


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
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Contract
GRANT # 79-TA-AX-0027

FINAL REPORT
TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS FOR LOCAL
ELECTED OFFICIALS

79332



National League of Cities
 1620 Eye Street, N.W.
 Washington, D. C.
 20006
 (202) 293-7310
 Cable: NLCITIES

OFFICERS:
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 Jessie M. Rattley
 Councilwoman, Newport News, Virginia
 First Vice President
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 Mayor, Savannah, Georgia
 Executive Director
 Alan Beals

December 17, 1980

Mr. James A. Caffrey
 Program Manager
 Office of Operations Support
 Office of Justice Assistance, Research
 and Statistics
 633 Indiana Avenue, N. W.
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

The National League of Cities is pleased to submit the enclosed final report under LEAA contract 79-TA-AX-0027 entitled "Terrorism Preparedness for Local Elected and Appointed Officials." I would like to express my appreciation for your support of this NLC effort to improve strategic policymaking in major U.S. cities. Looking ahead, we hope to continue the movement begun by the terrorism preparedness project.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

James R. Jarboe
 Assistant Director
 Office of Membership Services
 Public Safety

Enclosures

PAST PRESIDENTS: Tom Bradley, Mayor, Los Angeles, California; Henry W. Maier, Mayor, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Tom Moody, Mayor, Columbus, Ohio; DIRECTORS: R. Michael Amyx, Executive Director, Virginia Municipal League; Patrick J. Baca, Council President, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Stephen C. Bauer, Executive Director, League of Oregon Cities; Kenneth F. Bowen, Mayor, Lafayette, Louisiana; Kenneth G. Bueche, Executive Director, Colorado Municipal League; Henry G. Cisneros, Council Member, San Antonio, Texas; Charles O. Clark, Mayor, Long Beach, California; Willie Dell, Councilwoman, Richmond, Virginia; Arrington Dixon, Council Chairman, Washington, D.C.; Patrick A. Dunne, Executive Director, Massachusetts Municipal Association; Woody Etherly, Jr., Council Member, Fort Michigan; Carl T. Langford, Mayor, Orange, Florida; Ronald P. Lurie, Council Member, Las Vegas, Nevada; Jim McConn, Mayor, Houston, Texas; Ruth W. Messinger, Council Member, New York, New York; Ernest N. Morial, Mayor, New Orleans, Louisiana; John M. Patriarcho, Director, Michigan Municipal League; Kenneth Payne, Executive Director, Rhode Island League of Cities; Jayne H. Plank, Mayor, Reading, Massachusetts; Joseph P. Riley, Jr., Mayor, Charleston, South Carolina; Patricia Roach, Councilwoman, San Antonio, Texas; Charles Royer, Mayor, San Diego, California; James T. Ryan, Mayor, Arlington Heights, Illinois; Victor F. Swyden, Council Member, Kansas City, Missouri; Fred Turnage, Mayor, Hockley, Missouri; Dorothy Van Horn, Council Member, Jacksonville, Florida; John P. Watkins, Executive Director, Kentucky League of Municipalities; Hans Weinreb, Mayor, Hayward, California; Ted Wilson, Mayor, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Final Report
Terrorism Preparedness for Local Elected
 and Appointed Officials

A project undertaken by the Public Safety Program, Office of Membership Services, National League of Cities. Submitted to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for final project review under Grant Number 79-TA-AX-0027.

U.S. Department of Justice
 National Institute of Justice

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PREFACE

This final report on the "Terrorism Preparedness Project for Local Elected and Appointed Officials", was prepared for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration by Edwin P. McClain, consultant to the project, and Richard M. Dotson, the project director. It is designed throughout to illustrate the concrete achievements of the terrorism preparedness initiative, and to provide the sponsors with a final accounting of a series of activities undertaken by the National League of Cities to address a complex and potentially disruptive problem in major U.S. cities. It also documents the efforts of NLC's Public Safety Program within the Office of Membership Services to provide assistance to the League's membership.

Although it is not possible to acknowledge by name all of those who were associated with the project, we would like to extend a special thank you to those individuals and organizations that made a significant contribution to the project's successful conclusion. Such contributions were made by: the professional and support staff of NLC's Public Safety Program--especially James R. Jarboe--the Program Director and Karen Ruatto, staff assistant to the project; the members of NLC's Public Safety Subcommittee, headed by Mayor Kenneth Blackwell of Cincinnati, Ohio; Mr. Perry A. Rivkind Assistant Administrator in LEAA's Office of Operations. Support and his staff--Mr. Steven Gremminger and Mr. James A. Caffrey--the project monitors; Ambassador Anthony C.E. Quainton, the Chairman of the NSC's Special Coordinating Committee's Working Group on Terrorism and Director of the Department of State's Office for Combatting Terrorism; Mr. Thompson S. Crockett, Chief of the Emergency Program Center, the Department of Justice; Mr. David L. Marvil, Chief, Contingency Plans/Readiness Branch of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and Sebastian Mignosa, Chief of the Terrorism Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Support received from the staffs of the above Agencies is also acknowledged.

We are especially indebted to the following federal, city officials, and anti-terrorism experts who participated in the program of the National Working Session: Charles F. Renfrew, the U.S. Deputy Attorney General; Mr. John Macy, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; Mr. John E. Otto, Assistant Director, Planning

and Inspection Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Honorable William H. Hudnut, Mayor of Indianapolis, Indiana; Mr. George Rodericks, former Director of the Mayor's Command Post, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Sam Nolan, Public Safety Director, Chicago, Illinois; the Honorable Charles Royer, Mayor of Seattle, Washington, Mr. John E. Karkashian, former Deputy Director of the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism, currently with Crisis Management Associates Ltd., Washington, D.C.; Mr. Robert L. Rabe, former Assistant Chief of Police, Washington, D.C., now with Crisis Management Associates; Mr. Fred Heckman, News Director, WIBC, Indianapolis, Indiana; and Mr. Sam Jordan, Special Assistant to the Mayor, Washington, D.C.

We should also like to thank the mayors, city managers and other senior officials who participated in the National Working Session, and those city officials who gave generously of their time during the project's follow-up Site Visits. Our appreciation is also extended to Mr. James Kunde, and his staff, from the Urban Affairs Program of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation who provided supplemental financial and staff support. Finally, we are indebted to the Department of State which generously provided its' diplomatic conference and reception facilities.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

While public order is a goal embraced by most private citizens, as well as by public servants, there have always been individuals and organizations that attempt to promote alternative systems of order through coercion or terrorism. Today, more than ever, such activities pose a distinct challenge to municipal officials who are responsible for maintaining order in their cities. Yet, modern-day strategic or policy-level preparedness for terrorism has tended to lag behind tactical or police preparedness. In light of this situation, the National League of Cities (NLC) recently organized a series of activities designed to address strategic policy-making and to focus the attention of local elected and appointed officials on the problem of terrorism, or the calculated use of coercion for political ends. This final report summarizes the results of the League's efforts.

With financial support from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), NLC planned and carried out the "Terrorism Preparedness Project for Local Elected and Appointed Officials"--a day and a half National Working Session (NWS) for municipal officials, held in Washington, D.C., May 5-6, 1980. The conference was augmented by follow-up Site Visits to nine U.S. cities whose representatives had attended the conference. During the Site Visits, project staff sought to determine the

state of terrorism preparedness in the nine cities, and to discover if the NWS had influenced attitudes and action towards local preparedness for terrorism.

It is hoped that this final report will help municipal officials respond effectively and efficiently to threats or acts of terrorism, as well as provide a basis for the wider sharing of project results with participants at the local level.

The report is organized into seven parts: an introduction, an executive summary of the findings, a description and analysis of the NWS, an analysis of the follow-up Site Visits, an overview of the project's evaluative design, an evaluation of the project by NLC's Public Safety Subcommittee, and a conclusion. Appendices are also attached.

PART II: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Experience provided by the terrorism preparedness project guides attention to several points that need to be highlighted. For your convenience they may be summarized as follows:

- o Local elected and appointed officials can be successfully mobilized for consciousness raising activities on the problem of terrorism. Overall, the NLC terrorism preparedness project created an awareness among municipal officials of the need for a realistic and comprehensive response to threats or acts of terrorism in U.S. cities. But while they recognized the importance of a technically efficient and effective law enforcement response, they also expressed considerable concern about basic policy issues raised by the NWS, such as the need to enhance intergovernmental cooperation; to develop local executive-level crisis management policies; to increase awareness of the local, national, and international dimensions of terrorism; and to direct attention to available and needed resources, both federally and locally, for responding to terrorism.
- o In May, 1980, the NWS for terrorism preparedness was held in Washington, D.C. at the U.S. Department of State's prestigious diplomatic conference facility. It was attended by 33 political and administrative leaders representing 28 cities and one state municipal association. Overall, the participants were exceedingly favorable in their evaluation of the NWS's objectives, agenda and process. Participants were especially positive about the case-by-case approach which relied heavily upon practicing city officials who had, in some cases, direct experience in managing an unfolding terrorist incident. The NWS consistently received high marks for organization, quality of speakers, and the opportunity provided for participants to communicate with federal officials and counterparts from other cities. Although the NWS

participants were encouraged to make criticisms of the conference, they did so sparingly. A few participants did indicate, however, that too much emphasis had been placed on hostage-barricade incidents. And there was some mixed sentiment expressed about the length of the conference and the physical setting. These and other criticisms are presented in more detail in PART III of this report.

- o The National Working Session paid considerable attention to the proper role for the mayor and/or city manager in an unfolding terrorist incident, and this emphasis was well received by participating officials. Although many felt that their attention should be focused on planning to avert terrorism, others indicated that they have an unavoidable role to play in an unfolding terrorist incident, and many appeared unwilling to have the management of such incidents entirely in the hands of law enforcement officials. At the same time, most participants expressed the opinion that local political and administrative leaders may have a limited role to play during such incidents. Law enforcement officials frequently indicated during the NWS and the follow-up that mayors and/or city managers, by becoming directly involved in terrorist incidents, can inhibit the effectiveness of the police response. Therefore, finding the proper role (given this mix of strategic policy and its interface with the command authority of police officials) remains as a critical issue that must be resolved when officials begin to think about and respond to terrorism at the local level.
- o A substantial amount of federal-local cooperation was involved during all phases of the project. The Washington-based meeting and the follow-up evaluation revealed that such cooperation had been a strong point of the project. One outcome was that the NLC project staff was able to respond to the requests of certain cities with specialized services that related to the substantive thrust of the project. Such services helped to improve federal-local cooperation and further sharing of information between U.S. cities.

During July and August, 1980, project staff members visited nine of the twenty-eight cities represented at the NWS in order to examine the state of terrorism preparedness

in U.S. cities, and to learn if the NWS had made a difference in the way participating officials think about and act toward the problem of terrorism. From their interviews they learned that:

- o In general, strategic or policy-level preparedness for threats or acts of terrorism and its aftermath was low. Police preparedness, on the other hand, constitutes an exception to this generalized finding. Policy-level preparedness for terrorism as a discrete issue is simply not a high priority item in many U.S. cities. This finding is, in part, a function of local risk assessment, and a feeling on the part of city officials that such planning should occur in the context of an overall emergency preparedness process. Approximately two-thirds of the officials participating in the NWS rated the risk of terrorism in their cities to be moderate to low. Although some cities appeared to be better prepared for terrorism than did others, no single factor, including an assessment of risk, explains local terrorism preparedness or the lack thereof. Yet, high-risk cities were more likely to have terrorism contingency plans within their emergency preparedness framework. Nevertheless, such plans were thought by many local officials to lack realism and comprehensiveness. Terrorism preparedness planning tends to occur within one of several contexts: regular police planning, the general emergency preparedness planning, or planning for special events - for example, the 1981 meeting of the International Union of Local Officials (IULA) in Columbus, Ohio; the 1982 World's Fair in Knoxville, Tennessee; and the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, California.
- o Findings from the Site Visits and the follow-up questionnaire indicated that technical preparedness for terrorism--well-trained and technically sophisticated police, coordinated local resources, and adequate command and control centers--received high marks from local officials. Further analysis also reinforced the finding, reported above, that policy level preparedness lags behind police preparedness in many of the selected U.S. cities. Taken as a whole, the follow-up evaluations demonstrated that involving key policy officials in advance crisis management processes, fostering sensitivity to

national and international concerns, and developing better media relations were policy areas that require further improvement. Although political and administrative leaders reported active involvement in an advanced crisis management process, the Site Visits revealed that such involvement was minimal with regard to terrorism planning. With some noteworthy exceptions, we learned that mayors and city managers had been only peripherally involved in planning for terrorism as a discrete issue. In many cities, such leaders had never met with police and emergency preparedness officials to discuss threats or acts of terrorism. This pattern was found in both high and low-risk cities.

Municipal officials in the high-risk cities displayed a greater sensitivity to national or international concerns than did their counterparts in the low-to moderate risk cities. However, only police officials suggested that political and administrative leaders might have something to learn from their counterparts in non-American cities where terrorism has been more prevalent. Media relations consistently received the lowest marks in the cities we visited and from those officials responding to the follow-up questionnaire. Although improving their media relations was thought to be an important aspect of strategic or policy level preparedness, municipal officials were not optimistic about their ability to strengthen such relations. Leaders frequently cited their inability to influence a range of aggressive and competitive media, armed with communications capabilities and information sources that frequently exceed those of municipal agencies.

- o The follow-up evaluations revealed that the terrorism preparedness project has made a difference in the way participating municipal officials think about terrorism. Importantly, the project has focused the attention of participating officials on selected aspects of a previously neglected problem, and, therefore, it has helped to raise the consciousness of these local leaders. Reportedly, those interviewed, as well as those who answered the follow-up questionnaire, stressed that the most valuable outcome of the project had been their own increased attention to terrorism.

There were indications that this heightened sense of awareness has also facilitated increased levels of activity in certain cities, especially in the cities visited during the follow-up. In one smaller, low-risk city, for instance, the mayor and city manager have actively worked with their city council to improve plans for responding to a range of extraordinary events, including terrorism. A formal motion to improve local preparedness was passed by the city council, and civic leaders, local business representatives, and members of community organizations have been recently mobilized for special seminars on various aspects of the terrorism problem. In addition, city officials have called in a recognized authority on terrorism to help place terrorism concerns in the local context.

In one larger, high-risk city officials were stimulated, prior to the NWS, to convene several policy-level meeting with the state's Attorney General, the state police, and mayors and city managers from other cities in order to examine the potential for civil disturbances, including terrorism. After the NWS, these same officials undertook a planning initiative to deal more effectively with civil disturbances and terrorism.

The majority of cities we surveyed reported that as a result of the project they had reassured themselves of the adequacy of pre-existing plans and had revised such plans where necessary. Strictly speaking, however, it is more appropriate to view the terrorism preparedness project as a catalyst to rather than a direct cause of increased awareness and action. Although most city officials reported a need for future terrorism preparedness, this need was expressed more frequently in the high-risk cities. Local officials consistently expressed the need for preparedness for civil disorders regardless of their terrorism risk assessment. It is a commonplace situation for local officials, including the police, to defer future terrorism preparedness until threats or acts of terrorism become more prevalent in their jurisdictions. Leaders involved in the terrorism preparedness project indicated that assistance from state and federal governmental agencies and public interest groups would be very helpful in continuing activities initiated, in part, by the terrorism preparedness project.

An obstacle frequently cited was the difficulty of convincing departments other than the police to plan for terrorism and its aftermath. In most cases the only time such departments ever think of preparing for terrorism is in planning for special events such as those cited earlier. Law enforcement officials were generally more responsive than political and administrative leaders to the inquiry about obstacles in planning for terrorism, a finding that reinforces a central premise of the NLC initiative: local elected and appointed officials have paid less attention to the problem of terrorism than have the police. The participants suggested several approaches to future preparedness, including adding more realism and comprehensiveness to existing crisis management and preparation procedures; anticipating and planning for security problems related to special events; and learning more about their cities' vulnerability to potential acts of terrorism.

- o Finally, as stipulated in the project design, a four-part evaluation was undertaken to guide attention to the effective and formal factors responsible for results of the project. This comprehensive evaluation was undertaken by project staff, the Public Safety Subcommittee of NLC, an outside evaluator from the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, and local officials who had participated in the NWS and the follow-up activities. Participants in the NWS completed two evaluation questionnaires, one at the conference and one several months later.

The evaluation employed a detailed interview schedule for examining terrorism preparedness in nine U.S. cities. It should be stressed, however, that the Site Visits did not constitute an in-depth, systematic assessment of the state of local terrorism preparedness. Therefore, the results of these Site Visits, although critical to the project design, must be viewed with appropriate caution and healthy skepticism.

A continuous and careful evaluation of the project by NLC's Public Safety Subcommittee provided overall project guidance, helpful suggestions and criticisms, and encouragement to project staff. The results of this evaluation, presented in detail in this final report, demonstrate that the project successfully realized its main objectives: to create an awareness among local elected and appointed officials of the need for an effective, total preparedness approach in

dealing with threats or acts of terrorism, and to examine terrorism preparedness in selected U.S. cities. These positive outcomes were attributed, in part, to an effective and efficient organization of the NWS, to the decision to rely heavily on experienced city officials as learning facilitators, and to the stimulation of interaction between federal and local officials. The prestige of the National League of Cities and the U.S. Department of State were formal factors that also accounted for project results.

Although the terrorism preparedness project produced some noteworthy results, it would be incorrect to conclude that the problem of terrorism in U.S. cities has been adequately dealt with over the long range. On the contrary, field research has suggested that considerably more thinking and action is required by officials at all levels of government (and civic organizations) in order to strengthen and sustain local terrorism preparedness. If urban terrorism increases in the U.S., a cautious and prudent response will be necessary, one that protects individual civil liberties, and, at the same time, maintains our existing system of public and civic order. The planners of this project intended that it would provide, at least in part, the necessary stimulation for such efforts.

Introduction

The National League of Cities project on "Terrorism Preparedness for Local Elected and Appointed Officials" was developed in response to a recognition that highly successful anti-terrorism training programs for municipal law enforcement officials, presented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and others, needed to be matched by a complementary effort for mayors and city managers in our nation's larger cities. U.S. Deputy Attorney General Charles B. Renfrew stated this need well in a keynote talk to political and administrative city leaders who gathered in Washington, D.C. for the project's National Working Session:

As public officials you share with me the recognition that a major terrorist incident--whatever its target or motivation--is a challenge to the credibility of government. Terrorism...the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain political goals, through instilling fear, intimidation or coercion...is really an attack on the established order of society itself. Its purpose is the disruption of normal political and social life. Hence, it is the proper concern not only of law enforcement, but of elected and appointed officials such as those gathered here today.

The efforts of the project were thus shaped and aimed primarily toward those officials in our cities entrusted with executive authority and policy-making responsibilities.

Conditioning Factors

It was recognized early on that the project would have to take into account certain conditioning factors:

- o the scope and nature of municipal offices and governing authorities in our nation's cities varies widely;
- o those incidents of political terrorism or quasi-terrorism (e.g. hostage-taking incidental to the commission of other crimes or terroristic actions by unstable individuals) have been of relatively low magnitude;
- o Incidents of political terrorism in the United States have tended to be concentrated in a relatively few geographic regions; and,
- o practical experience in managing the response to terrorist acts has largely been limited to domestic law enforcement agencies without the direct or frequent involvement of the civil authorities.

It was, therefore, anticipated that the project need/ recognition might be low to moderate in most cities--but high in certain cities --and that the initial judgment of many city administrations might be that terrorism preparedness is a "police matter". It was further felt that the variety of city governmental structures, operational sophistication and experience precluded universal "how-to" approaches to terrorism preparedness. However, it was judged possible to construct a relatively homogeneous, if generalized, framework of project activities, recommendations and suggestions that could be selectively adapted by participating officials into their own city context as part of their overall emergency crisis management set-up.

Project Message

Taking a leaf from the 1976 Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism, the project sought to communicate to key local officials the basic message that, with respect to the likelihood of terrorism occurring in their cities, "...there is as little basis for complacency as there is for paranoia..." and to advocate "...a balanced, realistic approach based on an appraisal of the present and future risks and of the minimum action required by civil authority."

Project Objectives

Our objectives were several. We aimed to enhance the local, state and federal cooperation necessary to develop a total response by all available resources to meet terrorist situations within cities. We endeavored to develop an increased awareness of the need for local executive-level crisis management plans and policies; of the local, national and international concerns which may be involved; and, of the available, needed resources, including federal, which may be brought to bear or which should be developed locally.

For purposes of this final report, the Terrorism Preparedness project can usefully be divided into key phases: the National Working Session and the Site Visits to selected cities. A comprehensive, four part evaluation component was built into both phases and forms the basis for most of the commentary which follows.

National Working Session

The development and presentation of a conference, or National Working Session, on terrorism preparedness for local elected and appointed officials was the key to accomplishing many central project objectives. The foundation was laid for the important Site Visits phase which was designed to carry forward and strengthen the project objectives.

The NWS was held May 5-6, 1980, at the U.S. Department of State diplomatic conference facility, with 33 mayors, city managers, chief operating or administrative officers, executive assistants, public safety or criminal justice planning directors in attendance. They represented 28 cities and one state municipal association (Appendix A). All cities were of over 100,000 in population, included some of the largest in the country, and represented a fairly wide geographic mix. These cities were drawn from a larger (60 plus) invitation list developed from a general assessment of cities considered more likely to experience a terrorist incident. This informal assessment was based on the project staff's polling of expert opinion and application of criteria considered relevant, e.g. city size; FBI data on domestic terrorist incidents over the last several years; other news reporting over the same period; the presence of potential terrorist targets, e.g. diplomatic and consular facilities, major corporate headquarters, energy facilities, etc.

A conscious decision was made to exclude police officials as city representatives to the NWS. Correspondingly, it was

decided to use civilian city officials with actual incident experience as speakers and panelists, in lieu of law enforcement officials, whenever possible. This was done to emphasize and preserve the project focus on chief city executives and to create a conference environment for such officials and their top deputies which would maximize uninhibited discussion among themselves and with federal and private (anti-terrorism) experts.

The 1½ day program itself represented a further adjustment to the target audience. It was felt that the originally project 2½ day program was too long to be attractive for the busy schedules of major city executives and that a more condensed format could successfully meet the basic project objectives.

A NWS conference participant's Notebook was prepared to provide needed background and working materials for the sessions and to serve as a basic reference for use by the participants in discussing and sharing the results of the NWS with other home city officials.

The program agenda (Appendix 3-1) and speakers/panelists (Appendix 3-2) covered a number of substantive areas:

- o The keynote address (Appendix C-1) by Deputy Attorney General Renfrew provided an overview of the boundaries of the domestic terrorist threat and the federal capabilities and resources that are available in response;
- o The hostage incidents panel discussed the role of the mayor or city manager during a terrorist/hostage incident. The objective was to examine real incidents that have taken place in this country through the eyes of the panelists, who had actually participated in the responses.

It was hoped to identify some of the key problems, decision points and policy choices which may have required actions by the chief city executive or his/her participation in collective crisis decision-making. Other areas the panelists were asked to touch upon were: how the incident management response was organized; how the chief city executive became involved and monitored the developing situation; how overlapping authorities and resources were coordinated, and; what public or media information role the city executive may have played. Finally, the panel was to consider how each particular terrorist incident affected other normal city government operations and what post-incident lessons learned, actions or plans for future crisis management may have emerged.

- o The Working Luncheon address (Appendix C-2) by Ambassador Anthony Quainton built upon Judge Renfrew's description of the federal government's domestic response program by placing it in the larger context of international terrorism and our national security and foreign policy concerns. Speaking as Chairman of the National Security Council/Special Coordinating Committee's interagency Working Group on Terrorism, he underscored the U.S. Government's commitment to an essential partnership between federal and local agencies based on a better understanding of each other's problems and a mutual respect for each other's capabilities.
- o The Incident Management Workshop, presented by an outside consultant, was constructed to bring into more practical focus the city executive's policy and operational decision-making role during the management of a terrorist/hostage incident having state, federal and possible international implications. An incremental, simulation scenario format was used under the general direction of the consultant to expose participants to key issues, elicit their responses and determine how they prioritized these responses. The consultant prepared a post-conference evaluation of the workshop. (Appendix D).
- o The Media Issues panel was intended to develop further insights for mayors and city managers on their media relations and/or public information role and needs during a terrorist incident. The panelists reflected elected official, police and practicing journalist perspectives and, in several cases, actual incident experience.

- o The presentation on the Washington, D.C. "Mayor's Command Post" was designed to offer the participants a unique crisis operations model for municipal executives that they might use as a reference in evaluating their own city's capabilities or needs.
- o The concluding address (Appendix C-3) by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Director John Macy spoke to the special coordinating responsibilities of civil authorities for dealing with the aftermath of larger scale, disruptive terrorism--consequences management--and of the need to link the local, state and federal capabilities.

NWS Evaluation

At the conclusion of the NWS, participants were asked to anonymously complete a four part questionnaire (Appendix E-1) which was part of the conference notebook. Twenty responses were received.

Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the post-conference questionnaire was twofold. While their participation in the NWS was still fresh on their minds, we wanted the respondents to evaluate its effectiveness with respect to the clarity, relevance and achievement of Working Session Objectives; the impact of specific Agenda segments and speakers, and; the helpfulness of particular Process elements. Second, we sought, through a series of open-ended questions, information to help us decide how to follow up on the NWS during the city Site Visits.

Overview of the Findings

- o NWS Objectives. Approximately two-thirds of the questionnaire respondents consistently indicated that the objectives were clearly stated, understood and relevant. The overall achievement

satisfaction ratings were positive with only isolated dissents. The objective best achieved was developing an awareness of the need for local executive level crisis management plans and policies. The least successful objective was fostering an awareness of the available incident response resources, including federal, which may be brought to bear or which should be developed locally.

- o NWS Agenda. Seventeen of the twenty respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the Incident Management Workshop helped them increase their awareness of the issues involved in a terrorist/hostage situation; allowed them to respond to the scenario in a realistic fashion, and; helped them prioritize or order their response in the event of an actual incident. Also very well received were the Hostage Incidents Panel and the Working Luncheon. The addresses by the Deputy Attorney General and the Director of FEMA received good to lukewarm ratings. The responses to the Media Issues Panel and the Mayor's Command Post presentation were decidedly mixed.
- o NWS Process. Overall, the respondents assigned high marks to the mix and interrelationship of process elements that made up the NWS. Approximately 90% of the respondents agreed that the NWS helped them to identify new ways of looking at their roles in terrorist incident management. They singled out for strongest approval the participation in the NWS of individuals from various jurisdictions and/or agencies at the local and federal levels who have had practical experience in managing terrorist/hostage incidents. Over half of the respondents strongly agreed that this practical orientation was quite helpful. The Incident Management Workshop was again rated very high as an educational technique; the panel discussions, moderators and distinguished speakers, by comparison, received good but less enthusiastic evaluations. Over two-thirds of the respondents indicated that they had made some professional contacts at the NWS that will be useful to them in the future.

With respect to the open-ended questions to which the NWS participants were invited to volunteer responses, individual comments included:

- o It would have been better to spend more time on: all subjects (many respondents); the Incident Management Workshop (almost half the respondents); dealing with the media in terrorist incidents (several respondents); discussions and informal exchanges among the participants; intelligence gathering as the key to appropriate action against terrorists or would be terrorists; examining chief executive actions priorities and alternatives in crisis situations; jurisdictional questions; identifying federal agency contacts and their capabilities to assist local government (several respondents); the prospects for terrorist acts happening; non-hostage incidents; in-depth analysis of one or two cases; the command center; the state role in incidents.
- o It would have been better to spend less time on: "war stories" (several respondents); talking about physical facilities such as the mayor's command post; FEMA and international examples; letting participants "flounder" in hypothetical situations.
- o If the NWS were repeated, the following changes were suggested: provide more situations and clinical analysis of real cases focused on the city executive's emotional, mental and political reactions; provide "best answers" to the situations; more interaction on the development of contingency plans and a decision-making model; present workshop scenario at the beginning of the conference then "de-bug" in small groups; more panel presentations, questions and answers; better integration of panel presentations by moderators; broader participation in the NWS by police chiefs, public safety information officers (several respondents); add more role-playing; provide evaluation of individual cities likely to have terrorist activities.
- o With respect to what criteria the project staff should use in determining the success or failure of the NWS, nearly all suggestions focused on following-up with participating cities in order to see what changes or actions, if any, they take or intend to take regarding plans or facilities to handle terrorist situations in the wake of the NWS.
- o Asked what they liked best about the NWS, individual respondents said it was extremely well organized, to the point and not drawn out; praised the selection of experienced speakers with first hand knowledge of actual incidents that could be reviewed and discussed; called it informative, realistic and stimulating; liked

the fact that the subject was being addressed for local officials, and contacts could be made; again praised the incident workshop and panel presentations, and; liked the isolated, attractive setting.

- o Asked what they liked least about the NWS, the few respondents were very sparing in their criticism. Isolated criticisms included: again the lack of sufficient time; tendencies on the part of some speakers to "showboat" or repeat themselves; too much emphasis on one or two actual incidents; not enough specifics on "how-to" assess city preparedness and develop a crisis management plan; a disorganized workshop; an opinionated, unobjective workshop moderator; lack of overall structure to the program and the large room setting.
- o Aspects of the NWS that received both positive and negative comments were: the length of the conference, the physical setting, and the emphasis placed on the mayor's specific terrorist incidents. Some participants felt, for instance, that the conference had been too short, whereas others thought it was about right; some seemed to enjoy the conference facility donated by the Department of State, while others would have preferred a smaller room and some felt that too much attention had been directed toward the Mayor's Command Post in Washington, D.C., whereas others found this unique command and control center to be both interesting and relevant to their local context. Sentiment about the ratio of discussion to lectures was similarly mixed. This mix of positive and negative responses is to be expected, and it is perhaps best viewed as a function of contrasting individual preferences and operating styles, rather than of the NWS per se.

Conclusion

The NWS was the key event in the terrorism preparedness project. It successfully focused the attention of civil authorities on a previously neglected problem, and exposed them to new and, hopefully, useful information. The NWS asked participants to assess the potential risk of terrorism to their cities, and thereby created a situation in which

city officials would have to make decisions about the adequacy of their cities' crisis management plans in light of their risk assessment. Additionally, a positive result of the NWS was its reported influence on the mind sets of the participating city officials. It sought to improve strategic policy making by subjecting the role of the mayor and/or city manager before, during and after an unfolding terrorist incident, to closer scrutiny. It did not, however, reach a conclusion as to the proper role for such civil authorities. Yet, the NWS provided participants with an opportunity to examine a problem that is decidedly not within the exclusive domain of law enforcement authorities. Also, the NWS laid the groundwork for the important follow-up phase of the terrorism preparedness project. This Site Visit phase was particularly critical in realizing project objectives.

PART IV: THE FOLLOW-UP SITE VISITS

During July and August 1980, interviews were conducted with local government officials in nine major American cities who participated in the NWS. The interviews were the principal follow-up activity to that session and were conducted by the project staff and Mr. Edwin P. McClain of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. (The Kettering Foundation had earlier agreed to provide supplementary financial and staff support to the project).

The cities visited were Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco, California, Ft. Worth, Texas, Newark, New Jersey, Knoxville, Tennessee, Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio and Boston, Massachusetts. They were chosen based on a mixture of criteria, including geographic and size mix, quality of participation in the NWS, and, in some cases, because of upcoming special events, e.g., 1981 meeting of the International Union of Local Officials (IULA) in Columbus; 1982 World's Fair in Knoxville, and; 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles.

Major interviews of approximately ninety minutes apiece were conducted with the following officials who attended the NWS.:

- o Ezunial Burts
Executive Assistant to the Mayor of Los Angeles

- o Ray Blair
City Manager of San Diego
- o Rotea Gilford
Executive Director of the Mayor's Criminal Justice Council,
San Francisco
- o Robert Herchert
City Manager of Ft. Worth, Texas
Ft. Worth
- o Alan Zalkind
Executive Director of the Office of Criminal Justice Planning
Newark
- o Kenneth Blackwell
Mayor of Cincinnati
- o Sylvester Murray
City Manager of Cincinnati
- o Stephen Dunleavy
Assistant to the Mayor for Public Safety
Boston

Scheduling conflicts necessitated briefer interviews with:

- o William Ricker
Chief Operating Officer of Knoxville
- o Ron Poole
Executive Assistant to the Mayor of Columbus, Ohio

Secondary interviews of varying lengths were conducted with Dianne Feinstein, Mayor of San Francisco; Tom Moody, Mayor of Columbus; the Directors of Public Safety of Cincinnati and Columbus; the Chiefs of Police in San Diego, San Francisco, Ft. Worth, Columbus; and senior police officials in Los Angeles and Knoxville. Project staff also met with other officials responsible for emergency or disaster preparedness activities in Los Angeles, San Diego,

San Francisco and Columbus, and visited a number of their emergency operations centers (EOC's).

A detailed questionnaire was used to guide the major interviews (Appendix E-2). This questionnaire was also mailed to city officials who attended the NWS but were not visited during the follow-up. The results of the mailed questionnaire (10 were returned), are quite consistent with the interview results. Since the interviews provided more in-depth information, this discussion draws heavily on what was learned during the Site Visits.

Purpose of the Follow-up

The purpose of the follow-up activities was twofold. During the major interviews project staff wanted to assess the state of local terrorism preparedness in the cities referenced above. Second, they wanted to learn if the NWS had made a difference in the attitudes and actions of these urban officials regarding threats or acts of terrorism. The secondary discussions were designed to reveal how well prepared these officials think their cities are for a range of extraordinary events, ranging from natural disasters and acts of terrorism to civil disturbances.

Overview of the Findings

An overview of the findings, presented below, demonstrates that the NLC has identified a problem in American cities that has not, as yet, received sustained and serious attention by appointed or elected officials. The NWS, while of

considerable value as a consciousness raising activity, is best viewed as a first step toward addressing the potential problem of terrorist violence in American cities. Also, the follow-up revealed that activity resulting from the NWS is just getting underway, and the Site Visits probably stimulated more activity than would otherwise have occurred.

Terrorism Preparedness

In general, it was learned that local preparedness for terrorism and its aftermath was low. Approximately two-thirds of the officials participating in the NWS rated the risk of terrorism in their cities to be moderate to low. In the high-risk cities, planning for threats or acts of terrorist violence was more advanced than in cities with a low assessment of risk; yet, in the high-risk cities planning tended to lack realism and comprehensiveness. High-risk cities tend to be located in the more populous, coastal regions, whereas low risk cities are frequently found in the less densely populated inland regions, and have a relatively homogenous population. Also preparedness for terrorism is not strictly a function of risk assessment; some high-risk cities appeared to be better prepared than did other high-risk cities, and some moderate to low-risk cities appeared comparable to high risk-cities in their terrorism preparedness.

Planning for terrorism as a discrete event has received far less attention by city officials than has planning for a range of extraordinary events including natural disasters and civil disturbances. Appropriately enough, if terrorism preparedness exists, it tends to occur in the context of police planning and a larger emergency preparedness framework. However, in cities where terrorism planning does exist, such plans have yet to be fully integrated into emergency preparedness procedures:

Planning for terrorism was also thought to require easy access to useful information at the federal level, a condition many local officials felt was currently absent. Finally, it was recognized that planning for the unpredictable is fraught with inherent difficulties and ambiguities. ✓

Technical aspects of terrorism preparedness received high marks from well over two-thirds of the local officials participating in the NWS. Such aspects included: police capabilities, local-federal cooperation, the existence of command center facilities, and the capability to coordinate resources of local government in the event of a large scale, disruptive terrorist incident. The following policy level characteristics of terrorism preparedness consistently received the lowest marks: the involvement of key policy officials in an advance crisis management process, a sensitivity to national and international concerns,

and the development of media relations and public information guidelines. These evaluations by local officials served to confirm one of the organizing premises of the NWS: terrorism preparedness for policy level officials is much neglected, and a needed innovation in the overall societal response to the problem of contemporary urban terrorism. With some noteworthy exceptions, we learned that mayors and city managers have only been peripherally involved in planning for terrorism as a discrete issue. In many cities, political and administrative leaders had never met with police and emergency preparedness officials to discuss terrorism or threat of such violence. This pattern was found in both high and low-risk cities. It should be noted, however, that local officials felt they were adequately involved in a larger planning and crisis management process, one not directly concerned with terrorism planning.

Although administrative and political leaders in the larger high-risk cities displayed a greater sensitivity to national or international concerns than their counterparts in the lower-risk cities, they did not mention the desirability of learning from non-American cities where terrorism has been more prevalent. Police officials did display such sensitivities, however.

Developing better media relations received the lowest marks in the cities visited by project staff. Well over

half of the surveyed local officials thought such relations were poor. While improving their media relations was considered an important aspect of local terrorism preparedness, municipal officials were not optimistic about their ability to strengthen such relations. Their inability to influence an aggressive and competitive media, one with communications capabilities and information sources that frequently exceed those of municipal agencies, was cited as a primary problem by local officials.

Did the National Working Session Make a Difference?

Over 90% of the surveyed local officials (including Site Visits) indicated that the NWS had made a difference in the way they now think about and act toward terrorism, or the calculated use of violence for political ends. More specifically, local officials indicated that the NWS facilitated the dissemination of useful information, provided a view of how other cities are responding to the threat of terrorism, created an opportunity for a substantive dialogue among counterparts, and provided them with access to both Washington-based policy officials and potential sources of funding. Some appointed officials also responded that the conference in Washington demonstrated to their superiors and associates that terrorism preparedness is a legitimate policy issue, one that requires more attention by both appointed and elected officials.

Most importantly, the NWS and the Site Visits focused

the attention of participating officials on a previously neglected problem, and thus helped to raise the consciousness of these officials. Those interviewed stressed, time and again, an increased awareness of terrorism as the most valuable outcome of the NWS. This finding also holds for cities that were not visited, an outcome that was also revealed by the follow-up questionnaires mailed to all the cities represented at the NWS. Moreover, it is clear that the NWS and the Site Visits served as a stimulus to activity. Local officials were placed in a position of reviewing their plans, and making a decision about the adequacy of such plans. In preparation for the Site Visits, meetings were held, plans were reviewed, relevant officials were briefed, and more attention was focused on terrorism than would have otherwise been the case.

The heightened sense of awareness, noted above, has facilitated increased levels of activity in certain cities. In one medium size Midwestern city, for instance, the mayor and the city manager have actively worked with their city council to improve the adequacy of plans to respond to a range of extraordinary events including terrorism. A formal motion was passed by the city council in order to improve local preparedness. Also civic leaders, local business representatives, and members of community organizations have been recently mobilized in this same city for special seminars on various aspects of the terrorism problem.

Other cities have also reported activities resulting directly from their participation in the NWS. In one large high-risk city with an heterogenous population, officials were stimulated, as a result of an invitation to the NWS, to convene several meetings with the state attorney general, the state police and the mayors and city managers from other cities in the state to examine the potential for civil disturbances, including terrorism. Immediately after the NWS, these same city officials undertook a planning initiative to deal more effectively and with extraordinary events. An ongoing dimension of this planning process has been to find an acceptable role for the mayor and/or city manager prior to, during and after a civil disturbance or act of terrorism. Nevertheless, it is perhaps more appropriate to view the NWS as a catalyst to rather than a cause of terrorism preparedness activities in the two cities discussed above.

While activity levels in the above two cities may be higher than in other local jurisdictions, many officials reported similar efforts in their cities to follow-up on the NWS by improving their emergency preparedness plans, and by sharing information provided by the NWS with their associates. Those cities hosting upcoming special events capable of attracting and/or generating terrorist activity have been particularly active in planning for security related problems. Upon request, NLC staff were able

to provide specialized services to cities where special events are to be held. Such services tended to focus on improving local-federal cooperation and facilitating the sharing of experience between cities. For example, efforts are underway in certain cities to learn from the experiences of other cities where planning for special events is commonplace.

However, in those cities that frequently host prominent international and national figures and that have experienced threats or acts of terrorism, officials were less likely to credit the NWS with having a direct impact on their terrorism preparedness activities. In these largely high-risk cities, where planning for a range of extraordinary is more extensive, an approach that goes beyond consciousness raising was thought to be necessary for future terrorism preparedness activities.

Over 95% of surveyed officials felt there was a need for future terrorism preparedness activities at the local level. This need was expressed most frequently by officials in high-risk cities. It was commonplace, however, to discover that many city officials, including the police, were inclined to defer future terrorism preparedness until the problem of terrorism becomes more prevalent in their cities. Approximately two-thirds of the local officials indicated that the federal government should take the lead in assisting them to prepare for terrorism. Generally,

they felt that state government and public interest groups have a secondary role to play in such preparedness. Suggested activities for future terrorism preparedness, especially in high-risk cities, included: adding more realism and comprehensiveness to crisis management and preparation plans; anticipating and planning for security related problems in upcoming special events; developing adequate physical facilities to respond to a range of extraordinary events; learning from the experiences of other American and non-American cities where urban officials have had more direct experience in coping with threats or acts of terrorism; and assessing the vulnerabilities, or "choke points" of their cities to acts of terrorism.

One of the most frequently cited obstacles inhibiting past and future crisis planning and management was convincing departments other than the police to plan for acts or threats of terrorism. Planning for special events, however, seems to constitute an exception to this generalization. Law enforcement officials were generally more responsive than political and administrative leaders to our inquiry about obstacles in planning for terrorism, a finding that reinforces, once again, a central premise of the NLC initiative: local elected and appointed officials have paid less attention to responding to terrorism than have law enforcement officials. Obstacles frequently cited by police officials included: legal restrictions on their

ability to gather information, including infiltration of terrorist groups, convincing political and administrative leaders that they need to prepare for terrorism, an inability to get their plans implemented, once formulated; and unnecessary interference in their activities by elected and appointed officials.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Site Visits and follow-up questionnaire have called attention to several points which deserve repetition:

- 1) Planning for terrorism as a discrete issue has not been a high priority item in most cities participating in the terrorism preparedness project. However, when terrorism preparedness exists outside police planning, it tends to occur in the context of a larger crisis management and preparation process.
- 2) In many cities there is a need to develop realistic and comprehensive contingency plans which includes the active participation of political and administrative leaders, municipal agencies, civic organizations within the community, and private citizens.
- 3) Such plans need to be fully integrated into existing crisis management and preparation procedures including emergency preparedness planning.
- 4) Planning for the technical or tactical aspect of terrorism preparedness tends to be more advanced than policy level or strategic planning. Finding the proper role for the mayor and/or city manager prior to, during, and after an act of terrorism requires improvement in many of the cities surveyed and visited by project staff.
- 5) Reportedly, the NWS did make a difference in local preparedness for threats or acts of terrorism. However, this difference is more apparent in some

cities than in others, and efforts need to be undertaken to strengthen and sustain movement begun by the terrorism preparedness initiative.

- 6) Most significantly, the NWS has focused the attention of key political and administrative leaders on a potential problem that had been largely neglected prior to the terrorism preparedness project.
- 7) The NWS has acted as a catalytic rather than a causal agent in influencing local terrorism preparedness and the Site Visits, in particular, stimulated activity consistent with the substantive thrusts of the project.
- 8) Local officials strongly indicated that future terrorism preparedness is needed, and to be effective requires the active cooperation and involvement of public agencies and civic organizations at the local, state, and federal levels.

PART V: OVERVIEW OF EVALUATIVE DESIGN

The terrorism preparedness project, as stipulated in the project design, utilized a four part evaluative design. This explicit evaluation was undertaken to guide attention to the effective and formal factors responsible for results. The results of this evaluation, presented earlier, demonstrated that the terrorism preparedness project was, indeed, effective in creating an awareness among local political and administrative leaders as to the need for an effective, total preparedness approach in dealing with threats or acts of terrorism. It also examined terrorism preparedness procedures in selected U.S. cities. As a result of the project, terrorism preparedness activities are now underway in major U.S. cities.

These positive outcomes were attributed, in part, to an effective and efficient organization of the NWS, to the decision to rely heavily upon experienced city officials as learning facilitators, and to the stimulation of interaction between federal and local officials. The prestige of the National League of Cities and the Department of State were formal factors that also accounted for the results produced by the terrorism preparedness project.

The comprehensive evaluation was undertaken by project staff, the Public Safety Subcommittee of NLC, an outside

evaluator from the Kettering Foundation, and local officials who participated in the NWS and the Site Visits. Participants at the NWS completed two evaluation questionnaires, one at the conference and a follow-up several months later. A more detailed procedure was used for evaluating the nine selected cities. And finally, selected members of NLC's Public Safety Subcommittee reviewed the project. Discussion of the Public Safety Subcommittee is deferred until the following section. An analysis of the results of this four part evaluation has been incorporated into the final report.

PART VI: NLC'S PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMITTEE: PROJECT EVALUATION

As planned from the project inception, the Public Safety Subcommittee of NLC's Transportation, Public Safety and Communications Steering Committee has been closely involved in the implementation process. As NLC's policy making body for the criminal justice area, their input and evaluation for this project has been extremely important.

The initial briefing by the project staff of members on the project took place in late November 1979 in a special confidential session of the subcommittee during NLC's Congress of Cities in Las Vegas. Key attendees included Subcommittee Chairman, Nancy Gray, Councilwoman from Ft. Collins, Colorado and Steering Committee Chairman, Mayor Charles Royer of Seattle. The subcommittee members indicated their receptiveness of the project and expressed a consensus view that the initial steps and planning for further implementation were well conceived for the target audience. Additionally, the groundwork was laid for the future participation of Mayor Royer, a former news broadcaster himself, as the moderator of the Media Issues panel at the NWS.

During the pre-NWS planning phase, a decision was made to specifically invite two key Subcommittee members to the conference: Mayor Kenneth Blackwell of Cincinnati,

the new Chairman, and, Kennedy Shaw, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Municipal Association, who had expressed a strong interest in the project. Although Mr. Shaw was not representing a city directly, he brought to the NWS his perspectives on the interrelationship between cities and state government as this related to many of the issues addressed at the conference.

Mayor Blackwell's and Mr. Shaw's evaluations of the NWS and the overall project were solicited through interview/briefings conducted in August with them in Cincinnati and Boston. Mayor Blackwell, as a key city participant also responded to the follow-up questionnaire, together with Sylvester Murray, City Manager of Cincinnati.

For Mayor Blackwell's part the NWS stimulated a number of follow-up actions. He:

- o introduced a motion, which passed the Cincinnati City Council, requesting the City Manager "...to conduct a prompt review of standby plans for handling the various kinds of disasters which may befall a metropolitan area and to recommend action to correct any deficiencies identified in the review." That review is now underway. Mayor Blackwell chose to broaden his stated concern beyond anti-terrorism preparedness to include a range of crisis management problems -- an approach encouraged by the NWS.
- o initiated a working session of the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce's Justice and Public Safety Subcommittee to discuss the problem of terrorism. The subcommittee is seeking to strengthen working relations among private executives and firms, the city and the FBI.
- o arranged presentation by a noted academic expert to a Jewish community organization on the subject.

of the media role in terrorist situations.

- o arranged a discussion with the Rand Corporation's anti-terrorism expert to probe his views on terrorism relating to the Cincinnati context.

Mayor Blackwell emphasized that all the above actions were a direct result of the NWS catalysing his thinking on the problem of terrorism preparedness. As a result, he offered a very positive overall evaluation of the conference. In particular, he found the cross-section of cities and officials represented and their joint participation in the incident simulation workshop to be helpful in exchanging ideas and gaining a clearer definition of his own role in terrorism and crisis management preparedness. His discussions and contacts with other participants evoked similar reactions to the project.

For his part, Mr. Shaw offered several criticisms and suggestions. Overall, he felt that the NWS program and presentations were not sufficiently sophisticated for the high-level city officials in attendance. He felt more anti-terrorism experts might have been used, such as a psychiatrist he had once heard discourse on the detailed crisis management response of the Dutch authorities to the South Moluccan train-hostage incident. Similarly, he found the incident management workshop somewhat simplistic. He felt that the state role in terrorism preparedness should have been given a larger role in the program. Also he would have preferred more time for discussion and dialogue

among the participants and program moderators. At the same time, he agreed that it was difficult to design and attract high level city officials to a program on a subject in which their perceptions, needs and experience differed so widely.

Both Mayor Blackwell and Mr. Shaw received with great interest briefings on the project Site Visits to other cities. They considered such project staff-to-participant contacts to have been an effective means of tying the ideas and themes of the NWS more closely into the local contexts, expanding upon them, and gaining post-conference insights. The Site Visits also were seen as effectively extending the reach of the project by drawing other police and civilian officials into an innovative dialogue on terrorism preparedness with city halls and NLC.

PART VIII: CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the terrorism preparedness project generated a series of outcomes which can be conveniently summarized as follows:

- 1) Overall, the terrorism preparedness project sought to create an awareness among local elected and appointed officials about the need for a realistic and comprehensive approach to threats or acts of terrorism in major U.S. cities. The project successfully focused the attention of local officials on a previously neglected problem, and thus helped to raise their awareness of the potential problem of urban terrorism.
- 2) In May 1980, the NWS for terrorism preparedness for local elected and appointed officials was held in Washington, D.C. at the U.S. Department of State's prestigious diplomatic conference facility. The conference was attended by 33 political and administrative leaders representing 28 cities and one state municipal association. It sought to improve strategic policy making by subjecting the role of the mayor and/or city manager prior to, during and after an unfolding terrorist incident, to closer scrutiny. The NWS provided the participants with an opportunity to examine a problem that is decidedly not within the exclusive domain of law enforcement officials. An evaluation of the NWS by the participants revealed that the conference was very well received and effectively organized. Participants were especially positive about the utilization of practicing city officials who had, in some cases, direct experience in managing a terrorist incident. Also, they encouraged project staff to visit their cities to learn more about the state of local terrorism preparedness.
- 3) During July and August 1980, project staff carried out an examination of the state of terrorism preparedness in nine U.S. cities. While the Site Visits did not constitute an in-depth assessment of local

terrorism preparedness, they did produce a wealth of useful information. It was learned that strategic or policy level planning for terrorism as a discrete issue is not a high priority item in many U.S. cities. No single factor, including an assessment of the terrorist risk, explains why some U.S. cities appeared to be better prepared for terrorism than others. Also, existing plans were thought by many local officials to lack realism and comprehensiveness. However, the Site Visits stimulated local preparedness activity, facilitated a review of local crisis management plans and procedures, and encouraged local officials to develop an effective and efficient response to threats or acts of terrorism.

- 4) A substantial amount of federal-local cooperation was involved during all phases of the terrorism preparedness project. The follow-up evaluation revealed that such cooperation was a strongpoint of the NLC initiative. Upon request, the NLC project staff was able to provide certain cities with specialized services that related to the substantive thrust of the project. Such services helped to improve federal-local cooperation, and facilitated the sharing of information between U.S. cities.
- 5) The terrorism preparedness project was closely monitored by the NLC's Public Safety Subcommittee. Such monitoring involved a closed session briefing, held early in the project, and briefings for individual members, held later in the project. During these meetings, results of the project evaluations were discussed, and criticisms and suggestions were offered by individual Subcommittee members. The participation of this NLC policy making Subcommittee was extremely important in shaping and evaluating the project.
- 6) City officials who attended the NWS and participated in the Site Visits felt that there is a need for future terrorism preparedness. While a number of suggestions were offered by city officials for future preparedness activity, they were especially open to the need for an assessment of local vulnerabilities.
- 7) An explicit and comprehensive four-part evaluation revealed that project goals were successfully realized, and that terrorism preparedness activities are currently underway in major U.S. cities. In some

cases these activities were thought by participants to be a direct result of the terrorism preparedness project.

- 8) While the terrorism preparedness project produced some noteworthy results, it would be incorrect to conclude that the problem of terrorism in U.S. cities has been adequately dealt with over the long range. On the contrary, field research has suggested that considerably more thinking and action is required by officials at all levels of government (and civic organizations) in order to strengthen and sustain local terrorism preparedness. If urban terrorism increases in the U.S., a cautious and prudent response will be necessary, one that protects individual civil liberties and, at the same time, maintains our existing system of public and civic order. The planners of this project intended that it would provide, at least in part, the necessary stimulation for such efforts.

APPENDIX A
Terrorism Preparedness
National Working Session

CITY PARTICIPANTS

Boston	STEPHEN DUNLEAVY Assistant to the Mayor for Public Safety
Chicago	SAM NOLAN Director, Department of Public Safety
Cincinnati	KENNETH BLACKWELL Mayor
Cleveland	SYLVESTER MURRAY City Manager
Columbus	GEORGE VOINOVICH Mayor
Detroit	RON POOLE Executive Assistant to the Mayor
Elizabeth	ARTHUR LUVALL Executive Assistant to the Mayor
Forth Worth	THOMAS DUNN Mayor
Greensboro	ROBERT HERCHERT City Manager
Indianapolis	T.Z. OSBORNE City Manager
Kansas City	WILLIAM HUDNUT Mayor
Knoxville	THOMAS HENRY Executive Assistant to the Mayor
Las Vegas	JOHN BURGE Assistant City Manager
	WILLIAM RICKER Chief Operating Officer
	RUSS DORN City Manager

Los Angeles EZUNIAL BURTS
Executive Assistant to the Mayor

Louisville PHILLIP SCHULTZ
Director of Public Safety

Massachusetts
Municipal
Association KENNEDY SHAW
Executive Director

Mayaguez, P.R. BENJAMIN COLE
Mayor

Milwaukee LEILA FRASER
Chief Administrative Officer

 KENNETH GIBSON
Mayor

 ALAN ZALKIND
Executive Director, Office of
Criminal Justice Planning

Newport News FRANK SMILEY
City Manager

Oakland JOHN BAKER
Assistant City Manager

Rochester RICH KERBEL
Special Assistant to the Mayor

San Diego RAY BLAIR
City Manager

San Francisco ROTEA GILFORD
Executive Director of the Mayor's
Criminal Justice Council

San Jose JAMES ALLOWAY
City Manager

Seattle CHARLES ROYER
Mayor

 WILLIAM STAFFORD
Director of Intergovernmental Affairs

St. Paul PETER HAMES
Director of Management

Tacoma ERLING MORK
City Manager

Washington, D.C. RICHARD BOTTOROFF
Acting Director
Office of Emergency Preparedness

NATIONAL WORKING SESSION

Terrorism Preparedness for Local Elected and Appointed Officials

May 5-6, 1980
Loy Henderson Room
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.

A G E N D A

May 5, 1980

8:30 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. REGISTRATION: 2201 C Street Lobby

9:00 a.m. - 9:15 a.m. WELCOME: THE PROJECT NEED

- o Alan Beals, Executive Director
National League of Cities (NLC)
- o Henry Dogin, Acting Director
Office of Justice Assistance,
Research, and Statistics (OJARS)

9:15 a.m. - 10:00 a.m. KEYNOTE SPEAKER: GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC TERRORIST
INCIDENTS

- o Charles Renfrew
U.S. Deputy Attorney General

10:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m. BREAK

10:15 a.m. - 11:45 a.m. PANEL: THE MAYOR/CITY ADMINIS-
TRATOR'S ROLE DURING A TERRORIST/
HOSTAGE INCIDENT - PERSPECTIVES

Moderator:

- o William Hudnut, Mayor
Indianapolis

The Kiritsis Case

- o George Rodericks
former Director
Mayor's Command Post
Washington, D.C.

The Hanafi Muslim Incident

- o Sam Nolan, Public Safety Director
Chicago

The West German Consulate Seizure

- o John Otto, Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

On-the-Scene Interaction of Local
and National Resources

12:00 Noon - 1:30 p.m.
(Benjamin Franklin Room)

WORKING LUNCHEON: SPEAKER: COMBATTING
TERRORISM - STRATEGY OF PARTNERSHIP

- o Ambassador Anthony Quainton
Chairman
NSC Working Group on Terrorism

1:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.
(Break: 2:30 pm. - 2:40)

INCIDENT MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP FOR
MAYORS/CITY ADMINISTRATORS

- o Conducted by Crisis Management
Associates, Ltd.:

- John Karkashian
former Deputy Director
Office for Combatting Terrorism
U.S. Department of State

- Robert Rabe
former Assistant Chief of Police
Washington, D.C.

6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m.

RECEPTION: Mayflower Hotel

May 6, 1980

9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.

PANEL: TERRORISM, THE MEDIA AND THE
MAYOR/CITY ADMINISTRATOR - PERSPECTIVES

- o Moderator:

Charles Royer, Mayor
Seattle

The City Executive's Media and
Public Information Role

- o Mr. Robert Rabe
former Assistant Chief of Police
Washington, D.C.

Police Perspectives on Media Responsibilities

- o Fred Heckman
News Director - WIBC
Indianapolis

Broadcast Journalism Perspectives on Media Reporting Practices and Policies

10:30 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.

BREAK

10:45 a.m. - 11:15 a.m.

THE MAYOR/CITY ADMINISTRATOR'S
COORDINATING ROLE: DEVELOPING
A CRISIS COMMAND STRUCTURE

- o Sam Jordan
Special Assistant to the Mayor
Washington, D.C.

11:15 a.m. - 12:00 Noon

DEALING WITH THE AFTERMATH OF
TERRORISM: COORDINATING LOCAL,
STATE AND FEDERAL RESOURCES

- o John Macy
Director
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)

12:00 Noon - 12:30 p.m.

ADMINISTRATIVE WRAP-UP

*2:00 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.

*OPTIONAL:

- Meeting with Key Federal Anti-Terrorism Officials
- Tour of Washington, D.C. Mayor's Command Post

- o arranged upon request

Terrorism Preparedness
National Working Session

Speakers

ALAN BEALS
Executive Director
National League of Cities (NLC)
Washington, D.C.

HENRY DOGIN
Acting Director
Office of Justice Assistance,
Research and Statistics (OJARS)
Washington, D.C.

SAM JORDAN
Special Assistant to the Mayor
Washington, D.C.

JOHN MACY
Director
Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)
Washington, D.C.

AMBASSADOR ANTHONY QUANTON
Chairman
National Security Council
Group on Terrorism
Washington, D.C.

JUDGE CHARLES RENFREW
U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

Panelists

FRED HECKMAN
News Director - WIBC
Indianapolis, Indiana

WILLIAM HUDNUT
Mayor
Indianapolis, Indiana

SAM NOLAN
Director
Department of Public Safety
Chicago, Illinois

JOHN OTTO
Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
Washington, D.C.

ROBERT RABE
Crisis Management Consultants
(former Assistant Chief
of Police)
Washington, D.C.

GEORGE RODERICKS
(former Director, Mayor's
Command Post)
Washington, D.C.

CHARLES ROYER
Mayor
Seattle, Washington



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

REMARKS BY

CHARLES B. RENFREW
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM
FOR RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC
TERRORISM INCIDENTS

TO THE
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
WORKING SESSION ON TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS
FOR LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS

AT
WASHINGTON, DC

MAY 5, 1980

I am pleased to have an opportunity to address your National Working Session on the subject of domestic terrorism. I bring you Attorney General Civiletti's greetings and best wishes for a successful conference.

Within the Department of Justice, I have the primary responsibility for ensuring that the federal government is prepared to deal promptly and effectively with domestic acts of terrorism in all their manifestations. Because such incidents are most likely to take place within our cities, I welcome this initiative of the National League of Cities, and share your concern that all levels of government be prepared to work toward a total, coordinated terrorism response capability.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM

Terrorism became a priority for most governments on the early morning of September 5, 1972, when a Palestinian group calling itself Black September violently interrupted the Olympic Games at Munich, Germany. This exercise in armed propaganda resulted in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes and caused many governments in the world, including the United States, to initiate increased preparedness measures.

During the intervening years, most significant acts of terrorism involving private or official Americans have occurred abroad. The problem of air hijackings in the United States has been substantially reduced through improved airport security

measures and effective law enforcement. For the most part, this country has experienced relatively few acts of domestic terrorism. Most of our experience has been with quasi-terrorism arising as a by-product of other criminality--hostage-taking in the course of bank robberies, for instance--or desperate actions by mentally disturbed individuals. However, we have not been entirely immune from major incidents of terrorism. During the past decade serious terrorist violence has included:

- In December 1975. Eleven persons were killed and about 75 injured when a bomb went off in a public locker at LaGuardia Airport, New York.
- In September 1976. Five Croatian nationalists hijacked a New York to Chicago TWA jet liner carrying 93 passengers and crew. A policeman was killed while disarming a bomb left behind by the terrorists.
- In March 1977. Twelve members of the Hanafi Muslim Sect were involved in the violent takeover of three buildings in Washington, DC. Some 149 hostages were held, a reporter was murdered, and another 19 persons were injured, some seriously.
- In August of 1978. Two armed Croatian activists seized hostages at the West German consulate in Chicago, demanding that a prisoner held in West Germany not be extradited to Yugoslavia.

- In December of 1979. The nation was shocked by the ambush of a U.S. Navy bus in Puerto Rico. Two service personnel were killed and ten wounded. Responsibility for this act of senseless violence was claimed by a handful of Puerto Rican independence groups that seek to achieve through terrorism what they have failed to achieve through the political process.

These Puerto Rican groups have since attempted to murder three Army personnel in Puerto Rico. And their counterparts here have resorted to the armed occupation of campaign offices in both New York City and Chicago.

More recently, on April 4, 1980, as a result of excellent police work by the Evanston, Illinois, Police Department and the security police at Northwestern University, a number of fugitives of a major Puerto Rican terrorist group, FALN, and their supporters were arrested in Evanston. These arrests apparently interrupted what was intended to be another major FALN terrorist operation here in the United States. Searches resulting from those arrests conducted in Milwaukee and Jersey City turned up caches of arms, maps of national political convention sites and files on 50 corporate executives.

Additional terrorist bombings have been claimed by anti-Castro Cuban exiles and anti-Yugoslav Croation and Serbian separatists who have elected to act out their political grievances through violent acts in this country.

According to FBI statistics on domestic terrorist incidents, 53 confirmed acts took place in 1979. Some twelve separate, identifiable groups have claimed responsibility or are believed to be the perpetrators of these terrorist acts. Clearly, recent experience suggests that we would be foolish to assume that we will be immune from serious terrorist violence in the 1980's.

As public officials you share with me the recognition that a major terrorist incident -- whatever its target or motivation -- is a challenge to the credibility of government. Terrorism has been defined as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain political goals, through instilling fear, intimidation or coercion. It is really an attack on the established order of society itself. Its purpose is the disruption of normal political and social life. Hence, it is the proper concern not only of law enforcement, but of elected and appointed officials such as those gathered here today.

FEDERAL ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM

It is not my intention to provide a protracted analysis of terrorism. Most of us have witnessed these tragedies on our living room television sets. We are all too familiar with the scenerios of aircraft hijacking and other acts of terrorism. Instead, I would like to take a few minutes to familiarize you with what the U.S. Government -- and especially the U.S. Department of Justice -- are doing to deal with terrorist acts here in the United States and to discuss how these plans and procedures relate to the antiterrorism responses of state and local authorities.

Shortly after President Carter's inauguration, the National Security Council initiated a detailed study to assess the Government's ability to deal with terrorism. That study confirmed the need for an extremely flexible antiterrorism program at the federal level -- a program that would take into account the changeable nature of the terrorist threat as well as the wide range of resources that might be required to meet all likely contingencies. The Administration subsequently developed such an antiterrorism program. A clearly defined command and control structure now links field operations with policy level officials in the Justice Department for domestic incidents and the State Department for foreign incidents.

For government-wide coordination of antiterrorism planning, the National Security Council created what is known as the Executive Committee on Terrorism and its Working Group on Terrorism. The Department of State chairs these groups, with a Department of Justice official -- a member of my personal staff -- serving as deputy chairman.

Within the Department of Justice, the lead agency for the management of terrorist incidents is the FBI. The initial, tactical response to such incidents is directed by the FBI Special-Agent-In-Charge at the scene. The Director of the FBI, Judge Webster, is responsible for on-going operations to contain and resolve the incident. As Deputy Attorney General I am responsible for policy decisions and for legal judgments relating to such resolution. The Department of Justice is linked through its 24-hour a day Emergency Programs Center to the FBI operations command center in Washington, which in turn is in continuous communication with agents at the scene of the terrorism incident.

In addition to FBI agents, the Department has available specially trained officers of the U.S. Marshals Service. The Department can also draw on other federal agencies for specialized personnel and equipment, as well as the resources of state and local agencies. The present antiterrorism program thus provides us with considerable flexibility in responding to a wide range of possible domestic incidents.

It is conceivable, however, that a very large terrorism incident might exceed the capabilities of available civil police forces and that the use of specially trained and equipped military forces might be necessary in order to effectively restore order and save lives. Military forces of this kind are trained and available. In such a situation, assuming the legal conditions are met, the President has the option, under federal statutes, to direct federal military forces to respond.

I should emphasize, however, that the FBI and other civil authorities have substantial capacity to deal with terrorism incidents. Military forces have not been used yet and would be necessary only in very unusual incidents such as ones involving large or highly sophisticated, paramilitary terrorist groups.

THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

But the federal effort is only part of the picture and not necessarily the largest or most important part. As you well know, under the Constitution and laws of the United States the protection of life and property and the maintenance of public order are primarily the responsibility of state and local government. The federal government has authority to assume this responsibility only in certain limited circumstances.

Acts constituting "terrorism," as it is commonly defined, are crimes independently proscribed by state statutes as well as violations of federal criminal statutes. Since most major acts of terrorism are violations of both state and federal law, concurrent criminal jurisdiction is the rule. Accordingly, the federal government can either assume the lead or defer to state jurisdiction and action, depending on the nature of the incident and the capabilities of local authorities. I should add that even where state and local authorities take the lead, the federal government will provide law enforcement assistance and support upon request. Conversely, where federal jurisdiction is exercised, state and local agencies provide assistance.

In short, when it comes to mounting an effective response to serious incidents of terrorism in the United States, there must be, and there is, a dynamic cooperative relationship between local and federal authorities -- between your offices and the Department of Justice. We will endeavor, working with you, to (1) rapidly assess the terrorist incident, (2) determine an appropriate level of governmental response, and (3) carry out an effective effort to protect life and property and to successfully terminate the incident.

FBI ASSISTANCE

As most of you are aware, the FBI has developed an ongoing program of assistance to state and local law enforcement authorities in the area of terrorism preparedness. Three major elements of this program include:

- Hostage negotiators. Should a terrorism act take place involving the lives of hostages, the FBI has a team of trained and experienced psychologists who can give on-the-scene support to local law enforcement officials. FBI hostage negotiators have, in several cases, furnished psychological profiles and analysis which have contributed to the successful and nonviolent conclusion of hostage situations. Their knowledge and experience has also been shared with local law enforcement through training sessions at the FBI Academy and across the Nation.
- Special Operations and Research Unit (SOAR). This group is made up of FBI Special Agents who are trained in psychology and criminology and are well versed in the practical operations of criminal apprehension. Their function is to gather facts concerning terrorism incidents, study them, and then through papers, articles and seminars, offer their conclusions concerning ways of dealing with terrorism. SOAR is available to local law enforcement for on-

site consultation during terrorism incidents.

SOARS also conducts training sessions for FBI personnel and local law enforcement. Recently this included a symposium at the FBI Academy for law enforcement executives on the management of counter-terrorism resources. Many of the cities represented here today sent police officials to this symposium. Your National Working Session today and tomorrow is a complementary follow-up effort.

- Terrorism Research and Bomb Data Unit. This unit conducts studies into the terrorist groups under investigation by the FBI. The purpose of this research is to study the organization and membership of terrorist groups to aid in devising better investigative methods. Another function of this unit is to collect and distribute in newsletter form the technical details of bombings by terrorist groups. By circulating this information, the FBI assists local law enforcement in combatting terrorism.

In addition, of course, the FBI and other components of the Department of Justice are committed to working with local authorities in terrorism preparedness measures on either a formal or informal basis whenever the opportunity arises. Please do not hesitate to contact Judge Webster or me if we can be of assistance in your response planning.

Any discussion of emergency planning would be incomplete without calling your attention to another government-wide coordinating group created by the Department of Justice. This group -- the Federal Special Events Security Coordinating Committee -- operates to coordinate and facilitate state-local and federal security planning for such major events as olympic games, political conventions, and large expositions. If your city is faced with such a major event, please do not hesitate to call upon us for security coordination assistance.

INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS

Any consideration of the governmental response to terrorism requires an acknowledgement that our efforts must be consistent with constitutional safeguards for individual rights. No less serious than the direct threat posed by terrorists themselves is the subtle threat to our institutions and values posed by the use of improper methods to collect intelligence and conduct preventive investigations.

To guard against this danger, the Justice Department has adopted guidelines which control intelligence-gathering and investigative techniques in terrorism cases. These guidelines are designed to ensure that investigations are directed only against possible criminal activity and do not unnecessarily chill the exercise of First Amendment rights or infringe on personal privacy. The guidelines require that investigative

efforts have a sufficient factual basis to believe that target groups or individuals are actually engaging in terrorist acts or are planning such acts.

These guidelines do not cripple the Government's ability to respond effectively and promptly to actual or threatened terrorist activity. The guidelines provide ample flexibility to take into account the nature and magnitude of a particular threat, as well as its likelihood and imminence. The basic test of the constitutionality of the Government's response is whether it is reasonable under all the circumstances -- the test embodied in the text of the Fourth Amendment and in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment.

In other words, the Constitution permits law enforcement authorities to take those steps which are necessary to deal with terrorism, even when it is ideologically motivated. What the Constitution does not permit, and what effective law enforcement does not require, are sweeping and overbroad measures to combat terrorism and the use of harassing and abusive investigative practices.

These proper constraints placed upon our ability to conduct preventative investigations make it all the more essential that we make the most effective use of that legitimate intelligence information to which we have access. Terrorist groups, by their very nature, are small, compartmented and -- with the help of sympathizers -- blend into the

community where they operate. This requires that you and I assure ourselves that there is prompt and complete sharing of terrorism information -- both as to potential incidents and terrorist groups in general.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

The relative difficulty in intelligence collection places a premium on advance planning and preparation. Ultimately, the initiative is with the terrorists -- they choose the place, time, and method. Because of this, our responses will always to some degree be predicated upon uncertainty. Cities cannot and should not try to prepare for every contingency. Yet certain preparations are both prudent and necessary. You need to know what they are. Also, different jurisdictions will have very different capacities to plan for and cope with terrorism. Therefore, it is important that there be planning and cooperation among all levels of government. The cost of unpreparedness in terms of lives, property, and confidence in the political system is unexceptionable.

I would like to suggest four steps that you might consider in assessing the response capability of your city to serious terrorist incidents. I am sure that you will receive many more specific suggestions during the course of this conference.

- First, review your personal overall crisis management capabilities. Do you have an adequate command center and communications. Is it clear who will be notified? Who will make what policy and operational decisions? Who has authority to act under what circumstances?
- Second. Assure yourself now that your police force is prepared for a serious terrorist incident. Are procedures understood? Are personnel fully trained and equipped? Have necessary plans been developed and coordinated, especially with city hall?
- Third. Make sure that you and your law enforcement leaders have coordinated fully and effectively with the FBI office in your jurisdiction. It is, of course, essential that any questions regarding jurisdiction and authority be resolved now -- not after an incident is underway.
- Finally, I would suggest that you and your police forces tie all of these preparations together through the staging of realistic training exercises that will test command and control, training and tactics, and your coordination with other local, state, and federal agencies.

In conclusion, let me again affirm the commitment of the Department of Justice to work with each of you in developing and coordinating effective responses to terrorist incidents in the United States. Let us together -- through effective cooperation and preparation -- act now to ensure that political and criminal terrorism do not find fertile soil here in the United States.

REMARKS BY

AMBASSADOR ANTHONY C.E. QUAINTON

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -

WORKING GROUP ON TERRORISM

AND

DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COMBATTING TERRORISM: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

BEFORE THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES':

NATIONAL WORKING CONFERENCE: TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS

FOR LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS

AT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY 5, 1980

TERRORISM: A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER

I am extremely pleased to address the participants of the National Working Conference on Terrorism Preparedness. I am especially glad to have the opportunity to discuss with you today one of the serious challenges facing our nation: International Terrorism. Judge Renfrew this morning described the Federal Government's Domestic Response Program. I would like to put that program in the larger context of our national security and foreign policy.

Violence stalks our world. Over the last 12 years we have seen more than 3,300 acts of international terrorism. More than 6000 innocent people have been injured; 2,000 have been killed. The victims have been Prime Ministers and Ambassadors, school children and teachers, businessmen and farmers. No group has been immune; no continent has been untouched; no country has gone unscathed. Terrorism has undermined and threatened the international order built on a common commitment to peace, security and the role of law.

With forty percent of all terrorist acts directed against the United States, we cannot stand aloof or be indifferent to the cynical brutality of those who would use terrorism to promote their political ends. Five US Ambassadors dead: our diplomats taken hostage in Tehran and Bogota; businessmen kidnapped in Honduras and El Salvador; seven soldiers murdered in Turkey. Terrorist violence has become a part of our daily lives.

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What is this phenomenon? What can we do about it? What can and should we expect of the international community? These are the issues I would like to address today. I have no simple answers. The issues are complex. The divisions in the international community profound.

Unfortunately, there is no agreed definition of terrorism. Three long sessions of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism wrestled with a definition from 1973 to 1979. Some nations insisted that acts of international terrorism are only those acts of violence carried out by "colonial, racist and alien regimes against peoples struggling for their liberation, for their legitimate right to self determination." These same states argued that terrorism was essentially a state phenomenon in which capitalist, colonialist or racist regimes inflict violence on subject peoples or classes. Under such a definition all the world's ills become part of the terrorist phenomenon. If so, no real progress can be made in the battle against terrorism until these ills are eliminated.

There is, of course, an element of truth in this assertion. Political, social and economic injustices do breed violence and terrorism. Many terrorist acts are the product of intense frustrations and a perception that existing institutions cannot be changed or modified except by force. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter made clear the United Nation's commitment to solving these economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems, to promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. From its inception the underlying causes of violence have been high on the agenda of the United

Nations and its principal organs - the Security Council and the General Assembly, as they have been high on the agenda of our own foreign policy. Unfortunately, the righting of the world's wrongs is a long and complex process. Peace in the Middle East, majority rule in Southern Africa, stability in Central America and the Caribbean cannot be achieved overnight. This Administration is committed to solving these problems, but we can have no illusions that permanent solutions are at hand. And even if they were, in other corners of the globe terrorist violence would go on under the sponsorship of various groups and with various goals in mind: The ETA seeks a homeland for the Basques; the IRA a united Ireland; the Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army the overthrow of the capitalist system, etc. Some of these causes enjoy broad popular support; others are totally inimical to our basic values and our national interests.

To focus on causes, however, is likely to create confusion and to encourage a moral relativism which asserts that anything goes as long as it is carried on in a worthwhile cause. I do not believe the United States can or should adopt such a philosophy in dealing with terrorism. The end should not justify the means, unless we wish to enshrine and codify the principle that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.

Instead we must recognize terrorism for what it is - the use or the threat of force for political purposes. It is coercion against innocent men and women with a view to promoting a political cause. It is the cynical, calculating

exploitation of violence to intimidate. It is a tactic which merits condemnation whenever it is used no matter what the cause.

Domestically, we know that all terrorist acts are criminal. Internationally we must work to defend the proposition that kidnapping, hijacking, the taking of hostages, bombing and assassination are criminal acts, intrinsically wrong, and in violation of the basic principles of international law. National liberation rhetoric notwithstanding, we have made progress in this endeavor. First the League of Nations and now the United Nations have adopted measures to make explicit the view that all terrorist acts are criminal, that states have an obligation to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of these acts or to extradite them to countries where they will be brought to justice.

Although organized political terrorism has only just celebrated its centenary - the foundation of the Russian anarchist group Narodnaya Volya in 1879, it was not until April, 1937 that the International Community organized itself to do anything about it. In that year, the League of Nations adopted two conventions: (a) one on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, and (b) the other creating an International Court in which to prosecute terrorists. Alas the League was soon to be engulfed in World War II. Only India ratified the Conventions which never came into force.

The impetus for those conventions was a wave of assassinations in the mid-1930's. It took another 35 years before the International Community returned to the issue and

then under the impact of many hijackings, kidnappings and bombings, and of barbaric acts of violence such as the Lod Airport and the Munich Olympic Games massacres.

WHAT HAVE WE ACHIEVED?

The major achievements have been the passage of a series of Conventions against hijacking (the Hague 1970), aircraft sabotage (Montreal 1971), Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (New York 1973) and most recently in December of last year a Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. States of every ideological and political persuasion and from every region of the world have supported these initiatives. The message is clear: the International Community regards these acts against innocent people as a fundamental violation of basic human rights which threaten international order and the rule of law. The United States has given strong support to these initiatives, for we have longed believed that if the United Nations is to be relevant in today's world, it must grapple with the issues raised by the prevalence of terrorist violence.

Obviously, international conventions in and of themselves do not solve the world's problems. The rule of law is still far from being universally respected as recent events in Iran and Afghanistan remind us all too vividly. Nonetheless, these initiatives have widened the fundamental consensus that certain violent acts are inadmissible. Of particular significance has been the decision in the recently concluded Hostages Convention to exclude hostage taking even when carried out during Wars of National Liberation. No cause,

no goal, the UN community has proclaimed, justifies the taking of innocent men and women hostage. Freedom fighters have no license to kidnap.

BUT WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

Where should we go now, given the depth of suspicion in the Third World of our motives in promoting a strategy of counter-terrorism? From personal experience in New York, I know how difficult it is to define a strategy which deals on the one hand with state terrorism and the violation of human rights and on the other with non-state violence as espoused by the Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army or the PLO.

Nonetheless, all nations are beginning to feel the direct threat of terrorist violence. Terrorism is no longer a phenomenon which affects "them"; it is something for "us", as even the Iranians have seen in recent days in London. And this realization was evident at the third session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, which met in New York last April. That meeting marked a watershed. It was the first occasion in which the debate moved from an ideological discussion of causes to a discussion of measures, and practical measures at that. The Committee's report began by unequivocally condemning all acts of international terrorism which endanger or take human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms. It called on states to refrain from organizing or participating in terrorist acts or acquiescing in them. It recommended universal ratification of the Hague, Montreal and New York Conventions. It urged greater international

cooperation and sharing of information. It suggested that new conventions be considered to cover other acts of terrorism. This is a positive agenda which we have supported.

Of particular significance was the appeal to all states to refrain from participating in terrorist acts. One of the most troublesome issues for us has been the consistent support, training and funding, which certain Arab and Communist states have given to international terrorist groups. We have tried to use our leverage, both political and economic, against them. Legislation currently pending before the Congress would impose specific sanctions on those states which show a pattern of support for terrorism.

But the work of the combatting terrorism cannot be left only to the United Nations. Each member state must also play its part in the global effort.

Here in the United States since 1972 we have had an active program of counter-terrorism. Because we have been so frequently the target of terror violence we have had to respond. We have not stood silently by while terrorists have attempted to disrupt economic and social activity. We have not complacently allowed terrorists to sow the seeds of distrust and fear. We have had a program of action which has concentrated on prevention and deterrence as well as effective crisis management. We have defined a policy which makes clear our opposition to terrorism and our determination to combat it.

WHAT IS THAT POLICY? WHAT STEPS HAVE WE TAKEN?

At the heart of our policy is the commitment to oppose terrorist blackmail. We will not pay ransom. We will not release prisoners to get back American officials who are kidnapped or caught in hostage situations. We care, of course, about the lives which are at stake in a particular incident. But we care even more about the risk to others in the future. Were the United States to pay ransom thousands of other Americans around the globe would be at risk. We hope all other governments will adopt similar policy stances. Only when all governments come to this same conclusion will the terrorists know that they cannot hope to gain from their violent acts. Alas, in the last decade, more often than not the terrorist has won; each victory has provided a new incentive for future acts.

It is not, however, sufficient to have a vigorous policy. It must be backed up by concrete actions. We must have good intelligence; we must have sound physical security; we must have the ability to respond quickly and effectively in a crisis.

A critical element of any counter-terrorist program is intelligence. If we can be forewarned of terrorist plans, we can take measures to thwart those plans. When a terrorist act takes place, we need to know as much as possible about his modus operadi, his personality, his propensity to kill. With that knowledge we can begin to resolve the incident. We, of course, do have much of this information, but it is never enough. Terrorist groups are hard to penetrate. Our resources are limited.

Because we will not always know when a terrorist will strike, we must also take certain defensive measure. We are all accustomed to the screening required before boarding an aircraft. The purpose is to deter and to apprehend potential hijackers. In very large part we have succeeded. In the last six years, we have seized over 18,000 weapons at US airports. Perhaps a hundred hijackings have been averted.

Similarly, we have improved security at our Embassies abroad. Bullet-proof glass, closed circuit television, armored vehicles, have become standard. It is not easy for terrorists to seize one of our Missions. Obviously, a mob of thousands as in Tehran or Islamabad can overcome an Embassy. But not since 1976 has a small terrorist group taken one of our Missions. Other countries are only just coming to realize that they too must take the same measures. Since the beginning of this year in Latin America alone, seven Embassies have been seized in five different countries. None of those Embassies was American. Our security has paid off, although at some cost in terms of the conduct of diplomacy and the free movement of our diplomats.

We have learned not to be complacent. Even with good intelligence and solid security the terrorists will sometimes succeed. We must be ready when they do. Effective crisis management is essential. In Washington 29 Federal agencies deal with the problems of terrorism and its necessary counter measures on a day-to-day basis. They, as well as the National League of Cities and the National Governors Association, form the Working Group on Terrorism the principal coordination

body for our national counter-terrorist policies. But when there is a crisis, when hostages are taken or a plane is hijacked, one lead agency takes charge. At home it is the Department of Justice and the FBI - abroad the Department of State. When it is a hijacking, the Federal Aviation Administration has the lead. If it is a nuclear incident, the Department of Energy will have special responsibilities. Each agency can call upon the combined resources of the Federal Government. But there is no question who is in charge. Should there be policy issues to resolve, they can be and are taken promptly to the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council, where crisis issues are dealt with.

These are not resources to be held in splendid isolation. When we have intelligence that indicates a threat to one of our citizens or facilities or to a foreign national or country - we immediately share it with whoever is the target. We are also pleased to share through various training programs the security and crisis management techniques which we have developed. We cannot combat terrorism alone. We need the help and support of others. Fear, the ultimate weapon of the terrorist, creates instability, weakens institutions, unravels the fabric of society. We all, therefore, have a stake in the outcome. Our sense of partnership is not only international, it also extends to the relationship between the Federal Government and state and local governments.

Notwithstanding the existing cooperation of law enforcement agencies at the Federal level, there is a need for

closer liaison and exchange of information between Federal and local governments in the field of terrorism. The participation of the National League of Cities on the Working Group on Terrorism and this Conference demonstrate the interest and concern about the emergency response capabilities of our cities. There is comparable concern at the state level. At the present time, 14 states are reviewing the vulnerabilities of key economic facilities, such as pipelines, transformers and power generator plants. A manual on domestic terrorism has been prepared by the National Governors Association. Terrorism is not just a Federal concern but an issue which can affect all levels of our society.

Here in Washington we are committed to the principle that the Federal, state and local governments must work together. The ultimate objective in this cooperative effort between Federal and local agencies is a partnership based on better understanding of each other's problems and a mutual respect for each other's capabilities. We must work harder than ever in our new partnership to assure that the momentum achieved thus far is increased in the period ahead. The problem of dealing with terrorism will remain a very serious and difficult one. It can only be solved if Federal and local resources are focussed on the common purpose of combatting terrorism. We must work together and put our respective skills at each other's disposition. This Conference makes a notable step towards that essential partnership.

DEALING WITH THE AFTERMATH OF TERRORISM:
COORDINATING LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RESOURCES

REMARKS BY
JOHN W. MACY, JR., DIRECTOR
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

TO THE
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
WORKING SESSION ON TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS
FOR LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS

AT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY 5, 1980

In creating the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) last July, the President recognized the importance of (1) centralizing all Federal, civil and civil defense emergency preparedness, mitigation and response activities into one agency directly responsible to the President and Congress and (2) establishing within the Executive Branch a single point of contact for state and local governments.

My mandate as Director is to "establish Federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation and assistance functions of Executive agencies." The President also established a Federal Emergency Management Council, which I chair, to "advise and assist the President in the oversight and direction of Federal emergency programs and policies." To insure the Council's scope and effectiveness, the President appointed as its other members the Assistants to the President for National Security, Domestic Affairs and Policy and Intergovernmental Relations, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

As the all-emergency management agency with the specific mission of establishing Federal policies and coordinating all emergency planning, management, mitigation and assistance functions of the various Executive agencies, we have a responsibility to try to insure the best possible governmental preparedness and response to all major disasters requiring Federal aid, no matter what their source. This is true whether the emergencies result from natural, technological, man-made or other types of disasters, or whether they are accidental or deliberate. Insofar as

terrorist-created emergencies are concerned, FEMA has a major responsibility and role in the Federal Government's anti-terrorist defenses.

As you know, the responsibility for developing Federal policies and coordinating Federal programs to combat terrorism is vested in special Executive committees and working groups under the National Security Council, chaired by Ambassador Anthony Quainton of the State Department. Thompson Crockett of the Justice Department serves as Deputy Chairman. FEMA is represented on and participates in the work of these anti-terrorism committees.

The response to and management of terrorist acts within the United States that involve violations of Federal laws, in general, are the responsibility of the Department of Justice and the FBI, except for airplane hijackings, where the Federal Aviation Administration retains responsibility for decisions affecting the safety of persons aboard the aircraft in flight.

Most domestic terrorist incidents, however, involve crimes covered by state statutes, and tend to be limited in their nature and impact to the city or county in which they occur. In general such terrorist incidents have been handled by the local law enforcement agencies concerned. To the extent such terrorist-type activities remain essentially local in character and consequences, the Federal role is likely to remain a very limited one, although Federal assistance by the Federal criminal investigative agencies with concurrent jurisdiction would continue to be available on request.

Recent developments overseas as well as here at home have made all of us aware of the possibility of the use of terrorism by extremist groups that could create an emergency or disaster extending far beyond the borders of a city or state. Although, currently, the likelihood of such threats may be low, common sense and prudent emergency management pointed to the need for preparedness to deal with such an eventuality.

As FEMA was the logical Federal agency to plan and prepare for the consequences management of those types of terrorist incidents that have national economic, social or political implications, the President assigned it specific responsibility "for the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major terrorist incidents."

In the course of its hearings on the establishment of FEMA, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs saw FEMA's new Federal responsibility for terrorist consequences as meeting a vital unmet need, observing: "The President has no one source he can turn to for reports on the damage incurred, the resources available to respond, and the relief actions underway. To fill this void, the new agency will monitor terrorist incidents in progress and, as required, report the status of consequences management to the President. Consequences management in terrorism will thus be a capability in the broad all-risk, all-emergency functions of the agency."

Our type of free-enterprise system and open society make us highly vulnerable to attacks and damaging disruptions by determined extremist groups. It is no secret that our modern

complex industrial systems contain critical choke points upon which essential functions depend. Serious damage to these choke points can result in entire communities and industries being deprived of vital energy, communications, transportation or other essential services and resources. Our experiences with the destructive impact of hurricanes, floods and other natural disasters have demonstrated to all of us how vulnerable our society is to unanticipated catastrophic events.

A basic principle in our approach to emergency planning and preparedness is to give priority to those programs and measures that will help prevent major disasters or mitigate their serious consequences. In this connection we are focusing our initial studies into the risks our country faces from major terrorist activities on the identification and assessment of the vulnerability of essential national and regional services and resources on which our economy and our society is highly dependent. We are currently compiling pertinent existing information within the Federal government which will provide an overall picture and assessment of these vulnerabilities and critical choke points. In the process we expect to develop a data base that will enable us to identify and assess the most important, feasible planning and preparedness policies and programs which will serve to prevent or mitigate the most serious risks and consequences of disruptive terrorist incidents.

Many of the vulnerabilities and damaging consequences that will be highlighted will also be relevant and applicable to other man-created and natural threats with which we are concerned.

Therefore, the results should be of invaluable assistance in helping us and the various public and private agencies responsible to plan and prepare effective programs which will reduce the likelihood of serious damage or loss to essential services and industries from non-terrorist disruptive events as well.

We also expect to work closely with the various Federal and state governmental agencies and private industries concerned in developing the requisite follow-up policies and coordination efforts necessary to insure adequate planning and preparedness that will serve to prevent or reduce the likelihood of serious damage and consequences to our communities and industries.

As chief executives and decisions makers, you can help to prevent or substantially mitigate the potential damage and losses from serious disruptions to services and industries vital to your communities by undertaking similar vulnerability assessments and follow-up measures that would appreciably reduce the chances of serious consequences from terrorist incidents -- or indeed from any catastrophic disasters, natural or man-created. The Federal Government is understandably limited in terms of its resources, capabilities and authority to deal effectively with the consequences of major terrorist or other catastrophic incidents. Therefore, the extent to which you and other mayors and city officials can identify the major risks and danger points within your jurisdictions and take steps to provide prudent safeguards and contingency plans, you will significantly decrease the likelihood of such disasters occurring or of paralyzing large population or geographical areas.



Crisis Management Associates, Ltd.
6005 Chesterbrook Road
McLean, Virginia 22101
(703) 536-8046

John E. Karkashian
President

Robert L. Rabe
Secretary/Treasurer

National League of Cities Workshop on Terrorism
National Working Session
May 5-6, 1980

Assessment of Terrorist Incident Management Workshop

Despite the limitations of time and the absence of over-all role playing, the Workshop proved to be an effective method for stimulating a greater awareness on the part of the participants to some of the practical issues and procedures they would face in a similar, real-life situation. The participants agreed that such incidents could occur in their respective jurisdictions.

The individual responses of the participants to specific issues and problems reflected the strong influence of local conditions and personal judgements. They also revealed the difficulty of attempting to develop a single or simple formula for local governments to follow when faced by such problems as presented in the scenario because of the significant differences in :

1. Government structure and organization
2. Divisions of responsibility, and
3. Local problems and experiences

As anticipated by C.M.A., it was quickly evident that there was no single correct way to handle any given problem. In dealing with the issues as they surfaced, the participants effectively assessed each problem and identified what was important, but proceeded to resolve them on the basis of their different individual experiences and responsibilities. The complexities of the problems and the urgency of the need to prioritize their responses gave them a better understanding of the difficulties involved in dealing with even a relatively simple scenario. One example was the unexpected notification of the security guard's "death" which drastically changed the priority and the direction of their prob-

lem solving efforts at that particular point in the scenario. It also made them more acutely aware of the need to expect the unexpected and be prepared to deal with it.

The participants expressed widely divergent views on what the relative roles of a Mayor and Chief Executive Officer should be in the management of such incidents and a great deal of time was spent in discussing that subject. Some indicated that a Mayor would have to become personally and immediately involved in the crisis management of the incident, while others insisted that apart from periodic updates and briefings, the Mayor should not be directly involved; adding that the more he did the more he would be asked to do. Such differences obviously stem from the significant variations in local government structure and organization. The participants unanimously agreed, however, that while Council members should be kept informed of some aspects of the incident, they should not become involved under any circumstances.

None of the participants indicated that their responses to the events in the scenario were based on established crisis management procedures in their own jurisdictions, although they might have such systems in place. The participants appeared to assume that the appropriate local officials would simply deal with their particular areas of responsibility.

As indicated above, there were some basically different views expressed on how certain issues should be resolved. Again, the security guard's "death" provides an example. Some wanted to keep the news of his death from everyone, including his family, while others indicated they believed the news media could be persuaded to withhold the information given the existing circumstances. The decision on whether to allow the broadcast of the "manifesto" also evoked widely differing responses. Some participants said they would stop the broadcast because it would cause an unruly crowd to gather which would create additional law enforcement problems. Others saw no problem in permitting the broadcast, adding that no one in their city would respond.

The fact that the participants did not show any great interest in requesting concessions from the hostage takers in return for their demand for food was understandable as they did not see themselves in a negotiating role. There appeared to be a consensus that the actual negotiations would be left to the law enforcement authorities. However, they quickly recognized the need to provide medicinals and a physician when the terrorists indicated that several hostages were complaining of heart ailments.

As a group, the participants were alert and responsive to the need for complete and current intelligence on the hostage takers, their previous criminal activity, etc. Also, the need to protect additional facilities that might be assaulted was immediately recognized and there was an unanimous and rapid decision that the Mayor should not respond to the demand that he become involved in actual negotiations. Concern was quickly evidenced about the number and condition of the hostages, to the point that requests were made to have the radio station manager report directly to the command post in order to obtain the needed information as expeditiously as possible. Overall, the participants did not indicate any special concern for establishing early and close liaison with the families of the hostages and the injured security guard. It is essential that such concern be evident as quickly as possible, not only because of the traumatic pressures experienced by the families, but also because it can prevent or ease serious public relation problems for the crisis manager throughout the course of the incident.

Although federal involvement was deliberately surfaced at various points in the scenario, the incident was generally perceived by the participants as a matter of local jurisdiction. There appears to be a need for a clearer understanding of the areas of likely federal involvement in such incidents. That understanding would enhance the necessary cooperative effort when actual incidents occur involving concurrent jurisdiction.

The Workshop was designed to expose the participants to broad policy issues and raise their awareness level on the kinds of decisions which they would have to face. We believe the Workshop succeeded in doing that. Many of the participants indicated that they plan to review their existing procedures and operational guidelines for dealing with such incidents in their respective jurisdictions. To the degree that such follow-on steps are taken, the purpose and objectives of the Terrorist Incident Management Workshop will have been achieved.

National Working Session on Terrorism Preparedness
for Local Elected and Appointed Officials

Evaluation

We appreciate your participation in the National Working Session on Terrorism Preparedness for Local Elected and Appointed Officials. We will be reviewing the program and would like your help in evaluating its effectiveness. The information you provide will help us to decide how to follow up on the program and will help us to determine the success of the program.

Please give us your frank comments. Feel free to add any additional comments. You need not identify yourself.

Working Session Objectives

The four primary objectives for the working session are listed below. Please evaluate the clarity, relevance and achievement of each by circling the number that most closely corresponds to your opinion: 1- strongly agree; 2- agree; 3-neutral; 4-disagree; 5-strongly disagree.

1. Enhance local, state and federal cooperation necessary to develop a total response by all available resources to meet terrorist situations.
 - a. This objective was clearly stated and understandable to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. This objective was relevant and meaningful to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - c. This objective was achieved to my satisfaction. 1 2 3 4 5
2. Develop an awareness of the need for local executive level crisis management plans and policies to respond to a terrorist incident.
 - a. This objective was clearly stated and understandable to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. This objective was relevant and meaningful to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - c. This objective was achieved to my satisfaction. 1 2 3 4 5

2.

- 3. Create an awareness of the local, national and international concerns which may be involved should such an incident occur.
 - a. This objective was clearly stated and understandable to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. This objective was relevant and meaningful to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - c. This objective was achieved to my satisfaction. 1 2 3 4 5
- 4. Foster an awareness of the available, needed resources, including federal, which may be brought to bear or which should be developed locally to successfully respond to a terrorist incident.
 - a. This objective was clearly stated and understandable to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. This objective was relevant and meaningful to me. 1 2 3 4 5
 - c. This objective was achieved to my satisfaction. 1 2 3 4 5

Working Session Agenda

The seven major items on the seminar agenda are listed below. Please evaluate each by circling the number that most closely corresponds to your opinion.

- 1. Charles Renfrew's presentation helped me to understand the boundaries of the terrorist threat and the various responses necessary to solve the problem. 1 2 3 4 5
- 2. The panel on the Mayor/City Administrator's role during a terrorist/hostage incident helped me to understand how mayors/city administrators can most effectively and efficiently respond to a terrorist/hostage incident. 1 2 3 4 5
- 3. Anthony Quainton's luncheon presentation convinced me that combating terrorism requires a partnership between federal, state and local governments. 1 2 3 4 5
- 4. The incident management workshop for mayors/city officials conducted by Crisis Management Associates, Ltd:
 - a. increased my awareness of the issues involved in a terrorist/hostage situation. 1 2 3 4 5
 - b. allowed me to respond to the terrorist/hostage scenario in a realistic fashion. 1 2 3 4 5
 - c. helped me to prioritize or order my response in the event of an actual terrorist/hostage incident. 1 2 3 4 5

3.

- 5. The panel on terrorism, the media and the mayor/city administrator provided me with multiple perspectives which should prove useful in effectively and efficiently managing potential terrorist incidents. 1 2 3 4 5
- 6. Sam Jordon's presentation convinced me that the most appropriate role for the mayor/city administrator in preparing for a terrorist/hostage incident is of coordinating the development of a crisis command structure. 1 2 3 4 5
- 7. John Macy's discussion on dealing with the aftermath of terrorism helped me to understand that coordinating local, state and federal resources is a critical policy issue for policy officials at all levels of government. 1 2 3 4 5

Working Session Process

The following items describe process elements of the national working session. Please evaluate each by circling the number that most closely corresponds to your opinion: 1- strongly agree; 2- agree; 3- neutral; 4- disagree; 5-strongly disagree.

- 1. The national working session helped me to identify new ways of looking at my role in the management of a terrorist/hostage incident. 1 2 3 4 5
- 2. It was helpful to have participants from various jurisdictions and/or agencies at the local and federal levels who have had practical experience in managing terrorist/hostage incidents. 1 2 3 4 5
- 3. The sessions that featured distinguished speakers provided me with a good orientation and overview of the substantive issues discussed in the panel sessions. 1 2 3 4 5
- 4. The panel discussions helped me to understand, digest and to think about applications of the materials covered in the presentations by distinguished speakers. 1 2 3 4 5
- 5. The panel moderators helped us to achieve the objectives of the national working session. 1 2 3 4 5
- 6. The incident management workshop or simulation exercise was a useful educational technique. 1 2 3 4 5
- 7. I made some professional contacts at the national working session that will be useful to me in the future. 1 2 3 4 5

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Please comment on the following:

It would have been better if we had spent more time on:

It would have been better if we had spent less time on:

If the national working session were repeated, I would suggest the following changes:

If asked to suggest criteria of evaluation to the organizers to determine the success or failure of the national working session, I would suggest the following:

What I liked best about this national working session was:

What I liked least about this national working session was:

Please indicate whether you are:

- a. an elected official; or
- b. an appointed official.

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES

Terrorism Project for Local Elected

and

Appointed Officials

Follow-up Evaluation

N=10

How Prepared is Your City?

1. In your view, what is the risk that your city may experience a significant terrorist incident in the next year?
 - a. High - 2
 - b. Moderate - 4
 - c. Low - 4

2. Please rate your city's anti-terrorism preparedness, based on the following areas discussed at the National Working Session, by circling the number that most closely corresponds to your opinion:

1 - excellent; 2 - good; 3 - poor; 4 - unprepared

 - a. Re: Police anti-terrorism operational capabilities, including hostage-negotiation and SWAT training.

5	5		
1	2	3	4

 - b. Re: Involvement of key policy-level officials--especially one mayor and/or city manager--in an advance crisis management planning and preparation process.

1	7	2	
1	2	3	4

 - c. Re: Local - federal cooperation within your city to develop a total incident management response capability.

2	6	2	
1	2	3	4

 - d. Re: Sensitivity to national or international concerns which may become involved.

2	5	3	
1	2	3	4

 - e. Re: Development of media relations and public information guidelines/strategies for use before, during and after an incident.

1	5	4	
1	2	3	4

f. Re: Existence of permanent command center-type facilities for use by the mayor or city manager during terrorist incidents or other emergency management situations.

5 3 3 2
1 2 4

g. Re: Capability to coordinate other available resources of general local government (e.g. medical, social and family services, transportation, disaster response components, etc.) to support the operational law enforcement response or to handle the aftermath of a large scale, disruptive terrorist incident.

2 6 3 2
1 2 4

Did the National Working Session Make a Difference?

1. In general, did the National Working Session make a difference in the way you think about and act toward the threat of terrorism in your city?

a. Yes. 9

b. No. 1

c. If yes, please indicate what those differences are:

2. What specific follow-up activities have you undertaken or plan to initiate as a direct result of the National Working Session? For example, were the results of the National Working Session shared widely with other officials in your city?

3. What obstacles have you encountered or do you anticipate in your attempts to follow-up on the National Working Session?

4. Additional Comments.

5. Do you think there is a need for future terrorism preparedness activities at the local level?

a. Yes. 8

b. No. 1

c. If yes, what types of activities would you suggest,

and who should assume the leadership for designing and carrying out such activities? (can mark more than one)

a. Federal government 8

b. State government 2

c. Public Interest groups 1

d. Private consulting firms 1

e. Others

6. Please indicate whether you are:

- a. an elected official; or 2
- b. an appointed official. 8

END