WORKING PAPER:

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Managing Criminal Investigations:
A Summary Report

By

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PREFACE

In 1976 the Office of Technology Transfer, part of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, awarded grants to five police departments to test a process for managing criminal investigations. Generally speaking, this concept involves augmentation of patrol role; reassignment/decentralization of detectives; case screening; police/prosecutor relations and monitoring investigations.

The sites chosen for this test were Birmingham, Alabama; Montgomery County, Maryland; Rochester, New York; St. Paul, Minnesota; and Santa Monica, California.

In late 1976, The Urban Institute received a grant to evaluate this project. During 1977 and 1978, Urban Institute staff visited the sites numerous times and evaluated their managing criminal investigations programs.

An individual case study has been prepared describing the background setting, planning, implementation and results of the managing criminal investigations program at each site.

MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: A SUMMARY REPORT

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1976, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
awarded 18-month grants of $117,000 to $135,000 to five police departments
to try out processes for managing criminal investigations (MCI). The five
sites were Birmingham, Alabama; Montgomery County, Maryland; Rochester,
New York; St. Paul, Minnesota and Santa Monica, California.

This summary report describes the MCI program and its effects. The
report begins with an overview of the program background and then discusses
our evaluation methodology.

The rationales associated with managing criminal investigations are
presented next, followed by a summary discussion of what was implemented
and what results were observed. A summary of each site's MCI program
is next and the report concludes with a general assessment of MCI.

II. THE MCI DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

A. BACKGROUND

The Office of Technology Transfer (OTT), which funded the managing criminal investigation demonstration is part of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), an arm of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The following background information about the organization of NILECJ at the time the demonstration was funded and the description of the Office of Technology Transfer's [now the Office of Testing, Development and Training (OTDT)] demonstration should form a useful context for those not totally familiar with these parts of LEAA.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (NILECJ)

Figure II-1 presents a simplified organization chart of NILECJ at the time of the MCI demonstration began. A separate institute within the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), NILECJ at that time had three major line offices--the Office of Research Programs (ORP), the Office of Technology Transfer (OTT) and the Office of Evaluation (OE). Among other functions, OTT was responsible for a demonstration program under which two demonstrations were fielded annually. The Office of Evaluation, among other responsibilities, was charged with helping to plan the demonstration evaluations, choosing and monitoring the national evaluation contract.

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
FIGURE II-1: SIMPLIFIED ORGANIZATION CHART OF NILECJ
             AT START OF MCI DEMONSTRATION

C. OTT'S DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

OTT was responsible for demonstrating a variety of criminal justice concepts or projects "shown to have a high potential for improving the system of criminal justice and reducing crime."[1] The Office of Testing, Development and Training is now charged with that responsibility. Demonstration programs that have been funded include "full-service neighborhood team policing," "juror utilization and management," "community-based corrections," "family crisis intervention" and "managing criminal investigations." Typically, OTT funded two demonstration programs a year.

The technology transfer demonstration program has two distinct purposes. One is "to expedite nationwide implementation of promising new criminal justice concepts or practices."[2] It helps communities "to reproduce successful programs by providing handbooks and guidelines, specially tailored training materials and courses, financial assistance and evaluation."[3] The second aim is to "further evaluate projects employing such concepts or practices as they are demonstrated in different environments."[4]

In the overall demonstration program three of the activities—defining exemplary projects, screening research and developing prescriptive packages—are designed, in part, to identify candidate demonstration concepts. Each fall these sources are reviewed and a "shopping list" of potential demonstration topics is developed.

Once the demonstration topics are identified, OTT requests site "nominations" from within the LEAA and from the state planning agencies. Usually

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1. Memorandum from Louis Mayo to Gerald Caplan, "Approval of Demonstration/Replication Topics for FY 1976," October 24, 1975.
2. Ibid.
3. NILECJ Brochure, Office of Technology Transfer, GPO: 1974 0-558-670; emphasis added.
4. Memorandum from Mayo, op. cit., October 24, 1975.

with the help of a consultant specialist, staff members visit the proposed sites, call for grant proposals from the most suitable candidates, and select five to ten sites--no more than one per region--to participate in the demonstration. Each qualified site receives a grant usually ranging from $135,000 to $180,000 to cover "transitional" costs during the 18 to 24-month grant period. Through a contractor, each site receives intensive training and some technical assistance in the "technology" under demonstration. All sites are exposed to the core research available in the field. After the grant period, sites are expected to retain and "institutionalize" the successful elements of the demonstration. Further, as a condition of the grant, sites are required to host technology transfer meetings designed to interest other criminal justice agencies in adopting the techniques under demonstration.

Historically, a central detailed model which must be implemented at all sites has not been prescribed. Instead, each site has been given the major research materials available, and within broad guidelines, permitted to develop their own versions of the concept to be demonstrated. Verification of this fact can be obtained by examining initial proposals of sites sub- sequently receiving grant awards. Such a review will show that in many instances a relatively unknown quantity was bought, as the design parameters of the sites' programs are often not spelled out in detail, but worked out subsequent to the grant period during the preliminary planning period.

The modest grants cover one-time transitional expenses, including the salary of project directors and aides, staff training costs, modest support for a local evaluator and expenses associated with hosting technology transfer workshops. In selecting demonstrations, attempts were made to avoid programs entailing heavy capital investment or repeating expenses over and above the agency's normal operating budget.

Each site hosts one or more technology transfer workshop attended by areawide representatives from criminal justice agencies. The attendees are afforded an opportunity to talk directly with their counterparts who have implementation experience. Attempts also were made to maintain some data on the volume of technology transfer activities and rough estimates of the effectiveness of the program: The frequency with which other criminal justice agencies adopt components of the technology to which they were exposed.

D. CHRONOLOGY AND FUNDING OF MCI

1. REGIONAL OFFICE SITE NOMINATIONS

In December 1975, OTT contacted the regional office police specialists to explain the MCI program design and solicit nominations for potential MCI grantees. In March 1977, The Urban Institute conducted telephone interviews with a sample of regional office police specialists to elicit information about the nomination process.

There was some variation in police specialist accounts of the status of the MCI design at the time. One said, "The components were not too clear," another that "specific components were defined" and the remaining group was "generally aware" of what MCI involved. As one respondent put it, "of course we didn't have the materials we have today."

OTT did not stipulate formal criteria the police specialists should use in developing site nominations. Regional office specialists in conference with state SPA representatives simply used their "best judgment." As the following quotations reveal, police specialists employed informal criteria.

● "Of the two or three departments I talked to, [the site we nominated] showed the greatest interest. It is a progressive department, with good people who want to do a good job."

● "[Our site] was picked because it was a leader in the MCI field for certain portions of the program. There were no formal criteria except perhaps city size—the department had to be big enough so a change in detective structure would be meaningful."

● "[The site] was nominated because it is one of the most progressive departments in the areas. They have elements of team policing, they use the agent concept, they have four Ph.D.s, 13 people with masters degrees and 70 percent of the force is college educated."

● "There was no particular reason why [the site] was suggested for MCI; it just appeared to be a good place to put it."

2. FIRST-ROUND SITE VISIT ASSESSMENTS

In January and February 1976, an OTT consultant and an OTT staff member visited ten sites, one per region. The purpose of the visits was twofold: to explain the MCI program and to assess the suitability of the sites as demonstration candidates. Although written assessment criteria were available, they were apparently intended more as a rough guide than a test, as most of the sites endorsed as good demonstration candidates failed to meet one or more of the criteria. (The most important criteria, never violated, was a strong departmental commitment to the MCI philosophy.)

At the conclusion of each visit, the OTT consultant prepared a site assessment report describing general departmental background, the site's status in relation to the criteria. Each report contained a recommendation whether the site would make an appropriate demonstration participant.

a. CRITERIA FOR SITE ASSESSMENT[1]

Table II-1 lists the 11 criteria which appear to have functioned only as rough guides in site assessment. Some of the criteria, like the population bounds, are clearcut and simple to apply. However, assessing in four hours whether a department has "a progressive, stable, and superior capability in police management, including potential for participative management," appears to be a difficult feat even for consultants with broad experience in police research and administration. According to one, "I haven't been in the business for 35 years for nothing. I can get a feeling whether I'm getting a snow job or not, but admittedly, it's a subjective evaluation."

Time constraints forced OTT to rely on the department--an interested party--for most of its information. For example, to assess criteria F, the presence of a "history and climate of successful innovation implementation," site visitors relied on "talking to the people in charge of implementing them (grants designed to introduce innovation)." The same situation pertained to applying criteria D. Since the visitors did not usually meet with citizens' groups, the department represented the main source of information on the "stability" of relations with the citizenry.

The nine departments visited were all recommended as suitable demonstration sites. None was rated as inappropriate. Positive recommendations were apparently uninfluenced by the fact that many of the sites did not meet one or more of the formal selection criteria. Apparent departures are summarized below.[2]

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1. Site visit reports are available for nine of the ten sites visited, including: St. Joseph, Missouri; Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; Santa Monica, California; Providence, Rhode Island; Rochester, New York; Montgomery County, Maryland; Seattle, Washington; Cobb County, Georgia; and St. Paul, Minnesota. (Although Lakewood, Colorado, was visited, a site assessment report was not available.)

2. All materials quoted in this section are excerpted from the site visit assessment reports prepared for OTT.

TABLE II-1:   IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR DEMONSTRATION CITIES

A.   Municipal police department serving a population between 100,000
and 300,000 (or equivalent Sheriff's Office).

B.   Progressive, stable, and superior capability in the police
management, including potential for participative management.

C.   Service orientation for the role of the police (vs. legalistic
orientation).

D.   Stable political atmosphere with the citizenry and between the
police and all relevant city agencies, including potential for
inter-agency cooperation.

E.   Local in-service training program resources (vs. regional).

F.   History and climate of successful innovation implementation,
but not so much as to create current instability.

G.   Strong political support for the police chief executive for
him to survive the critics of modern innovation.

H.   No other adverse factors observed in the assessment visit
which might significantly impair successful implementation
of the demonstration project.

I.   A strong commitment from the Mayor, City Manager, Police
Chief Executive, and other relevant senior policy makers to
implement, institutionalize the project, as well as promote
the project in the state and throughout the LEAA region.

J.   Decentralized investigative functions with field officers
(i.e., patrol force) responsible for most preliminary
investigations.

K.   No union opposition to increased professional responsibility
for patrol officers.

Source: Undated OTT document.

- <u>City Size.</u> Although the population limits restrict sites to cities of 100,000 to 300,000, five of nine cities did not meet the criteria, having populations of 78,000; 80,000; 400,000; 503,000 and 590,000, respectively.

- <u>Management.</u> Several cities were recommended which appeared to have anything but "progressive, stable and superior capability in police management." For example, one site is characterized as having "a history of turmoil and corruption, of reform adminis-trations and a continuation of the status quo despite all reform attempts . . . Serious doubt can be raised over who is really run-ning the Department, the city administration or the department management." Further, the department is "fragmented by organiza-tional units" and shows "instability . . . in managing investiga-tions and the control of major criminal activities." Finally, "a 'Mini-Watergate' expose concerning intelligence gathering" is currently underway. Yet the site was recommended as follows:

    "In spite of the political, administrative conflict situations . . . [This site] would provide a meaningful approach for change and modification of its managing criminal investigations."

    In another example, a department's progressiveness was judged by asking the rhetorical question, "Is it possible to catapault a nineteenth century police department into the latter half of the twentieth century?" According to the report, this department operates "in the traditional of traditional modes . . . organi-zation is of the military bureaucratic mode." Yet, "the positive factors seem to outweigh the negative" in considering this de-partment as a demonstration site.

- <u>Innovation.</u> It was unclear how many grants a department needed to be considered innovative. One department seemed to be found wanting in that it "has had only three grant projects, all in the past three years. It is also unclear what constituted instabil-ity attendant upon too much change. For example, one department adopted a team policing model which "has introduced dramatic and traumatic changes. Supervisory/middle management haven't caught up with the changing nature of their responsibilities." Yet this department received a positive recommendation.

- <u>Political Support of The Chief.</u> In general, the mayor was strongly supportive of the chief. In one of the recommended sites, the chief and mayor were embroiled in a feud of sufficient magnitude that they refused to meet with each other during the site visit.

- Support of Technology Transfer. One of OTT's representatives called this criteria (I), "The bottom line--the thing we're really looking for." In fact, it appears to be one of the only criteria satisfied by the departments at the initial visit. (Later, as the program became more highly specified and directive, several departments withdrew because they did not support the implementation of particular components.)

- Decentralized Investigation Functions, Field Officer Responsibility for Preliminary Investigations. At least two departments were described as having centralized detective operations. In two departments, patrol responsibility in preliminary investigations was limited only to report taking.

- Training. It is traditional that training of site staffs is carried as an overtime activity, reimbursed at overtime wages. One site was recommended despite the fact that it had in place a policy precluding the use of overtime pay for training.

3. FINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OTT REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

At this juncture, in late May, time became a critical factor. OTT's objective was to expedite grant awards before the deadline of September 30, 1976. Complicated and crucial program design activities had to be accomplished in a very short period of time. The task was assigned to one OTT staff member.

The question of laying uniform requirements upon site activity is central to the mounting of an experimental effort. The RFP represented a mixture of requirements and guidance, subsequently diluted as a result of site resistance.

The request for proposal was mailed to the sites in July of 1976. As a result of feedback gathered by OTT consultants on the second-round site visits, a two-page amendment was forwarded to the sites modifying the design of one of the components.

4. DESCRIPTION OF THE OTT MCI PROGRAM MODEL AS REFLECTED IN THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

Figure II-2 represents OTT's view of the MCI program design in July of

FIGURE II-2: MODEL OF MCI PROGRAM DESIGN BASED ON OTT REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
TO SITES

1976. The Urban Institute constructed the model with reference to the (amended) request for proposal delivered to the sites.[1]

The program design contained four basic components: (1) changes in the organization structure, which involved reallocation of detective and patrol responsibilities; (2) the introduction of a screening model for early closure of burglary and robbery cases; (3)the use of several techniques to improve police/prosecutor relationships; and (4) the installation of a system to monitor the investigative process. Taken together, these adjustments in the investigative process and its management were designed to increase the number of UCR Part I cases cleared by arrest, to increase the number of UCR Part I cases accepted for prosecution, and to increase the number of UCR Part I cases resulting in conviction. Each component is discussed in detail below.

5.   SECOND-ROUND SITE VISITS AND SITE SELECTION

The evidence indicates that the ten sites receiving favorable recommendations on the first round of site visits were considered at the time to be final (if unofficial) selections.

Although the exact date is uncertain, budget pressures became a concern to OTT in late May or early June. As a result, OTT was required to cut the number of sites from ten to seven.

Second-round site visits were arranged for six of the seven remaining sites and one additional site, Birmingham, Alabama, which was nominated when the other Region IV site withdrew. The visits were conducted by an OTT site visit consultant and a staff member of the University Research Corporation, representing OTT. The purpose of the second-round visits was to elicit site

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1. We verified the accuracy of the model with the author of the RFP who was in charge of the MCI demonstration at that time.

reaction to the request for proposal, to explain the "new" program which had replaced the nearly total flexibility promised in the first-round visits, and to collect additional information bearing upon site selection.

The net result of the site selection attrition process was a pool of five sites. Four of these did not meet one or more of OTT's criteria for site selection.

- Although the ceiling on city size was adjusted upwards from 300,000 to 500,000 to accommodate one of the sites initially selected, Santa Monica is 20,000 below the minimum requirement of 100,000.

- While sites were supposed to be free of major outside influences which would affect field test results, Saint Paul has received a $1,000,000 grant to install team policing. According to one OE official, "it will certainly be difficult, if not impossible, to sort out the various effects of the two programs there."[1]

- For the Rochester department, two criteria do not obtain, the requirement that there be "no effective unit monitoring investigative process" and that "preliminary investigations [be] duplicated to some degree by detectives."

6. PROPOSAL PREPARATION

During July and August, six sites prepared proposals in response to OTT's RFP. (While Seattle prepared a proposal, the site later withdrew, by mutual agreement with OTT, because the department did not wish to commit itself to implementing the case screening and organizational restructuring components.) Thus the proposal preparation and review activity did not result in further winnowing of sites or in an extended search for new candidates. It appears that the preparation of proposals is a somewhat pro forma process—the sites invited to bid are relatively well assured they will qualify for grant funds. This observation is evidenced by the fact that a small number of sites were invited

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1. Memo from Vicki Jaycox to Richard Linster, "Evaluation of the Managing Criminal Investigations Demonstration," November 16, 1976.

to bid in a time frame which would preclude a search for new sites if OTT were to dispose of its grant funds by the September 30 deadline. Nevertheless, the proposal is the document where sites lay out their preliminary plans. By requiring revision or greater specification, OTT could have shaped and controlled the site's program designs, with the grant award (theoretically) hanging in the balance.

An analysis of the proposals reveals one relatively striking finding: a number of sites had already implemented activities closely resembling the program elements defined by OTT. For example, Rochester had implemented one or more elements within each of the four major components. As Table II-2 illustrates, three or more sites had implemented a case screening model, an on-scene report, a case disposition feedback system and a monitoring system.

Examination of the five sites' program designs reveals that, for the most part, the sites were not very specific in detailing their design commitments. For example, it is instructive to examine sites' responses to the most specific portion of the request for proprosal: the requirement to implement the SRI case screening model and to justify any departures.

- One site's proposal does not even mention the SRI model. It promises to develop a computer-assisted followup decision model.

- One site promises to "review" the SRI model "in the process of developing our own [model]."

- One site stresses it has already developed a model, independent of SRI. "within the framework of [our] system, the department will test applicable elements of the SRI system."

- Another site says it will "study" the SRI model, but the model the department adopts should depend upon local conditions.

- A final site declares "we cannot commit ourselves to . . . the [SRI] methodology" until the results of the validation are in.

One site did not even address in its proposal six of the fourteen elements within the four components defined in the RFP. Other sites make

TABLE II-2: MCI PROGRAM ELEMENTS IN PLACE BEFORE PROPOSAL SUBMISSION*

COMPONENT	Element	Birmingham	Montgomery County	Rochester	Santa Monica	St. Paul
ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING	● Decentralization of Detectives			X (Since 74)		
	● Reassignment to Non-Traditional Roles			X (Some)		
	● Augment Patrol Role			X (Search for Solvability Factors)		X (Police Officer Processing Evidence)
	● Police Officer Training for Augmented Role			X		X
CASE SCREENING	● Criteria and Decision Model	X (Screening to Identify Cases For No Followup; Non-Uniform Decision Criteria)	X (Burglary Screening Model)	X (Rochester Early Case Closure Model)		
	● On-Scene Report		X	X		X (Incident Report)
POLICE/PROSECUTOR RELATIONS	● "Major Case" Criteria			X (Serious Offense Criteria)		
	● RAND-Based Followup Report					
	● Case Disposition Feedback	X		X	X	X
MONITORING SYSTEM	● No Elements		X ("MBO Program Structure Arrays Considerable Amount of Data That Can Be Used To Evaluate Project Performance")	X	X (Designed But Not Yet Implemented)	X ("Extent to Which Current System Will Expand Remains To Be Seen")

*"X" signifies that activity within the element was implemented prior to the demonstration.

only vague commitments, for example, to "augment the patrol role" in an

unspecified manner or to reassign an unspecified number of detectives.

OTT did attach special conditions to each of the sites' grants. For the

most part, these special conditions dealt with administrative matters—

budgetary adjustments, the use of consultants, technical assistance, etc.

In one case, however, the special conditions increased the specificity of the

program design. In its proposal, Saint Paul made no commitment concerning

the improvement of police/prosecutor relations or in implementating a moni-

toring system. The special conditions required the following:

- "[the grantee] will establish detailed followup case reporting
  requirements in consultation with the prosecutor and will modify
  the case preparation forms."

- "[the grantee] will expand current monitoring activity to include
  measures on the performance of all units and personnel involved
  in criminal investigations and on case flow."

Whatever the intent of OTT and OE, it is clear that, in the end, the

sites promised to undertake a vaguely defined program, a program whose hall-

mark was flexibility. Since the sites committed themselves to very little in

the proposals, and since OTT accepted the proposals, OTT in effect gave tacit

approval to the sites to evolve their specific plans as they saw fit.

7. TRAINING AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROGRAM DESIGN

Training is considered an integral part of OTT's demonstration programs.

OTT hires a contractor (in the case of MCI, the University Research Corpora-

tion was chosen) to train sites in the "technology" to be transferred. To

develop the training package, University Research Corporation (URC) estab-

lished a planning group consisting of several prominent chiefs, a prosecutor

and an OTT official. The first all-site training workshop was conducted

November 30 to December 3, 1976. Participants' ratings of the interest
and utility of the training workshops were consistently high.

E.   SUMMARY

In the foregoing sections, we have attempted to portray the evolution
of the MCI program. First explained to the sites as an opportunity "to do
their own thing," MCI was later renamed as an official "experiment" which
would "provide a means of validating specific findings of the research on
the investigative process." By the fall of 1976, the design had evolved
full circle, resuming its flexible character.

The unscientific manner in which the sample of sites was selected and
the uncontrolled nature of the activities at each site makes any general-
ization of the findings of this demonstration extremely tenuous.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

A. RESEARCH FOCUS

Evaluation of the managing criminal investigations demonstration was intended to do the following:

- assess implementation of the MCI components;

- measure departmental changes before and during the demonstration period;

- assess whether intended results occurred and whether the actual outcomes resulted from MCI at a given site; and

- assess which activities were retained, modified, or dropped at the end of the demonstration.

The evaluation framework was based on the MCI program components and outcomes which the five sites articulated. Through interviews and a review of site proposals and planning documents, we developed MCI chronologies and models of program activities. These were verified at each site and the models were the basis for each individual evaluation design. These evaluation designs were submitted for comment to LEAA in individual site reports and approved.

B. SITE EVALUATION PROCESS

The activities and goals of the five sites varied considerably. Thus, each location had to be evaluated against its own objectives and activity targets. There was no requirement that sites implement all program elements, and each evaluation was structured around what local police officials selected as planned activities and anticipated results.

For each activity, we asked the following questions:

- Was it in operation before the MCI grant was funded?

- If not, was there a plan to implement the activity during the demonstration period?

- Was the activity implemented during the demonstration period?

- Are there plans to continue the activity after the grant expires?

For each outcome, we asked the following:

- How was movement toward the objective to be measured?

- In what direction do the data indicate a change?

- Is is plausible to attribute a change to MCI grant activity?

To answer these questions for each site, we did the following:

- Obtained Background Data. Usually on the first site visit we tried to get enough background information to help understand the MCI project. For example, we collected information on how the department was organized, budgetary information, and special or unique features about the department and its setting.

- Obtained Planning History. As indicated in the previous section on "research focus," we established, through interviews and a review of planning documents, an MCI chronology for each site.

- Identified Project Components and Outcomes. We identified MCI components and outcomes peculiar to each site. To accomplish this task, we conducted interviews, reviewed the grant proposals and all plans, and searched related documentary sources (e.g., minutes of planning meetings and project task forces by departmental staff).

- Identified Data Sources. We examined departmental records to find out if data were available to detect changes in activities and outcomes. When statistical data were unavailable, we relied on softer information sources. For the most part, departments did not undertake major new statistical data collection efforts at our behest.

- Described the Implementation Process. We conducted interviews and searched departmental records for information on how MCI was implemented. Typical sources included general orders, organizational plans, policy directives, training bulletins, etc.

- Collected and Analyzed Data for Pre/Post Comparisons of Activity and Outcomes. Major data sources for this effort included crime and arrest statistics, personnel rosters, routine departmental statistical reports, interviews, and case dispositions.

- Developed Attribution Arguments. When a desired outcome was achieved, we examined whether it was plausible to believe that MCI produced the change. To estimate plausibility, we asked ourselves the following questions:

  --Did the MCI component activities bear a logical relationship to the outcome?

  --Was the MCI activity of sufficient magnitude to induce the observed outcome?

  --Were other, unrelated explanations available to to help us understand the outcome?

- Examined Status at Grant Termination. Here we are interested in learning how key department officials viewed the demonstration and finding whether they planned to keep, change, or drop the program.

- Verified Report with Department. When each case study was completed, we reviewed and verified it with representatives of the police department.

C.   DATA SOURCES

Table III-1 shows the major sources of information we used to examine and evaluate the five MCI demonstration programs.[1] They include on-site interviews and various departmental records and reports. Reports from other local evaluators and department analysts also were useful.

Finally, we made at least four site visits to each department. We also made a final visit to review each case study with department personnel and to verify our findings and determine the status of the MCI program at the end of the demonstration.

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    1. Specific data sources for each site are discussed in the individual case studies.

TABLE III-1: SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES FOR NATIONAL EVALUATION

TYPE OF DATA	DATA SOURCES FOR NATIONAL EVALUATION
On-site Interviews	Minimum of four site visits to each department.
Grant Applications	Reviewed for all five sites.
Personnel Rosters	Reviewed for all sites
Case Trace[a]	Conducted for Montgomery County, St. Paul, Santa Monica, and Rochester.
Department Budget	Reviewed for all sites.
Quarterly Progress Reports	Reviewed for all sites.
UCR Crime and Arrest Statistics	Used for all sites.
Department Orders	Reviewed for all sites.
Other[b]	

a. A sample of criminal cases starting at the time of the dispatch
    call and ending up with final disposition in the system (such as
    jail sentence, not guilty, or no charges made).
b. For example, offense and arrest computer tapes, minutes from meetings,
    etc.

Two significant constraints affected data collection and subsequent
analysis. First, the implementation schedules at the sites often allowed
little or no time to collect data during the "pre" program phase. Second,
the variation in local program designs made cross-site comparisons tenuous.

IV. MCI RATIONALE AND RESEARCH

A. INTRODUCTION

The Urban Institute undertook a detailed analysis of the MCI literature forwarded to the sites. The review was directed toward identifying the nature and size of past effects generated by MCI technology. In addition, we wished to assess the applicability of past measurement techniques to our own study. The review generated the following major findings:

- The core research showed few positive measurable effects unequivocably related to MCI technology;

- Some observed effects were in a direction opposite of that to be expected; and,

- Some areas of the LEAA program design were not subjected to test in the core research.

We have reviewed in detail each of the major research documents mailed to the sites and summarized below, including:

- Peter W. Greenwood and Joan Petersilia, The Criminal Investigation Process, Vol. I, Summary and Policy Implications, Rand, Santa Monica, 1975.[1]

- Bernard Greenberg, Excerpts from Final Report, Felony Investigation Decision Model--An Analysis of Investigative Elements of Information, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California, 1975.[2]

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1. In addition, we reviewed Volumes II and III of the "Rand Report": Chaiken, Jan M., The Criminal Investigation Process, Vol. II: Survey of Municipal and County Police Departments, The Rand Corporation, October 1975; and, Greenwood, Peter W., Chaiken, Jan M., Petersilia, Joan and Prusoff, Linda, The Criminal Investigation Proces, Vol. III: Observations and Analysis, The Rand Corporation, October 1975.

2. In addition, we reviewed SRI's final report: Greenberg, Bernard, et al. Felony Investigation Model: An Analysis of Investigative Elements of Information, NILECJ, LEAA, February 1977.

● Peter B. Bloch and James Bell, Managing Investigations: The Rochester System, Police Foundation, Washington, D. C.

● Peter B. Bloch and Donald R. Weidman, Managing Criminal Investigations (a prescriptive package), Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D. C., 1976.

B. THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS: VOLUMES I, II and III
THE RAND REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The "Rand Study," published in 1975, was an attempt "to describe, on a national scale, current investigative organization and practices"[1] and to assess their effectiveness. In connection with their work, the Rand team developed a series of major findings and proposed "reforms" which are reproduced below.

a. MAJOR FINDINGS

● "On investigative effectiveness: Differences in investigative training, staffing, workload, and procedures appear to have no appreciable effect on crime, arrest, or clearance rates . . . .

● "The method by which police investigators are organized (i.e., team policing, specialists vs. generalists, patrolmen-investigators) cannot be related to variations in crime, arrest, and clearance rates . . . .

● "On the use of investigators' time: Substantially more than half of all serious reported crimes receive no more than superficial attention from investigators . . . .

● "Our data consistently reveal that an investigator's time is largely consumed in reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate and interview victims on cases that experience shows will not be solved. For cases that are solved (i.e., a suspect is identified), an investigator spends more time in post-clearance processing than he does in identifying the perpetrator . . . .

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1. Greenwood, op. cit., October 1975, vol. I, p. v.

● "On how cases are solved: The single most important determinant of whether or not a case will be solved is the information the victim supplies to the immediately responding patrol officer. If information that uniquely identifies the perpetrator is not presented at the time the crime is reported, the perpetrator, by and large, will not be subsequently identified . . . .

● "On how cases are solved: Of those cases that are ultimately cleared but in which the perpetrator is not identifiable at the time of the initial police incident report, almost all are cleared as a result of routine police procedures . . . .

● "On collecting physical evidence: Most police departments collect more physical evidence than can be productively processed. Our analysis shows that allocating more resources to increasing the processing capabilities of the department can lead to more identifications than some other investigative actions . . . .

● "On the use of physical evidence: Latent fingerprints rarely provide the only basis for identifying a suspect . . . .

● "On investigative thoroughness: In relatively few departments do investigators consistently and thoroughly document the key evidentiary facts that reasonably assure that the prosecutor can obtain a conviction on the most serious applicable charges . . . .

● "On investigative thoroughness: Police failure to document a case investigation thoroughly may have contributed to a higher case dismissal rate and a weakening of the prosecutor's plea bargaining position . . . .

● "On relations between victims and police: Crime victims in general strongly desire to be notified officially as to whether or not the police have 'solved' their case, and what progress has been made toward convicting the suspect after his arrest . . . .

● "On investigative organization and procedure: "Investigative strike forces have a significant potential to increase arrest rates for a few difficult target offenses, provided they remain concentrated on activities for which they are uniquely qualified; in practice, however, they are frequently diverted elswhere."[1]

b. PROPOSED REFORMS

"1. Reduce follow-up investigation on all cases except those involving the most serious offenses . . . .

"2. Assign generalist-investigators (who would handle the obvious leads in routine cases) to the local operations commander . . . .

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1. Ibid., p. vi-ix.

"3. Establish a Major Offenders Unit to investigate serious crimes . . . .

"4. Assign serious-offense investigations to closely supervised teams, rather than to individual investigators . . . .

"5. Strengthen evidence-processing capabilities . . . .

"6. Increase the use of information processing systems in lieu of investigators . . . .

"7. Employ strike forces selectively and judiciously . . . .

"8. Place post-arrest (i.e., suspect in custody) investigations under the authority of the prosecutor . . . .

"9. Initiate programs designed to impress on the citizen the crucial role he plays in crime solution . . ."[1]

The study relied on two major sources of information, a national survey and on-site research conducted in over 25 agencies. The survey was mailed to 300 departments which had 150 or more full-time employees or a service juris- diction, exceeding 100,000 by 1970 census figures. The questionnaire was completed and returned by 153 agencies. The resulting data base was used to identify investigative correlates to UCR arrest and clearance rates.

Based on questionnaire responses, Rand selected "more than 25 police agen- cies" for individual site work. Rand's analysis of the daily investigative routine, however, is based principally on data from one department, Kansas City, which maintains a computer system with information on daily activity. "Summary reports are produced by the department on a monthly and quarterly basis. These describe, for each investigator and for each unit, the number of hours spent on various activities, the number of cases handled, and the number of arrests and clearances produced."[2] Rand was forced to rely mainly on Kansas City data because "visits . . . revealed only a handful of instances

1. *Ibid.*, p. ix-xiii.
2. Greenwood, *op. cit.*, vol III, p. 47.

where departments could provide even a modestly comprehensive summary of how investigators spend their time."[1] The analysis of how crimes are solved is based on a sample of cases drawn, for the most part, from five departments. A study of the effectiveness of strike forces and the relationship between investigative thoroughness and case disposition were both based on experience at two departments.

In general, it is fair to say that the Rand research does not support the MCI design; in fact, in a number of instances, the Rand findings would tend to indicate that elements of the design are likely to be ineffective, rather than successful. The Rand data, however, cannot be regarded as conclusive. In some cases, the samples are very small and the correlations rely in part on UCR arrest and clearance statistics known to be flawed.

The Rand research is described below in relation to applicable components of the model of options.

C. FELONY INVESTIGATION DECISION MODEL:
AN ANALYSIS OF INVESTIGATIVE
ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) study deals only with the use of burglary and robbery case screening systems. The research presented in this volume does not relate to the other five components.

To design the robbery and burglary screening systems, SRI conducted a series of discriminant analyses to determine what factors differentiate a large sample of cleared and uncleared cases. For both classes of crime, SRI was able to identify a series of information elements which, when present,

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1. Chaiken, op. cit., October 1975, vol. II, p. 27.

indicated a high probability of case solution. SRI attached a weighting
factor to each information element and developed decision rules governing
whether to conduct a follow-up investigation.

The robbery model was validated at a relatively high degree of predictive
accuracy. "Ninety percent of the cases in our sample were correctly grouped
as cleared or uncleared by the classification function derived from the dis-
criminant analysis and reflected by the relative scaling in the decision
model."[1]

When the burglary model was validated, the authors "were somewhat dis-
mayed to discover that a range of predictive accuracy in case selection
varied from a high of 90 percent to a low of 67 percent. The explanation
for the wide variation is simply that the agencies involved had inconsistent
policies governing the criteria by which a burglary case is cleared."[2]

The SRI screening system was validated on an old sample of cases. The
research shows that the presence/absence of certain information elements could
be used to predict, with relative accuracy, whether a case had been solved.
The research does not report on the day-to-day use of the system. As a result,
the SRI study offers no information concerning whether the system would refocus
investigative effort on fewer, more solvable cases. Nor does the research show
that the use of the system affects arrest, prosecution or conviction rates.

D. PRESCRIPTIVE PACKAGE: MANAGING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

The prescriptive package describes promising ideas and practices in the
management of criminal investigations. One section deals with "managing to

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1. Greenberg, op. cit., p. 42.
2. Ibid., p. 44.

achieve results," while others document "strategic" and "tactical" decisions
facing a police department.

To compile the prescriptive package, the authors reviewed the literature
and conducted two- to four-day visits to six police departments including
Cincinnati, Ohio; DeKalb County, Georgia; Fremont, California; New York City
and Rochester, New York; and Washington, D.C. These cities were selected
for study because "they were trying to improve their management of criminal
investigations. The sample represents a range of sizes, geographic loca-
tions, socioeconomic conditions and management approaches."[1] Unlike the
other documents reviewed in this section, the prescriptive package is not
primarily structured to report on the results of controlled research.
"Where available, information is presented on how successful the action
has been (or how satisfied the users are.) But in many cases, there is not
yet enough evidence to draw firm conclusions, even when there is evidence
that something has worked in other circumstances." In the absence of
evidence, the authors simply describe the technique or system as it was
implemented.

E. MANAGING INVESTIGATIONS: THE ROCHESTER SYSTEM

The "Rochester system" entailed the creation of two teams, each with 36
members. The teams were staffed by 30 uniformed patrol officers and six de-
tectives and plainclothes investigators. The responsibility for patrol and
investigative operations was vested at the team level. Both teams utilized
an early case closure system based on solvability factors and one team
instituted a "centralized case management" system, whereby team commanders

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1. Bloch and Weidman, op. cit., June 1975, p. 2.

assigned investigative tasks on a daily basis.[1] Team performance was then

compared to nonteam performance.

The following, fairly unequivocal findings were generated by the study.
For certain classes of cases, the teams were superior to nonteams in
generating:

- a larger percentage of total arrests and clearances;
- a larger percentage of on-scene arrests; and,
- a larger percentage of arrests resulting from followup investigations.

A greater proportion of nonteam on-scene arrests resulted in prosecution.

However, the quality of followup arrests was similar between teams and non-

teams. Attitude surveys revealed officers' belief that the team system was

(1) more effective in fighting crime, (2) was instrumental in alleviating

morale problems, and (3) resulted in greater cooperation between team and

investigative personnel.[2]

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1. Bloch and Bell, op. cit., 1976, p. 2.
2. Ibid., pp. 8-10.

V. MCI PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES

This chapter describes the MCI program at the five demonstration sites. It discusses how the program was implemented at each site and what outcomes resulted.

A. IMPLEMENTING MCI

1. BASIC MCI PROGRAM MODEL

There were six major components of the MCI program. They were:

- augmentation of patrol role;

- case screening;

- managing the continuing investigation;

- improvement of police/prosecutor relations;

- monitoring system; and

- policing organization and allocation of resources.

Each component could be implemented in a number of ways, at the discretion of the individual department. In turn, various program objectives were feasible and together were expected to contribute to the overall goal of increasing arrests for serious crimes that are prosecutable, ultimately leading to an increased number of convictions.

Figure V-1 is a model of MCI developed by the University Research Corporation for training MCI sites. It provides examples of how the various program components can be implemented.

FIGURE V-1: MCI MODEL BASED ON PARTICIPANT'S AND TRAINER'S MODEL DEVELOPED
BY THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORPORATION

FIGURE V-1: MCI MODEL BASED ON PARTICIPANT'S AND TRAINER'S MODEL DEVELOPED
BY THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORPORATION Continued

COMPONENT   OBJECTIVE   GOAL


FIGURE V-1: MCI MODEL BASED ON PARTICIPANT'S AND TRAINER'S MODEL DEVELOPED
BY THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORPORATION Continued

FIGURE V-1: MCI MODEL BASED ON PARTICIPANT'S AND TRAINER'S MODEL DEVELOPED
BY THE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORPORATION Continued

2. PROGRAM SITE MODELS

Each site attempted to implement or refine already existing procedures for augmenting patrol role, case screening, managing the criminal investigation, improving police/prosecutor relations, and monitoring. All but St. Paul changed their organization/allocation of resources. Not unexpectedly, the ways in which the components were implemented varied from site to site.

In Rochester, MCI was begun in 1971 as part of a Police Foundation funded project to improve case clearance rates. The LEAA grant has enabled the department to refine and make improvements in overall management of criminal investigations. Birmingham too formally instituted some MCI components prior to this program. The department has been screening out cases for which no further investigation was required since 1974. The position of police/prosecutor liaison was created the same year.

The Montgomery County program was implemented in one district only, to test the feasibility of the concept and provide the basis for a decision on county-wide implementation. The removal of the Chief from office has suspended such a decision pending the selection of a replacement.

In Santa Monica, MCI began with a major reshuffling of the Investigative Bureau including the installation of a computer-based case management system.

MCI in St. Paul formally began on the same day a one million dollar team policing program was implemented. Therefore, while activities were implemented for five of the six components, it is impossible to distinguish between effects produced by MCI from those resulting from team policing.

Table V-1 is an overview of what was implemented at each site. Table V-2 presents a summary of activities implemented for each component by site. Specifically, the table describes:

- what activities were implemented for each component?

TABLE V-1: SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION AND RETENTION OF MCI COMPONENTS

MCI COMPONENTS	BIRMINGHAM		MONTGOMERY COUNTY		ROCHESTER		SANTA MONICA		ST. PAUL	
	Imple-mented	Post-Grant Plans	Imple-mented	Post-Grant Plans	Imple-mented	Post-Grant Plans	Imple-mented	Post-Grant Plans	Imple-mented	Post-Grant Plans
Augment Patrol Role	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue
Case Screening	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue
Managing the Continuing Investigation	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue
Improvement of Police/Prosecutor Relations	Yes	Continue	No	--	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue
Monitoring System	Part-ially	Discontinue many report ing forms	Part-ially	Continue	Part-ially	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue
Police Organization and Allocation of Resources	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Continue	Yes	Investigation Bureau reorganized & reverted to pre-MCI	No	--

V-7

BIRMINGHAM   MONTGOMERY COUNTY   ROCHESTER

	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION		MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE
AUGMENT PATROL ROLE	Develop investigation training for patrol officers	Investigative training rotation started September, 1977	Schedule and content of training	Investigative training check-lists	Continue	Stack Calls	Dispatch stack calls on request of Silver Spring supervisor	Very infrequent use of stacking	Supervisor estimates of frequency of stacking verified by observation	Interviews with supervisors	Continue	Rating solvability factors for crime investigation report	Yes	Number of cases assigned follow-up
						Patrol officers use event report to rate solvability of case and recommend follow-up	Officers prepare event reports	Yes				Video tape scenario of preliminary investigation process		Content analysis of tapes; Number of times used and to what extent
						Rotation of patrol officers through MCI	Patrol officers rotating	Yes	Rotatees, rotation period and content of training; o did patrol officers conduct follow-ups before MCI? o people to whom follow-ups are assigned for investigation	Daily assignment records; pre-Silver Spring patrol officers & case tally sheets; during 1 week of cases for which follow-ups conducted	Continue	Managing Criminal Investigation Manual		Content analysis of document; How used in training; number and to whom distributed
												Institute preliminary investigative quality control		List supervisory problems and how resolved; System deficiency list and outcomes
						Assign lesser offense follow-ups to patrol officer rotation graduates	Cases are assigned to rotation graduates	Yes	See above	See above	Continue	Train staff in preliminary investigation and reporting system		Content analysis of training; Persondays to train staff
CASE SCREENING	Introduce case screening based on solvability factors	Screening since February 1975, modified during MCI	Interviews with Investigative personnel	Interviews	Continue	Investigative coordinator assigns solvable cases to permanent investigators, shift supervisors, rotatees and rotation graduates	Cases assigned to permanent investigators, rotatees and shift supervisors who reassign cases to shift investigator (rotation graduate) and other patrol officers	Yes	Solvability scores of assigned and not assigned cases	MCI case management cards	Continue	Test case screening using weighted solvability factors	Yes	Categories and results of screening
												Detail tactics that could be utilized in "solvability factor" search		List of tactic
												Test SRI burglary case screening methodology		Results of 500 RPD cases compared to SRI prediction

TABLE V-2: SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED BY SITE

SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS
Crime Investigation Reports; Coordinator's Log; Interviews	Continue	Patrol officers receive training for investigations	Training given Yes	Schedule and content analysis of training	Text of training session	None	Increase patrol responsibility during initial investigation; use new report forms with solvability factors	New report form with solvability factors introduced 7-17-77	Comparison of content of old and new forms	Copies of forms Interviews	Continue
Video Tapes; Interviews; Attendance Roster											
Document; Distribution Log; Interviews											
Problem List; Interviews; Deficiency List											
Training manual; Attendance Roster; Interviews											
Interviews	None. Test completed	Investigations bureau gets feedback from prosecutor on cases submitted	Information entered into MIS Yes	Pre vs. during description of feedback information	Interviews with liaison officer; sample of cases prosecuted	Continue	Assign cases using solvability factors as criteria	Screening system using solvability factors initiated 7-1-77	Investigative captains' description of case	Interview with investigative captains	Continue
HCI Manual Interviews	None. Manual completed	Install computer-based case monitoring and management system	Data collected from January 1976 Yes	Pre vs. during description of system	Samples of data collected and produced by HIS	Uncertain	Send out letter on non-assigned cases	Letters sent to victims of cases screened out since 7-17-77	Number of letters sent out to victims	Case management cards and HCI Secretary	Continue
500 RPD burglary cases	None. Test completed	Revise on-scene crime report form	Implemented in 1977; added solvability factors Yes	Comparison of items on old vs. new forms	Copies of forms	Continue					
		Add a case screening officer to screen cases and critique preliminary reports	Implemented late 1976 Yes	Pre vs. during number of personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews, and general orders	Continue					

BIRMINGHAM   MONTGOMERY COUNTY   ROCHESTER

		ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE
MANAGING THE	CONTINUING INVESTIGATION	Establish investigative coordinator position	Central and precinct coordinators assigned	Positions filled	Department orders	Continue	Establish investigative coordinator position	Position filled	Pre vs. during; personnel and duties by unit	Interviews; personnel rosters	Continue	Develop an investigative action report	Yes	Number reports requiring follow-up
							Establish case management system	Case tracking cards introduced	Description of uses of system	Interviews; case management cards	Continue	Clearly define "Sector Coordinator" position		
												Develop "Central Coordinator" position		
												Develop a "Universal" support file system		
												Liaison system between patrol operations and prosecutor's office		Number meetings held
												Develop investigator performance documents		Change in individual investigators performance
POLICE PROSECUTOR	RELATIONS	Establish police/prosecutor liaison officer position	Position filled since early 1974	Personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews and general orders	Continue	Police to use checklist to prepare cases	List of 36 criteria; "checklist" rarely used	Low level of effort—little change	Checklist	Interviews	Continue	Establish closer liaison between: 1) Chief of Police and Monroe County D.A. 2) MCI Project Director & major bureau chiefs 3) "Line Level" (Arresting officer) Supervisor and Trial Assistant D.A.	Yes	Number Meetings Meeting Reports
							Police attend mandated State's Attorney conference by deadline	Detectives or patrol officers consult with State's Attorney by phone or in person as they did in the past	Yes, conference held closer to time of arrest—small change	Pre: time between arrests and conferences (2 months of arrest data) During: time between arrests and conferences (2 months of arrest data)	Interviews	Continue			
							State's Attorney sends feedback form to police	Forms not being used	No				Case referral document		Results of cases screened
												Feedback Report		Number reports; Case results

TABLE V-2: SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED BY SITE (continued)

SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS
Investigative action report; Interview users	Continue						Install color-coded case management cards	Cards in use since 2-25-78	Investigative coordinator's description of use of case management cards	Interview with case coordinator	Continue
General Orders; Interviews											
General Orders; Interviews											
Interviews; File Logs; General Orders											
General Orders; Meeting Reports; Interviews											
Documents; Interviews											
Interviews	Continue	Retain prosecution liaison officer	No change required Yes	Pre vs. during number of personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews, and general orders	Continue	Distribute "The Charging Process-Offense Elements and Issues" to patrol officers	Booklet distributed to everyone in police department and county attorney's office 9/21/77	Booklet	Interviews	Continue
Interviews											
Interviews											
Referral documents; Interviews											
Feedback Report; Interviews											

BIRMINGHAM | MONTGOMERY COUNTY | ROCHESTER

		ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION		MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE
M O N I T O R I N G	**S Y S T E M**	Establish automated monitoring system	Partially operational	Computer programs	Interviews, computer printouts	Continue to implement	Research & Planning conducts special briefings for key managers	Briefings have not been conducted	No				Report #100; detailed Crime Report by section		Audit reports Utility to Second Cmdr.
							Research & Planning prepares tri-monthly report on project status, with recommendations	First tri-monthly report due April 1	Yes—new report	Reports	Reports	Continue	Report #101; Car Beat Report by section		Audit report Utility to Patrol Supervisor and subordinate personnel
							Research & Planning prepares special reports for other task forces	3 reports completed; evaluation requirements from event report	Yes—new report				Report #102; Investigative Outcome Assessment	Partially implemented prior to MCI, revised during MCI	Audit report Utility to top management (Major & above)
							Research & Planning prepares summary reports for lieutenants, sergeants and MCI investigators	Reports based on tri-monthly report	Yes—new report				Report #103; Investigative Outcome Assessment		Audit report Utility to Patrol Cmdr. & coordinator
													Report #103A; Investigative Outcome Assessment		Audit report Utility to management group (Captains, etc.)
P O L I C E **O R G A N I Z A T I O N** **O F**	**A N D** **A L L O C A T I O N** **R E S O U R C E S**	Realign precinct boundaries	4 patrol precincts formed in September 1976	Personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews and general orders	Continue	Decentralize detectives to Silver Spring	Detectives are: 1) non-specialists 2) work out of Silver Spring District; and 3) under Patrol Command	Yes	Cases assigned to detectives, by type of crime; pre and during rosters	MCI case management cards; personnel assignments	Continue			
		Decentralization Crimes Against Property Bureau	Property crimes detectives assigned to patrol precincts September 1976	Personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews and general orders	Continue									

TABLE V-2: SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED BY SITE (continued)

SANTA MONICA   SAINT PAUL

SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS	ACTIVITY	IMPLEMENTATION	MEASURE	SOURCE	POST-GRANT PLANS
Report #100; Interviews							Case coordinator monitors reports	Introduction of color-coded cards. Case coordinator appointed 7-17-77	Investigative coordinator's description of use of case management; printouts	Interview with case coordinator	Continue
Report #101; Interviews											
Report #102; Interviews	Continue										
Report "103; Interviews											
Report #103A; Interviews		Form Major Crimes Section, set criteria for Major Cases	Staffed with five investigators last quarter of 1976	Yes Pre vs. during number of personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews, and general orders						
		Split Vice and Narcotics Unit	Four narcotics and two vice investigators form two units	Yes Pre vs. during number of personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews, and general orders						
		Reduce "Property" unit to two investigators and screen out many burglary cases	Only two investigators remain in unit at end of 1976. Screening officer assigns cases	Yes See above; Investigator caseload, pre vs. during	See above; Sample of 100 "pre" burglary cases; 100% sample of "during" burglary cases	Changes in progress					
		Reduce "Persons" to four investigators and eliminate specialization	Staffing changes done in 1976	Yes Pre vs. during number of personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews, and general orders						
		Combine "forgery" and "bunko"	Staffing changes done in 1976	Yes							
		Reduce "auto" to one officer	Already reduced to one before the program started	Yes Pre vs. during number of personnel and duties by unit	Personnel rosters, interviews, and general orders						
		Reduce personnel in "Youth"	Reduced from 4 to 3 investigators late in 1976	Yes							

- when was the activity implemented?

- what measures were used to determine implementation?

- what was the source of the measurement information?

- what are the post-grant plans for the activity?

All sites implemented activities to (1) augment the role of the patrol officer in investigative work; (2) institute new or adjusted ongoing case screening sytems to ensure that follow-up investigations were concentrated on those cases with the highest probability of being solved; and (3) manage continuing investigations. All sites planned activities aimed at improving police/prosecutor relations and all but Montgomery County successfully implemented new or refined existing procedures. All but St. Paul restructured their investigative resources prior to or during the MCI grant period. Monitoring systems proved to be the most difficult to implement and most of the departments are still working on them. Most of the sites are continuing their MCI programs with few changes after the grant period. The most extensive post-grant changes were in Santa Monica where personnel changes in the Investigations Bureau lead to a reorganization and return to some pre-MCI investigative procedures.

B.   MCI OUTCOMES

1.   RESULTS

Figure V-2 presents an overview of the MCI outcomes and whether they were achieved. Communities had to meet the following conditions before we could attribute any of those results to their MCI efforts:

- The police department adopted a certain outcome as an
  objective.

OUTCOME	WAS THE OUTCOME ADOPTED AS AN OBJECTIVE BY THE SITE?	CONSIDERING WHAT WAS IMPLEMENTED, IS THERE A PLAUSIBLE REASON TO EXEPECT THE OUTCOME?	ARE THERE MEASURES AND DATA TO MAKE A COMPARISON	WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE COMPARISON?	IS CHANGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MCI?
Increase Arrests	5 sites →YES→ 5 sites →YES→ 5 sites →YES→			Birmingham : no significant change Montgomery County : no sustained change Rochester : little increase Saint Paul : little increase Santa Monica : little increase	-- -- Perhaps Perhaps Perhaps
Improve Clearance Rates	2 sites →YES→ 2 sites →YES→ 2 sites →YES→ NO →Birmingham Montgomery County Saint Paul			Rochester : little change Santa Monica : clearance rate increased	Perhaps Yes
Improve Conviction Rates	5 sites →YES→ 5 sites →YES→ 4 sites →YES→ NO →Montgomery County			Birmingham : maintained high rate Rochester : no significant change Saint Paul : increased Santa Monica : no significant change	-- -- Perhaps --
Increase Productivity	1 site →YES→ 1 site →YES→ 1 site →YES→ NO →Birmingham Montgomery County Saint Paul Santa Monica			Rochester : maintained past levels of performance with decreasing personnel	Perhaps

FIGURE V-2: SUMMARY OF EXPERIENCE WITH MCI OUTCOMES

● The magnitude and timing of the program were such that
operational changes could plausibly have produced the
desired outcome. This means that there was enough
change to trigger an anticipated outcome.

● Measures and data were available to make comparisons
and detect outcomes, and comparisons had to show
change. As much as possible, we tried to use the
measures of those who designed each MCI program.

● Any change observed had to be attributable to the
MCI program. This insured that alternative explana-
tions for the change were considered.

Table V-3 then shows six MCI outcomes and summarizes the experience

with them by site.

2.   COMPARISONS THAT REVEALED CHANGE

This section discusses outcomes adopted as objectives at the demon-

stration sites and the data which were available to show change in the

direction of achieving the objectives.

a.   INCREASE ARRESTS

Examination of time series formats of the ratios of arrest to offense

data for all five sites showed no significant change or little increase for

the increased arrest outcome. Of the five sites, only Rochester, St. Paul

and Santa Monica showed any increase and it was small. In our judgment, the

small changes that were observed can not be definitely attributed to MCI.

b.   IMPROVE CLEARANCE RATES

Only Rochester and Santa Monica showed any changes in the ratios of

clearances to offenses over the time of the demonstration. Rochester's

clearance rates showed only a slight increase overall, when the ratios

were examined prior and during the grant period. Santa Monica's clearance

rates for Part I crimes showed a marginal increase. In general, improved

TABLE V-3: MCI OUTCOMES AT INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS

OUTCOME	BIRMINGHAM	MONTGOMERY COUNTY	ROCHESTER	ST. PAUL	SANTA MONICA	OVERALL
INCREASE ARRESTS	Total Part I crimes, Burglary and Larceny showed no significant change when ratio of arrests to offenses examined	No sustained increase shown for Total Part I Crimes, Robbery and Burglary when ratio of arrests to offenses examined	Overall little change shown for Total Part I Crime, Robbery, Burglary, and Larceny when ratio of arrests to offenses examined	Little change in Arrest rates for Robbery, Burglary and Theft when arrests to offenses examined	Overall only marginal changes for Total Part I Crimes, Robbery and Burglary when ratio of arrests to crimes examined	Overall, only marginal, if any, change observed in the ratio of arrests to offenses
IMPROVE CLEARANCE RATES	Not specified as an outcome	Not specified as an outcome	Examination of the ratio of clearances (cleared arrest/cleared warrant advised/cleared no prosecution/cleared no arrest) to offenses shows little change	Not specified as an outcome	Marginal increase in Part I crimes but Robbery and Burglary were the highest achieved since 1953	Only two of the five sites specified improved clearance rates as an outcome. Santa Monica showed an increase for Robbery and Burglary but only marginal increase for Total Part I. Rochester maintained a comparable clearance rate to the pre-MCI period
IMPROVE CONVICTION RATES	Issuance of a warrant for arrest agreed upon as a measure of prosecutorial acceptance of a case. Throughout the grant period, few warrants were rejected or referred and as a rule, more than 70 percent were issued.	Failure of the State's Attorney's Office to provide feedback to Department on cases seriously curtailed efforts to assess prosecutorial outcomes	The Department has a court disposition analysis system but have experienced difficulty in obtaining disposition data from the court. As a result, a sample was developed of cases to trace dispositions. 50 percent of the sampled cases showed favorable outcomes (convicted or warrant).	In general, it appears that prosecution of offenders was somewhat more successful in 1978. But whether this is due to better quality of cases, more attention to details of evidence, or mere chance is difficult to determine.	No significant change in conviction rates for a sample of Felony and Misdemeanor cases.	Difficult to assess the success of achieving the improved conviction rate outcome because of the data limitations. Overall slight improvement was achieved for Birmingham and Rochester.
INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY	Not specified as an outcome	Not specified as an outcome	Overall the Department has been able to maintain a fairly sustained level of productivity with decreasing personnel levels and increasing calls for service.	Not specified as an outcome	Not specified as an outcome	Only Rochester specified increased productivity and it can be said that it has maintained a consistent level with increasing service calls and personnel decreases.

clearance rates were not achieved, unless the little or marginal change
is interpreted as being successful. It is our judgment that participation
in the MCI grant program did lead to the Santa Monica marginal increase
and perhaps the slight improvement in Rochester's clearance rates.

c. IMPROVE CONVICTION RATES

This outcome was difficult to assess because of data limitations and
the time lag from arrest to court disposition. Montgomery County could not
be assessed because of the failure of the State's Attorney's Office to
provide feedback to the Department on case dispositions. Four of the sites
either increased the conviction rates or showed no significant change.
Birmingham and St. Paul showed some increase but it can not be said that the
increase was attributable to MCI. Conviction rates remained constant
in Rochester and Santa Monica. Overall the MCI program did not seem to
affect conviction rates.

d. INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY

Rochester was the only site that specified increasing productivity as
a goal at the start of MCI. UCR crime data, Rochester arrest/offense data,
computer tapes and staffing rosters were examined to assess whether there
was an increase in productivity. Examination of these data showed that
the Department has been able to sustain a constant level of productivity
with a slight decrease in personnel levels and increasing calls for service.

Using increasing arrest and clearances per sworn personnel as a defini-
tion of productivity, it is possible to claim that productivity increased
in some of the other sites. However, only Santa Monica claimed such an
increase in productivity as a result of the MCI program.

In addition to the program results related to the outcomes discussed above, a number of other findings were observed. These are discussed in the last chapter.

VI. MCI PROGRAM SUMMARIES

A. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND

1. SETTING

Montgomery County, Maryland, is an area of 493 square miles immediately north and northwest of Washington, D.C. In the vicinity of the Capital Beltway (Washington's circumferential highway which cuts an arc across the southern part of the County), the population is suburban, but the northern reaches of the County are still rural. The County has very little industry involving direct production or handling of material goods/commodities; rather, it is a center for research and development.

The major population centers of the County are administered directly by the County and served by the Montgomery County Department of Police. In 1978, the Department had an authorized strength of 780 sworn officers. Its FY 1977 budget was $21.5 million. The MCDP is organized into three major bureaus: Field Services, Investigative Services, and Management Services.

2. PLANNING MCI

Montgomery County filed its original grant application on August 15, 1976, requesting $135,000 to conduct an MCI project in the Bethesda District. Several changes came about in the interim between grant application and approval. The Department subsequently filed an amended grant application and the project was shifted from Bethesda to Silver Spring.

The planning stages of MCI focused on four major program elements:

- organizational restructuring and expanding the investigative role of patrol officers

- case screening

- police/prosecutor coordination

- monitoring investigations

In conjunction with the planning phase, four principal activities were carried out by the Department:

- particiaption in MCI training workshops sponsored by LEAA and operated by the University Research Corporation;

- visits to other police departments, such as Rochester and Santa Monica, which had already implemented MCI programs;

- assignment of responsibilities under the program; and

- program design by five planning task forces dealing with overall coordination, training, monitoring, State's Attorney liaison, and case screening.

A Task Force was set up develop further on the specific areas of case screening criteria, police/prosecutor cooperation, MCI training, and MCI monitoring and evaluation. The overall program goal articulated by the Task Force was to increase the number of arrests for serious crimes that were prosecutable and ultimately lead to a conviction.

As can be seen in the following section, the decentralization, patrol role enhancement and case screening elements received the most emphasis in the implementation phase of the MCI program.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

Field implementation of MCI began in June of 1977 with all Silver Spring patrol officers receiving two days of training at the patrol academy. Case screening was initiated at this time using a set of 6 solvability factors.

to October 1977, all ranks of patrol officers and investigative positions received training in the use of the event report, case screening, and investigative checklist.

Decentralization in Silver Spring involved the assignment of 10 detectives (serving Silver Spring only) who were placed under Patrol Command and given responsibility for a wider range of crimes than those in central units.

The enhancement of patrol officer's role was to be brought about by the use of the new event report, rotation through the investigations unit, assignment of follow-ups to rotation graduates, and stacking calls. These activities were to allow patrol officers more time to expend on investigations and were designed as an incentive to do more thorough investigations.

Case screening had been used informally prior to MCI. After comparing the Stanford Research Institute and Multnomah County, Oregon models, as well as their own informal model, more formalized guidelines using solvability factors from the event report were introduced by the Task Force.

Of the other components set forth in the MCI program:

- Case monitoring was not appreciably affected during the grant period.

- Police/prosecutor liaison activities which were to be enhanced by the use of the Investigative Checklist and Prosecutor Feedback forms were rarely used.

- The monitoring system modeled after the Rochester Police Department, was an ongoing but not major activity of the program.

4. RESULTS/OUTCOMES

The overall goal of the MCI program was to increase the number of arrests for serious crimes that are prosecutable and ultimatetly lead to conviction. The success of the program was assessed by examining the

number of favorable departmental and prosecutorial outcomes. With respect

to the departmental outcomes it was found that:

- in the process of doing several analyses to determine whether
  arrests did increase during the period of the MCI program a
  sample of 181 MCI cases during 1978 elicited a 19 percent
  ratio of arrests to offenses--not a significant departure
  from previous years; and

- in looking at the percent of cases closed by arrest, the
  same sample, developed from the MCI case tracking cards
  maintained by the investigative coordinator, revealed little
  about the quality of either investigations or prosecutions;
  they did reveal that judicial processes were rather slow.

The assessment of prosecutorial outcomes was very limited due to the

failure of the State's District Attorney's Office to provide adequate feedback

to the Department, thus precluding an evaluation as to whether MCI led to

more favorable prosecutorial outcomes.

The Montgomery County MCI Project has changed the way the Silver Spring

District handles its investigative work.

- Silver Spring now has its own investigative unit with detectives
  working under the command of the Silver Spring District Commander
  rather than under the central Bureau of Criminal Investigations.

- Patrol officers now conduct follow-up investigations that were
  formerly the exclusive domain of detectives.

- Case screening and case management systems are now focused
  on solvability even though the characteristics of the cases
  differ to such a degree that such factors may be generally
  absent in some types of cases.

It can be said that the MCI project had a marked affect on investigative

organization and procedures without having a corresponding impact on the

number of closures or convictions. MCI did bring about many of the desired

internal changes--greater patrol involvement, better patrol/detective coopera-

tion, better focused case management--without producing any perceptible change

in the rate of case clearance or arrest.

5. POST-GRANT PLANS

The MCI Program continues to operate essentially as it did under the
grant. The Montgomery County Police Department is in a period of transition
and under the interim leadership of a veteran senior officer while the search
for a new Chief of Police is being conducted. Therefore, the implications of
further MCI activities are not clear.

B. SAINT PAUL, MINNESOTA

1. SETTING

The St. Paul Police Department is responsible for policing an area
of about 52.2 square miles in which almost 300,000 persons reside. In
1976, before the advent of team policing and MCI, the Department employed
647 persons, 533 of whom were sworn personnel. The Department consisted
of four divisions--Administrative, Services, Patrol, and Investigative--
all of which reported directly to the Chief of Police.

2. PLANNING MCI

In 1976, the LEAA invited the St. Paul Police Department to submit
a grant proposal. The proposal was submitted in July 1976 and the $135,000
grant was awarded that August. The major portion of the allocated grant
money was used to hire staff and consultants who would work directly with
the program. A one million dollar Team Policing grant was in its planning
phase prior to and during MCI project planning; therefore, both grants
were run simultaneously (Team Policing grant awarded over a 3-year period,
MCI over an 18-month period).

The ultimate goal of the MCI program was to increase the number of cases that result in arrest, prosecution and conviction by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the investigative process. This goal was approached in two ways:

- by integrating patrol and detective divisions; and

- by monitoring cases as they proceeded through the investigative process.

Department personnel directly involved in the planning process attended workshops and seminars emphasizing the MCI concepts, carried out in-house training programs, and visited other MCI project sites.

One of the key functions that the planning phase concentrated on was that of the Investigative Coordinator. The position was created as a result of team policing reorganization and would act as the chief functionary in managing the continuing investigation.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

The St. Paul Police Department successfully implemented activities within four component areas of the MCI program:

- enhancing the role of patrol officers;

- formalizing the case screening process;

- improving the management of criminal investigations; and

- improving police/prosecutor relationships.

Formal implementation of MCI began seven months after the grant award.

The role of patrol officers was augmented essentially by turning over many of the investigative duties, which had previously been the responsibility of the Investigations Unit personnel, to the officers. They were aided in this effort by a series of new reporting formats and access to fingerprint and camera equipment.

The Investigative Coordinator played an important role in formalizing the case screening process in that he made the final decision on case dispositions, referring them to the proper Investigative Unit. Prior to MCI, the "sorting" process was largely based on individual judgment. Solvabilty factors provided the objective criteria for abandoning or pursuing further investigation of a case.

Case management was implemented by the use of new report forms (color-coded cards) which summarized the preliminary crime report information. The forms used along with a 28-day printout listing of the case dispositions, allowed the Investigative Coordinator to monitor the course and results of the Department's investigative activities.

Some attempts were made at the improvement of police/prosecutor relationships via distribution of a booklet entitled, The Charging Process. However, this particular component was not considered a main objective in the overall program.

4. RESULTS/OUTCOMES

Because the team policing and MCI programs were implemented and carried out concurrently, there is little hope of disentangling their impact. Many of the outcomes the Department expected to result from its MCI program activities were influenced by the reorganization of the Department for team policing and therefore cannot be said to be attributed exclusively to the MCI program.

The Department's overall goals of increasing the number of offenders that are arrested, prosecuted, and convicted have at least been partially achieved. Although case clearance rates appear to have improved only slightly, there was no noticeable change in arrest rates. The percentage of convictions among cases sent to the prosecutor appears to have increased.

Finally, it must be reiterated that the contribution MCI might have made on the Department goals could not be isolated from the contribution of the team policing.

5. AFTER THE MCI GRANT

The only change in MCI activities planned at this time is to discontinue the recording of detectives' time allocations to specific tasks--part of managing the continuing investigation. No other major changes are antici- pated at this time.

C. ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

1. SETTING

Rochester is located on the shore of Lake Ontario in western New York, midway between Buffalo and Syracuse. Its population is estimated at between 260-265,000. It is an area of high and stable employment resulting from highly skilled labor employed by industries including Xerox and Eastman-Kodak.

The area is served by the Rochester Police Department which currently has 625 sworn personnel. The RPD Is organized into three sections--Special Criminal Investigation, Internal Investigation, Research Evaluation and Community Services--and two bureaus--Operations and Administration.

Of the five sites, Rochester probably has the longest history of working with and toward MCI-type concepts and many of its model reforms both pre and during MCI were to set the "pioneering" example for the remaining four.

2. PLANNING MCI

The Rochester Police Department's actual involvement with the MCI

program began in 1971 when the Department designed an experimental model

for decentralizing the detective function to work closely together with

patrol officers. The major objectives of the RPD/MCI program at that time

were:

- Improve case clearance rates;

- Improve conviction rates; and

- Increase productivity.

In September 1976, LEAA selected the Rochester Police Department as

a participant in the MCI program, awarding the Department $117,000 in grant

money. Prior to this time, the Department had already either planned, tested,

revised and fully or partially implemented activities in five areas:

- Managing the continuing investigation;

- Police/prosecutor relations;

- Preliminary investigations;

- Case screening; and

- The monitoring system.

These activities as well as the above major objectives were to be the basis

for the continuing refinement of the MCI concepts.

During the six-year time span in which the RPD had already planned,

experimented, implemented and revised many of the MCI components prior

to the then-current MCI program, the Department had an investigative system

consisting of the following:

- a decentralized investigative structure, with most investigators
  assigned to police sections in the patrol division;

- a preliminary investigation system aimed at the identification
  of solvability factors;

- an early case closure system based upon the existence of specific solvability factors;

- a centralized office of investigative coordination to facilitate the exchange of investigative information within the Department;

- a case management information system to provide an overview of investigative performance; and

- a selection system for investigators based upon a task analysis in utilizing modern personnel selection techniques.

3. IMPLEMENTATION

Rochester had already partially implemented and revised many of these activities prior to the current MCI demonstration. During this demonstration, the Department worked to refine the activities already underway and implement new ones which would help improve overall investigative effectiveness.

4. RESULTS/OUTCOMES

The three objectives that the RPD wished to achieve through its MCI program were:

- Improve clearance rates;

- Improve convictions; and

- Increase productivity.

Little change is shown for the outcome measures when examined prior to and during the MCI grant period. The trend of the outcomes is consistent when examined in a time series format from the time team policing was implemented citywide (April 1975) and during the MCI grant period (October 1976 through August 1978). It should be noted that the Department was able to maintain this consistency while the Department's staffing levels were decreasing slightly.

5. AFTER THE MCI GRANT

No major changes are anticipated in the MCI program, however, revisions will be made that further refine the investigative system. The department plans to continue preliminary investigative training. They expect to refine the training program by updating or adding video tape scenarios on the investigative function.

E. BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

1. SETTING

Birmingham, known as "the Pittsburgh of the South," is a leading iron and steel center. It is served by a police department which employed 679 sworn personnel and 155 civilians in 1977. The department is divided into four patrol precincts; with the exception of crimes against property detectives who are assigned to precincts, all other detective operations are centralized.

During 1976, the year the department received LEAA funding for this MCI program, the Detective Bureau lost 16 property investigators who were assigned to the precincts. At the same time, the Major Felony Squad gained three members by 1978. The number of detective personnel decreased during 1976 as did the total number of sworn personnel.

In 1975, the department budget was slightly over ten and one half million dollars; at the same time the per capita city expense for police services was $21.92 per year.

2.　PLANNING MCI

Some parts of Birmingham Police Department's procedures for managing criminal investigations were initiated in the department as early as 1974, prior to their official participation in the LEAA-funded MCI program. In 1974, Sumrall and Associates, a local consulting group, completed a study of the Department's response to dealing with property crimes. The report recommended that specialized in-service training be provided for patrol officers and civilian employees so the foundation on which investigative work is based would be sound. The program worked with property crimes, rather than crimes against persons, because crimes against persons are gener- ally viewed by the police, and the community which they serve, as being more serious than property crimes and less subject to an early case closure system which considers solvability factors in allocating investigative resources.

In early 1976, LEAA contacted the Birmingham Police Department to assess the suitability of the Department for participation in the national MCI demonstration. That spring, the Department was invited to submit a proposal which was subsequently funded.

3.　IMPLEMENTATION

A number of changes in the property crime investigative process were introduced at the time the Department received its MCI grant. These changes, in addition to the activities already implemented, were designed to achieve two overall departmental outcomes:.

- Increase the arrests made for serious crimes
- Increase the cases accepted for prosecution

To this end, a variety of case screening techniques were implemented. The first of these screening procedures, the "No Investigation Required" (NIR)

classification was implemented in 1974. Solvability factors were introduced in late 1976 and the Call Screening Officer position was established the following summer. The decentralization and reassignment of crimes against property detectives to the four precincts occurred in September 1976.

During April 1977, a series of training sessions were held to formally introduce MCI to all department personnel. The training focused on the preliminary investigation, case screening and the use of solvability factors, case management (during the continuing investigation), and police/prosecutor relations. The sessions introduced new forms to be employed as part of the program, and sought to clarify the roles of police officers, detectives, precinct sergeants, coordinating investigators, the new police/prosecutor liaison officer and personnel in the D.A.'s office.

The department plans to implement a monitoring component as part of their MCI effort. They have obtained the computer programs from the Rochester Police Department and adapted them for their own use. At this time, the system is not fully operational.

4.   RESULTS/OUTCOMES

As already mentioned, the Birmingham Police Department articulated two overall goals it hoped to achieve through MCI:

- increase arrests for serious crimes;
- increase cases accepted for prosecution.

To assess whether arrests for serious crimes increased, we computed the ratio of arrests to offenses for burglaries and larcenies from January 1974 through August 1978. There was no sustained increase observed for burglary. The ratio of arrests to offenses for larceny has been inching downwards since 1974. This is consistent with the trend for total Part I

crime during this same period. Birmingham was able to maintain its already high percentage of cases accepted for prosecution during the MCI that it had experienced prior to the program.

5. AFTER MCI

Since the LEAA grant period ended on September 30, 1978, the Birmingham Police Department has continued its MCI program much as before. Department officials remain committed to the goals of increasing overall investigative effectiveness and believe MCI is a means to that end.

Most changes which were made involved discontinuing or easing record keeping requirements. A change also was made in the solvability factors. The initial five classification factors have been reduced to three:

Factor A: Cases assigned to a detective;

Factor B: Cases assigned to beat or desk officers;

Factor C: No Investigation Required cases.

When asked what they would change about MCI, most Precinct Coordinators said they were satisfied with the changes specified in the memo mentioned above. A few other changes were suggested however; they include:

- decentralize other investigative functions;

- modify or revise MCI check-off training because it takes too long;

- increase patrol officer investigative responsibilities.

According to the Precinct Coordinators, the patrol officers are favorably disposed toward MCI, although some say there was resentment by patrol officers when the crimes against property detectives were first assigned to precincts. Detective attitudes have been favorable as well--especially toward the emphasis on investigating the most "solvable cases."

D.   SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

1.   SETTING

The city of Santa Monica is a Southern California beach city and has a
population of approximately 93,000 and an area of 8.3 square miles. It is
surrounded by the city of Los Angeles and shares most of the characteristics
of other beach cities in Los Angeles County: the population is roughly 90 per-
cent White with Black and Latin populations of 3 and 7 percent respectively.

Santa Monica is also the western terminus for the Santa Monica Freeway
which allows easy access to other parts of the Los Angeles Metropolitan area.
The proximity to the freeway allows the random "hit" of burglary and robbery
to be high.

The Santa Monica Police Department is organized into four administrative
bureaus: Administrative Services, Operations, Investigations, and Technical
Services. The Department has a policy of augmenting its sworn force with
civilians where possible, thus allowing more of its officers to work in
the field.

2.   PLANNING MCI

In July 1976, the Santa Monica Police Department responded to an LEAA
request for proposal to participate in the Managing Criminal Investigations
Field Test. In October 1976, a program design was formulated that planned
how changes in the investigative process were to be carried out by the SMPD
over the life of the grant. The program was then integrated as a whole
program rather than as an "add-on" which would disappear after the termina-
tion of the grant.

The basic components which were to become the foundation for the program were:

- the case screening system;

- a shift of personnel;

- the initiation of a major crimes unit;

- establishing a new police/prosecutor working relationship; and

- the beginning of the monitoring system.

The MCI Field test was regarded not only as a method of improvement but also as an agent of reorganization; therefore, the planning phase took into consideration that rather profound changes would have to be made.

3.   IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of the MCI program was accomplished in five steps:

- the development of a new report form (modeled after the one used by the Rochester Police Department) which would tell at a glance whether a case had high probability for successful investigation or not;

- a case screening system which functioned on the basis of the new crime report specifying the pertinent data required for a successful solution to a crime;

- organizational restructuring;

- case preparation strategy and checklist (the MCI grant termed this as "police/prosecutor relations"); and

- the monitoring system which would follow the progress of each case through the Investigations Bureau to its final disposition in the court.

Of the five steps, the monitoring system was considered to be the most sophisticated. It was to be used as a management information system for the Investigations Bureau to measure productivity as well as tracing cases.

4. RESULTS/OUTCOMES

The major outcomes achieved during the MCI grant period were in the areas of:

- Increased productivity of the Investigations Bureau;

- Overall improvement in the Bureau's operations;

- Some improvement in the clearance rates; and

- Higher percentage of cases being accepted at the Prosecutor's office;

The effects of the MCI program on the arrest rates were negligible and proved to be the weak link in the implementation process.

In general, the Department felt that the MCI program had improved the performance of the Investigations Bureau and from a managerial standpoint, the program proved itself to be successful with respect to its original objectives.

5. AFTER MCI

While the program worked smoothly during the grant period, it was sufficiently complex that many components of the program fell into disuse after the original MCI staff had retired or transferred to other sections within the Department. There has been a drift towards the pre-MCI period in terms of investigational processes and policies and it seems unlikely that there will be a return to the MCI model unless strong policy changes come about.

VII. A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF MCI

This Chapter presents an assessment of MCI from two perspectives.
First, we update research findings related to MCI program components.
Then we discuss some general program findings and observations.

A.   RESEARCH FINDINGS RELATED TO MCI PROGRAM COMPONENTS

The rationales behind MCI and the available knowledge at the beginning
of the program were presented in Chapter III. Table VII-1 summarizes
those past findings and updates them based on the results of this study.

As already mentioned, previous research showed few positive effects
that could be reliably attributed to MCI; in fact, some parts of the program
were not tested prior to this demonstration. In some cases, findings were
in a direction opposite of that to be expected. The current research
has found a few more positive effects of MCI. It also has confirmed some
of the past findings and produced knowledge about previously untested
theory. These results are discussed below in regard to specific MCI program
component.

1.   AUGMENT PATROL ROLE

The Rand study had found no correlation between increased investigative
responsibilities and increased arrest/clearance rates. In the MCI demonstra-
tion, patrol responsibility in investigations increased at all five sites.
While none showed an increase in arrests, Santa Monica did experience an
increase in clearances.

TABLE VII-1: SUMMARY OF CORE RESEARCH FINDINGS RELATED TO
MCI PROGRAM COMPONENTS

AUGMENT PATROL ROLE

- • (Rand) Increased investigative responsibilities for patrol were not
  correlated with increased arrest/clearance rates.

- ★ (LEAA Demonstration) Patrol responsibility increased in all sites.
  One out of five sites showed an increase in clearances and none
  showed an increase in arrests.

- • (Rochester) Use of preliminary form with solvability factors did
  not increase data completness.

- ★ (LEAA Demonstration) Anecdotal evidence from 5 sites where solvability
  factors were introduced indicate data collected in preliminary investi-
  gations were complete. Since completeness remains undefined in oper-
  ational terms, these are subjective judgments.

- • (PP)[a] Rochester patrol officers successfully assumed/executed evidence
  technician duties.

IMPLEMENT CASE SCREENING

- • (SRI) The presence of information elements can be used to predict,
  with relative accuracy, whether a past case was solved or not.
  The use of the system to re-direct investigative efforts was not
  tested. The effect of the system on arrest/clearance rates was   -
  not tested.

- ★ (MCI Demonstration) Use of case screening procedures tested at the
  five sites. One out of five sites showed an increase in clearances
  and none showed an increase in arrests.

- • (Rochester) Data suggests that case screening system helped
  increased the arrest rates; missing evidentiary link erodes con-
  clusiveness of findings.

- • (Rand) Shows existence of informally operating case screening system.
  [These might influence impact of "formalizing" solvability factors
  already in use.][b]

- ★ (MCI Demonstration) Confirmed existence of informal case screening
  procedures prior to implementing formal system.

- • (Rand) Arrest/clearance rates do not vary with investigative work-
  load. [Case screening systems rest partly on the hypothesis that
  lowered investigative workload will increase arrest/clearance rates.]

- • (PP) DeKalb County attempted to measure the influence of their case
  screening system on arrest/clearance rates; true performance was
  obscured by a marked increase in caseload during the measurement
  period.

IMPROVE POLICE/PROSECUTOR RELATIONS

- • (Rand) Small samples at two sites indicated that thoroughness in
  case preparation influences case disposition. The Rand Checklist
  was used as a measure of thoroughness. Its use in fostering
  thoroughness was untested.

TABLE VII-1: SUMMARY OF CORE RESEARCH FINDINGS RELATED TO
MCI PROGRAM COMPONENTS (continued)

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* (MCI Demonstration) Thoroughness of case preparation was not tested due to lack of a generally accepted definition of thoroughness and no department attempted to define it operationally.

● (PP) Case feedback forms were used in several departments, but no data were adduced on their efficacy.

○ (PP) Fremont believes the 24-hour availability of prosecutorial consultation "boosted" prosecutorial success. No data presented.

IMPLEMENT MONITORING SYSTEM

● The effectiveness of this component is untested.

* (MCI Demonstration) Monitoring system implemented and retained at one site, implemented and dropped at one site and not yet fully implemented at three sites. Effectiveness untested to date.

MANAGEMENT OF CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS

○ (Rochester) The department believes the superior performance of one team over the other was due to its use of the case management system. No data are adduced.

● (Rand) While Rand recommended increased supervisory control, no data were presented to illustrate differential investigative output in high or low control settings.

MODIFY POLICE ORGANIZATION AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

● (Rand) No positive correlation could be established between methods of organizing the detective function and arrest/clearance rates.

* (MCI Demonstration) Longitudinal data confirm Rand cross-sectional determination that no positive correlation could be established between methods of organizing the detective function and arrest/clearance rates.

● (PP) The Cincinnati decentralization experiment produced the anomalous result that investigative output was lowest under the organizational mode which generated the largest increases in departmental clearance rates.

● (Rochester) The Rochester system appears to be a highly successful, but somewhat atypical variant of team policing.

● (Rand) The report proposes strike forces and major offenders units; data on effectiveness are from two sites where results were somewhat equivocal.

● (PP) The report describes major case and major offenders programs in several cities, but presents no data on efficacy.

[a] Prescriptive Package
[b] Material in brackets represents authors' interpretation.

officers in preliminary investigations were more complete. It is important

to remember that these are subjective judgments since no department has

defined "completeness" in operational terms.

2. CASE SCREENING

Informal case screening procedures existed at each of the five sites

which eventually instituted formal case screening processes. As was already

mentioned, arrests did not increase appreciably at any of the sites; however,

clearances did increase in Santa Monica.

3. POLICE/PROSECUTOR RELATIONS

Thoroughness of case preparation as it relates to case disposition

remains untested. There has been no general acceptance (either within or

among departments) of a definition of thoroughness and attempts to define it

have not resulted in any agreement.

Case feedback processes were implemented in St. Paul, Birmingham,

Rochester, and Santa Monica. Anecdotal evidence from those sites indicate

that the police find such feedback useful.

4. MONITORING

Investigative monitoring systems proved difficult to operationalize.

In Santa Monica, a monitoring system was implemented as part of their MCI

program but it was discontinued at the end of the grant period when a number

of personnel changes occurred. Rochester has a fully operational monitoring

system--however, it has not been in use long enough to assess its effectiveness.

The monitoring systems at the remaining three sites are still in the process

of being implemented.

5. <u>POLICE ORGANIZATION AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES</u>

During this study we were able to collect longitudinal data to assess the relationship between methods of organizing the detective function and arrest/clearance rates. Our findings confirmed the Rand cross-sectional determination that no positive correlation could be established between the way detective functions are organized and arrest/clearance rates.

B. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

We conclude this report with some general observations. Overall, MCI was a popular program at each of the demonstration sites, although it was met with some skepticism at the beginning as most organizational changes are. Decentralization of detectives is one example of a change which met opposition at first, then was hailed as a good way to facilitate interaction and communication between patrol officers and detectives. And patrol officers were hailed as performing more complete preliminary investigations due to the introduction of solvability factors in event reports. However, as already discussed, the impact of this could not be assessed.

Those departments which used a letter to inform crime victims that no follow-up investigation would be conducted without presentation of further information about the crime found that these victims were satisfied as long as they were kept informed. Anecdotal evidence indicates that citizens acknowledge the need for the police to screen out those cases which are unlikely to be solved.

Good police/prosecutor interaction is desirable but can be implemented only if there is some motivation on the part of both investigators and pro- secutorial staff. Furthermore, the time lag between when an arrest is made

and when a case is finally prosecuted makes feedback difficult to provide.

Too, the worlds of the police and prosecutor are very different in terms

of their education, their goals and their rewards, so they don't necessarily

complement each other.

Monitoring of work and resources is essential to the effective manage-

ment of any process. However, it requires the commitment of managers or

supervisors or it will never occur.

The question of whether or not to recommend that police departments

should implement a managing criminal investigations project remains un-

resolved at this time. While we have been able to document the implementation

of most MCI components at the sites studied here, we have not been able

to reach firm conclusions about the results of the program from a national

program perspective because of the great variation among sites as to what

was implemented, in what manner, and with what confounding uncontrolled

factors.

END