


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X
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN CRIME AND
JUSTICE RESEARCH

REPORT

PREPARED BY THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND COOPERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
Washington, D.C., November 1, 1977.

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE,
Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representa-
tives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to submit to you our Subcom-
mittee's Special Oversight Report "The Federal Role in Crime and
Justice Research".

This report primarily focuses on the National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice which is the research arm of the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. We were pleased to be
joined in hearings on the subject by the Subcommittee on Crime of
the Committee on the Judiciary on June 22, 23, 29, 30 and July 21,
1977.

Crime and justice research is a highly important facet of our war
on crime; only by understanding the basic phenomena of crime in our
society can we hope to deal with it in an effective and rational man-
ner. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
represents the Federal Government's largest and most extensive com-
mitment in the criminal justice and crime research field. It was the
purpose of our hearings to examine the effectiveness and contributions
of that agency. This report summarizes the testimony presented to the
two subcommittees, and recommends the Subcommittee on Do-
mestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation
believes will improve the Federal research effort in the crime and
justice area.

The Honorable Robert McClory, who was so instrumental in creat-
ing the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice's
enabling legislation, has carefully reviewed our Subcommittee's
recommendations. Mr. McClory reaffirms his full support for the
concept for a Federal research and development program in the crime
and justice area.

I commend this report to your attention, to the attention of the
members of the Committee on Science and Technology, and to the
members of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,

JAMES H. SCHEUER, *Chairman,*
Subcommittee on Domestic and International
Scientific Planning, Analysis and Cooperation.

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SPECIAL OVERSIGHT

Most Federal Government agencies and departments support research and development to further advances in those fields of science and technology which are related to their mission.

In the House of Representatives these research and development activities are reviewed individually by a number of standing committees having jurisdiction of the various programs, agencies, and departments. Beginning with the 94th Congress, the rules of the House provide that a continuing review of the entire Federal research and development effort be done. For this purpose the Committee on Science and Technology is charged with the function of Special Oversight in this area. Rule X, paragraph 3(f) provides that "The Committee on Science and Technology shall have the function of reviewing and studying, on a continuing basis, all laws, programs, and Government activities dealing with or involving non-military research and development." This special oversight function is to be performed in addition to the legislative and direct oversight function of the standing committees.

The review and the recommendations included in this report are made pursuant to this special oversight provision of the House rules.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Several Department of Justice witnesses have informed the Subcommittee that a number of ameliorative actions have been taken in response to the criticisms and suggestions of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. NILECJ officials had begun taking such steps during the Spring of 1976.

Establishing the proper environment for a research program should not have proceeded only after prolonged and intense criticism has been registered; a sound environment should be present at the outset of the research effort. It is difficult if not impossible to create such an environment in an agency that has heretofore shown little interest in hosting a balance of basic and applied scientific research.

Despite the sincere and emphatic assurance of the Deputy Attorney General and his staff that in the future research of all kinds will be valued and promoted by the present administration, the Subcommittee was not presented with specific measures to prevent a reconstituted research effort from falling into the unsatisfactory pattern that has characterized NILECJ over the last eight and one-half years.

For the above reasons, the Subcommittee feels it imperative to spell out the form such measures should take.

RECOMMENDATION I

The Federal Government should be the primary source of funding for research into criminal behavior and the operation of the criminal justice system. Moreover, the Subcommittee recommends that the federal role be strengthened and that the Executive Branch provide the leadership initiative in the development of a research strategy.

RECOMMENDATION II

Federally sponsored research should be directed towards two principal objectives:

1. Increasing our understanding of criminal behavior with special emphasis on violent crime.
2. Improvement of the societal institutions involved in the prevention and control of crime. Particular emphasis should be placed on the way the justice delivery system deals with the interplay between civil and criminal matters.

RECOMMENDATION III

The research program should represent a relatively stable mix between the various areas of investigation including:

1. Research directed towards expanding our basic understanding of the phenomenon of crime, studies of its causes and correlates, and development of improved methodology to measure reliably its incidence and prevalence.

2. Experimentation in attempts to deter, prevent or control crime; but only if coupled with a well-planned evaluation program.

3. Operational studies of the criminal and civil justice delivery system with the aim of developing, demonstrating and evaluating attempts at improving the efficiency of the process and the quality of justice.

RECOMMENDATION IV

Every effort should be made to insulate any reconstituted research effort from the types of influence that have encroached upon the management of NILECJ, sapping its strength and eroding its research integrity and credibility. The Subcommittee holds to the premise that it is neither possible nor desirable to remove the research program from overall policy guidance exerted by political leadership in the Administration and in the Congress. However, once the broad outline of policy has been laid down, a considerable measure of independence must be maintained. To do this the Subcommittee recommends that the following conditions be met in order to assure a quality research program:

1. The agency must be directed by a person of considerable stature in the research community in addition to being a skilled administrator.

2. The Director should be appointed by the President.

3. The Director must have final sign-off authority on all grants, contracts, and personnel matters.

4. The agency should be guided by a Presidentially-appointed statutory advisory body of distinguished scientists, educators, and practitioners who are thoroughly familiar with the canons of scientific research.

5. This Board should advise the Director, and the Congress and the Administration of new areas of research which offer the potential to improve the practice of crime deterrence, prevention and control, and the delivery of justice. It should periodically review the research program and provide formal advice to the Director, the President and the Congress on the advisability of pursuing such programs.

6. A staff of high quality program managers and project monitors must be recruited. Personnel policy and grade structure should be fashioned so as to permit the acquisition of a staff of fully trained and experienced scientists for most key positions.

7. Peer review should be the fundamental prerequisite for all major research project decisions. Revolving review panels should be established as standing committees, though open-ended with regard to the tenure of members. Panels should consist of members with diverse disciplines, methodological skills, substantive interests and experience. Additionally, the ad hoc peer review system should be utilized when determined appropriate so as to facilitate program flexibility.¹

8. Multi-year funding of research programs or projects must be facilitated. This is essential to the conduct of longitudinal investigations into the causes of crime as well as long-term follow-up (cohort) evaluations of the effects of prevention or control policies.

¹ The ad hoc peer review system consists of a panel of scholars convened to determine the merit of a particular research project proposal, or evaluation of research project proposals by individual scholars, usually conducted through the mails.

RECOMMENDATION V

Location of the research effort within the Federal Government should be made contingent upon the above conditions. The Subcommittee has heard arguments both for and against locating a reconstituted crime and criminal justice research program within the Department of Justice. The Subcommittee is inclined to favor retaining the program in the Department of Justice on the premise that the potential for attracting a broad and diverse constituency still exists within that agency; but this should be done only if there is assurance that Department of Justice officials are willing and able to create the environment for quality research detailed in IV above.

1. The Subcommittee strongly recommends the removal of the research activity from its present site in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Association with that program has so seriously degraded the image of the National Institute (despite serious and partially successful attempts to reform it by present staff) that we are convinced it is best to start de novo with a new location, a new format, new leadership and staff. The evaluation of LEAA action programs and the development and dissemination of new hardware technology should remain functions of LEAA.

2. If maintained within the Department of Justice, the Subcommittee recommends that the research effort be broadened in concept. Three institutes should be established and together they would form the National Institutes of Justice:

(a) The Institute for Research into Criminal Behavior and Criminal Justice.

(b) The Institute of Civil Justice and Administration of Law.

(c) The National Justice Information Center consisting of:

1. The Bureau of Criminal Statistics

2. The Bureau of Civil Justice Statistics.

Existing research and statistics programs within the Department of Justice would fall under one or another of the three Institutes, though their exact placement should be left to future determinations. The affected programs would include the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the National Institute of Corrections, the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, the Uniform Crime Reports, and the Office for Improvement in the Administration of Justice.

If the conditions outlined in IV above cannot be met, consideration should be given to creating a freestanding research agency responsible to the Congress and the President. A special set of deliberations should then be initiated to determine the structural characteristics of the research agency and its statutory authority.

RECOMMENDATION VI

We recommend preserving existing programs in crime and justice research located outside the Department of Justice such as those in the National Science Foundation (Research Applications Directorate) and the National Institute of Mental Health (Center for Studies of

Crime and Delinquency. The Subcommittee concludes that a certain amount of healthy pluralism among agency missions is desirable in order to accelerate the development of research into the causes of criminal behavior and to provide multiple opportunities for pursuing what may be a controversial research area. These relatively specialized programs should serve to complement a larger and more diversified research program which would serve as the Federal Government's principal investment in crime and justice research.

RECOMMENDATION VII

Finally, the DISPAC Subcommittee recommends that conferences between the executive and legislative branches be convened among interested Federal agencies and Congressional subcommittees to establish a set of principles upon which a reconstituted research effort should be based. Such consultation will accelerate the search for a workable resolution of the many problems found in the structure and administration of the Federal Government's crime and justice research program.

FORMAT OF THE HEARINGS

JUNE 22-JULY 21, 1977

The hearings were structured so as to move in a logical and more or less sequential manner through six topical areas.

- What, if any, should be the federal role in crime and criminal justice research? Four practitioners and two researchers addressed this question.
- What should be the priorities assigned to various types of federally sponsored research?
- Discussion of these broad policy questions was followed by members of the National Academy of Sciences panel reviewing the history of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Two past directors of the Institute responded to the NAS report and to the several case studies of NILECJ sponsored projects presented by a former NILECJ administrator and a prominent researcher. Research Directors from two other Federal agencies joined with the NAS panel in detailing the conditions necessary for developing quality sponsored research and offered their recommendations for what should be done in the crime and criminal justice and civil justice research field.
- Finally, members of the Attorney General's I EAA study group responded to issues raised during the hearings and presented the current position of the Department of Justice on the research issue.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF HEARINGS

INTRODUCTION

In preparing this report the Subcommittee drew on a variety of sources, first and foremost being the hearing record. In all, eight additional sources were utilized ranging from the intensive eighteen month study of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to that of this Subcommittee's own oversight study conducted a year ago. A list of "Primary Data Sources" appears at the end of the section on History of Research Within the LEAA.

The analytic processes leading to this report followed a topical approach. The full record of the five days of hearings was subjected to a detailed content analysis. Each significant point raised by witnesses was content coded. All comments pertaining to the same issue were collated and arranged within the outline for the report. Often, lengthy passages of testimony were abstracted or paraphrased for incorporation into the text of the report. A similar method was employed for the utilization of the studies mentioned above.

HISTORY OF RESEARCH WITHIN THE LEAA¹

Nearly 9 years ago, the Federal Government launched its first large-scale assistance program for improvement of the nation's criminal justice and law enforcement capabilities. Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 and authorized establishment of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) as a new agency within the Department of Justice to carry forward the program. Since the inception of LEAA, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) has served as the research arm of the Crime Control Act program.

The Omnibus Crime Control Act, when created, was a multifaceted program of state and local support which reflected, perhaps, the best current wisdom on federal assistance for key state and local functions. It provides for:

- Planning grants to every state to develop comprehensive criminal justice improvement plans.
- Sizable "block grants" to every state, allocated on the basis of population, for the purpose of implementing comprehensive plans once submitted to and approved by LEAA;
- A network of "state planning agencies" in every state to develop plans, receive block grants, subgrant funds to state and local agencies, and generally superintend and monitor the total effort;

¹In large measure this descriptive material consists of sections excerpted from an analytical report prepared by Daniel L. Skoler, Program Development Counsel, American Bar Association, and former Associate Administrator of the LEAA from 1968-1971.

- “Discretionary grants” permitting the Federal government to award action funds as it sees fit and thus exercise Federal influence and leadership on behalf of selected innovations and program initiatives;
- The conduct of evaluation studies of programs receiving Federal assistance; the collection and dissemination of criminal justice statistics and data; and the rendering of technical assistance to state and local agencies and groups; and
- Establishment of a research and development program (the special focus of this profile) conducted by the National Institute to “improve” and strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice.

These basic elements describe the LEAA program as it has operated since 1968 subject to (1) creation in 1971 of a special and additional appropriation of “block grants” and “discretionary grants” for correctional activities, and (2) establishment in 1975 of a special grants-in-aid program for the control and prevention of juvenile delinquency with its own counterparts for virtually every LEAA element described above (comprehensive plans, formula grants, discretionary grants, training and education, a research institute, etc.).

The LEAA program grew rapidly. Commencing with an initial appropriation of \$60 million in fiscal year 1969, it multiplied more than a dozen times in less than five years, peaking at over \$900 million in fiscal year 1975 and receding to the current fiscal 1977 level of \$753 million (inclusive of a \$75 million Juvenile Delinquency Act allocation). Within these gross appropriation boundaries, program allocations have stabilized at the following levels over the past five years:

- Research at \$30 to \$40 million annually;
- Education and manpower at \$40 to \$45 million;
- Information and statistics at \$20 to \$25 million;
- Technical assistance at \$10 to \$15 million;
- State regional and local planning and grant administration at \$55 to \$65 million, and
- “Overhead” (LEAA management and operations) at \$20 to \$25 million.

The bulk of federal aid, of course, has been appropriated for “action” purposes (\$450 to \$550 million annually), 85 percent of which is distributed as the formula-based “block grants” and 15 percent as “discretionary awards.”

Congress has been quite active in adjusting and “fine tuning” the Crime Control Act. Major substantive amendments and additions were approved on four occasions and at approximately 2-year intervals:

- Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-664)
- Crime Control Act of 1973 (Public Law 93-83)
- Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-415)
- Crime Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-503)

Only the 1973 and 1976 Acts affected the National Institute and will be discussed briefly in the next section.

LEGISLATIVE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE

While it was contemplated that LEAA would carry on research, evaluation and statistical activities, the idea of a distinct R. & D. institute was largely an afterthought. The concept was not included

as part of the Johnson Administration legislation that ultimately evolved into the Crime Control Act. The National Institute was primarily the “creation” of DISPAC Chairman James H. Scheuer, who was assisted by Representative Robert McClory in offering it as a Floor amendment to the Administration bill on August 3, 1967. Although the concept of the Institute derived from some of the thinking of the landmark President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Katzenbach Commission of 1965-67), it generated limited discussion at the time.

The initial 1968 enactment dealt with the Institute in a single and relatively brief section. It established a National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice “under the general authority” of LEAA to encourage criminal justice research and development. There were specific authorizations to (1) make grants to public and private organizations for research, demonstrations and special projects, (2) undertake research aimed at developing new or improved systems, approaches, techniques and equipment to strengthen law enforcement, (3) carry out “behavioral research” on crime causes and crime prevention, (4) make action recommendations to federal, state and local governments, (5) conduct programs of instructional assistance, including fellowships and workshops, (6) undertake programs for collection and dissemination of information to reflect research findings, and (7) “establish a research center” to carry out the foregoing activities.

The 1973 amendments specified that the Institute director was to be appointed by the LEAA Administrator and added text emphasizing National Institute training of criminal justice personnel, service as an international clearinghouse for criminal justice improvement data, and evaluation efforts on the impact and success of LEAA-supported projects. The Institute was also directed to submit separate annual reports to the President and Congress and to conduct a national survey of criminal justice manpower needs.

The 1976 amendments made the Institute directorship an Attorney General appointment rather than an LEAA Administrator appointment, apparently emphasizing the importance of the post (although nothing was done to remove or attenuate LEAA supervisory authority). These amendments further stressed growing Congressional interest in program evaluation, directing the Institute to (1) develop criteria and procedures for such work and communicate them to the state planning agencies and (2) identify, catalog and disseminate information on demonstrably successful projects. The Institute was also given some new special assignments, e.g., undertaking research on drug treatment programs and the relationship between drug abuse and crime and conducting a national survey on “existing and future needs in correctional facilities” (in each case collaborating with other relevant federal agencies). Also to be noted is what Congress failed to do in the 1976 Amendments. Despite Ford Administration backing and general acceptance by the Justice Department of the concepts and legislative offerings on needed LEAA amendments, Congress chose not to expand the National Institute’s scope explicitly to cover civil as well as criminal justice and to place the Institute “under the general jurisdiction” of the Attorney General rather than the LEAA Administrator.

In July, 1975, DISPAC's predecessor, DISPA, held hearings on the subject of the "Application of Science and Technology to Crime Control." The thrust of those hearings was to examine: (1) pure and applied research programs in crime control and prevention, (2) efforts to disseminate information about successful techniques and programs, (3) the effectiveness of the operational procedures within LEAA and especially its research arm, NILECJ, and (4) the status of coordination between the latter and other government agencies.

The subsequent report on these hearings offered five recommendations which called for: (1) the improvement of interagency coordination of crime-related research, (2) establishment of priorities for R. & D. in crime prevention and control in cooperation with state and local governments, (3) a review of NILECJ's performance as a research institution and its organizational position in the Department of Justice, (4) a study of the collection, dissemination and use of statistics gleaned from R. & D. undertaken in the control of crime, and (5) the conduct of R. & D. in crime prevention and control so as to achieve an improved balance between hardware development and the study of societal and behavioral aspects of crime deterrence, prevention and control.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

As a unit of LEAA, the National Institute has always been under the supervision and authority of its parent agency. Throughout its history, the LEAA Administrator has retained signoff authority on all National Institute grants and awards.

Under the current National Institute leadership (there have been several organizational formats), the Institute now operates with three major divisions: Office of Research Programs, Office of Evaluation, and Office of Technology Transfer.

The Office of Research Programs carries on the major R. & D. mission of the Institute and spends most of its money. It is divided into six subunits—police, courts, corrections, community crime prevention, advanced technology and special programs. The Office of Evaluation is concerned with evaluating projects (not only the Institute's, but also LEAA's discretionary grants) and also improving evaluation techniques. The Office of Technology Transfer is concerned with getting information on the results of successful research out to potential users. It does this through (1) a reference service that indexes and circulates announcements on virtually all criminal justice literature and maintains library and reading room facilities, (2) a "model programs" unit that identifies, writes up and packages dissemination items such as "exemplary projects" (outstanding and innovative programs) and "prescriptive packages" (how-to-do-it manuals for selected program areas) and (3) a training and testing unit that funds field demonstrations of promising projects and conducts training sessions to encourage their adoption (e.g., the team policing concept, jury management, conducting criminal investigations).

MANPOWER AND EXPENDITURES

For the past several years the Institute has operated with 75 to 85 staff members (about two-thirds at a professional level). In terms of present organizational patterns, this puts about 8 in the Office of

the Director, 35 in the Office of Research Programs, 25 in the Office of Technology Transfer and 12 in the Office of Evaluation.²

Since 1973 there has been a 21-member Advisory Committee to the Institute director with well chosen academic and practitioner members, but it has met on an irregular basis (three or four times a year) and has had difficulty exercising meaningful policy consultation or guidance. It may be contrasted with the Advisory Committee for the newer National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the Advisory Board for the National Institute of Corrections which are defined by statute and have exercised almost "board of directors" policy oversight.

Through January 1, 1977, the Institute had spent nearly \$200 million. Annual budgets for the last two years have run at \$27 million (FY 1977) and \$32 million (FY 1976), a significant reduction from the \$40-42 million levels of 1974-75. The 1977 budget reduction, bringing the Institute to its lowest level in five years (since 1972) reflects, at least in part, an offset for increasing research funding allocated to the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (\$7.5 million in fiscal 1977). Taking the last three completed funding years (1974, 1975 and 1976), the major unit expenditure breakdown for the Institute has been as follows:

	Million
Office of Research Programs-----	\$62
Office of Evaluation-----	14
Office of Technology Transfer-----	14
Miscellaneous (primarily "pass through" funds for Drug Enforcement Administration)-----	26
3-year expenditure total-----	116

Within the Office of Research Programs, fund allocations for the same three year period were as follows:

	Million
Advanced Technology Division-----	24
Community crime prevention-----	8
Police-----	6
Courts-----	7
Corrections-----	7
Special programs-----	7
Education/manpower (placed elsewhere in 1976)-----	3
3-year total-----	62

The most striking fact is the dominance of the Advanced Technology Division, which administers the equipment R. & D. program and has accounted for 40 percent of all resources allocated to the Institute's research operation in recent years (this despite a recent de-emphasis which will be felt in 1977 and beyond.)³

² A recent survey of the training and experience among NILECJ professional personnel revealed that one in five had training at the doctorate level though every other staff member claimed to have had overall responsibility for administering at least one research project.

³ The Institute's 1977 budget has reduced Advanced Technology to about \$3 million. The fiscal year 1978 budget cut out virtually all of this expenditure category.

Even the foregoing pattern shows considerable diversification from earlier years such as 1972 and 1973 when nearly half of all Institute research funds went into LEAA's high impact/pilot cities programs under the "crime reduction" programing approach.⁴

Equally striking is the fund recipient patterns of Institute research investment. According to an analysis of the National Academy of Sciences (and excluding the sizable impact/pilot cities awards to a few urban governments), research organizations emerge by far as the heaviest dollar recipient of Institute funds:

	Percent
Research organizations.....	40
Universities.....	22
Other Federal agencies.....	13
National and professional associations.....	9
Corporations and private industry.....	7
State and local government agencies.....	7
Other.....	2
Total.....	100

Within the giant research organization category (about \$41 million in funding since National Institute inception), three organizations set up as contract research centers have enjoyed the lion's share of funding over the Institute's life (50 percent of the research organization total or nearly \$23 million) with one of these (Aerospace Corporation, which manages the Institute's Advanced Technology Program much like a Federal agency unit) accounting for \$16 million in awards. Another major fund recipient, also part of the Technology Research Program, has been the Federal Government's own National Bureau of Standards which through 1975 had received over \$8 million for equipment standards work.

TYPES OF PROGRAMS

As the financial figures indicate, two program categories, technology and the High Impact/Anti-Crime (Impact Cities) program, have dominated the Institute's budget. The former has been fairly constant although the present trend is down and the latter largely ended with the demise of the Impact Cities programs in 1975. Traditional criminal justice program areas—police, courts and correction have maintained a fairly constant claim on Institute resources (collectively running a solid but not so close second to advanced technology) and, by and large, there has been a tendency to fund more projects at more modest amounts in these areas. A National Academy of

⁴ The Pilot Cities and High Impact Programs were concentrated LEAA efforts to upgrade enforcement capabilities and attack crime in selected demonstration cities. Funded primarily with "discretionary grants" (nearly \$15 million for Pilot Cities and over \$150 million for High Impact), the Institute invested large quantities of its own funds (over \$21 million) in research support, technical assistance and evaluation. These efforts have attracted considerable criticism in virtually all evaluations, particularly High Impact which was to have achieved measurable reductions in crime rates through saturation funding and leadership by "crime analysis teams" directed at stranger-to-stranger violent crimes. Pilot Cities, the first and more modest effort, had a greater research orientation, was more realistic in seeking system improvement progress rather than immediate crime reduction, and included separate funding to develop R. & D. capacity in local academic institutions or research centers.

Sciences program breakdown for the period 1969-75 (to be distinguished from the divisional outlays previously presented) shows the following:

Program area	1969-75 expenditures (millions)	Number of projects
Advanced technology.....		
Courts.....	\$34.4	105
Police.....	10.1	84
Corrections.....	7.8	85
Juveniles.....	9.5	81
Community crime prevention.....	5.8	44
Drug rehabilitation.....	5.3	29
Criminal justice overall.....	1.5	9
Specific crimes.....	20.8	98
Fellowships.....	2.7	42
High impact/pilot cities.....	1.3	50
Total.....	21.1	8
Total.....	120.3	635

The Institute has recently begun its "Research Agreements Program" under which long-term awards are made to support a variety of broadly-based research projects, each in a specific area of inquiry. Thus far, Rand Corporation, Yale University Law School, Stanford's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs, and most recently the Vera Institute have each received \$600,000 in awards to probe, respectively, the habitual offender, white-collar crime, econometric analysis of crime rates and criminal behavior and citizen reactions and participation in anti-crime efforts.

In programmatic terms, the Institute's work has been characterized as (1) focusing more on applied than basic research, (2) dealing more heavily with improvement of the fairness and effectiveness of the criminal justice system than addressing crime reduction and causes, (3) emphasizing predefined short-term, single projects as opposed to integrated clusters of projects directed towards the resolution of major research problems over a longer term. Testimony presented by James M. H. Gregg, Deputy Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and Blair G. Ewing, Deputy Director of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice indicates however, that the Institute has recently begun to shift its emphasis away from the short-term, orientation towards integrated, long-term projects with little or no predefinition. According to Gregg: "Through the Research Agreements Program, the Institute attempts to develop long-term relationships with selected universities and research organizations with an interest in criminal justice research. Each agreement represents a long-term commitment to a program area that complements the overall efforts of the National Institute."

OTHER JUSTICE RELATED EFFORTS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Three other research entities have recently been established in the Department of Justice: (1) The National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, now operating within LEAA at a Fiscal 1978 appropriations level of \$10 million, conducts research into the problems of juvenile delinquency, evaluates juvenile justice programs,

develops standards for the administration of juvenile justice, provides training for persons working or preparing to work in the delinquency field, and serves as a center for the collection and dissemination of information; (2) the National Institute of Corrections, financed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons by a \$5 million budget, has designed its research function (one quarter of the program) to strengthen the research and evaluation capabilities of state and local correctional agencies, through grants made primarily to state and local correctional agencies that have their own research and evaluation staff. Its remaining energies are devoted to training and clearinghouse functions; and (3) the office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice with a budget request of \$2 million for fiscal year 78, which is an applied research office headed by an Assistant Attorney General and charged with bringing about improvements in the Federal civil and criminal justice systems.

In thinking about the research, evaluation, training and dissemination mission of the National Institute, mention should be made of the impact of other LEAA program elements such as the "discretionary grants" and the work of LEAA's National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS).

There are three related research programs in other Federal agencies.

The first is the *Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency* within the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which is part of HEW's Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration. This is a modest-sized but long-standing research program (older than LEAA) which has operated over the past decade with a budget of \$4 to \$5 million per year. Beyond traditional research, it deploys significant resources for training, information dissemination and experimental models and demonstrations. The official mission has been to develop and strengthen scientific knowledge on crime, delinquency and related deviant behavior. Its work has often overlapped LEAA correctional and delinquency concerns but the Center has also added much by its basic focus on sources and patterns of crime, delinquency and violence, interrelations between mental health, criminal conduct and justice concepts, and public policy roles in this area.

National Science Foundation.—Although the Foundation has no overall law or justice research program as such, its RANN (Research Applied to National Needs) Program funds a substantial amount of justice research through two divisions—Advanced Productivity Research and Technology and Social Sciences. The striking contrast that this work exhibits in relation to NIMH and the LEAA complex is its focus on civil justice and civil law problems. These NSF efforts currently amount to perhaps \$3 to \$4 million annually (inclusive of some criminal justice and crime research in other NSF units). The NSF programs concentrate on research and are free of training, technical assistance, clearinghouse and statistical collection responsibilities to a greater degree than the LEAA Institute.

Federal Judicial Center.—It is estimated that the bulk of the Center's current \$4 million budget (perhaps 60 percent) is devoted to research and development directed toward improving Federal judicial administration, personnel and practices. Here too, smaller allocations are targeted at continuing education and training as well as inter-judicial affairs.

RECENT CRITIQUES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Most critiques and studies have focused on LEAA's large-scale planning/block grant activities rather than the research mission of the National Institute program. However, several recent studies do focus on the NILECJ and do so in a thorough and thought provoking manner.

National Academy of Sciences Study (NAS).—Perhaps the most recent and intensive review of National Institute performance was that undertaken by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. The report was supported by an LEAA grant, involved a distinguished committee of research experts and academic/administrative/generalist leaders, and was conducted by a full-time staff. Despite LEAA funding, the report is quite critical of its sponsor. Entitled, "Understanding Crime: An Evaluation of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice," the Academy's basic findings were that (1) the quality of National Institute-funded research has been mediocre (due largely to substandard research designs and administrative failings), (2) the usefulness of Institute work is difficult to assess but generally does not warrant high ratings; little of it appears to be used by practitioners in planning or program development, (3) the Institute has failed to build a coherent body of knowledge and to focus that knowledge on problem-solving, and (4) the Institute has harbored serious shortcomings in research administration, including a weak advisory panel system, ineffective review procedures, exclusion of important segments of the research community, and vulnerability to outside pressures detrimental to research:

The Committee finds that the Institute has been asked to carry too large a share of the burden of making LEAA accountable. It has been required to undertake numerous tasks—such as technical assistance to State Planning Agencies, training programs, project evaluations and other direct service obligations that have turned its focus away from research. The Institute has responded to pressures for instant solutions to what are complex problems instead of concentrating on a program for testing, developing and cumulating knowledge . . . The Institute has not had autonomy within LEAA, nor has it been able to establish independent stature as a research agency.

The Academy of Science's organizational recommendations include the following:

- An end is suggested to "LEAA domination over the Institute" with the Institute Director being accorded Assistant Attorney General rank, full sign-off authority on all awards, and control over administrative budget, personnel and program review.
- A statutory "Criminal Justice Research Advisory Board" should be established to assure independence and establish program priorities.
- LEAA's juvenile justice institute and criminal justice statistics service should be included within the structure of the new independent National Institute (hopefully expanding the latter to a Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics).
- Functions and activities extraneous to the Institute's substantive research program (e.g., technical assistance to planners and practitioners in designing evaluations and the "packaging" or "marketing" aspects of dissemination) should be dropped from the Institute and put elsewhere in the LEAA structure.

—The Institute should abandon organization of its program around functional divisions (police, courts, corrections) or character of tasks (dissemination, evaluation, research funding, equipment and technology) and focus on an organization based on substantive program areas which reflect priority subjects of inquiry, e.g., deterrence, rehabilitation, consequences of change in the system, relation of socialization to crime, and focusing the criminal law.

Twentieth Century Fund.—The Twentieth Century Fund's 1976 study of the total LEAA program, "Law Enforcement: The Federal Role" would appear, after dropping "block grants," to mold the complete LEAA program into an entity similar to the National Institute. The proposal is that 50 percent of all Federal moneys for crime control should flow directly to state, county and municipal governments through "special revenue sharing" and the remaining 50 percent should be allocated to an LEAA successor known as the "Law Enforcement Assistance Institute" (LEAI). LEAI's primary function would be research, evaluation and experimentation and at least half of its funds would be used for this purpose.

Unlike the Academy of Sciences approach, the Twentieth Century Fund envisions continuance of large responsibilities extraneous to pure research, including higher education subsidies, incentive funds for comprehensive planning, large-scale demonstrations beyond normal research bounds and special action efforts such as projects relating to corruption and organized crime.

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.—Issued in early 1977, this document is a set of standards dealing exclusively with criminal justice R. & D. from LEAA's national standards and goals program. The 150-page volume is the work of a task force of recognized and knowledgeable research experts within LEAA's National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. It offers a wealth of guidance on research practices, principles and approaches, frequently using the National Institute and NIMH Center for Studies on Crime and Delinquency as illustrative examples. However, there is no explicit critique of the National Institute or suggestions for restructuring, other than an implied acknowledgment of the National Institute's problems of politicization, naivete and pressure for quick results in comparison with the NIMH Center:

NILECJ (National Institute) was created in response to national pressures to reduce crime, is at a more youthful stage of development, is still working out basic administrative relationships to its parent organizations as well as to Congress in its attempts to fund R. & D. that will lead to immediately useful improvements in the criminal justice system . . . In contrast, the DHEW Center was formed as part of an overall tradition of health-related R. & D. (and) has been able to employ long-standing R. & D. management practices developed by the older National Institutes of Health.

Perhaps of greatest significance for this profile is the National Advisory Committee recommendation that criminal justice R. & D. be funded by a variety of sources—governmental and private (Standard 1.1, "Report on Criminal Justice Research and Development"). This recommendation is in sharp contrast to the proposal that would combine all criminal justice research functions in an enlarged National

Institute, and is an issue that must be faced with the de facto presence of federal statutory research institutes on corrections and juvenile delinquency and the possibility of new research centers that could focus on court-related civil and criminal justice themes. The National Advisory Committee rationale, as might be expected, is that a variety of R. & D. funding sources will offer a healthy multiplicity of research ideas and approaches in a field that cannot yet settle for any single, all-powerful orientation toward the R. & D. mission.

Law and Disorder IV Study.—This is the latest in a series of LEAA reviews that have been the most critical of all outside studies of the agency. Like the National Academy of Sciences review, Law and Disorder found the National Institute inadequate, politicized and ineffective. It recommended, in its place, the creation of a new, scholarly high-quality center to carry out its own research on the causes of crime, ways of protecting society from its ravages and means for reduction of criminal behavior. The new entity was to be separate and independent from the Department of Justice and under the governance of a private board of Presidential nominees. Its program would focus on providing policy-relevant data to officials and agencies dealing with crime at all government levels. In particular, it would (1) seek to draw lessons from past experience and disseminate this data, (2) design demonstrations and evaluations to test and assess unresolved issues and approaches, and (3) look at the role of nonlaw enforcement service agencies and disciplines in preventing crime. Along with the research function, equal stress is placed on the creation of a "Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics", perhaps as part of the proposed research center, to reassess the volume and kinds of crime and the characteristics of offenders and victims and to develop other statistical data.

Research Priorities for Crime Reduction Efforts.—Prepared by Henry S. Ruth, Jr. (a former NILECJ Director) this monograph was published in January, 1977 under the auspices of the Urban Institute. Ruth outlines what he sees as the priority research topics in the crime and criminal justice field. Though not explicitly a critique of the NILECJ program, Ruth's attempt to formulate a research agenda at this late date, is criticism by implication. Nevertheless, the listing of priorities is not dissimilar from what NILECJ more or less ended up doing without an overall plan. Top value is placed on "Interim improvements in efficiency and fairness" the criminal justice apparatus with a secondary emphasis on research that would "posit the need to limit the use of the criminal sanction" (laws). The major long-range thrust would be directed towards improving criminal justice operations. Research on basic concepts and that directed towards creating a theoretical base, the so-called "basic research," is mentioned last among Ruth's priorities.

PRIMARY DATA SOURCES

1. Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, National Academy of Sciences National Research Council, "Understanding Crime: An Evaluation of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice" (Unpublished final report, 1977).
2. Report of Task Force on Criminal Justice Research and Development, National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice

Standards and Goals, "Criminal Justice Research and Development" (Government Printing Office, December 1976).

3. Rand Corporation, "The Management of Federal Criminal Justice R. & D." (Unpublished analysis, September, 1976).

4. "Research Priorities for Crime Reduction Efforts," Henry S. Ruth, Jr. The Urban Institute, No. 5037-6-1, January, 1977, Washington, D.C.

5. "First and Second Annual Reports of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice" (Fiscal Years 1974 and 1975).

6. Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Law Enforcement: The Federal Role" (McGraw-Hill, 1976).

7. Center for National Security Studies, "Law and Disorder IV" (1976).

8. "Review of the Application of Science and Technology to Crime Control," Special Oversight Report No. 3, Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis of the Committee on Science and Technology, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session, December, 1976.

FINDINGS OF HEARINGS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

FEDERAL ROLE IN CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH

Before detailing the reasons for the successes and failures of the Federal crime research effort it would do well to reexamine the fundamental question of whether there should be Federal involvement in this type of research. All witnesses who addressed the issue, agreed without question that there is an important Federal role. While reviewing the rationale supporting this thesis, it should be kept in mind that Federal initiative does not necessarily guarantee performance superior to State or local efforts. Federal research may constitute a threat particularly if it takes the form of developing information that may reflect poorly on local criminal justice programming. It may be regarded as an unwelcome intrusion into local affairs. Thus, Federal influence may exert a depressing effect on local crime research initiatives. Accepting this as a possibility the Subcommittee, nevertheless, agrees with most of the arguments in support of a strong Federal role in crime and justice research offered during the hearings.

Six distinct reasons justifying a Federal role were offered during the course of the hearings.

First, crime is a national problem. No locality in the United States is singularly immune from the horror and tragedy of criminal acts and serious, primarily violent delinquent behavior. Further, acts of criminality are a reflection of cultural and social phenomena which bear little relation to local and political boundaries;

Second, the Federal Government has the advantage of being a potentially dispassionate observer of criminal activity since it is divorced from the day to day pressures which surround the State and local participants in the criminal justice system;

Third, the Federal Government possesses far greater financial resources for research and development than do state or local governments. In addition, a research and development effort at the federal level can take full advantage of economies of scale as research can be

conducted in one jurisdiction and then transferred to others. The cost may well exceed the value to the initial jurisdiction, but the benefits can be derived by all under Federal sponsorship and stimulation. This can result in far greater efficiency and utilization of research opportunities, research facilities and skilled personnel. It also results in the best accumulation of research knowledge;

Fourth, the relative smallness of the criminal justice research community warrants centralizing and coordinating talent in an effort to stimulate intellectual discourse and activity;

Fifth, the Federal Government has the capability of disseminating knowledge and information far more quickly and efficiently than state and local governments and has much more of an interest in doing so;

Finally, the Federal Government has the capability of acting as a national data center by taking national samples when needed; to discern national and regional differences in given areas of criminality and criminal justice. Controlled experimental groups can test various findings in a variety of settings to determine the universality and transferability of research results.

The subcommittee concludes that the Federal Government should use its prestige, resources and its central role to provide leadership in the criminal justice and crime research area. In addition, state and local governments should be encouraged to sponsor their own R. & D. activities in conjunction with the Federal effort, should they so desire.

EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH PROGRAM AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Although there are several sources of Federal support for research on crime and the operation of the criminal justice system, (the NIMH's Center for Studies in Crime and Delinquency, the NSF's Division of Law Science and Technology in its Research Applications Directorate, the National Institute of Corrections, the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Federal Judicial Center, to name a few), the DISPAC Subcommittee focused on one program: the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ). The NILECJ is the largest, most diversified, and ambitious of all federal research programs devoted to the subject of crime. Comparisons between the performance of NILECJ and that of other research centers must be carried out cautiously since no other program has the scope or size of NILECJ.

The hearing record reveals little disagreement among witnesses regarding the facts of NILECJ's 8½ year history. The chronology of that history, compiled by the NAS panel, was largely acceptable to virtually all witnesses familiar with the report. Opinions differed, however, over the ways in which its history could be interpreted, particularly regarding NILECJ projects and program initiatives, and its overall contributions and shortfalls. Not surprisingly, the differences in viewpoint occurred between past and present NILECJ and LEAA leadership and those who observed its performance from outside the Government.

Mediocre Research.—Nevertheless, the overall quality of research sponsored by NILECJ has been consistently judged as "mediocre".

Few projects could be clearly termed "successes" or "failures" since few were conducted rigorously enough to permit such a conclusion upon completion. Several witnesses noted a slight but steady improvement in quality over time. There has been a detectable improvement in standards by which designs are judged with a corresponding improvement in the stature of the Institute as a research center.

No long-range agenda.—Practitioners and researchers alike observed that the Institute failed to establish or adhere to a long-range, coherent research agenda. Strategies shifted with the Institute directorships, in a constant quest over the early years for short-term "winners" at the expense of long-term solutions.

Lost Opportunities.—The greatest costs of NILECJ's wavering direction, and the failure of the Institute, the LEAA and the Justice Department to pursue a coherent research agenda over the years, are the lost opportunities to contribute to the national intelligence on crime. A cogent example was offered by one witness, who indicated that a study of sentencing policies was aborted by the Institute's director in 1971. The potential value of that lost critical information became increasingly obvious as three sitting jurists (Justices Bazelon, Day, and Hall) called for research guidance in fashioning determinate sentencing legislation.

Directors Not Researchers.—In addition to this instability of direction and vulnerability to transitory outside pressures and other influences, it was alleged that there were several other features of the Institute's program which contributed to its deterioration as a reputable research center. Only in the first few months of its existence was the Institute headed by a respected researcher of known reputation in the scientific community. Since early in 1969, it has been primarily directed by a succession of lawyers who, though of recognized administrative acumen, were virtually unknown to the larger community of researchers and scientists. Consequently, their understanding of the substance of research and the nature of the research community, and particularly their ability to make effective, research program judgments were frequently subject to question.

Inadequate Project Review.—The lack of credible peer review of proposals militated against bringing the best of scientific and research talent into the program of NILECJ, either as grantees, contractors, advisors, or as staff. The Institute preferred one year grants and required time-consuming annual reviews of multiyear projects. From the outset, NILECJ Directors had no final sign-off authority in any action, be it fiscal, programmatic, or personnel. Each Director's decision was subject to as many as a dozen reviews. Despite sizeable resources, all of these factors made the NILECJ program comparatively unattractive to reputable scientists.

Lacked Image of Integrity.—The structural constraints on NILECJ's independence tended to exclude most of the existing social science research community, particularly that majority working under university auspices. The Institute grew to rely upon various constituencies composed of private groups, Federal agencies, and nonprofit research centers. Being divorced from mainstream scientists, NILECJ found itself vulnerable to pressures exerted by its host agency, LEAA, the Justice Department and the Congress. It was unable to sustain the image of integrity characterized by an understanding that research

must search for the truth wherever it may lie, and not respond to the immediate demands for solutions or findings that justify preconceived conclusions. One witness pointed out that "people of high scientific quality simply won't participate in a program that they perceive lacks such integrity."

Few Scientists Involved.—These handicaps in image were severe. They were aggravated by what one witness termed disdain of university scientists as venal, impractical and nonrelevant. Despite these problems NILECJ was still able to expand the number of researchers working on crime and criminal justice problems. Ten years ago there were only a handful of social scientists working in the area. Today there are at least several hundred, but still only a handful compared to the tens of thousands of social and behavioral scientists, who may have much to offer this new field. Much of the increase can be attributed to NILECJ funding of projects and fellowships. The NAS panel noted that it was impressed by the quality of scientists participating in program evaluations mandated by the Congress in its 1973 Amendments. It pointed out, however, that the talents of these researchers were not being fully utilized, particularly in developing badly needed evaluation methodology.

Contributions Limited.—Hope that NILECJ would make substantial systematic contributions to the knowledge of criminal behavior was abandoned some time ago. The agency became preoccupied with the search for crime prevention and control measures that relied heavily upon the technology paradigm. Despite the energetic pursuit of "solutions"; NILECJ did find the resources to begin the arduous task of building a data base through large scale studies of victims, prisoners, and arrestees. NILECJ's programs and projects ultimately came to be judged by the degree to which their "discoveries" came to be utilized by practitioners in the field. Testimony on this point was mixed. One law enforcement administrator (Dr. Lee Brown) reported an awareness of no less than eight initiatives attributed to NILECJ (Crisis Intervention Neighborhood Team Policing, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, computer information systems for district attorneys, Criminal Investigation studies, studies of alternatives to incarceration and the various documents produced by the Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals).

Other practitioner witnesses claimed that the work of the Institute was barely visible, and the NAS panel reported that little of the material disseminated by NILECJ was used by the state planning agencies.

Lack of Independence.—Shortly after its creation, NILECJ fell victim to intense pressures to bring the "crisis" in crime under control. Like its parent agency, LEAA, it was to take its place in the overall strategy to fulfill the promise of crime reduction that played such a prominent role in the 1968 presidential campaign. Once the concept of a national research center to be noted for its independence and integrity was abandoned, NILECJ's conversion into a reactive appendage of LEAA was virtually assured. Issues important to a research program such as developing a broad base for understanding crime were left unresolved. The Justice Department's first attempt at scientific research went through a series of transformations that left it with little semblance of the high quality research center envisioned by its Congressional sponsors and early advocates.

According to the NAS study, confirmed by several witnesses the politicization of research at the Department of Justice's National Institute was already apparent during the tenure of its second director in 1971. Interference and pressures emanating from LEAA and elsewhere within the Department of Justice, and from certain Members and committees of Congress played an important role in shaping the Institute's program—the efforts of several directors notwithstanding. Rather than evolving into a prestigious national center for crime and justice research, NILECJ became the private arm of its parent agency, LEAA. It should be pointed out that within LEAA, the Department of Justice, and many important Congressional quarters there was little understanding of or patience with the nature and requirements of sound, long-range scientific research. There was also seemingly little faith in the possibility that scientific research could, over the long haul, help fashion a rational, Federal crime deterrence, prevention and control policy.

Witnesses repeatedly described how the Institute was forced by LEAA to share LEAA's impossible task of reducing crime in a relatively short time. In accepting this politically attractive but unrealistic mission, NILECJ ignored the admonitions of experts and tied the evaluation of their programs to changes in crime. Increasing emphasis was placed on the quest for "quick victories" in the "war on crime". Accordingly, the administrative structure and procedure of the Institute were fashioned and refashioned to pursue short-run objectives. Thus, the value of the Institute became justified within the full scope of Federal programs devoted to crime control. It was to be utilized as a practical and useful tool, generating program ideas and documenting the success of those programs already underway.

Consequently the research program came to rely on contract research conducted along narrowly delineated guidelines. Research organizations that agreed to accept NILECJ contracts and grants would be expected to produce their "deliverables" within a politically acceptable timetable. The research "Grant in Trust" was regarded as far too open-ended and uncontrollable to be relevant to Federal program demands. It was a risky investment carrying a low probability of providing the badly-needed, easy-to-apply "breakthrough" solution. The peer review of proposals, as practiced by the most respected of Federal research agencies, was also too risky. There was no assurance that the projects the staff wanted would ever be approved by a panel of ruminating scientists and academicians.

Perhaps the most important sign of the Institute's thorough-going dependence on the LEAA was the requirement that all programs and projects had to be approved by the LEAA Administrator. Every important programmatic decision was either reviewed or initiated outside of the research institute. Without "signoff" authority, the Institute director "directed" in name only. The first two directors intended to create a program of careful research guided by a well-planned, long-range agenda. One director was quickly replaced, the other quit in exasperation.

Instability of Leadership.—The Department of Justice and LEAA insistence upon directors who were responsive to LEAA, Departmental and Congressional demands probably was responsible for the rapid turnover in the directorship. Each director, in turn, was pressured to

produce in a short period of time; several were placed in the untenable position of making promises on which it was not possible to deliver. The multimillion dollar Impact Cities program, with its yearly five percent crime reduction goal, is an example of an unrealistic objective, for any research program, basic or applied. The development of hardware technology, the dissemination of written and audio-visual materials, and the conduct of special skills training programs lent themselves more readily to this type of approach. Consequently those activities flourished at the expense of a more balanced program.

As LEAA and the Institute leadership became preoccupied with imposing deadlines and acquiring "product line" solutions, techniques, and mechanisms, the task of long-range planning for basic research was inevitably put off.

The Institute's instability served only to compound a gradually growing lack of credibility. Many project starts and few actual finishes characterized this period. Those dedicated to the original idea of building a prestigious Federal criminal justice research center, left the Institute. There was little trouble in recruiting bright young replacements. For the most part, however, they were assigned to program responsibilities beyond their capabilities. This was particularly true where project monitoring required a firm grasp of research methodology and substantive issues acquired through personal experience in the management of research projects or programs. It may very well be that the staff lost whatever interest it might have had in research simply because many of them did not truly understand how the process worked. The search for solutions that could quickly be put into action, is easily understood. Moreover, the development of a program based on quick-fix solutions tended to conform to the values and expectations of LEAA and Justice Departmental leadership.

Summary.—If there was any hope at the outset of engendering a respect for the Institute's research integrity among the scientific community, subsequent developments precluded it. The work of the Institute came to be seen as mediocre, with few notable exceptions, e.g., work on police patrol and some of the work on environmental design. Its staff had no strong links to the scientific community and so the Institute found itself unable to take advantage of more than a small fraction of the scientific talent that could have been brought to bear on the problems of crime and criminal justice.

The entire process was circular. In retrospect, cause and effect are difficult to discern one from the other. Beginning with its structural vulnerability to the slightest pressures from without, the Institute lost its ability to attract and hold staff who could command respect in the research community and its ability to persuade talented researchers to move into the crime field. All this severely crippled its ability to conceive and carry out the kind of research program that is central to its mission. By the time the current effort to restore a true national research institute was attempted in 1975, irreparable damage to NILECJ's image as a credible crime research agency had already been done.

ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL TO A QUALITY PROGRAM OF SPONSORED RESEARCH

Throughout its investigation the Subcommittee was particularly desirous of receiving guidance in identifying those conditions necessary

to foster quality research. Accordingly, through its review of the several critical studies of the NILECJ program and in its hearings, the DISPAC Subcommittee received testimony on this vital issue from several sources. Witnesses testified on the experiences of the National Science Foundation and on the NIMH's Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency. Several prominent scientists from universities and other research centers (including members of the National Academy of Sciences panel), two former directors of NILECJ, one of the initial program managers, and a group of criminal justice practitioners, also gave significant testimony.

Autonomy.—There was broad support among the witnesses for the principle of autonomy as an essential element in a productive research program. A considerable measure of autonomy and independence should be built into any new program, they said. From this point of agreement two positions emerged: one, that the requisite autonomy for fostering research could not be achieved if the research were housed in a mission agency; two, alternatively that it could be attained providing proper safeguards were imposed. The argument for maintaining the mission agency linkage rests on the contention that in so doing the research effort acquires the already established clientele and constituency of its host agency. Outside of the mission agency a research effort is left to fend for itself, alone, unsupported and vulnerable. Furthermore, it was argued that the research function would benefit from the direct input of practitioners in several important respects. The direction taken by research will be influenced by practitioner needs; the research product would reach a potential user community more rapidly; and the research program would have easy access to data sources.

The counter-argument offered by some witnesses citing their past experience in research dealing with highly politicized topics, contends that regardless of what structural defenses or safeguards are created, organizational autonomy will be overwhelmed by the political needs of the parent agency. Thus, the Subcommittee found itself confronted by an array of remedies differing primarily on the dimension of the location of the Institute, i.e., inside or outside of the LEAA or the Department of Justice.

Each of these several alternatives will be discussed in detail in the ensuing section. This section, however, deals with the principles that should guide further attempts to set up a crime and justice research agency, regardless of its organizational location.

"Autonomy" means a certain measure of, but by no means absolute, self-determination. Once the broad purposes of the Institute are laid down by Executive and Congressional mandate, the research agency would be subject to minimal interference. The director should be able to prepare the research agenda, hire staff, determine which projects will be funded, and most importantly, set standards of quality.

Advisory Bodies.—Witnesses strongly urged that major research policy decisions be formulated by a council or advisory board. Guidance for program funding decisions should be delegated to peer review groups. Several plans for an advisory council were offered, including one created with statutory advisory authority over all agency actions, and another—a presidentially appointed body—with limited program authority but broad responsibility for agency policy. Regardless of

the powers suggested for the board, there was near unanimous agreement that its members reflect diverse experience and expertise. Not only should it contain researchers of high distinction, but also it should include criminal justice practitioners and others with special viewpoints.

It is important to point out that the argument for autonomy and independence does not mean freedom from accountability. The research agency must be politically responsive by devoting its energies to addressing the national needs identified by the Congress and top administration policymakers. All of its programs should be directed toward improving the assessment of those national needs and finding ways to meet them. To do this, the Institute as with any research agency, especially one working on politically volatile topics, must be insulated from day-to-day harassment. It must alter its course when necessary, but within the framework of a carefully constructed research strategy. This strategy will certainly be revised as needs change, as some approaches reach dead ends, and as societal concerns shift. Furthermore, as a convincing symbol of autonomy, the director must have sign-off authority over all fiscal and personnel matters.

The advisory board was seen as a buffer that could absorb the shocks of intense political pressure and represent the research agency before its parent department and Congress. It would also act as the vehicle for advice and concern emanating from outside sources. In this manner the advisory body, with the guidance and support of the Congress and the Executive branches, could provide the proper insulation necessary to permit the long-term program stability essential to the production of useful research. Only one witness, a past director of NILECJ, felt that placing the sign-off authority in the hands of the Director would be sufficient to guarantee the necessary autonomy and insulation from harassment.

When the conditions of autonomy and leadership were met, most witnesses felt that the other prerequisites of quality research could be secured. Closely following in importance to the issue of autonomy was the question of the research agency's image, which should reflect its high quality research effort and its scientific integrity. Without these, it will be difficult to attract the best of the nation's social, behavioral, legal and criminal justice research talent as participants in the research program.

Staff capabilities.—Testimony indicated that the selection of a highly qualified person as director of the agency would go a long way towards establishing an image of integrity. Many witnesses felt that the director should be respected by the scientific community, yet skilled in the administration of a national research program. Some witnesses preferred that the director be "highly qualified", but not necessarily as a scientist. In any event, the director should bring considerable prestige to the position. This would be enhanced by the director's status and relative independence as a presidential appointee as well as by the sign-off authority described earlier.

There was strong sentiment for placing the management of the research institute in the hands of people who know, and can conduct both basic and applied research. They should be well-trained, experienced scientists who have struggled with the intricacies of social

science research. They would be responsible for monitoring projects and making the important judgment of what can and cannot be expected of a research design. They should be able to assist applicants in developing theoretically sound and methodologically feasible proposals. Professionally competent performance of this function is particularly critical when research is done under contract. Staff experience and skill should virtually be on a par with that of the contractor, or at least closely approaching it. Contract arrangements tend to orient the contractor towards pleasing the client agency, as represented by the project officer or monitor. Often the project officer unwittingly exerts considerable influence over structuring of the research. Since some of this type of influence is unavoidable, staff should be fully qualified to perform the role. In order to attract and hold professionals capable of coping with these complexities of project monitorship, the agency's grading and salary structures must be realistic.

Peer Review.—Expert and experienced as the staff might be, neither it nor the director alone should bear the full responsibility of determining which proposals merit approval and funding. Only one witness, a past director of NILECJ (Gerald M. Caplan) contested this view. He contended that although "a rugged review process . . . (using) outsiders is desirable, advisory bodies tend to get into the business of making final decisions . . . (and) on the whole it makes more sense for government employees to make those decisions than outsiders". Almost all other witnesses called for reliance upon the peer review process as a fundamental control over research quality. Though occasionally subject to charges of being overly conservative and of encouraging cronyism, the peer review process is still regarded as the best of all the imperfect methods for screening research proposals.

One witness claimed that proposed projects, initially reviewed by competent scientists, tended to turn out a higher quality finished product when evaluated at completion. The House Committee on Science and Technology arrived at a similar judgment after an intensive eighteen month investigation of peer review practices of the National Science Foundation. The peer review bodies like the advisory board should display a healthy diversity in their membership. Particular attention should be given to acquiring reviewers other than researchers in the relatively narrow sub-discipline of crime and justice. Peer review principles and processes presently employed by NSF and NIMH were described by witnesses as an effective means for securing "front-end quality control" at an "astonishingly cheap" price. The more quality that is built into the design of a project, the easier it is to maintain control over that quality once the project is set in motion.

The crime research effort should be regarded with respect by its sponsoring agency, and that agency should make a serious effort to preserve the scientific integrity of its research. This can be conveyed by the sponsor only by demonstrating that it values research that conforms to the canons of scientific method. In short, the agency should be committed to not attempting to influence the outcome of its investigations to reach some preconceived conclusion. It must be trusted to behave this way; otherwise, its conclusions should and will carry no more weight than any other political statement.

Long-range Strategy.—These, then, are the basic requirements for a high quality Federal research program in crime and justice. Indeed, the requirements of Autonomy, outside advisory input, peer review, and capable staff and leadership might well apply to the conduct of sponsored research in most Federal agencies regardless of statutory responsibility for social problems.

Beyond the fundamental principles of insulation, autonomy and integrity, there was considerable discussion of other requirements. On the question of what role the crime and justice research program should play and what specific activities it should pursue, there was far less unanimity. Several principles, however, were enunciated; though in some instances there was neither challenge nor debate.

Often mentioned was the consensus that the best payoff from this type of research can be achieved by conducting it in the context of a long-range, high quality research strategy. Research goals should reflect what quality research can reasonably be expected to deliver, and in what time frame. Expecting the impossible retards rather than stimulates the development of national intelligence on issues so vital as crime. Many NILECJ activities have been scored as failures because "they attempted to achieve goals that were unrealistic to begin with".

Establishing, reviewing, and adhering to a well conceived, carefully constructed long-term research agenda was seen as the principal means for building a cumulative body of knowledge about crime and its prevention and control. Referring to what some critics have termed, the "quick fix" strategy characteristic of past Department of Justice research, a former director of NILECJ (Gerald N. Caplan) offered the following: "If there is any lesson we have learned from this vast expenditure of Federal funds and the research effort, it is that there are no shortcuts. We have tried them all. . . . It is going to be solved in a different way. It is going to be solved by the slow and careful accumulation of knowledge in a number of areas that cumulatively may impact on crime."

"Basic" and "Applied" Research.—There was virtually no disagreement over the pressing need for a balanced fare of basic and applied studies regarding the nature of crime and criminal behavior. There was a broad consensus that the Federal Government should encourage and support a diversity of research in both the "basic" and the "applied" areas. The need for good theoretical studies is particularly keen because all action programs are founded initially on theory, and theoretical assumptions. Regrettably, such theory is frequently only partially formed, often labeled as "commonsense", and rarely if ever put to test of rigorous scientific scenting. Large and expensive mistakes in social programming have been incurred in the name of "commonsense". Just as basic studies aimed at developing sound theories with the greatest practical utility are imperative, "applied" research on action programs that "work" often have a high potential for contributing to the process of theory-building. Thus the two are complementary, albeit, unfortunately basic and applied interests can be and often have been placed in destructive competition for resources, especially if located within the same agency.

The issue of where to house the basic and the applied research generated a considerable divergence of opinion. One view, firmly held

was that it is best to separate "basic" studies from the "applied" with a preference for assigning them to established research agencies experienced in the nurturance of "basic research". "Applied" research which studies the operation of the justice delivery system, involving experimentation, demonstration, and evaluation and technological applications, should directly serve the action and policy needs of the mission agency, in this case, the Department of Justice.

The other view saw little chance of developing the much desired complementarity between "basic" and "applied" studies unless they are actively and simultaneously performed by a single agency. It is this issue which is principally responsible for the several alternative proposals concerning the placement of crime and justice research discussed in the next section. It must be stressed, however, that regardless of where the research agency is placed or what type of research it does, the same high standards of quality must be imposed on "applied" as well as "basic" research.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH

Eight distinct proposals for reconstituting Federal crime and justice research have been advanced. They are presented below in capsule form, distilled from several pertinent studies and reports and from the record of the DISPAC/Crime hearings.

1. *Leave NILECJ intact, but restructure it from within while leaving it within LEAA.*—This plan calls for strengthening NILECJ through various administrative means including changes in personnel; redefinition of the research program based on a carefully prepared agenda; stress on programs that have a cumulative impact; provision for multiyear funding; increased emphasis on "basic" research, improved evaluation methodology; maintenance of closer ties with groups conducting Federal and non-Federal research programs with similar goals; and a concerted effort to improve relations with the research community-at-large. This list, by no means exhaustive, details some of the positive steps that can be taken to improve NILECJ.

2. *Leave NILECJ intact, but restructure it, and increase the research programs of the NIMH Center for Studies in Crime and Delinquency and the NSF Research Applications Directorate.*—In addition to the administrative actions described in the first plan, this proposal would increase the NIMH and NSF funding of crime and justice related research recognizing that both organizations have a demonstrated competence in the field and have made valuable contributions to the knowledge base and existing practice.

3. *Remove the technology transfer and evaluation functions from NILECJ; leave intact its granting authority for demonstrations, rely on the NIMH and NSF programs for "basic" research.*—This alternative strips NILECJ of nearly all research functions save the conduct of demonstration projects under grant support. Technology transfer and program evaluation would be entirely taken over by the LEAA; all other research would be transferred to the NIMH Center for Studies in Crime and Delinquency and the NSF Research Applications Directorate with increased funding for each agency.

4. *Disestablish NILECJ; remove all research and development activities from LEAA; and place them within a National Institutes of Justice under*

the direction of an Assistant Attorney General.—The National Institutes would consist of three major research programs: The Institute for Research into Criminal Behavior and Criminal Justice; The Institute of Civil Justice and Administrative Law; and the Institute of Justice Information including a Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics and a Bureau of Civil Justice Statistics. Operating somewhat like the National Institutes of Health the three units would function in a semi-independent though interdependent fashion. All research and development operations now carried out within the Department of Justice would be consolidated into the National Institutes of Justice. Present Department of Justice programs such as the National Institute of Corrections, the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, the Uniform Crime Reports, and the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice would be subsumed under one or another of the Institutes. A balance between "basic" and "applied" research would be maintained in the programs of the institutes.

5. *Disestablish NILECJ; remove all research and development activities from LEAA and place them within a National Institute of Justice under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General.*—This proposal is the same as the preceding one in all respects except that emphasis would be placed on "applied" research and program evaluation.

6. *Create a freestanding National Institute of Justice outside of the Federal Government but funded by it* (as proposed by the American Bar Association). While present programs are to be retained within the Department of Justice, the new Institute would conduct small scale "applied" and "basic" research in both the criminal and civil justice areas. A board of directors would be created by statute to guide the agency.

7. *Assign responsibility for conducting all crime and criminal justice research to the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health.*—This would involve removal of virtually all research and development activities from the Department of Justice.

8. *Establish a freestanding National Institute of Justice outside of the Federal Government but funded by it* (as in proposal 6 above) *but disestablishing all Department of Justice research and development offices.*—The Institute would have broad authority to conduct both "applied" and "basic" research on both civil and criminal matters.

In analyzing these plans, it should be noted that four (1, 2, 3, and 6) would leave NILECJ more or less intact but with some administrative changes. These include staffing, definition of its mission, and the reassignment of certain responsibilities to other sections within the Department of Justice, to other Federal agencies, and/or out to a freestanding National Institute of Justice outside the Federal agency structure. An additional two (4 and 5) would remove all research and development activity from LEAA and reassign it within the Department of Justice. The final two proposals (7 and 8) call for the complete disestablishment of Department of Justice programs in crime and criminal justice research and their reassignment to the NIMH and the NSF or to a free-standing quasi-governmental research agency.

Arguments Pro & Con.—Underlying the differences among the proposals are the ways in which their various proponents resolved the

issues of autonomy and program diversity discussed in the preceding section. Those in support of the four proposals leaving the NILECJ intact, felt that the program could not only be salvaged but revitalized by measures already set in motion. The reform should take place through the judicious adherence to the guidelines set forth in the National Academy of Sciences study, as well as that of others, that dealt with NILECJ and its program. The two proposals (4 and 5) currently under consideration by the Department of Justice would begin anew with a much larger and comprehensive program of research, but clearly disassociated from the LEAA. The first five plans appear to be predicated on the assumption that the autonomy and independence requisite for quality research can be guaranteed, at least, within the Department of Justice if not within the present NILECJ-LEAA arrangement.

Arguing support for this majority position proponents hold that a course can now be charted for Department of Justice research that will avoid the problems of the past. Similarly, it is assumed that the controversy between "basic" and "applied" research orientations can be resolved administratively. Much of the hope for resolving these issues seems to lie in the selection of a competent director to administer the program.

Proponents of the three proposals (6, 7, and 8) which would remove most of the responsibility for research from the Department of Justice simply do not believe that the issues of autonomy and diversity can be effectively resolved within the context of that mission agency. While the principle of autonomy has been at least partially achieved in several of HEW's health related research institutes critics are skeptical that conditions favorable to research could ever be obtained in the Department of Justice. They see it as a prosecution-oriented agency, single-minded in its purpose, whose method of problem-solving and disciplinary traditions seriously clashes with the canons of scientific inquiry. Intense congressional and public pressure on the Department of Justice to take the lead in controlling the rapidly rising rate of crime made that task too politicized for officials to treat it in the detached, patient, and thorough manner required for quality research. For this reason, and to a lesser degree, the concern that "basic" studies will again be sidetracked in the search for quick and "applied" solutions, the proposed program's best location is outside of the Department, concluded its proponents.

The main argument for maintaining the research capability in the mission agency is that it will enjoy a constituency and thereby be afforded some measure of protection. Without broadbased support outside the government, long-range programmatic commitments may not be possible. Skeptics however are quick to observe that the advocacy and protection afforded a research agency by practitioners may very well be a mixed blessing. That close arrangement might well cost the agency a good measure of control over the direction of its own research programs.

The second argument for keeping the research within the Department of Justice asserts that an optimal mix between "basic" and "applied", and civil and criminal justice research is more readily achieved under the aegis of an agency with broad responsibility for justice matters. The Department of Justice has not been traditionally an agency with a research capability. Nevertheless, its most recent

attempt to establish one should not discourage further efforts. The National Science Board has adopted the position that each mission agency should develop its own capability for conducting research in its field.

CONCLUSIONS

The Subcommittee gave careful consideration to all these points of view and their supporting rationale. Its deliberations were made difficult by the fact that almost all of the arguments had merit, some more than others, but none so compelling as to preclude action in all but a single direction. Nevertheless the Subcommittee was able, with a degree of confidence, to draw a series of conclusions on which its recommendations are based.

First, the Subcommittee holds that it is preferable to maintain a major federal research effort within the Department of Justice. It agreed with many of the reasons cited above, but particularly, those dealing with proximity to practitioner needs and the appropriateness of high priority research as a line function of a mission agency.

Second, there is a great gap in our knowledge of and need for information about the phenomenon of crime, and of many other areas in criminal and civil justice as well. Important areas of inquiry were neglected during the NILECJ years primarily because that agency was unable to sustain a single direction for any appreciable period of time. Therefore, a fully comprehensive research program is necessary, founded on a well-conceived, long-range strategy.

Third, the Subcommittee concludes that it would be wiser for the Department of Justice to make a fresh beginning rather than to try to repair the old NILECJ program. Starting with a new format it should be possible to initiate at a new, satisfactory level the research functions within the Department that could make a substantial contribution to the mission of the Department. Consequently the research function should not remain within the LEAA. The thrust of the new effort when free from LEAA's administrative control should allow the new program to begin to enjoy the autonomy it requires and deserves.

Fourth, the Subcommittee concludes that transferring crime and criminal justice research to the National Science Foundation or the National Institute of Mental Health is not a wise course of action. Transferring the function to those agencies would downgrade its importance in those agencies because crime and justice are distinctly minor concerns. Furthermore, it is a firmly held principle to establish pluralism in research, mission agencies should conduct their own research and development activities. NSF should not be used as a repository for unwanted research and development programs.

Fifth, the Subcommittee agrees that the area of civil justice has been grossly neglected among federal research priorities. Important new initiatives should be undertaken. A principal effort should be located within the Department of Justice, because the Subcommittee sees no compelling argument for creating an Institute on civil justice research external to the Federal Government. The DISPAC Subcommittee does, however, caution that one proposed plan for such an external institute (the NIJ plan offered by the American Bar Association) includes eventually taking over the funding of a good deal of the federal effort in crime, and justice research. The Subcommittee sees no real advantage to so broad a delegation of authority to a non-governmental entity unless it is a solution of last resort.

Finally, the position that research should be an integral function of the Department of Justice is not held without considerable reservation. The Subcommittee notes that the National Academy of Sciences panel began its evaluation with virtually all fifteen of its members in favor of keeping the research in LEAA but concluded eighteen months later without dissent, that it be removed from the agency. The panel with considerable anxiety proposed maintaining the research within the Department of Justice. The Subcommittee's reaction following its own investigation is very much the same. The main impetus for crime and criminal justice research should ideally be within the Department but doing so requires the provision of stringent safeguards without which the growth of a viable and worthy program of research is impossible. Without those safeguards, the Subcommittee observes, there is a good likelihood that the recent history of crime and justice research in the Department of Justice will repeat itself.

APPENDIX

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

JOINT HEARINGS BY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
PLANNING, ANALYSIS AND COOPERATION, COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Hearings on the Federal Role in Criminal Justice and Crime Research

WITNESS LIST

Wednesday, June 22, 1977; 9:00 a.m.; room 2237 Rayburn HOB:

Hon. Jack Grant Day, Chief Justice, Ohio Intermediate Appellate Court.
Dr. Lee P. Brown, Director, Department of Justice Services, Portland, Oreg.
Dr. Marvin Wolfgang, Director of Criminology, Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Dr. Stanton Wheeler, Professor of Law and Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Thursday, June 23, 1977; 9:00 a.m.; room 2141 Rayburn HOB:

National Academy of Sciences Panel:
Dr. Samuel Krislov, Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
Dr. Susan White, Executive Director, National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Alfred Blumstein, Director, Urban Systems Institute, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Dr. Richard Schwartz, Ernest I. White, Professor of Law, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.

Wednesday, June 29, 1977; 9:00 a.m.; room 2141 Rayburn HOB:

Hon. David Bazelon, Chief Justice, U.S. Court of Appeals For the District of Columbia.
Dr. Richard Atkinson, Director, National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Saleem Shah, Director, Center for Crime and Delinquency, National Institute of Mental Health, Rockville, Md.
Dr. Richard McGee, Director, American Justice Institute, Sacramento, Calif.
Justice Robert H. Hall, Georgia State Supreme Court, Representing the American Bar Association.

Wednesday, June 29, 1977; 9:00 a.m.; room 2141 Rayburn HOB:

National Academy of Sciences Panel:
Dr. Samuel Krislov, Professor of Political Science and Law, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
Dr. Susan White, Executive Director, National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Research on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, June 29, 1977—Continued

Dr. Alfred Blumstein, Director, Urban Systems Institute, School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Dr. Richard Schwartz, Ernest I. White, Professor of Law, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.

Thursday, June 30, 1977: 9:00 a.m.; room 2141, Rayburn HOB:

John Conrad, Former Chief of the Center for Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Columbus, Ohio.

Peter B. Bloch, Staff Director, American Bar Association Commission on Law and the Economy, Washington, D.C.

Gerald M. Caplan, Former Director, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C.

Thursday, July 21, 1977: 9:00 a.m.; room 2141, Rayburn HOB:

Martin Danziger, Former Director, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C.

Peter J. Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

James Gregg, Acting Administrator, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C.

Blair Ewing, Acting Director, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Washington, D.C.

Paul Nejelski, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

END