efforts. Here again we need an understanding of the development in the early stages of the life-cycle of a "participatory demeanor" and its relationship to extraversion, and personal control beliefs.

Our research has provided some very preliminary evidence of generalized dispositions:

*A better understanding of these relationships would also complement the findings of other research NIJ is currently funding regarding territoriality and informal social control.

- to feel at risk,
- to view oneself as vulnerable to the consequences of victimization,
- to endorse the efficacy of various prevention measures, and
- to engage in various preventive behaviors.

That is, there appears to be some regularity in the way individuals adopt these attitudes and behaviors. However, given our lack of "multiple methods" of construct operationalization (cf. Campbell & Fiske, 1959), we cannot be certain that methodological artifacts do not exist in our data. Therefore before these generalized constructs can be considered viable (valid) and meaningful, most robust methodological approaches are called for. For example, combining observational methods and archival data retrieval with data from survey methods would yield the more definitive knowledge necessary. Additional research is also needed to explore feedback systems whereby modifications in one's behavior are undertaken to meet changing contingencies.

Although our research has examined many of the issues concerning: the "who, what, how much, and why not" of citizen participation in various types of formal voluntary organizations, the role of such organizations as vehicles for promoting citizen involvement in community issues (specifically crime prevention), and organizational maintenance issues, a variety of knowledge gaps still exist. In terms of general social participation, research questions which need more attention include:

- What are the specific incentives/benefits and disincentives/costs that influence membership initiation, activity level among members and long-term commitment to community organizations?
- Do such factors account for more of the variance in participation patterns than, for example, socio-demographic or personality characteristics; or general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes (cf. Mulford & Klomlan, 1972)?
- How cognizant are organizations of the actual factors that effect citizen initiation and maintaining of involvement in such groups?
- What organizational maintenance strategies can be developed on the basis of such findings?

Several other knowledge gaps regarding *organizational* maintenance (vs. specific membership maintenance) need to be systematically investigated. Our findings suggest that organizations may serve a political linkage function between their members, the communities they represent, and city service agencies or local government. The role organizations play in this respect has received little systematic documentation.

In a different vein, little systematic research has been conducted to address the question: are neighborhoods served by community organizations "better off" (e.g., have lower crime rates) than comparable neighborhoods without such organized efforts to deal with local problems? Research that is currently being funded by NIJ should begin to address these questions.

Finally, our research has explored the flow from awareness to opportunity to involvement as it relates to citizen participation and nonparticipation in local crime prevention programs/efforts. Before we can systematically determine how much of the variance in participation patterns is accounted for by the simple awareness that certain programs exist, and by perceived opportunities to become involved, a fuller exploration of the parameters of "opportunity" and the means by which people become aware of such anti-crime efforts is necessary.

The past decade has seen a significant advancement in knowledge about the role of the citizenry in crime prevention. In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a naive expectancy of community crime prevention. As most of the NEPs documented, early efforts to engage the citizenry in anti-crime activities lacked adequate conceptualizations. This naive expectancy was also an unfair (unrealistic) one, as we subsequently have learned how difficult it is to successfully implement citizen anti-crime programs, and then to document what successes, if any, can be attributed to them.

We feel it is significant that the National Institute of Justice has realized the need for carefully planned and well conceptualized investigations in the area of citizen crime prevention of which the present research is hopefully a part. Based on our findings, and those of other researchers, the state of knowledge in Community Crime Prevention is moving toward that time when "realistic" field experimentation can and must begin. A decade is not a long time to reach this stage. Hopefully the 1980s will see a logical progress of citizen anti-crime research and program development, one that has a firm continuity with what has been learned in the 1970s.

In the future three broad issues form the basis around which applied research in this topic area ultimately needs to be organized, for the formulation of sound crime prevention policy:

- what is reasonable and desirable to expect from the citizenry, especially community residents?
- what is reasonable and desirable to expect from the criminal justice system, especially the police?
- how can the interface between the citizenry and the police best be facilitated, especially by the government?

In sum, we need more empirical knowledge on *the roles* of citizens, police, and government in preventing crime!

Findings from our research program and the Reactions to Crime Project provide a good start at understanding what the citizenry is already trying to do. Results from other LEAA projects (e.g., NEPs, CPTED) provide additional information on citizen participation in crime prevention. What now is needed is a brief and concise synthesis of evaluation and research findings on the efficacy of citizen anti-crime measures, so that some reasoned judgement can be formed about which of these measures appear to work, and thus which should be encouraged.

It is the "encouragement," or promotion of citizen involvement in crime prevention that the results of our present research addresses. We have not collected data to evaluate the success (efficacy) of citizen anti-crime measures in actually preventing crime. Yet, that kind of information is critical to formulating public policy about the role of citizens in crime prevention *that merits endorsement*. Such evaluation research on the efficacy of citizen anti-crime measures, and the research we have begun, are inextricably linked from the perspective of policy formulation.

D. Issues for Policy-makers

What all of the citizenry's anti-crime activities share is an apparent common goal i.e., the prevention of criminal victimizations and associated losses. To the extent that any and all of these anti-crime activities actually reduce the absolute number of criminal victimizations, then citizens are playing a critical role in our society as "co-producers" of safety and security (cf. Rosentraub & Harlow, 1980; Percy, 1979; Bish & Neubert, 1977).

Yet some have argued that only efforts aimed at the root causes of crime constitute true "crime prevention." For example, Cohn, Kidder & Harvey, (1978) state that "[only] actions which try to eliminate the breeding grounds and presumed root causes of crime are 'crime prevention'" (p. 287). In contrast, these authors regard efforts meant to protect one's self or property as merely "victimization prevention" and not truly *crime prevention*; presumably because their effectiveness is thought to

displace crime, thus not actually reducing its absolute magnitude. Implicit in this argument is the notion that only by *reducing* the actual number of criminal incidents is crime being prevented: that is, crime prevention *is* crime reduction.

If this line of reasoning is accepted, it could be concluded that any and all anti-crime measures not directed at the root causes of crime, benefit only the citizen who employs them; promoting only his/her *private* security, with no gain for society as a whole. If this were the case, then much of what Federal, state, and local governments and law enforcement agencies endorse under the rubric of Community Crime Prevention could be regarded as the promotion of *private* security by *public* agencies.

Yet such a view would miss the importance that "opportunity" may play in the commission of crimes. If reducing opportunities for crime does not merely displace crime, then much of what the citizenry does for their own safety and security will in fact reduce crime. This is not to say that displacement never occurs. It is simply a recognition that whenever crime is not merely displaced by the actions of a vigilant citizenry, then crime prevention *is* occurring. In that light, public policy that encourages the citizenry to engage in a host of personal, household, and neighborhood-based anti-crime measures is fulfilling the legislative mandate that crime be reduced.

Much of the current public policy regarding the proper role of the citizenry in crime prevention seems premised on the distinctions between *individual* and *collective* responses to crime. These categories have been used to refer to ways citizens are assumed to respond to the threat of crime: As crime becomes a problem for a citizen he or she can either take a series of actions to protect one's person (or family) and one's property (e.g., going out less, avoiding certain parts of town, installing target hardening devices, buying a gun, etc.), or the citizen can join some joint (collective) action with others to combat crime. It has been argued that individual preventive responses increase the citizens' fear and isolation by eroding social cohesion and interaction.

Predatory crime does not merely victimize individuals, it impedes and, in the extreme case, even prevents the formation and maintenance of community. By disrupting the delicate nexus of ties, formal and informal, by which we are linked with our neighbors, crime atomizes society and makes of its members mere individual calculators estimating their own advantage, especially their own chances for survival amidst their fellows (Wilson, 1975, p. 21).

Crime weakens the fabric of social life by increasing fear, suspicion, and distrust. It also reduces public support for the law, in terms of unwillingness to report crime and criticism of the police. However, under certain conditions people will engage in collective action to fight crime. They may work for a political candidate who promises to restore law and order. They may call meetings of the community residents to plan an attack on crime. Sometimes they may even band together in a civilian police patrol to carry out the functions that the police are not effectively performing for them (Conklin, 1975, p. 185).

Little of the material we have examined... suggests that Durkheim was correct in arguing that crime brings people together and strengthens social bonds. Instead, crime produces insecurity, distrust, and a negative view of the community. Although we lack conclusive evidence, crime also seems to reduce social interaction as fear and suspicion drive people apart. This produces a disorganized community that is unable to exercise informal social control over deviant behavior (Conklin, 1975, p. 99).

The above works have suggested to many that all "individual" responses to crime are ultimately self defeating, because they perpetuate and even exacerbate a climate within which crime could run rampant and unchecked. In contrast, collective action are viewed as the only means that will ultimately mitigate the impact of crime. Following from this view it could be reasoned that Community Crime Prevention strategies should attempt to limit crime's debilitating effect on community by building up the community's capacity to prevent victimizations. This "theoretical" assumption appears to be built into the Office of Community Anti-Crime's statement of funding priorities: Individual responses are viewed as "private-minded" because they are presumed to protect only the citizens who engage in them. And following Conklin's position, such individual preventive action is seen as running counter to the needs and welfare of the public as a whole. Therefore, CAC funding priority is given to "collective" efforts.

To us it appears that the individual/collective and public/private distinctions have been used carelessly to refer to anti-crime measures, motives, and outcomes. Here, we have argued that those distinctions are murky when it comes to thinking about citizen anti-crime measures *qua* measures. These distinctions as they have been used in the past rest less on the nature of the measures undertaken, and more upon the presumed motives for initiating the measures. All measures are individual in the sense that an individual does the activity: Individuals go to meetings, patrol neighborhoods, mark their

property. Individuals buy locks and guns, stay home at night, and avoid dangerous areas. "Collective" activities which are sponsored by community organizations are implemented by individuals: watching blocks, escorting children, observing court rooms, etc. While occasionally done in concert, all involve individual citizens. Furthermore, one can question the validity of the individual/collective distinction as a way of categorizing anti-crime measures on logical grounds. Are collective responses those which can only be performed by groups of citizens (e.g., an organized neighborhood patrol)? Or are they individual behaviors (e.g., property marking) that a group of neighbors agree to engage in? If an anti-crime measure can be both an "individual" and a "collective" response, then the individual/collective distinction is ambiguous when it comes to categorizing the measure itself.

This same concern applies to the private-minded vs. public-minded distinction. When citizens engage in anti-crime measures for their own protection, can it be certain that the cumulative effect does not extend beyond the individuals involved? Is this then a private-minded or public-minded measure? When neighbors organize a blockwatch program that successfully reduces crime in their own neighborhood, but in turn displaces it to an adjacent neighborhood, is this public-minded or private-minded? Furthermore, given the limited state of knowledge on the total impact of crime prevention, we are far from the time when it can reliably be concluded that some anti-crime measure benefited only that citizen or those citizens who was (were) involved, while some other measure benefited the public at large.

Here we have tried to use the individual/collective and private-minded/public-minded distinctions as ways of conceptualizing *motives* that lead citizens to engage in crime prevention. Our research supports the notion that there are individual/private-minded *motives* that lead some citizens to become involved in some anti-crime measures: we have identified these motives as risk-avoidance. And as shown by our results, risk-avoidance seems most strongly linked to behavioral restrictions, and in a weaker manner to some household preventive measures.

Our research also supports the notion that there are collective/public-minded *motives* that lead some citizens to become involved in some crime prevention measures: we have identified these motives as social participation. And as shown by our results, social participation seems most strongly linked to group (territorial) anti-crime measures, and in some instances to household preventive measures.

It can be surmised that if one wanted to increase the extent to which citizens engage in behavioral restrictions, increasing their fear of crime would be most effective, especially with women and the elderly. In turn, if fear and concern for crime were increased one would expect an increase not only in behavioral restrictions, but also in some household anti-crime measures.

Furthermore, if one wanted to increase the extent to which citizens engaged in household anti-crime measures it appears that this could result not only from increasing fear and concern for crime, but rather by increasing incentives and opportunities for social participation in neighborhood/community groups which see crime as a local problem to address. In turn, if incentives and opportunities for social participation in local groups were increased, one would expect increased citizen involvement in neighborhood/community based anti-crime measures, providing crime is perceived as a large enough local problem to address. This itself would typically lead to increases in the extent to which citizens employed certain household anti-crime measures.

While the above reasoning is acknowledged to be speculative, it captures the jist of our findings. Yet until more definitive information is available, public policy on the citizenry's proper role in crime prevention must be very carefully formulated. We are not at the point where we can confidently state that *this* is what should be encouraged, while *that* should be discouraged. This lack of knowledge must be acknowledged, for only by being aware of the uncertain state of knowledge can policy makers formulate careful judgements on crime prevention priorities.

It is in this light that the findings of our research can be discussed as they apply to the needs of crime prevention practitioners. Here, we assume that the wide range of citizen anti-crime measures are important in the control and prevention of our nation's crime problems. The discussion that follows should be read with this in mind.

E. Implications for Crime Prevention Practitioners

What is apparent in viewing our detailed pattern of research findings is that individuals who are "resource-poor" seem to face a life that is relatively insecure compared to those who are "resource-rich." Their apparent lack of a positive "preventive" demeanor toward crime and other hazards is merely one more thing missing in their lives. Unfortunately it is many of these same individuals who are most likely to become victims, possibly because they do the least to guard against it.

We have found that the sum total of "resources" available to an individual related to his/her involvement in crime prevention includes material and nonmaterial personal resources, and a variety of social network and public service resources external to the individual citizen. A person's sex, age, race, marital status, education, income, type and place of residence all constitute personal attributes that relate to the type and extent of involvement in crime prevention. Furthermore, the quality of resources in a neighborhood, such as the police, community organizations, the schools, and social service agencies

seem clearly related to participation in crime prevention. Broadly stated the resource-rich do more for the safety of themselves, their household, and their communities, than do the resource-poor: For the most part, the resource-rich are already co-producing their own safety and security in a *proactive* manner, while the resource-poor are more likely to be merely *reactive* to life's hazards, if they do anything at all. And what the resource-poor are most likely to do is simply restrict their own behavior.

The special challenge to crime prevention practitioners then is how to increase the safety and security of the resource-poor above some minimum level where their fear of crime will no longer "interfere" with involvement in other anti-crime measures, especially those of a group nature. It must be recognized that this calls for long run solutions that will improve the quality of life of the resource-poor. It is in such neighborhoods where behavioral restrictions are deemed most prudent that traditional Community Crime Prevention solutions may be likened to treating cancer with a band-aid (and one that doesn't stick, for that matter). These are the extreme instances where Wilson (1975) and Conklin (1975) see crime and its attendant fear as totally undermining a community and its ability through informal social control to deal with its own crime problems. In these cases the government must acknowledge the need for major allocations of resources (e.g., police, employment programs, improved schools, rehabilitated housing, etc.) to compensate for the citizenry's apparent inability to co-produce their own safety and security.

In areas where crime and fear are not of such magnitude that cooperative initiatives among residents are already undermined, then it seems that the police and local voluntary groups (e.g. block clubs and community organizations) can play an important role in improving the quantity and quality of citizen crime prevention. In the role of "expert authority figures" the police help define for many citizens what can be done to prevent crime. Their impact on citizens seems a large part a function of their contact. Where citizens are found to be exposed to the police, higher rates of household anti-crime measures are found. This contact seems to occur both when the police investigate a burglary, and when police attend community organization meetings.

While not conclusive, our results suggest that the police could increase the extent to which citizens engage in crime prevention measures/efforts if good use is made of these contact points for disseminating anti-crime information. When a burglary had been attempted or has occurred a citizen (for risk-avoidance motives) seems most readily disposed toward increasing household security. It is at that time that a security survey of the home by a police officer would probably have its greatest

impact on the resident. This suggests that law enforcement agencies should consider instituting an immediate "follow-up" contact for the purposes of offering a security survey after a breakin (or attempt). Furthermore, making presentations to groups of citizens, especially those connected with some formal voluntary organization, seems to be an excellent way the police can influence citizen crime prevention. The police, in the role of "security advisors" to the community, could contact church, school, and community organizations to arrange a presentation to the membership. In doing so it is important that they be cognizant of the full range of citizen crime prevention measures, and be ready to make some reasoned statement on what they feel should/shouldn't be done *and why*.

Community organizations and other local voluntary groups in which residents can participate appear to have a great potential for involving citizens in crime prevention. Our findings suggest a number of recommendations of how to increase the positive role such groups can play:

- the organizations themselves, can request regular attendance of a local law enforcement officer to serve as a security advisor.
- organizations in "high" crime areas will be faced with different problems than those in "lower" crime areas. In high crime areas, organizations will not only have more serious problems to deal with but are likely to have greater difficulties in getting citizens involved. This suggests that a great deal of person-time will have to be devoted to organization maintenance and membership recruitment for FVOs in high crime areas. It is possible that the person-time required cannot be met voluntarily, and only by a paid staff with the support of outside funding.
- as there is more movement of people to suburbs, and as the suburbs themselves age, crime and incivility problems would be expected to become more prevalent. The suburban populace seems more ready to take a proactive stance toward crime prevention, and community organizations should capitalize on this by addressing crime issues and mobilizing citizens before problems become serious.
- organizations must recognize life-cycle demands placed on their members and varying levels of attachment to the community among local residents and members. This would help to develop realistic expectations. Recruitment and involvement strategies should also recognize that homeowners have property interests,

parents have child-related interests, young adults have recreation interests, etc., and it is these vested interests that should be built upon.

- organizational resources may better be invested in maintaining the involvement of the "active core" of members, rather than focusing disproportionately on recruitment of new members. Here it seems that providing social affiliation benefits and other expressive incentives may be especially important to keeping members active.
- from the standpoint of recruitment, it seems especially important that potential members perceive an opportunity to become involved in helping solve local problems; that is, initial involvement in community organizations seems predominantly related to instrumental motives. But regardless of what issues are used in recruitment, personal contact of potential members is felt to be most effective by organization leaders. Leaders, though, seem not to recognize the importance of providing specific opportunities for involvement to potential members.
- the personal saliency of crime to citizens seems not to be a factor that community organizations should play upon. Instead approaching residents as members of the community recommends itself as the way that social participation motives can be invoked and manifested in group action.
- social service programs are needed that are targeted to the elderly to help improve their security. For example, the elderly may be willing to spend the funds necessary to purchase better locks, but can't install them. They may have heard of engraving their valuables, but can't get an engraving tool, or may not be physically able to use one. Certainly, community organizations and local services agencies could be encouraged to place the elderly's security needs on their agenda.

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APPENDIX A

LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARIES

1. Social Participation in the Neighborhood and Community

Neighborhood "rootedness," in terms of home ownership and length of residence has often been assumed to play a role in social participation. For example, home ownership has consistently been found to be related to membership in formal voluntary organizations (cf. Reddy, 1974). It is reasoned that owning a home creates a sense of economic investment in the neighborhood and thus may promote local community organization involvement, to the extent that such groups focus on neighborhood-relevant issues.

Length of residence, as a reflection of lifecycle stage, may also facilitate a feeling of "rootedness" or sense of community. Young adults tend to be unmarried, childless and transient, and therefore may not feel a strong attachment to their neighborhoods. In contrast, persons in the mid-life stage tend to be married couples with children and are likely to have lived in one neighborhood for a moderate length of time; as a consequence, such individuals are likely to feel attached to their neighborhoods and thus may take an interest in organized community group activities (Riger & Lavrakas, 1980). In the elderly years, the relationship between length of residence and social participation is expected to "drop off." Even though older people tend to reside in an area for a long time, they are not "tied" or attached to a neighborhood in the same sense as couples with children at home who have lived in one area for a moderate length of time. In sum, a curvilinear association between length of residence and social participation is hypothesized.

Age is the key aspect of the lifecycle stage concept. Like length of residence, age was hypothesized to have a curvilinear relationship with participation in formal voluntary organizations (FVOs). Again, however, past research has produced inconsistent findings in this regard (Tomeh, 1974). For the present purposes, participation is expected to be low in the early adult years, rising to a peak in the forties and fifties, and declining thereafter.

Two additional aspects of lifecycle stage affecting household composition are marital status and presence of children. Previous research (e.g., Fischer, 1977; Tomeh, 1974; Reddy, 1974) indicated that people who are married and those with children are more likely to join formal voluntary organizations than nonmarried or childless persons.

Other socio-demographic characteristics were also thought to be related to participation in formal voluntary organizations, including race, sex, and economic-related factors (education, income, employment status). Reddy (1974) provides an extensive review of the literature concerning the influence of socio-demographic characteristics on social participation (also Smith, Reddy and Baldwin, 1972). Studies prior to the 1970s consistently

found that men were more likely to participate in FVOs than women. With the advent of the Women's Movement this pattern may have changed.

Studies prior to the 1960s consistently found that Whites were more likely to participate than Blacks. Coinciding with civil rights action of the 1960s Blacks apparently increased their level of participation. A 1974 national census of volunteerism found that Blacks reported more social participation than Whites (ACTION, 1974). This is supported by Antunes and Gaitz (1975) which also found that Latinos are less likely to participate in FVOs than Blacks or Whites.

The relationship between socio-economic status and group involvement has often been examined in past research (cf. Reddy, 1974; Tomeh, 1974). Higher income has traditionally been found to be associated with greater social participation. But with the activism of the 1960s more lower-income persons have been spurred to social action. Thus while income still is assumed to be positively correlated with participation, the strength of this relationship may have diminished over the past two decades. Education, also has consistently been found to be positively correlated with participation in FVOs. Here again, the recent social changes in the U.S. may have attenuated the strength of this relationship.

Consistent with the positive associations between income, education and social participation, it would be expected that people with full-time jobs are more likely to become members of formal voluntary organizations. However, *active* participation requires a time commitment that individuals who work forty hours a week may be reluctant or unable to make. Individuals working part-time or who are unemployed do not have such constraints. Therefore, employment status may differentially be related to patterns of social participation.

Apart from socio-demographic characteristics, past research has found that social attachments in the community and attitudinal factors relate to membership in local groups. Citizens are members of a variety of social networks. Individuals who are totally unattached to their neighborhood social environment are unlikely to become involved in formal voluntary organizations. Riger and Lavrakas (1980) found support for this hypothesis in terms of neighborhood/community group membership. Similarly, Smith (1972) found that knowing a large number of neighbors was related to participation in voluntary groups. Perceiving neighbors as being generally helpful, as opposed to "going their own way" or being isolated, might also be expected to relate to social participation. It may be that social cohesion and group involvement are related; however, the causal link between these factors remains unclear.

The relationship between social participation and territorial attitudes, representing a proprietary demeanor in one's home and neighborhood, is virtually an unexplored area. It can be inferred from psychological studies that strong feelings of personal responsibility for what happens in the home and concern for neighborhood affairs (e.g., feeling that what happens in the neighborhood *is* one's business) are associated with group membership.

Past research (Reddy, 1974; Smith, Reddy and Baldwin, 1972) indicates that a number of personality traits are also related to general social participation. One personality dimension of importance to the present research is that of internal-external locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Locus of control refers to an individual frame of reference in perceiving one's ability to affect what happens in one's life. An individual who perceives it within his/her power to play a determining part in solving life's problems is described as having an internal locus of control. On the other hand, a person with an external locus of control perceives himself/herself as being less able to influence fate and thus less capable of solving life's problems.

Previous research (Phares, Ritchee, & Davis, 1968; Butterfield, 1964) has demonstrated that perceived internal locus of control leads to instrumental and effective behavior. Logically, persons with a high degree of perceived personal control are likely to view their actions as being efficacious; therefore it may be that such persons will be more likely to join formal voluntary organizations in an effort to meet their goals than persons with low perceived personal control (e.g., those with an external locus of control). Likewise, persons who feel that chance or luck does *not* play an important role in life's events (internal locus of control) are also likely to believe their actions are effective, and for similar reasons, may be more likely to participate in groups than people who believe more in the influence of fate (external locus of control).

Distinctions between mere membership and active participation, and levels in between, are generally not made. Personal resources, specifically time and energy, undoubtedly distinguish active from passive group members, and are likely to play a role in long-term participation. Such factors may even change the previously hypothesized relationships between simply joining groups and demographic characteristics. For example, although individuals with familial ties are likely to join groups, they may be less likely to be active members due to conflicting obligations, than nonmarried people. Personality and attitudinal characteristics which are expected to determine who will join formal voluntary organizations may be more strongly pronounced among active and/or long-term members vs. members "in name only."

The distinction between active and passive membership and the issue of continued or long-term participation has been conceptualized in terms of incentives/benefits and disincentives/costs by a number of researchers (e.g., Wilson, 1973; Sharp, 1978; Flynn and Webb, 1972; Giamartino, Ferrell, and Wandersman, 1979; Smith and Reddy, 1972). Personal tendencies or internal motivations and various organizational features can be characterized as providing incentives and disincentives toward social participation.

Wilson (1973) provided a useful typology for investigating incentives related to citizen activity. He distinguished among material incentives, solidary (expressive) incentives, and purposive (instrumental) incentives. *Material* incentives are tangible rewards such as money or goods received for participatory services. *Expressive* incentives are intangibles such as prestige and sociability. Finally, *instrumental* incentives deal with gaining a sense of fulfillment commitment, typically by attaining some goal or by benefiting some larger public.

For the most part, material incentives are not assumed to play a significant role in motivating citizens to participate in formal voluntary organizations. Furthermore, people who do join organizations to receive goods and services, especially when such material incentives meet temporary needs, appear to have a limited commitment (Sharp, 1978). On the other hand, expressive or social-oriented incentives are assumed to be important to the initiation and maintenance of group involvement. Several studies have found that extroverted people (those with well-developed social skills and a strong desire for social inter-action) are more likely to participate in formal voluntary organizations than introverts (Bronfenbrenner, 1960; Smith, 1966; Smith, 1972).

Instrumental incentives or problem-solving motivations are also thought to be important dispositional mediators. Flynn and Webb (1972) in a study of women policy campaign volunteers, found that self-maintenance needs (e.g., a need to keep busy, to satisfy psychological deficits or escape unpleasant circumstances, etc.) and self-actualizing expressions (e.g., opportunities for personal growth, self-education, desire for productive activity in the community, etc.) were related to the initiation of group involvement. Similarly, Giamartino *et al.* (1979) found that neighborhood environmental conditions, general concern for the neighborhood, a desire to get to know neighbors and other factors were related to participation in local block organizations. Clearly, the results from these two studies provide evidence for the utility of Wilson's conceptualization concerning expressive and instrumental incentives.

Mulford and Klonglan (1972) provided an extensive review of the literature concerning attitudinal determinants (motivations) of individual participation in organized voluntary action which led them to distinguish between general and organization-specific attitudes toward group affiliation. They concluded that several

general FVO-relevant attitudes were significantly related to affiliation with organized groups, including: general obligation to participate; general perception of instrumental value of FVOs; formal group preference, low degrees of need inviolateness; nonalienation; service orientation toward leisure time; and friendly relations with people in specific groups. *Specific* FVO-relevant attitudes related to participation included: commitment to a specific organization; efficacy of a specific organization; attractiveness of a specific organization; outside significant-other support for specific organization; personal fit with specific organization; friendly relations in specific organization; and influence by others to join the specific organization. Mulford and Klonglan also provided an almost identical list of general and specific FVO-relevant attitudes found to relate to active and continued participation (i.e., maintenance).

Disincentives are the opposite of incentives, and serve as inhibitors rather than motivators. It can be reasoned that material, expressive, and instrumental disincentives may exist as *barriers* to the initiation and maintenance of participation in formal voluntary organizations. For example, results from the Flynn and Webb study (1972) indicated that unclear or non-salient goals, leadership problems, and interpersonal conflicts among members acted as inhibitors to joining groups. Discontinued participation was attributed to personal frustrations over individual needs not being met, feelings of inadequacy, personal overextension resulting from involvement in many groups ("burn-out"), and other factors. Similarly, lack of time, conflicting obligations due to employment, dislike of members, and no desire to join groups were some of the reasons given for nonparticipation among respondents in the Giamartino *et al.* study (1979). In general, the nonfulfillment of various expressive or social-oriented and instrumental or problem-solving motivations for involvement led to nonparticipation in both studies. In addition, some of these disincentives were general FVO-relevant attitudes (e.g., dislike of members).

2. Public Participation in the Environmental Movement

As many as 10 million Americans belong to one or more of some 50,000 local, regional and national environmental organizations. The major national environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the National Wildlife Federation, have been primarily responsible for the passage and enforcement of strong environmental laws.

The percentage of the general public who are actually enrolled as members of environmental organizations is small, mostly from the educated middle class. But the movement's support is quite broadly based. Sympathy for the environmental movement and its goals cuts across racial, sex, education, and income groups.

The three largest national membership groups are the National Wildlife Federation, the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club. Each of these has regional, state or local affiliates -- the Sierra Club has 250 local chapters and the Audubon Society has 385. The environmental movement also consists of over 20,000 regional and local organizations.

The environmental movement's major political tactic involving its membership is "grass roots lobbying" wherein members are encouraged to communicate with their state legislators and representatives in Congress on particular issues of environmental concern. They are also typically urged to monitor the implementation of environmental laws and regulations by attending public hearings and deliberations.

The national environmental organizations are highly effective in influencing environmental public policy because full-time professional staffs supplement the voluntary efforts of their members. At the national level, for example, the Sierra Club has 85 full-time staff, and Friends of the Earth has 47 (1977 figures).

Membership participation in national organizations consists mainly of payment of dues -- which range from \$7.50 to \$25.00 annually, and are usually tax deductible. Members also constitute a body of informed citizens which the group can claim to represent in its lobbying. An impressive percentage of the members can be mobilized periodically to communicate its support of key bills to legislators.

Members are far more active at the local level, where success is almost entirely a function of the level and intensity of members' voluntary action.

Most of the national membership group recruit members through sophisticated use of direct mail appeals. Foundation grants have underwritten membership recruitment campaigns for several of the groups.

a. Public participation and the environmental protection agency. The Environmental Protection Agency's general regulations on public participation set a high formal standard for its regional offices and for state and local government. It mandates that public participation "be provided for, encouraged assisted to the fullest extent practical..." The regulations call, *inter alia*, for mechanisms or activities to assist the public on technical matters; to consult with the public on major agency programs; and to assure prompt consideration of citizen complaints or information on violations of the law.

These requirements are apparently observed more in form than in fact. The implementation of the public participation requirements of the various laws administered by EPA is left largely to the discretion of EPA national and regional officials, who are

often burdened by seemingly more pressing concerns.

Regulations governing most programs under EPS control rarely mention public participation activities at all. The fault for this may not entirely rest with EPA. Congress has consistently and drastically cut EPA's requests for public participation program funding. In the wake of these cutbacks, EPA has largely confined its public participation activities to producing a great quantity of public information material.

Public involvement at the state level (under EPA direction) consists almost exclusively of offering testimony at public hearings. Public hearings are often weak instruments for changing programs. They generally attract state and government representatives and professional consultants -- *viz.* those with a finger in the federal pie -- and virtually no one else.

Effective public participation programs take considerable time, can delay programs, and produce aroused public debate and resistance rather than consensus upon program goals and means. To "encourage" (i.e. to create) public participation, EPA administrators would need to seek out broad segments of the public, spend time and resources to explain what programs mean, and help the public to understand those program consequences which may some day be important to them. This is a very labor-intensive, high-cost endeavor for which EPA is currently not being funded.

b. The national environmental groups. *The Sierra Club* is the most activist and the most "grass roots" of all the environmental groups. The majority of Club members write letters (to decision makers) and take positions on environmental issues. Members testify before local planning bodies. There is a lot of activism at the local level. Many members participate in club hikes and outings. They are committed to minimizing man's impact on the wilderness. They avoid littering the outdoors and often pick up what litter they find. Insiders say the Club undoubtedly has fewer smokers and more carpoolers than the general population. Members are constantly looking over EPA's shoulder and monitoring the activities of other public bodies.

In the *National Wildlife Federation*, social and recreational activities seem to dominate. Many NWF members are affiliated through sports groups and their participation is focused on their sport, such as canoeing and hunting. On especially important issues, the national staff sends out an "action alert." This is a mailing to all members explaining an issue and urging all members to write to their representatives in Congress.

More than 10 million students, teachers, and members of conservation groups take part in the observance of National Wildlife Week each year. In 1977, actor Robert Redford served as honorary chairman and carried the observance's theme of clean water to millions of Americans over television.

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3 OF 4

NWF recently polled its members and found that energy conservation was the membership's second highest priority. One of NWF's national programs is to develop a national policy aimed at reducing energy growth to the lowest practicable level. The members involved in fashioning these principles are presumably committed to conserving energy in their own everyday lives.

About a third of all members of the *Audobon Society* are recruited through individual chapters. Another third join by sending in the cards attached to *Audobon* magazine. The last third comes from direct mail membership solicitation letters each year.

Most participation occurs at the local chapter level and about 10% of all Audobon members can be classified as "active." One-third of all membership dues return to the local chapters. Members are active in attending meetings of public bodies, after which they report back to their local chapters and write up observations for local newsletters.

A major form of membership participation is sending letters to public officials. Chapters mounted a massive campaign to influence members of Congress on the Alaska Conservation Act. The campaign consisted of letters to newspaper editors, and letters, phone calls, and mailgrams to individual members of Congress. Since virtually every member of Congress has an Audobon chapter in his/her district, this pressure came from constituents, rather than simple conservationists.

Each Audobon chapter reflects the environmental concerns of its own local community. A coastal chapter, for example, may be active in resisting oil tankers in coastal waters, or protecting coastal wetlands. A chapter located near the California desert has been active in providing public planners with data on desert flora and birds, with a view to preserving the natural habitat.

Besides contributing time and money, members of the *Isaak Walton League* are often engaged in community education projects -- such as meeting at a stream to demonstrate against its pollution. The League's "Save our Streams" program involves citizens at the local level in cleaning up the nation's waters.

The League's special concern for the use of the outdoors is expressed in organized anti-litter activities and in education programs for children in the use of the outdoors. League philosophy stresses *ethical* hunting and fishing. League members believe they are much less abusive of the outdoors than non-members. In Minnesota, for example, League members overwhelmingly supported restricting the Boundary Waters Area to canoeing, whereas the majority of the electorate apparently favored snow-mobiling and motor-boating.

c. Local environmental groups. There are myriad environmental groups at the local level. The majority of these groups were organized to promote a special purpose or cause. For example, *Friends of the River* is probably the most active single-purpose environmental organization in California today. Most of its members are young and enthusiastic river rafters and canoeists. When first organized in the early 1970s FOR's purpose was to resist the proposed New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River. The California electorate turned down FOR's 1974 ballot initiative calling for preservation of the Stanislaus River in its wild state. The dam was subsequently constructed, and FOR's current objective is to save about 10 miles of the Stanislaus from further damming.

Since losing their ballot initiative, FOR has become increasingly sophisticated. It uses novel administrative strategies to gain its objectives: For example, it has argued with some success that Miwok Indian caves adjacent to a river justified treatment of that river as a historic preservation site.

Although FOR has nominal dues (\$10 regular, \$5 for low-income members) most of its budget comes from river outfitters--who charge every rafter \$1 per trip and transfer these payments to FOR.

A spokesperson for FOR summarized membership participation activities as follows: "We get our membership to write constituents letters to members of Congress. We have campaigned for candidates who support our views. Members have also participated in such publicity-attracting activities as a well-attended "river-walk", at the end of which we planted trees in front of the governor's office. We also have observed Stanislaus River Day at the State Capitol. We have recruited the handicapped and the blind to help us in our campaign: The Stanislaus River is uniquely accessible to people in wheel-chairs and the blind. We have also been successful in getting our members and supporters to pack hearing rooms when we offer testimony dealing with rivers."

3. Citizen Involvement in Health Maintenance, Traffic Safety and Fire Prevention

The recognition of the important role of the individual citizen in risk management has been accompanied by increasing governmental commitments to encourage citizen prevention activities. Prevention has also been a long-time research interest. However, the literature tends to be fragmented and inconsistently developed, reflecting the issue-by-issue or single behavior approach adopted by social scientists. This summary reviews what is presently known about people's reactions to three common stressors--health concerns, traffic safety and fire hazards--to aid in identifying possible key individual factors important in understanding citizen involvement in prevention activities.

In general, these three fields differ in the extent to which the government has assumed responsibility for prevention activities. Health maintenance is an issue in which the individual exercises many decisions--both in gaining access to available services and then choosing to utilize them. The question of access to seat belts has become a non-issue with the legislation of belt-equipped automobiles. The decision arena for the person centers solely on whether or not the belt will be used. Government intervention in the fire prevention area has been demonstrated to an even greater extent: Most of the environment has been structured and designed to be nearly fire resistant. The choices left to the individual are considerably limited, although important. These considerations provide the back drop against which people may operate in a cautious or "careless" manner.

The most critical overall finding in our survey of the literatures is that there are identifiable subgroups in the population who are more likely to engage in general and specific instances of prevention. These individuals are marked by several characteristics, which include factors that are internal to the person and those that impinge on her/him from without. The factors which have received research emphasis include socio-economic status, cognitive variables (e.g., awareness and attitudes), personality, contextual influences and organizational features. The associated findings are briefly summarized below.

People who take prevention measures in health and in traffic safety tend to be better educated, enjoy a higher socio-economic level based on income and occupational status, and are somewhat older. While sex differences have not been documented in either area, race and marital status of the individual appear to play some role in seat belt usage; white and married persons tend to "buckle up" more often. Other demographic factors have been found in the fire prevention area; older citizens tend to exhibit less preparedness in terms of knowledge in handling an unwanted ignition and planning an appropriate escape route, but also suffer fewer exposures to fire hazard.

Users and non-users of health services, fire-fighting techniques and traffic restraining devices also differ significantly in the attitudes they hold. At the more general level, a consensus exists among drivers about the "goodness" of seat belts and among citizens about the value of fire prevention. However, consumers of health services are more likely than non-consumers to view good health as an important issue and perceive the official health care system positively. Thus, where many, including the public sector, assume each issue to be of equal and high importance, some dissension is noted. Health is the one area of the three in which considerable personal decision leeway is available and does not assume the same priority for all people.

Differences are also apparent in more specific attitudes. Individuals appear to make health-related decisions on a disease-by-disease basis. Consumers of specific illness prevention strategies tend to evaluate their susceptibility to the particular condition as more likely, the consequences of disease as more severe and the efficacy of the treatment more positively. The influence of one's personal assessment of risk is also important in seat belt usage, but the relationships are complex. Those who see themselves in little risk as well as those who have directly experienced danger are less likely to use the belt devices than those who are aware of the dangers but have not been victims of traffic mishaps. Moderate threat is thought to facilitate people's precautionary seat belt behavior, while severe threat serves to impede appropriate driver behavior.

Personality determinants of prevention activities have received limited attention. Findings in these studies are suggestive, however: there is evidence that some people adopt a generalized prevention orientation while others do not. That is, people who are careful in health matters are also careful in traffic and other areas. Further, risk-avoiders tend to display a different psychological makeup than nonprecautious individuals. They appear to be better-adjusted in relationships with others, behave in ways consistent with social norms, and tend to believe in and seek personal control over events in their environment. Non-consumers, on the other hand, exhibit more impulsive features, rigidity and a sense that the environment is not amenable to their control. These themes have only preliminary treatment in the literature and should be considered tentative.

A second direction in this research examines factors outside the individual which are thought to influence whether he can or will engage in prevention activities. These studies address two somewhat different concerns. The first issue deals with the "opportunity structure" or availability of prevention strategies: That is, how does the cost and time involved, the proximity of services or the "trouble" encountered to be precautionary impact on people's willingness to engage in these activities? The second issue focuses on contextual considerations: What in the immediate situation serves as a cue or what kind of environment (primarily social) supports and encourages precaution?

The question of "opportunity structure" is more pertinent to health maintenance than to seat belt usage and, perhaps, fire prevention. All later model automobiles (mid-1960s and newer) come equipped with seat belts for front-seat occupants. In a similar mode, buildings and materials must meet certain fire-equipped or -resistant specifications before their use by consumers is permitted. Within the three prevention areas reviewed here the influence of opportunity structure variables may be considered

a major issue only for health maintenance. In general, the more convenient, simple and inexpensive the medical procedure, the more likely an individual is to participate in the activity. Similar examination of the role played by the cost and effort necessary to install a smoke detector or extinguisher has not been undertaken in the fire literature.

The contextual factors have been approached from two viewpoints. Research in seat belt usage has concentrated on the apparent "effect" of the immediate traffic environment on prevention behavior. Traffic conditions have been found to play a significant role in the incidence of seat belt usage. In general, belt use tends to be greater in highway than city traffic, travel for longer distances, at higher speeds, in bad weather and at night. The individual's decision to travel by highway appears to have some potency as a cue to "buckle up." However, more of the variance in belt usage is explained by personal factors than is explained by situational factors.

A more global perspective on the meaning of "environment" or "setting" has been adopted in studying health maintenance. Here, an individual's context is seen to include a wide range of life-style influences and moves beyond the immediate health-decision situation (a flu epidemic, for example). Childhood socialization practices, the values, beliefs and number of an individual's peer groups, community size and character and religious affiliation help to shape the person's past and current socio-psychological environment. The available research supports the important role that social life circumstances play in the person's prevention orientation. These contextual factors are interpreted as defining the kind and amount of information and role models to which the individual is exposed.

Recent interest in social-information networks marks an attempt to expand our knowledge of "who" the participator is from the demographic sense. He/she may be described not only in terms of age and income, but also the kinds of life experiences he/she is likely to have had. The kind of questions important to this issue center on the personal and social incentives and barriers associated with prevention activities. The psychological and contextual correlates of precaution are suggestive and promising, but relatively undeveloped. What is the instrumental value of exercising control over the environment? How do social groups operate to influence the individual? Do they merely provide information (a proper "knowledge context") or set into motion more powerful forces such as pressure and approval for conforming to certain norms? How do personal dispositions and social forces interact? Identifying the components of a prevention *motivation* is the core to an adequate knowledge bank in developing public police. The ability to specify the benefits and costs of precaution (the "why") provides the basis from which effective programs may be devised. Further attention to the issue is unquestionably necessary.

APPENDIX B

RDD TELEPHONE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

4-7

8-11

12-14

15

16-17

18

Time interview began _____ AM
PM

The first few questions are about the area where you now live.

1. What city, suburb, or town do you live in?

Chicago 001

Other (Specify suburb/town) _____

Don't Know 997

Refused 998

2. How nice a place is (your present neighborhood/suburb) to live in? Would you say it's ...

Very nice, 4

Nice, 3

Just okay, or 2

Not a nice place? 1

Don't Know 7

3. How many years have you lived in (your present neighborhood/suburb)?

_____ years (If 1 year or less, Skip to Q.5)

Don't Know 97

4. Overall, in the past two years, would you say (your neighborhood/suburb) has become a better place to live, has gotten worse, or has it stayed about the same?

Better 3

Worse 2

About the same 1

Don't Know 7

5. Where did you last live before you moved to your present neighborhood?

_____ (record exact spelling; if out of Illinois record city and state)

Lived here all my life (Skip to Q.9) 996

Don't Know (Skip to Q.8) 997

Refused (Skip to Q.8) 998

6. Would you think back to (Answer to Q.5) and tell me how much of a problem each of the following was for people in your household at the time you moved?

First,

	Big Problem,	Some Problem, or	Almost no Problem?	Don't Know	R was child	
a. the quality of public schools? Was that a ...	3	2	1	7	9 (Skip to Q.9)	19
b. the kind of people who lived there? Was that a ...	3	2	1	7		20
c. the convenience to work?	3	2	1	7		21
d. crime and safety in the neighborhood?	3	2	1	7		22

7. When you left that area were many people moving out of the community at that time or were you one of the few leaving?

Many moving 1

One of few 2

Don't Know 7

23

8. Now I would like to ask about the neighborhood where you presently live. When you decided to move here how important to you was...

	Very Important,	Somewhat Important,	or Not Important?	Don't Know	
a. the quality of public schools? Was it...	3	2	1	7	24
b. the kind of people who lived here? Was it...	3	2	1	7	25
c. the convenience to work?	3	2	1	7	26
d. crime and safety in the neighborhood?	3	2	1	7	27

9. In the past couple of years has the amount of crime in your neighborhood increased, decreased, or stayed about the same?

Increased	3	28
Decreased	1	
Stayed about the same	2	
Don't Know	7	

10. How likely is it that you will move out of your neighborhood in the next 2 years? Will you...

Definitely move,	5	29
Probably move,	4	
Probably not move, or	2	
Definitely not move?	1	
Fifty-fifty chance	3	
Would like to move, but can't	6	
Don't Know	7	

11. All things considered, what do you think (your neighborhood/suburb) will be like 2 years from now? Will it be a better place to live, will it have gotten worse, or will it be about the same as it is now?

Better	3	30
Worse	1	
About the same	2	
Don't Know	7	

12. About how many families in your neighborhood do you know well enough to ask a favor of?

_____ families	31-32
Don't Know	97

13. Nowadays, where do you usually...

	In your neighborhood/suburb,	(elsewhere) in Chicago,	(elsewhere) in the suburbs?	All-over	Not Appl.	
a. go grocery shopping? Is it...	1	2	3	4	9	33
b. eat out at restaurants?	1	2	3	4	9	34

14. How safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night? Would you feel...

Very safe,	4	35
Somewhat safe,	3	
Somewhat unsafe, or	2	
Very unsafe?	1	
Don't Know	7	

15a. How often do you wear a seat belt while driving or riding in a car? Would you say...

Always,	4	36
Most of the time,	3	
Sometimes, or	2	
Never? (Skip to Q.16)	1	
Don't Know (Skip to Q.16)	7	
Never travel by car (Skip to Q.16).	9	

b. What is the main reason that you wear a seat belt?

Safety/protection	1	37
Buzzer won't go off/car won't start	2	
Other (Specify _____)	3	

Now I'd like to ask about some other things people do to protect themselves.

16. In (your neighborhood/suburb),...

	Always,	Most of the Time,	Some-times, or	Never?	Don't Know	Refused	Don't go Out	
a. How often do you avoid being outside alone at night because of crime? Would you say...	4	3	2	1	7	8	9	38
b. How often do you avoid walking near certain types of strangers?	4	3	2	1	7	8	9	39
c. How often do you avoid carrying a lot of cash on you, because of crime?	4	3	2	1	7	8	9	40

17a. Are there any places in the Chicago Metropolitan Area you avoid specifically because of crime?

Yes	1	41
No (Skip to Q.18)	0	
Don't Know (Skip to Q.18)	7	
Refused (Skip to Q.18).	8	

b. Which ones? (record exact spelling)

- (1) _____
- (2) _____
- (3) _____

18. When you are away from home for at least a couple of days, how often do you...

	Always,	Most of the Time,	Some-times, or	Never?	Don't Know	Re-fused	Don't Go Away	
a. Use a timer on indoor lights or a radio? Would you say...	4	3	2	1	7	8	9 (Skip to Q.19)	42
b. Have a neighbor watch your home? Would you say...	4	3	2	1	7	8		43

19. Do any of your neighbors ask you or someone else in your household to watch their home when they are away for at least a couple of days?

Yes	1	44
No	0	
Don't Know	7	
Refused	8	
Don't go away	9	

20. Does your home have a smoke detector installed inside of it?

Yes	1	45
No	0	
Don't Know	7	

21. Have you planned an escape route from your home in case of fire?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

46

22a. Do you have an insurance policy which covers household property against loss from theft or vandalism?

Yes No Don't Know Refused
1 0 7 8

47

b. Have you installed any special outdoor lights to make it easier to see what's going on outside your home?

1 0 7 8

48

c. Have you installed an alarm system, window bars, or special locks to help prevent break-ins at your home?

1 0 7 8

49

d. Do you have a hand gun at home at least in part for protection?

1 0 7 8

50

e. Have you engraved any of your valuables to help recover them in case they are stolen?

1 0 7 8

51

f. Is there anything (else) you have done at home to protect against burglary?

1 0 7 8

52

Specify: (1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____

(If all NOs,
Skip to Q.24)

23. Have you done this /these because you or someone in your household have been a victim of crime, or to avoid becoming a victim of crime?

Have been victim 1
Avoid becoming victim 2
Other (Specify: _____). 3
Don't Know 7
Refused 8

53

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about your participation in voluntary organizations (i.e., block clubs, community, civic and church groups).

24a. Would you generally describe yourself as a "joiner," that is someone who likes to join together with groups of people for some specific purpose?

Yes 1
No (Skip to Q.24c) 0
Don't Know (Skip to Q.25a). 7

54

b. Is that because you really enjoy group activities, or is it that you feel the group approach is the best way to get things done?

Enjoy group 1
Group approach best 2
Both 3
Other (Specify) _____ . 4
Don't Know. 7

55

(SKIP TO Q.25a)

c. Is that because you really don't enjoy group activities, or is it that you don't feel the group approach is the best way to get things done?

Don't enjoy group 1
Group approach not best 2
Both 3
Don't have time 4
Other (Specify) _____ . 5
Don't Know 7

56

25a. Are you currently a member of ...

Yes No Don't Know
(1) a group at your church or synagogue? 1 0 7
(2) a PTA or local school council? 1 0 7
(3) a block club or neighborhood-based community group? 1 0 7
(4) any other kind of group? 1 0 7

57

58

59

60

(IF ALL NOs, SKIP TO Q.26a)

b. Approximately how many hours per month do you usually spend in activities related to this/these group(s)? Would you say...

None, 0
1-4 hrs, 1
5-10 hrs., or 2
More than 10 hrs? 3
Don't Know. 7

61

26a. Have you heard or read about any of the following kinds of activities taking place in your neighborhood in the past couple of years?

(ASK A FOR 1-7, BEFORE ASKING B)

(IF YES TO "A")

(ASK "E", IF NO TO "D")

	Yes		No		b. Was (this) to keep crime from becoming a problem or was it that crime had already become a problem in your neighborhood?			c. Were you given an opportunity to attend/take part? Did anyone ask you, or did you see a notice or poster?		d. Did you attend/take part in (this)?		e. Why didn't you attend/take part in (this)?															
	1	0	8	9	Keep From	Already	Don't Know	15	16	17	18		19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
(1) a neighborhood crime prevention meeting?	1	0	8	9	1	2	7	15	1	0	16	(1) 1	0	17	(1) _____												
(2) a citizen's patrol of your neighborhood?	1	0	9	10	1	2	7	18	1	0	19	(2) 1	0	20	(2) _____												
(3) an escort program in your neighborhood?	1	0	10	11	1	2	7	21	1	0	22	(3) 1	0	23	(3) _____												
(4) a blockwatch or neighborhood watch program?	1	0	11	12	1	2	7	24	1	0	25	(4) 1	0	26	(4) _____												
(5) a Beat Representative program?	1	0	12	13	1	2	7	27	1	0	28	(5) 1	0	29	(5) _____												
(6) a WhistleSTOP program?	1	0	13	14	1	2	7	30	1	0	31	(6) 1	0	32	(6) _____												
(7) any other crime prevention program in your neighborhood?	1	0	14		1	2	7	33	1	0	34	(7) 1	0	35	(7) _____												

(IF ALL NOS, SKIP TO WHITE)

(ASK PINK)

(ASK BLUE)

(ASK BLUE)

(ASK BLUE)

(ASK BLUE)

(SKIP TO WHITE)

(SKIP TO WHITE)

This page was pink.

27a. Did you attend a crime prevention meeting once or more than once?

Once 1
More 2
Don't Know 7

b. About how many persons participated?

_____ persons
Don't Know 997

c. Was a law enforcement officer involved?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

d. What was this meeting about?

e. Since attending this meeting, is there anything different you now do or have done for crime prevention reasons?

Yes 1
No (Skip to Q. 27g) 0
Don't Know (Skip to Q. 27g) 7

f. What have you done?

g. Was this meeting connected with an organized neighborhood or community group?

Yes 1
No (Skip rest of PINK) 0
Don't Know (Skip rest of PINK) 7

This page was pink.

28a. Is crime prevention a main purpose of this organized group?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

43

b. Were you given an opportunity to become a member of this organization?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

44

c. Are you currently a member of this organization?

Yes (Skip to Q.28g) . . . 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

45

d. Were you ever a member?

Yes (Skip to Q.28f) . . . 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

46

e. Why didn't you join?

(Skip rest of PINK)

f. Why are you no longer a member?

g. How long (have you been) (were you) a member?

_____ years
Don't Know 7

47-48

h. Approximately how many hours do (did) you spend per month in activities related to this organization? Would you say...

None, 0
1-4 hrs, 1
5-10 hrs, or. 2
more than 10 hrs? . . . 3
Don't Know. 7

49

i. How is (was) most of this time spent? (Record up to 3 activities)

- (1) _____
- (2) _____
- (3) _____

This page was blue.

ASK FOR FIRST "YES", Q.26d. (2) - (5)

29a. How many times have you done this?

_____ times
Don't Know 97

50-51

b. About how many other persons have participated?

_____ persons
Don't Know 997

52-54

c. Was a law enforcement officer involved?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

55

d. What did you do as part of this (activity) (program)?

e. Since participating in this, is there anything different you now do or have done for crime prevention reasons?

Yes 1
No (Skip to Q.29g) 0
Don't Know (Skip to Q.29g) . . 7

56

f. What have you done?

g. Was this (activity) (program) connected with an organized neighborhood or community group?

Yes 1
No (Skip rest of BLUE) 0
Don't Know (Skip rest of BLUE) . . 7

57

(If same organization as on PINK, skip to WHITE)

30a. Is crime prevention a main purpose of this organization?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know ?

58

b. Were you given an opportunity to become a member of this organization?

Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know ?

59

c. Are you currently a member of this organization?

Yes (Skip to Q.30g) . . . 1
No 0
Don't Know ?

60

d. Were you ever a member?

Yes (Skip to Q.30f) 1
No 0
Don't Know ?

61

e. Why didn't you join?

(SKIP REST OF BLUE)

f. What is the main reason you are no longer a member of this group?

g. How long (have you been) (were you) a member?

_____ years
Don't Know ?

62-63

h. Approximately how many hours do (did) you spend per month in activities related to this organization? Would you say...

None, 0
1-4 hrs, 1
5-10 hrs, or, 2
more than 10 hrs? . . . 3

64

i. How is (was) most of this time spent? (Record up to 3 activities)

- (1) _____
(2) _____
(3) _____

31. Think about all the things you do to be safe from crime. How much are you influenced by what you have learned from...

Table with 5 columns: A lot, Some, or, Not at all?, Don't Know. Rows include: a. your parents or other relatives? b. newspapers or magazines? c. television? d. your friends or neighbors?

32. Now please tell me how likely you think it is that the following things might happen to you in the next couple of years.

Table with 6 columns: First, Very likely, Somewhat likely, Somewhat unlikely, Very unlikely, or Don't Know. Rows include: a. having a fire in your kitchen? b. having a stranger rob you on the street? c. having a minor car accident? d. having your home burglarized when no one is home? e. developing heart trouble? f. having a stranger attack you?

33. Now I'd like to ask you how serious these things would be if they happened to you right now in your life. How about...

	Very Serious,	Serious,	Not too Serious, or	Not at all Serious?	Don't Know	
a. developing heart trouble? Would that be...	4	3	2	1	7	18
b. having your home burglarized when no one is home? Would that be...	4	3	2	1	7	19
c. having a fire in your kitchen?	4	3	2	1	7	20
d. having a stranger attack you?	4	3	2	1	7	21
e. having a minor car accident?	4	3	2	1	7	22
f. having a stranger rob you on the street?	4	3	2	1	7	23

34. Now I'd like your opinion on how helpful some things are that people do to protect themselves.

	Very Helpful,	Helpful,	Not too Helpful, or	Not at all Helpful?	Don't Know	
a. How helpful is regular exercise in preventing heart trouble? Is it...	4	3	2	1	7	24
b. How helpful are alarm systems, window bars, or special locks in protecting homes from burglary? Are they...	4	3	2	1	7	25
c. How helpful are seat belts in preventing traffic injuries?	4	3	2	1	7	26
d. How about avoiding certain places and people? How helpful is <u>that</u> in protecting against robbery or assaults?	4	3	2	1	7	27
e. How helpful are smoke detectors in preventing injuries from fires?	4	3	2	1	7	28
f. How about asking a neighbor to watch your home when you're away? How helpful is <u>that</u> in protecting against burglary?	4	3	2	1	7	29
g. How about people patrolling their own neighborhoods? How helpful is <u>that</u> in preventing crime?	4	3	2	1	7	30

35. Is the brightness of street lighting in front of your home at night...

Very bright,	4	31
Somewhat bright,	3	
Somewhat dark, or	2	
Very dark?	1	
Don't Know	7	
Refused	8	

36. During weekday evenings, between 7 and 10, is the street you live on usually...

Pretty busy, or	3	32
Almost deserted?	1	
In the middle	2	
Don't Know	7	
Refused	8	

37. In your neighborhood do people try to help each other out, or do people mostly go their own ways?

Help out	3	33
Go own way	1	
In the middle	2	
Don't Know	7	

38. If young people in your neighborhood were involved in some minor destruction of property, would most people try to do something about it, or would they not get involved?

Do something	3	34
Not get involved	1	
In the middle	2	
Don't Know	7	

39. Now I'd like you to tell me whether each of the following is a big problem, some problem, or almost no problem in your neighborhood.

	Big Problem,	Some Problem, or	Almost no Problem?	Don't Know	
a. Buildings or storefronts sitting abandoned or burned out? Is this a ...	3	2	1	7	35
b. How about fires being set on purpose in your neighborhood? Is this a ...	3	2	1	7	36
c. Vandalism, (like kids breaking windows or writing on walls or things like that.)	3	2	1	7	37
d. People breaking in or sneaking in to homes to steal something?	3	2	1	7	38
e. Groups of teenagers hanging out on the streets. Is this a ...	3	2	1	7	39
f. People being robbed or having their purses or wallets taken on the street?	3	2	1	7	40
g. People being attacked or beaten up by strangers?	3	2	1	7	41

40. When it comes to the prevention of criminal behavior in a neighborhood, do you feel that it's more the responsibility of the residents, or more the responsibility of the police?

Residents	1	42
Police	0	
Both	3	
Other (Specify: _____)	4	
Don't Know	7	

41a. In the past year or so have you contacted the police to make a complaint or to request some kind of help?

Yes	1	43
No (Skip to Q.42a)	0	
Don't Know (Skip to Q.42a)	7	
Refused (Skip to Q.42a)	8	

b. Was this to report a crime or some suspicious activity?

Yes	1	44
No	0	
Don't Know	7	
Refused	8	

42a. In the past couple of years has your home been broken into or has anyone tried to break-in?

Yes	1	45
No (Skip to Q.43a)	0	
Don't Know (Skip to Q.43a)	7	
Refused (Skip to Q.43a)	8	

b. Did this happen in your present neighborhood, elsewhere in your town, or outside your town?

	1st	2nd	
Present neighborhood	1	1	46 47
Elsewhere in town	2	2	
Out-of-town	3	3	
Don't Know	7	7	

43a. Do you personally know of anyone (else) whose home has been broken into in the past couple of years or who has had someone try to break into their homes?

Yes	1	48
No (Skip to Q.44a)	0	
Don't Know (Skip to Q.44a)	7	
Refused (Skip to Q.44a)	8	

b. Did this happen in your present neighborhood, elsewhere in your town or outside your town?

	1st	2nd	
Present neighborhood	1	1	49 50
Elsewhere in town	2	2	
Out-of-town	3	3	
Don't Know	7	7	

44a. In the past couple of years have you been robbed or attacked, or has anyone tried to rob or attack you?

- Yes 1 51
- No (Skip to Q.45a) 0
- Don't Know (Skip to Q.45a) 7
- Refused (Skip to Q.45a) 8

b. Did this happen in your present neighborhood, elsewhere in your town, or outside your town?

- | | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|----|
| Present neighborhood | 1 | 1 | 52 |
| Elsewhere in town | 2 | 2 | 53 |
| Out-of-town | 3 | 3 | |
| Don't Know | 7 | 7 | |

45a. Do you personally know of anyone (else) who has been robbed or attacked in the past couple of years, or who has had someone try to rob or attack them?

- Yes 1 54
- No (Skip to Q.46) 0
- Don't Know (Skip to Q.46) 7
- Refused (Skip to Q.46) 8

b. Did this happen in your present neighborhood, elsewhere in your town, or outside your town?

- | | <u>1st</u> | <u>2nd</u> | |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------|----|
| Present neighborhood | 1 | 1 | 55 |
| Elsewhere in town | 2 | 2 | 56 |
| Out-of-town | 3 | 3 | |
| Don't Know | 7 | 7 | |

Now I'd like to finish by asking you some background questions to help analyze the data.

46. Do you own or rent your home?

- Own (includes still paying, co-op) 1 8
- Rent 2
- Other (Specify) _____ 3
- Don't Know 7

47a. Is your residence a single family house, a rowhouse, or a bigger building?

- Single family/rowhouse/townhouse (Skip to Q.49a) 1 9
- Trailer/mobile home (Skip to Q.49a) 2
- Bigger building 3
- Other (Specify) _____ (Skip to Q.49a) 4

b. About how many units are there in your building?

- 2 to 6 1 10
- 7 to 21 2
- more than 21 3
- Don't Know 7

48. (ASK EITHER "A" OR "B")

a. (IF Q. 46 WAS "OWN") Is this a condominium or Co-op?

- Yes 1 11
 - No 2
 - R owns bldg. 3
 - Don't Know 7
- (SKIP TO Q.49a)

b. (IF Q.46 WAS "RENT") Do you think your building is likely to become a condominium in the next couple of years?

- Yes 2 12
- No 0
- Maybe 1
- Don't Know 7

c. What will you do if your building does become a condominium? Will you probably buy or probably move?

- Buy 2 13
- Move 1
- Don't Know 7

49. Now I'd like you to tell me how well the following statements describe you.

	<u>Always,</u>	<u>Most of</u> <u>the</u> <u>Time,</u>	<u>Some-</u> <u>times,</u>	<u>or</u> <u>Never?</u>	<u>Don't</u> <u>Know</u>	
a. I feel responsible for whatever happens in my home. Do you feel this way ...	4	3	2	1	7	14
b. I feel that chance and luck play an important role in my life. Do you feel this way ...	4	3	2	1	7	15
c. I feel that what happens in my neighborhood is <u>none</u> of my business.	4	3	2	1	7	16
d. I feel I have a strong influence over things that happen in my life.	4	3	2	1	7	17
e. I try to keep an "eye on" what's going on around me. Do you do this ...	4	3	2	1	7	18

50. Some people try hard to take care of their health, while others just don't pay much attention to it. In order to keep healthy, do you...

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Some-</u> <u>times</u>	<u>Don't</u> <u>Know</u>	<u>Not</u> <u>Appl.</u>	
a. get regular exercise?	2	0	1	7	9	19
b. avoid smoking?	2	0	1	7	9	20
c. get voluntary medical check-ups?	2	0	1	7	9	21
d. watch your diet?	2	0	1	7	9	22

51. How tall are you? _____ ft. _____ inches 23-24
Don't Know 97

52a. Are you underweight, overweight or is your weight just about right? 25
Underweight (*Skip to Q.52c*) 1
Overweight 3
Just about right (*Skip to Q.53*) 2
Don't Know (*Skip to Q.53*) 7
Refused (*Skip to Q.53*) 8

b. Are you 20 or more pounds overweight? 26
Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

(SKIP TO Q.53)

c. Are you 10 or more pounds underweight? 27
Yes 1
No 0
Don't Know 7

53. In what year were you born? 28-30
_____ year
Don't Know 997

54. What was the highest grade or year of school you have completed? 31-32
None 00
Elementary 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
High School. 09 10 11 12
Some college 13
College graduate (*Bachelors*) 14
Some graduate school 15
Masters degree 16
Doctoral degree 17
Don't Know 97

55a. How many people under 19 years old currently live in this household?

Don't Know 97

33-34

b. Including yourself, how many people 19 years and older, currently live in this household?

Don't Know 97

35-36

56a. Are you presently working full or part-time, keeping house, retired, unemployed, or something else?

- Working full-time 1
- Working part-time 2
- Keeping house 3
- In School 4
- Retired 5
- Unemployed 6
- Disabled 7
- Other (Specify: _____). 8

37

(SKIP TO Q. 57a)

b. Is your (main) place of work in (your neighborhood/suburb), downtown Chicago, elsewhere in Chicago, elsewhere in the suburbs, or somewhere else altogether?

- Own neighborhood/suburb . . . 1
- Downtown Chicago 2
- Elsewhere in Chicago 3
- Elsewhere in suburbs 4
- Somewhere else 5

38

57a. Are you currently...

- Married, 1
- Living with someone as married, . . . 2
- Widowed, 3
- Divorced, 4
- Separated, or 5
- Never been married? 6
- Don't Know. 7

39

(SKIP TO Q. 58a)

b. Is your (husband) (wife) (person you live with) presently working full or part-time, keeping house, retired, unemployed or something else?

- Working full-time 1
- Working part-time 2
- Keeping house 3
- In school 4
- Retired 5
- Unemployed 6
- Disabled 7
- Other (Specify _____) 8

40

(SKIP TO Q. 58a)

c. Is their (main) place of work in (your neighborhood/suburb), downtown Chicago, elsewhere in Chicago, elsewhere in the suburbs, or somewhere else altogether?

- Own neighborhood/suburb . . 1
- Downtown Chicago. 2
- Elsewhere in Chicago 3
- Elsewhere in suburbs 4
- Somewhere else. 5
- Don't Know 7

41

58a. Was your total household income from all sources, before taxes for 1978...

(Repeat until "No")

(SKIP TO Q.59)

- More than \$ 6,000? No . . . 0
- More than \$10,000? No . . . 1
- More than \$15,000? No . . . 2
- More than \$20,000? No . . . 3
- More than \$30,000? No . . . 4
- More than \$50,000? No . . . 5
- Yes . . . 6
- Don't Know 7
- Refused 8

42

(IF DON'T KNOW OR REFUSED)

b. Could you just tell me if it was above or below \$15,000?

- Above 1
- Below 0
- Don't Know 7
- Refused. 8

43

59. What is your racial-ethnic background? Are you...

- Asian, 1
- Black, 2
- Latino, 3
- White, 4
- American Indian, or 5
- Something else (Specify _____) . 6
- Don't Know. 7
- Refused 8

44

60a. What street do you live on?

_____ (record exact spelling)

- DK 997
- RF 998

b. What street crosses it at the corner nearest your home?

_____ (record exact spelling)

- DK 997
- RF 998

c. What is your zip code?

- 6 _____
- Don't Know 9997
- Refused 9998

45-48

61a. Altogether, how many different telephone numbers are there in your household?

Total #s _____

49-50

Don't Know 97

Refused 98

b. (Are any of these) (Is this number) listed in the current directory?

Yes. 1

51

No 2

Don't Know 7

Refused. 8

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Time ended _____ A.M.
P.M.

52-55

62. Sex of respondent:

Male 0

56

Female 1

63. Was respondent's English...

Good, 3

57

Fair, or 2

Poor? 1

64. Was respondent...

Very cooperative, 3

58

Fairly cooperative, or 2

Not very cooperative? 1

65. Did respondent seem...

Very interested in interview, 3

59

Somewhat interested, or 2

Not interested; hard to hold attention? 1

66a. Do you think the information given by respondent was...

Accurate, or 1

60

Inaccurate? 0

(If inaccurate)

b. Why? _____

APPENDIX C
INPERSON INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
AND
INPERSON INTERVIEW
CODING FORM

CPCCP INPERSON INTERVIEW

Date _____

Time _____

Interviewer _____

Organization _____

Contact Person _____ Phone _____

Address _____

Introduction:

Hello, I am _____ from Center for Urban Affairs (492-3395), Northwestern University, in Evanston. We are in the process of studying how various community organizations and groups work to solve problems and get "the people" involved in their activities. I am going to be talking to groups all over the city in the next few months. I am glad to be able to interview your organization as a representative of this part of the city. I want to assure you that the information you give me will remain confidential, none of our findings will include any organization names.

6.6.79

CPCCP INPERSON INTERVIEW

I. FORMATION AND OTHER INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS

A. The Community Organization Leader-Respondent

I'd like to ask you some questions about yourself and your involvement in ORGANIZATION.

1. How long have you been a member of ORGANIZATION?

2. What is your current position in ORGANIZATION? (Or: What office in ORGANIZATION do you now hold?)

3. How long have you held that position (office)?

B. Origins of the Community Organization

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about how ORGANIZATION first got started.

4. When was ORGANIZATION originally established? (Or: How many years has ORGANIZATION been in existence?)

5a. What circumstance prompted or helped to prompt the formation of ORGANIZATION?

b. The work of forming ORGANIZATION was done by:

_____ local residents themselves

_____ a community organizer(s) working together with local residents

_____ others (Specify) _____

6. Were there any organizations or individuals (local or nonlocal) who helped in any way (e.g. endorsed, gave resources, provided leaders) in the establishment of ORGANIZATION?

(IF YES) What organizations or individuals? How did they help?
[Record two]

a. _____

b. _____

7. At the time ORGANIZATION was established, were there any other community organizations already existing in the area?

(IF YES) Which ones?

(IF YES) What stand did they take towards the forming of ORGANIZATION?

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

8. What were the original goals of ORGANIZATION when it was established?

(Try to Get Clear Statement of Goals).

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

- 9a. What percent of the original officers are still active? _____ %
- b. What percent of the original members are still active? _____ %
- c. Why have the original officers and members become inactive or dropped out? (PROBE for up to 3 "stories", don't get names)

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

- d. Were there any times ORGANIZATION came close to disbanding or did disband and then "got going" again?

____ Yes ____ No

(IF YES, ask "e")

- e. What events led to the disbanding stage and how did it become reinvigorated?

- 10. What is the name of the geographic area within which ORGANIZATION operates?

- 11. Roughly, what are the boundaries (street names) of that area. (TRY TO Equate to Square Miles)

C. Operational Structure

- 12a. Are there any appointed officers of ORGANIZATION?

____ Yes

____ No (SKIP TO #13)

→ CHECK LIST OF APPOINTED OFFICES

- ____ Members of Executive Board
- ____ President
- ____ Vice-President
- ____ Treasurer
- ____ Secretary
- ____ Executive Director
- ____ Other (specify) _____

- b. Who appoints them? _____

- c. How long are they appointed for?

- 13a. Does ORGANIZATION have elected officers?

____ Yes

____ No (SKIP TO #14)

→ CHECK LIST OF ELECTED OFFICES

- ____ Executive Director
- ____ Members of Executive Board
- ____ President
- ____ Vice-President
- ____ Treasurer
- ____ Secretary
- ____ Other (specify) _____

- b. How long are they elected for? _____

- c. Who votes in the elections? _____

14. Does ORGANIZATION have a board of directors, or similar group?

No (SKIP TO #19)

Yes (ASK #15-18)

15. How many persons serve on this board (group)?

16. How are they chosen? (PROBE: Is there competition for positions?
Is there a problem getting people to serve on the board)

17. How often does this body meet?

18. Thinking back over the last year what percentage of the board members
attended board meetings on the average?
_____%

19. Does ORGANIZATION as a whole hold regular meetings that members can
attend?

Yes No

→ CHECK FREQUENCY

- weekly
- bi-weekly
- monthly
- quarterly
- semi-annually
- annually
- other

→ (IF YES) During the past year, what percentage of your
membership attended these regular meetings?

_____%

D. Staff

20. How many persons are employed full time by ORGANIZATION?

How many part-time? _____

How many volunteer workers (e.g. students) do you have? _____

E. Relationship with Other Groups

21. Is ORGANIZATION part of a larger group?

Yes No (SKIP TO #22)

→ What group?

22. Is ORGANIZATION made up of other organizations, chapters and/or
block clubs?

Yes No (SKIP TO #23)

→ Please describe these groups.

II. MEMBERSHIP

23a. How many members does ORGANIZATION currently have? _____

b. How many of these make up the "active core" of members? _____

24. Who can be a member? (PROBE: Determine if limited by residency, or
other demographics).

25. For descriptive purposes, I'd like to get a more detailed picture of the kinds of people who currently make up your membership. (Get rough percentage estimates)

- a. age: under 40 _____ 40-60 _____ over 60 _____
- b. sex: male _____ female _____
- c. race: White _____ Black _____ Asian _____
 Latino _____ American Indian _____ Other _____

PROBE for the core (active) members. (Get rough percentage estimates)

- a. age: under 40 _____ 40-60 _____ over 60 _____
- b. sex: male _____ female _____
- c. race: White _____ Black _____ Asian _____
 Latino _____ American Indian _____ Other _____

26. Are there annual membership dues?

Yes _____ No _____

↳ How much \$ _____

27. Are there other membership requirements? That is, things a person must do to become and remain a member?

28. Does ORGANIZATION actively recruit new members?

Yes _____ No _____

↳ By what strategies? (e.g. door to door canvassing?)

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____

29. Are there any obstacles to increasing your membership?

Yes _____ No _____

↳ What are these?

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____

30. Now I'd like to learn what it is about ORGANIZATION that attracts new members. Would you think of some specific members and explain why they became involved? (PROBE for up to 3 "stories", don't get names).

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____

31. We are also trying to learn why people don't get involved in groups like ORGANIZATION. Would you think about some specific persons that haven't become involved in ORGANIZATION and explain what kept them from joining? (PROBE for up to 3 "stories", Don't get names).

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____

32. How does ORGANIZATION's current membership compare in number with a year ago?

_____ about the same

_____ increased (PROBE: about how many? _____)

_____ decreased (PROBE: about how many? _____)

33. We know that groups like ORGANIZATION often have to deal with the problem of keeping their members involved in organization activities. What are some of the things ORGANIZATION does to keep members involved. Do you...

a. Contact members by phone or in person to discuss ORGANIZATION's activities and business? YES NO

b. Send members mailed information about ORGANIZATION's activities and accomplishments? YES NO

c. Organize social events to bring members together? YES NO

d. Have active members contact those members who have become inactive or dropped out in order to get them re-involved? YES NO

e. Anything else? (SPECIFY) YES NO

f. From your experience which of these approaches have been most effective in keeping members active?

34. What are the activities of ORGANIZATION in which members can participate?

- a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

35. Thinking about your own participation with ORGANIZATION over the last year, what are the major benefits or satisfactions you have received here. (PROBE up to 4)

- a.
b.
c.
d.

36. Now would you think of some of your most active members. What keeps these persons active? (PROBE for satisfactions and benefits that members experience. Don't get names).

- a.
b.
c.
d.

37. Thinking back about your own experiences with ORGANIZATION what have been your major frustrations or dissatisfactions (PROBE up to 4)

- a.
b.
c.
d.

38. Now would you think of some specific members who have become inactive or have dropped out. What led to their nonparticipation? (PROBE for dissatisfactions, complaints and frustrations that members experience; Don't get names).

- a.

(38 continued)

- b. _____
- _____
- c. _____
- _____
- d. _____
- _____

IV. CURRENT GOALS AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION

39a. Before I asked you about ORGANIZATION's original goals. Are these your current goals.

___ No ___ Yes

(IF NO, ask "b")

b. What brought about the change in goals? What are current goals?

40. What are the specific problems/issues ORGANIZATION is trying currently to do something about? (Differentiate from "general" goals)

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____

41. How were these problems/issues picked? (PROBE: Whose decision was it to pick these problems. How was it determined that these are priority problems?)

- a. _____
- _____
- b. _____
- _____
- c. _____
- _____

42. What has ORGANIZATION done or is doing to solve these problems/issues? What have the outcomes been?

- a. _____
- _____
- _____
- b. _____
- _____
- _____
- c. _____
- _____
- _____

43. (SKIP IF ANTI-CRIME EFFORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL).

a. How much of a problem is crime in this neighborhood.

- ___ Big problem
- ___ Moderate problem
- ___ Slight problem
- ___ No problem
- ___ DK

b. Has ORGANIZATION done (or is doing) anything to try to prevent crime?

___ Yes ___ No (IF CRIME PROBLEM, ASK WHY NOT?)

(1) What has been done? (Get description of anti-crime efforts, specifically what members have done?)

43. continued

(2) What was the outcome?

44. Has ORGANIZATION ever tried to influence some government policy?

Yes No

↳ Would you describe what the issue was and how you went about your effort? What was the outcome?

V. BUDGET/FUNDRAISING

We're trying to get some idea about how community organizations receive funding and how they appropriate these funds. The questions I have about budget and funding will be used to get an overall idea about community organization funding. Specific questions that I have here will be used only to get a composite of all organizations in the city.

45. Approximately what is your current annual budget to operate ORGANIZATION and its programs? \$ _____

46. What are the mainways ORGANIZATION gets funds for this budget? (Rank)

(Try for %)

- a. _____ %
- b. _____ %
- c. _____ %

47. What are the major ways your funds are spent? (Try for %)

- a. _____ %
- b. _____ %
- c. _____ %

VIII. COMMUNICATIONS

48. a) Does ORGANIZATION use any of the following means of communication with its members?

How about:

Frequency of distribution

- _____ a. organizational newspaper or newsletter _____
- _____ b. periodic mailings of information _____
- _____ c. flyers, leaflets for handout _____
- _____ d. annual reports _____

b) Do you have a mailing list? Yes _____ No _____

49. It's possible that we may want to interview some of ORGANIZATION's original members. Could you give me the names of some of the original/past long-time members who you think would be willing to be interviewed. (Get at least one inactive) (IF UNWILLING, ASK TO CALL BACK AFTER HE/SHE HAS CHECKED WITH SOME PEOPLE)

Phone #

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____
- 4. _____

50. Finally, I'd like to ask you if you'd summarize for me "what is important about ORGANIZATION", in case I've missed it in my specific questioning.

51. Thanks. Is there any literature, or reports from ORGANIZATION I might take with me. Ask for:

- _____ Brochures, Newsletters
- _____ Annual Reports
- _____ Bylaws/Constitution
- _____ Membership List

A. Description of Physical Setting.

.....

.....

.....

B. Description of Behavioral Activity Level (#s of people doing what?).

.....

.....

.....

C. Assessment of Respondent-Interviewer rapport.

.....

.....

.....

D. Other Comments.

.....

.....

.....

E. IM mentioned? Yes _____ No _____

CPCCP INPERSON INTERVIEW CODING FORM

CARD 01

(1-3) _____ I.D.

(4) _____ Interviewer

- 1=Jason
- 2=Lieberman
- 3=Moore
- 4=Garfinkel
- 5=Ollman
- 6=Stout

(5-6) _____ Q1. Length of membership in years

- 00=less than 6 mos.
- 99=lifetime or as wish

(7) _____ Q2. Current position

- 1=director
- 2=officer
- 3=other staff

(8-9) _____ Q3. Length of position in years

- 00=less than 6 mos.
- 99=lifetime or as wish

(10-11) _____ Q4. When ORG established in years

- 00=less than 6 mos.
- 99=99 years or more

(12-13) _____ Q5a. What prompted ORG formation (CODE UP TO 3 RESPONSES)

- 01=specific criminal incidents
- 02=provide needed services
- 03=social cohesion/integration
- 04=maintain NBHD-physical
- 05=maintain/cope with NBHD-demographic
- 06=improve NBHD-physical
- 07=expansion/encroachment of gov't programs or other establishments
- 08=youth problems
- 09=ideological/political motivations
- 10=availability of funding
- 11=social incivility problems
- 12=formed as umbrella/become part of coalition
- 13=other
- 14=don't know (SKIP TO Q6)

- (18) _____ Q5b. Who helped form ORG (CODE UP TO 3 RESPONSES)
- (19) _____
- (20) _____
 - 1=local residents
 - 2=community organizer
 - 3=churches
 - 4=businesses
 - 5=other community groups
 - 6=gov't agencies
 - 7=other individuals
 - 8=don't know
- (21) _____ Q6. ORG get help in any way
 - 0=no (SKIP TO Q7)
 - 1=yes
 - 7=don't know (SKIP TO Q7)
- (22) _____ How did others help ORG (CODE UP TO 2 WAYS)
- (23) _____
 - 1=money
 - 2=space
 - 3=technical assistance
 - 4=other
- (24) _____ Q7. Other ORG's already existed
 - 0=no (SKIP TO Q8)
 - 1=yes
 - 7=don't know (SKIP TO Q8)
- (25) _____ Stand toward ORG formation
 - 1=oppose
 - 2=indifferent
 - 3=support
 - 4=mixed

- (26-27) _____ Q8. Original goals of ORG (CODE UP TO 5 GOALS)
- (28-29) _____
- (30-31) _____
- (32-33) _____
- (34-35) _____
 - 01=prevent crime
 - 02=provide needed services
 - 03=social cohesion/integration
 - 04=maintain NBHD-physical
 - 05=maintain/cope with NBHD-demographic
 - 06=improve NBHD-physical
 - 07=expansion/encroachment of gov't programs or other establishments
 - 08=youth problems
 - 09=ideological/political motivations
 - 10=availability of funding
 - 11=prevent social incivilities
 - 12=attain political power
 - 13=to act as umbrella/be part of coalition
 - 14=other
 - 15=don't know (SKIP TO Q9)
- (36) _____ Overall specificity of goals
 - 1=vague
 - 2=mixed
 - 3=specific
- (37) _____ Q9a. % original officers still active
 - 1=few or none (0=25%)
 - 2=some (26-50%)
 - 3=most or all (51-100%)
 - 7=don't know (SKIP TO Q9b)
 - 9=NA, no officers
- (38) _____ Q9b. % original members still active
 - 1=few or none (0=25%)
 - 2=some (26-50%)
 - 3=most or all (51-100%)
 - 7=don't know (SKIP TO Q9d)
 - 9=NA, no members

(39) _____ Q9c. Why become inactive or drop out (CODE UP TO 4 REASONS) (SKIP IS NO OFFICERS OR NO MEMBERS)

- (40) _____
 - (41) _____
 - (42) _____
- 0=none inactive
 1=died/old age/ill health
 2=moved away/transient NBHD population
 3=conflicting obligations
 4=apathy
 5=burnt out
 6=personal disagreements
 7=policy disagreements
 8=other
 9=don't know (SKIP TO Q9d)

(43) _____ Q9d. ORG close to or did disband
0=no (SKIP TO Q11)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q11)

(44) _____ Q9e. What lead to disbanding (CODE UP TO 2 REASONS)

- (45) _____
 - (46) _____
- 1=administrative/leadership problems
 2=funding problems
 3=policy differences
 4=issues died out
 5=lack of interest
 6=influence/conflict with other ORGS
 7=other

Did ORG get going again

- 0=no
- 1=yes

(47-79) _____ Q11. Area in square miles (USE MAP TO ESTIMATE)

- 000=block club size
- 88.8=business areas
- 99.8=large area of city
- 99.9=city wide

(50) _____ Q12a. ORG has appointed officers

- 0=no (SKIP TO Q13A)
- 1=yes
- 7=don't know (SKIP TO Q13a)

(51) _____ Q12b. Who appoints officers
1=board
2=president

(52-53) _____ Q12c. Length of appointment in years
00=less than 6 mos.
99=lifetime or as wish

(54) _____ Q13a. ORG has elected officers
0=no (SKIP TO Q14)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q14)

(55-56) _____ Q13b. How long elected in years
00=less than 6 mos.
99=lifetime or as wish

(57) _____ Q13c. Who votes in elections
1=All members
2=representatives of member groups
3=board members
4=really self appointed

(58) _____ Q14. ORG has Board of Directors
0=no (SKIP TO Q19)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q19)

(59-60) _____ Q15. Number persons on board

- (61) _____ Q16. How board is chosen
1=elected
2=mixed
3=appointed
- (62) _____ By membership?
0=no
1=yes
- (63) _____ By representatives from member groups?
0=no
1=yes
- (64) _____ By board itself?
0=no
1=yes
- (65) _____ Competition for position?
0=no
1=yes
- (66) _____ Problem getting people to serve?
0=no
1=yes
- (67-68) _____ Q17. Frequency of board meetings per year
- (69) _____ Q18. % board members attend board meetings
1=few or none (0=25%)
2=some (26-50%)
3=most or all (51-100%)
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q 19)

- (70) _____ Q19. Does ORG hold regular meetings
0=no (SKIP TO Q20)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q20)
9=NA, no members (SKIP TO Q20)
- (71) _____ Frequency of meetings
1=weekly
2=biweekly
3=monthly
4=quarterly
5=semi-annually
6=annually
7=other
- (72) _____ % of membership attended regular meetings
1=few or none (0-25%)
2=some (26-50%)
3=most of all (51-100%)
- (73-75) _____ Q20. # people ORG employs full-time
- (76-78) _____ # part-time
- (80) _____ 1

CARD 02

- (1-3) _____ I.D.
- (4-6) _____ Q20. # volunteers
- (7) _____ Q21. ORG part of larger group
0=no
1=yes
2=don't know

- (8) _____ Q22. Is ORG an "umbrella" group
0=no (SKIP TO Q23)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q23)
- (9) _____ Block clubs?
0=no
1=yes
- (10) _____ Churches?
0=no
1=yes
- (11) _____ Businesses?
0=no
1=yes
- (12) _____ Service institutions?
0=no
1=yes
- (13) _____ Other NBHD institutions?
0=no
1=yes
- (14) _____ Other community ORGs?
0=no
1=yes
- (15-17) _____ Q23a. # of members (IF NO MEMBERS SKIP TO Q35 AND Q37, THEN GO TO Q39a)
999=999 or more members
- (18-20) _____ Q23b. # members in active core
999=999 or more members
- (21) _____ Q24. Who can be a member
1=Individuals (e.g., residents, property owners, businessmen)
2=Mixed
3=Groups (includes member group representatives)

- (22) _____ Q25. Racial make-up of total membership
1=Somewhat hetero; 15-25% minority
2=Heterogeneous; more than 25% minority
3=Homogeneous white (over 85%)
4=Homogeneous black (over 85%)
5=Homogeneous Latino (over 85%)
6=Homogeneous asian (over 85%)
7=Homogeneous other (over 85%)
8=don't know
- (23) _____ Q25a. Age-Active members (mostly=70% or more)
1=mostly under 40
2=mostly 40-60
3=mostly over 60
4=mixed
7=don't know
- (24) _____ Q25b. Sex-Active members (mostly=70% or more)
1=mostly male
2=mostly female
3=mixed
7=don't know
- (25) _____ Q25c. Race-Active Members
1=Somewhat hetero; 15=25% minority
2=Heterogeneous; more than 25% minority
3=Homogeneous white (over 85%)
4=Homogeneous black (over 85%)
5=Homogeneous latino (over 85%)
6=Homogeneous asian (over 85%)
7=Homogeneous other (over 85%)
8=don't know
- (26) _____ Q26. Are there annual dues
0=no (SKIP TO Q27)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q27)
- (27-29) \$.00 How much dues
- (30) _____ Q27. Other membership requirements
0=no
1=yes
7=don't know

- (31) _____ Q28. Does ORG actively recruit
0=no (SKIP TO Q29)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q29)
- (32) _____ Canvassing/informal personal contact?
0=no
1=yes
- (33) _____ Mailings?
0=no
1=yes
- (34) _____ Telephoning?
0=no
1=yes
- (35) _____ Formal mass solicitation/nonpersonal?
0=no
1=yes
- (36) _____ Social Events?
0=no
1=yes
- (37) _____ Meetings?
0=no
1=yes
- (38) _____ Other?
0=no
1=yes

- (39) _____ Q29. Obstacles to increase membership
0=no (SKIP TO Q30)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q30)
- (40) _____ Inadequate resources (facilities, money, etc.)?
0=no
1=yes
- (41) _____ Apathy?
0=no
1=yes
- (42) _____ Intergroup conflict?
0=no
1=yes
- (43) _____ Interpersonal/intragroup conflicts?
0=no
1=yes
- (44) _____ Image of ORG?
0=no
1=yes
- (45) _____ Language/cultural barriers?
0=no
1=yes
- (46) _____ Too few active members (inadequate person-power)?
0=no
1=yes
- (47) _____ Other?
0=no
1=yes

- (48-49) _____ Q30. What attracts new members (CODE UP TO 4 ATTRACTIONS)
- (50-51) _____
- (52-53) _____
- (54-55) _____
- 01=specific crime issues
 02=general crime issue
 03=threats to physical nature of NBHD
 04=threats to social/demographic nature of NBHD
 05=threats by expansion/encroachment of gov't programs/other establishments
 06=interest in youth problems
 07=image of ORG-problem solving or representational
 08=commitment to community
 09=commitment to involvement/altruism
 10=to receive services provided
 11=status and power
 12=personal skill development
 13=social affiliation
 14=education and information
 15=enhance political knowledge
 16=to solve own problem/self interest or issues
 17=other
 97=don't know
- (56-57) _____ Q31. Why don't people get involved (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)
- (58-59) _____
- (60-61) _____
- (62-63) _____
- 00=unaware of ORG
 01=lack of time/conflicting obligations
 02=no perceived need/lack of issues
 03=apathy/lack of interest in joining groups/selfishness
 04=mistrust/suspicious of neighbors
 05=language and cultural barriers
 06=racial tensions
 07=image of ORG/ORGs in general
 08=personality clashes-internal conflict
 09=oppose ORGs stand on issues (policy conflict)
 10=other

- (64) _____ Q32. Change in ORG's membership in past year
- 0=decreased
 1=about the same
 2=increased
 7=don't know
- (65) _____ Q33a. Contact members by phone or in person to discuss ORG's activities and business?
- 0=no
 1=yes
- (66) _____ Q33b. Send members mailed information about ORG's activities and accomplishments?
- (67) _____ Q33c. Organize social events to bring members together?
- 0=no
 1=yes
- (68) _____ Q33d. Have active members contact those members who have become inactive or dropped out in order to get them reinvolved?
- 0=no
 1=yes
- (69) _____ Q33e. Use mass media?
- 0=no
 1=yes
- (70) _____ Q33f. Use other technique?
- 0=no
 1=yes

(71) _____
From your experience which of these approaches have been most effective in keeping members active?
(USE a THRU f ABOVE)

- 1=a
- 2=b
- 3=c
- 4=d
- 5=e
- 6=f
- 7=don't know

(80) 2

CARD 03

(1-3) _____ I.D.

(4) _____ Q34. Activities of ORG
Social events?
0=no
1=yes

(5) _____ Attend ORG meetings.
0=no
1=yes

(6) _____ Political activities?
0=no
1=yes

(7) _____ Serve on standing committees?
0=no
1=yes

(8) _____ Work on publications?
0=no
1=yes

(9) _____ Take part in crime activity?
0=no
1=yes

(10) _____ Take part in youth activity?
0=no
1=yes

(11) _____ Take part in housing activity?
0=no
1=yes

(12) _____ Recruit members/block or NBHD organizing?
0=no
1=yes

(13) _____ Take part in health care and social service delivery?
0=no
1=yes

(14) _____ Take part in seminars/workshops (education)?
0=no
1=yes

(15) _____ Take part in other activity?
0=no
1=yes

(16-17) _____ Q35. What are personal satisfactions? (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)

(18-19) _____

(20-21) _____

(22-23) _____

- 00=none, no satisfactions
- 01=challenge/excitement
- 02=personal recognition/exposure
- 03=self development and education
- 04=solve problems of their own
- 05=sense of personal accomplishment
- 06=personal influence/political power
- 07=social outlet
- 08=actualizing beliefs and ideology
- 09=feel needed
- 10=pride in ORG's effectiveness
- 11=commitment to community
- 12=commitment to involvement
- 13=cooperation or support from community
- 14=other

(24-25) _____ Q36. Why do members remain active? (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)

(26-27) _____

(28-29) _____

(30-31) _____

- 00=none are active
- 01=challenge/excitement
- 02=personal recognition/exposure
- 03=self development and education
- 04=solve problems of their own/self interest or issues
- 05=sense of personal accomplishment
- 06=personal influence or status/political power
- 07=social outlet
- 08=actualizing beliefs and ideology
- 09=feel needed
- 10=pride in ORG's effectiveness
- 11=commitment to community
- 12=commitment to involvement/altruism
- 13=enhance political knowledge
- 14=other
- 97=don't know

(32-33) _____ Q37. What are personal frustrations? (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)

(34-35) _____

(36-37) _____

(38-39) _____

- 00=none, no frustrations
- 01=inadequate money
- 02=inadequate member commitments/numbers
- 03=policy conflict within ORG
- 04=interpersonal conflict (intra-group)
- 05=administrative/leadership problems
- 06=dealing with public bureaucracy
- 07=lack of success-no tangible accomplishments
- 08=inter-group conflict
- 09=too time consuming
- 10=lack of cooperation/support from community
- 11=other

(40-41) _____ Q38. Why do members become inactive/drop-out? (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)

(42-43) _____

(44-45) _____

(46-47) _____

- 00=none inactive
- 01=die, old age, ill health
- 02=move out
- 03=burn out
- 04=conflicting obligations
- 05=accomplished what set out to do
- 06=loss of interest
- 07=intergroup conflict
- 08=interpersonal conflict (intra=group)
- 09=policy conflict
- 10=lack of success
- 11=discouragement over funding problems
- 12=not re-elected/appointed/not asked to renew position or membership
- 13=other
- 97=don't know

- (48) _____ Q39a. Are ORG's original goals the current goals?
 0=no
 1=yes (SKIP TO Q40)
 2=yes but expanded/additional goals
 3=don't know (SKIP TO Q39b second part)
- (49) _____ Q39b. What brought about the change? (CODE UP TO 2 RESPONSES)
 1=change in interest
 2=expand interest
 3=funding available
 4=other
- (50) _____
- (51-52) _____ What are *new* current goals? (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)
- (53-54) _____ 01=prevent crime
- (55-56) _____ 02=provide needed services
- (57-58) _____ 03=social cohesion/integration
 04=maintain NBHD-physical
 05=maintain/cope with NBHD-demographic
 06=improve NBHD-physical
 07=expansion/encroachment of gov't programs or other establishment
 08=youth problems
 09=ideological/political motivations
 10=availability of funding
 11=prevent social incivilities
 12=attain political power
 13=to act as umbrella/be part of coalition
 14=other

- (59-60) _____ Q40. What are current issues? (CODE UP TO 6 RESPONSES)
- (61-62) _____ 01=zoning
- (63-64) _____ 02=crime
- (65-66) _____ 03=youth
- (67-68) _____ 04=housing
- (69-70) _____ 05=physical maintenance
- 06=education
- 07=city services
- 08=unemployment
- 09=redlining
- 10=establishment/gov't encroachment
- 11=demographic changes
- 12=senior services
- 13=recreation
- 14=political issues
- 15=drugs
- 16=trying to get funds
- 17=publicity
- 18=traffic and parking
- 19=support other groups/form coalition or umbrella
- 20=physical or mental health care (also referrals)
- 21=organize neighborhood in general
- 22=other
- (71) _____ Q41. How were issues picked (CODE UP TO 3 RESPONSES)
- (72) _____ 1=board
- (73) _____ 2=problems brought by resident
- 3=problems brought by block clubs/other groups
- 4=consensus=clearly apparent problems
- 5=decided by membership/committees
- 6=funding incentive
- 7=suggestions by staff
- 8=other
- 9=don't know
- (80) _____ 3

CARD 04

(1-3) _____ I.D.

(4-5) _____ Q42. What ORG is doing/has done to solve problems (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)

- (6-7) _____
 - (8-9) _____
 - (10-11) _____
- 00=nothing is/has been done
 01=compile and distribute information
 02=start programs/services (e.g., youth, senior, drugs)
 03=participate in physical maintenance
 04=political/gov't pressure activities
 05=pressure private institutions
 06=attend ORG meetings
 07=committee work
 08=joined coalitions
 09=apply for money
 10=arrange social events
 11=organize neighborhood in general
 12=other

(12) _____ Q43a. Extent of NBHD crime problems

4=Big problem
 5=Moderate problem
 6=Slight problem
 7=No problem
 8=Don't know

(13) _____ Q43b. Has ORG done anything to prevent crime?

0=no (SKIP TO Q44.)
 1=yes (IF DISCUSSED ELSEWHERE REREAD AND CODE FOLLOWING)
 7=don't know (SKIP TO Q44)

(Q43b(1) on next page)

(14-15) _____

(16-17) _____

(18-19) _____

(20-21) _____

Q43b (1)What has been done? (CODE UP TO 4 RESPONSES)

- 00=nothing is/has been done
- 01=operation I.D.
- 02=patrols-walking or radio
- 03=block watches
- 04=block clubs
- 05=WhistleSTOP
- 06=BEAT REP
- 07=CLASP
- 08=SAFE
- 09=target hardening
- 10=request more from police
- 11=control police
- 12=senior citizen escorts
- 13=lighting
- 14=hire private police
- 15=meetings
- 16=indirect effort (e.g., youth programs or services)
- 17=promote police/community relations
- 18=other

(22) _____

Q43b (2)What was outcome?

- 0=negative
- 1=no change
- 2=positive
- 3=too soon to tell
- 4=mixed
- 7=don't know

- (23) _____ Q44. Has ORG tried to influen-e gov't policy?
0=no (SKIP TO Q45)
1=yes
7=don't know (SKIP TO Q45)
- (24) _____ How did ORG try to influence gov't policy?
Pressure agencies?
0=no
1=yes
- (25) _____ act as watchdogs?
0=no
1=yes
- (26) _____ attend meetings/hearings?
0=no
1=yes
- (27) _____ lobby & write letters?
0=no
1=yes
- (28) _____ pressure thru the media?
0=no
1=yes
- (29) _____ draft or sponsor legislative recommendations?
0=no
1=yes
- (30) _____ other?
0=no
1=yes

- (31-37) \$ _____ .00 Q45. Approximate annual budget of ORG
- (38) _____ Q46. Main ways ORG gets funds (RANK ORDER FIRST 3 BY PERCENT INFORMATION)
1=gov't funds
2=private foundations/institutions
3=membership dues
4=contributions from private individuals
5=business donations
6=local fund raising
7=other
8=don't know
9=refused
- (39) _____
- (40) _____
- (41) _____ Q47. Major ways funds are spent (RANK ORDER FIRST 3 BY PERCENT INFORMATION)
1=staff salaries
2=ORG overhead/maintenance
3=service programs
4=social activities/niceties
5=publications
6=mailings
7=other
8=don't know
9=refused
- (42) _____
- (43) _____
- Q48. ORG's means of communication

(44) _____ Q48aa. ORG newspaper/newsletter?

0=no (SKIP TO Q48ab)
1=yes

(45) _____ how often?

1=weekly
2=bi-weekly
3=monthly
4=quarterly
5=semi-annually
6=annually
7=other or as needed

(46) _____ Q48ab. mailings of information

0=no (SKIP TO Q48ac)
1=yes

(47) _____ how often? (USE CODES 1-7 FROM Q48aa "HOW OFTEN")

(48) _____ Q48ac. Handout flyers/leaflets?

0=no (SKIP TO Q48ac)
1=yes

(49) _____ how often? (USE CODES 1-7 FROM Q48aa "HOW OFTEN")

(50) _____ Q48ad. Annual reports?

0=no (SKIP TO Q48b)
1=yes

(51) _____ how often (USE CODES 1-7 FROM Q48aa "HOW OFTEN")

(52) _____ Q48b. Does ORG have mailing list?

0=no
1=yes

(53) _____ Q51. Did ORG provide literature/reports?

0=no
1=yes

(54) _____ Type of ORG

1=block club
2=community organization
3=coalition/umbrella group
4=problem specific agency
5=settlement house
6=business organization
7=other


(55) _____ Who coded interview?

1=Lieberman
2=Benben
3=Bester
4=Herz

(56) _____ Estimated SES of membership/NBHD

1=lower class
2=working class
3=middle class
4=upper or upper middle class
5=mixed

(80) _____ 4



END