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THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL, INDIVIDUAL, AND
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Volume I

by
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Whenever I needed help, they were there. Above all others, I thank my beloved wife Elaine. She managed the incredible task of seeing me through my dissertation at the same time as she finished her own. Without her companionship, her counsel, her caring, and her un-flagging confidence in me, I would never have finished. For these reasons and more, I dedicate it to her.

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INTRODUCTION

Students of public law, long devoted to the examination of Supreme Court decisions, have in recent years extended their concerns to encompass the whole range of individuals, institutions and practices related to the Court. A recognition that an understanding of the context in which the Court operates is important to a true understanding of what the Court does has led them beyond exegeses and syntheses of written opinions toward empirical analyses of the antecedents and consequences of the Court's actions.[1] Initially, the range of interest expanded to include such antecedents as the social backgrounds and psychological characteristics of Supreme Court Justices and recruitment to the Court.[2] Consequences were explored in "impact" studies—examinations of the effects which Court pronouncements had on government and society.[3] The hypotheses and findings emerging from these studies—that the "law-as-interpreted" reflects the men who interpret it as well as abstract legal principles and that the "law-as-applied" diverges from the "law-as-interpreted"—stimulated new interest in the processes by which cases move from society to the Court and decisions move from the Court into society. Thus have studies, at the federal, state and local levels, of courts, prosecutors and defense counsel, plaintiffs, defendants, and juries entered into the literature of public law and political science.[4]

As scholars have traced out the long strands of antecedents and consequences linking the Court to society, they have come to recognize one institution which plays a crucial role in the legal process—the police. After years of neglect—the reasons for which are open to debate—the study of the police seems now to have been accepted as a legitimate enterprise for political scientists.[5] This dissertation is intended to advance further that acceptance. The central question explored is a fundamental one: why do policemen act as they do? But, for the political scientist, two questions are logically prior to this one. The first is the question of what it is that police actually do. The behavior of interest must be identified. The second is the question of the political significance of that behavior. Only when this second question, the answer to which depends on the answer to the first, is answered affirmatively can an exploration of the central question stated above be justified as a study in political science.

This logic underlies the structure of this dissertation. The nature of police activity—the answer to the question of what the police do—is taken up first. The first section of Chapter I identifies the "dependent variables" of the field and provides the basis for the ensuing discussion of the political significance of police behavior. Fortunately, as will become apparent, much descriptive work on the behavior of policemen has already been done, so the descriptive task here is eased considerably. Then follows a consideration of the political significance of police behavior. The activities described in the preceding section are shown to be politically

significant, given a commonly accepted definition of politics. The police's law enforcement, order maintenance, and service activities, it is argued, authoritatively allocate values in a society and influence citizen support for the political system and compliance with its policies.

In Chapter II, exploration of the central question of the dissertation begins, with the identification of three models—organizational, individual difference, and situational difference models—which can be seen as underlying much of the literature on the police. Evidence to support many of the specific hypotheses defining each of these models is found to be lacking because the hypotheses have either never been tested or been tested with methods so deficient that neither internal nor external validity is reasonably assured. More important, it is concluded, there has been little effort to evaluate the models as competing hypotheses or to consider interactions between the three types of factors in their effects on behavior.

Chapter III prepares the way for such an effort by examining research which deals with these problems on a broader scale—the work of psychologists and social psychologists on the interaction of individual and situational factors in the determination of behavior. This research suggests that situational factors deserve more attention than they have received up to now and that the two classes of factors do indeed interact, with the effects of situational characteristics on behavior depending on individual characteristics and the effects of individual characteristics on behavior depending on situational characteristics.

Chapter IV undertakes two tasks. The first is to translate the theoretical concerns raised in Chapters II and III into some broad hypotheses about the relationship between organizational, individual, and situational factors and police behavior. The second is to describe the data used to evaluate these hypotheses in the succeeding chapters—Albert J. Reiss's 1966 observational study of police behavior in Boston, Chicago, and Washington—and the ways in which the data base has been transformed to meet the requirements of this analysis.

Operationalization of the three basic dimensions of police behavior examined here—formal decisions to invoke the legal process, the informal manner of the policeman toward the citizen, and the effort the policeman exerts—are described in the first part of Chapter V. In the second part, specific hypotheses about the effects of organization on police behavior—drawn from James Q. Wilson's typology of police departments—are advanced and tested empirically.

Chapter VI formulates and tests hypotheses describing the effects of four specific dimensions of individual difference on police behavior—the officer's length of service, his satisfaction with his job, his race, and his attitude toward black people. Chapter VII presents and evaluates hypotheses regarding the impact of four classes of situational factors on police behavior—the legal aspects of the interaction, the characteristics of the citizens involved, their behavior toward the policeman, and the physical and social aspects of the setting within which the interaction occurs. In contrast to

earlier analyses of these data, particular attention is paid to both the independent impact of each of the factors, once all the other factors have been controlled, and their aggregate impact on behavior.

Wilson's typology of police departments suggests that the effects of individual and situational factors on behavior are contingent on organizational style. Chapter VIII pursues these possibilities. The hypotheses raised in Chapter III—that the effects of individual and situational factors on behavior may be contingent on each other—are evaluated in Chapter IX. Following the suggestions of the literature, attention focuses on possible differences in responsiveness to situational factors with increasing experience in the police role and differences in the impact of individual factors across situations varying in their visibility to the public, to the police department, and to a partner.

Chapter X considers the implications of the findings for law enforcement policy, for political science in particular, and for the social sciences in general.

Footnotes for Introduction

1. The perspective adopted here follows that advanced by
    Stuart S. Nagel in The Legal Process from a Behavioral Per-
    spective (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1969) and "Some New
    Concerns of Legal Process Research Within Political Science,"
    Law and Society Review 6 (August 1971): 9-16.

2. See, for example, John R. Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court:
    Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures (New York: Holt,
    Rinehart and Winston, 1960); David J. Danelski, A Supreme
    Court Justice Is Appointed (New York: Random House, 1964); and
    Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies
    of Supreme Court Justices 1946-1963 (Evanston, Ill.: North-
    western University Press, 1965).

3. See, for example, Theodore L. Becker, ed., The Impact of
    Supreme Court Decisions (New York: Oxford University Press,
    1969); Frank J. Sorauf, "Zorach v. Clauson: The Impact of a
    Supreme Court Decision," American Political Science Review
    53 (September 1959): 777-791; and Stephen L. Wasby, The Impact
    of the United States Supreme Court: Some Perspectives (Homewood,
    Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1970).

4. See, for example, James R. Klonoski and Robert I. Mendelsohn,
    eds., The Politics of Local Justice (Boston: Little, Brown,
    1970). Law and Society Review is perhaps the best source of
    current research in this area.

5. The political science literature, while lacking in studies of
    the police, is replete with references to the "unjustifiable"
    neglect of the police. See, for example, David H. Bayley, "The
    Police and Political Change in Comparative Perspective," Law
    and Society Review 6 (August 1971): 91; David Easton and
    Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York:
    McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 210-12; and Jameson W. Doig, "The Police
    in a Democratic Society," Public Administration Review 28
    (September-October 1968): 393. For documentation of the neglect,
    see Doig, 402. He sees the neglect as stemming from the lack
    of controversy over the police, with interest arising because
    the police became a controversial issue. Klonoski and
    Mendelsohn argue that early researchers may have avoided the
    conflict between their ideals of "justice" and the "political
    justice" they observed by choosing to ignore the reality of
    local criminal justice (p. xiv). Another possible explanation
    is that the police were excluded from "politics" by the non-
    partisan reformers of the 1930's and readmitted as political

scientists began to think less in terms of institutional labels
and more in terms of function; see George F. Cole, Politics and
the Administration of Justice (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 1973), p. 26. Recent writings in police adminis-
tration still manifest this aversion to "partisan politics"—
"The influence of partisan politics on the police remains one of
the great handicaps to effective police administration." O.W.
Wilson and Roy Clinton McLaren, Police Administration, 3rd ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 27.

CHAPTER I

THE POLICE AND POLITICS

The Nature of Police Activity:
What Policemen Do

The behavior of policemen is by now a thoroughly described class of phenomena. Journalists, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists have documented the activities of a variety of police agents in a variety of settings. Most studies have focused on the work of what might be called the typical policeman—the patrolman in the city.[1] They vary greatly in their character, from the dramatic individualized portraits of Whittemore through the superbly detailed participant-observer account of Rubinstein to the analytic and more academically oriented accounts of Westley, Banton, Wilson, and Reiss.[2]

The central fact which emerges from all these descriptions, at least at the level of depicting what the police do, is the diversity of police work. They reveal a stark contrast between the myth and the reality of what the police do. Police work is, to most minds, the work of enforcing the law. The public, long exposed to "cops and robbers" themes in literature and the mass media, seems to view the primary task of the police as one of identifying and apprehending those who violate the law.[3]

Specialists in police work share this conception. Police scientists see police goals as "the prevention of crime and disorder and the preservation of peace (for community security)" and "the

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protection of life and property and personal liberty (for individual security)."[4] Police administrators seem also to share this perspective:

> The primary purpose of a police department is the preservation of peace and protection of life and property against attacks by criminals and injury by the careless and inadvertent offender. In addition, police departments are charged with the enforcement of a wide variety of state and local laws, ordinances, and regulations dealing with all sorts of subjects.[5]

The ways in which they organize their departments reflect this. They are organized around crimes—homicide, burglary, vice, and auto theft divisions, for example.[6] Not surprisingly, this emphasis on law enforcement as the real work of policemen is shared by the policemen themselves: "...the apprehension of the felon is, for the policeman, the essence of police work . . . the 'good pinch' is elevated to a major end in the conduct of the policeman."[7]

The image of police work which emerges from all these accounts is thus one of the police on patrol, looking out for criminals, thwarting them before they can commit crimes, apprehending them when they do, interrogating, searching, solving crimes and arresting the culprits. The emphasis is on criminal behavior and the exercise of legal powers. Such activities undeniably are a part of police work, but what the descriptive literature reveals is that they are a relatively small part.

Both impressionistic accounts and systematic empirical studies demonstrate that the patrolman spends a relatively small proportion of his time in enforcing the law. Scholars have found it useful to

characterize police activities in terms of three different categories: law enforcement, order maintenance and service.[8] Law enforcement involves, obviously, situations in which violations of a jurisdiction's laws and ordinances have occurred—robberies, assaults and traffic infractions, for example. Order maintenance involves situations in which non-criminal disorders or threats of disorder arise—domestic disputes, groups of noisy youths congregating on street corners, and quarrels between cab-drivers and their customers over fares. Service involves situations in which citizens need some kind of assistance—a sick or injured person who needs transportation to the hospital, the proverbial old lady with the cat in the tree, and the stranded motorist.

Empirical studies, reinforced by the more impressionistic accounts, establish that the bulk of police activity falls into the order maintenance and service categories. Differences in the categories used often make direct comparisons difficult, but analyses of citizen calls to the police—by far the most common stimulus for police intervention in a situation—indicate that most calls to the police are requests for information or services of some kind, that requests for help in resolving disputes are next most common, and that calls involving criminal activity are least common of all. Reiss, for instance, finds 34% of all calls to the Chicago police department to be requests for assistance (service, in the above scheme), 26% to involve disputes or breaches of the peace (order maintenance), and only 22% to involve reports of offenses against persons or

property (law enforcement). These categorizations rely on the citi-

zen's own description. When the police do the characterizing, the

percentage of incidents involving criminal matters drops to 17%.[9]

Wilson, using similar data from the Syracuse, New York police depart-

ment, finds 38% of calls to involve service, 30% to involve order

maintenance, 22% to involve information gathering and only 10% to

involve law enforcement. He concludes that "Only about one tenth

of the calls afforded, even potentially, an opportunity to perform

a narrow law enforcement function . . ."[10] This figure is somewhat

understated in that he includes calls reporting crimes from which

the suspect has already fled as "information gathering" rather than

law enforcement. Overall, however, the picture emerging from all

these studies is clear—policemen spend most of their time providing

services and settling minor non-criminal disputes and relatively

little of their time actively enforcing the law.[11]

The descriptive literature also illuminates another aspect of

police work. As stated before, the traditional image of the police-

man focuses on his activity as an implementer of the law. His acti-

vities are formal ones—interrogating, arresting, filing reports of

criminal incidents. The descriptive literature enriches this image

by bringing to light the informal activities. It reveals what the

formal perspective partially obscures—that in the course of carrying

out his work the policeman is continually involved in personal inter-

actions with citizens. These interactions, like all human inter-

actions vary in their character. The police can be friendly or

hostile to citizens. They can try to get citizens to comply with their requests by intimidating them or by reasoning with them. Most dramatically, as the more critical, reform-oriented literature shows, the police can abuse those with whom they come into contact, both verbally and physically. Police violence has concerned students of the police at least from the days of the Wickersham Commission in the early 1930's, which focused on police coercion of confessions— the so-called "third degree."[12] Its continued existence is documented in a number of more recent studies, from Westley's study (in 1951) through Reiss's study (in 1966) on to Cray's study (in 1972).[13]

Thus any description of police behavior which includes only the formal aspects of police activity ignores a significant aspect of the reality of "what policemen do." Such considerations become especially important in light of the finding, reported earlier, that much police work does not involve even potentially the enforcement of the law. In many order maintenance and service situations, the legal powers available to the policeman are essentially irrelevant and police behavior often varies only along these informal dimensions.

The Political Significance of Police Behavior

With the dimensions of police behavior now roughly delineated, the basic question is whether or not these activities are of political significance. It is interesting to note that phrasing the question in terms of activity constitutes an approach markedly different from that employed in much of the literature on the police. Many political scientists, especially those of an earlier era, see

the police as political, not because of what they do, but because
of the ties between the police and other "political" institutions.

Initial interest in the criminal justice system in general and
the police in particular centered around their ties to partisan
politics and organized crime.[14] Pound, Frankfurter, and Moley empha-
sized the entanglement of figures in the criminal justice system—
primarily prosecutors and judges—in partisan politics. The insti-
tutions of criminal justice were political because the men who ran
them were politically selected and used their power to advance their
own political ambitions. Perhaps most important, the minds of
judges, prosecutors, police, and other agents of law enforcement were
"political minds." They, as political creatures, viewed their work
not in terms of justice, but in terms of partisan political advan-
tage.[15] The police, in particular, were "the prey of politics,
departmental favoritism, and religious and fraternal factionalism."[16]
Also enmeshed in this congeries of criminal justice and politics
was organized crime. Wrote Pound, "The sinews of war for local
political rings in our cities are derived chiefly from organized or
exploited law-breaking."[17] V. O. Key, Jr., interestingly enough,
devoted his early work to an examination of these "political" ties
between the police and organized crime.[18] In essence, to early
scholars, the police were political because they were part of a
politically charged institutional environment—the urban political
machine. This perspective continues to influence the work of some
more modern students of the police.[19]

Current perspectives in political science, however, base the argument for political significance more on grounds of function than of institution. Probably the most frequently advanced and widely accepted argument along these lines is that which underlies the opening paragraphs of this chapter. The courts make political decisions and the institutions which determine the flow of cases to the courts influence the alternatives available to the courts. Therefore, the decisions which these institutions make must be political too. The criminal justice system is seen as a sequential processing system—a set of decision points. The police are a point at which cases—criminal suspects—are taken in, the prosecutors and the courts are intermediate decision points, and the correctional system is the terminus. Decisions about the fate of an individual drawn into the system are not made by a single agency at a single time, but by a series of agencies over a period of time. In what has been described as a "filtering system" or a "sieve," each agency in the sequence makes its decision and, depending on it, does or does not pass the case on to the subsequent agency.[20] Thus the alleged offender is moved from police to prosecutor to court to prison and then out of the system—or he may be dropped out at any point along the way.[21]

The police play a crucial role in this process because, positioned at the beginning of the chain, they decide who will and will not enter. They perform the "initial screening function"—they are "the essential gateway for the entrance of raw materials to be processed," the "gatehouse" to the "mansion" that is the court.[22] In exercising the legal powers delegated to them, the police determine the cases

which will be handled by the prosecutors, courts, and correctional institutions on down the line.

The processing perspective is a useful one—in many ways an improvement over the "political ties" perspective described previously. It depicts clearly the interorganizational environment within which the police operate and acknowledges the linkage to the general society in the idea of cases moving in from the society and back out into the society. However, it clearly rests the case for the "politicalness" of the police on their role as a law enforcement agency and as an input to a governmental agency.

Unfortunately, since most police activity does not involve law enforcement or, as a result, input to successive agencies in the legal process, such a perspective establishes only a part of police activity as politically significant. It ignores the order maintenance and service activities of the police and neglects the police as an output agency—one with real and direct impact on society. The basic question then is whether an empirically realistic, more general case can be made for the study of the police from political perspectives—one which subsumes order maintenance and service as well as law enforcement and police outputs to society as well as inputs to other governmental agencies. Resolution of that question is the task of the remainder of this chapter.

A currently influential conception of politics focuses on two basic issues—the authoritative allocation of values and the persistence of the political system. In Easton's framework, politics

is defined as the process by which binding decisions about the distribution of valued things in a society are made and implemented. Implicit in this definition is the assumption of an ongoing process. The most fundamental question that can be asked about politics is therefore how such a system persists—how allocative decisions continue to be made and implemented and continue to be accepted as binding.[23] Though this perspective has been widely employed in political science generally and is increasingly being employed in the study of the legal process, it has had little impact on the study of the police. Bayley notes that "the police are rarely viewed from perspectives natural to political science."[24] Easton and Dennis agree:

> Vital as the police are as an institution in a legal society, it is strange that they have never been considered of central significance in the functioning of political systems. As a result they have always fallen into a position so peripheral to the core of political science that it is virtually impossible to find a sustained discussion of the varied functions they fulfill in political systems.[25]

What follows, then, is an attempt to establish that police activities do have an impact on both the allocation of values in a society and on the ability of the political system to persist—that police behavior is political behavior.

The Police and Allocation

The police authoritatively allocate values. That is to say, they make and implement binding decisions which affect the distribution of values in a society. This assertion raises at least two

questions. First, do the binding decisions of the police affect the

distribution of values in a society? Second, is the police role one

of making or implementing? At this point the basic question is the

distributional one. The question of "making versus implementing"

is essentially one of why the police act as they do—do they act on

their own or as automatons of some higher authority? Consideration

of this question is deferred to the next chapter and the discussion

of police discretion. Here it will suffice to say two things. The

evidence is strong that the police role partakes of both "making"

and "implementing," as will be seen later. And, in any case, the

distinction between the two is not crucial here. Both "making" and

"implementing" are significant political processes—in Easton's

terms, both "authoritative statements" and "output performance" are

politically important.[26]

The impact of the police on the allocation of values in society

is varied and complex. The analytic strategy employed here is one

of assessing the allocative impact of each of the three basic types

of police activity described in the police literature. In the course

of this assessment, particular care will be taken to distinguish

both "formal" and "informal" allocations.

Law Enforcement and Allocation

From the perspective of authoritative allocation, the enforce-

ment of the laws is perhaps the most obviously political of police

activities. Law can be seen as a set of rules which governs the

allocation of values in a society. In some cases, it explicitly

allocates values among members of a society, as when a law imposes a tax on one citizen and confers a benefit on another or expresses a value to which some or all citizens are entitled. In other cases, the law sets rules under which values may be redistributed in a society, as when a law permits certain kinds of exchanges and prohibits others. For example, the sale of a car is allowed, but the sale of heroin is not.[27]

By enforcing the criminal law, the police enforce the allocation of values established in the law. Note in particular the generality of this statement. Other scholars, in adopting the allocative perspective in the study of the legal process, have tended to see the values which are allocated in fairly narrow, even if abstract, terms. Wilson focuses on "honor or dishonor, freedom or imprisonment, life or death."[28] Jacob and Klonoski and Mendelsohn speak in terms of the allocation of "justice."[29] These conceptions seem overly confined—in the former case, to the dramatic and, in the latter, to the philosophical. Though it can be regarded as a value in its own right, justice is also a notion about how the allocation of values should be managed. People may want justice, not just as an end in itself, but also as a means or instrumental value—they want their "fair share" (or more!) of the valued things. Further, as Holden points out, "Effective criminal law may or may not allocate justice . . . empirical realism requires us to work within a conception which includes all the varieties of uses which we see the criminal law system put to, many of which do not produce 'justice,' even if defined as 'equality of treatment.'"[30] It is neither necessary nor

useful, in other words, to confine consideration to a few values simply because "legal" as opposed to "political" institutions are being studied. In law enforcement, the values which the police allocate are as varied as the laws which they are charged with enforcing, ranging from small amounts of money and property to Wilson's matters of "life and death."

Just as the potential range of values allocated by the law enforcement activities of the police is great, so also is the number of people affected by these activities great. This is true in terms of both those in behalf of whom law enforcement activities are carried on and those against whom the activities are carried out.

Crime reallocates drastically the distribution of values in a society. In economic terms, crime redistributes huge amounts of property and income each year. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice estimated the annual impact of crimes against property at almost four billion dollars. Crimes against persons accounted for losses of almost one billion dollars, primarily in losses of earnings. Economic activity in illegal goods and services (for example, narcotics, gambling, and prostitution) exceeded eight billion dollars. Expenses incurred in the prevention of crime and the administration of justice are also costs of crime. The Commission estimated public and private expenditures in these areas to be over six billion dollars. The figures are of questionable reliability and are undoubtedly understated—"numerous crimes were omitted because of the lack of figures"—but a conservative estimate of the economic reallocations due to crime, based on the Commission's figures, would be twenty-one billion dollars.[31]

To these costs must be added the human costs of crime. Other less tangible values, equally if not more important than the economic ones, are affected by crime. Consider the psychological impact on the victims—or their acquaintances—of the 20,000 murders, the 50,000 rapes, the 400,000 robberies, or even the one million auto thefts annually.[32] Consider the disruptions to the lives, not just of those who are victimized, but also of those who live in fear of being victimized. The occurrence of crime and the threat of crime restrict the mobility of citizens, isolate them from one another, and force them to change their basic patterns of life, even to the point of having to relocate their homes or businesses in safer areas. Wilson and McLaren write: "The failure of society to diminish crime imposes great hardships on our citizens, not only in terms of life and property, but also in terms of fear and suspicion, which detract from our peace of mind and comfort."[33] Rubinstein describes vividly the disruptions crime inflicts on the lives of urban residents and the steady spiral of decline in the quality of urban life to which it leads. Crime and the threat of crime impel people to take extreme measures to reduce their vulnerability. "It is impossible to calculate how much energy is drained off daily in efforts to generate self-confidence," he says. "How much attention and time that could be devoted to other matters must be given over to self-protection? What is the value of the human capital invested in these efforts which, if successful, produce nothing more than what every citizen is presumably guaranteed?"[34] All told, crime works substantial reallocations of important values for large numbers of citizens.

Police activity is an important part of the governmental effort to prevent these illegal reallocations. By arresting those suspected of violations, or by filing official reports of crimes, the police initiate the authoritative sanctioning process. By patrolling, they deter, through their physical presence, individuals from committing crimes. Law enforcement, by evoking the authority and the force which are the monopoly of the state, makes binding, on those otherwise indisposed to accept, the legally established allocation of values.[35]

That, at least, is the theory. Whether police activity really does affect the amount of unlawful reallocation in society is an empirical question, and one on which there is little compelling evidence. Wilson has argued convincingly that there is little reason to think that police activity can have much effect on the level of crime. The police have no control over the causes of crime—they are essentially social, psychological, and economic. Most crime occurs in private places, out of view of the police, and what crime occurs in public places may be suppressed by the presence of the police only to reappear elsewhere.[36]

Evidence reflecting conclusively on these matters is hard to obtain. The statistics on the extent of crime cited earlier describe the amount of criminal reallocation with the police working to enforce the law. It is impossible to say how much would have occurred without the police and therefore impossible to say how much the police have prevented. What little evidence there is does not suggest that police patrol has a significant impact on the level of crime. A few quasi-experimental studies indicate that only the most intensive

police efforts have any effect at all. One carefully conducted experiment found variations in the amount of police patrol—from none through standard practice to intensive—to have no significant impact on the reported incidence of crime.[37] Given the limited evidence, both in terms of alternative levels and types of enforcement and of locales surveyed, generalizations about the impact of police in their law enforcement activities must be made with caution. The linkage between police patrolling and the rate of crime remains an intuitively plausible one, but an empirically unsubstantiated one as well.

In contrast, the impact of law enforcement on offenders is by now fairly well understood. The means by which the legally designated allocation of values is upheld are in themselves allocative. To be specific, they involve the imposition of sanctions on those thought to be offenders. In deciding whether to invoke the legal process—by arrest or summons if the suspected offender is accessible and by report if he is not—the police make decisions with sometimes tremendous impact on the life of an individual. In the simple, more personal terms of Lasswell, the decision to invoke the legal process bears heavily on "who gets what, when, and how" from the political system.[38] A person who is arrested is put in line to be deprived of his most fundamental rights. In the case of a fine, he is deprived of some of his property. In the case of imprisonment, he is deprived of his liberty—his ability to move about, to pursue a livelihood, to associate with his family and friends, to experience all the benefits of a free society. (And, of course, of special importance to political scientists, he loses the right to vote!) Instead, he

experiences the depredations of prison life.[39] Eventually imprison-
ment ends, but its impact does not. The individual must bear the
social stigma and the difficulties of readjustment, of finding work,
and of re-establishing relationships. In the case of the death penalty,
of course—by now a more remote possibility—the individual is
deprived of his very existence. Casper sums it up well: "The appli-
cation of the criminal sanction is perhaps the most serious and
destructive measure that the government can take against a citizen."[40]

Obviously, these costs accrue to the person who is arrested and
convicted, while the police are directly involved only in the arrest
decision. Most often, then, the police do not have the final say
about whether such costs will be imposed. However, given the
"assembly-line" nature of justice in general and the extremely
mechanistic handling of some offenses (usually less serious ones)
in particular, the decision of the policeman is sometimes tantamount
to the decision of the legal process. Studies of the handling of
traffic violators and of drunks and even of the warrant-issuance
process have suggested that meaningful review by impartial authori-
ties (in particular, the judiciary) of police actions is, in some
areas, the exception rather than the rule.[41] What a person "gets"
from the legal process depends in some cases—admittedly the less
serious ones—almost entirely on the policeman.

Beyond this, even those against whom the legal process proceeds
only a short way after invocation suffer substantial costs. Those
not sentenced or not convicted or not brought to trial or not even

arraigned pay a price simply because a policeman has decided to invoke the legal process against them. LaFave describes how even a person who is immediately arraigned and released has his freedom of movement interrupted, his privacy violated by a search in most cases, and his reputation besmirched.[42] Added to this must be the time and money which a person is compelled to spend in order to defend himself. "The plain fact is," Blumberg writes, "that an accused in a criminal case always 'loses' even when he has been exonerated by an acquital, discharge, or dismissal of his case."[43]

These considerations demonstrate that the political significance of police behavior runs far beyond simple input into the legal process. "An arrest is not only an important decision in the criminal justice process," argues LaFave. "It is also likely to be a critical episode in the life of the individual who is arrested."[44] Official police actions have long been seen as important because of the potential for sanctions to which they expose the individual. When politics is construed as the authoritative allocation of values, police decisions become important in their own right, regardless of the eventual legal outcomes. An individual against whom the legal process is invoked pays a substantial price. With over nine million citizens arrested each year, the cumulative impact of the social sanction is enormous.[45]

This discussion of the allocative consequences of the police's law enforcement activities for society and alleged offenders has eschewed normative issues. The police role has been characterized in the ostensibly neutral terms of enforcing the legally designated

allocation of values. Many students of the police see their role in a different light. To them the police are not politically neutral because, while they enforce the law, the law reflects the prevailing distribution of values in the society. Politics here involves not so much "who gets what" as "who keeps what." The police are seen as an inherently conservative organization, one whose function is to up-hold the status quo. Some writers imply a racial division, with the police protecting whites from blacks, but more often the division is drawn along class lines, with the police protecting the "haves" from the "have-nots."[46] The normative issue is joined with the "haves" favoring this kind of police role and the "have-nots" opposing it. Blumberg and Niederhoffer describe the view of the favorably inclined:

> To the vast middle mass of America the police represent
> the somber reassurance that their tenuous status, security,
> and hard won possessions will not be wrested from them.
> The middle classes welcome the police rushing into the
> breach whenever the turbulence of the have-nots precipitates
> disorder or threatens existing arrangements.[47]

The negative view of the legal system finds perhaps no better expres-sion than Engels':

> It is obvious that the whole legal system has been devised
> to protect those who own property from those who do not. The
> laws are needed only because people exist who have no pro-
> perty . . . at the root of all laws lies the idea that the
> proletariat is an enemy which must be defeated . . . The Jus-
> tices of the Peace have no hesitation in regarding the admin-
> istration of the law as a means of keeping the working classes
> down . . . The police follow the lead given by the magistrates.
> A policeman will always treat a member of the middle class
> with every courtesy whatever he may do and will stretch the
> law in his favor as far as he possibly can. But a worker who
> falls into the hands of the police is immediately treated in
> a nasty and brutal fashion. The fact that a worker is poor
> is sufficient for him to be suspected of every crime in the

> calendar. The worker loses all the legal protection to
> which he should be entitled against the arbitrary conduct
> of the police. The protection which the law usually gives
> is denied to the worker. The police do not hesitate to
> enter his house, to arrest him and even to knock him about.[48]

There is considerable evidence to support the view that the legal system in general and the police in particular work to the disadvantage of the lower classes. Eisenstein, for example, states well the general case that they do.[49] More specifically, Sutherland argues that the police concentrate on crimes likely to be committed by lower-class people and ignore "white-collar" crime.[50] And sometimes the police openly pursue policies that reinforce the class structure of the society—as when, for example, they protect upper-class areas from incursions by lower-class people.[51]

At the same time, it may be that the image of the police as the crucial line of defense around the propertied—whether in terms of protecting the respectable middle-class citizen from the lower-class hood or the bourgeois capitalist from the poor worker who is only trying to get his fair share—is overdrawn. Many criminal incidents, though certainly not all, do not involve the poor and the black attacking the rich and the white. The poor and black, in fact, are more often the victims of crime than the rich and white. The evidence that there is suggests that whites are typically victimized by whites and blacks by blacks. Violent crime is more often an intra-class and even intra-family phenomenon than an inter-class one.[52] So, although police work certainly does, to some degree, involve protecting the haves from the have-nots, upper-class people might well consider how much crime they actually would suffer at the hands of

the lower classes were the police not to intervene and lower-class
people might well wonder whether their real problem with the police
is not so much that the police protect the middle class from the
working class as that the police fail to protect the working class
from the upper class and from itself.

Order Maintenance and Allocation

If the case for the police as authoritative allocators in their
law enforcement activities is fairly clear-cut, it is less so in
their order maintenance activities. Much has been written about the
differences between law enforcement and order maintenance.[53]
Scholars have discussed at length the conflict between the two acti-
vities. At the practical level they have argued that the two are
so inherently different that different kinds of individuals and
different kinds of organizations are required if each is to be per-
formed properly. At the theoretical level they have gone so far as
to argue that law enforcement and order maintenance involve two
fundamentally different social functions: in Wenninger and Clark's
view, law enforcement is a part of "goal attainment," while order
maintenance is a part of "pattern maintenance."[54]

From the standpoint of a political scientist interested in
authoritative allocation, these differences seem to be overdrawn.
Modern perspectives on politics suggest the following approach.[55]
Disorder poses a basic problem for every society. Whether it stems
from heredity, social environment, individual pathology or simply
self-interested competition in the face of scarce resources is not

important here. What is important is that disorder is an inevitable feature of human coexistence. And though the common cant is that society is becoming increasingly disorderly, the evidence suggests that social existence has generally always been fairly disorderly.[56]

Just as inevitable is, of course, the desire for order. Maslow, for example, recognizes this in his inclusion of safety as one of the most basic needs of human existence.[57] Whether it is a fundamental need, like the need for food or affection, or a more instrumental one—a need to insure against the loss of the fundamental needs—as Davies suggests, is an interesting question, but not crucial here.[58] What is important, though, as Davies argues, is that the needs for safety and security—for protection against disorder—are uniquely political ones:

> People generally do not turn to politics to satisfy hunger
> and to gain love, self-esteem and self-actualization; they
> go to the food market, pursue members of the opposite sex,
> show friends what they have done, and lose themselves in
> handicrafts, fishing or contemplation—with rarely a thought
> about politics. If achievement of these goals is threatened
> by other individuals or groups too powerful to be dealt with
> privately, people then turn to politics to secure these ends.
> They want government to prevent murder, famine, or theft.
> They rarely expect the government to create life, food, and
> other goods, but do expect it to make safe their private
> pursuit. To secure their own ability to satisfy their indi-
> vidual wants, people will make demands on government. In
> day-to-day living they prefer to satisfy their wants by
> themselves and privately.[59]

The call for order is a common one and one which is directed particularly toward government. In social contract theory, in fact, it constitutes the very raison d'etre of government. From the time of Aristotle, who saw "the goal of the city [to be] to make men happy and safe" to the recent rise of "law and order" as a political issue,

people have looked to the political system to maintain order. Order

is perhaps the most fundamental demand citizens make on the political

system.[60]

Both law enforcement and order maintenance activities are, in

this view, governmental responses to the demand for order. In both,

the police allocate rewards and sanctions to individuals as a means

of protecting the distribution of values desired by the society and,

to that extent, the two are indistinguishable. What essentially dis-

tinguishes the two is the legal status of these allocative activities.

Law enforcement and order maintenance differ in the legal standing of

the standards upheld and the sanctions imposed.[61]

In the law enforcement situation, the standards upheld are

explicitly stated in the laws of the jurisdiction. For example, pro-

perty cannot be taken without the consent of the owner and no person

can intentionally injure another. The sanctions which can be imposed

are also laid down in the law. Depending on the seriousness of the

offense and the kind of evidence against him, a violator of the

standards may be released or summoned to appear in court or arrested.

In the order maintenance situation, the standards upheld are not

stated in the law. Rather they are set by the community, the poli-

tical authorities, the police administration, or the policeman him-

self. (Since this really raises the question of why policemen act

as they do—do they follow organizational rules, their impressions

of what the community wants, or their own inclinations?—it will be

taken up in the next chapter.) As examples, parties may not be allowed

to disturb the neighbors after midnight and youths may not be allowed to assemble on the streets after dark.

The sanctions to be imposed are not stated in the law either. The policeman may simply reason with the "trouble-maker" or verbally or physically intimidate or force him or her into compliance. The fact that these sanctions are not legal ones should not conceal the fact that they are real allocations of values. The psychological and sometimes physical effects of such treatment constitute real "costs" to the recipient. Reich argues that the verbal behavior as well as the physical behavior of policemen can "cause a sense of injury to the person in a direct, visceral sense . . . we are dealing with the chief point of personal contact between the individual citizen and the law, and what is at stake is the respect and dignity due to each individual from his government. It is no small matter."[62]

The question then is whether the non-legal character of these standards and sanctions excludes them from the realm of the political. Easton writes that "political science is concerned with every way in which values are [authoritatively] allocated for a society, whether formally enunciated in a law or lodged in the consequences of a practice."[63] By the last phrase, he clearly means to include the non-legal in the political. But doing so risks opening the door to a uselessly broad concept of the political. Therefore, he emphasizes those elements of the definition that limit "politics" to a narrower range of phenomena.

The first of these is the authoritativeness of the allocation, by which he means whether or not "the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it."[64] Unlike many other definitions of authority which rest on the moral basis of compliance, Easton's definition is a psychological, empirical one. Though why people accept decisions is an interesting question—whether for reasons "moral, traditional, or customary, or purely from fear of the consequences"—it is not the crucial question. That is simply whether or not they accept.[65]

The second limitation is that the allocation be "for a society." By this he does not mean that "every policy . . . must apply in its immediate consequences to each member of society." Rather, he means only that "all or most members of a society" must regard it as being authoritative.[66]

Under this definition, then, whether the order maintenance activities of the police are properly regarded as political depends on whether "all or most members of a society" . . . "consider that they must or ought to obey" the police when they engage in them. This is a straightforward empirical question, but one on which structured data have apparently not been gathered—most probably because the answer seems so obvious. Unstructured observation suggests that, certainly, most people do accept police activity in the order maintenance sphere. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the character of calls to the police, as described earlier in this chapter—calls to settle family arguments, to quiet noisy parties, to break up crowds of juveniles, to calm boisterous drunks. People who make such

calls often do not have in mind the legality of the behavior they want stopped. They simply want it stopped—they want the police to "do something" about it. Most citizens, in other words, not only accept this kind of police intervention, they expect it. So implicit in the sorts of demands made on the police is evidence that at least "most" members of society consider that the police "must or ought" to be obeyed in their order maintenance activities.

Given Easton's requirement that only "most" members of a society need cede compliance for an action to be authoritative, the case for the "politicalness" of order maintenance could rest here. But to leave it at this would ignore a fact revealed by previous research— that there are those who do not accept police authority as binding on them in order maintenance situations. Bittner and Werthman and Piliavin provide examples of cases in which citizens question the authority of the police to intervene in situations which are, as far as the citizens are concerned, none of the police's business and Reich argues against the police's right to intervene in any situations except those in which they have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed.[67]

The question that arises is whether, in such situations, the police's actions are any less authoritative because the citizens involved do not acknowledge the right of the police to intervene. If politics were defined by whether or not people felt a moral obligation to obey authority, certainly there would be a difficulty here. However, in Easton's scheme, it must be reiterated, the crucial factor

is whether or not the citizen complies—either on grounds of "must" or "ought." Even among offenders, there is usually some willingness to comply on moral grounds—especially if, as Werthman and Piliavin point out, the police enforce standards that the citizens themselves acknowledge to be fair—and, if not that, compliance founded on the threat or the use of force.[68] So, even for offenders, the order maintenance activities of the police are authoritative in the sense that offenders consider, if not that they ought, at least that they must, obey them.

One other clarification is also in order. In the preceding discussion, formal actions have been tied to law enforcement and informal ones to order maintenance. Though analytically a proper connection, this represents an overly simplified picture of reality. First, the taking of a formal action in a law enforcement situation obviously does not preclude the taking of informal actions as well. A person who is arrested may also be subjected to informal verbal or physical sanctions. Indeed, in some cases, the informal sanctions may completely supplant the formal ones. Westley describes how police may substitute informal sanctions for formal ones in the case of sex offenders. Personal feelings and public pressures incline the officer toward sanctioning the suspect, but the difficulties of getting the victim to testify and convincing the judge or jury that the testimony is truthful and not "a camouflage for other actions or needs of the victim" make it unlikely that an arrest will result in a successful conviction. Therefore, the policeman administers his own sanction—a physical beating, for example.[69]

Second, formal actions may also be taken in order maintenance situations. This is possible because of the existence of what might be called "public order" laws—statutes and ordinances which prohibit "disorderly conduct" or "disturbing the peace." Though these are technically laws, their enforcement falls more into the category of order maintenance than law enforcement. Law enforcement, it was said above, involves the application of legally defined standards. These public order statutes differ from other laws in that they provide no clear legal definition of the impermissible behavior. They simply prohibit "having an 'evil reputation and consorting with persons of like evil reputations,' and 'causing a crowd to collect'" or making "'loud or unusual noise.'"[70] Such laws do not give a policeman a meaningful standard by which to judge behavior. (For this reason, in fact, some of these laws have been declared unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness.) Instead they give him a formal sanction to employ when informal sanctions prove ineffective in controlling a situation. Related to this are what might be called "cover" arrests. A policeman who abuses a citizen physically but does not arrest him leaves himself open to later charges of abuse. A policeman who "covers" his abuse with an arrest can always defend himself by saying that the injuries sustained by the citizen occurred because the citizen was resisting arrest and officers are, of course, authorized by law to use whatever force is necessary to effect an arrest.[71] Formal actions, then, may follow upon informal ones.

These considerations, beyond warning that law enforcement may involve informal behaviors and that order maintenance may involve formal ones, raise the question of the relationship between formal and informal actions in police work. The discussion raises two competing hypotheses. The first suggests a negative covariation between formal and informal sanctions—one type may replace or supplant the other. The second suggests positive covariation—imposition of informal sanctions leads to imposition of formal sanctions as a cover. The evidence on this kind of effect is mixed, with Chevigny claiming that it does occur and Reiss claiming that it does not.[72] The relative merits of the two hypotheses will be considered more fully later on.

Service and Allocation

The service activities of the police, like the order maintenance activities, have received little systematic attention from political scientists. Unlike the order maintenance activities, however, the neglect seems understandable, even if not fully justified. If politics is authoritative allocation, it is hard to see why such activities should be excluded. They impose costs on some members of society and confer benefits on others—and, given the amount of time which police spend on such activities, the costs imposed and the benefits conferred are substantial. The authoritative and reallocative aspects of these activities manifest themselves in that the government taxes some citizens in order to provide these services to others—the recipients most often being the less well-off members of society who turn to the police because they cannot afford help from anyone else.[73] As

government becomes more and more involved in the provision of social services, it seems increasingly unrealistic not to recognize the political significance of the "helping" activities which many government agencies, including the police, perform.[74]

Beyond this, service activities can acquire political significance through their contribution to law enforcement. Students of the police have long noted that police provision of services could be used to build up reservoirs of good will that could be drawn upon when the police need assistance from the public in enforcing the law or keeping order.[75] Police administrators are increasingly recognizing the validity of such an approach.[76]

Nevertheless, these arguments overall are not fully convincing. Their upshot is that the provision of any service by the government renders that service "political." And there is, as Easton warns, a danger of rendering the concept of "politics" meaningless by construing it too broadly.[77] In light of this, Wilson's argument that such activities are not of great concern to the student of the police because "they impose few, if any, external benefits or costs that are imposed on third parties or on society generally" deserves some consideration.[78] Because the police spend much of their time on such activities, this is not really true with respect to costs. But, with respect to benefits, the underlying distinction here—between public and private goods—may be a useful one. Law enforcement and order maintenance, though they involve individual interactions, do directly benefit society in general. On the other hand, the provision of

services bestows benefits primarily on individuals. All in all, the provision of services may be political, but its narrower impact renders it less compelling as an object of study for political scientists than law enforcement and order maintenance.

The Police and System Persistence

Broad assertions that the police have significance beyond what have been identified here as their allocative functions are commonplace in the sociological and political literature. The policeman is widely depicted as an important symbol of authority, one that gains its efficacy from the frequency of contact between citizens and the police, compared to contact between citizens and other governmental figures, and from the authority so visibly vested in him. Hahn, LaFave, Reich, and Wilson all emphasize the role of the policeman as a primary point of contact between citizen and government.[79] The uniform, the badge, the billy club, and the gun all dramatically symbolize the policeman's governmental investiture and legal monopoly on the use of force.[80] Thus LaFave can state generally: "The police officer serves, for many members of the community, as the only point of contact with government, and the impressions he creates must, in the aggregate, have profound effects."[81] Hahn focuses the questions somewhat more precisely:

> While the routine actions of patrolmen on city streets might appear to be relatively mundane and unexceptional, they also seem to represent an important means by which many of a nation's highest values are transmitted to the public. Concepts such as law and order, authority, and justice might

convey the appearances of remote abstractions, but in modern society perhaps the principal public official who is authorized to apply these standards to social conduct is the policeman. Law enforcement officers may play a crucial role in the relationship between ordinary citizens and the awesome principles that sustain an organized society.[32]

Bayley rightly asserts the speculative nature of the hypothesis and locates it in the field of study of which it is properly considered a part: "Though the proposition has yet to be empirically demonstrated, it is reasonable to expect that policemen are among society's most influential agents of socialization."[33]

The literature, then, is rife with conjecture that the policeman may be an important psychological linkage between citizens and political authority. Though the writers cited above tend to compound them, two distinct strains of hypothesizing about the socializing role of the police can be identified in the literature. The first focuses on the policeman as a socializer to obedience and the second, as a socializer to allegiance. Ultimately, of course, the two are probably linked, with obedience being given to that toward which allegiance is felt. But here the two will be separated for purposes of analysis.

The Police and Symbolic Control

The police role in maintaining an orderly society through the imposition of sanctions and the deterrent effect of their physical presence is, as has been discussed, a widely recognized one. Equally important, it has been argued, is the restraining effect exerted by the internalization of norms enforced by the police. That is, members of a society see, or experience personally, the police enforcing the

laws and customs of the community. Over time they tend to adopt for themselves the norms and values that they see being enforced. Thus, even in the absence of the police, they tend to behave in accord with the norms and values upheld by the police. The police keep order in two different ways in the society—directly, by imposing sanctions and making their presence visible to members of the society, and indirectly, by inculcating standards of behavior upon members of the society.

This notion of the police as symbolic controllers of behavior is one that recurs frequently in the literature. Smith writes of the "policeman in everybody's head" who deters the potential shoplifter and slows the speeder.[84] Wenninger and Clark focus on what they call the value-maintenance aspect of the police's social control function. They argue that the police reinforce the standards of behavior already internalized by most individuals:

> . . . the police operate as part of the background or social milieu affecting all members of society . . . members have internalized the norms and values associated with the society and the allocation of rewards and punishments serves to reinforce these normative patterns.[85]

What they recognize is, in effect, a feedback loop in the social control system, with the value system being enforced through governmental allocations of sanctions and the internalization of sanctions leading to the reinforcement of the value structure.

This idea has received special attention in the case of Britain. Reith argues that the "British orderliness and love of order" are largely the result of the particular style of policing which emerged

in Britain. The rise of "orderliness" in Britain, he says, coin-
cided with the beginning of the police institution, continued over
a period of many years, and then reversed itself as the efficiency
of the police declined due to "the strain of war conditions on their
organization."[86] He makes, however, no real attempt to show that this
was the result of the indirect effects of the police rather than the
direct effects. Gorer suggests that the British policeman has worked
a "profound modification on the character of the urban population,"
becoming

> not only an object of respect but also a model of the ideal
> male character, self-controlled, possessing more strength
> than he has ever to call into use except in the gravest
> emergency, fair and impartial, serving the abstraction of
> Peace and Justice rather than any personal allegiance or sec-
> tional advantage . . . This model . . . has had an appreciable
> influence on the character of most of the population during
> recent decades, so that the bulk of the population has, so to
> speak, incorporated the police man or woman as an ideal and
> become progressively more 'self-policing.'"[87]

Unfortunately, he presents virtually no evidence to back up the claim,
other than that British policemen are recruited and commanded in ways
that emphasize an even temper and self-control and that they are held
in great respect by the British populace.

The idea of the police as socializers to obedience has also
received special attention, as is characteristic in the study of
socialization, in the case of children. Some have focused on the
effects which first-hand experience with the police can have on later
inclinations to obey the law. Goldman writes, for example, that

> The decision regarding the disposition of a given instance
> of juvenile law violation, by the policeman, may have some
> very significant effects on the future conduct of the child.
> The consequences of any act will significantly alter the be-
> havior of the actor in similar situations in the future. The
> interaction, or exchange of gestures, between the policeman
> and the child apprehended in law violation may serve to in-
> crease or decrease the probability of future excursions into
> delinquency. Thus the behavior of the police toward the child
> may be a significant determinant of the child's continued
> participation in delinquent conduct.[88]

Though this "personal experience" model seems plausible, there appears

to be little hard evidence supporting it. The literature in crim-

inology and deviant behavior focuses on broader social and economic

conditions and on psychiatric difficulties in explaining the origins

of criminal behavior, not on specific factors like experience with

the police.[89] This is not to say that an experientially based model

is incompatible with these approaches, but rather that experiences

with the police have not received any attention from the proponents

of these approaches.

However, at least one study does indicate that experiences with

the police may bear some relationship to later behavior. Casper, in

his study of criminal defendants, reports that the criminal's antag-

onism toward the police often has its roots in childhood experiences—

"a large number responded that they had never liked cops, had always

feared them, . . . had always seen them as men to be avoided, . . .

and saw police officers not as helpers and good guys, but as a kind

of 'they' who possessed a power over their lives that was resented."[90]

Early "brushes with the law" seem, in other words, to leave a lasting

feeling of animosity toward the police which may be related to these

men's involvement in criminal behavior.

Other writers focus less on direct ties to criminal behavior and more on the police's role in forming children's propensities to comply with political authority in general. Easton and Dennis emphasize the high salience of the policeman to children and the favorableness of their images of him—he is seen as helpful to the child and his family, dependable, and trustworthy. Following Piaget, they suggest that the positive image of the policeman helps children to accept the obligation to obey him.[91] Their discussion presents at least two difficulties. First, as they admit, though children's images of the police are favorable, they are not as favorable as images of other authorities. Children seem more ambivalent about the police and seem to focus on their punitive and prohibitive powers.[92] One might question whether the inclination to obey flows more out of the fear of sanction than out of any affective ties to the policeman. Second, at no point do Easton and Dennis perform any direct test of the underlying mechanism of the hypothesis—that favorable images of the police do incline children to greater compliance with political authority.

Subsequent research has begun to clarify these issues. Children's ambivalence toward the police has been documented in other settings and, indeed, clearly unfavorable images have been found to be more common among minority children than among white children like those studied by Easton and Dennis.[93] This heightens the importance of understanding the mechanisms at work in this area. Should unfavorable attitudes toward the police incline children to non-compliance with political authority, the less favorable attitudes toward

the police of minority children augur for higher levels of misbehavior in these segments of society.

Work by Rodgers and Taylor and by Engstrom addresses the mechanisms relating orientations toward the police to compliance. Rodgers and Taylor find, in a sample of 300 white and black high school students, a relationship between attitudes toward the police and compliance among whites, but not among blacks. They attribute this pattern to the existence of compensatory mechanisms for blacks—though blacks view the police more negatively than whites, these negative attitudes are compensated for by other generally positive attitudes toward the political system.[94] Engstrom's work suggests an alternative explanation. He finds that the essentially identical propensities of white and black children to comply with police directives stem from sharply different bases. White children's compliance is tied to perceptions of the benevolence of the policeman, while black children's compliance is tied to perceptions of the power of the policeman.[95]

What these findings, taken together, suggest is that the police do have an effect on children's compliance with the law, but not the simple one posited by Easton and Dennis. The process they posit— one of favorable evaluations of the police leading to a willingness to obey—does operate. This is suggested by their own findings, Rodgers and Taylor's findings that an essentially evaluative dimension does relate to compliance, and Engstrom's finding that benevolence and compliance correlate—all among white children. But children also

obey out of fear for the power of the police. This is suggested by Easton and Dennis's findings of ambivalence among white children and Derbyshire's findings of similar feelings in white, black, and Mexican-American children.[96] It is shown more clearly in Engstrom's finding that power and compliance correlate among black children. The mechanisms which underlie the linkage between the police and children's orientations to compliance appear to operate uniformly. Only the failure of some studies to incorporate all the pertinent variables and the differences between races in distributions along the independent variables measuring attitudes toward the police have made research findings appear to be disparate.

The evidence that orientations toward the police do affect expressions of compliance among children thus appears to be fairly good. There is, of course, need for more research into the origins of these orientations. Are they based on personal experience, the experience of family and friends, or the community's collective experience with the police? Or are they transferred to the police from other authority figures? Equally necessary is research into the relevance of these orientations to compliance to actual behavior and into their persistence later on in life. Are those children who express less compliance actually more likely to break the law? And do their less compliant orientations continue on into adulthood and affect behavior then? These are basic questions which must be answered before the role of the police as agents of childhood socialization can be accepted unequivocally. Intuition and social-psychological

theory suggest that the police play an important role in indirect social control, but further empirical examination of these theoretically plausible linkages is clearly needed.

The Police and System Support

If the nature and consequences of the police's role in socializing obedience to government are not well understood, the opposite is perhaps true of the police's role in socializing more general support for government. Students of the police have long speculated that the way in which the police do their job influences public attitudes toward them. This is, in fact, the basic concern of those in the field of police-community relations. A tenet of modern law enforcement is that public support is essential if a police department is to enforce the law effectively. Terris writes: "The police can simply not operate effectively as long as they are viewed with skepticism or hostility by much of the population in large sections of the city. Such attitudes mean that crimes are not reported, that witnesses often refuse to identify themselves or testify in court, and that suspects resist arrest with the tacit or even physical support of bystanders."[97] Public support depends on how the police act: ". . . the constantly-accumulating effect, created by . . . thousands of man-to-man contacts, determines the degree of public acceptance or the state of police public relations."[98] Therefore, in order to enforce the law effectively, "every effort must be made to create as many favorable contacts as possible between the police and the public . . ."[99]

More recently, scholars have begun to consider the broader psychological impact of these police activities. They have pondered the impact of police behavior on public attitudes, not only toward the police themselves, but also toward the legal system and the political system as a whole: "The way in which policemen behave may affect attitudes not only toward themselves, but toward law, authority, government and conflict."[100] Implicit in this view is the idea that the attitudes the public holds toward the police are generalized to other political institutions.

Special attention has been paid to the possibility that the police, through behavior which generates hostile attitudes, have had a destabilizing effect on urban life.[101] Of particular importance here may be the impact of police behavior on minority groups. Doig writes: ". . . the police are, for the ghetto resident, the visible and direct symbol of a government and social system that often seem unjust and oppressive. Consequently, the attitude and behavior of the police officer have broad ramifications regarding the ghetto dweller's perception of the government and society, and regarding such specific and urgent questions as the prospects for widespread violence in urban areas."[102] Reich argues that improper police behavior "must deeply affect the attitudes of minority groups toward the police and government. It is the raw material of alienation and rebellion."[103]

These concerns parallel those of much recent theoretical and empirical work in political science, though their stimulus emanates more from the turbulent streets of the 1960's than from the halls of academe. Modern perspectives on politics have focused on support for

the political system as a crucial variable—"feelings of trust, con-
fidence or affection, and their opposites."[104] Support is crucial
for a political system because the capacity of authorities to make
allocations depends upon it. Without public trust and confidence,
the authorities will be unable to acquire resources to allocate and
to get their decisions about allocations accepted. Instability—
disorder and even rebellion—may be the consequences.

Two types of support, differing in the conditionality with which
they are given, have been distinguished. Support given uncondition-
ally—diffuse support—is learned by individuals over extended periods
of time. Its roots are thought to lie in childhood exposure to the
prevailing political culture and even in more general personality
dimensions like "trust in people." Support given conditionally—
specific support—is a result of individuals' reactions to the per-
formance of the political system. It depends on the individual's
evaluations of the costs and benefits which the system imposes and
bestows upon him.[105] The two kinds of support are linked because,
over time, individuals' diffuse support will tend to color the ways
in which they evaluate specific actions of the system and individuals'
specific evaluations will tend to be generalized to the political
system as a whole.

Early research on political support, done in a context and at
a time in which trust and confidence in the political system seemed
to be uniformly high, focused on the stabilities of the phenomenon.
Support for the system was seen as emanating from the socialization
of children into feelings of support for the system—feelings which

endured on into adulthood.[106] Support was also linked to stable sociological and psychological characteristics—class and personality.[107] More recent discoveries that political support is not uniformly high across different groups and that it has fallen substantially in recent years have forced political scientists to take a more dynamic view of the phenomenon. In seeking the sources of these variations, political scientists have found substantial evidence that support depends on people's evaluations of political events and on their responses to personal experiences with government.[108]

From this perspective, then, what evidence is there that the police play a significant role in determining the level of support in a political system? The evidence regarding the inculcation of diffuse support is again fairly limited. Easton and Dennis argue that the police "play a vital role in laying part of the foundation for the input of support." As described in the earlier discussion of socialization to compliance, they rest their case on the fact that the policeman is one of the first figures to appear on the child's political horizon and is evaluated in reasonably favorable terms. But again they provide no evidence that these attitudes actually are generalized to the broader political system. Rodgers and Taylor do. They find that, for white children, attitudes toward the police are related to a more general measure of political trust, even when a variety of factors which might produce a spurious relationship are controlled for. They again posit the operation of a compensatory mechanism for blacks which prevents their negative attitudes toward the police from leading to negative evaluations of the political system

as a whole.[109] This limited evidence does suggest that orientations toward the police may, at least for some groups, play a role in determining broader orientations toward political authority. Again, whether these broader orientations do indeed carry on through to adult life and whether they do at any time affect behavior remain crucial and unanswered questions.

The evidence regarding the police role in setting the level of specific support is more extensive than the evidence regarding diffuse support. It is also highly variable in quality, with studies differing in both scale and rigor. Perhaps most important, it is not a particularly well integrated body of literature. Conceptualization and operationalization of variables differ widely from study to study. In view of this, it will be useful to sketch out the kinds of linkages which should exist if police behavior does affect levels of support. Under this conception, the activities of policemen constitute the outputs of the political system. The citizens experience the effects of these activities. On the basis of these experiences, they form evaluations of the quality of the work that the police are doing. In the long run, these specific evaluations cumulate into a general evaluation of the work of the police. This, in turn, has two effects. First, it affects the citizens' behavior toward the police—their propensities to engage in supportive behavior and to make demands on the police. Second, it generalizes to affect in some degree their overall evaluations of the legal system in particular and of the government as a whole. These evaluations, in turn, affect the behavior of citizens toward these broader institutions.

In particular, they affect their willingness to support the political authorities and to make demands upon them. When evaluations become extremely negative, support may fade completely and demands may be exerted, not in normal fashion, but violently.

Now what evidence is there to support such a model? There is at the crudest level the simple, yet compelling observation that stimulated much of the research described in the next few pages, the simple and direct tie between the police and the urban disorders that shook American society in the 1960's. In the words of the Kerner Commission,

> Almost invariably the incident that ignites the disorder
> arises from police action. Harlem, Watts, Newark, and
> Detroit—all the major outbursts of recent years—were
> precipitated by arrests of Negroes by white police for
> minor offenses.[110]

But it was not just that the police were the spark that set off the disorder. The police seem to have contributed greatly to the underlying discontent that eventually burst into open rebellion. The Kerner Commission found, for example, that the grievance most commonly expressed by urban blacks was the practices of the police.[111] In terms of the model outlined above, dissatisfaction with the police was a factor that led some urban citizens to lose confidence in the prevailing political structure and to rebel against it.

But several important questions remained unanswered. How widespread and deep was dissatisfaction with police performance? Why were citizens dissatisfied with the police? Did their attitudes toward the police affect their attitudes toward government and their

behavior toward government? In other words, the specific linkages connecting the police and system support were not laid bare. Fortunately, subsequent research has cleared the way to a better understanding of the processes involved.

The initial linkage of the model posited above sees people's attitudes toward the police as being determined by their experiences with them.[112] The circumstantial evidence for this hypothesis is good. In general, groups that have more negative evaluations of the police are the same as the groups reputed to have less favorable experiences with the police.

Numerous studies have examined the demographic bases of attitudes toward the police. The central fact to emerge from all these studies, it must be said, is that public evaluations of the police are generally favorable, not unfavorable. Across race, sex, age, and educational groups, the majority of citizens view the police favorably.[113] Nevertheless, there are substantial pockets of dissatisfaction. Blacks invariably are less favorable toward the police than are whites.[114] Young adults seem less favorably disposed than older adults and men less so than women, though here the evidence is mixed.[115] There is little indication that class, education, or occupation have any independent effects.[116]

A lesser number of studies have examined public experiences with the police. In general, blacks, young people, and men are more likely to report unfavorable experiences with the police than are whites, old people, and women. These unfavorable experiences are of two types. One is what is perceived as a failure by the police to

protect citizens—for example, police failures to enforce the law when violations occur and to respond quickly to calls for help. The second is what is perceived as police mistreatment of citizens—for example, verbal abuse, harassment, and the unnecessary use of force.

Perhaps the best evidence here comes from the national surveys conducted by Campbell and Schuman and by Ennis. These studies show, across the board, that blacks, the young, and men more often report unfavorable experiences with the police than do their opposites. Blacks, for example, are roughly twice as likely as whites to say that the police have not responded quickly to their calls (25% to 15%) and that they have been insulted by the police (15% to 7%), and more than three times as likely to say that they have been frisked or searched without good reason (13% to 4%) and roughed up unnecessarily in the course of being arrested (4% to 1%). Similar differences are reported for indirect experiences—those which happen to acquaintances or "to people in this neighborhood."[117] Ennis finds that blacks view both the protection provided by the police and the respect that police show to citizens less favorably than do whites.[118]

Age also sharply differentiates experiences with the police. Reports of unfavorable experiences with the police are uniformly at least twice as common among the young (16 to 19 years) as among the old (60 to 69 years), with a clear monotonic trend from one extreme to the other.[119] The only exception to this is in blacks' evaluations of police protection, which vary little in their unfavorableness across age cohorts. Sex differences are less sharp for items relating to police protection, more sharp for items relating to mistreatment,

and most sharp for items relating to personal experience of mis-
treatment at the hands of the police. Women and men report with
almost equal frequency police failures to respond to calls for help,
but men are more than twice as likely to report that they have been
insulted or shown disrespect by the police and more than six times
as likely to report that they have been searched without good reason
or roughed up unnecessarily in the course of an arrest.[120] Campbell
and Schuman's national survey results are generally confirmed in a
number of local studies.[121]

One other important detail emerges from these studies. The
lack of police protection overshadows police mistreatment as the
dominant kind of negative experience with the police. Ennis, for
example, finds that 59% of his national sample rates the local police
as "very good" in "being respectful" while only 42% rates them as
"very good" in "giving protection." This tendency to evaluate pro-
tection less favorably than treatment holds up across race, sex, and
income divisions.[122] Campbell and Schuman's data reveal that the
pattern persists even across age groups—regardless of age, citizens
complain more often about the lack of police protection than they do
about police mistreatment. Young people, relative to the old, more
often complain about mistreatment than about poor protection, but
even among young people, lack of protection is cited more frequently
than mistreatment.[123] All this suggests that, even among the groups
most hostile to the police, the primary complaint is not that the
police treat citizens badly, but that they do not protect them well
enough.

The congruent social locations of unfavorable evaluations of the police and of unfavorable experiences with them—blacks, young people, and men—are one indication that the evaluations may stem from the experiences, as the model posited above suggests. But they also urge caution in inferring from any relationship between experiences and attitudes toward the police that the former lead to the latter. These findings suggest that a relationship between the two variables may be the spurious product of some demographic factor. Blacks may tend to have more unfavorable experiences with the police than do whites because police patrol more frequently in the higher crime areas in which they live. They may also tend to have less favorable attitudes toward the police because they transfer their less favorable evaluations of government in general to the police. A relationship could exist, therefore, between experiences and evaluations without the former causing the latter. Confirmation of the linkage posited by the model requires that the relationship stand up even when other possibly confounding factors are controlled for.

What then is the evidence that experiences with the police affect evaluations of them? At the crude level, Gourley's early study in Los Angeles, which found unfavorable contacts with the police to outnumber favorable ones, while favorable evaluations of the police department outnumbered unfavorable ones, would suggest that the linkage is not strong.[124] But this is weak evidence indeed because Gourley does not correlate experience with attitude in order to determine whether unfavorable attitudes are associated with unfavorable

experiences and favorable attitudes with favorable experiences. In fact, only a few studies, all of them on a local scale, do this—and even fewer insure internal validity by controlling for other factors.

The studies in this area differ widely in their characterization of the independent variables. Some focus on simple contact, some on informal aspects of treatment, some on formal aspects, and others on more diffuse experiences of "safety." In the face of this diversity, it is reassuring to find that experiences with the police, as operationalized in a variety of ways, do relate to evaluations of the police. Bayley and Mendelsohn report, in their study of Denver, that "the sheer fact of contact" and "the character of contact" both affect evaluations of the police.[125]

In the area of informal treatment, Furstenberg and Wellford find that those to whom the police explain their actions are more satisfied with police performance than are those to whom the police do not explain their actions.[126] The manner of the policeman—how much concern he shows to the citizen—has, according to Bordua and Tifft, a substantial impact on how satisfied the citizen is with his contact with the police.[127] Jacob also sees the character of the experience as affecting the evaluation of the police.[128] Smith and Hawkins report similar results and demonstrate as well that observation of "police wrong-doing" has a negative impact on attitudes toward the police.[129]

Formal police outputs also affect evaluations. Even as minor a sanction as the receipt of a traffic ticket disposes citizens to

regard the police less favorably.[130] Being sanctioned seems to
produce more negative evaluations of the police and, as might be
expected, so does being arrested. Smith and Hawkins, in their survey
of Seattle, find that, while only 26% of those never arrested have
unfavorable attitudes toward the police, 42% of those arrested do.[131]

If evidence that these treatment dimensions relate to evaluations
is good, evidence that concern over police protection does is less so.
One survey item identified earlier as a possible indicator of satis-
faction with police protection is whether or not the respondent felt
the police to be slow in coming when called. Furstenberg and
Wellford find that dissatisfaction with police performance increases
directly with increases in the time a citizen must wait until the
police respond to his call.[132] Other indicators of citizens' direct
experiences with police protection are scarce. One possible approach
is to assume that those who are most fearful of crime or who have
themselves been the victims of crime will blame the police for not
protecting them adequately. Fear of crime and experience of crime
are thus possible indicators of personal beliefs that police protec-
tion is inadequate. Smith and Hawkins, adopting this strategy, find
no statistically significant relationship between either fear of
victimization or actual victimization and attitudes toward the
police.[133] Biderman, on the other hand, in a study of four high
crime precincts in Washington, D.C., discovers a strong relationship
between anxiety about crime and negative attitudes toward the police.
Seventy-five percent of those least concerned with crime express

high "pro-police" scores, while only 42% of those most concerned do so. No clear relationships exist between actual victimization and attitudes toward the police.[134]

The evidence outlined here strongly suggests that police actions do affect public attitudes toward the police, with the evidence somewhat stronger in the area of police treatment of citizens than in the area of police protection. But, as suggested earlier, the possibility that these relationships are spurious must be considered before any conclusions can be drawn. Fortunately, a fair number of the studies cited do implement controls for at least one of the potentially confounding factors—race. In general, relationships do persist when race is controlled for, increasing the plausibility of the hypothesis that public evaluations of the police are influenced by the performance of the police. Bayley and Mendelsohn assert that the link between experience and evaluation holds up across racial groups. While Bordua and Tifft do not control for race in their assessment of the impact of manner, they do in assessing the impact of search. Though the imposition of a control variable causes the number of cases in the partial tables to become distressingly small, being searched does appear to continue to have a negative impact on the citizen's evaluation of the police. When Smith and Hawkins control for race in evaluating the impact of arrest, they find that arrest is related to evaluations within racial groups, though the relationship does not attain statistical significance for blacks.[135]

Relationships between police protection and evaluations of the police also appear to hold up when race is controlled for. Furstenberg and Wellford find the linkage between response time and evaluation to hold up within racial groups and to be stronger among blacks than among whites. This suggests that blacks may be more sensitive to instances of poor police performance than whites. The linkage between anxiety about crime and evaluations of the police reported by Biderman also persists. Even within racial groups, increased anxiety over crime is associated with less favorable evaluations of the police.[136]

No definitive picture of the relationship between experiences with the police and evaluations of them emerges from this body of findings. Almost all of the studies are of such a small scale that great significance cannot be attached to any differences which they do or do not find. Some confusion stems from the variety of places in which research was done. Smith and Hawkins may be right, for example, in attributing the discrepancies between their findings and Biderman's to the differences between a city-wide sample in Seattle, Washington (5% black) and a sample of four high-crime precincts in Washington, D.C. (75% black).[137] Differences in the evaluational dimensions tapped by the survey questions and in the specificity of their referents also complicate the picture: is the respondent describing his experience with the police or evaluating it, and is he evaluating a specific experience or a specific aspect of police work or the police in general terms? Finally, there are the problems of sorting out causality. Do specific evaluations cumulate into general

ones or do general ones determine specific ones or, as is most likely, do both processes occur?[138] The evidence seems strong enough to accept provisionally the linkages between experiences with the police and evaluations of them. But better research in this area is definitely needed—larger-scale studies which explicitly take into account differences in context, which clearly separate out descriptive from evaluative aspects and specific from general aspects, and which employ longitudinal designs capable of providing better insight into the direction of the causal paths between the variables.

Few studies assess the remaining linkages in the model posited above. The linkage between attitudes toward the police and behavior toward them has been directly examined in only one study. Hawkins reports that confidence in the police has no effect on people's willingness to report crimes to the police.[139] Some studies do suggest that a primary reason that people fail to report crimes to the police is that they feel "the police would not be effective." More often than not, though, this appears to be more a function of the trivial or _fait accompli_ character of the incident than of any negative evaluation of the police.[140] One finding does run against this conclusion—Hahn reports that ghetto residents who see police protection as being equitably distributed (perhaps a crude indicator of satisfaction with the police) were more likely than their opposites to cooperate with the police.[141]

Questions of generalization from attitudes toward the police to broader attitudes toward the legal system and toward government in general have similarly been ignored. Jacob finds attitudes toward

the police and toward judges to be strongly related, but offers no evidence as to the mechanism underlying the relationship.[142] In a broader analysis, he explores the linkage between satisfaction with governmental services and various indicators of support. His results challenge the assumption that citizens' experiences with governmental services are a major determinant of their support for the political system. The relationship between experiences with governmental services and satisfaction with services is only moderate in strength and exists only among ghetto and white working-class people, not among the white middle class. Satisfaction with services affects broader orientations toward government only among the white working-class respondents. Jacob wisely concludes that the evidence suggests that "any theory of feedback from public programs" to supportive attitudes must be viewed conditionally—the linkage is simply not a pervasive phenomenon.

If Jacob's findings bode ill for the model under discussion here, those of Aberbach and Walker are perhaps more promising. Skipping over any intervening indicator of attitude toward the police, they tie experiences with the police directly to attitudes toward government. To be specific, they correlate, for the blacks in their Detroit sample only, the Survey Research Center Political Trust Scale with personal experiences of police mistreatment—insult and disrespect, unwarranted searches and frisks, and excessive force in effectuating arrests (the same items used by Campbell and Schuman)—and with recognition of "the way the police act" as a serious community problem. The results seem to confirm the model described above. Personal

experience of mistreatment correlates highly with political trust among blacks—more highly, in fact, than does any other correlate of political trust reported in the article. And recognition of the police as a serious community problem correlates more highly with trust than either of the other related items—"crowded conditions" and "poor education." Differences in the strength of the relationship across educational groups suggest that the relationship is not a simple one, but the linkage between police behavior and system support seems solidly confirmed for at least one group in one place at one time.[143]

An evaluation of the final link between attitudes toward government—for example, trust and efficacy—and behavior toward government will not be made here. As the burgeoning body of literature demonstrates, that topic is a separate one in itself. Rather, note will be taken of a set of findings which link experiences with the police directly to politically pertinent behavior. In their studies of public attitudes toward the police in Denver, Bayley and Mendelsohn find that personal experiences with the police and broader evaluations of the police affect people's propensities to involve themselves in political protest activities. People who evaluate police performance negatively are more likely to approve of demonstrations and to participate in demonstrations. Unpleasant personal experiences with the police seem to have a similar effect.[144] More seriously, people who evaluate police performance negatively and people who have had unpleasant personal experiences with the police are more likely to approve the use of violence as a means of political

protest.[145] Most of these relationships stand up when controlled
for racial differences, indicating that they are not the spurious
product of race. The limited scope of the study, question-wordings
that are far from ideal, the failure to control for other poten-
tially confounding factors, and, perhaps most important, the inability
to determine whether experiences led to protest activities or vice
versa all compel caution in generalization. Nevertheless, these
findings do suggest that police activities have a direct effect on
the character of the support for, and demands upon, political
authority.

The evidence tying attitudes toward the police to attitudes and
behavior pertinent to the broader political system is even less
definitive than that tying experiences with the police to attitudes
toward them. Indeed, it manifests all the difficulties noted earlier
with respect to that body of evidence. Again, provisional acceptance
of the basic hypothesis seems warranted. The actions of the police
do seem to have an impact on citizens' support for the political
system and on the ways in which they exert demands upon it—two cru-
cial variables in the equation determining the political system's
viability. However, given the limited amount and variable quality
of much of the evidence, more and better research in these areas is
clearly needed. Perhaps most important is the need for rigorous
empirical evaluation of the generalization link: do citizens' evalua-
tions of the performance of the police—and other public servants—
really figure substantially in determining their more general

orientations toward government? Until this question is resolved, a central assumption of the current dominant perspective on political science, the feedback loop—one that is crucial to the case for the political significance of the police—will remain in doubt.

This chapter has examined police behavior through the "conceptual lens" suggested by a widely accepted contemporary approach to politics—one which sees politics as the "authoritative allocation of values for a society" and which sees, as the basic question about a political system, how it persists through time. Because the basic tasks the police perform—enforcing the law, maintaining order, and providing services—each involve the distribution of valued things among the members of a society and because these activities are generally accepted as legitimate by members of the society, police behavior is properly regarded as political behavior.

Further, argument and evidence advanced in the literature on the police suggest that police actions significantly affect the ability of a political system to persist over time. The willingness of citizens to go along with the policies that political authorities make and to offer support to political authorities appears to depend, to some extent, on the behavior of police officers.

This is not to say that the case for the political significance of the police is closed. The effectiveness of the police in maintaining the legally established distribution of values, the effect of police actions on public evaluations of the police, and the effect

of these evaluations on broader evaluations of government in general and behavior directed toward government—all these are questions on which better evidence is sorely needed. Nevertheless, the preponderance of the available evidence does suggest that police actions do have politically significant results.

With the political importance of the behavior of interest at least provisionally established, then, attention can now turn to the central question of this inquiry—why do policeman act as they do?

Footnotes for Chapter I

1. Notable exceptions to this are Jerome H. Skolnick's work on
   detectives in the vice squad in Justice Without Trial (New York:
   Wiley, 1966) and the substantial literature on juvenile offi-
   cers. Most of the work available in this country focuses on
   American police institutions, notable exceptions being Michael
   Banton's excellent comparative treatment of Scottish and
   American organizations, The Policeman in the Community (New York:
   Basic Books, 1964), and George E. Berkley's somewhat broader
   discussion of American and Western European police organiza-
   tions, The Democratic Policeman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

2. L.H. Whittemore, Cop (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications,
   1969); Jonathan Rubinstein, City Police (New York: Ballantine
   Books, 1973); William Westley, Violence and the Police
   (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1970); Banton; James Q.
   Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
   University Press, 1968); Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and
   the Public (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).

3. Frank Remington and Herman Goldstein, "Law Enforcement Policy:
   The Police Role," in Readings in Criminal Justice, ed. Edward
   Eldefonso (New York: Glencoe Press, 1973), p. 94. Apparently
   little systematic study has been done of public perceptions
   of police activities. Thomas Adams cites a study by Green,
   Schaeffer, and Firchenauer of community expectations which
   suggests that the public sees as most important the traffic
   control and criminal law enforcement function of the police.
   Law Enforcement, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
   Hall, 1972), p. 140. Wilson (Varieties, p. 26) does offer some
   amusing speculation about how the citizen is likely to think
   that the police spend most of their time "doing nothing"—
   riding around in a car, strolling along the street, and sitting
   in drive-ins drinking coffee.

4. A.C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R.J. Gallati, Intro-
   duction to Law Enforcement (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C.
   Thomas, 1962), p. 25.

5. O.W. Wilson and Roy Clinton McLaren, Police Administration,
   3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 5. Sir Robert Peel,
   founder of the modern police institution in Britain, identi-
   fied in 1822 as the basic aim of police action "to prevent
   crime and disorder," a priority which is echoed in much of the
   administrative writing on the police even today. Cited by
   Edward M. Davis, "Professional Police Principles," in
   Eldefonso, Readings in Criminal Justice, p. 113.

6. Wilson, _Varieties_, p. 69.

7. William Westley, "Violence and the Police," _American Jour-nal of Sociology_ 59 (July 1953): 36. Wilson echoes this theme in his discussion of policemen's longing for "real police work"—"catching 'real' criminals" (_Varieties_, p. 68).

8. The tripartite distinction is drawn from Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 4-5. Some combine the latter two categories into one general order maintenance or service rubric. See, for example, Banton's distinction between "law officers" and "peace offi-cers" (p. 7); Arthur L. Stinchcombe's distinction between criminal situations and disorderly ones in "Institutions of Privacy in the Determination of Police Administrative Practice," _American Journal of Sociology_ 69 (September 1963): 150-61; Bernard L. Garmire's distinction between the "law-enforcement role" and "community-service role," in "The Police Role in Urban Society," in _The Police and the Community_, ed. Robert F. Steadman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 2-6; Herman Goldstein's distinction between criminal and non-criminal activities in "Police Response to Urban Crime," _Public Administration Review_ 28 (September-October 1968): 417-423; Egon Bittner's distinction between "law enforcement" and "keeping the peace," in "The Police on Skid Row: A Study of Peace-Keeping," _American Sociological Review_ 32 (October 1967): 699-715; and Eugene P. Wenninger and John P. Clark's distinction between law enforcement (as goal attainment) and order maintenance (as value maintenance), in "A Theoretical Orientation for Police Studies," in _Juvenile Gangs in Context_, ed. Malcolm W. Klein (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 161-172. The trichotomy is employed here because, while order maintenance and law enforcement are similar in their non-legal character, they do differ in their allocative implications.

9. Elaine Cumming, Ian Cumming, and Laura Edell, "Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend," _Social Problems_ 12 (Winter 1965): 276-86; Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 18-19; Reiss, _The Police_, pp. 70-76; Thomas Bercal, "Calls for Police Assistance," in _Police in Urban Society_, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 267-77. Skolnick writes that the paucity of law enforcement activity at the level of patrolmen led him to reorient his focus to detectives (_Justice_, pp. 33-34). Cumming, Cumming, and Edell provide a detailed breakdown of the kinds of services requested and the changes in the pattern of the demand over the day and week.

10. Wilson, _Varieties_, p. 19.

11. Though it is not a "perfect" typology, this simple trichotomy has, as will be seen, provided the foundation for much of the work on the police. Difficulties arise primarily from the typology's ambiguities—although an assault on a stranger is a crime and an argument with one's wife is probably just disorderly, where does an assault on one's wife fit? Similarly, the line between keeping order and providing a service—for example, counseling or directing traffic—can often be a thin one. Probably for this reason, the writers cited in note 8 merge the order maintenance and service functions.

12. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter H. Pollak, and Carl S. Stern, The Third Degree (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931), No. 11, pp. 13-261.

13. Westley, Violence, pp. 118-140; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Brutality: Answers to Key Questions," Transaction, July-August 1968, pp. 10-19; Ed Cray, The Enemy in the Streets (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1972) esp. pp. 1-8 and 209-54.

14. George F. Cole, Politics and the Administration of Justice (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 26.

15. Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter, eds., Criminal Justice in Cleveland (Cleveland: Cleveland Foundation, 1922), esp. pp. 63-70, pp. 183-192; Raymond Moley, Our Criminal Courts (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1930), p. xxi, pp. 247-250.

16. Raymond Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929), p. 23.

17. Pound and Frankfurter, p. 183.

18. V. O. Key, Jr., "Police Graft," American Journal of Sociology 40 (March 1935): 624-36.

19. See, for example, Herbert Jacob's discussion of the legal process's linkages to other political processes through staffing and resources, in Justice in America, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 11-12; and Cole's discussion of the "ways in which political influences permeate the legal system" (pp. 15-20). Seymour Martin Lipset also notes these kinds of political ties between the police and local politics in "Why Cops Hate Liberals—and Vice Versa," Atlantic, March 1969, pp. 76-83; and John Gardiner emphasizes the connection between the police, politics, and organized crime, in "Wincanton: The Politics of Corruption," in Criminal Justice: Law and Politics, ed. George F. Cole (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972), pp. 101-31.

20. Cole, *Politics and the Administration of Justice*, p. 67; Abraham S. Blumberg, *Criminal Justice* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 50.

21. This is a simplified description of the criminal justice process, omitting bail setting, probation, parole, and the like. For a more detailed description and discussion, see Jacob, *Justice in America*, pp. 165-81 or Blumberg, *Criminal Justice*, pp. 50-55. These perspectives see the process as an essentially cooperative one. For perspectives that suggest the possibility of more conflictive relationships between agencies, see Cole, *Politics*, p. 67 and pp. 131-2; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Donald J. Black, "Interrogation and the Police," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 374 (1967): 48-50; Wilson, *Varieties*, pp. 50-56; Albert J. Reiss and David J. Bordua, "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police," in *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967): 41.

22. Herman Goldstein, "Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real," in *The Ambivalent Force*, eds. Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg (San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1973), p. 149; Cole, *Politics*, p. 100; Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau, and Thurman Arnold, *Criminal Justice in Our Time* (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1965), p. 20; Herbert Jacob, *Urban Justice* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 24-32.

23. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 474-5.

24. David H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Change in Comparative Perspective," *Law and Society Review* 6 (August 1971): 91.

25. David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 210.

26. Easton, *A Systems Analysis*, p. 355.

27. David Easton, *The Political System*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1971), pp. 125-37, esp. pp. 129-31.

28. Wilson, *Varieties*, p. 35.

29. Herbert Jacob, "Black and White Perceptions of Justice in the City," *Law and Society Review* 6 (August 1971): 69-90; James R. Klonoski and Robert J. Mendelsohn, "The Allocation of Justice," in *The Politics of Local Justice* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 3-19.

30. Matthew Holden, Jr., "Politics, Public Order, and Plural-
ism," in Klonoski and Mendelsohn, The Politics of Local
Justice, p. 238.

31. U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admini-
stration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967),
pp. 31-35.

32. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports,
1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

33. Wilson and McLaren, p. 3.

34. Rubinstein, pp. 355-8.

35. That the state is the association that "successfully upholds
a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force in the enforcement of its order"—Max Weber, Max Weber:
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. and ed.
A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press,
1964), p. 154—and that the police are the arm of the state
that actually exercises the force are points often made by those
seeking to justify the political significance of the police.
In brief, the police are the essential instruments of the
essence of the state—legitimized force.

36. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 57-64; see also his "Dilemmas of Police
Administration," Public Administration Review 28 (September-
October 1968): 407-17.

37. James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books,
1975), pp. 81-97; Donald T. Campbell and H. Laurence Ross,
"The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in
Quasi-Experimental Analysis," Law and Society Review 3 (August
1968): 33-53. Wilson summarizes nicely the findings of some
of these studies in Thinking About Crime. Campbell and Ross's
study of a similar problem, the impact of intensified speed
limit enforcement on highway fatalities, shows "no unequivocal
proof" that the crackdown led to a reduction in fatalities and
sets out the methodological pitfalls of such quasi-experiments.
Charles F. Wellford similarly concludes that enforcement efforts
do not have an appreciable impact on the level of crime.
"Crime, Society, and the Police," in Police: Perspectives,
Problems, Prospects, ed. Donal E.J. MacNamara and Marc Riedel
(New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 118-131.

38. Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1936).

39. James Eisenstein, The Politics of the Legal Process (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 210-11. See also Abraham S. Blumberg and Arthur Niederhoffer, "The Police in Social and Historical Perspective," in The Ambivalent Force, pp. 3-4.

40. Jonathan D. Casper, American Criminal Justice: The Defendant's Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 1.

41. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 35-36; Stinchcombe, p. 158; Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 17-62.

42. LaFave, p. 229.

43. Blumberg, Criminal Justice, p. 285. See also Charles A. Reich, "Police Questioning of Law-Abiding Citizens," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 247.

44. LaFave, p. 524.

45. Uniform Crime Reports, 1973. This includes arrests for all criminal acts except traffic offenses.

46. Nicholas Alex, Black in Blue (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 3-22. See also Joseph Lohman, cited in Westley, Violence, p. 16.

47. Blumberg and Niederhoffer, p. 7. Allan Silver traces these sentiments back to the eighteenth century, when the propertied felt the threat of the so-called "dangerous classes," and attributes the initial acceptance of the modern police concept partly to the police's success in alleviating these fears. See "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 1-24.

48. Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. and ed. by W. O. Henderson and W.H. Chaloner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 317-18. A useful discussion of the class character of the law in Marxist theory is found in Graeme Duncan, Marx and Mill (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 145-52, esp. 148-51.

49. Eisenstein, pp. 321-337, esp. pp. 323-326.

50. Edwin Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1949); see also Leonard Downie, Jr., Justice Denied (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1971), pp. 72-108; and Holden, pp. 239-240.

51. Carl Werthman and Irving Piliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," in Bordua, The Police, pp. 77-79.

52. The Challenge of Crime, pp. 38-40; Ramsey Clark, Crime in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 51-52.

53. A substantial amount of literature uses the distinction as a premise. The underlying idea is one of role conflict—in particular, the law enforcement and order maintenance activities are seen as being inimical. This is seen as having deleterious consequences for individual officers and the functioning of the police organization as a whole. Solutions run along two basic lines: the first is a division of the police department into two separate agencies—one dealing with criminal matters and the other with community service functions. See James Q. Wilson, "What Makes a Better Policeman," The Atlantic, March 1969, pp. 129-135; Garmire, pp. 2-6; H. Goldstein, "Police Response," pp. 417-423.
     The second is an attempt to reconceptualize the role in less conflictive terms. In this perspective, law enforcement is the basic task of the police, but order maintenance contributes to its achievement by preventing the escalation of disorderly situations into criminal ones and service facilitates law enforcement by developing sources of support that can be drawn upon by policemen when needed. (See Wilson and McLaren, p. 320; Jesse Rubin, "Police Identity and the Police Role," in Steadman, The Police and the Community, p. 41.) Berkley indicates that this approach is the direction in which European forces are moving (p. 89). There seems to be a basic consensus that the police should in any case improve their capacity to deal with non-criminal matters. Skolnick, though using similar terminology, addresses a different kind of conflict. He sees order as the overall objective and law as a constraint which must be observed in achieving it. (Justice, p. 6.)

54. Wenninger and Clark, pp. 161-167.

55. Easton, The Political System, pp. 135-141.

56. See, for example, William M. Bowsky, "The Medieval Commune and Internal Violence," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, pp. 32-38; Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," pp. 1-24; Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Rubinstein, City Police, pp. 3-25.

57. Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," Psychological Review 50 (July 1943): 370-396.

58. James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics (New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 9-10.

59. Ibid., p. 10.

60. See also Holden, pp. 238-239. For an interesting reformulation of Hobbes' position in terms of modern collective goods theory—one which sees order as the fundamental collective good—see John M. Orbell and Brent M. Rutherford, "Social Peace as a Collective Good or How Well Does 'Well does Leviathan . . .?' Undermine 'Can Leviathan . . .?'?", British Journal of Political Science 4 (October 1974): 501-510.

61. Others have seemed to argue for a more complicated distinction. Wilson, in particular, differentiates the two in terms of whether there is agreement among the participants that the behavior is wrong or over who should be blamed—"guilt is at issue in both order-maintaining and law-enforcing situations, but blame is at issue only in the former" (Varieties, pp. 16-17)—whether danger is manifest or merely latent, whether discretion is narrow or broad, etc. Given his typological approach, it is hard to tell what he thinks is basic and what is derivative. The distinction made here provides a basis from which his other characteristics flow as logical consequences.

62. Reich, "Police Questioning of Law-Abiding Citizens," p. 246.

63. Easton, The Political System, p. 131.

64. Ibid., p. 132.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 134.

67. Bittner, pp. 699-715; Werthman and Piliavin, pp. 61-62; Reich, pp. 244-251.

68. Werthman and Piliavin, p. 66.

69. Westley, Violence, pp. 61-64, esp. p. 63.

70. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 21-22.

71. Paul Chevigny, Police Power: Police Abuses in New York City (New York: Pantheon, 1969).

72. Ibid.; Reiss, "Police Brutality," p. 18.

73. Robert A. Mendelsohn ("Police-Community Relations: A Need in Search of Police Support," in Hahn, _Police in Urban Society_ , pp. 161-962) writes that ". . . the police, despite a self-conception that the role is one of apprehending law-breakers and keeping blacks in their place, in fact, probably provide more essential services to lower class residents than most other governmental service organizations." Garmire (p. 4) emphasizes that the service role of the police is directed primarily toward "the impoverished, the sick, the old and the lower socioeconomic classes."

74. Morton Bard, "The Role of Law Enforcement in the Helping System," in _The Urban Policeman in Transition_, ed. John R. Snibbe and Homa M. Snibbe (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1973), pp. 407-420.

75. Rubin, p. 41; Rubinstein, p. 350; Bercal, pp. 267-277.

76. Wilson and McLaren, p. 320. See also Berkley, p. 89.

77. Easton, _The Political System_, pp. 131-134.

78. Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 4-5.

79. Harlan Hahn, "The Public and the Police," in Hahn, _Police in Urban Society_, p. 9; LaFave, p. 510; Reich, p. 246; Wilson, _Varieties_, p. 3.

80. Hans H. Toch, "Psychological Consequences of the Police Role," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, _The Ambivalent Force_, pp. 49-50; Arthur Niederhoffer, _Behind the Shield_ (New York: Anchor, 1967), p. 1; Bayley, p. 108.

81. LaFave, p. 510.

82. Hahn, "The Public," p. 9.

83. Bayley, p. 108.

84. William R. Smith, "Police-Community Relations Aides in Richmond, California," (Berkeley, Calif.: Survey Research Center, University of California, 1967), pp. 14-17.

85. Wenninger and Clark, pp. 163-164.

86. Charles Reith, _A Short History of the British Police_ (London: 1948), pp. 83-84.

87. Geoffrey Gorer, "Modification of National Character: The Role of the Police in England," _Journal of Social Issues_ 11 (1955): 31.

88. Nathan Goldman, "The Differential Selection of Juvenile Offenders for Court Appearances," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 161.

89. See, for example, Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, 8th ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970).

90. Casper, p. 43.

91. Easton and Dennis, pp. 150-153, 236-239.

92. Ibid., pp. 221-227.

93. Harrell R. Rodgers and George Taylor, "The Policeman as an Agent of Regime Legitimation," Midwest Journal of Political Science 15 (February 1971): 72-86; Robert L. Derbyshire, "Children's Perception of the Police: A Comparative Study of Attitudes and Attitude Change," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 59 (June 1968): 183-190.

94. Rodgers and Taylor, pp. 72-86.

95. Richard L. Engstrom, "Race and Compliance: Differential Political Socialization," Polity 3 (Fall 1970): 100-111.

96. Easton and Dennis, pp. 221-223; Derbyshire, pp. 183-190.

97. Bruce J. Terris, "The Role of the Police," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 42; G. Douglas Gourley, Public Relations and the Police (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1953), pp. 6-8.

98. Gourley, p. 6.

99. Ibid.

100. Bayley, p. 108.

101. Terris, p. 42; U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 144.

102. Jameson W. Doig, "The Police in a Democratic Society," Public Administration Review 28 (September-October 1968): 394.

103. Reich, p. 246.

104. Easton and Dennis, p. 57.

105. Ibid., pp. 61-64.

106. Ibid., pp. 66-69.

107. See the discussion of these issues in Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," _American Political Science Review_ 64 (December 1970): 1199-1219.

108. See Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970," _American Political Science Review_ 67 (September 1974): 951-972; and Jack Citrin's "Comment," pp. 973-988.

109. Rodgers and Taylor, pp. 81-82.

110. U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, _Report_ (New York: Dutton, 1968), p. 93. For a more detailed description of the police role in precipitating urban disorders, see pp. 68-71.

111. Ibid., pp. 80-83.

112. This approach to the study of attitudes toward the police differs from that taken by some political scientists. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba—in _The Civic Culture_ (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 106-114—and Easton and Dennis (pp. 292-294) argue for "attitude toward the police" as a good indicator of attitudes toward political authority in general. Easton and Dennis write: "It is not farfetched therefore to interpret orientations toward the authority of the police at least as symptomatic of those that may be developing toward political authority in general" (p. 293). To the extent that attitudes toward the police are determined more by experiences with the police than by generalization from other authorities, their assumption is a weak one—unless one assumes that attitudes toward the police are generalized to broader political authority. Easton and Dennis run afoul of this when they end up explaining changes across age in their "rough indicator of possible incipient feelings about the legitimacy of political authority in general" (p. 293) in terms of experience with the police (pp. 297-303).

113. Wilson provides a good overview of the literature demonstrating the generally favorable evaluation of the police ("The Police in the Ghetto," pp. 53-54); see also _Task Force Report: The Police_, pp. 147-148; and Paul E. Smith and Richard O. Hawkins, "Victimization, Types of Citizen-Police Contacts, and Attitudes toward the Police," _Law and Society Review_ 8 (Fall 1973): 135-152.

114. Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman—"Racial Attitudes in Fif-
teen American Cities," in Supplemental Studies for the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Praeger,
1968), pp. 1-67—provide the most credible evidence here, since
their results are based on a study of over 5000 individuals in
fifteen American cities. Most other studies are confined to
only one or two localities. See, for Detroit, Aberbach and
Walker; for Denver, David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn,
Minorities and the Police (New York: Free Press, 1969); for
Washington, Albert D. Bideman et al., Report on a Pilot Study
in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes
toward Law Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967); for Baltimore, Frank F. Furstenberg,
Jr., and Charles F. Wellford, "Calling the Police: The Evalua-
tion of Police Services," Law and Society Review 7 (Spring
1973): 393-406; for Los Angeles, Gourley; for Milwaukee,
Herbert Jacob, "Black and White Perceptions of Justice in the
City," Law and Society Review 6 (August 1971): 69-90; for
"Central State," Jack J. Preiss and Howard J. Ehrlich, An
Examination of Role Theory: The Case of the State Police
(Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966); for Boston
and Chicago, Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Public Perception and
Recollection About Crime, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice,"
in U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admini-
stration of Justice, Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in
Major Metropolitan Areas, Field Surveys III, Vol. I, Section
2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967);
and for Seattle, Smith and Hawkins.

115. The AIPO poll cited by Easton and Dennis shows a clear age
trend, with positive sentiment increasing from 21 to about 60
and then trailing off somewhat (p. 301). Campbell and Schuman,
on the other hand, report no significant trends by age (p. 40).
Among local studies, Gourley finds support declining to about
40 and increasing thereafter (pp. 63-67) and Preiss and
Ehrlich find support declining across age cohorts (p. 130).
Smith and Hawkins report a decline in favorableness with in-
creasing age for whites, but not for blacks (pp. 138-139).
Bayley and Mendelsohn find no relationship between age and
evaluations of police (p. 113).
   With respect to sex, Campbell and Schuman show no consistent
differences in satisfaction (p. 40). Neither do Bayley and
Mendelsohn (p. 113). But Biderman (p. 138) and Preiss and
Ehrlich (pp. 131-132) find women to be more favorably disposed.
Gourley (p. 72) finds women to be less likely than men to view
the Los Angeles police department favorably.

116. Bayley and Mendelsohn find no class differences in evaluations
(p. 113). These results are echoed by Preiss and Ehrlich, who
find no relationships between education or occupation and
evaluations of the police (p. 132). Biderman reports that

education uniformly disposes people more favorably toward the police and that income has a similar effect, but only for white respondents (pp. 138-9). Gourley finds the least educated and those in the lowest status occupations to have the most favorable attitudes toward the police (pp. 79-82, 85-92).

117. Campbell and Schuman, pp. 42-43. Aberbach and Walker, using essentially the same measures, find even more striking differences in Detroit.

118. Philip H. Ennis, Criminal Victimization in the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 52-60.

119. Campbell and Schuman, p. 44.

120. Ibid., pp. 42-43. Ennis, using more evaluational summary measures, reports that "sex differences are relatively minor, with perhaps a tendency for the Negro women to be more critical than the men on occasion" (p. 58).

121. Bayley and Mendelsohn report that in Denver black and Mexican-American citizens are more likely to see police treatment as unfriendly or prejudiced than whites (p. 112). Reiss reports that blacks in Boston and Chicago are more likely to say that the police are not doing a good job and mistreat blacks (pp. 37-52). Biderman's data show that blacks more than whites and men more than women are more likely to agree with items stating that the police push people around and are not doing a good job (p. 137). See also Task Force Report: The Police for summaries of other local studies in this area (pp. 146-147).

122. Ennis, pp. 53-56; Campbell and Schuman's data show a similar pattern with respect to sex and race (pp. 42-43). Aberbach and Walker find a similar effect in Detroit (pp. 525-527).

123. Campbell and Schuman, p. 44.

124. Gourley, pp. 46-51. Gourley emphasizes that contact affects evaluations, but never tests the hypothesis empirically, though his data would appear to allow him to do it.

125. Bayley and Mendelsohn, pp. 119-120. Unfortunately, they do not display the data which lead them to this conclusion.

126. Furstenberg and Wellford, pp. 393-406. The measures they use, though evaluational, are much more specific to the incident than the others. Their table on page 404 suggests, however, the degree to which these specific measures correlate with more general evaluations. Whether the specific determine the general or the general color the specific is, unfortunately, unresolved.

127. David J. Bordua and Larry L. Tifft, "Citizen Interviews, Organizational Feedback, and Police-Community Relations Decisions," Law and Society Review 6 (Novwmber 1971): 168-170.

128. Jacob, "Black and White Perceptions," pp. 69-90.

129. Smith and Hawkins, pp. 140-141.

130. Preiss and Ehrlich, pp. 132-136. Smith and Hawkins' findings disagree, except for low income individuals (p. 142).

131. Bordua and Tifft, pp. 164-165; Smith and Hawkins, pp. 142-143.

132. Furstenberg and Wellford, p. 402.

133. Smith and Hawkins, pp. 139-140.

134. Biderman, pp. 140-141. These summary figures are recalculated from Biderman's more detailed table (p. 140). Richard L. Block, using the 1966 NORC national sample and a somewhat less desirable measure of support—"Do you favor giving the police more power to question people, do you think that they have enough power already, or would you like to see some of their power to question people curtailed?"—finds victims of crime less likely to support the police than non-victims and those more fearful of attack slightly more likely (not statistically significantly) to support the police. He finds this kind of support to be most strongly delineated by people's evaluations of how respectfully the police treat citizens. "Fear of Crime and Fear of the Police," Social Problems 19 (Summer, 1971): 91-101.

135. See the corresponding footnotes for the preceding paragraphs (notes 125-131).

136. See the corresponding footnotes for the preceding paragraphs (notes 132-134).

137. Smith and Hawkins, p. 145.

138. See Bordua and Tifft, pp. 177-180, and Furstenberg and Wellford, pp. 403-404, for opposing viewpoints.

139. Richard Hawkins, "Who Called the Cops?: Decisions to Report Criminal Victimization," Law and Society Review 7 (Spring, 1973): 437-439.

140. Ennis, pp. 43-47. Reiss, though noting that people frequently fail to report a crime because they think that the police can do nothing about it, argues that this is more a reflection of the kind of incident than of negative evaluations of the police

("Public Perceptions and Recollections about Crime, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice," pp. 67-69). Biderman concurs, finding negative evaluations of the police to account for only about 16% of non-reporting (pp. 153-156).

141. Harlan Hahn, "Ghetto Assessments of Police Protection and Authority," Law and Society Review 6 (November 1971): 190-191.

142. Herbert Jacob, "Contact with Government Agencies," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (February 1972): 141.

143. Aberbach and Walker, pp. 1199-1219.

144. Bayley and Mendelsohn, pp. 185-186.

145. Ibid., pp. 179-180.

CHAPTER II

MODELS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR

Given the diverse fields from which students of the police have come, it is not surprising to find considerable variety in the approaches to the explanation of police behavior which they have taken. Legal scholars, sociologists, psychologists, students of organization and administration, and political scientists all have studied the police, as noted earlier, and each has brought to his work the perspectives of his own discipline as well as the idiosyncrasies of his own thinking. The student of police behavior who seeks to integrate all this research thus faces the formidable challenge of tying together a large number of hypotheses which differ in level of conceptualization, empirical support, and normative content. Particularly vexing is the failure of many writers to identify explicitly the assumptions under which they are proceeding. Readers are often left to divine them from the questions which writers address—and fail to address.

Nevertheless, the communalities of the literature and the potential contribution to the task of this study seem sufficiently great that an effort at integration is worthwhile. An understanding of the present state of knowledge regarding police behavior is essential if further study, including that undertaken in the following chapters, is to be plotted effectively. The integrative strategy employed here is to identify certain fundamental conceptions

of human behavior which seem to underlie most of the writing on the police. These basic conceptions, which will be called—perhaps too generously in view of their minimal structure—models of police behavior, are three in number. One is borrowed directly from organization theory. The other two derive from modern psychological and sociological theory. They are:

(1) the "machine" model—individual actions execute the directives of superior authority;

(2) the individual differences model—individual actions express characteristics intrinsic to the actor;

(3) the situational differences model—individual actions respond to characteristics of the situation in which actions are evoked.

For analytic purposes, these may be regarded as three competing sets of hypotheses about why policemen act as they do. But it must be noted that, as will become apparent in the following pages, empirical evidence indicates that all three sets of factors simultaneously influence behavior, in a process that is more complementary and interactive than competitive.

The "Machine" Model

At the heart of two broad bodies of writing on the police—the legal literature and the organizational literature—lies a common conception of the roots of police behavior. The policeman is seen simply as an instrument of higher authority. His actions flow

solely from the directives given him. He is, as Simon has described the worker in his analysis of Taylorism, a machine that carries out assigned tasks.[1]

The Legal Variant

In legal theory, the higher authority is the law and the directive is simply to enforce the law:

> So far as the police function is concerned, the official assumption of the system seems to be that there is no place for expert administrative discretion; police are supposed to enforce all the laws against all offenders in all circumstances . . . the image [of the policeman is as] a ministerial official with talents and authority solely to follow the law's precise commands . . .[2]

The substantive law lays down a set of rules to be enforced and the procedural law, a set of practices to be followed in enforcing the rules. The policeman simply compares behavior which comes to his attention with the set of rules and follows the set of practices when infractions of the rules occur. This conception is explicitly promulgated in many state statutes. Joseph Goldstein cites as typical the following provisions:

> It shall be the duty of the police . . . under the direction of the mayor and chief of police and in conformity with the ordinances of the city and the laws of the state, . . . to pursue and arrest any persons fleeing from justice . . . to apprehend any and all persons in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state . . . and to take the offender forthwith before the proper court or magistrate, to be dealt with for the offense; to make complaints to the proper officers and magistrates of any person known or believed by them to be guilty of the violation of the ordinances of the city or the penal laws of the state; and at all times diligently and faithfully to enforce all such laws . . .[3]

If such provisions are not specifically defined in statutes, they are

then often found in municipal charters or ordinances.[4] Courts have generally upheld this view of the policeman as automaton, though the situation is complicated by some courts' recognition of the exercise of some discretion by the policeman as valid.[5]

One important facet of this legal variant of the machine model should be emphasized at the outset: it is a model of legal behavior. No other dimensions—interpersonal treatment, provision of services— are addressed. The use of force is perhaps an exception—policemen are legally permitted to use force to the degree that it is necessary to effectuate an arrest. From the perspective of the law, this narrow focus is understandable. But from the perspective of politics, as defined in the first chapter, this is a shortcoming. The model can at best account for only a small part of the politically signi- ficant behavior of policemen.

The Organizational Variant

Although the model of behavior underlying legal writing on the police is stated in statutes and court decisions, clear expressions of an underlying model are harder to find in the literature on police organization and administration. Here the image of the police- man emerges less from explicit description than from what remains unsaid. In the police administration literature, the focus is on the formal aspects of the police organization—division of labor, delegation of authority, specialization, hierarchical structure, and span of control. The basic concerns are coordination, communication, and supervision. The individual policeman is scarcely mentioned at all.[6] The underlying assumption seems to be that an individual

officer who is told what to do and who is properly supervised will do as he is told. With proper organization, in other words, individual behavior will directly follow organizational dictates. The policeman is an instance of Weber's ideal type of the bureaucrat:

> [He] has the attributes of impartiality, expert knowledge and obedience to superiors. His duty is to comply with the rules and with orders coming from above. In cases where his personal opinions differ from those of his superior, he has to put them aside and do his utmost for the faithful execution of the orders received.[7]

In the case of the policeman, the ultimate superior is still the law, but its directives are passed to him via the hierarchy of the police department (as suggested by Joseph Goldstein at note 3 above). He is an employee of the police department with, as commonly set forth in the manuals of police departments, the duty of enforcing all criminal laws and ordinances.[8] Of course, if that were all there was to it, the end results of the legal and organizational variants would be the same. The models differ primarily in that the organizational model allows for the department to add to and subtract from, in practice, the laws enforced and observed by its officers and to dictate their non-legal behavior as well. On the legal side, the department may, for example, establish a policy of not enforcing the law against narcotics violators who agree to provide information against the "big suppliers."[9] This is what might be described as high-level police discretion. LaFave identifies a number of reasons why departments may choose not to enforce the law in every instance. Within a context of limited resources, they may decide not to waste time on trivial offenses, offenses which are accepted as normal

behavior in the subgroup within which they occur, offenses for which
the victim will not request prosecution, or offenses in which the
victim is also implicated. Laws which are ambiguous, or are on the
books only as an expression of moral ideals, or are antiquated may
also go unenforced as a matter of departmental policy. On the other
hand, departmental policies may occasionally call for invocation of
the legal process in situations when it would not normally be in-
voked, as when a department cracks down on social gambling in order
to protect its image or rousts groups from the street to prevent the
development of disorders.[10]

On the non-legal side, the department may establish policies for
the handling of non-law-enforcement situations and direct officers
to deal with citizens in a certain manner. A department may, for
example, direct officers to treat citizens courteously or, as in the
case of the by-now widely cited directive of the "Westville" Police
Department, to "refrain from language which has a derogatory conno-
tation with reference to race, color, religion, or nationality."[11]
Regardless of the ultimate source of the directive or its formal or
informal nature, the assumption of the organizational model is the
same—the policeman will do what superior authority tells him to do.

In substituting the police department for the law as the immedi-
ate source of directives to the policeman, the organizational variant
does raise one question which the legal variant of the model need not
address: what determines departmental policy? Some see policy as
dependent upon the social character of the community or the prefer-
ences of the dominant group in the community.[12] Banton emphasizes

that these directives can sometimes differ from the directives of
the law:

> The observer who tried to predict, from a knowledge of the
> criminal law alone, what actions an ordinary policeman would
> take, would not be very successful. To explain what the
> policeman actually does it is necessary to see his actions as
> being governed much more by popular morality than by the letter
> of the law; most often morality and the law coincide, but when
> they do not, it is usually morality that wins.[13]

Others see departmental polices as being determined by local govern-

ment. The police are thought to operate at the behest of local poli-

tical authority. Bordua and Reiss see police chiefs, for example,

> both at law and in practice, [as] politically accountable
> officials who ordinarily stand or fall with the fortunes of
> their civilian superiors . . . the American police chief who
> is responsible to a politically elected official comes close
> to the position of a "patrimonial bureaucrat" in Weber's
> terms. His tenure as chief, though not necessarily his tenure
> in the department, depends on continuing acceptability to the
> elected official(s).[14]

In contrast to both these perspectives stands the conception of the

police department as an independent and professional agency set apart

from the pressures of parties and politics. The police administra-

tion literature, for example, extols as an ideal a department with

leadership that is aware of public and group pressures, but able to

resist them when they threaten to interfere with police functioning.[15]

What is the evidence supporting this "machine" conception of

police behavior? In its legal variant, the evidence in support is

very weak indeed. The machine model posits that all offenses which

come to the attention of the police will be prosecuted by the police.

One of the central findings to emerge from studies of the police to

date is the extent to which police underenforce the law—"making

substantially fewer arrests than observed behavior in theory warrants
and, in those arrests actually made, preferring the lesser rather
than the maximum charges."[16] The literature abounds with instances
in which policemen ignore offenses, most often lesser ones, which
come to their attention.[17] Banton remarks, "In my experience the
most striking thing about patrol work is the high proportion of cases
in which policemen do not enforce the law." He goes on to conclude,
"It seems clear from LaFave's discussion and from my own experiences
that in both Britain and the United States, where minor offenses are
concerned, underenforcement is a general rule."[18]

Less impressionistic evidence comes from the study of ticketing
and arrest rates. Assuming equal levels of criminal behavior across
a jurisdiction, if police simply arrested "any and all" violators of
the law, arrest rates would be equal across subunits of the jurisdic-
tion. Gardiner finds, in an examination of traffic ticketing prac-
tices in the United States, that rates can vary widely. Though
traffic laws differ little across the United States, levels of ticket-
ing vary sharply: for example, Dallas, a city about the same size
as Boston, in 1964 issued 24 times as many tickets for moving viola-
tions as did Boston. To control as tightly as possible for differ-
ences in laws and driving conditions, he examines rates in cities in
Massachusetts alone and in the Boston metropolitan area alone. Again
he finds wide variations in the level of ticketing. If the assump-
tion of equal levels of violative behavior is valid, the obvious
explanation is that traffic laws are enforced less strictly in some

areas than in others—that the machine model is not in fact a generally valid explanation of police behavior, at least for relatively minor offenses like traffic violations.[19]

Wilson finds similarly broad differences in ticketing rates across cities and in other offense categories, such as larceny and disorderly conduct, as well. These differences hold up even after a control for differences in actual levels of crime is imposed (by comparing only cities of similar social character), indicating again that the law is "more underenforced" in some areas than in others. Even granting substantial differences in actual levels of crime, differences in sanctioning rates are so great that it seems clear the law is differentially enforced.[20] Further, as suggested by the impressionistic studies, underenforcement appears to be greater for less serious offenses—rates for minor violations like traffic infractions and disorderly conduct vary far more widely across cities than rates for assaults.[21]

Finally, evidence from systematic observational studies indicates that the police do not simply follow the dictates of the law. In procedural matters, imposition of procedural safeguards by the Supreme Court in the _Miranda_ decision apparently had little effect on police behavior. Reiss and Black, in a study which coincidentally encompassed six weeks immediately following the _Miranda_ decision, observed issuance of all the _Miranda_ warnings in only 1% of interrogations and of at least one of the warnings in only 3%. The fact that the decision had just been announced and that observations took place

only in field settings, whereas _Miranda_ applies more directly to in-custody station house interrogations, may account for the extremely low level of compliance.[22] Another study, which continuously monitored interrogations in New Haven's police headquarters for an eleven-week period following _Miranda_ found that ". . . the police simply did not comply with the decision in many cases." Only 20% of suspects received the full set of warnings which the Supreme Court instructed the police to give.[23]

In matters of substantive law, an analysis by Black provides what is perhaps the most compelling evidence of all for underenforcement. In an observational study of police behavior in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, Reiss asked observers to record all pertinent features of police encounters with citizens. Given that a policeman generally may arrest a suspected felon when he has "probable cause" to believe that the suspect is guilty and a suspected misdemeanant when he personally observes the offense or receives a signed complaint, Black's analysis shows a startlingly high level of underenforcement of the law. In encounters involving both a complainant and a suspect,

> [the police] arrest only slightly over one-half of the [45]
> felony suspects against whom testimonial evidence is present
> in the field encounter, although "probable cause" can be as-
> sumed to have been satisfied in nearly every such incident.
> Furthermore, during the observation study, the police released
> 2 of the 6 felony suspects they observed in allegedly felonious
> activity . . . In misdemeanor situations the arrest rate is
> about two-thirds when the police observe the offense, while
> it drops to about one-third when the only evidence comes from
> a citizen's testimony.

Encounters with suspects alone, all involving misdemeanors, also mani-
fested a low arrest rate. In 112 cases in which the police themselves
witnessed misdemeanors, arrests ensued in only 61, or 54%. Again,
underenforcement is found to be more common in less serious offenses:
58% of felony suspects are arrested, but only 44% of misdemeanor
suspects.[24] Similar patterns emerge in the writing of official re-
ports—the method of invoking the legal process when the suspect is
not available. Here reports are written in only 64% of crime cases.
Again, under-reporting is more common for less serious offenses.
Seventy-two percent of felonies are reported, compared to only 53%
of misdemeanors.[25] The thrust of all the evidence is clear—police
do not as a general rule simply execute the provisions of the law.
They tend to underenforce it, especially for less serious offenses.
The legal variant of the machine model, in other words, does not
accurately depict the reality of police work.

This is not to say that the conception does not serve a useful
purpose. For the police it serves as a convenient defense against
criticism from those who feel the police have singled them out for
sanctioning. It is far easier to defend as impartial a stance that
"any and all" offenders will be arrested than one that acknowledges
that some will be and some will not. The policeman accused of dis-
criminatory action or overzealous enforcement by an angered citizen
thus commonly responds "I don't make the laws" or "I'm only doing my
job."[26]

For scholars the conception serves at least as a baseline against
which to measure actual behavior—a standard from which deviations

in practice can be noted and then accounted for. For some scholars, in fact, it stands as an ideal—a goal to which the criminal justice system should aspire. The objectives of the criminal justice system cannot be served, Joseph Goldstein argues, so long as the law is not fully enforced. And, "if a criminal law is ill-advised, poorly defined, or too costly to enforce, efforts by the police to achieve full enforcement should generate pressures for legislative action" to amend or repeal it.[27]

Other scholars disagree, seeing this conception as an impossible and undesirable objective—impossible because laws are necessarily too ambiguous to provide the policeman with specific directives for every situation and resources are too limited to support a policy of full enforcement, and undesirable because the law needs to be enforced flexibly and with compassion. They also contend that mechanistic law enforcement can engender counter-productive antagonisms among the public.[28] Still others see merit in both positions and propose as a solution efforts by police organizations themselves to develop specific and detailed rules and procedures for law enforcement.[29]

As the legal variant of the machine model has passed from the status of description to that of ideal, the organizational variant has emerged to take its place as perhaps the most widely accepted notion of why policemen act as they do. The same evidence of differences in arrest rates across cities presented earlier to show that not all violations of the law elicit invocation of the legal process suggests that departmental policies play an important role

in determining levels of arrest. Gardiner finds that other plausible variables—accident rates and demographic characteristics of the community, for example—account for very little of the variation in ticketing rates. His case studies of four Massachusetts towns, on the other hand, convince him that "variations in departmental policy are probably the source of the greatest intercity variations in effective enforcement rates."[30] Wilson reports findings which are "in every respect similar to those of Gardiner" for traffic offenses and which are comparable for other offenses.[31]

Both Gardiner and Wilson buttress their argument by outlining the devices superiors use to control levels of enforcement—formal commands and informal personal pressures, detailed work reports, institution of quotas, and the creation of specialized units—and by showing that departments which take such actions typically show higher levels of ticketing and arrest for the offenses singled out than those that do not. Wilson summarizes all these differences in his typology of departmental style. Traditional or "watchman-like" departments, with a loose command structure and weak pressures to produce, have low arrest rates (as do client-oriented "service" departments), while modern, "legalistic" departments, with central-ized command structures and high pressures to produce, have high arrest rates.[32] Also indicative of the impact of departmental policies, both Gardiner and Wilson point out, are the shifts in arrest rates which coincide with the institution of new policies and the inception of new departmental administrations.[33]

Gardiner and Wilson explore as well the determinants of department-mental policy. Gardiner finds the social character of the community to have little impact on ticketing. Only population stability appears to affect ticketing rates—more tickets are issued in cities with less stable populations. He suggests, in an argument drawn from Banton, that this is because policemen in more stable communities rely more heavily on informal sanctions.[34] His case studies suggest that, at least in traffic enforcement, political control of the police is minimal.[35] Other work of his, however—the study of Win-canton—indicates the extent to which a police department can become the tool of political forces.[36]

Like Gardiner, Wilson finds community characteristics to have little impact on ticketing rates.[37] Their impact is greater for other kinds of offenses, though, not just because they affect the occurrence of crime, but also because they affect "the degree to which public opinion will tolerate [illegal] activities."[38] He finds little evidence of direct political control over the police. Occasionally, "when the public can observe some general condition for which the police can be held responsible," the police may come under pressure to take some special steps, like cracking down on illicit activities or increasing patrols in high crime areas. But in general, political control is indirect. The police are free to act within a "zone of indifference," the breadth of which is set by the political culture of the community. The natural sensitivity of public employees to the constituency upon which they depend for their jobs constitutes an important part of this control, but perhaps the

major linkage is through the selection of a police chief. Communities, through their elected officials, tend to select chiefs who will run the police department in accord with the prevailing political style of the community. Thus "caretaker" urban machines tend to have "watchman"-style departments, nonpartisan reform governments have "legalistic" departments, and suburban governments have "service" departments.[39]

Despite the pre-eminence of the organizational model, the evidence supporting it seems insufficient in several respects. For one, Gardiner and Wilson's approaches both rest on the assumption that rates of actual violation are equal across the cities compared—an assumption which seems questionable, especially if levels of illegal activity respond to police enforcement policies. For example, cities in which the police have the reputation of enforcing traffic laws vigorously may indeed have lower rates of actual violation than cities in which they do not. One would prefer to see evidence which showed differences across jurisdictions in the proportion of suspects available to the police who are arrested. McEachern and Bauzer come close to this, finding some differences between California departments in the rates at which petitions for juvenile offenders are requested (the means of invoking the legal process for juveniles in that jurisdiction). However, differences between that procedure and ordinary arrest decisions—the former is an office decision—seem great enough to preclude generalization from the former to the latter.[40]

Second, showing differences across cities in arrest rates, even granting the equal-violations assumption, does not show that policy

differences cause them. Both Gardiner and Wilson fall back on the
less rigorous impressionistic evidence from their case studies in
individual departments to show that policy differences are responsible
for the differences. Systematic demonstration of the way in which
these differences in policy are translated into differences in
behavior is lacking. Bordua and Reiss's comment of ten years ago
still seems accurate, in spite of the studies done since:

> To our knowledge, there is no detailed empirical descrip-
> tion of command processes in a police department. It is
> necessary, therefore, to rely largely on published dis-
> courses that give information on the rhetoric of command
> and control and that are of variable and unknown validity
> as descriptions of behavior.[41]

There is definitely a need for structured research into how policy
set at the top of the police organization is put into effect at the
bottom.

Third, and perhaps most important, studies of arrest rates show
differences across departments, but they reveal nothing about
differences within departments. The departmental arrest rate, which
is simply the average of all the individual officers' arrest rates,
reveals nothing about the uniformity of behavior within the depart-
ment, which is in the final analysis what the organizational model
is all about. Consider a hypothetical example. Two police depart-
ments in cities with equal rates of violation set different policies.
If organizational control is weak, officers may vary widely about
the departmental norm in their behavior. Yet, following Gardiner
and Wilson's logic, one would conclude from the differences in over-
all arrest rates that organizational factors are important.. The

basic point is that the organizational model posits that, if poli-
cies differ across organizations, then arrest rates will differ
across cities, but be uniform across officers within cities.
Gardiner and Wilson's evidence addresses the first question, but not
the second.

In many organizational contexts, this would be an interesting
point, but not a crucial one, since superiors have ways of insuring
reasonable uniformity in the work of subordinates. They can, for
example, watch them at work, keep track of their output, and take
action when performance deviates from the desired course. In the
case of the police, though, the point is a crucial one. Here
superiors have relatively little control over the work of their sub-
ordinates. This stems from the lack of knowledge about what sub-
ordinates are doing. Studies of the police have emphasized the
limited information which police administrators have regarding the
work of patrolmen. Policemen work in the field, usually alone or
with a single companion, out of the sight of their supervisors. The
decisions they make are "low visibility" ones, seldom coming to the
attention of their superiors.[42] Only when a policeman does something
special are his actions likely to become visible to those above him.
His actions or inaction may, for example, generate a citizen com-
plaint or his ticketing record may reveal a low level of effort.
But in most cases what he does is not known to his superiors, parti-
cularly in the case of his decisions not to invoke the legal process.
Thus the control which command personnel can exert over officers in
the field is limited.[43]

Police discretion exists, then, at a second level within the police hierarchy. In addition to that exercised by administrators, policemen on the street exercise it as well. They too may choose to disregard offenses because the law is not clear or the offense is trivial and they too may act more severely because the offender is disrespectful or suspected of other crimes.[44] (Other factors which can cause policemen to deviate from organizationally prescribed paths will be discussed in the following pages.) The opportunities and the motivations to diverge from legal and departmental standards arise frequently and any model or empirical test which fails to take this into account risks missing an important aspect of police work.

Fourth, much of the evidence in support of the organizational model involves only arrest rates. The political conception of police behavior advanced in the first chapter calls for a broader view of the dependent variable. Little is known about differences across departments in the treatment of citizens, the use of force, the provision of services, and the exertion of effort. As noted earlier, departments do set policies on such matters, but few studies have assessed the degree to which such policies are implemented in the field. Again, perhaps the best information on these points comes from Wilson. He ties an expressive manner and low levels of effort to the watchman-style of department and an impersonal manner and a high level of effort to the legalistic style of department.[45]

The view of the policeman as organizational subordinate has guided much current thinking on the police. It has stimulated a body

of research which seems to demonstrate the impact of organization on the behavior of policemen. Arrest rates do vary across cities in ways that coincide with differences in policies. Nevertheless, in the end, the organizational model seems incomplete. The evidence supporting it rests on an assumption of equal rates of violation. Little is known about how policy differences are translated into actual differences in behavior. Data on only a few of the behaviors of interest—ticketing and arrest, in particular—have been used to test the model. But, perhaps most important, by focusing on comparisons across departments, empirical tests have left unexplored the lower and, by impressionistic accounts, most crucial level of police discretion. Available information indicates that the policeman on the job has wide latitude in the way he carries out his work. The studies cited to this point suggest that the organization has some impact on how he behaves, but leave unsettled the capacity of other forces to offset organizational directives.

Social-Psychological Models

While organizational perspectives have guided much of the research on the police, the disciplines of psychology and sociology have made substantial contributions as well. Part of the impact has been indirect, through the contributions of these disciplines to the study of organizations and the subsequent reliance on these contributions by students of the police. Perhaps the major instance of this is the application of the "human relations" approach to the study of the police. A distinct "school" in the study of organizations,

the human relations approach drew heavily from psychology and sociology. It saw individual behavior as influenced, not just by the formal structure of the organization, but by the informal social structure as well. Researchers who apply this variant of the organizational perspective to the study of the police often find the directives of the law and of organizational superiors to count for little. Rather, pressures exerted on the policeman by his fellow officers have the greater impact on his behavior. On the basis of his observations in a Midwestern police department, Westley concludes that the norms developed in the police occupational group—particularly those requiring "secrecy among the police . . . as a shield against the attacks of the outside world" and permitting the use of force when it is necessary to "maintain respect" for the police or to make the "good pinch" described in Chapter I—can actually override the directives of the law and superiors.[46] Rubin draws a similar conclusion about the importance of informal structure from his observations in Miami: "The upper levels of command have less influence on the behavior of the patrolman on the street than his peer group and immediate supervisors."[47] Wilson alludes to the influence of the occupational peer group in his discussion of the reasons for underenforcement of the law: "'Rate-busters' are no more appreciated by fellow workers on police forces than they are in factories."[48] Though peer pressures are generally seen as having undesirable effects on behavior, Banton argues that they may sometimes work to improve the quality of police work.[49]

In a similar fashion, Skolnick sees the police organization as generating on its own pressures for efficiency and initiative that threaten legally established constraints on behavior. The high value which the police come to place on maintaining order causes them sometimes to pursue order at the expense of observance of due process restrictions.[50] The impressionistic quality of the evidence for these effects and the limited number of departments in which the evidence has been gathered urge caution, but the informal social organization of the police department does seem to affect police behavior.

The greater part of the contributions of psychology and sociology has come, however, from the direct application of perspectives common in these fields to the study of police behavior. To be specific, students of the police have borrowed from these disciplines, sometimes explicitly and other times implicitly, two basic models of human behavior. The models differ primarily in their conception of behavior as being internally generated or externally stimulated. One model, emphasizing the internal sources of behavior, looks to the characteristics of the patrolman himself—his race and his attitudes, for example—to explain his behavior in a situation. This will be called here the individual differences model: variations in police behavior can be explained by variations in policemen's characteristics. The other model looks to the characteristics of the situation in which the policeman meets citizens—the social setting and the behavior of citizens, for example—to explain the policeman's behavior. This will be called here the situational differences model:

variations in police behavior can be explained by variations in the characteristics of the situations in which it occurs. Such a division, as will be seen later, poses some problems. Nevertheless, it does underlie much of the work on police behavior and, as such, provides a convenient framework within which to examine much of the literature on the police.

The Individual Differences Model

Primarily as a result of the salience of the police in recent years, the literature on their characteristics has grown to voluminous proportions. It is by now so voluminous that any detailed review is beyond the scope of this study. Besides, no further review is really needed, since several adequate ones already exist, most notably those by Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder, Balch, and Lefkowitz.[51] For the purposes of this study, it is enough to note two central features of this body of work.

The first relates to what students of the police have done. They have devoted much of their effort to the description of the "typical" urban policeman—his background, his personality, his attitudes—presumably on the theory that knowing "typical" characteristics will lead to an understanding of "typical" police behavior. Unfortunately, what "typical" police behavior is is seldom specified. These studies have found police personnel to be, disproportionately to the total population, white and of lower or working class origins. Following a traditional American stereotype, the Irish, as an ethnic group, are substantially over-represented. Educational levels are

generally low—a high school education being a typical attainment—
but on the increase as departments seek to recruit better educated
personnel and encourage veterans to continue their schooling.[52]

A picture decidely less clear emerges from psychological studies.
Much effort has been spent on determining whether or not there exists
a modal police personality. Since policemen exercise authority,
the argument runs in a neat equation of power with pathology, the
"logical" modal personality is the authoritarian personality. As a
result, most of the research has tried to ascertain whether police-
men manifest any of the congeries of traits associated with that con-
struct: for example, conventionalism, submission to authority,
aggression against the deviant, cynicism, and bigotry. Overall,
there is little evidence for the existence of an "authoritarian
police personality." Policemen typically have average scores similar
to or lower than those of relevant control groups on measures of
authoritarianism.[53] Ironically, as Balch points out, even though
there is little reason to believe that policemen are atypically
authoritarian, much of the psychologically oriented police literature
is devoted to explaining the roots of police authoritarianism—
either in terms of selective recruitment or on-the-job socialization.[54]

Other scholars, while stopping short of any construct so grand
as a "police personality," have examined individual elements of the
policeman's outlook on the world. Policemen have been characterized
as suspicious (though Balch rightly questions whether a phenotypic
occupational suspicion can be equated with a generic trait of

suspicion), isolated from the public, cynical, personally and politically conservative, and racially prejudiced. Attitudes relating more specifically to the police role have also been assessed. Findings here are sometimes inconsistent and inconclusive, but it seems safe to say that policemen enter police work primarily because it is a secure civil service job, are not particularly satisfied with their line of work, take a dim view of the public, and manifest considerable hostility toward the courts.[55] Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder's study of the presumably more fundamental realm of values offers some interesting parallels to these results: policemen rate more highly than do others such values as "an exciting life, a sense of accomplishment, family security, and mature love;" they rate as less important than do others "a world at peace, a world of beauty, equality, national security, and social recognition."[56]

The second important feature of this work relates to what students of the police have not done. Surprisingly enough, they have made virtually no attempt to answer what is the most basic question of all—whether or not these individual characteristics actually have anything at all to do with the way policemen act. In almost every case, the linkage between individual characteristics and behavior is assumed, explicitly or implicitly. Consider the following assertions:

> The social and personal values of the law enforcement officer strongly condition the quality of service he delivers to different segments of the population at large.[57]

> . . . personality factors and social attributes are
> obviously very important in the constructive use of
> police authority and the general implementation of
> police functions.[58]

> . . . it is reasonable to assume that [attitudes and
> personality characteristics] will be important deter-
> minants of the manner in which police carry out their
> daily duties.[59]

And these writers are at least to be credited for making explicit

the premises which most leave unspoken! For example, for all the

effort Niederhoffer devotes to describing the cynical outlook of the

police officer, he never really specifies its behavioral consequences,

other than to say that the police "role clothes [officers] with both

power and ample opportunity to 'act out' these underlying and

largely unconscious orientations."[60] Overall, very little effort

has been given to determining empirically whether policemen's char-

acteristics and attitudes do in fact affect their behavior.

This is not to say, however, that speculation about ties between

individual differences in policemen and variations in their behavior

is in short supply. Because such speculation is in some cases

fairly well-informed—coming from those who have observed at close

hand, even if casually, the work of the police—and because it can

provide some hypotheses for the research to be described later, it

will be useful to outline it here. Among demographic variables,

the race of the policeman is perhaps most often identified as an

important individual difference. Black policemen are thought to

behave differently from white policemen, particularly in their con-

tacts with black citizens. It is contended that they will engage

in less "racist behavior, harassment and brutality . . . toward blacks."[61] Banton has argued that the opposite may occur with black offenders, reporting that ". . . Negro policemen have the reputation of being stricter with Negro offenders than white policemen would be."[62]

Ethnicity has also been related to behavior. Wilson argues that Irish officers may differ from others in their propensity to follow organizational rules, since they are much more likely than other officers to "rely on personal loyalties and the exchange of personal favors as a way of doing things."[63] He also argues that the class background of the policeman may have an effect on his behavior: police may evince in their behavior "some of the focal concerns" of their working class background—"a preoccupation with maintaining self-respect, proving one's masculinity, 'not taking any crap,' and not being 'taken in.'"[64] Finally, the educational level of officers is often thought to affect their performance. In describing the qualities which make for a good policeman in a democratic society, Berkley writes:

> With the possible exception of recruitment, nothing is more vital to the creation of the democratic policeman than education. . . Democratic attitudes and patterns of behavior increase markedly with education. Thus the educated police-man is more likely to be the democratic policeman.[65]

Police reformers have often accepted this premise. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, for example, placed great emphasis on the need to raise educational standards, recommending that

the ultimate aim of all police departments should be that
all personnel with general enforcement powers have bacca-
laureate degrees.[66]

Psychological variables, it has been hypothesized, also play an

important role. Much speculation centers around the kinds of person-

ality traits which may be well or ill-suited to police work. Even

Robert Peel, the nineteenth century founder of the modern British

police system, included as one of his "police principles" a pro-

vision expressing a kind of personality requirement: ". . . there

is no qualification so indispensable to a police officer as a per-

fect command of temper."[67] More recent discussions have emphasized

such qualities as tact, patience, tolerance, and a liking for

people.[68]

More often, hypotheses have linked the alleged aggressiveness

and hostility of the police in dealing with the public to authori-

tarian strains in the policeman's personality. The police officer

as a "frustrated dictator who is attracted to the police service in

order to give vent to his aggressive or neurotic feelings" is indeed

a common stereotype.[69] Locke and Smith speculate that authoritarian-

ism in policemen "may affect their decision-making in crucial and

sensitive situations" and the "ability of the policeman to function

properly."[70] Speaking prescriptively, Carlson, Thayer, and German

write: "a strong case can be made that open-minded, non-authori-

tarian, and non-punitive attitudes in police would help them to

function more effectively in sensitive social areas."[71] Similarly,

Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder argue that changes in the basic values

of the police might lead to "more harmonious daily interactions"

between police and citizens.[72] These examples, incidentally, point up as well as any a common problem in the speculation about the impact of individual differences—the failure to make explicit the hypothesized effect of the characteristic on behavior.

Other less global dimensions of personality have also been tied to behavior. The policeman's suspicion and cynicism toward the public and his feeling that the public does not like him may cause him to withdraw from the public or to be aloof or even hostile when he must deal with it.[73] His conservatism is thought to make him respond negatively to the socially and politically deviant and, as noted earlier, to carry out his duties in a way that helps some and hurts others.[74] This notion that the police enforce their own political values rather than those embodied in the law finds classic expression in the work of Ortega y Gasset:

> It is foolishness for the party of "law and order" to imagine that these "forces of public authority" created to preserve order are always going to be content to preserve the order that that party desires. Inevitably they will end by themselves defining and deciding on the order they are going to impose—which, naturally, will be that which suits them best.[75]

More often than any other kind of attitude, racial attitudes have been tied to the behavior of the police. A common assumption is that negative attitudes toward minority groups, particularly blacks, will be translated into negative actions towards these groups. Robert Mendelsohn writes, for example: ". . . obviously an officer carrying around such a [negative] view of the black community is going to act on it at some points."[76] Such an assumption underlies

proposals to improve police treatment of blacks by changing their racial attitudes.[77] Others question whether individual racial attitudes can have much impact in the face of organizational controls over behavior. Bayley and Mendelsohn sum up this opposing claim well:

> Policemen might be prejudiced, unsympathetic, and not adequately informed about minorities, but they could still feel constrained to treat minority persons fairly. The linkage between personal attitudes and organizational norms can offset, often to a surprising extent, the basic attitudes and predispositions of people. This is especially true in organizations, such as the police, where discipline is tight and unrelenting.[78]

In view of the findings on the low visibility and high discretion of police work, one may question how "tight and unrelenting" control over policemen is.

But this basic idea—that organizational constraints can block ties between attitudes and behavior—is an intriguing hypothesis. Wilson refines it by suggesting that the style of the organization may determine the extent of the blockage, with police behavior manifesting individual characteristics to a greater extent in watchman-like departments than in legalistic ones.[79] Skolnick and Woodworth posit a similar organizationally based effect in their work, arguing that racial attitudes may have more of an impact on informal behaviors (like the interpersonal manner of policemen) where clear-cut organizational norms are less likely to exist and less easily enforced than on formal behaviors (like decisions to arrest) where they do exist and can be enforced.[80]

Related to the racial hypotheses are hypotheses involving atti-
tudes toward other groups which the police contact. Most generally,
the negative attitudes of the police toward the public are thought to
determine police behavior:

> The theme of an enemy public . . . is an occupational
> directive, a rule of thumb, the sustenance and core of
> meanings. From it the definitions flow and conduct is
> regulated for the general and the particular.[81]

Attitudes toward women and young people have received more attention
than any others except, of course, racial minorities. The police-
man's leariness of women has been emphasized. Rubinstein explains:

> No policeman will stop a woman on the street without special
> cause . . . This is certainly prejudice of the most funda-
> mental kind. But every policeman recalls with horror the
> time he or a colleague has had to arrest a woman, the charges
> made against him, the screaming in the street, the cries of
> rape and assault that he thinks people will always believe
> and that he would be likely to believe if he were not the one
> accused.

Also important is the policeman's fear that he cannot adequately pro-
tect himself from a woman offender: he cannot frisk her for weapons
or generally use force to control her.[82] Attitudes toward young
people have been posited to have a special impact on the "way police
approach the problems of inner city youth."[83] Wilson provides more
specific hypotheses. He suggests that the police's view of juvenile
misbehavior as less serious and as something better dealt with in
the home may cause them to ignore some offenses and to deal with
offenders informally rather than formally.[84]

Finally, attitudes toward the job have been identified as
important to police behavior. As is typical in studies of behavior

in organizational settings, much attention has been paid employee morale. Wilson advances a general theory of "police problems" with low morale at the root of all of them. Low morale, he says, may contribute to corruption, criminality, brutality, and incompetence on police forces.[85] Others, less ambitious, have tied low morale to ineffective performance. For example, Olson hypothesizes that policemen's dissatisfaction with their work "may be related to poor community-police relations."[86] Wilson offers a hypothesis here as well. He posits that, while morale may have little impact in emergency situations, it may

> be a greater influence on police behavior in matters of routine police contact with citizens, which make up such a large part of police work and which may, precisely because of their routine nature, be governed to a greater extent by the attitudes of the officer.[87]

Niederhoffer has focused on the psychologically debilitating aspects of the police role, reporting that suicide rates among policemen are higher than among the comparable non-police population.[88] McNamara sees the policeman's evaluation of the career opportunity structure in the police department as an important factor: officers' dissatisfaction with promotion possibilities "underlies much ineffective performance" and desires to advance to higher ranks through the building of an impressive arrest record sometimes lead officers to act overzealously.[89] Lefkowitz perhaps best characterizes the state of knowledge in this area. To him, the basic question— "whether differences in [job] attitudes 'make a difference' with regard to job behaviors, such as quantity or quality of performance, tenure, absences, willingness to assume responsibilities, disciplinary

charges, and so forth"—has not yet been answered and, as a result, provides a compelling focus for future research.[90]

One other job-related attitude receiving special attention in the case of the police is their attitude toward the courts. Though recent concern has probably grown in response to the hostile reaction of many policemen to court decisions extending procedural safeguards for suspects in criminal cases, Westley actually had postulated a linkage many years earlier. In <u>Violence and the Police</u> he documented the hostility of the police toward the courts, especially their feeling that courts let off people whom they know to be guilty, and the police's resultant inclination to take the law into their own hands and administer punishment themselves.[91] More recent work continues to entertain this hypothesis. Reiss and Bordua write that

> police dissatisfaction with the administration of justice by the courts results in their doing justice, a tendency to settle things outside the courts to be sure that 'justice is done.'"[92]

As should be apparent by now, the notion that the individual qualities of policemen—their background, their personalities, their attitudes—affect their behavior is one that pervades the literature on the police. But thus far, all that has been advanced in support of the premise is speculation and inference from relatively unstructured observations. The basic question remains—how good an assumption is this? One response is to look at the broader literature on the relationships between individual differences and behavior. That task will be undertaken in Chapter III, though it is not giving anything away to say here that the wider body of evidence indicates

that ties between attitudes and behavior are often tenuous. Another response is to examine what direct empirical evidence there is on the relationships between individual differences of policemen and their behavior. Given the amount of hypothesizing on the subject, it turns out, there is surprisingly little.

Do individual differences affect police behavior? To most, the answer to the question must seem self-evident—of course, there are, at least, some "good cops" and some "bad cops." Wilson writes:

> We all have had contact with police officers and most of us can recall officers who were friendly as well as a few who were rude. In the ghetto (and indeed within the police force) the identity of the few most abusive officers is widely known and they are compared unfavorably to the others who are more correct.[93]

Gardiner notes in a similar vein that ". . . variations among individual patrolmen were quite evident in the cities studied. . ."[94] And certainly some behavior can be considered only as the product of the particular officer—consider Whittemore's account of the former bus driver who as a policeman made it a point to ticket every car that he saw parked in a bus stop.[95]

But these answers really beg the basic question, which is whether policemen's backgrounds, personalities, and attitudes substantially and systematically affect their behavior, not just whether they operate as minor disturbances on an organizationally established baseline. This is an important question. An answer to it either way would have important implications for, among other things, efforts to change police behavior by recruiting "better" men and upgrading training programs.[96] Unfortunately, there is little good empirical evidence bearing upon it.

Certainly one of the major efforts to relate police behavior
to psychological characteristics is the work of Baehr and her asso-
ciates. They seek to develop a battery of psychological tests that
can reliably differentiate police candidates who will perform well
on the job from those who will perform poorly. Using a multiple
regression analysis of measures of performance on a large number of
indicators, they construct a predictive model which suggests that
the best policemen are those who have established a stable family
life, who are physically healthy, and who evince cooperativeness,
strong impulse control, self-confidence, resistance to stress, and
a realistic (as opposed to subjective) approach to life.[97]

The work suffers from a lack of theoretical focus but, even
taken on its own terms as an exercise in prediction, it manifests
serious methodological difficulties. The measures of behavior are
fairly crude—paired comparison ratings by supervisors and other
official departmental measures. Given the low visibility of much
police behavior to supervisors and department, the validity of such
indicators as measures of actual behavior is questionable. Further,
measures range basically from "bad" to "good," which evaluates rather
than describes how the policeman is acting. For the political
scientist interested in formal and informal outcomes for citizens,
this is clearly inadequate. But even for the police recruiter, it
is unsatisfactory, since it leaves the criteria of performance un-
specified and thus in the hands of each individual rater.

Neither do sampling procedures enhance generalizability. Parti-
cipants were paid volunteers from selected districts in the Chicago

Police Department,

> all of whom had been (1) rated by at least two supervisors;
> (2) rated with acceptable individual rater consistency and
> combined rater agreement; and (3) rated clearly in either the
> top third or bottom third in level of field performance.[98]

These selection procedures are undesirable on their face because they narrow the initial group of those rated, 2327 in number, to just 490 for whom data are analyzed. Further, procedures 2 and 3 seem sure to inflate systematic variation. Given these suspect selection procedures and the large number of predictors used—many of the regressions have over 20 independent variables—the multiple correlation coefficients achieved, generally in the .6-.7 range, are unimpressive. The methodological weaknesses of the work are such that it cannot be regarded as a fair test of the individual difference hypothesis. At best it suggests that such differences may affect behavior, but it certainly does not establish that they do. More important, it reveals little about how policemen act or why they act as they do.

Other evidence regarding the impact of individual differences comes from McEachern and Bauzer's study of the disposition of juvenile offenders in Santa Monica. They find that whether or not a request to the probation department to submit a petition to the juvenile court— "the only legal sanction that police may use" against juvenile offenders in California—is made depends upon the individual officer: "No matter what the offense, some officers are more likely to request petitions than others."[99] The limited scale of this part of their study—one city only—and the differences in the juvenile procedure noted earlier urge caution in generalizing from it.

Even moving to less general approaches—studies which attempt to tie one individual characteristic, personality dimension, or

attitude to behavior—evidence is extremely limited. There is no

systematic empirical evidence that the behavior of black policemen

differs from that of white policemen. The only study to test such

a hypothesis, Reiss's observational study in Boston, Chicago, and

Washington, found little difference in the propensities of police-

men of either race to use force.   Eight point seven percent of

whites used force and 9.8% of blacks. The race of the citizen, often

hypothesized to be important here, was unfortunately not taken into

account. Reiss nevertheless concludes that "the use of force by

the police is more readily explained by the police culture than it

is by the policeman's race."[100]

No studies relate actual police behavior to basic personality

dimensions like authoritarianism. The only suggestion that such

factors may be at all important, apart from writers' impressions,

comes from Bayley and Mendelsohn's interview study of Denver patrol-

men. They find a statistically significant relationship (of un-

specified magnitude) between a belligerency scale which "tested the

pugnaciousness of the individual or, conversely, the extent to which

he was unassertive and likely to 'turn the other cheek'" and the

policeman's report that he has been sued by a citizen. From this

frail evidence of a tie between a personality trait and a form of

citizen response to police mistreatment, they conclude

> first, that the personality of the officer is a very im-
> portant variable in contact situations—as most police
> officers recognize—and second, that people responsible
> for recruiting police officers should give careful atten-
> tion to the value of using discriminating personality
> tests in the selection process.[101]

Moving from personality dimensions to more specific attitudes, evidence exists to support only two of the hypotheses advanced above. In the first instance, the effect of political attitudes, the evidence is very weak. Some regard the widely publicized "bumper sticker" experiment as demonstrating the impact of the police's political attitudes on their work. Students with "exemplary" driving records were asked to affix "Black Panther" stickers to their cars' bumpers. In a seventeen-day period, the students drew a total of 33 tickets.[102] Though one may question whether adequate controls were indeed exerted over such factors as the actual performance of the drivers, the results do suggest that the police's generally conservative outlook may be translated into their official actions.

The second instance, the impact of racial attitudes, has received probably the most empirical scrutiny. The frequent expressions of dissatisfaction with the police from minority groups have led many to conclude that at least some policemen must be acting upon negative racial attitudes. This supposition finds some support in the findings of Kephart's early interview study. There more prejudiced policemen were found to be more likely than less prejudiced policemen to say that it was necessary to be more strict with blacks than with whites.[103]

Nevertheless, it comes as something of a revelation to find that most who have studied police behavior have concluded that policemen's racial attitudes are not manifested in their behavior. Observing that black policemen are often just as tough and suspicious in dealing with blacks as white policemen, Wilson concludes that "race

prejudice is not the crucial factor" in police treatment of blacks.[104]
On the basis of his observations, Skolnick asserts that, even though
traffic warrant officers are prejudiced, they carry out their work
"relatively evenhandedly." Any apparent discrimination, he says,
is really a spurious effect. The officer has certain non-racial
criteria for determining whether or not to arrest but, because blacks
are less likely to meet them, they are arrested more often. He con-
cedes, though, that his presence may have had some effects on the
officers' behavior and that policemen working in less "benign" settings
may more often act on their prejudices.[105]

Black and Reiss also conclude from the three-city observational
study that racial attitudes are not generally manifested in police
behavior. One reason is that, although more than 70% of policemen
express prejudiced attitudes, only about 8% of citizens are treated
with any signs of prejudice.[106] Another is that their observers
report no obvious links between attitudes and behavior.

> A recurring theme in the observers' reports was the great
> disparity between the verbalized attitudes of officers, in
> the privacy of the patrol car, and the public conduct of
> officers in encounters with Negroes and members of other
> minority groups . . .[107]

The first argument, as Campbell has shown, does not really demon-
strate that attitudes do not affect behavior. The disparity in per-
centages may simply result from a "threshold" effect: the fact that
expressing prejudice privately is much "easier" than acting it out
publicly. The more conclusive test is whether those who express
prejudice verbally are more likely than those who do not to

discriminate against blacks in their actions.[108] This test Black

and Reiss do not perform. Also questionable is their measure of

prejudice. Simply asking the observer to state whether or not the

officer acted "with prejudice," as they did, calls less for a

description of behavior than an evaluation of the motivations behind

it.

The second piece of evidence seems suspect as well. It is

doubtful whether observers in the field have sufficient perspective

to discern patterns underlying all the different actions they observe.

Further, observers may be swayed by officers' explanations—and

rationalizations—for what appears to be discriminatory behavior,

as one suspects Skolnick may have been in his study of warrant

officers.[109] (Other evidence, which approaches race by comparing

the treatment of blacks with the treatment of whites, rather than

by comparing the treatment of blacks across groups of policemen

differing in racial prejudice, will be considered in the following

section.)

Clear-cut empirical evidence that policemen's attitudes toward

women or young people affect their behavior toward these groups is

in short supply too. Rubinstein's participant-observer account does

clearly support the sex hypothesis, but one man's experiences in one

department during one year do not provide a solid basis for generali-

zation. Some support does come from the surveys cited in Chapter I.

As would be expected, women are less likely and young people more

likely to report mistreatment at the hands of the police. Whether

these differences are real and thus evidence of discriminatory behavior or occur simply because women are less likely and youths more likely to be offenders is unclear.[110]

There is no systematic evidence relating police isolation from the public, suspicion, morale, professionalism, or any other job-related attitude to actual police behavior. The case for these hypotheses rests almost entirely on the impressions of observers of the police. Walsh's interview study of policemen in four Midwestern towns does indicate that less professionally oriented policemen would act differently from more professionally oriented ones. The less professional say more often than the others that they would rough people up for "looking and talking tough," rather than for purposes of effectuating an arrest or defending themselves. Whether these men actually do act differently is unknown.[111] No studies have examined ties between attitudes toward the courts and actual behavior.

The notion that individual differences play an important role in the determination of police behavior is one that pervades the police literature. In spite of all the speculation and hypothesizing, though, there is very little evidence that bears one way or the other on the validity of the model. What little evidence there is yields a mixed picture, with individual differences sometimes appearing to be of consequence and other times not. The lack of evidence shows a need for more research into the relationships between police-men's attitudes and their behavior. The mixed character of the available evidence suggests the existence of relationships may not

be a "yes-no" proposition, but rather a contingent one. Future
research should be oriented, not toward the simple question of
whether individual differences do or do not affect behavior, but
rather toward the identification of conditions under which they do
or do not.[112]

The Situational Differences Model

Writers adopting a situational perspective have in common a
conception of police behavior as a response to the particular
characteristics of the situation in which policemen confront citizens.
They differ, as might be expected, in the kinds of characteristics
which they see as important. Some have focused on the legal aspects
of the situation, others on the characteristics of the citizens
encountered, and others on the physical and social setting.

The legal variant of the situational model bears a very close
resemblance to the legal variant of the machine model described at
the beginning of this chapter. Police behavior is seen as a response
to the legal character of the situation, with principal attention
being devoted to the law-enforcement/order maintenance distinc-
tion, the seriousness of the offense, and the quality of the evi-
dence. The essential difference is that the machine model is pre-
scriptive in tone, while the situational model is descriptive.
Whereas the machine model views factors like offense and evidence
as discrete criteria to be followed, the situational model views
them as variables which influence the actions of the officer. Black's
analysis of data from the observational study presented earlier in

this chapter provides perhaps the best evidence that the formal
actions of the police do depend on the seriousness of the offense
and the quality of the evidence, even if not exactly as the law
prescribes. The literature provides little indication of how infor-
mal treatment varies with such factors—whether, for example, the
offender who is suspected of a felony is treated more harshly than
one who commits a misdemeanor.

The second category of situational factors includes those
relating to the citizens with whom the policeman comes into contact—
the human stimulus, in effect, to which the policeman responds. These
may be usefully divided into two types: the characteristics of the
person and the behavior of the person. As noted in the section on
individual differences, where characteristics were viewed as objects
of attitudes rather than as variables in a situation, important
characteristics include sex, age, and race. Differences in the
treatment of the races have received the most attention, with the
anticipated disadvantage to blacks usually not materializing. Black
and Reiss find, for example, that blacks are not treated more harshly
than whites, although they are more likely to be treated in a
business-like fashion.[113] They further contend that blacks are not
arrested more often than whites once such factors as class and the
tendency of black offenders to be more antagonistic to the police
are taken into account.[114] Organizational factors may also impinge
on the relationship. Wilson finds little difference in arrest rates
between whites and blacks in legalistic departments, but some
differences in watchman-style departments. This fits with his

hypothesis that personal characteristics may play a bigger role, relative to legal behavior in watchman-style departments than in legalistic departments.[115]

Class, a factor identified early on in Marxist thinking as important to the actions of the police, continues as a focus of scholarly interest. Wilson argues that class provides special cues to the policeman, with the lower class victim often being seen as less legitimate than one of higher social standing.[116] Banton also sees class as significant:

> Many of the policemen whom the author has observed on patrol, or with whom he has discussed the question of how to handle different subjects, in practice adopt an impersonal manner with socially superior offenders and a familiar one with socially inferior offenders.

But he believes differences to be more important in Britain than in the United States, because of the greater salience of class in the former, and concedes that his observations were too limited to test adequately the hypothesis.[117]

Often the roles of class and race are evaluated competitively, with some arguing that alleged racial differences in treatment are really class differences. Bayley and Mendelsohn, relying on interview data, conclude that "it is clear that ethnicity is more important than class in the perceptions of officers."[118] In contrast, Black and Reiss report that "the observation data show that class rather than race determines police conduct"—where conduct refers to both police brutality and arrest.[119] A closer look at the evidence they present for arrest, however, indicates that race does have an impact even after class is held constant.[120]

Citizens' actions also exert a strong effect on police behavior. The role the citizen plays—complainant, victim, or offender, for example—affects the way in which the police treat him. Black and Reiss provide perhaps the best evidence of this, showing, for instance, that offenders are in fact treated more harshly than others.[121] But perhaps just as important is the way in which the citizen behaves toward the policeman. Many students of the police have singled out the citizen's deference or opposition to the policeman's authority. Verbal and physical resistance to the policeman has repeatedly been linked to sharp reactions by the policeman—verbal abuse, arrest, and even physical mistreatment. For example, in a study of police treatment of juvenile offenders, Piliavin and Briar report that "in the opinion of juvenile patrolmen themselves, the demeanor of apprehended juveniles was a major determinant of their decisions for 50-60 percent of the juvenile cases they processed." Further evidence is that, in a small-scale observational study, of 45 juvenile offenders rated as cooperative, 4.4% were arrested, while of 21 rated as uncooperative, 66.7% were arrested. Piliavin and Briar contend that differences in arrest rates between the races can be explained not so much by police prejudice or higher levels of offense among blacks as by the greater propensity of black offenders to be uncooperative with the police.[122] Black and Reiss present corroborative evidence for juveniles, though race and deferential behavior appear to complicate the basic pattern. They provide clear-cut evidence for adults as well, showing that demeanor affects verbal treatment, physical treatment, and even the probability of being arrested.[123]

Actions taken by one party in an encounter can also affect the way in which the policeman treats another party. LaFave and Wilson both note the control which the complainant or victim can exercise over the fate of an offender by expressing a preference on disposition to the officer.[124] Black's analyses show that such expressions do sway police decisions to file official reports and to arrest both juveniles and adults. In particular, rarely do police go against a complainant's request that the legal process not be invoked against a suspect. In a discussion which deserves greater attention from political scientists, Black notes the "radically democratic character" which this gives to police decisions on suspects. Community control of the police comes, not through the electoral process and the police chain of command, but through the individual actions of policemen complying with complainants' wishes. Though responsiveness may indeed be a virtue, this microcosmic political system reveals how it may be obtained at the expense of "uniform standards of justice."[125]

Finally, situation in the most common sense of the word—simple physical and social setting—has attracted the attention of a few scholars. Settings can vary in many different respects, as can be seen in Black and Reiss's descriptions of the many different places in which the police meet citizens. (Unfortunately, they do not actually relate these differences to behavior.[126]) In considering the effects of such a complicated factor as place, it is useful to think in terms of dimensions of difference.

Perhaps the most elemental and important distinction is between private places and public places—"inside" and "outside" settings, in police parlance. Many have noted that where a crime occurs greatly affects the possibility that the police will be able to do anything about it: crimes occurring in public can at least conceivably be prevented by the police, while crimes occurring in private cannot usually be prevented.[127] Rubinstein says that the importance of a crime to the policeman depends on this difference. If the crime is "outside"—i.e., the policeman can be expected to see it—then he should have done something about it. If the crime is "inside," away from his view, then he is "in the clear."[128]

Less often noted is the extent to which place can affect the policeman's behavior in the situation. Wilson points out that a policeman has fewer legal options in a private place than in a public one—he cannot, for example, usually arrest a person for public intoxication or disturbing the peace. There are ways of getting around the lack of authority. In cases where action seems essential, the policeman may simply go ahead and arrest.[129] Or he may employ trickery, amusing if it were not so appalling: a person who is drunk in a private place is asked by the police to step outside and talk things over. When he does, he is arrested for public intoxication.[130]

Setting may affect the policeman's manner as well. Skolnick contends that policemen are more likely to treat blacks harshly on the street than off the street. In street patrol, where police confront what they perceive as a hostile public, where stereotypy seems the only guide to action, and where performance bears little on

rewards or sanctions, the policeman may act hostilely.

> In detective work, by contrast, where contacts do not
> take place on the street, where the policeman does not
> feel as threatened, where he generally has more informa-
> tion about the people with whom he is dealing, and where
> the outcome is likely to be something that will benefit
> his professional record—these are the conditions that
> tend to moderate hostile interactions between police and
> citizens.[131]

Skolnick rightly suggests here that it is not so much physical place that determines behavior as its correlates. As the preceding quote indicates, central among these may be the threat which the officer feels in a situation. In fact, Skolnick sees danger as so much a part of police work that he gives it a prominent role in his conception of the "police milieu." To the "working personality" of the policeman it contributes traits of suspicion and isolation from both "symbolic assailants" and the general public.[132] That threat is important and correlated with place is borne out by other studies as well. Denver police officers have clear expectations, Bayley and Mendelsohn find, about the kinds of problems they are likely to encounter in particular geographical locations. They come to expect more trouble in some parts of the city than others—lower-income and minority areas, in particular—and thus are more alert, cautious, and anxious about violence when they enter these areas.[133] Rubin-stein's discussion of the policeman's dislike for public housing projects conveys a similar concern with threat: ". . . they combine the characteristics the policeman most fears—uncontrollable space [e.g., high roofs which can be used as platforms for attack], ardu-ous and restricted passage to the street [and the radio, his link

to additional help], and hostile people."[134]

An additional correlate of situational threat is the number of
patrolmen on the scene. A patrolman on his own, writes Rubinstein,
has only "slight and tenuous" control of the situation because he
is always vulnerable. Policemen in teams, on the other hand, can
share responsibilities and look out for each other.[135] This con-
sideration figures importantly in the debate, in the prescriptive
police administration literature, over one-man versus two-man pa-
trols. Advocates of two-man patrols argue that their lesser vulner-
ability disposes them to be more aggressive and thus more effective.
Advocates of one-man patrols argue that their greater vulnerability
is desirable because an officer by himself has ... use tact and t -
suasion, to exert moral authority and not unadorned power."[136] Un-
fortunately, no empirical evidence has yet demonstrated whether or
not police behavior actually does vary with this factor.

Setting may convey not only a sense of danger but also a set of
social standards. In Chapter I, it was noted that the policeman is
called upon to enforce community standards as well as, and sometimes
instead of, legal ones. In deciding what standards of behavior apply,
the policeman may well refer to the physical and social setting.[137]
Rubinstein states this notion succinctly: "Behavior tolerated in
one place is disallowed in another because it violates [the police-
man's] notion of what is right in that place."[138] Also important
is whether or not a person is "out of place." A black man walking
through a black neighborhood may be ignored by the police, but a
black man in a white neighborhood will probably be stopped and
questioned.[139]

Setting, finally, has implications for visibility to both the public and the police organization. Goldstein, LaFave, and Wilson, as noted earlier, have emphasized the low visibility of police actions. Neither the public nor the police organization has much knowledge of what the police do in the field. Consequently, the police have wide discretion in the way they carry out their work. To the extent that place affects visibility to either the public or the organization, it may affect the amount of discretion the policeman has and thus his behavior. Black writes, "It seems reasonable to expect that the sheer number who participate will affect the texture and perhaps even the substance of police-citizen interaction."[140] However, his analysis does not evaluate the hypothesis empirically. Perhaps this is because it is difficult to generalize about what such effects would be. Large numbers of people, especially unsympathetic ones, may threaten the policeman's control of the situation and cause him to react by asserting his authority. On the other hand, sympathetic bystanders may ease his task. Westley suggests that the presence of an audience may sometimes cause an officer to react with more hostility and Bittner reports some actual instances of this.[141]

Visibility to the organization may play a role as well. Most often, this is examined by assessing the effects of a presumably important determinant of visibility to the organization—whether the encounter is initiated by citizens or police. Black and Reiss argue that, when the citizen initiates the encounter by calling the police, the encounter becomes a matter of police record—that is, it becomes visible to the department—and the policeman's discretion is reduced.

When the policeman initiates the encounter, the department does not know of it—unless the policeman reports it himself or the citizen, perhaps because of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, reports it. Police discretion thus is thought to be greater in police-initiated than in citizen-initiated encounters. Black and Reiss treat this variable, which they call mobilization, as important, controlling for it repeatedly. However, their results and arguments suggest that differences in behavior between the two kinds of encounters may result more from the higher proportion of offenders in police-initiated encounters than from differences in visibility.[142]

Wilson offers a more complicated explanation of the relationship between mobilization and discretion. He properly recognizes that discretion exists at both the departmental level and the level of the individual patrolman, that it exists with respect to both the decision to initiate an encounter and the choice of a course of action within the encounter, and that it may vary between law enforcement and order maintenance situations. Yet his arguments on the relationships between all these factors and discretion are less than convincing. He draws his conclusions from an analysis of the "typical" incidents in each of the categories, not from the conceptual distinctions themselves, and additional variables (e.g., existence of performance measures, age of offender) are introduced ad hoc into the analysis.[143] In the end, it is not clear that his complicated formulation is preferable to a simple one that sees discretion as greater in police-invoked and order maintenance situations than in citizen-invoked and law enforcement situations.

Anyone who has observed closely the work of policemen in the field or even read one of the better observational accounts almost inevitably must come away with an appreciation of the importance of even extremely subtle situational differences in police behavior.[144] Indeed, one might despair that such complex and elusive phenomena could ever be the object of empirical analysis and generalization. Nevertheless, the literature presented here shows that a start has been made toward identifying the sorts of variables which influence behavior. The importance of the citizen's demeanor, for example, seems clearly established. In other areas, such as the effects of the presence of other citizens and other policemen, knowledge is clearly lacking.

Also lacking is an understanding of how these situational factors operate together to affect behavior. Do the seriousness of the offense and the antagonism of the offender each affect his treatment, for example, or is it just that more serious offenders are more likely to be antagonistic? Students who have measured only one factor cannot, of course, be expected to control for factors they have not measured. But even studies which have measured several factors have not in general employed controls effectively. It is paradoxical that, in an area where complexity is so often acknowledged, no one has yet employed the statistical techniques which can sort out the effects of a number of factors. Black and Reiss, for example, present only percentagized cross-tabulations and control only by subsetting. In all their analyses, they report not one measure of association, much less a partial measure of association. Thus there

is little way to gauge which variables are important, either by themselves or when taking into account the effects of other variables. Clearly, more sophisticated analytic techniques are needed if the complicated relationships between situational factors and police behavior are to be understood.

As a means of summing up what has come before and pointing the way to what follows, it is useful to ask at this point how much is really known about police behavior. Taken as a whole, the police literature is clearly long on speculation and impressions about why policemen act as they do, but short on evidence. Many key hypotheses have never been put to empirical test. Little is known about how much control police organizations can actually exert over the behavior, both formal and informal, of officers in the field. The effects of allegedly important factors such as the policeman's race, his degree of authoritarianism, his satisfaction with his work, and his attitudes toward the courts, for example, have never been systematically evaluated.

Other hypotheses have been tested, but the methods employed have often been so deficient as to call into question the value of the findings. Common among the problems in this area are the frequent reliance on small-scale studies in a single locale. Without questioning at all the internal validity of findings from such efforts, one can fairly ask whether what is true in "Westville" or Albany, or even high crime precincts in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, is

generally true of policemen in the United States or even big cities
in general.

Compounding this problem are differences in research foci and
methodology. For example, are Skolnick's observations about the
work of the vice squad or McEachern and Bauzer's conclusions regard-
ing the decisions of juvenile offenders applicable as well to the
work of patrolmen like those studied by Banton, Black and Reiss, and
Wilson? Do differences in methodology—between strategies which
observe police behavior in the field and those which rely on objective
indicators like arrest rates or between treatment of race as an
object of attitudes and as a situational variable—lead to differences
in conclusions? The result of all these differences is that it is
hard to know what to make of inconsistencies in results—do they
represent "real" differences or are they the result of differences in
locale, methodology, both, or neither? Until methodologically equi-
valent research is done in a variety of locales—some similar and
some different in their social and political character—generaliza-
tion will be a risky and, given the possibility of subsequent policy
use, even irresponsible business.

Another shortcoming, already noted in the discussion of situa-
tional factors, is the failure to employ appropriate statistical
techniques. Police behavior is indisputably complex in its deter-
minants. Yet most who have studied it have used only the simplest
statistical techniques. Simple cross-tabulations and, at the most,
chi-squares are the methodological order of the day. Though everybody
talks about how complicated things are, like the weather, nobody ever
does anything about it.[145]

But perhaps the foremost methodological problem is the failure

of scholars to look systematically at police behavior itself.

Rubinstein comments:

> Scholars rarely have either the time or the inclination
> to seek close ties with the men they want to study. In-
> stead of studying the work, they report on its organization
> and administration; instead of describing what the men do,
> they examine their feelings and values.[146]

This is a criticism which rings true. Those taking an organizational

approach have been content to compare arrest rates across police

organizations without considering the potential for intraorganiza-

tional variation and without acknowledging that the significance of

police work extends beyond arrest decisions. Those taking a social-

psychological approach have almost always assumed that behavior is

understood when attitudes are known without recognizing that the

former may diverge from the latter. In a literature filled with

references to "police behavior," the paucity of research which looks

systematically at what the police actually do stands as a glaring

anomaly.

In the end, however, the most serious deficiency of research

into the behavior of policemen is the narrowness of focus. This

chapter has identified, as underlying much of the thinking on the

roots of police behavior, three different models: the machine model,

the individual differences model, and the situational differences

model. All seem plausible as explanations of police behavior and at

least some evidence has been adduced for each of the three. What is

striking about the research taken as a whole, however, is that

individual research efforts address only one of the three explanations and exclude the others from consideration. Rarely do researchers assess the effects of more than one class of factors. Consider as examples of this narrowness in focus the following statements. Skolnick, operating within an organizational framework, dispenses with individual differences:

> I was not, in this study, concerned with individual differences among policemen.[147]

Gardiner writes, in a similar vein:

> It should be made clear . . . what this book does not purport to study. . . I am concerned with the policies of police departments, not of individual policemen.[148]

Holding firmly to his situational perspective, Black eschews individual differences:

> [This analysis's] approach is radically behavioral or, more specifically, supramotivational, in that it seeks out supraindividual conditions with which the probability of arrest varies. Implicit in this strategy is a conception of arrest as a social event rather than as an individual event. The mental processes of the police and the citizens whose outward behavior our observers recorded are not important to this analysis.[149]

Even Reiss, who has written at length on police organization and who selected the cities in the three-city study with their organizational differences in mind, devotes most of his attention to situational factors and little of it to organizational factors in his empirical analyses.[150] And the attitude studies cited earlier are uniform in their neglect of situational factors.

This failure to consider alternative hypotheses within the context of any single empirical study has had two undesirable consequences. First, the relative importance of each of the classes of factors remains unknown. Little is known about the relative impact of organizational, individual, and situational differences at the output level of police work. For example, a statement like the following one by Black and Reiss must be questioned.

> . . . Policemen, like other social actors, often are not quite so free to act out their feelings as they appear to be . . . Police-citizen transactions seemingly assume an empirical uniformity that is to a significant extent independent of the attitudes of the participants involved.[151]

As plausible as the assertion may seem, it must be recognized that their analysis has not given the attitudinal explanation a fair empirical test, since attitudes have not been entered into the empirical analysis in any adequate fashion.

Second, and just as important, there is no way to assess the interplay among the different classes of variables. Do differences in the organizational context or in the field situation affect relationships between individual differences and behavior? Do responses to differences in situations differ across individuals and organizations? With the exception of Wilson's work, research up to now has ignored such questions. This is a neglect which this dissertation aims to redress. In the following pages, it is hoped, new light will be shed on some old hypotneses and first light shed on some new ones.

Footnotes for Chapter II

1. Nicos P. Mouzelis, Organization and Bureaucracy (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1968), p. 85.

2. Sanford H. Kadish, "Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes," Harvard Law Review 75 (1962): 906. Herman Goldstein characterizes this view of the policeman's function as a "cold and somewhat meachanical calculation . . . of relating the provision of the law to a fine measurement of the quantum of evidence." "Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real," in The Ambivalent Force, eds. Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg (San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1973), p. 148.

3. Joseph Goldstein, "Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process," in Criminal Justice, ed. George F. Cole (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972), p. 62. Wayne R. LaFave agrees that "a good case can be made for the proposition that the state legislatures have generally denied the police authority to exercise discretion," but points to statutes defining general powers of arrest without warrant which seem to speak more often in terms of permission than of obligation: the police "may" arrest when evidence exists rather than the police "shall" arrest. Arrest (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 76-79.

4. J. Goldstein, p. 63.

5. LaFave, pp. 79-82. Oddly enough, the distinction between permissive and obligatory views of arrest is not crucial here. LaFave notes, "Occasionally courts have suggested that even the permissive language must be read as imposing a duty to arrest when the officer obtains the necessary evidence" (p. 78).

6. See, for example, the classic text in police administration, O.W. Wilson and Roy Clinton McLaren, Police Administration, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 55-149. Note the emphases on coordination (pp. 115-119, 124-127), communication (pp. 128-135, 144-149), and supervision (pp. 135-141). The concentration on formal characteristics of the organization and the neglect of the individual noted in this branch of the police literature are typical of classical organization theory. Mouzelis comments: "The universalist school concentrates on the formal aspects of the organization: the organizational structure is mainly viewed in terms of patterns of responsibilities, and prescribed in relationships among them. The stress is not on behavior and motivation but on design and rules to be recorded in an organizational chart or manual " (p. 90).

7. Mouzelis, p. 21.

8. J. Goldstein, p. 63. LaFave again agrees in principle, but
    cites some manuals which recognize a need for discretion
    (pp. 156-157).

9. J. Goldstein, pp. 65-78. John Gardiner provides another good
    example of this policy of deliberately underenforcing the
    traffic laws in Lynn, Massachusetts. Traffic and the Police
    (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 52-58.

10. LaFave, pp. 83-152.

11. Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York: Wiley,
    1966), pp. 80-81.

12. Abraham S. Blumberg and Arthur Niederhoffer, "The Police in
    Social and Historical Perspective," in Niederhoffer and
    Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 4; Joseph Lohman, cited in
    William Westley, Violence and the Police (Cambridge, Mass.:
    The MIT Press, 1970), p. 16; George F. Cole, Politics and the
    Administration of Justice (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage
    Publications, 1973), p. 17.

13. Michael Banton, The Policeman in the Community (New York:
    Basic Books, 1964), p. 146. This quote refers more to indi-
    vidual decisions than departmental policy, but the remarks
    by supervisory officers in the following pages (pp. 47-49)
    clearly show that they accept and, indeed, require of their
    subordinates a sensitivity to the public's wishes.

14. David J. Bordua and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Command, Control,
    and Charisma: Reflections on Police Bureaucracy," in Niederhoffer
    and Blumburg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 83.

15. Wilson and McLaren, pp. 14-27.

16. James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge,
    Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 49.

17. See, for example, LaFave, pp. 83-143; Banton, pp. 147-148, 163,
    174, 201; Wilson, Varieties, p. 54, pp. 145-146.

18. Banton, pp. 127, 132.

19. Gardiner, pp. 4-10.

20. Gardiner, p. 4.

21. Wilson, p. 49. See, for example, pp. 95, 132, 158-159.

22. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Donald J. Black, "Interrogation and the Criminal Process," Annals of the American Academy 374 (1967): 55.

23. Richard Ayers, "Confessions and the Court," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 276.

24. Donald J. Black, "The Social Organization of Arrest," Stanford Law Review 23 (June 1971): 1087-1011 (quote from p. 1094).

25. Donald J. Black, "Production of Crime Rates," American Sociological Review 35 (August 1970): 733-48.

26. LaFave, pp. 147-149, 493-494; H. Goldstein, "Police Discretion," pp. 149, 151-154; Wilson, Varieties, p. 181.

27. J. Goldstein, p. 78.

28. LaFave, pp. 69-72, 127-132; Banton, pp. 130-146.

29. Herman Goldstein, "Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, pp. 85-99; Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1969), pp. 80-96.

30. Gardiner, pp. 127-159.

31. Wilson, Varieties, 95-139.

32. Ibid.; Gardiner, pp. 45-108, 156-159.

33. Gardiner, pp. 62-66, 91-108, 154-156; Wilson, Varieties, pp. 172-185, 234.

34. Gardiner, pp. 139-149.

35. Ibid., pp. 162-165.

36. John A. Gardiner, The Politics of Corruption (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), esp. pp. 69, 95.

37. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 95-96.

38. Ibid., pp. 94-99.

39. Ibid., pp. 227-277, esp. 227-234. Parallel to the empirical question of how much political control over the police there is runs a normative one of how much there should be. The notion that the police should be under political control is, as suggested earlier, abhorrent to many. To those who see law as a fixity or law enforcement as a profession, "politics" is an illegitimate force which deflects the law from its proper application

(Wilson and McLaren, p. 27). In the United States, tradi-
tional misgivings about concentrations of power urge separa-
tion between elected officials and the police—in contrast to
Europe, where "political control" is viewed more favorably.
See George E. Berkley, The Democratic Policeman (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969), pp. 38-45. Recent years have seen more support
for increased popular and/or political control of the police,
with some arguing that the police, like other public institu-
tions, should be more responsive to the needs, standards, and
preferences of the people they serve—see, for example, Elinor
Ostrom, "The Design of Institutional Arrangements and the
Responsiveness of the Police," in People vs. Government: The
Responsiveness of American Institutions, edited by Leroy N.
Rieselbach, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1975), pp. 274-299. For a discussion of the merits of the two
positions, identified as the "institutional" and "communal"
models, respectively, see Wilson, Varieties, pp. 285-290. A
related debate is the controversy over police-citizen review
boards—to what degree should the actions of the police be
subject to review by "outsiders"? See, for example, Algernon
Black, The People and the Police (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

40. A. W. McEachern and Riva Bauzer, "Factors Related to Disposition
in Juvenile Police Contacts," in Juvenile Gangs in Context,
ed. Malcolm W. Klein (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1967), pp. 148-60.

41. Bordua and Reiss, pp. 78-79.

42. See, for example, Wilson, Varieties, pp. 7-8, 30; Skolnick,
Justice, pp. 231-34; Banton, pp. 128-29; LaFave, pp. 153-57.

43. Wilson and McLaren make the point in more prescriptive terms:
"He who gives an order must ascertain that it has been properly
executed. It is relatively easy to delegate authority by giv-
ing a command, but to determine the manner in which the order
was carried out is often difficult." (pp. 196-197).

44. See especially LaFave, pp. 83-152.

45. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 155-157, 185-187.

46. Westley, Violence, pp. 111-52; see also Ellwyn R. Stoddard,
"The Informal 'Code' of Police Deviancy: A Group Approach to
'Blue-Coat' Crime," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and
Police Science 59 (June 1968): 201-213.

47. Jesse Rubin, "Police Identity and the Police Role," in The
Police and the Community, ed. Robert F. Steadman (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 31.

48. Wilson, *Varieties* , p. 49.

49. Banton, p. 234. Jonathan Rubinstein provides a good description of the nature of peer relationships (especially between partners) among policemen in *City Police* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), pp. 483-47.

50. Skolnick, *Justice*, esp. pp. 6, 238-245.

51. Milton Rokeach, Martin J. Miller, and John A. Snyder, "The Value Gap Between Police and Policed," *Journal of Social Issues* 27 (Spring 1971): 156-58; Robert W. Balch, "The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science* 63 (March 1972): 106-119; Joel Lefkowitz, "Psychological Attributes of Policemen: A Review of Research and Opinion," *Journal of Social Issues* 31 (Winter 1975): 3-26.

52. Fewer than 10% of policemen are black. John Darnton, "Color Line a Key Police Problem," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, *The Ambivalent Force*, p. 75. On class and education, see Arthur Niederhoffer, *Behind the Shield* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 39-41; and John H. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work," in *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 193-94.

53. Balch, pp. 107-108; Lefkowitz, pp. 11-13; Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder, p. 57.

54. Balch, pp. 110-117.

55. Rokeach, pp. 156-158; Balch, pp. 110-114; Lefkowitz, pp. 9-19.

56. Rokeach, pp. 160-163.

57. Jacob Chwast, "Value Conflicts in Law Enforcement," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, *The Ambivalent Force*, p. 113.

58. H. Carlson, R.E. Thayer, and A.C. Germann, "Social Attitudes and Personality Differences Among Members of Two Kinds of Police Departments (Innovative vs. Traditional) and Students," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science* 62 (December 1971): 564.

59. Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder, p. 156.

60. Niederhoffer, *Behind the Shield*, p. 10.

61. William K. Stevens, "Black Policemen Bring Reforms," New York Times, 11 August 1974, p. 35. See also Nicholas Alex, Black in Blue (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 16.

62. Banton, p. 174. See also Rita M. Kelly and Gorman West, Jr., "The Racial Transition of a Police Force," in The Urban Policeman in Transition, eds. John R. Snibbe and Homa M. Snibbe (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1973), pp. 354-81. At pp. 354-5, they cite a number of references favoring and opposing increased minority hiring by police departments. William M. Kephart finds that black policemen in Philadelphia generally feel they must be particularly hard on black offenders. Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 115.

63. James Q. Wilson, "Generational and Ethnic Differences Among Career Police Officers," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 71.

64. Wilson, Varieties , pp. 33-34.

65. Berkley, p. 74. See also Bernard Locke and Alexander Smith, "Police Who Go to College," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, pp. 144-145.

66. U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 109-10; see also Niederhoffer, pp. 41-42.

67. Cited in T.A. Critchley, A History of the Police in England and Wales: 900-1966 (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1967), p. 53.

68. Berkley, pp. 53-54.

69. William H. Parker, quoted by Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield, p. 109.

70. Locke and Smith, pp. 145-146.

71. Carlson, Thayer, and German, p. 564.

72. Rokeach, Miller, and Snyder, pp. 168-169.

73. Skolnick, Justice, pp. 49-51.

74. Ibid., pp. 59-62.

75. Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: Norton, 1932), p. 135.

76. Robert A. Mendelsohn, "Police-Community Relations: A Need in Search of Police Support," in Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 167. See also L.H. Whittemore, Cop! (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1969), p. 279; and W. Eugene Grove and Peter H. Rossi, "Police Perceptions of a Hostile Ghetto," in Hahn, Police, pp. 176-77.

77. U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 100; and Rubin, p. 48.

78. David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn, Minorities and the Police (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 162-163. See also Jerome H. Skolnick, "The Police and the Urban Ghetto," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 225; Michael Banton, Police-Community Relations (London: William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1973), p. 113.

79. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 155-56, 187.

80. Jerome H. Skolnick and J. Richard Woodworth, "Bureaucracy, Information, and Social Control: A Study of a Morals Detail," in Bordua, The Police, p. 121.

81. Westley, Violence, p. 49.

82. Rubinstein, pp. 265, 316-7; see also Niederhoffer, pp. 127-8; Bayley and Mendelsohn, pp. 100-105.

83. Donald H. Bouma, Kids and Cops (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1969), p. 119.

84. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 140-6.

85. James Q. Wilson, "The Police and Their Problems," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, pp. 293-4.

86. Bruce T. Olson, "Police Opinions of Work: An Exploratory Study," in Snibbe and Snibbe, The Urban Policeman, p. 234.

87. James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case," in Bordua, The Police, p. 159.

88. Niederhoffer, pp. 101-2.

89. McNamara, pp. 186-90.

90. Joel Lefkowitz, "Attitudes of Police Toward Their Job," in Snibbe and Snibbe, The Urban Policeman, p. 205.

91. Westley, _Violence_, pp. 81-82.

92. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and David J. Bordua, "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police," in Bordua, _The Police_, p. 33. See also Nathan Goldman, "The Differential Selection of Juvenile Offenders for Court Appearance," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, _The Ambivalent Force_, p. 159.

93. James Q. Wilson, "The Police in the Ghetto," in Steadman, _The Police in the Community_, p. 71.

94. Gardiner, _Traffic_, p. 152.

95. Whittemore, p. 237.

96. See, for example, Bruce J. Terris, "The Role of the Police," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, _The Ambivalent Force_, pp. 43-44; James Q. Wilson, "Dilemmas of Police Administration," _Public Administration Review_ 28 (September-October 1968): 409.

97. Melany E. Baehr, John E. Furcon, and Ernest C. Froemel, _Psychological Assessment of Patrolman Qualifications in Relation to Field Performance_ (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968); John E. Furcon, Ernest C. Froemel, and Melany E. Baehr, "Psychological Predictors and Patterns of Patrolman Field Performance," in Snibbe and Snibbe, _The Urban Policeman_, pp. 58-59.

98. Ibid., p. 56.

99. McEachern and Bauzer, pp. 148-60.

100. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Brutality: Answers to Key Questions," _Transaction_, July-August 1968, pp. 16-7.

101. Bayley and Mendelsohn, pp. 104-5.

102. F.K. Heussenstamm, "Bumper-Stickers and the Cops," _Transaction_, February 1971, pp. 32-33.

103. Kephart, pp. 106-7.

104. Wilson, "Dilemmas," 412.

105. Skolnick, _Justice_, pp. 83-90, and "The Police and the Urban Ghetto," pp. 225-6.

106. Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions," in U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, _Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas_, Field Surveys III, Vol. II, Section 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 41-42, 132-39.

107. Ibid., p. 138.

108. Donald T. Campbell, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Dispositions," in Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 159-62.

109. Balch (p. 109) offers two additional criticisms of Black and Reiss's study: (1) the inclusion of pejorative names in the measure of racial prejudice, which, because they may simply be a part of police argot, may not be a good indicator of racial prejudice; (2) the failure to provide non-police control groups as a baseline against which to evaluate levels of pre-judiced expressions and prejudiced behavior among policemen.

110. One study which does take several of these factors into account simultaneously is McEachern and Bauzer's California study (see note 40). Holding age constant by looking only at juveniles, they find an apparent relationship between sex and disposition, with girls somewhat more likely than boys to be sanctioned. Controlling for seriousness of offense reveals sex to have no significant impact, though there is a significant interaction effect: girls are more likely than boys to be sanctioned for less serious offenses and less likely to be sanctioned for more serious offenses.

111. James Leo Walsh, "Professionalism and the Police: The Cop as Medical Student," in Hahn, The Police, pp. 225-45.

112. See Wilson, "The Police in the Ghetto," p. 65, for an expression of a similar sentiment.

113. Black and Reiss, "Patterns," pp. 32-3.

114. Ibid., pp. 79-80; Black, "Social Organization," pp. 1097-8.

115. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 189-90.

116. Ibid., p. 27.

117. Banton, The Policeman, pp. 186-7.

118. Bayley and Mendelsohn, pp. 73, 144-7.

119. On class and brutality, see Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 155. For a fuller discussion, see his "Police Brutality," pp. 16-17. On class and arrest, see Black and Reiss, "Patterns," p. 80.

120. An examination of per cents in their Table 13 ("Patterns," p. 80) shows that, within both class groups, blacks are arrested more often than whites—13% to 8% in the white-collar group and 26% to 15% in the blue-collar group.

121. Black and Reiss, "Patterns," pp. 51-57.

122. Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, "Police Encounters with Juveniles," American Journal of Sociology 70 (September 1964): 210-2.

123. For juveniles, see Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Control of Juveniles," American Sociological Review 35 (February 1970): 74-75. For adults, on verbal treatments, see Reiss, The Police, pp. 48-54; on arrest, see Black, "The Social Organization," pp. 1097-1101; on physical mistreatment, see Reiss, "Police Brutality," p. 18. See also, for a discussion of ties to informal treatment, Black and Reiss, "Patterns," pp. 33-37; Skolnick, Justice, pp. 89-90. Rubinstein also provides a good discussion of the ways in which verbal treatment can be used to control an antagonistic citizen (p. 326); for a discussion of ties to arrest, see Egon Bittner, "The Police on Skid Row: A Study of Peace-Keeping," American Sociological Review 32 (October 1967): 708; Goldman, p. 160; LaFave, pp. 146-7; Wilson, Varieties, p. 130; Westley, Violence, p. 119. For a discussion of ties to force, see Westley, Violence, pp. 118-28; Rubinstein, pp. 328-30.

124. LaFave, pp. 114-123; Wilson, Varieties, p. 131.

125. Black, "Production," pp. 738-9; "Police Control," pp. 70-72; "Social Organization," pp. 1095-7, 1105-6.

126. Donald J. Black, "Police Encounters and Social Organization: An Observation Study," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968), pp. 78-87; Reiss, The Police, pp. 7-17.

127. Wilson, Varieties, p. 59; Richard Dougherty, "The Case for the Cop," in Niederhoffer and Blumberg, The Ambivalent Force, p. 310; Reiss, The Police, pp. 7-8; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Institutions of Privacy in the Determination of Police Administrative Practice," American Journal of Sociology 69 (September 1963): 150-61.

128. Rubinstein, pp. 341-5.

129. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 128-9.

130. LaFave, p. 29.

131. Skolnick, "The Police and the Urban Ghetto," pp. 225-6; also _Justice_, pp. 86-8.

132. Skolnick, _Justice_, p. 44; see also Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 39-40.

133. Bayley and Mendelsohn, pp. 72-7, 89-97.

134. Rubinstein, p. 299.

135. Rubinstein, p. 315.

136. The sides also differ in their expectations about how citizens respond to the two situations. Two-man advocates argue that resistance is less likely with two officers present, since the offender knows it will be of little use. One-man advocates argue that resistance is more likely with two officers present, since the offender feels more threatened. Banton, _The Policeman_, pp. 151-2. See also O.W. Wilson, "One-Man Patrol Cars," _The Police Chief_, May 1963, pp. 18-24.

137. LaFave, pp. 110-4; Wilson, _Varieties_, p. 141.

138. Rubinstein, pp. 151-2; see also Bittner, p. 713.

139. Carl Werthman and Irving Piliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," in Bordua, _The Police_, pp. 77-9; Thomas Adams, "Field Interrogation," _Police_, May-April 1963, p. 28. Adams advises policemen to "look for the unusual," e.g., "persons who do not 'belong' where they are observed." See also Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 38-9.

140. Black, "Police Encounters and Social Organization," p. 98.

141. Westley, _Violence_, pp. 119, 127-8; Bittner, 712-3.

142. Black and Reiss, "Patterns," pp. 6-8, 32, 35, 78-9; Black, "Police Encounters," pp. 31-2.

143. Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 83-89.

144. See, in particular, Rubinstein, Piliavin and Briar, Werthman and Piliavin, and Bittner. Perhaps the best single illustration is Rubinstein's discussion of the subtleties of observing cars and, particularly, license plates (pp. 252-259).

145. This problem is not unique to the police literature. See Edward Tufte, "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," in _The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems_, ed. Tufte (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970), p. 438.

146. Rubinstein, p. x.

147. Skolnick, <u>Justice</u>, p. 34.

148. Gardiner, <u>Traffic</u>, p. 12.

149. Black, "Social Organization," p. 1093.

150. Reiss, <u>The Police</u>, p. xi-xii.

151. Black and Reiss, "Patterns," pp. 138-9.

CHAPTER III

INDIVIDUAL AND SITUATIONAL SOURCES OF BEHAVIOR

In its division between individual and situational explana-
tions of behavior, the police literature reflects a basic division
that cuts across the behavioral sciences as a whole. Some
scholars—traditional psychologists and social psychologists, for
example—have tended to see behavior as emanating from within the
individual, as a product of the individual's personality and atti-
tudes. Others—sociologists and behavioral psychologists, for
example—have tended to see the behavior of the individual as
externally determined, as a response to the environment which the
individual confronts. The parallel divisions are not surprising,
given that students of the police have often been psychologists or
sociologists who simply apply the general perspectives of their
disciplines to the particular problem of the police.

However, if the literature on the police and the broader be-
havioral literature resemble each other in their common division
between "internal" and "external" explanations of behavior, they do
differ in one important respect. In the behavioral literature,
the two different models of behavior have been explicitly recognized
and some attempt has been made to evaluate their relative merits
and to integrate them. In the literature on the police, as noted
at the conclusion of the previous chapter, the models only impli-
citly underlie much of the work. The failure to recognize them

explicitly has precluded their treatment either as competing or complementary hypotheses. As a result, our understanding of the determinants of police behavior remains limited and unstructured.

This difference in level of understanding suggests a strategy for advancing our knowledge about the behavior of policemen. The more developed general literature can serve as a guide to the exploration of the particular class of phenomena under study here—the actions of policemen. It can point up conceptual and methodological difficulties and suggest more and less promising hypotheses. In this way, our understanding of police behavior can perhaps be advanced further and faster than would be possible otherwise.

The one difficulty with this approach is that the broader literature bearing directly on the individual versus situational differences question is not itself a single well-integrated body of work. It includes two fairly separate strands of theory and research: the psychological literature on personality and the social psychological literature on attitude-behavior consistency. They differ in the models which underlie them and the methodologies which have been employed to test those models. Nevertheless, both bodies of literature do suggest possible avenues for research into the impact of individual and situational factors on behavior—and, fortunately, the avenues they suggest turn out to be fairly similar.

The objective of this chapter is to pull together the psychological and social psychological literature on individual and situational differences and to draw from that integrated body a set of

general hypotheses describing the impact of these factors on behavior. Chapter IV will build upon the work of this chapter by applying the general hypotheses developed here to the specific instance of police behavior.

It should be emphasized at the outset that it is not the intention here to present a comprehensive review of all the literature on individual and situational differences. Others have already pursued that objective more thoroughly and more successfully than could be done here and their work provides the basis for much of what follows.[1] Rather, the aim is to identify the central themes of this literature and the questions it raises for further research.

Individuals and Situations: An Overview

The layman, when asked why a particular person has performed a particular action, often will explain it in terms of either the person's "character" or, alternatively, the circumstances in which the person acted. When pressed, he will usually concede the importance of the alternative explanation and then perhaps move to some more complicated explanation of the behavior in terms of both the person and the circumstances.[2] But, through much of its history— Lewin's formulation of

$$Behavior = f \ (Person, Environment)$$

is perhaps the most important early exception[3]—psychology has tended to focus on either the person or the circumstances, but not on both.

Individuals

Early on, "person"-oriented conceptions of behavior dominated psychology. Human behavior was seen as flowing from within the individual, as a consequence of stable mental structures which existed within the individual. These mental structures differed in the breadth of the range of behaviors which they controlled. Structures which determined behaviors toward a broad range of objects— here construed to include people and real or abstract things—were called types or traits. For example, people might differ in how friendly, anxious, or honest they were, to name a few common "traits." Mental structures which determined behaviors toward a narrower range of objects were called attitudes. People might vary in how much they like cherry pie, blacks, or Mozart, for example.

Assessing these structures posed a major problem to the advocates of the perspective. Being mental phenomena, traits and attitudes were concealed within the individual's head, closed off to direct outside observation. The strategy employed was to administer tests and questionnaires to the individual, constructed so as to elicit verbal responses that revealed the psychological make-up of the individual. Traits and attitudes were, in other words, inferred from the verbal responses of the individuals to strategically structured stimuli.

Since these mental structures were seen as determining behavior and as stable within the individual, but varying from individual to individual, the "mental structures" perspective implied the validity of three empirical propositions:

1)   overt behavior and the relevant mental structures—
the traits and attitudes "tapped" by verbal re-
sponses—will be correlated;

2)   the behavior of an individual (and of individuals
with like traits or attitudes) will, in general or
with respect to particular objects, be consistent;

3)   behavior will vary from individual to individual (or
at least across groups of individuals with different
traits or attitudes).

However, for a long period of time, there was little interest in
examining the validity of propositions like these. Though the
assessment of mental structures seemed relatively easy, the study
of actual behavior was more difficult.[4] And the "face validity"
of the factors tapped by measurement techniques as explanations for
behavior seemed so great that there seemed to be little need to
correlate them with behavior. It seemed easier and of far greater
theoretical significance to focus on the mental structures them-
selves—their nature, their sources, their inter-relationships—and
that is the task to which many social scientists devoted themselves.

The "trait and attitude" conception has drawn two separate but
related challenges. One concentrates on the logical structure of
the model—essentially the first proposition above. The other con-
centrates on the empirical validity of the model—essentially the
second and third propositions above.

The first challenge attacks the conception's reliance on an internal mental state which is "tapped" via verbal responses. Those pursuing an objective, observationally based explanation of behavior understandably criticize a model in which the "independent variable" is not directly observable. The strategy which the proponents of mental states employ to assess these structures is not likely to assuage the "behaviorists'" concerns. In inferring internal structures from verbal responses, the "attitudinalists" or "mentalists," as behaviorists sometimes pejoratively call them, seize upon one kind of behavior—verbal behavior—and interpret it as indicating an internal state. They then correlate it with overt behavior and claim to have explained the overt behavior by reference to the internal state. The problem with this lies in the logical basis for identifying verbal behavior as an indicator of a mental state and overt behavior simply as behavior. Both could just as well be regarded as indicators of mental states—independent variables—or behaviors to be explained—dependent variables. The designation of one as independent variable and the other as dependent variable seems arbitrary. Why not, for example, explain verbal behavior by correlating it with a mental state inferred from overt behavior? The strategy of inferring from one behavior a mental state which is then interpreted as a cause of another behavior seems to many unscientific in its reliance on an unseen variable and theoretically arbitrary in its assumption regarding the direction of causality.[5]

In fairness, it must be admitted that, were there evidence of a significant correlation between verbal behavior and overt behavior,

the objections noted in the previous paragraph would be less compelling. Viewing both verbal responses and overt actions simply as behavior, the existence of a correlation between the two would at least suggest the existence of a latent variable—for example, a mental structure—determining both.[6] Empirical confirmation of Proposition 1, in other words, might help to rebut the criticisms of the behaviorists. To the detriment of the "attitudinalists'" case such evidence has not in general been forthcoming. Mischel finds the evidence of relationships between verbal indicators of traits and behavior to be limited.[7] Wicker concludes an extensive review of the social psychological literature—focusing primarily on the evidence of relationships between job attitudes and job performance and between attitudes toward minorities and behavior toward them—with this assessment:

> Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to actions. Product-moment correlation coefficients relating the two kinds of responses are rarely above .30, and often are near zero. Only rarely can as much as 10 percent of the variance in overt behavioral measures be accounted for by attitudinal data.[8]

Setting aside all questions of logical status, then, there is little evidence in the literature on verbal and overt behavior consistency to support "trait and attitude" explanations of behavior.

Given the difficulties of getting at internal psychological dispositions, some have pursued a strategy which avoids any pretense of measuring internal states and looks instead to what should occur as the logically derivable consequences of the operations of such entities. Even if traits and attitudes cannot be measured directly,

if such stable entities do determine behavior, then individuals should behave consistently and different individuals should behave differently. (Propositions 2 and 3.)[9]

Again, however, the empirical evidence does not appear to jibe with theoretical expectations. Individual consistency in behavior appears to be not the rule, but the exception. In a few instances—where intellective and cognitive variables are concerned, where the situations in which the behaviors occur are very nearly alike—behavioral consistencies may emerge. But in most other instances behavior is often quite inconsistent. Mischel examines a substantial number of studies, ranging over such diverse personality variables as attitudes toward authority and peers, moral behavior (honesty), dependency, aggression, rigidity and tolerance for ambiguity, cognitive avoidance, and conditionability.[10] He concludes:

> Individuals show far less cross-situational consistency in their behavior than has been assumed by trait-state theories.[11]

Vernon, Peterson, and Bem and Allen draw similar conclusions from their reviews.[12] The evidence of inconsistency in verbal and overt behaviors cited in the previous paragraph makes the same point for behaviors toward more narrowly defined classes of objects and is buttressed by evidence of inconsistent behavior toward apparently similar objects.[13] There is, then, little evidence of the consistency of behavior in general or of behavior toward particular objects which the trait and attitude perspectives, respectively, would predict.

These challenges to the trait and attitude conceptions have elicited several significant responses. One class sees the problems as essentially methodological. Campbell has argued, for example, that much of the alleged evidence against behavioral consistency stems from a confusion of inconsistency with situational threshold differences. He contends that people who act in a certain fashion in one situation and differently in another may be revealing, not that they are inconsistent, but that it is "easier" to act in that fashion in the former situation than in the latter. Only when people who act in a certain way in one situation are less likely than others to act that way in another similar situation can it be said that behavior is inconsistent.[14]

Others have argued that inconsistencies observed in behavior, including the inconsistencies between verbal and overt behavior, stem not from real variability, but from faulty measurement. Granted, any two specific measures may correlate weakly, but this is because these are each only imperfect indicators of broad underlying behavioral generalities. The weak relationships result, in other words, not from the failure of the theory, but from the failure of the methods used to test the theory—namely, measurement of dubious validity and reliability. The typical palliative for this problem has been to employ multiple-item indicators of verbal and overt behavior in lieu of single-item indicators. Such strategies do indeed often generate stronger relationships between verbal and overt behavioral measures.[15] But this apparent success should not be allowed to conceal the fact that inconsistencies among the behaviors

that enter into these indices are often low. For example, Fishbein
and Ajzen, in attempting to construct a scale from 100 behaviors
which "theoretically" manifested religiosity, found that most
items did not scale under either Guttman, Likert, or Thurstone pro-
cedures.[16] Inconsistency among items that "should" go together is
often so great as to threaten the assumption of communality on
which the construction of a summary indicator rests. The promise
of the "better measurement" response thus remains just a promise—
one which the available evidence on behavioral consistency suggests
will not be realized and for which the burden of proof rests upon
its advocates.

Other responses have involved theoretical reformulation. One
retains the assumption of stable internal states, but denies that
they will necessarily lead to consistency in behavior. This is
the underlying premise of psychodynamic conceptions of behavior.
Individuals possess underlying stable dispositions or motives which,
because they are to some extent repressed through the individual's
defense mechanisms, sometimes manifest themselves only in disguised
fashion. The apparent inconsistencies between direct and disguised
behaviors are, once the defense mechanisms are understood, revealed
to be, not inconsistencies, but varying phenotypic manifestations
of an underlying genotype. Behaviors which appear to be inconsis-
tent are in fact consistent because they are all expressive of the
individual's underlying dispositions and motives.[17] The validity
of the approach, however, depends upon the ability of observers to
sort out and decipher the direct and the disguised behaviors—an

ability which the divergence in the assessments such observers make suggests has not yet been developed.[18]

If these responses at least retain the essential elements of the "mental structures" perspective, others reveal more willingness to discard it. They ask, in effect, whether there is really any good reason to expect that verbal behaviors and/or overt behaviors will be consistent with one another. Deutscher provides a useful discussion of some of the theoretical grounds on which behavioral inconsistency seems just as plausible, if not more plausible, a state of affairs as consistency.[19] Underlying most of them is a conception that questions the emphasis on the individual alone as the source of behavior and looks instead to the environment in which he functions.

Situations

The logical problem posed by inferring unobservable internal states from some behaviors and then using those inferred states to explain other behaviors and the empirical problem posed by the substantial evidence of behavioral inconsistency have weakened the foundations of "trait-state" psychology. They have also laid the foundations for the conception of behavior which has been advanced as a replacement and which in recent years has come to hold center stage in many of the behavioral sciences. This perspective directs attention to the external determinants of behavior. It sees human behavior as flowing from the environment, as a response to the exterior conditions which the individual confronts.

The conception's prototype is the stimulus-response paradigm of experimental psychology. As a result of various learning processes (in early formulations, classical and operant conditioning), specific stimuli come to elicit specific responses in conditioned individuals. Thus variations in stimulation to the individual produce variations in the responses of the individual. More recent formulations have emphasized other types of learning processes (e.g., contemporary "social learning" theories emphasize learning by observation) and have construed stimulus more broadly—not necessarily as a particular and narrow event, but also as a broader and more complex package of stimuli that comprise a "situation" or environment.

The perspective is calculated to avoid the logical problem which plagues the "trait-state" conception. Adopting a positivistic stance, it seeks to identify <u>observable</u> variables which <u>cause</u> behavior. In stressing the observability of phenomena, it eschews interest in the workings of people's minds and focuses instead on actual behavior and the objective conditions under which it occurs. In stressing causality, it leans toward experimental, as opposed to correlational, tests of hypotheses.[20]

On the characterization to this point, most of both the advocates and the opponents of this "situational" perspective would probably agree. Somewhat less agreement would be found in evaluations of the perspective's success in eschewing unobservable variables. If scientific explanation consists, as is commonly accepted, of the observation of empirical regularities and a theoretical

rationale for the regularities, then the success of the paradigm
must be questioned. The conceptual gap between stimulus and
response has led many to question the "theoretical understanding"
imparted by the perspective. By what means other than some inter-
nal mechanism, they ask, can a variation in stimulation produce a
variation in behavior? Advocates of situational explanations have
in effect conceded the point by re-admitting perceptions, cogni-
tions, and such notions as "the acquired meaning of stimuli" into
their lexicon—even if only on an avowedly "temporary" basis.[21]

Even less agreement would be found regarding the role which
the perspective implies for "person." Since this is crucial to an
understanding of the empirical implications of the perspective—and
since it seems to be a major source of confusion among those who
have written about it—it deserves some attention here. Three dis-
tinct interpretations of the situational perspective can be iden-
tified—the perspective as its advocates conceptualize it, the
perspective as its advocates employ it in their research, and the
perspective as its opponents characterize it.

The prototype for situational explanations, the stimulus-re-
sponse model, is, as stated earlier, a model of individual behavior.
Linkages between stimulus and response are built through a process
of individual learning. Because each individual can have a differ-
ent history of learning with a given stimulus, each individual's
response to that stimulus may differ from the responses of other
individuals. The basic conceptualization thus sees behavior as

dependent on both the situation and the individual's learning history—i.e., as a function of situation and person.

However, in practice, tests of the model have tended to focus on situation to the neglect of person. The basic strategy of conditioning, for example, is to subject a single organism, often a "neutral" one such as an animal, to variations in stimuli, which typically produce variations in response. Environment is varied while individual is held constant and variations in response occur. Carlson provides convincing evidence that much recent psychological research displays a similar methodological bias. Much of the work is experimental, draws on homogenous groups—for example, college students—and ignores subject characteristics. All these make it likely that "person" will not be found to have substantial effects. In spite of the basic paradigm, in other words, behavioral research has often been constructed in ways that minimize the chances of finding individual factors to be important.[22]

Partly as a result of these practices, some critics have come to characterize situational explanations of behavior as denying, even at the conceptual level, the importance of the individual and asserting the absolute power of the situation. But misinterpretation, attributable to both ambiguity on the part of the writers and confusion on the part of the readers, has played an important role ·too. Undoubtedly a major source of the misinterpretation lies in the critics' failure to recognize the distinction between a rejection of internal states and a rejection of the importance of the individual. Situationalists do indeed reject internal states as explanations of

behavior. But they do not reject the importance of the individual. Indeed, as noted earlier, the individual's past learning history is crucial to their explanation of behavior.

A good example of this is found in the exchange between Mischel and Bowers. Mischel's statement that "individual difference measures" account for a "trivial portion of the variance" in behavior while "situationally specific variables" account for an "enormous" portion of the variance[23] leads Bowers to conclude that Mischel is "minimizing the importance of . . . individual differences."[24] This seems a fair conclusion, except that Bowers has failed to recognize that Mischel is talking about "individual difference measures" and their low correlations with behavior, not about the importance of individual differences themselves. But Mischel could have forestalled misunderstanding had he been more explicit about what he really meant—"global trait measures" instead of the more ambiguous "individual difference measures." And more generally Mischel might consider his own assertions of the "utter dependence of behavior on the details of the specific conditions"[25] and his own research's inattention to individual differences[26] before again complaining that his position

> has been widely misunderstood to imply that people show no consistencies, that individual differences are unimportant, and that "situations" are the main determinants of behavior.[27]

When misunderstandings become widespread, responsibility for them should probably be spread wide as well.

Once these differing perspectives on the role of person are understood, the empirical implications of the situational perspective emerge more clearly. The basic paradigm of the situational perspective is, of course, that variations in behavior will be associated with variations in situation. But, it must be emphasized, this is a relationship that is defined at the individual level—one the nature of which will be established by the individual's past experiences. Thus it is clearly not the case that, on the basis of the simple model alone, relationships should be expected to exist between situations and behavior across groups of individuals. If each individual associates his own behavior patterns with particular situations, variations in situation will cause him to shift to his own particular response, which may be different from everyone else's. As a result, variations in situation should not be expected to produce uniform shifts in behavior. For groups of individuals, then, situational variations should not be expected to correlate with behavioral variations.

However, if, as is possible and likely, individuals in the group tend to have similar past experiences—if reward and sanction patterns are shared, if they observe the same external events—then the implications change. If individuals do associate the same behaviors with the same situations, then variations in situation should produce variations in behavior even across groups of individuals. Socialization can, from this perspective, be viewed as the process by which individuals build up situation-behavior linkages that coincide to a greater or lesser degree with the linkages

developed in others. Thus variations in behavior will be associated
with variations on either the microscopic level alone or on both
the microscopic and macroscopic levels, depending on the communality
of past experiences.

But what of the impact of the individual? In the original S-R
paradigm, as already noted, the individual is as crucial as the
stimulus. Thus it implies that behavior will be organized at the
particular-individual-in-a-particular-situation level. That is,
each individual will behave consistently in the same situation, but
others will behave differently in that situation and he will behave
differently in other situations. It implies intra-situational,
intra-personal consistency, in other words, but neither intra-situa-
tional consistency across persons nor intra-personal consistency
across situations. If past experiences are shared, however, the
behavior associated with a particular situation by one individual
will be the same as that associated with it by another and the
implication is of intra-situational consistency across persons.

Both situational formulations would suggest that intra-person-
al consistency across situations is unlikely to occur. This is not
to say that it cannot occur. Mischel, for example, recognizes that
not everyone will have learned responses to every stimulus.[28] When
confronted with situations for which they have learned no specific
response, individuals may tend to "fall back" on fairly general
response tendencies. When such consistency does occur, it is labeled
a trait or attitude, not in the sense of an internal state, but as
a description of the behavior itself. No inferences are made about
mental states which lead to such consistencies. Rather, the

consistencies are simply taken as empirical phenomena to be explained in terms of other observable variables.[29] In this can be seen the breadth of the gap which has developed between psychologists and social psychologists, roughly described. What is to the social psychologist a crucial question—"is behavior consistent with attitude?"—is to the behavioral psychologist a meaningless one, since attitude is not separate from behavior, but a description of it. Attitude and trait, notions devised as independent variables to explain behavior, are transformed into dependent variables describing behavior which can, in turn, be explained only by reference to other observable independent variables.

The Empirical Evidence

The evidence which might be brought to bear on all these arguments is voluminous. Broadly speaking, any information which ties people or their characteristics or their environment to how they act—indeed, the whole of the literature in the behavioral sciences—is pertinent.[30] To ease the task, the discussion here will be confined to the bodies of evidence that have most shaped the debate about individual and situational effects on behavior. These are three in number: the evidence of individual consistency in behavior across situations, the person-situation analyses of variance, and the studies of contingency in the attitude-behavior relationship.

The evidence and interpretation which played a major role in setting off the individual-situational differences controversy were those advanced by Mischel in his Personality and Assessment. Since

it is too vast a body of research to be reviewed here, comment will
be limited to its thrust and Mischel's interpretation. The basic
thrust of the evidence is to show that the same individual differs
in his responses across situations, even when the situations are
"ostensibly relatively similar (i.e., they are selected to evoke
the same trait) . . ."[31] Even the consistency that does emerge,
Mischel contends, is often not "real" consistency but artificially
constructed consistency—the result of observer and rater effects,
response sets, and the like.[32] Mischel rightly argues that this
evidence of intra-personal, inter-situational inconsistency disputes
the existence of global traits that can account for behavior across
a wide variety of situations. However, this evidence does not prove
that situations are important, as Mischel implies when he summarizes
his interpretation of the literature: "Behavior depends on stimulus
situation and is specific to the situation: response patterns
even in highly similar situations often fail to be strongly related."[33]
Behavior could be random and response patterns across situations
would fail to be strongly related. Situations can be shown to be
important only by evidence which relates situations to behavior and
not by evidence which shows only that individuals are inconsistent
across situations. Nor does it show that behavior is idiosyncra-
tically organized within the individual, along the lines of Mischel's
social behavior theory—it is consistent with it, but demonstration
of the theory's validity requires evidence of intra-personal, intra-
situational consistency as well. Given the importance of this point

to his argument, Mischel might be expected to provide more evidence of this than he does.

Mischel's reliance on the absence of a correlation to support his conception of behavior points up the need to draw on evidence that confronts the theoretical issues as squarely as possible. Alker has correctly noted that, in the case of the individual-situational debate, this evidence is to be found in "well-designed comparative studies of personality and situational variables."[34] One approximation to this description is the multi-way analysis-of-variance study of the type conducted by Endler and Hunt, Moos, and others. Typically these studies assess the behavior of a group of individuals in a variety of settings. In some cases, behavior is assessed with respect to more than one criterion. The studies also differ in the types of people sampled and in whether the settings and the behaviors are "real" or questionnaire-type stimuli and responses. The data gathered are then subjected to a multi-way analysis of variance in order to determine the proportions of variance attributable to "persons," "situations," "modes of response" (in those studies with multiple behavioral criteria), and their various interactions.

In summary, the studies have shown that neither person nor situation accounts for the bulk of variance in behavior. This augurs poorly both for the trait position—people do not show cross-situational consistencies in their behavior—and for the "shared learning experience" variant of situational explanation—behavior is not intra-situationally consistent across persons. Rather, these studies

show, most of the variance is accounted for by interaction terms—
by person-situation interactions in the two-way studies and by the
various first and second order interactions in the three-way
studies.[35] These empirical results have been interpreted as indi-
cating that particular persons have particular ways of behaving in
particular situations.

Another important finding of these studies is that various
kinds of behavior differ in their sensitivity to the various main
and interactive influences.[36] For example, "person" has greater
impact for "hostile" behaviors than for "anxious" behaviors and
"talking" depends more on setting than do "smiling" or "smoking,"
which seem to depend more on person.[37] Perhaps more important,
questionnaire responses seem to be particularly vulnerable to per-
son effects, compared to actual behavior. This may help to account
for the importance which users of this technique frequently attri-
bute to "person."[38] In addition, the studies suggest, the longer
the exposure to an environment, the more sensitive to situational
variations a person's behavior becomes.[39]

The empirical evidence of interaction has been widely hailed as
showing that behavior is idiosyncratically organized within each
individual.[40] In traversing a unique history of experience, each
individual develops a unique set of responses to the situations he
encounters. Thus, when confronted with a particular situation, he
behaves in a way that is uniquely his own. Behavior therefore can
be understood only idiographically—the same processes may operate

within all individuals, but to understand how each individual acts, it is necessary to know the particulars of his past experiences and his present situation.

Bowers elaborates on the mechanisms by which these interaction terms are produced. (Unfortunately, he labors under the misconception that the large interaction terms are inconsistent with the "situationist" point of view, since he sees models derived from a stimulus-response framework as implying strong main effects for situations.) He argues that "person" affects behavior through situation in two distinct ways. First, the perceptions of situations to which people respond will be affected by their personalities. Second, the situations to which people respond are to a great extent the situations that they put themselves into and that, in turn, depends on their personalities. Though these are plausible and interesting hypotheses, Bowers unfortunately does not show how essentially developmental relations like these produce interactive effects in the analyses of variance.[41]

The results of the analysis of variance studies have also been taken by some to indicate that the protracted "person versus situation" controversy is over—that a new synthesis which recognizes the idiosyncractic organization of behavior within situations at the individual level brings to an end the debate. One participant in the controversy over "whether the main source of variation in behavior is in situations or in persons" has characterized it as a "pseudo-issue."[42] Mischel himself has more recently written that

> We may predict best if we know what each situation means
> to the individual, and consider the interaction of the per-
> son and the situation, rather than concentrating either on
> the situation itself or on the individual in an environmental
> and social vacuum.[43]

Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between what these studies show and what they suggest. They show that the tendencies for a single person to behave in the same way across all situations sampled and for all persons to behave in the same way in a single situation are limited. They do show a substantial tendency for a particular person to behave in a particular way in a particular situation. But to say that the studies show that behavior is idio-syncratically organized at the individual level within a particular situation is misleading because it implies that this is the highest level at which behavior is organized. It is misleading because the way in which the analysis of variance technique is employed in these studies makes it impossible to determine whether behavior is organized at any higher level.

The analysis of variance studies all operationalize "person" and "situation" in the most discrete fashion imaginable. Each person and each situation are treated as separate categories on the "person" and "situation" dimensions, respectively, of the analysis. An analysis of the behavior of fifty persons in ten situations, for example, would have fifty categories on the person dimension and ten categories on the situation dimension. This avoids any assumptions about which properties of the persons or the situations sampled may or may not have an effect on behavior. But it also has two less desirable consequences.

First, the theoretical meaning of the results is uncertain. To find no individual or situational effects is to find that, for instance, person 1's behavior does not differ from person 2's behavior or that behavior in situation A does not differ from behavior in situation B. But persons 1 and 2 stand for nothing other than persons 1 and 2 and situations A and B for nothing other than situations A and B. Because the people and the situations stand for nothing but themselves, the analysis provides no basis for generalization to the same people in other situations or different people in the same situations, much less to people in general in situations in general.[44] In fact, given that we know nothing about persons 1 and 2 and situations A and B, why should we even expect that behavior by these persons or in these situations will differ? By reducing person and situation to discrete categories, the technique severs the linkage between the research world and the "real" world. It is, in other words, a purely descriptive exercise.

As a result of this, a second consequence emerges. Let us posit that behavior is structured at a somewhat higher level than the idiosyncratic. Say that personality and situational characteristics can be measured at a level higher than the discrete. People, for example, can be grouped along dimensions (liberal, hostile, prejudiced, etc.) and situations can be grouped as well (socially supportive, visible, and so forth). Then it might be the case that, in certain kinds of situations, certain groups of people behave in one way and other groups in other ways, while in other situations, these groups do not differ in their behavior. An analysis which

correlated these categories of individuals with behavior within

categories of situations would, of course, reveal this structure

in the behavior. But—and this is the important point—a discrete

person-situation analysis of the type conducted by Endler and Hunt

could not distinguish this sort of structure in behavior from an

idiosyncratic structure. The person-situation analyses of variance

look for structure at the level of the individual person and the

individual situation. They determine whether behavior is consistent

across individuals in a situation or across situations in an indi-

vidual or within a situation for an individual. But they do not

address the possibility that behavior is consistent within classes

of individuals or within classes of situations or within a class

of individuals in a class of situations. The fact that an idio-

syncratic structure emerges at the individual level does not

necessarily mean that behavior is not structured at a higher level.

The failure of a test of an idiographic hypothesis would preclude

the acceptance of a nomothetic one—if individuals are not consistent

in their behavior, then groups composed of those individuals cannot

be consistent in their behavior either—but the validation of an

idiographic hypothesis does not preclude acceptance of a nomothetic

one either. If individuals are consistent within situations, then

groups may be consistent as well.

The results of these analyses, then, suggest at least an idio-

graphic explanation of behavior, but they leave the door open for

a nomothetic one as well—one less grandiose than the pure "trait"

or the pure "situational" approaches, but one which does allow useful

generalizations about behavior. By this is meant an approach
which admits the possibility of seeing individuals and situations
differing, not discretely—each discrete and not comparable with the
rest, as the Endler-and-Hunt-type analyses of variance imply—but
along dimensions of differences such as traits and attitudes. The
impact of these differences is seen as being contingent. The effect
of differences among individuals depends upon the kinds of situa-
tions and the effects of situations depend upon the kinds of indi-
viduals. This is in fact the tack suggested by one of the few
political scientists to deal with these questions. Greenstein has
recently formulated the issues in these terms:

> Given a common environmental stimulus, what other factors,
> whether environmental, predispositional, or in the nature
> of the response itself, lead individuals of different dis-
> positions to behave uniformly, and what factors contribute
> to the expression of personal variability through differ-
> ences in behavior?[45]

Some evidence from the analysis of variance studies themselves
points in this direction, suggesting that the effects of situation
depend upon the kind of person. Though retaining the treatment of
each individual as a discrete category, some scholars have analyzed
behavioral variance for various subgroups of their samples. Endler,
for example, reports that women appear to be more sensitive to
situational variations than men and that variance due to modes of
response increases with age—suggesting that people may adopt
socially desirable modes of response as they grow older.[46] Situa-
tions seem to account for more variance as one becomes increasingly
familiar with an environment—the longer one is in an environment,

the more sensitive one becomes to variations in it.[47] The more "normal" the person is, the more sensitive his behavior is to situational variations and the less important are individual differences.[48] This finding suggests that Freud was not wrong in recognizing broad and pervasive consistencies in the behavior of his patients, but that he was wrong in generalizing the existence of "traits" from the disturbed people he treated to "normals."[49] Bem and Allen find that it is indeed possible to identify on a priori grounds those who will and will not exhibit "trait-like" consistency across situations. They simply ask individuals to describe how much they vary from situation to situation with regard to a particular trait. They report much higher levels of cross-situational consistency on each trait among those who say they are consistent than among those who say they are not. Correlations among the self-ratings of consistency across traits, which might indicate whether cross-situational consistency is trait-specific or perhaps a more general personality dimension in itself, as Alker has suggested, are unfortunately not reported.[50]

The complement to these suggestions of interactions in the form of individual differences in sensitivity to situational variations is the possibility of situational variations in the impact of individual differences on behavior. Social psychologists, it was noted earlier, have often traced inconsistencies between attitudes tapped by verbal behavior and overt behavior to methodological problems. They have also accounted for inconsistencies by noting that

many attitudes may be relevant to the behavior toward any particular object. Therefore the relationship between any one attitude and behavior may be weak because other variables override it.[51]   This point has been widely accepted, and perhaps the most commonly employed strategy for improving the prediction of behavior from psychological measures is to employ several of the latter in a multiple regression analysis.[52]

But the central thrust of much recent work has been toward the identification of conditions under which consistency between atti- tudes and behavior breaks down. The basic assumption of this approach is that attitudes and behavior ought indeed to correlate, but that other factors impinge upon and weaken the relationship. Therefore, when the other factors are identified and controlled for, stronger relationships between attitudes and behavior should emerge in some sub-groups.[53]

While acknowledging the promise of such an approach, some writers have cautioned that this "moderator variable" approach, as they call it, is bound to increase the number of larger correlations found between attitudes and behavior simply by increasing the number of correlations examined. They see it as a kind of "fishing expedi- tion" in which analysts march out to look at more relationships in the hopes that at least some of them will turn out to be substan- tial. For this reason, they emphasize the need to specify in advance the factors which on theoretical grounds should increase or diminish relationships:

> The moderating-variable strategy becomes more than an
> empty analytic or linguistic convention, however, only
> when one can begin to predict on a priori grounds which
> moderators are likely to divide up the world into useful
> equivalence classes. . .[54]

Enumerations of the factors that impede behavioral consistency

have by now become commonplace. In what has become more or less

the standard account of the factors, Wicker identifies "the actual

or considered presence of certain people, . . . normative prescrip-

tions of proper behavior, . . . alternative behaviors available, .

. . specificity of attitude objects, . . . unforeseen extraneous

events, . . . and the expected and/or actual consequences of various

acts."[55] His classificatory scheme is open to challenges to its

exhaustiveness and, in particular, to its exclusiveness. It is hard

to see how "normative prescriptions of proper behavior," especially

those "externally enforced," differ from the "actual or considered

presence of certain people." And if "consequences" is broadly con-

strued to include the whole range of psychological consequences,

then most, if not all, of the factors can be subsumed under the

"expected and/or actual consequences" rubric, as Wicker acknowledges.

That such is in fact the case is suggested by the similarity to the

formulation which Mischel advances in his "cognitive social learn-

ing" conceptualization—"the expected consequences for the perfor-

mance of responses."[56] Indeed, it is surprising that two writers

working from such different premises as do Mischel and Fishbein

arrive at conceptions of a model of behavior that are so similar in

their basic elements: Fishbein's "beliefs about the consequences of

performing a particular behavior (in a given situation)," the

evaluation of those consequences, the person's normative beliefs (both personal and social), and his motivation to comply with the normative beliefs[57] compared with Mischel's expectancies (behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome), subjective values of the outcomes expected, and self-regulatory systems.[58]

The basic principle which underlies the effects of all these situational factors on consistency is, in Wicker's view, this:

> The more similar the situations in which verbal and overt behavioral responses are obtained, the stronger will be the attitude-behavior relationship. The situational factors to be discussed may be thought of as potentially signifi-cant dimensions along which environments can vary from highly similar to highly dissimilar.[59]

This is but a more specific formulation of Mischel's broader asser-tion that

> The more dissimilar the evoking situations, the less likely they are to lead to similar or consistent responses from the same individual.[60]

Most of the empirical work has focused on the interactive effect of the social situation on attitude-behavior consistency. That is, if the social situation surrounding the performance of one behavior (e.g., the verbal response to a questionnaire item) differs from that surrounding the performance of the other behavior (e.g., an overt act), the behaviors will not be related. Substantial evidence has been accumulated to show that behavioral inconsistency often occurs when verbal behavior is assessed in a "neutral" setting while overt behavior is assessed in a public setting. Social pressures in the second often cause the individual to deviate in his acts

from the course which his words suggest he will take.[61] Deutscher

summarizes this work, saying

> Both the field studies and the experiments reviewed here
> provide evidence that a considerable proportion of the
> variance in human behavior can be explained by efforts
> (conscious or unconscious) on the part of people to bring
> their sentiments and acts into line, not with each other,
> but with what they perceive to be the sentiments and the
> acts of others in the immediate situation.[62]

The increased interest in moderator variables and interaction

effects among psychologists and in contingencies in the attitude-

behavior relationship among social psychologists represents a

striking convergence of thinking in two separate traditions. Such

a development is to be applauded because it demonstrates, in gen-

eral, a shift from talking about the complexity of human behavior

to doing something about it—incorporating more complicated notions

into analytic models as well as conceptual models. It demonstrates,

in particular, a recognition of the way in which person and environ-

ment interact to determine behavior—a question which has long

interested students of behavior, but which has stimulated relatively

little research. As such, this development constitutes the pushing

forward of one of the frontiers of behavioral research. However,

like all frontiers, as Bem and Mischel have noted, this one's pro-

mises lie in the future and much additional work will be needed to

realize them.[63]

The psychological literature on individuals, situations, and

behavior points in a single general direction. Simple notions of

behavior as flowing from either the person alone or from his

environment alone have faded in the face of disconfirming empirical evidence. Behavior is now seen as the complex product of the interaction between the person and his environment. New types of analysis have emerged for sorting out these complicated patterns of behavior. This is not to say that there is complete consensus on all issues. In particular, the utility of inferring internal states from some behaviors in order to explain others and of the idiographic as opposed to the nomothetic approach remain unresolved. But there does seem to be enough common ground that research can proceed, and the specification of the kind of research needed is the objective of the following pages.

Some Suggestions for Further Research

By now, one of the assertions made at the beginning of this chapter has clearly been justified—sociologists and psychologists have devoted considerably more effort to the individual-situational differences question than have students of the police. The other assertion—that their work can be used as a guide for further re-search—may, given the unsettled questions in the area, appear to be overly optimistic, if not incorrect. The aim in the last few pages of this chapter is to distill from the literature summarized in this chapter some suggestions for research—some suggestions that can serve as a general guide in the study of the personal and en-vironmental roots of behavior. These lessons of the literature can usefully be grouped into two classes: methodological suggestions and substantive hypotheses.

Methodological Suggestions

Clearly, the role of methodology emerges as an important theme in all this literature. Page after page points up the fact that what we find out depends, to a considerable extent, on how we go about finding it out.

Measurement

The chronic difficulties in tapping internal states demonstrate the need to insure the reliability and validity of measures, so that the fate of hypotheses rests with the concepts operationalized, not measurement error. And these, of course, are concerns, not just with the measurement of individual characteristics, but also with the measurement of situational characteristics and behavior as well. Perhaps the greatest hope lies with multi-item scales of the sort that Fishbein suggests for attitudinal and behavioral dimensions. At the same time, caution must be exercised to insure that these scales and the relationships between them represent real consistency, not the artificially constructed kind of which Mischel warns. Undoubtedly, the most effort needs to be devoted to the assessment of situations and behavior. The technology for assessing internal states, though too often leading to measures of dubious validity and reliability, has at least received much attention. The technology for assessing situations and behavior is, on the other hand, comparatively primitive and thus fertile ground for future work.[64] Only when we have confidence in our measures can we rest quietly upon the acceptance or rejection of our hypotheses, knowing

that the results reflect the merit of the hypotheses, not flaws in
the measures.

Analytic Techniques

Attention must also be paid to the analytic techniques employed.
Campbell's discussion of pseudo-inconsistency points up the need
to look at the degree of relationship between variables, rather
than just at simple differences in their distributions. Mischel's
conclusion from a lack of intra-individual consistency that situa-
tions are important and Endler and his colleagues' failure to re-
cognize that structuring of behavior at the individual-in-a-situa-
tion level does not preclude structuring at a higher level as well
point out the need to test hypotheses directly—by relating the in-
dependent variable involved to the dependent variable involved—
and not indirectly—by making inferences about the validity of one
hypothesis from the fate of an alternative hypothesis.

Research Design

Finally, the implications of experimental as opposed to non-
experimental designs must be considered. It is true, as Cronbach,
Carlson, Bowers, and others have suggested, that experimental methods
tend to favor situational as opposed to individual explanations of
behavior—though this is not a defect of the experimental method
itself, but a result of the greater manipulability of situational
factors.[65] Bowers writes that the heavy reliance on the experimen-
tal method has "produced enormous constraints on the kinds of
observations that psychologists are likely to incorporate into their

thinking."[66] This suggests greater use of nonexperimental methods, in which personal and situational factors can freely vary and co-vary (along the lines suggested by Bowers) to determine behavior—recognizing, of course, that this comes at the expense of some control. The external validity of findings may also be enhanced through nonexperimental approaches, given that the artificiality of some assessment situations and experimental situations seems to cast doubt on the validity of measures and results.[67]

Substantive Hypotheses

However important methodological considerations may be, the essential thrust of the literature surveyed here is substantive. It is that the fundamental question of whether behavior flows from the person—a compound of his past experiences, what he has been able to make of them, and perhaps certain inborn dispositions (an issue that will not be addressed here)—or from his circumstances cannot be answered by pointing to one or the other, but only by pointing to both. Further, both determine behavior, not in any simple additive way, with the effects of person piled on top of the effects of situation, but in a complex interactive way, with the effects of person depending upon the situation and the effects of situation depending upon the person.

To be more specific, from the literature examined here flow several broad expectations about the relationship between individual characteristics, situational characteristics, and behavior. The previous findings of both social psychologists and behavioral

psychologists suggest that

(3.1)   Individual factors by themselves will have only
           a limited impact on behavior.

In the parlance of the behavioral psychologists, individuals will
not show cross-situational consistency in behavior. In the more
traditional attitudinal parlance, individual characteristics will
not show strong relationships with behavior. However, it may be
that more substantial amounts of variation in behavior can be ex-
plained if several individual characteristics are introduced into
the explanatory equation simultaneously.

     Previous findings suggest that

(3.2)   Situational factors, assuming substantial commun-
           ality of past learning experiences among actors,
           should have a substantial impact on behavior.

Further, since behavior may respond simultaneously to several facets
of a situation, more substantial amounts of variation in behavior
may be explained if several situational characteristics are intro-
duced into the explanatory equation simultaneously. However, if
the past learning experiences of actors with respect to the relevant
situations are idiosyncratic, then situational factors will not in
general relate to behavior. Rather, they would be expected only to
show relationships ipsatively—for each person alone.

     An answer to the question of the relative importance of indi-
viduals and situations—once regarded as a central issue in the
controversy—must be tempered, however, by a recognition of the
specific persons and the specific situations studied. That is,

(3.3)   If individuals are similar in their character-
          istics, but situations differ widely, situations
          may appear to be more important while, if indi-
          viduals are diverse and situations are similar,
          individuals may appear to be more important.

This dependence of outcome on the persons and situations sampled,

it should be noted, has led some to dismiss the relative importance

question as a useless one. Discussing the interaction studies,

Mischel writes:

> It would be wasteful to create pseudo-controversies that pit
> person against situation in order to see which is more impor-
> tant. The answer must always depend on the particular per-
> sons and situations sampled; presumably, studies could be
> designed to demonstrate almost any outcome. The interaction
> studies correctly demonstrated that the question of whether
> individual differences or situational differences are more
> important is a fruitless one that has no general answer.[68]

However, although it has no general answer, it is not a fruitless

question. In a nonexperimental setting, within the context of a

particular group of people and situations, whether person or situa-

tion accounts for more variance may still be of interest. Such

information may be particularly useful in modifying behavior by

indicating whether changes in personnel or changes in setting are

more likely to produce desired behavioral changes.

But even if the relative impacts of the additive effects are

not trivial, the question of these effects' importance must relin-

quish precedence to the more promising question of the importance

of the interactive effects of person and environment on behavior.

The literature suggests two broad hypotheses along these lines.

The work of the social psychologists suggests that

(3.4)   Individual characteristics will manifest them-
selves in behavior only under certain circum-
stances.

For example, verbal behaviors may correlate with overt behaviors

only under certain conditions. In general, this will occur when

the two behaviors are assessed under similar conditions. Crucial

here may be the social pressures on the actor. If the social "field"

in which overt behavior occurs differs from the social field in

which verbal behavior is assessed—often constructed or assumed to

be neutral—then overt behavior will probably be inconsistent with

verbal behavior. It is important to recognize here that social

pressures may be complex. For one thing, they may emanate from a

number of sources and they may conflict with one another. For

another, they may be externally imposed or internalized.[69] But,

in either case, verbal and overt behavior will be consistent under

circumstances where these pressures do not exist and inconsistent

where they do exist and where socially desirable behaviors differ

from those toward which the individual is predisposed.

The work of the behavioral psychologists, on the other hand,

suggests that

(3.5)   The impact of situation may vary across
individuals.

Individuals with certain characteristics may be more sensitive than

others to variations in situation. Hence situations may be more

strongly related to behavior for these people than for others. As

noted earlier, for example, for some behaviors women and "normals"

appear to be somewhat more sensitive to situational variations than

men and "abnormals," respectively. Perhaps most significant, those who have spent more time in an environment appear to be more sensitive to stimulus variations within that environment than others. Length of exposure thus should affect relationships between situational characteristics and behavior. Similarly, certain attitudes or outlooks may affect the impact of specific situational characteristics on behavior. For example, attitudes of professionalism or of partisanship may incline actors to dwell upon or ignore certain aspects of situations in performing job tasks or making political decisions.

The interpretation of "interactions" advanced by Bowers suggests an interesting hypothesis as well. He posits, as noted earlier, that one way in which person affects behavior through situation is through the tendency of persons to choose the kinds of situations into which they will enter. If so, the following hypothesis seems worthy of investigation:

> (3.6)   In situations in which persons are free to decide which situations to enter and which not to enter, relationships may exist between personal characteristics and the characteristics of the situations entered and, in turn, between these situational characteristics and behavior.

Finally, the different weights for individual, situational, and interactive influences that emerge in studies that examine a variety of behaviors—for example, Moos's and Endler and Hunt's studies—suggest that

(3.7)   Behaviors will differ in their vulnerability to
the various influences.

Given that behaviors may differ in their meanings to the individuals involved and in the consequences the individuals anticipate from them, this is exactly what would be expected on theoretical grounds. The implication for research is that behavioral measures should be defined as specifically as possible and treated as separate dependent variables, at least until it is established empirically that the distinctions among them are of no utility and that they may be safely combined into aggregate measures.

The hypotheses identified here are extremely broad in scope. The task of the next chapter is to apply some of them to the study of police behavior in particular. The primary purpose of this chapter has been to pull from the general literature some guidelines for the examination of a specific substantive area—police behavior. But the chapter also emphasizes the relationship between the work described here and a central question in contemporary behavioral science. (It is because of the broader significance of this topic that the discussion here has, at some points, ranged beyond that which is, strictly speaking, necessary for the following chapters.) The contribution to the understanding of a relatively narrow class of phenomena which this work makes may also constitute a small contribution to our understanding of political and human behavior in general.

Footnotes for Chapter III

1. In the social psychological literature, perhaps the best re-
   views are A.W. Wicker, "Attitudes versus Actions: The
   Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Atti-
   tude Objects," Journal of Social Issues 25 (1969): 41-78; and
   a more recent account, Allen E. Liska, "Emergent Issues in the
   Attitude-Behavior Consistency Controversy," American Sociological
   Review 39 (April 1974): 261-272. The "institutionalization"
   of the topic in this field is reflected by the appearance of at
   least three good readers: Kerry Thomas, ed., Attitudes and
   Behavior, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971); Irwin Deutscher, ed.,
   What We Say/What We Do: Sentiments and Acts, (Glenview, Ill.:
   Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973); and Allen E. Liska, ed.,
   The Consistency Controversy (New York: Wiley, 1975). In the
   psychological "personality" literature, perhaps the best intro-
   ductions to the issues are: Walter Mischel, Personality and
   Assessment, (New York: Wiley, 1968); Kenneth S. Bowers, "Situa-
   tionism in Psychology: An Analysis and a Critique," Psychologi-
   cal Review 80 (September 1973): 307-336; and Walter Mischel,
   "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization of
   Personality," Psychological Review 80 (July 1973): 253-283.

2. E.E. Jones and R.E. Nisbett argue that the mode of explanation
   often depends on whether the person is explaining his own or
   another's behavior: "Actors tend to attribute the causes of
   their behavior to stimuli inherent in the situation, while
   observers tend to attribute behavior to stable dispositions
   of the actor" (The Actor and Observer: Divergent Perceptions
   of the Causes of Behavior, New York: General Learning Press,
   1971, p. 15).

3. Kurt Lewin, Principles of Topological Psychology (New York:
   McGraw-Hill, 1936).

4. Richard LaPiere, "Attitudes vs. Actions," Social Forces 13
   (December 1934): 237.

5. Melvin L. DeFleur and Frank R. Westie make essentially the
   same point, in "Attitude as a Scientific Concept," Social
   Forces 42 (October 1963): 26.

6. Emphasis should be placed on the word suggest here. Caution
   is necessary because of the possibility, suggested by dis-
   sonance theory and raised primarily by the literature on
   attitude-behavior change, that whatever consistency there is
   may come from attitudes being brought into line with behavior
   and not vice versa. See, for example, Liska, The Consistency
   Controversy, p. 14.

7. Mischel, Personality and Assessment, pp. 74-83. He does make one important qualification. See the reference noted at footnote 60.

8. Wicker, "Attitudes," p. 65. See also Liska, The Consistency Controversy, pp. 15-18. Deutscher (What We Say), summarizes additional evidence in favor of (pp. 48-50) and against (pp. 59-60) attitude-behavior inconsistency and reproduces several useful articles.

9. This is essentially the tack which Mischel takes in his challenge to what he calls "trait and state" theories (Personality and Assessment, p. 13).

10. Ibid., pp. 20-32.

11. Ibid., p. 177.

12. P.E. Vernon, Personality Assessment: A Critical Survey (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 179-200; Donald R. Peterson, The Clinical Study of Social Behavior (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), pp. 15-31; Daryl J. Bem and Andrea Allen, "On Predicting Some of the People Some of the Time: The Search for Cross-Situational Consistencies in Behavior," Psychological Review 8 (November 1974): 506-507.

13. Ralph D. Minard, "Race Relationships in the Pocahontas Coal Field," Journal of Social Issues 8 (1952): 29-44; Joseph D. Lohman and Dietrich C. Rietzes, "Deliberately Organized Groups and Racial Behavior," American Sociological Review 19 (June 1954): 342-348.

14. Donald T. Campbell, "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioral Predispositions," in Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 159-162.

15. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, "Attitudes Toward Objects as Predictors of Single and Multiple Behavioral Criteria," Psychological Review 81 (1974): 59-74; C.R. Tittle and R.J. Hill, "Attitude Measurement and Prediction of Behavior: An Evaluation of Conditions and Measurement Techniques," in Thomas, Attitudes and Behavior, pp. 179-196. Mischel concedes as much as well (Personality and Assessment, p. 37). See also Campbell, pp. 159-162.

16. Fishbein and Ajzen, pp. 62-65.

17. Mischel, Personality and Assessment, pp. 6-8; Mischel, "Continuity and Change in Personality," American Psychologist 24 (1969): 1015-16; Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization," pp. 253-54.

18. Mischel, Personality and Assessment, pp. 41-72, 114-118. Bowers (p. 328) provides additional evidence that the accuracy of such judgements is tenuous.

19. Deutscher, What We Say, pp. 60-65.

20. Bowers, pp. 309-311, pp. 316-318.

21. Ibid., pp. 310-311, pp. 315-316.

22. Rae Carlson, "Where is the Person in Personality Research?" Psychological Bulletin 75 (March 1971): 203-219.

23. Mischel, Personality and Assessment, pp. 82-83.

24. Bowers, p. 323.

25. Cited in Bowers, p. 308.

26. Bowers, p. 324.

27. Mischel, "Towards a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualiation," p. 254.

28. Ibid., pp. 276-277.

29. This is the distinction between "latent process" and "probabilistic" conceptions of attitude which DeFleur and Westie draw—here applied to traits as well.

30. Deutscher makes a similar point with regard to the attitude-behavior section of the literature: "Anything which illustrates or considers the relationship between what people do and what they say is potential data as far as I am concerned. . ." (What We Say, p. 4).

31. Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization," p. 255.

32. Mischel, Personality and Assessment, pp. 41-101.

33. Ibid., p. 177.

34. Henry A. Alker, "Is Personality Situationally Specific or Intrapsychically Consistent?" Journal of Personality 40 (March 1972): 1-16.

35. See Bowers for a useful summary of work of this type (pp. 319-322).

36. Bowers, p. 325.

37. Norman S. Endler and John McV. Hunt, "S-R Inventories of Hostility and Comparisons of the Proportions of Variance from Persons, Responses, and Situations for Hostility and Anxiousness," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9 (1968): 309-315; Rudolf H. Moos, "Sources of Variance in Responses to Questionnaires and in Behavior," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 74 (August 1969): 405-412.

38. Bowers, p. 322.

39. Moos, pp. 405-412; M. Argyle and B.R. Little, "Do Personality Traits Apply to Social Behavior?" Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 2 (1972): 1-35.

40. Norman S. Endler and John McV. Hunt, "Generalizability of Contributions from Sources of Variance in the S-R Inventories of Anxiousness," Journal of Personality 37 (March 1969): 1-24.

41. This is perhaps the best indication of Bowers' misunderstanding of Mischel's position. The large interaction terms show, he writes, that "Obviously, and to some considerable extent, the person and the situation are codeterminers of behavior, and they need to be specified simultaneously if predictive accuracy is desired." Because he misinterprets the "situationists" as saying that behavior depends only on situation, he sees this as evidence that a new perspective is needed to explain the results and goes on to develop his "interactionist" position (pp. 327-330).

42. Norman S. Endler and John McV. Hunt, "Sources of Behavioral Variance as Measured by the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness," Psychological Bulletin 65 (June 1966): 337.

43. Walter Mischel, Introduction to Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 149.

44. Mischel makes a similar point, phrased in terms of prediction ("Towards a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization," p. 257).

45. Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Politics," in Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 18.

46. Endler and Hunt, "Generalizability of Contributions," pp. 1-24.

47. Moos, pp. 405-412; Argyle and Little, pp. 1-35.

48. Endler and Hunt, "Generalizability of Contributions," pp. 1-24; Moos, pp. 405-412; H.L. Rauch, A.T. Dittmann, and T.J. Taylor, "Person, Setting, and Change in Social Interaction," Human Relations 12 (1959): 361-78.

49. Alker, p. 4

50. Bem and Allen, pp. 506-20; Alker, pp. 11-15.

51. Liska, The Consistency Controversy, pp. 11-13; Wicker, pp. 67-68.

52. The most frequently cited example, even in the social psychological literature, is the six-attitude model of voting choice in Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, The American Voter (Wiley, 1960). See also Howard J. Ehrlich, "Attitudes, Behavior, and the Intervening Variables," in Deutscher, What We Say, pp. 262-263.

53. See, for example, Liska, The Consistency Controversy, p. 19; Wicker, p. 67.

54. Daryl J. Bem, "Constructing Cross-Situational Consistencies in Behavior: Some Thoughts on Alker's Critique of Mischel," Journal of Personality 40 (March 1972): 21. Bem sees the moderator variable approach as equivalent to Mischel's view of behavioral consistencies as situationally specific, and Mischel concurs in that assessment ("Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization," p. 257).

55. Wicker, pp. 69-74. See, for a similar cataloging, Steven Jay Gross and C. Michael Niman, "Attitude-Behavior Consistency: A Review," Public Opinion Quarterly 39 (Fall 1975): 358-368; and for a different one, Ehrlich, pp. 29-34.

56. Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization," p. 272.

57. Martin Fishbein, "Attitude and the Prediction of Behavior," in Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement, ed. Martin Fishbein (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 477-92.

58. Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization," pp. 269-75. For an insightful collection of readings which suggest that the convergence includes "subjective expected utility models" as well, see Thomas, pp. 241-91.

59. Wicker, p. 69. Deutscher cites a number of similar assertions (What We Say, pp. 321-22).

60. Mischel, Personality and Assessment, p. 177. This assertion defines the occasion when verbal behavior—"attitudes"—and overt behavior will be consistent (p. 183).

61. See, for example, L.G. Warner and M.L. DeFleur, "Attitude
    as an Interactional Concept: Social Constraint and Social
    Distance as Intervening Variables between Attitudes and Action,"
    American Sociological Review 34 (April 1969): 153-169; William
    J. Bowers, "Normative Constraints on Deviant Behavior in the
    College Context," Sociometry 31 (December 1968): 370-385;
    M.L. DeFleur and F.R. Westie, "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts:
    An Experiment on the Salience of Attitudes," American Sociologi-
    cal Review 23 (December 1958): 667-673; Lawrence S. Linn,
    "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Behavior: A Study of Racial Dis-
    crimination," Social Forces 43 (March 1965): 353-364; Charles
    K. Warriner, "The Nature and Functions of Official Behavior in
    Morality," American Journal of Sociology 64 (1958): 165-168;
    LaPiere, pp. 230-37; James M. Fendrich, "A Study of the Associa-
    tion Among Verbal Attitudes, Commitment and Overt Behavior in
    Different Experimental Situations," Social Forces 45 (March
    1967): 347-355; Minard, pp. 29-44; Lohman and Reitzes, pp. 342-
    344; Philip Himelstein and James C. Moore, "Racial Attitudes
    and the Action of Negro- and White-Background Figures as Factors
    in Petition-Signing," in Deutscher, What We Say, pp. 232-236;
    Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and James W. Dyson, "Attitude-Behavior
    Congruence in Varying Situational Environments," Experimental
    Study of Politics 2 (March 1973): 39-60; and additional
    references cited by Deutscher, What We Say, p. 256.

62. Deutscher, What We Say, p. 240.

63. Bem, p. 24; Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning
    Reconceptualization," p. 258.

64. For discussion of this point, see DeFleur and Westie,
    "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts," pp. 667-673; Ehrlich,
    pp. 29-34; Mischel, "Continuity and Change in Personality,"
    p. 1014; Bem and Allen, p. 508; Deutscher, What We Say, pp.
    42-43.

65. Indeed, when attitudes and behavior are explicitly studied
    in the laboratory, substantial relationships do often emerge
    (Deutscher, What We Say, pp. 45, 129-130).

66. Bowers, "Situationism," p. 330.

67. Linn's subjects, in post-experiment interviews, reported the
    artificiality of the assessment situation to be a major reason
    for attitude-behavior inconsistency: ". . . this group of S's
    saw the signing of the photographic releases as being a
    different, more "real" situation than answering questions on a
    questionnaire" ("Verbal Attitudes," p. 362). Fendrich
    summarizes a body of literature arguing the atypicality of

many test settings, suggesting that the "play-like" charac-
teristics of the situations may weaken attitude-behavior ties.
He finds that "verbal attitudes can be useful predictors of
behavior, if the artificial play atmosphere of the testing
situation is reduced" by making respondents commit themselves
to action on their attitudes before measuring their attitudes
("A Study," p. 354). Focusing on the behavioral side of the
relationship, Tittle and Hill find behavior to correlate more
strongly with attitude when the former is measured "in those
situations which the individual has come to define as normal
and common" ("Attitude Measurement," p. 180).

68. Mischel, "Toward a Cognitive Social Learning Reconceptualization,"
pp. 255-256; see also Endler and Hunt, "Sources of Behavioral
Variance," p. 337; and Bowers, "Situationism," p. 327.

69. These considerations underlie Fishbein's distinction between
social and personal norms and his extension to the n-group
case ("Attitudes and the Prediction of Behavior," pp. 489-91).

CHAPTER IV

EXPLAINING POLICE BEHAVIOR:

HYPOTHESES AND DATA

Chapter I identified police behavior as a class of politically
important behavior—behavior which affects the "authoritative
allocation of values in a society" and levels of support for, and
compliance with, the political system. Chapter II demonstrated
that our understanding of the determinants of this behavior is
limited and unstructured. Chapter III drew from the broader litera-
ture in psychology and social psychology some general hypotheses
about the relationships between individual characteristics, situa-
tional characteristics, and behavior which might serve as guides to
inquiry into the sources of police behavior. This chapter will pull
together these various strands by developing a set of broad hypo-
theses about the impact of organizations, individuals, and situations
on the politically significant actions of policemen. It will then
go on to describe the data to be employed in testing these hypotheses
and to discuss the advantages and disadvantages associated with its
use.

It should be emphasized that, even at this point, it is not the
intention to state hypotheses that anticipate specific kinds of
relationships between specific independent variables and specific
dependent variables. That task will be accomplished in the data
analysis chapters themselves. Rather, here the intention is to set
out the general hypotheses which emerge from the fusion of the

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literature described in Chapters I, II, and III.

Because the reader may, by this point, be eager to move to speci-
fics, a few words in explanation of this procedure are in order.
First of all, the overall structure of the analysis to follow can be
revealed more clearly through the assertion of the basic hypotheses
under study than through the assertion of specific ones. In addi-
tion, broad formulations may be of greater use than specific ones
to others interested in pursuing the same sorts of questions in
other contexts or with different variables.

In more practical terms, the number of hypotheses implicit in
what has already been said is considerable. However, the data avail-
able will permit the testing of only some of them. Advancing all
the possibilities at this point would therefore mean advancing many
specific hypotheses that cannot actually be tested here. Finally,
advancing the specific hypotheses that can be tested both here and
later on, as will be necessary, in the data analysis chapters would
involve a good deal of needless repetition. To derive these benefits
and to avoid these problems, then, this chapter presents only fairly
broad hypotheses about the sources of behavior.

Some Broad Hypotheses

A hypothesis specifies three essential elements: a dependent
variable, an independent variable, and a relationship between them.
Since all the hypotheses advanced in this chapter share a common
set of dependent variables, their exposition can best be accom-
plished by discussing first the common elements—the various dimen-
sions of police behavior which are to be explained. Then the three

broad categories of independent variables and the relationships
and inter-relationships that they should have with the dependent
variables will be described.

The Dependent Variables

The discussion in Chapter I pointed to three broad classes of
police behavior as politically significant. First, of course, are
the formal decisions the police make—decisions involving the
exercise of their legal authority. Included here are such acts as
interrogation, detention, arrest, ticketing, and the filing of re-
ports of crime. These acts gain significance because they induct
individuals into the legal process and because they presumably have
some impact on the level of order in society.

The second class encompasses the informal aspects of police
behavior. These acts do not involve the exercise of legal author-
ity, but because, as was shown in Chapter I, they do "authoritatively
allocate" values and they appear to influence mass orientations
toward the political system, they are properly labelled "political."
Included here are such acts as the verbal and physical manner of the
policeman toward the citizen and the willingness of the policeman
to comply with the requests of citizens in non-legal affairs.

The third class involves the efficiency and effectiveness of
the police. Given that the primary task of the police is to main-
tain order in a society, the obvious criterion for effectiveness is
how much the police contribute to the prevention of disorder. But,
in view of the virtual impossibility of determining how much

crime there would be were there no police and how much crime there is with the police, it is impossible to say how much crime the police deter. Therefore, it is generally necessary to fall back from any kind of an indicator of how much crime the police deter to indicators of how hard they work. Such measures as the number of calls handled, the response time, the number of contacts with citizens initiated, and the numbers of tickets given and arrests made are often taken as measures of police effort.

To facilitate the discussion of hypotheses and findings, a few simple conventions will be adopted. Formal behaviors which tend to move the citizen toward further processing by the legal system will be characterized as negative actions, while behaviors which tend to move the citizen away from further processing will be characterized as positive behaviors. Informal behaviors which damage or diminish the individual—for example, hostility or brusque-ness—will also be characterized as negative behaviors, while their opposites—friendliness, for example—will be characterized as positive. The perspective taken in these conventions is that of the citizen with whom the policeman is dealing, and there is full recog-nition that actions, especially formal ones, which are negative from the standpoint of the citizen may be positive from the stand-point of society as a whole.

Independent Variables and Relationships

The discussion in Chapter II pointed to three broad models which can be seen as underlying the actions of policemen. One sees

police behavior as a response to the directives of a higher authori-
ty—either the law or the police organization. Another sees it as
flowing from the individual policeman himself—as a result of his
characteristics (here used to subsume physical, sociological, and
psychological dimensions). The third sees behavior as flowing
from the environment in which the policeman works—as a response
to the situations in which the policeman confronts the public.

The Machine Model

The legal variant of the machine model, as described in Chapter
II, sees the policeman as making formal decisions on the basis of
the legal aspects of the situation he confronts. Therefore, under
the machine model in its legal variant,

(4.1)   The formal actions of the police will vary with
         the legal features of the situation—principally,
         the seriousness of the offense and the character
         of the evidence that an offense has been com-
         mitted—and should be independent of the legally
         "irrelevant" features of the situation.

The legal variant does not directly address questions of in-
formal behavior or efficiency. The conception of the policeman as
a strictly ministerial official does, however, evoke images of
neutrality of treatment and maximum efficiency. The operation of
this variant therefore might be seen as implying that

(4.2)   The informal actions of the police will be im-
         personal in character and levels of effort will
         be high.

The organizational variant of the machine model sees the
policeman as behaving in a fashion consistent with the directives

of his superiors. A precise test would involve a comparison of
each of the actions of the officer with the pertinent policies laid
down by his superiors. That, however, would require extensive
knowledge about the exact policies in effect in the police depart-
ment. In the absence of such information, Wilson's threefold typ-
ology of police department styles provides a useful basis for
hypothesizing. He sees departments in certain kinds of cities as
having certain types of structure and ethos which, in turn, en-
courage certain "varieties of police behavior."

To be specific, legalistic departments typically arise in re-
form urban governments and are characterized by a centralized command
structure, professional personnel, bureaucratic modes of operation,
and an emphasis on enforcing the law as opposed to just maintaining
order. They engender frequent invocation of the legal process (con-
ditioned on the legal and not the non-legal features of situations),
informal behavior that is professional or neutral in tone, and high
levels of effort. Service departments typically arise in homo-
genous middle-class communities and emphasize satisfying the "cus-
tomers." Policemen there rely more on informal as opposed to formal
actions and exert lower levels of effort. Informal behavior is
usually courteous and deferential. Watchman-style departments
typically coexist with "caretaker" machine governments. They are
characterized by decentralized and loose control, an ethnic occupa-
tional group and an emphasis on keeping order as opposed to enforc-
ing the law. Policemen typically invoke the legal process infre-
quently (and respond more to the characteristics of the people dealt

with than the legal features of the situation), engage in more expressive informal behavior, and exert low levels of effort.[1] To sum up, then, this organizational variant of the machine model posits that

(4.3)   The actions of the policeman will vary with the directives emanating (and sometimes not emanating) from departmental superiors, with the basic character of such directives, and thus of behavior, being determined by the style of the department— whether it is legalistic, service-oriented, or watchman-like.

The Individual Differences Model

The individual differences model sees police behavior as flowing from sources within the policeman himself. The literature surveyed in Chapter II reveals an interest in a wide variety of factors, ranging from the physical (e.g., race) to the sociological (e.g., class) to the psychological (e.g., racial prejudice). The basic hypothesis implicit in all this is, of course, that

(4.4)   The actions of the policeman will vary with his personal characteristics.

However, what scant evidence there is in the police literature and, more importantly, the evidence reviewed in Chapter III and summarized in hypothesis 3.1 suggest that the relationships between these individual characteristics and actions will not be strong. One possible exception to this general disclaimer, following the suggestion of hypothesis 3.7 and Skolnick and Woodworth's suggestion (cited in Chapter II) that racial attitudes may have more of an effect on the manner of the policeman than on his formal decisions is that

informal actions may, in general, be more responsive to the indi-
vidual characteristics of the policeman than formal ones. In
addition, because any number of characteristics may bear on a single
action, as suggested in Chapter III, the ability to explain behavior
should be enhanced by employing several characteristics simultan-
eously.

The Situational Differences Model

The situational differences model described in Chapter II looks
to the legal features, the characteristics and behavior of citizens,
and the physical and social features of the settings within which
police meet citizens to explain police behavior. The basic hypo-
thesis thus is that

(4.5)   The actions of the policeman will vary with the
          characteristics of the situation which he
          confronts.

The general impact of situational factors on behavior, hypothesis
3.2 suggests, would depend on the degree to which actors had learned
common notions about appropriate responses to stimuli. Given the
sort of milieu in which policemen work—the common setting of the
street, the common position at the base of a hierarchy, the strength
of the occupational peer group—it is reasonable to expect that
policemen do indeed develop common notions about the appropriate
responses to various situations. Thus relationships between situa-
tional factors and actions might be expected to be strong. That
they will be strong in comparison to relationships with individual
factors is suggested by a consideration of the issues raised in

hypothesis 3.3. Because police officers are, in terms of their sociological and psychological characteristics, a fairly homogenous group and because they move through a wide variety of situations in their work, the potential for situations to exert more impact on behavior than individuals is certainly present. In other words, in the police milieu, it is likely that situational differences will account more satisfactorily for police behavior than individual differences. As in the case of individual characteristics, it is plausible to assume that, since individuals engaging in any particular behavior may be responding to a number of facets in a situation, explanatory power will be enhanced through the employment of several situational factors simultaneously.

Interactive Models

The essential thrust of the literature discussed in Chapter III is that, although the simple general effects of individual and situational factors on behavior may be weak, such factors may, under certain circumstances, exert a more substantial effect. The identification of these circumstances, though, if it is to be more than the "fishing expedition" alluded to in Chapter III, must be guided by theory.

One such set of theoretically justifiable circumstances is the organization within which the behavior occurs. Wilson himself suggests, though not in these explicit terms, that organization may play an important moderating role. As mentioned in Chapter II, he sees the style of the organization as influencing the relationships

of individual and situational characteristics with behavior. That
is,

    (4.6)   The effects of the individual characteristics of
               the policeman on behavior will vary with organi-
               zational style, with these characteristics having
               more effect in watchman-like departments and less
               effect in legalistic departments.

and

    (4.7)   The effects of situational characteristics on
               behavior will vary with organizational style, with
               legal features having more effect in legalistic
               departments and legally irrelevant features (such
               as citizen characteristics) having more effect in
               watchman-like departments.

Hypothesis 3.5 suggests that

    (4.8)   The effects of situational factors on police be-
               havior will vary with the characteristics of the
               policeman.

Foremost among these characteristics may be the amount of experience

the officer has had in the police role. In view of the findings

reported in Chapter III, it seems plausible to expect that the longer

a policeman serves, the more sensitive he will become to situational

variations.

    The complement to this hypothesis is one based on hypothesis

3.4:

    (4.9)   The effects of individual characteristics on be-
               havior will vary with the situation, with the
               expression of individual differences in behavior
               depending on the "audience" to which the actions
               are visible.

For the police, as discussed in Chapter II, perhaps the most pertinent

onlookers are the public, the department, and the partner. In

general, it would be expected that higher visibility to an audience would impel the officer toward caution in acting out his own inclinations. However, in situations in which the audience is perceived as supportive or similarly inclined, increased visibility might actually enhance relationships between individual characteristics and behavior.

Finally, following hypothesis 3.6, the following sort of developmental hypothesis can be advanced:

> (4.10)   Policemen with certain sorts of characteristics may tend to enter into certain sorts of situations. The particular characteristics of these situations may then incline them to act in certain ways.

For example, a relationship between racial prejudice and negative treatment of citizens could arise in this way: racially prejudiced policemen may tend to enter more often into interactions with black offenders than with white offenders. If, as Piliavin and Briar contend (see Chapter II), it is the higher rate of disrespect for the police among blacks that causes the police to arrest them more often than whites, then this "selection out" could lead to a relationship between prejudice and arrest.

The Data

The Reiss Study of Police-Citizen Encounters

The data used to test the hypotheses advanced here are drawn from a study conducted by Albert J. Reiss, Jr. for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in the summer of 1966. In an attempt to understand transactions between policemen and citizens, Reiss deployed observers to ride and walk

with policemen on their regular daily rounds. The observers had
two basic tasks. One was to record in a booklet not unlike the
typical survey questionnaire the details of each and every encounter
between police and citizens which they observed. The observation
schedule elicited information on virtually every aspect of the
encounter between policemen and citizens—the number, characteris-
tics, and behavior of the citizens involved, the reason for the en-
counter, and both the formal and informal actions taken by the
police in the situation. The second task was to record in a separ-
ate booklet which was filled out at the end of each shift both
summary descriptions of what had gone on during the shift—the num-
ber of encounters, the kinds of people encountered, the character-
istics of the territory patrolled—and the characteristics of the
patrolmen observed.[2] The latter was based on observation—their
race, for example—and on the policemen's responses to questions
asked by the observer during the course of the shift. These ques-
tions sought information about the officers' work experiences, their
attitudes toward their job and their department, and their attitudes
toward some of the kinds of people they encountered in their work.

The study was conducted in three large American cities: Boston,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C. They were selected because their
police departments represented different organizational styles:

> Boston, Massachusetts was chosen to represent the traditional
> police department based on an ethnic occupational culture
> (here, the "Irish cop") and personalized administration of the
> department. Chicago, Illinois was chosen to represent the
> model of the modern, bureaucratically organized department
> based on systems analysis and a centralized command and control.

> Washington, D.C., was selected because the department was
> in the process of professionalizing the staff and moving
> toward modernization of its command and control systems.[3]

In terms of Wilson's typology, Boston typified the watchman style

of department, Chicago typified the legalistic department, and

Washington might be seen as in a state of transition from the former

to the latter.[4]

The mid-1960s were, in general, a time of turmoil for law

enforcement agencies. Compared to the other two departments, Chicago

was a relatively stable department, having recovered from the scan-

dals which rocked it in the early 1960s.[5] Boston and Washington,

on the other hand, were both experiencing some criticism from local

government, the community, and the media.[6] The pressures were most

severe in Washington. Widely publicized incidents between citizens

and police and allegations of corruption had cast the force in an

unfavorable light.[7] The department came under investigation by

the President's Commission on Crime for the District of Columbia.[8]

The Washington department was, in other words, experiencing the

simultaneous strains of internal reorganization and external scrutiny.

Because of limitations on resources, only a few precincts in

each city could be studied. In order to maximize the number of

police-citizen encounters that might be observed by a fixed number

of observers in a fixed amount of time, only precincts with relative-

ly high crime rates—and thus higher rates of interaction between

citizens and police—were admitted into the sample. In order to

insure observation of a sufficient number of encounters with white

and black citizens, attempts were made to select at least one

predominantly white precinct and one predominantly black precinct
in each city. To the extent possible, precincts were selected to
provide as diverse a social class composition as possible. However,
given the requirement of a relatively high crime rate, the precincts
selected were predominantly lower class. An additional aim was to
observe in precincts that were "real" communities within the larger
urban area.[9]

The end result of this selection process was a sample of eight
precincts—two each in Boston and Chicago, and four in Washington.[10]
The two precincts selected in Boston were Dorchester and Roxbury.
Dorchester was a predominantly white area, with the Irish compri-
sing the primary ethnic group. Some blacks did live in the pre-
cinct too, though, primarily in a housing project which the police
called "Sin City" and along one of the borders. Both lower class
and middle class people lived in the area. Relative to other white
precincts in Boston, Dorchester had a very high crime rate—the
highest of all, in fact, outside downtown Boston.

Roxbury was a predominantly black area, with a few scattered
white families. Most of the inhabitants had low incomes, but there
was one pocket of middle and upper-middle class white families which
the police referred to as "The Oasis." The crime rate was very high,
relative to both the city as a whole and to other black areas. A
measure of the disproportionate impact of urban crime on blacks is
shown by the fact that the crime rate in Roxbury, the black area,
was double the rate in Dorchester, the precinct with the highest rate
among white areas.

The Chicago precincts selected were Town Hall and Fillmore. Town Hall was the predominantly white area, with a substantial number of Southern white migrants and a sizeable Puerto Rican community. The social composition of the precinct was diverse, ranging from low income to upper-middle class, but geographically segregated—the latter, for example, being concentrated in high-rise apartments along the Lake Michigan shore. Relative to other white precincts in Chicago, Town Hall had a fairly high crime rate. But, as in Boston, it was only half that in the predominantly black area, Fillmore. Fillmore was a poor urban ghetto, with many of its residents recent migrants from the South. Some rioting broke out in the precinct during the period of the observation study.

A decision relatively late in the planning of the study to examine the effects of variations in crime rate led to the addition of two relatively low crime rate areas to the two high crime areas originally selected in Washington.[11] The four precincts finally selected included more than 40% of the people living in the District of Columbia. Given that the district at the time was more than two-thirds non-white, it is not surprising that none of the areas had a white majority. Precinct 6 came closest, with a little more than half its population non-white. Precincts 10 and 13 were about 75% non-white, and Precinct 14, 90%. Precinct 6 was of mixed class composition, with some areas of great affluence, some upper-middle class, and some less well off. It had the lowest crime rate of the four. Precinct 10 included people who were generally less well off and had the second highest crime rate of the four. Precinct 13 was also

inhabited by people of low socioeconomic status, though one section included some upper class and diplomatic residents. This precinct had the highest crime rate of the four. Precinct 14 was predominantly lower-class, but with a sizeable middle class. This precinct had the second lowest crime rate of the four.

The practical difficulties of defining the universe of all police-citizen encounters in the precincts selected and then sampling from it necessitated an alternative procedure. A sample of all tours of duty (a policeman or a team on a shift, usually eight hours long) was drawn instead, with the idea that a random selection of tours of duty would have the effect of randomizing the selection of encounters. Because the frequency of encounters varies across the time of the day and the day of the week, "busy" times and days were represented more heavily.[12] The observers—the individuals who actually recorded information about the encounters and interviewed the patrolmen about their work—were drawn from three different backgrounds: law, law enforcement, and the social sciences.[13] This was done to allow an examination of the effects which an observer's background had on his performance.[14] Though hired in the cities in which they worked, the observers all were put through a common training experience and supervised similarly. They were assigned randomly to the tours of duty which it was their task to observe.[15] In order to minimize the effects of observation on the behavior of the policemen, the observers were instructed to work at developing relationships of trust with the policemen. In addition, the policemen were told that the purpose of the study was to examine the behavior of citizens

toward the police, not vice versa, and the observers filled out their observation schedules after the tour of duty was over, relying on simple log sheets that they filled out during the tour to refresh their memories.[16]

The actual observations of police behavior took place over a six-week period in each of the three cities during the summer of 1966. A total of 36 observers, 12 in each city and equally divided among the three types identified earlier, was deployed. Altogether, they accompanied police on 840 tours of duty: 260 in Boston, 266 in Chicago, and 314 in Washington.

In the course of their work, the observers watched nearly 600 different policemen at work. Table 4.1 shows the numbers observed in each city and each precinct.[17] Each policeman was seen on an

Table 4.1

Number of Policemen Observed in Each City and Precinct

Precinct	Boston		Chicago		Washington, D.C.			
	Dorchester	56	Town Hall	91	Precinct 6	46	Precinct 13	48
	Roxbury	94	Fillmore	124	Precinct 10	71	Precinct 14	53
	Total	150	Total	215	Total			224
					Grand Total			589

average of about 2 1/2 tours. Altogether they were observed in 5391 encounters or potential encounters with citizens. However, because many potential encounters turn out not to be encounters at all—no one answers the door at the address to which the police have been dispatched, for example—only 3955 out of 5391 actually involved interaction with citizens. In these, the police interacted with a total of 11,422 citizens.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Using the Reiss Data

In many respects, the Reiss study provides an excellent basis
for the examination of the hypotheses set out earlier in this
chapter. Perhaps most important, it offers an opportunity to look
at the actual behavior of policemen going about their daily work—
making decisions and taking actions that are of considerable poli-
tical significance. It provides detailed information on the situa-
tions within which the behavior occurs. And it provides at least
some information on the characteristics and attitudes of the police-
men engaged in the activity. Further, by having been conducted in
eight different precincts in three different cities with depart-
ments differing in organizational style, it provides some insight
into the effects which social context and organization may have on
police behavior. Reiss, in sum, gathered data which relate to every
class of independent variable and dependent variable identified in
this study as being theoretically important, both to political
science (because of the political import of the dependent variables)
and to behavioral science in general (because of the implications
for the individuals-situations issue).

These features of the data are of particular consequence in
view of the methodological lessons noted at the end of Chapter III.
Because organizational, individual, and situational factors have
all been measured, it is possible to test hypotheses regarding each
of the models directly, rather than indirectly, as so often has
been the case in the past. Further, because the data were gathered
in a field setting, the data provide an alternative to the experimental

data that have been the basis for so much of the research into the individual versus situational differences controversy. Finally, in view of the criticism of the lack of multivariate analyses in the study of police behavior raised at the end of Chapter II, it is important to note that Reiss gathered data on a scale—3 cities, 8 precincts, 600 policemen, 11,000 citizens, and 19,000 dyadic interactions—that facilitates the use of multivariate analysis techniques and breeds confidence in the results obtained from them.

Nevertheless, the study does present several problems, some of which are basic to its design and some of which arise because of the particular use to which it will be put here. As in any analysis of this sort, not all the information that might be useful was recorded. For example, information on the physical sizes of policemen and citizens might have formed the basis of an interesting analysis. Also, more information on the characteristics of those situations which policemen chose not to enter would have been useful in exploring hypothesis 4.10. In fact, the lack of such information, coupled with the extremely high rate of citizen-invoked encounters in these data—meaning that the opportunity for policemen to enter situations on their own volition is quite limited—argues persuasively against any attempt to test hypothesis 4.10 with these data.

Another problem is the possibility that the officers observed may have altered their behavior because of the presence of the observer. The general conclusion of those who have conducted

observational studies of the police seems to be that such effects are not too serious. They argue that, when observation extends over a period of time, policemen tend to forget that they are being watched and to behave in their usual manner. They suggest that the exigencies of the situation are usually such that the observer fades into the background. Students of the police point to the results of their observation as well—the technique gains face validity from the substantial amount of misconduct which is often observed. Finally, of course, there is the question of a better alternative—in order to be explained, the phenomena must be described and, in order to be described, the phenomena must be observed.[18]

However, a theoretical perspective such as the one advanced in the preceding pages, which emphasizes the importance of situational factors, especially those involving the visibility of actions to others, must concede that observational effects may be substantial. At the least, efforts should be made to minimize the magnitude of such effects and to anticipate the kinds of distortion which they may introduce into the findings. Reiss, as noted above, did take several steps to reduce these effects—building rapport between observer and observed, leading the policemen to believe that they were not the central focus of the study, extending observation over a substantial length of time, and lowering the visibility of the recording of police actions.

It is generally thought that distortion introduced by observation into police behavior runs in the direction of the policemen acting "better" than they normally do.[19] This seems a reasonable

expectation, since their main concern is probably that any impro-
prieties in which they engage will be reported back to their depart-
ment. There may, however, be some tendency for behavior to be less
"good," since policemen may sometimes try to impress their observers
by looking "tough" or powerful, particularly in the face of citizen
disrespect. In any case, given the atypical constraints which
observation may place on police behavior, relationships between
behavior and the factors which typically determine it are probably
attenuated as a result of outside observation. (A parallel problem,
which will not be addressed here, is the effect of the observer's
presence on the citizens' behavior.)

Another problem of the particular observational methodology
employed involves the way in which information on the policemen's
attitudes was obtained. Interviewing a policeman on the job, often
in the presence of another officer, hardly seems a good way to elicit
candid responses—though some might disagree.[20] All sorts of
extraneous factors may intrude to affect the response and render it
of little value as an indicator of the policeman's true attitude.
Thus even if the true attitude bears a strong relationship to behavior,
correlations between the verbally expressed attitude and behavior
may be weak or non-existent. This aspect of the measurement pro-
cedure raises the possibility of Type I error—rejecting a true hypo-
thesis because of faulty measurement.

At the same time, another aspect of the design raises the
opposite threat. For any given tour of duty, the same observer was

responsible for recording both the policeman's overt behavior and his attitudes. It is possible that his assessment of one will be contaminated by his assessment of the other—as Mischel has pointed out, raters may "construct" consistency in the behavior of those they observe. Correlations between attitudes and behavior may, on these grounds, be inflated. This aspect of the measurement procedure raises the possibility of Type II error—accepting a false hypothesis because of constructed consistency.

The strategy taken here to ameliorate these problems relies on the fact that many policemen were observed on more than one tour of duty—an average, as noted before, of each policeman being observed on 2 1/2 tours of duty. This makes it possible to construct a measure of a policeman's attitude by combining his responses across all the tours on which he was observed. This may alleviate the first difficulty by "randomizing out" extraneous influences on the expressions of opinion. It contributes to a resolution of the second problem because it makes the attitude scores to be correlated with each behavior of the policeman dependent, not just on the observer who saw that behavior, but on all the other observers who talked with that policeman as well. The procedure is by no means an ideal one—that would require assessment of attitude by a different observer in a neutral context—but it seems the best that can be managed under the circumstances.

Another problem—perhaps more on the order of a qualification—involves the scope of the study. Though the study was conducted on a large scale, it did nevertheless encompass only patrol officers

in only eight precincts in only three cities. The departments were chosen because they represented "ideal types" or extremes of police organization and the precincts were selected on the basis of high crime rates and racial homogeneity. None of these characteristics are necessarily typical of the contexts in which most policemen work. Thus the study does not provide a firm basis for assertions about "police behavior in general" or "typical police behavior." Rather, the study does allow assertions about how police patrolmen acted and why they acted as they did in these particular places at this particular time. Given the paucity of our knowledge about police behavior, that in itself is something of great value. Further, when it is recognized that the context examined is, if not the typical context of police work, at least a typical context of police work— patrol officers in lower-class black and white areas of large cities— the study is seen to have greater external validity. The range of generalization is, in other words, limited, but nevertheless wide enough to be of substantial utility.

The greatest drawback of the study, from the practical stand-point of using the data gathered to explore the hypotheses advanced here, relates to the organization of the data. The original investigators were interested primarily in the "social structure" of trans-actions between police and citizens. As a result, they took as their unit of analysis, and organized their data around, what they called the encounter—any meeting between one or more policemen and one or more citizens. Each encounter was thus comprised of a substantial number of individual actions by police and citizens. The interests

here, on the other hand, are, as expressed in Chapter I, in the individual behaviors of policemen and in what happens to citizens— the specific outputs of the political system. Attention is shifted from the aggregate of behavior in the encounter to the particular acts of policemen toward individual citizens that make up the encounter. These individual acts toward individual citizens become the unit of analysis and the basis for organization of the data.

This shift is not intended as an explicit or implicit criticism of the original investigators' approach. Indeed it is undertaken with considerable trepidation of shattering into incomprehensible pieces what is, after all, a functioning miniature social system—the police-citizen encounter. However, given that the objective of this study is to understand the roots of individual police actions toward individual citizens, it seems appropriate to define them and not the broader aggregates which they compose as the basic unit of analysis.

Restructuring the Reiss Data

The differences in purpose between the original Reiss study and the study of the hypotheses proposed here dictated a transformation of the data from a form suitable to the purposes of their study to a form suitable to the purposes of this study. Each encounter report submitted in the original study contained detailed information on the interactions between the one or two policemen to whom the observer was assigned and the one to five primary citizen participants. Summary information on the behavior of any additional

citizens was also gathered, but has never been subjected to analysis.
To fit the data to the purposes here, a computer program was
written which decomposed the encounter into the from one to ten
police-citizen interaction pairs which made it up.[21]   The data
were structured so that it remained possible to treat them at either
the interaction, the citizen, or the encounter level—an important
feature because some central variables described only at one level
could then be related to variables described only at other levels.
Given the distribution of citizens for encounters with one and two
policemen (shown in Table 4.2), the 3955 actual encounters yielded

Table 4.2

Number of Encounters, Number of Citizens, and Number of
Dyadic Interactions, By Number of Policemen and
Number of Primary Citizen Participants

Number of Policemen		Number of Primary Citizen Participants					
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Total
One	#Encounters	322	265	159	96	294	1136
	#Citizens	322	530	477	384	1470	3183
	#Interactions	322	530	477	384	1470	3183
Two	#Encounters	698	606	466	314	735	2819
	#Citizens	698	1212	1398	1256	3675	8239
	#Interactions	1396	2424	2796	2512	7350	16478
Total	#Encounters	1020	871	625	410	1029	3955
	#Citizens	1020	1742	1875	1640	5145	11422
	#Interactions	1718	2954	3273	2896	8820	19661

a total of 19,661 dyadic interactions between policemen and citizens.
All told, 3183 of the 11,422 citizens interacted with one policeman
and 8239 interacted with two policemen to produce the 19,661 cases
which provide the basis for much of the analysis to follow.

A similar procedure was employed in constructing a file com-
posed of data on each individual policeman. Reports on each tour
of duty contained information on the from one to four policemen—
almost always one or two—whom the observer had accompanied. Given
the distribution of policemen across the 840 tours (seen in Table
4.3), the total number of "policemen-seen-on-a-shift" was 1455.

Table 4.3

Number of Tours of Duty, By Number of Policemen
Observed on Each Tour, and Total Number of
"Policemen-on-Tour" Observed

Number of Policemen Observed	Number of Tours	Total Number of "Policemen-on-Tour" Observed
One	289	289
Two	497	994
Three	44	132
Four	10	40
Total	840	1455

However, because the same policeman could be seen on more than one
shift, some of the cases were repeat observations and interviews.
Computer programs were used to extract from the tour report infor-
mation on each of the policemen observed on that tour and to re-
aggregate the information into a new file, which combined, in the
various appropriate fashions, the information about a single police-
man from all the different tours on which he was observed into a
single collection of information about him. (It is this aspect
which permits the multiple-attitude measurement process described
earlier.)

The data on the 19,000 interactions and the 600 policemen who acted in them were then merged into a single file. This made it possible to correlate the behaviors of the policemen toward citizens in the encounters with many of the characteristics of the encounter—the city and the precinct in which it occurred, its legal and social aspects, the attributes and behavior of the citizens— and with some of the characteristics and attitudes of the policemen. It is this set of data which provides the basis for the analysis described in the following chapters.

Footnotes for Chapter IV

1. James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 140-226.

2. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. xii-xiii; and "Systematic Observation of Natural Social Phenomena," in Sociological Methodology 1971, ed. Herbert Costner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), p. 13.

3. Reiss, The Police, pp. xi-xii.

4. James Q. Wilson verifies this view of the departments studied:

    "Boston had a traditional police force with older patrolmen, a decentralized administrative structure, poor equipment and facilities, low pay, few blacks on the force, almost no community relations program, and weak internal discipline. Chicago was nationally famous for its modernized, professional style; it had young patrolmen, good pay, highly centralized administration, an active internal inspection and discipline system, a large community-relations program, and a high proportion of blacks serving in the ranks."

    "The Police in the Ghetto," in The Police in the Community, ed. Robert F. Steadman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 69.

5. James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect," in The Police, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 140.

6. Howard Aldrich and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Officers as Boundary Personnel: Attitude Congruence Between Policemen and Small Businessmen in Urban Areas," in Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 200-201.

7. Albert D. Biderman, et al., Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes toward Law Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 22-23, E-1 to E-4.

8. Aldrich and Reiss, pp. 200-201; Reiss, "Career Orientations, Job Satisfaction, and the Assessment of Law Enforcement Problems by Police Officers," in U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas, Field

Surveys III, Vol. II, Section 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 97-99.

9. Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions," in Studies, Vol. II, Section 1, p. 14; Reiss, The Police, p. xii; Donald J. Black, "Quick Overview of Boston," unpublished observation study document, 1966.

10. The descriptions of the precincts have been drawn from the following sources: Howard Aldrich and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "The Effects of Civil Disorder on Small Business in the Inner-City," Journal of Social Issues 26 (Winter 1970): 188-189; Biderman, et al., pp. 3-4, 23-24, A-1 to A-18; Black and Reiss, "Patterns," p. 14; Reiss, "Measurement of the Nature and Amount of Crime," in Studies, Vol. I, Section 1, pp. 77-78; Reiss, "Public Perceptions and Recollections about Crime, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice," in Studies, Vol. I, Section 2, pp. 23, 58; Reiss, "Career Orientations," pp. 2-3; Reiss, The Police, p. xii.

11. Reiss, The Police, p. xii.

12. Ibid., pp. xii-xiii; Black and Reiss, "Patterns," p. 14; Reiss, "Systematic Observation," pp. 9-11.

13. This description of the observer methodology is drawn from Reiss, The Police, p. xiii; Reiss, "Systematic Observation;" and Donald J. Black, "The Social Organization of Arrest," Stanford Law Review 23 (June 1971): 1088.

14. Some results of this part of the project are reported in Reiss's "Systematic Observation" article. The article contains a good discussion of the problems of observational research and additional information on the specific procedures employed in the police observation study.

15. Observers generally worked only in one precinct, though some occasionally shifted from one precinct to another, and were instructed to ride with different policemen on each shift. Personal conversation with Donald J. Black.

16. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Brutality - Answers to Key Questions," Trans-action, July-August 1968, p. 15.

17. The frequencies shown here differ slightly from those reported by Reiss (The Police, pp. 157-159 and 165-166) because he includes all the policemen observed in a precinct, not just those who could be uniquely identified from the coded data, as is the practice in this analysis.

18. This discussion draws on Jerome Skolnick, <u>Justice Without Trial</u> (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 35-40; <u>Black and Reiss, "Patterns," p. 15; Wilson, "The Police in the Ghetto," p. 66; and Reiss, "Police Brutality," p. 15.

19. Skolnick, p. 36; Reiss, "Police Brutality," p. 15; and Wilson, "The Police in the Ghetto," pp. 66-67.

20. Irwin Deutscher, drawing heavily on the ideas of Aaron Cicourel, suggests that such "interviewing in context" may have a special value: "It . . . presents us with a world in which what people say is intimately related to what they are doing . . ." <u>What We Say/What We Do</u> (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), pp. 165-166.

21. This account neglects a substantial amount of work preliminary to this process. The original data were spread across three separate files—one each for encounters of different mobilization types (dispatched, on-view, and citizen field mobilizations). These three were merged into a single file before the extensive restructuring began.

CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATION

Police behavior is a complex and variegated set of phenomena, comprised of law enforcement, order-maintenance, and service activities, and manifesting formal and informal aspects. This chapter begins by identifying several specific dimensions of police behavior, selected for their theoretical importance, which will be used to test the hypotheses advanced in the preceding chapter. The basic distributions of police action along these dimensions are presented, because these distributions provide both a revealing picture of the character of police action in their own right and a baseline against which the effects of organization, individuals, and situations can be judged. An examination of the effects of organization—here measured by differences in behavior across three departments varying in what Wilson calls their style—will constitute the focus of the remainder of the chapter.

Operationalizing the Dimensions of
Police Behavior

Formal Behavior

The formal actions of the police to be studied here are those directly involving the invocation of the legal process: decisions on whether or not to arrest when a suspect is available or to file a formal report when one is not, and decisions on whether or not to

issue tickets in traffic cases. (Later, when more complicated
multivariate explanatory models are employed, only the most compell-
ing of these actions—arrest—will be examined.) The obviously
important prior question of decisions to enter into interactions in
the first place cannot be examined comprehensively here because of
the difficulties of identifying when a situation potentially warrant-
ing entrance exists and of describing such situations. Some light
can be shed on the question, however, by examining the organizational
and individual factors which relate to the propensities of officers
to patrol aggressively and initiate contacts on their own, in the
absence of an organizational directive via radio to do so.

The formal actions to be examined here have been chosen because
they involve the basic kinds of authoritative allocations in which
the police engage—the invocation of the legal process against sus-
pected offenders. They also have the advantage of being easily
observable, discrete kinds of acts, unlike other formal actions such
as interrogations, which may shade over into mere conversation, or
personal searches and frisks, between which the observers found it
difficult to distinguish reliably.[1]

Arrest

Following LaFave, arrest here means the taking of a suspect in-
to custody.[2] This usage differs from those employed by others. Some
construe the term broadly, taking it to mean "any interference with
a person which, if not privileged, would constitute false imprison-
ment"—what LaFave calls "detention." Others construe it much more

narrowly, using it to refer to "the taking of custody upon suffi-
cient and proper evidence for the purpose of prosecution"—what
LaFave calls "charging."[3] "Taking into custody" seems a preferable
construction to "detention" because, whereas the latter may involve
a short and only minor inconvenience to the citizen, the former is
more likely to involve a substantial imposition on him. In addition,
the latter does not usually involve a real invocation of the legal
process, whereas the former does—names, addresses, and other infor-
mation are often recorded. Looking at charging alone risks under-
statement of the impact of the police, since a substantial number
of citizens are taken to the station, but not charged. In addition,
charging decisions are not necessarily made by the officer himself
or even by a superior officer, but by a prosecutor, and thus may not
be a good indicator of police action. Finally, the use of charging
confronts the practical problem that this decision may be made at
times and at places removed from the purview of the observer who saw
the initial encounter. Thus, for the purposes here, "taking into cus-
tody"—the transportation of a suspect to the police station—consti-
tutes the operational definition of arrest.

Under this definition, only 519 of the 11,422 citizens whom the
police were observed contacting—fewer than 5%—were arrested.[4]
Of course, this characterization really begs the question, for only
offenders are typically vulnerable to arrest. Taking only the popu-
lation vulnerable to arrest—persons defined as offenders, where
offender means "the person who is seen as 'out-of-line' or as a

possible violator of some sort in the situation . . . a sociological,
not a legal category" or as members of an offender group, where
that expression denotes "the person who supports or stands with the
offender," including, "if there is a large number of offenders . . .
the least active persons"[5]—the 519 arrests of the 3737 people fall-
ing into these two categories yield an arrest rate of 14.2%. Since
the offender group includes individuals who only support offenders in
addition to individuals who are the "least active" offenders, its
inclusion in the base overstates the vulnerable population and hence
understates the arrest rate of offenders. Given that it is impossible
to sort out the offenders from the supporters in this group, it seems
best to exclude it from consideration altogether. This winnowing
yields a base of 2680 offenders, of whom 479 were taken to the sta-
tion, for a "final" arrest rate of 18.2%.

In rough terms, then, a person situated as an offender in an
encounter with the police stands about a one-in-five chance of being
taken in. At first glance, this would seem to demonstrate the oft-
alleged tendency of policemen to under-enforce the law. But it
must be remembered that many of these offenders are not offenders in
any legal sense at all. Rather, they are individuals seen as being
in the wrong in non-criminal matters. As will be seen later on,
such individuals are sometimes arrested, but most arrests are of
individuals suspected of having violated the law. A better indicator
of the extent of underenforcement of the law is the arrest rate in
criminal cases. Taking felony and misdemeanor cases together, the

proportion of offenders arrested is 321 out of 797 or 40.3%. In the 195 felony cases, 56.9% of offenders are arrested and, in the 602 misdemeanor cases, 34.9%. If by underenforcement of the law is meant the failure of the police to take into custody every suspected criminal they encounter, these figures provide further evidence for the existence of the phenomenon.

Official Reports

The police wrote official reports in some 21.8% of the 5391 incidents encompassed by the study. But again this raw figure is misleading because such reports acquire substantial significance only in cases in which a complainant alleges criminal behavior and a suspect is not present. If there is no allegation of criminal conduct, the report is unlikely to stimulate further investigative activity. If a suspect is present, the arrest decision is the more important event. Taking, then, only those cases where a complainant alleges criminal activity and no suspect is available, reports were written in 508 out of 900 cases, or 56.4%. Underenforcement, in the aforementioned sense of a failure to invoke the legal process in circumstances which seem to call for it, again seems the norm.

Traffic Tickets

Ticketing is the primary formal power of policemen in a task to which they, at least in many departments, devote a substantial share of their time—the regulation of automobile traffic. The giving of a ticket seems straight-forward enough of an event, but its empirical examination is complicated by the nature of the

ticketing process. When a policeman sees a motorist violating the

traffic laws, he has five basic options:

1) ignore the violation and not even stop the motorist;

2) stop the motorist, but take no action against him or
   her;

3) stop the motorist and issue a warning—oral or written—
   to him or her;

4) stop the motorist and issue a ticket;

5) stop the motorist and arrest him or her.

The problems for an observer are in distinguishing situations in
which the police do not see the violation from those in which they
see it, but ignore it and in not knowing when he has missed a viola-
tion which the police have seen, but chosen to ignore. To circum-
vent this problem, analysis here is confined to those instances in
which the police pull the motorist over. Of the 330 offenders in
such cases, 14.5% had no action taken against them, 19.1% received
warnings, 51.8% received tickets and 14.5% were taken to the station.
Traffic offenders in general run a higher risk of sanction—nearly
two out of three get ticketed or arrested. As many a driver may
suspect, underenforcement seems less prevalent for traffic offenders—
at least once contact has been made—than for other kinds of offenses.

Informal Behavior

The informal actions of the police, it was suggested in Chapter
I, constitute a significant allocative output of the government and
may affect people's feelings and actions toward the government. Reiss

asked his observers to describe the informal actions of each of the policemen toward each of the citizens on a number of distinct dimensions, each of which represented differences in behavior that were potentially significant in light of earlier empirical work and public criticism of the police. These were the five dimensions:

1) The degree of control which the policeman exerted over the citizen—whether he dominated him, simply maintained control, or acted subordinately. This measure focused on the oft-noted "take-charge" orientation of the policeman.

2) The degree of control which the policeman exerted over himself—whether he had firm self-control, maintained his self-control, or lost it. This measure addressed the contention that the police sometimes let their emotions get the best of them, particularly in riots and demonstrations.

3) The degree of prejudice manifested in the officer's behavior toward the citizen—"obviously prejudiced, showed signs of prejudice, showed no signs of prejudice." This could be used to determine whether the police were guilty of racial discrimination, as is often alleged.

4) The manipulative techniques which the policeman used in dealing with citizens—whether he used particularistic appeals, humor and jolliness, subtle threats, silence, redirection, or reasoning in dealing with citizens.

5) The general manner of the policeman in dealing with
the citizen—whether he was: (a) "hostile, nasty, pro-
vocative;" (b) "openly ridiculed or belittled;" (c)
"brusque, bossy, authoritarian;" (d) "subtly ridiculed
or belittled;" (e) "business-like, routinized, impersonal;"
(f) "good-humored, playful, jovial."

For the first three dimensions, the observers were instructed to pro-
vide only one summary description of each policeman's actions toward
each citizen. For the last two, they were asked to use as many of
the available characterizations as necessary. The first three
dimensions were taken to constitute ordinal scales as they stood.
The last two were reordered so as to constitute ordinal scales, in
which behaviors were arrayed from very negative to positive. Table
5.1 shows the schemes used to map the original characterizations
into the new behavioral dimensions.

In the relatively small number of cases in which the observer
exercised his option to describe the policeman's behavior in terms
of more than one characterization, the behavior was coded according
to the character of the most extreme action taken and negative
actions were given priority over positive ones. The rationale for
this procedure was that the action gained significance as an output
to the citizen, that the best indicator of output, especially with
reference to system support, was the action as perceived by the
citizen, and that the citizen was most likely to dwell on the posi-
tive or negative aspects of the action, as opposed to the neutral

Table 5.1

Relationships Between Original and Revised Codings
of Policeman's Manipulative Techniques and Manner

Manipulative Techniques		Manner	
Original Code	Revised Code	Original Code	Revised Code
1) Particularistic appeal	Priority Code:	1) Hostile, nasty, provocative	1) Very Negative
2) Humor and jolliness	1) Any combination including threats		
	2) Any combination including reasoning	2) Openly ridiculed or belittled	
3) Subtle threats			
4) Silence		3) Brusque, bossy, authoritarian	2) Negative
5) Redirection	3) Any combination including humor		
6) Reasoning or problem-solving		4) Subtly ridiculed or belittled	
		5) Business-like, routinized, impersonal	3) Neutral
		6) Good-humored, playful, jovial	4) Positive

aspects, and on the negative aspects, as opposed to the positive
aspects.[6]

Mischel's contention that behavioral characterizations often
reflect more the notions of the observer than the behavior of the
actor (noted in Chapter III) raises the question of whether these
measures might not be unduly contaminated by observer effects. The
urgency of this question is heightened by the relatively vague
characterizations of behavior called for by the first three dimen-
sions and the emphasis of the third measure on evaluating the motives
behind the officer's behavior rather than describing it. For these

reasons, intra-class correlations were calculated for each of these dimensions, taking the observer as the class, as a means of discerning whether or not observer effects unduly contaminated the characterizations of behavior.

The intra-class correlation coefficient, as Blalock describes it, "basically involves a product-moment correlation between all possible pairs of cases within categories of the nominal scale variable" and can be viewed as "a measure of the degree of homogeneity of the classes relative to the total variability in the interval scale."[7] In this context, it can be viewed as an indicator of the extent to which observers who score one policeman high or low on a scale tend to score other policemen high or low too. A small coefficient indicates that the placement of a policeman's actions along the scale is independent of the observer, while a larger one indicates that the placement depends on which particular observer is doing the describing.[8]

As Table 5.2 reveals, some of the dimensions appear to be seriously contaminated by observer effects. Characterizations of

Table 5.2

Intra-Class Correlations, by Observer, for Informal Dimensions of Police Behavior

Dimension	Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient	N
Control over citizen	.40	16,827
Control over self	.62	16,931
Prejudice	.10	16,878
Manipulative techniques	.07	5,837
Manner	.03	16,680

the policeman's control over the citizen and his control over himself are highly dependent on who is doing the observing. Because these measures appear to be better descriptions of what the observer thinks about police behavior than police behavior itself, they have not been further analyzed. Contamination of the prejudice dimension is less serious, but it presents a serious question of face validity: it looks more to motives than to actions. For this reason, it too has been excluded from further analysis. Neither the manipulative techniques dimension nor the manner dimension seems to suffer greatly from observer effects. But the similarity of the revised codings does suggest that they may convey essentially the same information and an empirical check bears this out—the product-moment correlation between the two is .52, an exceptionally strong relationship for these data. Further, an inspection of the number of interactions coded on the manipulative techniques dimension reveals that fewer than half (7289 out of 19,661) of the interactions were coded—the police, after all, do not try to manipulate everyone they contact. This makes this measure less desirable as a way of characterizing all interactions. Taken together, the similarity in content, the substantial correlation between the two items, and the paucity of cases on the manipulative techniques dimension make a strong case for relying on the manner dimension as the indicator of the policeman's informal behavior.

The picture of informal police action which emerges from this characterization of the policeman's manner is one of neutrality.

In nearly three-quarters of all interactions with citizens, Table 5.3 shows, police behave in a "business-like, routinized, impersonal" manner, to use the words which define the category. This is

Table 5.3

Percentage Distribution of Policeman's Manner Toward Citizens

Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total	N
1.1	10.2	73.4	15.2	100.0	16,680

not surprising, since the ideal conception of the policeman as a neutral, ministerial official would suggest such a pattern of behavior. Further, many departments, especially those with "professional" orientations, urge their officers to stand aside as disinterested and impartial authorities in the situations into which they enter. "The officers," to quote Wilson, "are instructed to do their duty impersonally and with minimum involvement . . ."[9] (Of course, whether these patterns emerge from such sources or are instead simply typical of interactions among people unfamiliar with each other is hard to say.) Positive behaviors outweigh negative ones by a ratio of about three-to-two and extremely negative actions—those involving outright hostility and open ridicule—are exceedingly uncommon. These figures give the lie to the image of the policeman as a hostile or antagonistic figure. His manner tends rather to follow a neutral track and is more often positive than negative.

However, as noted in the discussion of formal actions, to describe
police behavior in terms that do not recognize the different roles
of the people toward which it is directed can obscure as much as it
reveals. Thus even the most basic description of the informal dimen-
sions of police action must take into account that some of the be-
havior is directed toward people who have done something wrong—in
the situational as opposed to legal sense, as noted earlier—while
other of the behavior is directed toward people who have done nothing
wrong and, indeed, who are sometimes the victims of wrongdoing. Table
5.4 provides an opportunity to do this by displaying how the informal
actions of the police vary according to the role which the citizen
plays in the interaction with the policeman.[10] Perhaps the most

Table 5.4

Policeman's Manner Toward Citizen, by
Citizen's Role in Situation

Manner	Complainant	Complainant Group	Offender	Offender Group	Victim	Victim Group	Informer	Bystander	Total
Very Negative	.6%	.4%	2.7%	1.7%	.3%	.2%	.5%	.6%	1.2%
Negative	6.6	4.4	24.3	12.3	3.2	3.5	2.6	4.0	10.3
Neutral	78.2	80.5	58.0	71.9	74.0	77.6	81.1	81.3	73.4
Positive	14.7	14.7	15.0	14.0	22.6	18.8	15.8	14.2	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	4308	2307	4011	1502	757	607	913	1844	16,399

The columns Offender, Offender Group, Victim, Victim Group are grouped under the heading "Citizen's Role".

salient feature here is that in no instance does a majority of the behavior deviate from the neutral category. And in every instance, save two, positive actions far outnumber negative ones. These tendencies toward positive treatment are, as might be expected, most pronounced for victims and members of victim groups—"persons who need or request help from the police in a situation that does not involve an 'offense'" and those "who support or are concerned about the victims." But even here a friendly manner is not common. Fewer than a quarter of the people in these roles are treated in a positive fashion and roughly three-quarters are treated impersonally.

The exceptions to the general pattern of positive actions outweighing negative actions are, as might also be expected, offenders and members of offender groups. More than one out of every four offenders is treated negatively. However, positive actions do not assume the status of hen's teeth, as one might think—like other groups, offenders are treated in a friendly fashion once out of about every seven times. The treatment of members of offender groups falls roughly between that of offenders and that of others—a result which is not surprising given that the group is composed of both the "least active" offenders and others who simply support the offenders. Overall, perhaps the most important aspect of the treatment of offenders and their supporters is the relatively low level of negative treatment. The 27% level of negative treatment toward offenders themselves provides a clear reminder to all those who are inclined to see the police as taking out their frustrations on every offender

unfortunate enough to pass by that police behavior is not always
what media images and critics of the police would lead us to believe
it is.

Behavior toward citizens playing other roles fits with expec-
tations. Complainants—"persons who want police action in response
to what they see as an 'offense' of some kind (including victims
of violent crimes)"—and their supporters, as well as bystanders,
are treated neutrally most of the time, with what deviations there
are definitely tending toward the positive side. Informants—"per-
sons who give information relevant to the nature of a situation but
who do not support or stand with any of the central participants"—
seem particularly immune to maltreatment, probably because it would
make little sense for the police to antagonize their sources of
information.

The multiplicity of roles which citizens can play in their
encounters with the police and the differences in police behavior
toward them pose a problem for subsequent analyses. The most com-
prehensive strategy would be to examine all subsequent hypotheses
within the group defined by each citizen role. However, this would
so complicate the presentation and analysis that hardly any of the
major questions could be addressed effectively. The strategy em-
ployed here is, where role is an important variable, to divide the
citizenry into the simplest possible groupings—offenders and non-
offenders. Because of the mixed character of members of offender
groups, they have been excluded from analysis whenever the role
distinction is drawn.

Effort

Because, as discussed in Chapter I, assessing police effectiveness in reducing crime is so difficult, efficiency has generally been assessed in terms of police effort. The number of arrests, taken here as an indicator of authoritative allocation, has also been used to measure police efficiency. These indicators suffer, however, from the difficulty that they do not reflect only the behavior of the policemen. Officers might, for example, work strenuously, but intervene formally infrequently, perhaps because departmental policies explicitly or implicitly encourage the handling of matters informally.

As simple an indicator as the number of contacts which police make with citizens might instead be used as a rough indicator of police activity. For example, the 840 tours of duty served by policemen during the course of the observational study yielded a total of 5391 encounters or potential encounters, for an average of about 6 1/2 incidents per tour or a little less than one "task" per hour. Of course, as Black and Reiss have noted, a fairly high percentage of these encounters are only potential ones. About one-quarter involve no contact with citizens—no one answers the door, the address turns out to be non-existent, the crowd of noisy youths has disappeared. Taking these factors into account, the average number of police contacts with citizens on a tour of duty comes to about 4.7, or less than one every hour and a half.

But to take even this number as an indicator of the average level of police effort would be misleading. Reiss and Black have strongly emphasized the predominantly reactive character of police work. That is, most of the contact between police and citizens occurs, not as the result of police initiative, but as the result of the police responding to requests from citizens for police help.[11] Thus the average number of contacts between police and citizens reflects as much the propensity of citizens to make demands on the police as it does the propensity of police to initiate contacts. A better indication of police effort might therefore be the number of contacts between police and citizens that are initiated by the police. Taking only these contacts initiated by the police, the average number per tour falls to .72. A potentially serious defect of this measure is, of course, that it counts contacts with no attention to the environmental potential for contacts. Even a highly motivated policeman may find it difficult to initiate many contacts in a quiet neighborhood. This is not likely to be a serious problem with these particular data, however, since they were gathered primarily in high crime areas. The low rate, though, may be taken to reflect the extent to which much of the crime even in these areas occurs outside the perimeter of the policeman's vision. In any case, the number of police-initiated contacts—less than one a shift, on the average—disputes the image of the police as aggressive crime fighters.

Other information gathered by the observers also supports this picture. At the end of each tour of duty, the observers were asked to characterize the aggressiveness which each officer displayed in his patrolling. That is, during the periods in which the officer was not handling calls assigned to him by the dispatcher, did he spend his time in "frequent 'goofing off'" with "very little preventive work," or "relaxed patrolling" with "occasional checking," or "aggressive patrolling" with "frequent preventive action?" Of the 1455 policemen observed on separate tours of duty, 17.9% did very little preventive work, 61.5% patrolled in a relaxed fashion, and 20.7% patrolled aggressively. Though it is definitely not the case that policemen take no initiative in fighting crime, the effort they expend seems relatively modest.[12]

The broad picture, then, which emerges from these data on the level of effort policemen expend in performing their tasks is a mixed one. Policemen work, but it does not appear that the norm is for them to work very hard. In this, the data reinforce the image of the policeman as a worker at a job—one who balances the pressures to exert himself against the opportunities to slack off. The nature of those pressures and opportunities will be examined in the following pages.

The Effects of Organization

Effects on Formal Behavior

The effects of organization on formal police actions have, as discussed in Chapter II, constituted a central focus of much of

the empirical study of the police. Gardiner and Wilson, it was said there, have assessed these effects by comparing ticketing and arrest rates, calculated against the bases of number of motor vehicles and city population, respectively, across cities. They have buttressed their conclusions by drawing on impressions gleaned from interviews and observations in individual departments. A defect in their approach is the reliance on those sorts of bases in the calculation of rates. If the sanctioning rate is to represent the proportion of offenders who are sanctioned by the police, then it should be calculated against a base that reflects the number of offenses. Only under the questionable assumption that rates of violation are equal across cities can the measures based on numbers of motor vehicles and people that they use be justified.

Observational data of the sort gathered by Reiss provide a solution to this problem. Because the observer can record the number of offenders who come to the attention of the police and the disposition of each of these offenders, it is possible to calculate for each city the proportion of the "known offender" population that is inducted into the legal process.

Of course, even with this improvement in the calculation of rates, the mere demonstration of differences in sanctioning rates across cities does not prove that organizational differences are responsible for them. It is desirable, as Gardiner and Wilson have done, to identify the sorts of organizational differences which may account for the observed differences in behavior. In this instance, the description of the different departments' characteristics in

Chapter IV can serve to structure expectations. Boston, a decentralized, weakly supervised, traditional force—approximating Wilson's watchman-style department—would be expected to have low sanctioning rates. Police there would more often eschew formal actions in favor of informal ones. Chicago, a modern department with strong central command—approximating Wilson's legalistic department—would be expected to have high sanctioning rates. Police behavior there would approach the ministerial ideal of bringing in all potential offenders for further determination by the appropriate officials at subsequent points in the legal process. Washington, as a department in transition from a traditional to a modern form, evokes less clear expectations, but might be expected to produce rates which lie somewhere between Boston's and Chicago's, since norms of performance are presumably being raised from "traditional" low levels to "professional" high levels.

An examination of the primary indicator of formal police practices, the arrest rate, reveals that the expected difference between Boston and Chicago does emerge (Table 5.5). An offender in Chicago

Table 5.5

Arrest of Offenders, by City

Disposition of Offender	City			Total
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	
Arrested	11.2%	16.8%	25.3%	18.2%
Released	88.8	83.2	74.7	81.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	717	985	926	2628

is more than one-and-one-half times as likely as an offender in Boston to be taken to the station. The legalistic department does indeed arrest more frequently than the watchman-like department. What is unexpected, though—at least if the speculation about the Washington department is to be taken seriously—is the very high arrest rate, relative to the others, in Washington. It is nearly two-and-a-half times that in Boston and one-and-a-half times that in Chicago. One possible explanation is that the circumstances of building a modern police force—the influx of new and freshly train-ed personnel, intensive supervision, for example—may lead to an extremely legalistic department in which everybody is very careful to go by the book. Another possibility is that the public pressures on the department cited earlier put officers on their "best behavior," particularly in the presence of outside observers whom they may have suspected of working for the government.

A more general possibility, however, is that some or all of the differences in arrest rates across cities—including, but not limited to, that between Washington and the other two cities—are not the results of organizational differences, but the spurious effects of other factors which differ from city to city. Perhaps the most likely candidate as a confounding variable is the serious-ness of crime. Though Table 5.5 does improve upon Gardiner's and Wilson's analyses by ruling out differences in the gross rates of violation across cities as a source of the variation, it neverthe-less does not guard against the possibility that differences in the

seriousness of crime across the three cities may account for the differences observed in the arrest rates. Since more serious offenses do more often lead to arrest, higher rates of more serious crimes in one city might make it appear that police were more prone to arrest in that city when, in fact, arrest rates for a given degree of offense were the same. The elevated arrest rate in Washington, for example, might issue from a higher incidence of felony offenses there.

The persistence of inter-city differences in arrest rates even when the seriousness of offense is held constant demonstrates that such a mechanism is not at work (Table 5.6). Though the specific

Table 5.6

Percentage of Offenders Arrested, By City,
By Seriousness of Offense

| Seriousness of Offense | City | | | |
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Felony	36.8	60.0	63.2	56.9
(N)*	(38)	(70)	(87)	(195)
Misdemeanor	26.0	24.8	51.8	34.9
(N)	(146)	(238)	(218)	(602)
Traffic	10.0	10.2	17.2	13.0
(N)	(30)	(254)	(186)	(470)
Disputes	2.0	6.0	2.2	3.2
(N)	(148)	(134)	(186)	(468)
Juvenile Trouble	3.7	10.7	7.6	6.8
(N)	(242)	(169)	(131)	(542)
All Other	9.3	3.8	14.7	9.2
"Offenses"	(107)	(105)	(102)	(314)

*N denotes base frequency on which percentage is calculated.

pattern of inter-city differences in arrest rates varies across offense categories, the basic pattern observed in Table 5.4 holds up. Boston has consistently low arrest rates—in four of the six categories, it has the lowest rates and in none of the categories does it have the highest rate. Washington has consistently high arrest rates—in four of the six categories it has the highest rates and in none of the categories does it have the lowest rate. Chicago's pattern is, with one exception, consistent with that of a legalistic depart-ment. Arrest rates are high, not just in felony situations, but also in personal disputes and in juvenile incidents, as Wilson suggests will be the case.[13] They are correspondingly low for "all other offenses"—in a legalistic department, non-legal matters do not elicit legal re-sponses. Traffic arrest rates are relatively low, but ticketing con-stitutes a better indicator of formal output for these cases—as will be seen shortly. The one real anomaly is the arrest rate for suspected misdemeanants. Here one would expect Chicago's rate to outstrip Boston's, but the rates are instead virtually identical. This is a result for which no easy explanation emerges—whether it stems from a specific departmental directive or some other source cannot be ascertained from the data available.

Arrest rates, then, do vary from city to city in accord with expectations based on the style of the department—presuming the speculation about Washington can be accepted—and these variations cannot be accounted for by differences in the composition of crime. Of course, many other factors might account for the inter-city dif-ferences observed. Among them are differences in the sorts of men who work in the various departments and differences in the kinds of

people and situations that the policemen in the various cities con-
front. Since an assessment of these prospects requires an under-
standing of the effects which individual and situational factors
have within each city, and since those effects will not be examined
until Chapter VIII, that assessment will not be described until then.
Suffice it to say at this point that differences in situations appear
to be responsible for very little of the variation in arrest rates.
Differences in individuals have a somewhat greater effect, suggest-
ing that one of the ways in which police organizations control sub-
ordinate behavior is through the employment of certain types of men
as officers.

All these results, then, suggest that organization may have a
considerable impact on at least one important—and probably the most
important—formal action. But, as emphasized earlier, the decision
of whether or not to arrest is only one aspect of the policeman's
formal authority. Confidence in the results for arrest can be in-
creased and the generality of those results documented by determin-
ing whether or not differences of the sort observed in arrest rates
also emerge for other kinds of formal actions as well.

The rates at which official reports are written for complain-
ants—the principal means of invoking the legal process in situations
in which an offender is not present—are shown for each of the three
cities in Table 5.7. As for arrests, substantial differences do
emerge across the three cities. However, here the pattern of be-
havior coincides exactly with what would be expected on the basis of
organizational style. Boston, the most traditional department,

Table 5.7

Reporting for Complainants in Encounters with
Offender Absent, By City

	City			
Disposition	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Report Written	23.0%	52.3%	42.1%	40.5%
Report Not Written	77.0	47.7	57.9	59.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	440	562	680	1682

displays the lowest rate of reporting by far; Chicago, the most

modern, displays the highest; and Washington, the transitional depart-

ment, falls in between. The possibility that compositional differ-

ences in crime may produce the differences in rates of reporting can

be ruled out because, as Table 5.8 reveals, the pattern of inter-city

differences established in Table 5.7 stands up well when offense is

held constant.

Differences in the disposition of traffic offenders provide

additional evidence that enforcement patterns do differ across cities

and, the presumption is, across organizations that differ in style

(Table 5.9). Wilson writes that, with a watchman-like department,

motorists "will often be left alone if their driving does not endanger

or annoy others and if they do not resist or insult police authority,"

while "a legalistic department will issue traffic tickets at a high

rate."[14] Boston does indeed issue warnings and tickets and make arrests

much less often than the other two departments. An equally dramatic

pattern emerges in the number of police-initiated traffic encounters

Table 5.8

Percentage of Official Reports Written, By City,
By Seriousness of Offense

| Seriousness | City | | | |
of Offense	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Felony	42.8	81.6	62.4	62.4
(N)*	(145)	(147)	(218)	(510)
Misdemeanor	17.0	67.5	54.1	48.7
(N)	(100)	(120)	(170)	(390)
Traffic	0.0	29.0	28.6	24.6
(N)	(10)	(31)	(28)	(69)
Dispute	0.0	9.1	3.6	4.8
(N)	(37)	(55)	(55)	(147)
All Other	13.9	37.8	22.7	25.9
Incidents	(144)	(201)	(203)	(548)

*N denotes base frequency on which percentage is calculated.

Table 5.9

Disposition of Offenders in Police-Initiated
Traffic Encounters, By City

| | City | | | |
Disposition	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
No Action	73.3%	14.5%	7.0%	14.5%
Warning	13.3	18.5	20.9	19.1
Ticket	6.7	54.5	53.0	51.8
Arrest	6.7	12.5	19.1	14.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	15	200	115	330

in the three cities, as the marginals of this table show. Though roughly equal numbers of tours of duty were observed in the three cities, almost twice as many motorists were stopped in Chicago as in Washington, and less than one-tenth as many motorists were stopped in Boston as in Chicago. Assuming that actual offense rates across the three cities are fairly equal, it would appear that differences in the rate of initiation of contact with motorists as well as differences in the sanctioning rates once motorists have been stopped account for variations in the effective level of sanctioning.

The high levels of initiation of traffic contacts and of sanctioning in Chicago probably result from the substantial administrative pressures to "produce" characteristic of legalistic departments. The low levels in Boston, however, probably do not stem from the organizational style of the department alone, but from the peculiar legal procedures for issuing traffic tickets in the State of Massachusetts as well. Patrolmen there report traffic violations to "the police chief or any officer of a rank not lower than sergeant," who then decides on a final disposition.[15] These patrolmen may thus be disinclined to initiate the ticketing process against those whom they stop and this, in turn, may disincline them from making traffic stops in the first place.

Evidence on these other formal actions, then, tends to dovetail with the evidence on arrest and thereby affirms the conclusion drawn from that evidence: city, and presumably the organizational style of the police department, does affect the propensity of individual policemen to exercise their official powers. One puzzle does

remain—why should the results coincide exactly with expectations
for reporting, but deviate from expectations for arresting and traf-
fic enforcement, with Washington's rates at or above those of
Chicago's? It may be that Washington's administrators just did not
place the emphasis on reporting incidents that Chicago did, though
they were concerned with dealing with known offenders aggressively.
Or it may be that it is easier to stimulate workers to engage in the
relatively "exciting" aspects of police work, such as arresting and
ticketing, than in the more mundane aspects such as writing up re-
ports. In any case, this is a question on which these data can shed
no additional light.

Effects on Informal Behavior

Differences in patterns of informal behavior across cities and,
specifically, departments which vary in their organizational style
have received much less attention than differences in formal actions,
probably because few have observed policemen at work in more than one
organizational context. Wilson does, however, suggest that differ-
ences in organizational style will be reflected in the manner of
interaction with citizens: "The way a member of an old-style or
fraternal police force . . . maintain[ed] respect for himself" was
"through informal means in his day-to-day contacts with civilians,
good and bad." "Professionalism," on the other hand, "means imperson-
alization," with "officers . . . instructed to do their duty imper-
sonally and with minimum involvement, especially with suspects."[16]

These remarks can be construed in two ways. The first way—and the way more germane to the central concern here of assessing whether organization affects informal actions—involves the manner of the policeman: is he personal, in either a positive or negative sense, or is he impersonal? The second way involves the relationship between formal and informal police actions: do traditional departments favor informal over formal actions and professional departments formal actions over informal actions?

Under the first construction, police behavior in Boston might be expected to be more personal or expressive in tone than police behavior in Chicago and behavior in Chicago might be expected to fall into the neutral, impersonal category more than in Boston. Behavior in Washington might be expected to fall somewhere in between, but given the results for formal actions, it would not be surprising were it to meet or exceed Chicago's in its impersonality. Wilson's final phrase, "especially with suspects," suggests that offenders will be treated impersonally in the professional departments much more often than in the traditional departments.

Table 5.10 reveals that these expectations are not in general borne out. Rather than diverging widely, patterns of informal police behavior in Boston and Chicago coincide almost exactly. It is Washington that stands in sharp contrast to the other two—whereas behavior in Boston and Chicago deviates from the impersonal about 35% of the time, in Washington it does so only about half as often (16%).

Table 5.10

Manner of Policeman, By City

	City			
Manner	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Very Negative	1.8%	.9%	.9%	1.1%
Negative	12.8	12.7	6.8	10.2
Neutral	65.2	66.2	83.7	73.4
Positive	20.1	20.1	8.6	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	4467	5131	7082	16,680

Eta-square = .002

These findings are surprising in two ways. First, it is re-
markable that two departments differing as much in their organiza-
tional style as do Boston and Chicago should resemble one another
so closely in their informal outputs. Given the clear differences
in their formal actions, these results may simply demonstrate the lack
of leverage which police administrators, even in a modern, profession-
alized department, have over the informal actions of their subordinates,
relative to formal actions. The reason most likely is, as Wilson has
suggested, visibility. The formal actions of the patrolman are rela-
tively visible to the department—it receives or does not receive
reports from its patrolmen, it knows how often they arrest citizens.
Because these actions, by generating input to the department, are
visible to the department, the department can, to some extent, control
them. Informal actions are, in contrast, relatively invisible—the

way a policeman treats a citizen is unlikely to come to the attention
of the department unless it is so exceptional that a citizen (a
rarity) or another officer, a partner perhaps (an even greater rarity),
reports it. Thus it is understandable that informal actions differ
less from Boston to Chicago than formal ones.

But—and this is the second puzzle—why does behavior in Washing-
ton differ so much from behavior in the other two departments? Any
of the reasons cited earlier to explain Washington's unexpectedly
high arrest rate might be reintroduced here. The available data can
give no clue, but it seems plausible that pressures, emanating either
from the department or from within officers mindful of an onlooking
public, could impel officers to control their manner toward citizens
tightly.

Wilson's supposition that officers in professional departments
will be more inclined to treat suspects neutrally than officers in
traditional ones does, however, find empirical support. It is obvious
from Table 5.11 that in no department are offenders treated neutrally
more often than non-offenders. But Wilson's comment does suggest
that impersonal treatment of offenders should be more common, relative
to impersonal treatment of non-offenders, in professional departments
than in traditional departments. The calculation of a ratio of the
percentage of impersonal treatment toward offenders over the percentage
of impersonal treatment toward non-offenders for each city (Table 5.12)
reveals the expected differences between Boston on the one hand and
Chicago—and Washington, if it is taken as a professional department—

Table 5.11

Manner of Policeman, By City,
By Citizen's Role

| Manner | City | | | |
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
a) Non-Offenders				
Very Negative	.6%	.4%	.5%	.5%
Negative	5.7	7.5	2.7	4.9
Neutral	72.4	71.7	88.3	79.2
Positive	21.4	20.5	8.4	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	3008	3069	4809	10,886
b) Offenders				
Very Negative	5.0%	2.2%	1.9%	2.7%
Negative	32.8	24.0	19.3	24.3
Neutral	44.5	54.6	69.6	58.0
Positive	17.7	19.2	9.2	15.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	966	1477	1568	4011

Table 5.12

Ratio of Impersonal Treatment of Offenders to Impersonal
Treatment of Non-Offenders, By City

Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
.615	.762	.788	.732

on the other. The tendency of policemen to treat offenders neutrally is greater in the latter two cities than in the former city, a result which fits with Wilson's hypothesis.

These results flow, it should be noted, from the intriguing pattern apparent in Table 5.11. Inter-city differences in the treatment of non-offenders parallel exactly those observed in Table 5.10 for the sample as a whole, while the treatment of offenders becomes more and more personal as one moves from Washington to Chicago to Boston. In the last city, in fact, offenders are more likely to be treated personally than impersonally—a striking result given the preponderance of impersonal behavior in the sample as a whole. Clearly, the relaxations of constraints on informal police behavior as one moves from a professional to a traditional force and from non-offenders to offenders are additive effects.

Under the second construction of Wilson's remarks, one would simply expect traditional departments to exercise formal sanctions infrequently and informal ones frequently, and professional departments to do the opposite. If the percentage of offenders who are treated negatively or very negatively is taken as an indicator of informal sanctioning and the percentage of offenders arrested as an indicator of formal sanctioning, then the measures of manner and arrest provide the raw materials necessary for a test of this hypothesis. One complication is that, while arrest is an outcome measured in these data at the level of the citizen—a citizen either is or is not arrested—the manner of the policeman is measured at the level of

the interaction with one or two policemen. The solution employed
here is to use as the characterization of the manner of the police-
man the manner of the one policeman when there is only one policeman
and the average of the manners of the two policemen when there are
two.

Table 5.13 displays this averaged measure of informal police
treatment and the measure of formal treatment—the arrest rate,
drawn from Table 5.5—for each of the three departments. The relation-
ship between the two variables across the cities is exactly as expected.

Table 5.13

Percentage of Offenders Sanctioned Formally
and Informally, By City

| | City | | | |
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Formal Sanction (Arrest)	11.2	16.8	25.3	18.2
Informal Sanction (Negative or Very Negative Manner)	42.1	27.7	23.8	30.2

The department with the lowest rate of formal sanctioning (Boston)
has the highest rate of informal sanctioning and the department with
the highest rate of formal sanctioning (Washington) has the lowest
rate of informal sanctioning. The traditional department does favor
informal over formal means of handling offenders, while the more
professional departments seem to reverse the emphasis.

However, it is important at this point to forestall a possible misinterpretation. Chapter I raised the question of the relationship between informal and formal sanctions, asking whether those who were sanctioned informally ran a higher or a lower risk of formal sanctioning. The temptation is to conclude from these results that the relationship is an inverse one. However, to do so would run the risk of committing the ecological fallacy, since to do so involves making an inference about individual behavior on the basis of data describing the behavior of aggregates. In fact, to do so in this instance would be to run that risk and to lose for, as Table 5.14 shows, the relationship between formal and informal sanctioning is, at the individual level, a positive one: those who are treated negatively informally are also more likely to be treated negatively formally. Formal and informal sanctions, in other words, supplement rather than supplant one another. (These results seem to agree, it may be

Table 5.14

Percentage of Offenders Sanctioned Formally,
By Manner of Policeman

Disposition of Offender	Policeman's Manner				
	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total
Arrested	26.9%	23.1%	17.4%	14.2%	18.7%
Released	73.1	76.9	82.6	85.8	81.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	67	692	1307	445	2511

Tau-b = .082

recalled, with Chevigny's assertion that police "cover" the imposi-
tion of informal sanctions with the imposition of formal sanctions.)

This in turn raises the question of whether policemen differ
across departments in their tendencies to impose formal sanctions
more frequently as they impose more severe informal sanctions. One
might expect, for example, a greater tendency for one to replace the
other in the more traditional department (i.e., a negative relation-
ship) than in the more modern departments. Table 5.15 provides some
evidence consistent with that hypothesis. Although in every depart-

Table 5.15

Percentage of Offenders Sanctioned Formally, By
Manner of Policeman, By City

| City | Policeman's Manner | | | | | Tau-b for City |
	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total	
Boston	12.5	12.3	11.4	10.4	11.6	.021
(N)*	(32)	(252)	(255)	(135)	(674)	
Chicago	38.5	25.5	13.4	13.6	17.0	.122
(N)	(13)	(255)	(486)	(213)	(967)	
Washington	40.9	34.6	23.7	20.6	26.1	.109
(N)	(22)	(185)	(566)	(97)	(870)	

*N denotes the base frequency on which the percentage is calculated.

ment the two variables are positively related, the relationship is
clearly the weakest in Boston. This suggests that, at least compared
to policemen in the other two departments and given the lower arrest
rate in Boston, policemen in Boston are less likely to arrest those

whom they treat negatively and more likely to arrest those whom they
treat positively. In other words, the relationship in Boston,
while not negative, is at least closer to being negative than it is
in the other two departments.

Taken all together, then, these findings make several impor-
tant points. At the substantive level, they indicate that the manner
of policemen in their interactions with citizens does differ from
department to department, though not in the fashion expected. They
also show that traditional departments emphasize informal over formal
sanctions and professional departments emphasize formal over informal
sanctions. An individual who is sanctioned informally, however, runs
a higher risk of formal sanction regardless of the departmental style
and the tendency is stronger in professional departments than in
traditional departments.

At the methodological level, they point up the dangers of making
inferences about the behavior of individual policemen on the basis
of comparisons of the aggregate characteristics of departments. Given
the ease of obtaining aggregate data on cities and departmental actions
and the difficulty of obtaining individual-level data, this is a
bitter pill for some to swallow, but one that must be swallowed
nevertheless.

Effects on Effort

Wilson also posits a relationship between departmental style
and effort. In a watchman-style department, he writes, because

> there are few rewards to be sought outside the patrol
> force, there is little incentive to work hard to get
> out . . . Legalistic departments . . . emphasize tech-
> nical efficiency; that is, they try hard to produce as
> much output as possible, no matter how it is valued,
> for a given cost. In short, a legalistic department
> tries to get the men to work harder, confident in some
> areas . . . and hopeful in others . . . that this will
> achieve a desired objective.[17]

If the arrest and ticketing rates presented in the earlier pages of

this chapter as measures of formal action were taken instead as

indicators of police effort, they would tend to corroborate Wilson's

hypothesis. They suggest a relatively low level of police effort

in Boston and higher levels in Chicago and Washington—results con-

sistent with expectations based on organizational style. Neverthe-

less, as discussed earlier, these measures are, at best, only crude

indicators of how hard the police are working because they are

vulnerable to so many other influences.

For these reasons, it seems advisable in assessing the impact

of organization on police effort to refer to indicators of the sort

outlined earlier. Rates of overall contact with citizens (Table 5.16)

follow the patterns observed with respect to formal actions: police

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Table 5.16

Average Number of Encounters Involving Contact with
Citizens Per Tour of Duty, By City and
Type of Contact

Type of Contact	City			
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Citizen-Invoked	3.82	3.74	4.35	3.99
Police-Invoked	.41	1.12	.63	.72
Total	4.23	4.86	4.98	4.71

in Boston are clearly less active than policemen in either Chicago or Washington. But, as noted earlier, this measure may reflect differences in public demands on departments and in the resources they have available to meet them. That such is the case is demonstrated by the figures for citizen-initiated contacts. Here Washington policemen are seen to handle more calls than those in Boston or Chicago. Whether this is due to a higher volume of calls in Washington or fewer personnel to deal with an equal number of calls cannot be determined from these data.

Such factors do not complicate the interpretation of the figures which describe the propensity of the police to undertake contacts on their own initiative. Here it is clear that policemen in Boston work the least hard and policemen in Chicago, the most hard of policemen in the three cities—a result which squares exactly with what is known about departmental styles. Policemen in the traditional department in Boston initiate a contact less than once every two tours of duty, while policemen in the most modern department, in Chicago, do so more than once every single tour of duty.

Of course, it must be recognized that these differences are, to a considerable extent, the result of differences in traffic law enforcement policies. In fact, once traffic cases are excluded, the levels of police-initiated contact become much more alike across cities. Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to retain such contacts in this measure of effort, both because they are such a common

meeting-ground for police and citizens and because they do con-
stitute a significant allocative activity of the police.

The complication which traffic offenses introduce to the
analysis of police initiative does, however, suggest the desirability
of referring to at least one other measure of effort which is less
tied to somewhat extraneous policy decisions of the department. Per-
haps most pertinent is the aggressiveness with which police officers
carry out their patrol duties. Substantial differences in this
variable do emerge across the departments (Table 5.17). Though the

Table 5.17

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, By City

| Aggressiveness of Patrol | City | | | |
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Little Preventive Patrol	34.5%	17.5%	7.4%	18.0%
Some Preventive Patrol	47.9	62.6	69.4	61.4
Aggressive Preventive Patrol	17.6	19.9	23.2	20.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	409	366	625	1400

modal performance in all three departments is "relaxed patrolling,"
the direction and extent of deviations from this norm vary con-
siderably from department to department. In Boston, work is

lackadaisical better than one-third of the time, while, in Chicago, such behavior occurs only half as often and, in Washington, only one-fifth as often. Variations in the amount of aggressive patrolling are far less striking, but nevertheless indicative of the same pattern of behavior. In their performance of what is one of the most basic responsibilities of the police officer—the duty to patrol the streets watchfully and thereby to discourage wrongdoing—officers of different departments differ substantially. Policemen in the traditional watchman-style department exert themselves considerably less fully than do officers in more modern, professionalized departments.

In fact, overall, the evidence set forth in this section paints a consistent picture of organizational style as an important correlate of police effort. By every measure examined—whether arrest rate, rate of contact, or the observer's assessment of the officer's aggressiveness of patrol—the more modern departments outstrip the more traditional department in their levels of effort.[18] Clearly, departmental style does have, as Wilson has suggested, a significant impact on how hard policemen work.

Police behavior differs significantly from city to city. Substantial differences in the rates at which policemen invoke the legal process, in the way they treat citizens, and in the effort they put into their work exist across Boston, Chicago, and Washington. In Boston, police seldom invoke the legal process, treat citizens

personally as opposed to impersonally, and exert relatively little effort in their work. Chicago policemen work harder and invoke the legal process more often, but treat citizens much the same way interpersonally. In Washington, the patrolmen invoke the legal process very frequently—though they do seem disinclined to submit official reports—hew closely to the bureaucratic line in their inter-personal manner, and work vigorously.

These patterns of behavior are, in large measure, consistent with what would be expected of subordinate behavior on the basis of a knowledge of organizational structure and ethos alone. The sorts of behavior observed in Boston are precisely what one would project for a traditional, decentralized department with an ethnic occupational ethos—from, in other words, a watchman-style department in Wilson's typology. Similarly, the behavior of the Chicago department's officers is, in most respects, consistent with expectations for a modern, centralized department with a professional occupational ethos—for the legalistic department of Wilson's typology. Behavior in Washington does, on the other hand, diverge from expectations based on a characterization of it as a transitional department, but this can probably be attributed to the organizational and public pressures under which it was operating.

So police behavior does differ from city to city, and it does so in ways that are congruent with expectations built on differences in their organizational styles. This constitutes a prima facie case for the validity of the organizational hypothesis, but, it must be

emphasized, no more than that. Though such factors as differences in the gross rates of crime and in the composition of crime have been ruled out as confounding factors in this analysis, other possible threats to the "internal validity" of the conclusion that police organization causes these differences remain. Organizational struc- ture and police behavior may, for example, both simply reflect the social or political character of the community. In order to elimin- ate this possibility, studies will have to be done across communities which differ in the structure of their police departments, but re- semble each other socially and politically. (Of course, if Wilson's hypothesis that the political character of the community determines the structure of the police department is correct, then it will be difficult to find such cases.)

Beyond this, the internal validity of the organizational hypo- thesis can be further enhanced by evidence showing how it is that organizational structures and policies come to have an effect on the actions of subordinates at the output level. Gardiner and Wilson make a valuable contribution in this area through their case studies, but evidence gathered on a wider scale is desirable before general conclusions are drawn. The analyses in Chapter VIII and Chapter IX will make a limited contribution in this area as well.

However, those analyses will also look to a much broader concern. Here the impact of organization has been measured in terms of its direct effects on police actions. There the possibility will be assess- ed that organization also plays a somewhat more complicated role—

that it works to condition or specify the impact which individual and situational factors have on behavior.

Footnotes for Chapter V

1. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Systematic Observation of Natural Social Phenomena," in Sociological Methodology 1971, ed. Herbert Costner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), p. 6.

2. Wayne R. LaFave, Arrest (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 3-7.

3. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

4. Since the observation schedule allowed details to be recorded for only up to three arrestees, this figure—and all analyses—necessarily exclude any individuals for whom no specific information could be recorded.

5. "Police Observation Report Instructions," unpublished document of the Center for Research on Social Organization, University of Michigan, p. 4.

6. The coding procedures for the manner variable employed by the original investigators introduce an additional complication. For certain combinations where the policeman acted both negatively and positively, the code does not distinguish the degree of negative action. Here the statistically conservative strategy of treating all such cases of ambiguous negative behavior as merely "negative" rather than "very negative" was adopted in order to avoid inflating artificially the covariance between this and other variables.

7. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 355.

8. The use of this measure to assess observer effects parallels its use as an indicator of interviewer effects in survey research. See, for example, John Freeman and Edgar W. Butler, "Some Sources of Interviewer Variance in Surveys," Public Opinion Quarterly 40 (Spring, 1976): 79-91.

9. James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case," in The Police, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 160.

10. The role definitions cited here are, necessarily, those of the original investigators. See "Police Observation Report Instrutions," pp. 4-5.

11. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), p.11; Donald J. Black, "The Social Organization of Arrest," Stanford Law Review 23 (June 1971): 1090.

12. By focusing on police initiative, this account does neglect the share of their effort which the police devote to handling calls forwarded to them by the dispatcher. This aspect of effort has been excluded from the analysis here because these data do not allow examination of the process by which the dispatcher decides to allocate the available units to the requests for assistance received. The only real insight into the exertion of effort in these dispatched encounters comes from the observer's character-ization of the way in which patrolmen responded to the directive of the dispatcher to go to scenes—urgently (18.4% of the time), routinely (74.6% of the time), or in leisurely fashion (7.0% of the time). The police do hurry on occasion—particularly when the dispatcher informs them of a serious offense or another officer in trouble—but more often they proceed at a measured pace and, on a few occasions, they dawdle.

13. James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 172-183.

14. Ibid., pp. 141 and 172.

15. For a fuller discussion of ticketing procedures in Massachusetts, see John A. Gardiner, Traffic and the Police (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 25-28. Note also that the low rate of ticketing observed in Boston in this study is corroborated by Gardiner's finding, based on aggregate data, of an exceptionally low rate of ticketing in Boston (pp. 6-9).

16. Wilson, "Police Morale," p. 160. See also his Varieties, pp. 156-157 and Bruce J. Terris, "The Role of the Police," in The Ambivalent Force, ed. Arthur Niederhoffer and Abraham S. Blumberg (San Francisco: Rinehart Press, 1973), p. 44.

17. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 155-156 and p. 185.

18. The measure of police effort in dispatched calls introduced earlier (in footnote 12) shows only minor differences across the three cities, with policemen in all three cities respond-ing rapidly between 17.8% and 18.8% of the time and policemen in Boston and Chicago responding to dispatches slowly more often (8.4% and 7.8% of the time) than police in Washington (4.9%). The more significant differences in this variable emerge when it is examined at the precinct level, as is possible with the table on the following page.

Police Response to Dispatcher's
Directive, by Precinct

Police Response	Boston		Chicago		Washington				Total
	Roxbury (Black)	Dorchester (White)	Fillmore (Black)	Town Hall (White)	10 (Black)	13 (Black)	14 (Black)	6 (White)	
Urgently	14.5%	22.5%	13.6%	21.6%	18.6%	16.6%	17.8%	23.6%	18.4%
Routinely	77.5	68.5	74.2	74.6	78.5	77.9	75.5	70.4	74.6
Slowly	8.0	9.0	12.2	3.8	2.8	5.5	6.6	6.0	7.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n	726	710	632	705	494	439	286	267	4262

As stated in Chapter IV, Dorchester, Town Hall, and Pre-
cinct 6 in Washington are the more white precincts, while
all the rest are mostly black. It is interesting to note that
police responses are consistently less "urgent" in the black
precincts than in the white precincts. The complaint of
urban blacks cited in Chapter I—that the police don't come
quickly when called—would appear, at least on the basis of
these limited data, to be an expression of fact rather than
an expression of disenchantment, or a source of the dis-
enchantment rather than a result of it.

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THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL, INDIVIDUAL, AND
SITUATIONAL FACTORS ON POLICE BEHAVIOR

Volume II

by
Robert James Friedrich

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CHAPTER VI

THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUALS

Chapter III described the individual difference model of behavior as subsuming both "trait" and "attitude" explanations of behavior— explanations which seek regularities in, respectively, the behavior of the individual in general and the behavior of the individual toward specific objects or classes of objects. This chapter will evaluate hypotheses that fall under each of these rubrics, beginning with an examination of individual characteristics—length of service, satisfaction with the job, race—thought to have effects on a wide variety of police actions and concluding with one thought to have an effect on behavior toward a specific class of objects—black people. This latter hypothesis points up the unavoidable intermingling of individual and situational elements inherent in the testing of an attitudinal hypothesis: in order to test such a hypothesis, it is necessary to specify the situational characteristic to which the attitude pertains. Thus, even in examining the simple effects of an individual characteristic, situational factors must be recognized explicitly. A more thorough assessment of their impact, however, will await the next chapter.

The Effects of Length of Service

The individual differences perspective in the police literature which most closely approximates the trait conceptions of the psychologists in its aspirations to an over-arching psychologically based

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explanation of police behavior is probably the "police cynicism"
concept developed by Niederhoffer. He postulates and adduces evi-
dence in favor of the hypothesis that, over the course of their careers,
policemen become increasingly cynical about and alienated from their
work and the people they meet in the course of it. Cynicism, he
finds, is low at the beginning of the police career, increases sharply
during the first few months and then steadily until between seven and
ten years, after which it levels off and then finally declines in the
last years.[1] As pointed out earlier, Niederhoffer is distressingly
vague about what the precise impact of this psychological odyssey is
on the actual behavior of policemen other than to say that the "mis-
anthropy, pessimism, and resentment [are] a dangerous combination,
particularly in the case of policemen whose role clothes them with
both power and ample opportunity to 'act out' these underlying and
largely unconscious orientations."[2] However, it seems reasonable
to posit that such dark feelings would manifest themselves in any of
a number of ways—in particular, in harsher formal and informal treat-
ment of citizens and in less effort on the job.

The essential problem confronted in evaluating this "cynicism"
explanation of police behavior is that Reiss's observers recorded
no really adequate indicator of "police cynicism." Policemen were
not, for example, asked a battery of questions like that Niederhoffer
devised to get at feelings of cynicism in his sample of officers. The
only pieces of information available that bear in any way on Nieder-
hoffer's hypothesis are the officer's report of how long he has served

on the force and his verbal expressions of how much he likes his job and how he feels toward his superiors.[3]

However, relying just on these raw materials, it may be possible to draw some conclusions about the validity of Niederhoffer's hypothesis. First, if Niederhoffer is correct in positing that increasingly cynical attitudes emerge over the course of the police career, policemen with more experience would be expected to voice dissatisfaction with their job and with their superiors more often than those with less experience. Increasingly negative evaluations in these two areas might be taken, in other words, as evidence of an increase in a general trait of cynicism and alienation from the police job.

Second, if this trait is also expressed in the outward behavior of the policeman—or, to put it into terms more acceptable to those who reject the utility of explanations positing unobservable variables, if "cynical" behavior patterns extend to the realm of overt as well as verbal behaviors—then policemen with more experience should also engage in negative sorts of actions more often than those with less experience. To be specific, more experienced and presumably more cynical policemen might be expected to deal more harshly, in interpersonal terms, with citizens than less experienced, less cynical ones as they "act out" their increasingly negative views of those with whom they come into contact. Their growing disenchantment with their work might also cause them to exert themselves less vigorously, so that they would be less industrious and less efficient than their younger counterparts.

Effects on formal actions are more difficult to anticipate. If negative orientations toward the public lead them to greater severity in their actions, older and more cynical policemen would be expected to arrest, ticket, and file reports more frequently. But if, as observed earlier, these formal actions are viewed more as work—arresting people or writing up tickets and reports does, after all, entail more effort than just riding around in a police car—then the more cynical patrolmen may invoke the legal process less often than the less cynical.

Evidence on the verbal expressions of officers does coincide with expectations. In the case of satisfaction with the job, in fact, the pattern matches very closely that described by Niederhoffer. As shown in Table 6.1, satisfaction with the job declines through the

Table 6.1

Satisfaction with Job, By
Length of Service

Satisfaction with Job	Length of Service				
	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or more Years	Total
Dislikes	4.7%	8.1%	14.6%	12.5%	9.9%
Neutral	6.3	15.8	15.4	14.6	14.3
Likes	73.4	65.2	63.4	62.5	65.6
Likes Very Much	15.6	10.9	6.5	10.4	10.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	64	221	123	48	456

Tau-b = -.120

eight-to-fifteen year period and then increases slightly in the final years. Attitudes toward superiors, on the other hand, show a clear trend toward the negative across experience cohorts, with no tendency for favorable evaluations to re-emerge in the final years (Table 6.2). Taking verbal expressions as an indicator of a trait of cynicism, then, more experienced officers do indeed manifest higher levels of cynicism than less experienced officers.

Table 6.2

Attitude Toward Superiors, by
Length of Service

Attitude Toward Superiors	Length of Service				
	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or More Years	Total
Negative	37.3%	37.6%	41.3%	62.3%	41.5%
Neutral	17.6	41.2	39.7	30.2	36.8
Positive	45.1	21.3	19.0	7.5	21.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	51	221	126	53	451

Tau-b = -.151

Effects on Informal Behavior

If it is expressed in the verbal behavior of police officers, is this growing sense of disaffection expressed in the performance of the policeman as well? Table 6.3 displays the relationship between the length of time an officer has served and his manner toward citizens. Negtive and very negative treatment of citizens increases fairly

Table 6.3

Manner of Policemen, By Length of Service

| Manner | Length of Service | | | | |
	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or More Years	Total
Very Negative	.9%	.8%	1.2%	2.7%	1.1%
Negative	8.2	9.2	10.9	14.9	10.0
Neutral	74.9	76.9	69.4	63.3	73.5
Positive	16.0	13.1	18.5	19.2	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1742	8621	4048	1506	15,917

Tau-b = .000

regularly with increases in experience, with citizens who encounter

the most veteran officers nearly twice as likely—17.6% to 9.1%—to

be treated negatively as citizens who encounter recent additions to

the force. But this does not tell the whole story. Positive treat-

ment, after a decline in the early years, also increases as experience

on the job grows, with the highest levels of positive treatment coming

from the most experienced officers. The basic pattern of change here,

in fact, is a slight shift toward neutral behavior between the first

two groups followed by a more substantial shift away from routinized,

bureaucratic behavior toward more expressive behaviors of either a

positive or a negative sort in the more experienced groups. Across the

experience cohorts, the percentage of behavior which is not impersonal

increases from roughly 25% to 36%. What this means, then, is that

those who focus on negative behavior as a manifestation of police cynicism may be seeing only half the picture. The total effect of increasing experience appears to be one of increasing behaviors which deviate from neutral channels. If by "good" or professional behavior is meant neutral, routinized, bureaucratic behavior, it is clear that the quality of police treatment of citizens declines among more experienced officers. The stereotypes of both the "friendly" and the "tough" old cop, oddly enough, both find some empirical support. It is the image of the seasoned professional which suffers the most in the face of this evidence.

A division of citizens into offenders and non-offenders provides additional insight into the mechanisms underlying the overall relationship observed in Table 6.3. The steady increase in positive behaviors with increasing experience observed there is seen in Table 6.4 to result primarily from the tendency of more experienced officers to treat non-offenders more favorably. The steady increase in negative behaviors with increasing experience is seen to result primarily from the tendency of more experienced officers to treat offenders more harshly. In fact, the percentages show the most experienced officers to treat offenders negatively more than 38% of the time, while the least experienced treat them negatively only about 22% of the time. It may be that more experienced and thus more cynical officers feel a reduced commitment to organizational norms of neutral behavior. This, in turn, frees them to follow their own inclinations—to joke and be friendly with those who are on the "right" side of the

Table 6.4

Manner of Policemen, By Length of Service, By Role of Citizen

Manner	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or More Years	Total
a) Non-Offenders					
Very Negative	.7%	.4%	.4%	.6%	.5%
Negative	3.3	4.0	5.6	7.0	4.6
Neutral	81.5	83.1	74.2	70.0	79.4
Positive	14.5	12.5	19.9	22.4	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1119	5578	2713	966	10,376

Tau-b = .051

Manner	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or More Years	Total
b) Offenders					
Very Negative	1.8%	1.9%	3.2%	6.0%	2.6%
Negative	19.7	23.2	25.5	32.3	24.3
Neutral	59.6	60.8	54.8	48.8	58.0
Positive	18.8	14.1	16.5	12.9	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	436	2085	926	381	3828

Tau-b = -.067

Length of Service (column span header over the four year columns)

law and to express their disapproval of those who are in the

wrong.

Effects on Effort

In line with the hypothesis advanced earlier, as length of service increases, police effort appears to decrease. The rates at which policemen with varying amounts of experience contact citizens on their own initiative are shown in Figure 6.1. Contacts increase

Figure 6.1. Average number of police-initiated contacts per policeman per tour of duty, by length of service.

somewhat from the first to the second cohort and then decline fairly sharply. This picture of reduced levels of effort among the more experienced officers is reinforced by the relationship which emerges between the observer's report of how aggressively the officer patrolled and the amount of experience he has had (Table 6.5). The extent to which the policeman uses his unassigned time to engage in preventive patrolling declines monotonically with increasing tenure in service.

Table 6.5

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, By Length of Service

Aggressiveness of Patrolling	Length of Service				
	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or More Years	Total
Little Preventive Patrol	6.1%	13.9%	23.6%	37.4%	18.2%
Some Preventive Patrol	61.2	66.1	55.6	51.3	61.2
Aggressive Preventive Patrol	32.7	19.9	20.8	11.3	20.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	147	711	356	150	1364

Tau-b = -.170

The most experienced officers are about six times as likely to relax in their patrolling as the least experienced officers and, while about one-third of the most recent additions to the force patrol aggressively, scarcely one-tenth of their oldest colleagues do. If higher rates of contact and more aggressive patrolling are taken as "better" or more professional behavior, as they almost certainly must be, then the patterns observed here resemble those for informal behavior—comparing across experience cohorts, actions initially shift toward better, more professional performance and then diverge from it with more and more experience.

Effects on Formal Behavior

The contradictory expectations about the relationship between length of service on the police force and formal actions here prove to be resolved in favor of the "work" hypothesis—since the taking of a formal action requires effort on the part of the policeman, more senior and more cynical policemen should be less inclined to invoke the legal process. Figure 6.2 reveals an initial increase in the proportion of offenders arrested, followed by a substantial decline.[4]

Figure 6.2. Percentage of offenders arrested, by length of service.

Policemen with between two and eight years experience take to the station more than a fifth of all the offenders with whom they come into contact. Policemen who have been on the force for more than fifteen years, though, take in only one-tenth. So the propensity of a policeman to arrest, perhaps the most significant legal action he

is empowered to take, does vary with increases in experience in the
police role.[5]

A similar, though somewhat less clear-cut, pattern emerges in
the case of traffic offenses (Table 6.6). The likelihood that a

Table 6.6

Disposition of Offenders in Police-Initiated Traffic Encounters, By Length of Service

| | Length of Service | | | | |
Disposition	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15 or More Years	Total
No Action	27.6%	8.4%	15.2%	36.4%	14.4%
Warning	20.7	21.3	15.2	0.0	19.0
Ticket	36.2	54.5	57.0	54.5	51.8
Arrest	15.5	15.7	12.7	9.1	14.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	58	178	79	11	326

Tau-b = .048

policeman will take no action is relatively high for the least experi-
enced officers, drops dramatically for the second cohort, and then
increases fairly sharply for the most experienced officers. Formal
sanctions—tickets and arrests—are less likely to be imposed by
officers near the beginning or the end of their careers. The dwindling
numbers of cases in the right-most columns of this table deserve
special note for two reasons. First, they urge caution in drawing

any inferences about the behavior of more experienced policemen because of the small number of cases available. Second, they point up again the lack of aggressiveness among more experienced officers in these kinds of cases. Though more than 11% of the policemen observed in the study had more than fifteen years of experience, they account for only about 3% of all police-initiated traffic incidents. Clearly, the most experienced policemen devote little attention to traffic law enforcement.

Finally, a policeman's propensity to write reports for citizens who claim that a criminal offense has taken place also varies with the amount of experience he has had. Considering only those cases in which the writing of a report assumes substantial significance— those in which an offender is absent and in which a felony or mis- demeanor is alleged to have occurred—it is clear that formal action is less likely to be taken the longer the officer has served on the force (Figure 6.3). The shift across the first two cohorts is too

Figure 6.3. Percentage of official reports written for complainants, by length of service - felony and misdemeanor incidents only.

small to be taken as significant, but the subsequent decline is unmistakable. The proportion of serious cases in which a report is written falls by more than a quarter over the career cycle.

The general pattern thus.is, for all formal actions, for the most recent entrants into the police force to use their formal powers relatively sparingly. The one possible exception is in the writing of reports. This may occur because the writing of a report in the absence of an offender does not require the self-confidence that ticketing or arresting a person does—indeed, it may be easier to write than not to write a report in an encounter with a complainant. Somewhat more experienced officers exercise their legal authority more frequently. They may have both the self-confidence in their ability to do so and the motivation to do so. The most experienced officers— those with eight years and more of experience—invoke the legal process less and less often. Their long years in the police role have undoubtedly engendered in them the necessary self-confidence, but drained them of the motivation.

At least one individual characteristic of the police, it would appear, has a significant impact on each of the three facets of police behavior under consideration here. Differences in the amount of experience police officers have had are associated with differences in their formal actions, their manner toward citizens, and the effort they exert in their work. Further, although differences between cohorts on any one behavioral dimension are sometimes slight, confidence

in their existence is bolstered by the consistency with which they emerge. This is true both within the broad categories of behavior delineated here and across those categories. Within categories, both measures of effort show a substantial decline among more experienced officers, the differences in patterns between the first two cohorts on these measures perhaps being due to the fact that the least experienced officers may be highly motivated and hence vigilant in their patrolling, but lacking in assurance and hence hesitant to initiate interactions with citizens. In addition, all three dimensions of formal action show initial increases in the propensity to invoke the legal process (with the exception of reporting) and subsequent declines.

Across these broad categories, the results are also quite consistent. If the ideals for police performance are frequent invocation of the legal process, an impersonal manner in dealing with citizens, and a high level of effort, then it could be said that, in all respects, police behavior improves in quality over the early years of service and then deteriorates in the later years. This pattern suggests a period of initial and successful socialization into the police role followed by a period of declining motivation to subscribe to the demands of that role.

The evidence set forth here, then, is essentially consistent with Niederhoffer's assertion that police cynicism increases with experience in the police role and his suggestion that this growing sense of disaffection has a deleterious impact on the quality of police performance. The primary discrepancy is in the exact form of

the relationships between experience and verbal and overt behaviors. Niederhoffer reports an early and sharp increase in cynicism, which then levels off and declines at the end of the career. The results here describe an initial improvement in performance, followed by a steady decline. One root of the discrepancy may lie in the differences in the precision with which the length of service is measured. Niederhoffer records the exact number of years, while Reiss employs the less precise, four-category scheme seen in the last few tables. The changes which Niederhoffer detects are probably lost in the cruder gradations of the Reiss scheme. Another reason may be that cynicism is almost certainly not the only determinant of performance. Cynicism could indeed be growing in the early years of service and depressing the quality of performance, but its effect might initially be offset by other factors—such as the officer's increasing familiarity with the work and his growing confidence in his ability to do the job.

However, it must also be acknowledged that an explanation of these differences in behavior which looks to a growing cynicism among police officers with increasing experience is by no means the only one that could account for these phenomena. "Generational," as opposed to "life-cycle," effects could also produce these differences in behavior across cohorts. One possibility is that the systematic variations observed across experience cohorts reflect, not individual change, but changes over the years in the character of the pool from which police officers are recruited. Shifts in the content or the effectiveness of initial police training might also produce these kinds of differences. Yet another possibility is that systematic processes of attrition from

the patrol ranks are at work. High drop-out and dismissal rates for new entrants onto the force who do not adapt well to the police role could produce the initial increase in the quality of police work, while promotion of the more capable officers out of the patrol ranks could produce the subsequent decline. Longitudinal observational studies, as well as examinations of the recruiting, training, dismissal, and promotion practices of these departments over time, would be useful in evaluating these possibilities.

Differences in supervisory and disciplinary practices for officers with more or less experience might also play a role. Older officers might be watched less closely and disciplined less severely when deviations from expected behavior become known. Assessment of this hypothesis would, of course, require explicit attention to supervisory and disciplinary procedures in the departments.

Finally, the possibility that these relationships are the spurious products of other factors must be considered. An important candidate for this role is the department. The preceding chapter established considerable differences in behavior from city to city. Wilson's discussion of differences in the character of personnel across departments indicates that policemen are typically older in a watchman-like department than in the other types. That such is in fact the case is apparent from Table 6.7. About two-thirds of the officers observed in Boston have served for eight years or more, a high proportion consistent with its status as a watchman-like department. The corresponding proportion for Chicago is roughly half that, consistent

Table 6.7

Length of Service, By City

| Length of Service | City | | | Total |
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	
0-2 Years	8.2%	16.5%	19.4%	15.5%
2-8 Years	24.5	46.2	62.2	46.8
8-15 Years	42.2	27.8	14.4	26.3
15 or More Years	25.2	9.4	4.1	11.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	147	212	222	581

with its legalistic style. And, as might be expected in a depart-
ment in the process of reform and revitalization, Washington officers
manifest the least experience—four out of five have served less than
eight years. This relationship between city and length of service
and the other relationships between city and the various behavioral
measures described in the preceding chapter make the possibility that
the relationships between length of service and police behavior observ-
ed here are spurious relationships a live one. It is therefore neces-
sary to subject the relationships observed here to examination within
each of the cities to insure that they persist. The presentation of
the evidence pertaining to this question will be put off until
Chapter VIII, where the main concern addressed will be that of whether
or not relationships between individual difference variables and be-
havior vary from department to department. Suffice it to say here
that such an examination shows many of the relationships to hold up

within each city, suggesting that the relationships are not, at least with respect to this simplest of measures of organizational differences, spurious ones.

The Effects of Job Satisfaction

A policeman's satisfaction with his job is, in comparison to authoritarianism or cynicism, a narrower psychological orientation—more "attitude" than "trait," to use the parlance adopted in Chapter III. Nevertheless, its impact on behavior may be far-ranging. In the literature on organizations, employee morale has been hypothesized to affect both the quantity and the quality of work. And, in the literature on the police, Wilson has tied morale to a broad range of police problems (see Chapter II). Thus it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the policeman's satisfaction with his job will influence many aspects of his performance. Policemen who are satisfied with their job may tend to work harder—invoking the legal process more often, treating citizens better, initiating encounters with citizens more frequently, and patrolling more aggressively—than their disgruntled colleagues.

An empirical test of these expectations is complicated by two factors. The first is the weakness of the job satisfaction measure itself. As noted earlier (footnote 3), the measure of job satisfaction is very unstable. That is, over the tours of duty during which policemen reported to observers their degree of satisfaction with their work, they tended to give different answers. This is hardly

surprising—what a person says about how he feels about his work may depend very much on how things are going at the time he is asked. However, it does raise serious questions about the solidity of this attitude, at the worst, and the validity of this measure, at the least. For this reason, the results presented here must be regarded as more suggestive than conclusive.

Another concern stems from the relationship between this variable and the other two variables already shown to have an effect on police behavior. If job satisfaction is related to department and length of service, then any relationships which emerge between job satisfaction and police actions might be the spurious products of other relationships. Table 6.1, it has already been noted, reveals a relationship between job satisfaction and length of service, thus indicating a need to control for length of service should a relationship between satisfaction and behavior emerge. Table 6.8 shows slight differences across cities in officers' morale consistent with what

Table 6.8

Satisfaction with Job, By City

Satisfaction With Job	City			
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Total
Dislikes	10.7 %	10.5 %	8.4 %	9.8 %
Neutral	19.6	10.5	14.0	14.1
Likes	64.3	65.5	67.4	65.9
Likes Very Much	5.4	13.5	10.1	10.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	112	171	178	461

might be expected on the basis of their organizational style: lower
levels of satisfaction are most frequently found in the least pro-
fessionalized department, Boston—where 30% express negative or neutral
feelings—while positive feelings are most common (79%) in the most
professionalized department, Chicago. Though the differences are
obviously not sharp, the imposition of a control for city also seems
appropriate in the event that satisfaction and behavior are related.

Effects on Formal Behavior

Figure 6.4 presents evidence pertinent to the hypothesis that
increased satisfaction with the police job will lead to more frequent
invocation of the legal process via the arrest of suspected offenders.

Figure 6.4. Percentage of offenders arrested, by satisfaction with job.

Policemen who are more satisfied with their work do tend to arrest suspects at higher rates than those less satisfied. The slight deviation from this trend among those who dislike the job might occur for two reasons—the small number of cases in this category may reduce the precision of the proportion or officers who flatly dislike their work may take some of their ill feeling out on offenders.

Dispositions of traffic cases manifest a similar pattern (Table 6.9), and here again the trend is broken by a higher rate of ticketing

Table 6.9

Disposition of Offenders in Police-Initiated Traffic
Encounters, By Satisfaction with Job

	Satisfaction with Job				
Disposition	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total
No Action	0.0%	12.8%	16.5%	7.1%	14.0%
Warning	6.7	30.8	18.3	16.7	19.1
Ticket	93.3	48.7	48.2	59.5	51.9
Arrest	0.0	7.7	17.0	16.7	15.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	15	39	218	42	314

Tau-b = .058

among the few dissatisfied officers. This might be attributed to the same reasons advanced in the case of arrest. Otherwise, though, the proportion of offenders sanctioned through ticketing or arrest climbs neatly from 56.4% among the neutral to 65.2% among the satisfied to 76.2% among the most satisfied. Morale also has a very weak

positive effect on the rates at which official reports are written

(Figure 6.5). For each of the different ways of invoking the legal

process, then, higher levels of satisfaction lead to higher rates of

invocation.

Figure 6.5. Percentage of official reports written in felony and misdemeanor cases where suspect is absent, by satisfaction with job.

Effects on Informal Behavior and Effort

The hypothesis that job satisfaction will favorably affect the

policeman's manner toward a citizen—or even the hypothesis that it has

any effect on it at all—is not borne out by these data. Rather,

Table 6.10 shows the two factors to be virtually independent. A

division of citizens into offenders and non-offenders (Table 6.11)

reveals only a very slight underlying tendency for more satisfied

policemen to treat non-offenders more positively and offenders less

positively. This might constitute a behavioral manifestation of cog-

nitive balancing. For objects—in this case, non-offending citizens—

Table 6.10

Manner, By Satisfaction with Job

	Satisfaction with Job				
Manner	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total
Very Negative	1.0%	1.3%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%
Negative	12.3	10.4	9.2	11.7	9.9
Neutral	71.1	73.2	74.3	70.1	73.4
Positive	15.6	15.1	15.5	17.1	15.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1017	2888	9019	1344	14,268

Tau-b = .013

Table 6.11

Manner, By Satisfaction with Job,
By Citizen's Role

	Satisfaction with Job				
Manner	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total
a) Non-Offenders					
Very Negative	.6%	.6%	.4%	.5%	.5%
Negative	8.4	4.7	3.8	5.5	4.5
Neutral	76.2	79.1	80.1	77.0	79.3
Positive	14.9	15.5	15.7	17.0	15.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	726	1881	5835	853	9295

Tau-b = .022

b) Offenders					
Very Negative	2.1%	3.1%	2.6%	1.2%	2.5%
Negative	24.9	23.1	23.8	26.4	24.0
Neutral	56.1	58.5	58.2	58.4	58.1
Positive	16.9	15.4	15.4	14.1	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	189	684	2221	341	3435

Tau-b = -.007

that are presumably evaluated favorably, favorable job orientations
lead to favorable treatment; while for objects that are presumably
evaluated less favorably—offending citizens—favorable job orienta-
tions lead to less favorable treatment.

If the effects of job satisfaction on the manner of the policeman
are subtle to the brink of non-existence, its effects on effort are
more easily discerned. Consistent with the usual organizational hypo-
thesis, increases in satisfaction are clearly associated with increases
in the rates at which policemen initiate contacts with citizens (Fig-
ure 6.6). However, those officers who most like their work display

Figure 6.6. Average number of police-initiated contacts per police-
man per tour of duty, by satisfaction with job.

some slackening in effort. This may reflect either imprecision in the average due to the relatively small number of cases upon which it is based or a real departure from the general trend—rather than working hard because they like their work, some officers may like their work because they do not have to work hard!

The data on the use of non-mobilized time corroborate the finding of a positive relationship between satisfaction and effort. Increases in satisfaction lead to increases in aggressiveness of patrolling (Table 6.12). There is, in contrast to the findings for the initiation of contacts, no evidence of a decline in effort among the most satisfied officers. Since it is difficult to identify any substantive

Table 6.12

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, By Satisfaction
with Job

Aggressiveness of Patrolling	Satisfaction with Job				
	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total
Little Preventive Patrol	27.0%	22.8%	16.4%	12.6%	18.1%
Some Preventive Patrol	67.4	56.9	61.3	62.1	61.0
Aggressive Preventive Patrol	5.6	20.3	22.2	25.2	20.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	89	232	768	103	1192

Tau-b = .103

reason for this difference in the results obtained from the two measures of effort, the more clear-cut and plausible result obtained from the measure of patrol aggressiveness suggests that it is imprecision due to a small number of cases, rather than the substantive explanation advanced, that accounts for the discontinuity in the relationship between satisfaction and initiation of contacts.

As it was argued in the discussion of the effects of the length of police service, here again it can be argued that, although the effects of satisfaction on the various dependent variables are slight, nevertheless they do gain validity from their consistency, both within and across categories of behavior. All three measures of formal action show that the legal process is more frequently invoked by officers who are more satisfied with their job. Both measures of effort reveal that higher morale leads to greater exertion. And, if higher rates of invocation and higher levels of effort both more clearly approximate "ideal" police performance than their opposites, these two sets of results are consistent with one another. Only the evidence on informal actions does not clearly fit into this admittedly weak pattern and, even there, satisfaction does appear to have a very weak effect once offenders and non-offenders are separated.

The sole remaining question is whether these weak manifestations of morale persist in the face of the controls identified as necessary earlier. Because, in the case of length of service, controls can most conveniently be imposed following the introduction of two more individual difference variables and because, in the case of city,

the question of the persistence of these relationships can most con-
veniently be addressed in the context of an examination of interac-
tions in the relationships across cities, these controls will not be
imposed at this point. However, it can be said at this point that the
slight effects of morale do, generally, hold up. This constitutes a
weak endorsement of the contention made by students of organization
and students of the police—Wilson, to note one—that morale can affect
a wide range of police behavior.

The Effects of Race and Racial Attitudes

Though cynicism, authoritarianism, morale, and other work-
related orientations have received much attention from academic stu-
dents of the police, another set of characteristics has received atten-
tion from a wider audience as well—the general public and, in parti-
cular, minority groups and critics of the police. These characteris-
tics are the race of the policeman, especially as it interacts with
the race of the citizen, and the racial attitudes of the policeman.

The concerns of the academicians—and of the wider audience too,
one would suspect—focus on the three broad, race-related questions
raised in Chapter II. The first is whether the police treat black citi-
zens differently from white citizens—and, more specifically, whether
they treat black citizens less well than white citizens. The race of
the citizen is, under the division that has been drawn in this study
between individual and situational sources of variance in behavior,
actually a situational source, since the race of the citizen constitutes

a property of the stimulus to which the policeman is exposed. However, it warrants consideration here because an accurate assessment of the effects of the policeman's race and his racial attitudes cannot be made without taking this factor into account. At the same time, it must also be recognized that no final conclusion regarding the effects of the citizen's race can be made until other situational factors are taken into account. That part of the analysis will be presented in Chapter VII. The second concern is whether black policemen treat, or would treat, black citizens differently from the way that white policemen treat them—though whether they do or would treat them better or worse is, as noted in Chapter II, a point of disagreement. The third concern is whether or not the allegedly unfavorable treatment white policemen give black citizens flows from what are generally conceded to be their negative attitudes toward black people.

An empirical examination of these questions has heightened significance because it may serve two important purposes. First, in line with the primary objective of this research, it may contribute to a better understanding of the impact of individual characteristics and attitudes on behavior. Second, it may help to clear away some of the underbrush in the long controversy over police-minority relations.

The Effects of Citizen's Race

Do policemen treat white and black citizens differently? The data on both formal and informal actions suggest that they do. Among formal actions, black offenders stand a higher chance of being taken to the station than white offenders, by a margin of better than

three-to-two (Table 6.13). That this is not simply because blacks
tend to be involved in more serious crimes is demonstrated in Table 6.14.

Table 6.13
Arrest of Offenders, By Race of Offender

Disposition of Offender	Offender's Race		
	White	Black	Total
Arrested	13.3%	22.4%	18.3%
Released	86.7	77.6	81.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1114	1377	2491
	Tau-b = .118		

Table 6.14
Arrest of Offenders by Race of Offenders - Felonies and Misdemeanors Only

Disposition of Offender	Offender's Race		
	White	Black	Total
Arrested	32.0%	46.4%	40.7%
Released	68.0	53.6	59.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	300	461	761
	Tau-b = .143		

Even when only more serious crimes are considered, the black arrest
rate still outstrips the white arrest rate by about the same margin.
Traffic cases, on the other hand, show no tendency for blacks to be

sanctioned more often (Table 6.15). The frequency with which the legal process is invoked when no suspect is present, however, does vary with the race of the complainant. The police less often write

Table 6.15

Disposition of Offenders in Police-Initiated Traffic Encounters, By Race of Offender

	Offender's Race		
Disposition	White	Black	Total
No Action	17.0%	12.7%	14.7%
Warning	13.7	23.5	18.8
Ticket	58.8	45.8	52.0
Arrest	10.5	18.1	14.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	153	166	319

Tau-b = .023

reports when a black citizen complains than when a white citizen complains (Table 6.16). This finding supports some critics' charges that the police take crimes less seriously when blacks are the victims than when whites are the victims.

The manner of the policeman toward the citizen varies with the race of the citizen as well, although the difference is not of the sort that critics of the police would lead one to expect (Table 6.17). That is, there is scarcely any sign that blacks are treated less well than whites. Rather, the major difference in the way in which the races are treated is that blacks are more likely to be treated neutrally than

Table 6.16

Percentage of Official Reports Written in Felony and
Misdemeanor Cases Where Suspect is Absent,
By Race of Complainant

| | Complainant's Race | | |
Disposition	White	Black	Total
Report Written	61.4%	51.8%	56.4%
Report Not Written	38.6	48.2	43.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	414	448	862
	Tau-b = .096		

Table 6.17

Manner of Policeman, By Race of Citizen

| | Citizen's Race | | |
Manner	White	Black	Total
Very Negative	1.6%	.9%	1.2%
Negative	12.9	8.8	10.4
Neutral	65.0	78.7	73.3
Positive	20.5	11.6	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	6112	9407	15,519
	Tau-b = -.039		

are whites. Roughly four out of every five blacks are treated in a
neutral, business-like fashion, while only two out of every three
whites are. Police behavior toward blacks thus manifests substantially
less variance than behavior toward whites, with policemen acting in
expressive ways much more often with whites (35% of the time) than with

blacks (21% of the time). In the realm of interpersonal manner, then, it would appear that the basic response of the policeman to the black is not to treat him more harshly, but to treat him more cautiously.

One possible explanation for this is that policemen might be particularly leary of dealing with black offenders and that this difference might be the root of the differences observed in Table 6.17. A simple control for the role which the citizen plays in the encounter reveals that this is not the case (Table 6.18). Although the treatment of

Table 6.18

Manner of Policeman, By Race of Citizen
By Role of Citizen

Manner	Citizen's Race		Total
	White	Black	
a) Non-Offenders			
Very Negative	.5%	.5%	.5%
Negative	6.6	3.8	4.9
Neutral	71.8	84.3	79.3
Positive	21.1	11.4	15.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	4091	6144	10,235

Tau-b = -.081

Manner	Citizen's Race		Total
	White	Black	
b) Offenders			
Very Negative	4.2%	1.9%	2.8%
Negative	27.4	22.3	24.3
Neutral	49.9	62.7	57.7
Positive	18.5	13.1	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1513	2316	3829

Tau-b = .025

offenders and non-offenders does, as said previously, differ substantially, the tendency of blacks to be treated impersonally persists, with no indication at all that blacks are in any way treated less well than whites. Regardless of the role which the citizen plays, policemen seem to take more care in their dealings with blacks than in their dealings with whites.

The overall picture which emerges here is one in which blacks clearly are treated differently than whites. It cannot, however, be said that they are uniformly treated less well than whites. In some respects, they are—they are more likely to be arrested, less likely to have their complaints legitimated through the filing of an official report, and less likely to be treated in a friendly manner. In other respects, they are accorded treatment as good as, if not better than, that accorded whites—they are no more likely to be sanctioned for traffic offenses and they are less likely to be treated in an unfriendly manner.

One explanation for these results is simply that policemen treat black citizens more professionally than white citizens—they under-enforce the law less and they treat them more impersonally. This does not account for the differences in the filing of official reports, unfortunately. Another possibility is that policemen feel relatively confident in exercising their discretion when they use their formal powers—hence the results for arrests and reports—but relatively less confident in exercising discretion in areas where the lack of legal guidelines leaves them open to charges of bias—hence

the caution observed in their manner toward blacks. A policeman can always try to cover himself in the use of a formal power by responding that he is only doing his job as he sees fit. With his informal manner, though, he has no such ready defense and therefore might be more likely to watch his step.

Regardless of the reasons for these racial differences, it is necessary that they be taken into account before addressing the second issue raised above—the impact of the race of the policeman on his treatment of the citizen. The primary reason for this is the need to forestall an erroneous attribution of the effects of the citizen's race to the policeman's race. Such a spurious inference could arise because, as the previous paragraphs have demonstrated, the race of the citizen does influence the policeman's treatment of him. In addition, empirically, the race of the policeman bears a strong relationship to the race of the citizen. Table 6.19 shows that, while white policemen in the precincts studied deal with both white and black citizens, black policemen deal almost exclusively with black citizens. Out of the nearly 20,000 police-citizen interactions observed, almost 50% involved white officers and black citizens, but only about 2.5% involved black officers and white citizens. The upshot of this segregation is that an examination of the behavior of white policemen can draw on evidence from interactions with white and black citizens, while an examination of the behavior of black policemen must draw almost exclusively on interactions with black citizens. To the extent that behavior toward black citizens differs from behavior

Table 6.19

Racial Composition of Police-Citizen Interactions

Citizen's Race	Policeman's Race		Total
	White	Black	
White	6412	442	6854
%	36.4	2.5	38.9
Black	8329	2415	10,744
%	47.3	13.7	61.1
Total	14,741	2857	17,598
%	83.8	16.2	100.0

toward white citizens, as the preceding pages have shown it to do, a simple comparison of the behavior of white policemen and black policemen risks confounding the effects of the citizen's race with those of the policeman's race. To avoid this problem, it is essential to identify the effects of citizen's race and to control for this factor when examining the effects of policeman's race.[6]

The Effects of Policeman's Race

A possible explanation for the differences in treatment of citizens in general and for the differences in treatment of black and white citizens in particular looks to the race of the patrolman. As stated in Chapter II and reiterated in the previous section, it has often been posited that the behavior of black officers differs from that of white officers. And it is possible that the differences in the treatment of citizens of different races observed in the previous section could flow from differences in the behavior typical of the

officers belonging to the racial groups that most frequently inter-
act with citizens of each race. That is, if black policemen have
distinctive behavior patterns, then the differences observed in the
treatment of blacks as compared to the treatment of whites might be
due to black citizens' more frequent contacts with black policemen.
In addition, it is possible that the differences in the treatment of
citizens of different races emerge from tendencies for policemen of
a particular race to treat citizens of a particular race in particu-
lar ways—for white or black policemen, for example, to be particularly
harsh in their dealings with white or black citizens.

Effects on Formal Behavior

Since formal actions are measured at the citizen level rather
than the interaction level, a way of relating a variable at this level
to the race of the officer or officers involved in the interaction has
to be devised. The strategy taken here is to characterize a citizen
meeting one or two white policemen as meeting a white patrol, a
citizen meeting one or two black policemen as meeting a black pat-
rol, and a citizen meeting a white officer and a black officer as
meeting a mixed patrol.

The general hypothesis that black policemen will behave differ-
ently from white policemen and the specific expectation that they
will invoke the legal process more frequently than white policemen—
derived from Banton's discussion (cited in Chapter II)—are borne
out by the data on arrest. Panel C of Table 6.20 shows that black
officers arrest suspected offenders at rates roughly one-and-a-half

Table 6.20

Arrest, By Race of Policeman, By Race of Offender

Racial Composition of Patrol Unit:	(a) White			(b) Black			(c) Total			Grand Total
	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	
Disposition										
Arrested	13.3%	9.1%	17.1%	21.2%	23.0%	25.4%	16.8%	20.8%	24.1%	18.0%
Released	86.7	90.9	82.9	78.8	77.0	74.6	83.2	79.2	75.9	82.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1030	33	41	917	213	236	2057	250	286	2593

times those for white officers. The rate for racially mixed patrols falls neatly in between.

However, the considerations outlined on the preceding page dictate the imposition of controls for the race of the citizen. Panels a and b of Table 6.20 reveal that the tendency of black officers to arrest more frequently than white officers persists even when the citizen's race is held constant, though the differences across officer's race are attenuated and the small number of cases in which black officers confront white citizens renders comparisons involving that situation suspect. The overall picture that emerges here is one in which both officer's race and citizen's race have impacts, with black officers slightly more likely to arrest than white officers and black citizens somewhat more likely to be arrested than white citizens.

Small numbers pose a nettlesome problem for the analysis of traffic dispositions, but the same basic pattern observed for arrest recurs here (Table 6.21). Black officers are more likely to ticket or arrest citizens than white ones, by a margin of some 73% to 64%. This difference is, to some degree, attenuated by a general tendency for blacks to be sanctioned less often than whites. Indeed, once this suppressive factor is taken into account, in the partial tables in panels a and b, the differential between white and black policemen approaches 20%.

The disadvantage of black complainants, relative to white complainants, in getting police to file official reports of incidents

Table 6.21

Disposition of Offenders in Police-Initiated Traffic Encounters, By Race of Policemen, By Race of Offender

Racial Composition of Patrol Unit:	(a) White			(b) Black			(c) Total			Grand Total
	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	
Disposition										
No Action	19.8%	0.0%	0.0%	20.9%	7.9%	0.0%	19.7%	6.3%	2.0%	14.9%
Warning	10.7	33.3	12.5	24.4	18.4	27.5	16.1	20.8	25.5	18.3
Ticket	59.5	55.6	75.0	39.5	50.0	55.0	52.0	52.1	54.9	52.5
Arrest	9.9	11.1	12.5	15.1	23.7	17.5	12.1	20.8	17.6	14.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	131	9	8	86	38	40	223	48	51	322

(seen in Table 6.16) does not arise from any simple differences in the behavior of white and black patrolmen. Black officers, as a matter of fact, differ only slightly, if at all, from white officers in their overall propensity to write reports (Table 6.22, panel c). However, once a control for the race of the citizen is introduced, officer's race is seen to play a more substantial role. The net disadvantage to black complainants stems from a predisposition on the part of white policemen to write reports more often for white complainants than for black complainants. A countervailing tendency of black policemen to react affirmatively to black complainants more often than to white complainants only partially offsets this.

The small number of cases in the rightmost column of panel a makes reliance on the notably low rate at which black officers file reports for white complainants a dubious enterprise. Nevertheless, that low proportion is consistent with an overall pattern in which policemen of either race respond more favorably to complaints from citizens of their own race than to complaints from citizens of the opposite race. It is also interesting to note—keeping in mind that numbers are perilously small here—that citizens of either race are most likely to evoke reports from biracial teams. Evidence to be presented later will tend to discount the possibility that this is due only to differences in the number of officers on the patrol team. Rather, it may be that officers operating with partners of another race feel additional pressures to handle complaints officially, lest their partners suspect them of not taking the complaints of citizens of the opposite race seriously enough.

Table 6.22

Percentage of Official Reports Written in Felony
and Misdemeanor Cases Where Suspect is Absent,
By Race of Policeman, By Race of Complainant

Racial Composition of Patrol Unit:	Race of Complainant									Grand Total
	(a) White			(b) Black			(c) Total			
	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	
Disposition										
Report Written	62.6%	76.5%	38.9%	49.2%	65.0%	56.4%	56.5%	66.1%	53.1%	56.8%
Report Not Written	37.4	23.5	61.1	50.8	35.0	43.6	43.5	33.9	46.9	43.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	372	17	18	329	40	78	734	62	96	892

Effects on Informal Behavior

The emergence of substantial differences in the formal behavior of white and black officers heightens expectations that such differences will also be observed in their informal manner, where individual differences of this sort might be expected to be manifested more openly. However, neither the critics' contention that black policemen will be more lenient in their treatment of citizens nor Banton's contradicting hypothesis that black officers will be harsher is supported by these data (Table 6.23). In fact, the only significant difference which emerges between the officers of different races

Table 6.23

Manner of Policeman, By Race of Policeman
By Race of Citizen

	Citizen's Race						
	(a) White		(b) Black		(c) Total		Grand
Officer's Race	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	Total
Manner							
Very Negative	1.7%	.5%	.9%	.9%	1.2%	.8%	1.1%
Negative	12.5	9.1	9.2	7.7	10.4	7.7	10.0
Neutral	64.6	74.9	77.8	81.9	72.2	81.5	73.6
Positive	21.2	15.5	12.2	9.5	16.2	10.1	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	5426	375	7175	2071	13,399	2534	15,933

is one similar to that seen between the citizens of different races. Namely, black officers are somewhat more likely to treat citizens in

a neutral, bureaucratic fashion than are white officers. That such a difference is not due to differences in citizen's race is shown by its persistence even after a control for that factor is imposed (Table 6.23, panels a and b). Rather, the effects of citizen's race and policeman's race appear to be additive, with black citizens more likely than whites to be treated neutrally, regardless of the policeman's race, and black policemen more likely than white policemen to treat citizens neutrally, regardless of the citizen's race. Lest it be thought that these differences somehow result from a combination of differences in the treatment of offenders and non-offenders and differences in the racial composition of offender and non-offender groups, it can be answered that they are not. The same constriction of the range of behavior as one moves from the white citizen-white policeman combination to the black citizen-black policeman combination also occurs within both offender and non-offender groups (Table 6.24). Further, Table 6.24b shows that the specific hypotheses that black policemen will treat black offenders either more harshly or more gently than will white policemen are not substantiated. Rather, black policemen tend to treat black offenders in a neutral fashion more often than do white policemen.

Effects on Effort

Neither the police literature nor the discussion to this point has raised any specific expectations about the relationship between a policeman's race and how hard he works. Nevertheless, it is of some interest—and perhaps of some utility to those who make police

Table 6.24

Manner of Policeman, By Race of Policeman, By
Race of Citizen, By Role of Citizen

| | Citizen's Race | | | | Total | | Grand |
| | White | | Black | | | | |
Officer's Race	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	Total
Manner							
(a) Non-Offender							
Very Negative	.5%	.4%	.5%	.5%	.5%	.4%	.5%
Negative	6.1	3.3	4.3	2.0	5.0	2.2	4.6
Neutral	71.2	82.7	83.4	88.1	78.0	87.6	79.5
Positive	22.2	13.7	11.8	9.4	16.5	9.8	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	3614	271	4752	1277	8926	1607	10,533
(b) Offender							
Very Negative	4.5%	1.2%	1.8%	1.2%	2.9%	1.2%	2.6%
Negative	27.1	25.6	23.0	20.8	24.6	21.1	24.0
Neutral	50.0	51.2	61.0	67.4	56.6	65.9	58.2
Positive	18.4	22.1	14.1	10.6	15.9	11.8	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1346	86	1691	592	3178	692	3870

personnel policy—that observers more often rate black policemen as
exerting themselves to some degree or a great degree than they do
white policemen (Table 6.25). Nearly 20% of the white policemen engage
in little aggressive patrolling, compared to less than 10% of black
policemen. Data on the number of contacts initiated corroborate this
picture of greater activity among black patrolmen (Table 6.26). A

Table 6.25

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, By Race of Policeman

| Aggressiveness of Patrolling | Policeman's Race | | Total |
	White	Black	
Little Preventive Patrolling	19.8%	9.1%	17.8%
Some Preventive Patrolling	60.4	66.3	61.7
Aggressive Preventive Patrolling	19.8	24.5	20.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1157	208	1365

Tau-b = .084

Table 6.26

Average Number of Police-Initiated Contacts per Policeman per Tour of Duty, By Race of Policeman

	White	Black	Total
	.70	1.07	.76
N	484	84	568

final conclusion on the importance of this racial difference must await the imposition of controls for a number of possibly confounding factors but, on the face of the evidence, black officers do appear to be more active than white officers.

The evidence presented here consistently supports the general hypothesis that a policeman's race has some bearing on how he performs. Black officers take suspects into custody more often than do white officers and formally sanction traffic offenders more often than do white officers. They are more likely to file reports for black complainants than for white complainants, unlike white officers, who are more likely to file reports for complainants of their own race than for blacks. Black patrolmen hew more to a neutral and routinized course in their manner toward citizens than do white policemen and they seem to work harder than white policemen as well. Percentage differences are not, in most instances, great, but they are often unmistakable and their validity is enhanced by the consistency with which they emerge.

As in the case of the differences in behavior across levels of experience, these racial differences can perhaps best be summarized in terms of divergence from an ideal pattern of behavior. If ideal behavior is comprised of high rates of formal invocation of the legal process, neutral and routinized treatment of citizens, and high levels of effort, then it can be said that in general the performance of black policemen more nearly approximates the ideal than the performance of white policemen. Such differences could, of course, stem from black officers being hired by more progressive professional departments, or them being less experienced than white officers, or them being more satisfied with their work than white officers. Subsequent analyses, in this chapter and in Chapter VIII, will reveal

that many of these racial differences remain even after such factors
are taken into account. It may be that black officers are more
highly motivated than white officers or that they perform well in
response to a special sense of vulnerability growing out of their
position, to borrow Alex's argument, as black enforcers of the white
man's law. Additional research is needed to sort out these and other
plausible rival hypotheses. In any case, black officers do behave
differently from white officers—and it is a difference which appears
to work to the advantage of departments that employ them.

The Effects of Racial Attitudes

The difficulties alleged to occur between police and citizens
and, in particular, between white policemen and black citizens,
have often been attributed to unfavorable police attitudes toward
citizens and, in particular, to the unfavorable attitudes toward
black citizens reportedly held by white officers. That white police-
men harbor negative feelings toward blacks has often been contended
(see Chapter II). The attitudinal data gathered in the course of
Reiss's observational study corroborate that characterization (Table
6.27). More than three-quarters of all white policemen responding
hold negative attitudes toward blacks and roughly a quarter express
very negative opinions. Only one in forty expresses favorable feel-
ings and fewer than one-fifth manage even neutral sentiments. This
distribution contrasts sharply, though perhaps not as sharply as
might be expected, with the distribution of racial attitudes among

Table 6.27

Attitude Toward Blacks, By Race of Policeman

Attitude Toward Blacks	Race of Policeman		Total
	White	Black	
Very Negative	23.2%	8.6%	21.4%
Negative	54.8	20.7	50.6
Neutral	19.6	46.6	22.9
Positive	2.4	24.1	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	418	58	476
Tau-b = .302			

black officers, who are consistently more favorable in their charac-
terizations of black citizens, but by no means unanimously so.[7]
Even among that presumably favorably disposed group, more than a
quarter express negative sentiments and fewer than one-quarter ex-
press positive sentiments. More than anything else, these results
may attest to the power of the informal police culture to bring
individual opinions into conformity with group norms.

Even though it is generally conceded that policemen harbor
unfavorable attitudes toward blacks, whether these unfavorable atti-
tudes are translated into actual behavior is a point in dispute. As
noted in Chapter II, some scholars, such as Robert Mendelsohn, find
it hard to believe that they are not, while other scholars, such as
Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn and Skolnick, believe that legal and

organizational constraints effectively impede the translation of attitudes into action. And, as discussed in Chapter III, this is a question on which the entire literature of social science yields up a mixture both of opinions and of evidence.

So a basic and unresolved question that must be dealt with here is whether or not unfavorable racial attitudes are actually expressed in the formal and informal behaviors of police officers toward black citizens. Because the relationship between black policemen's racial attitudes and their behavior toward black citizens has received little attention, because the inclusion of black officers in the test of this set of hypotheses would only complicate the analysis—by opening up the possibility that effects which might appear to be the results of differences in the racial attitudes of officers might actually be due to differences in the race of officers—and because the number of black officers is too small to permit a test of the hypothesis within that group alone, the analysis here will be confined to interactions between white policemen and black citizens.

Effects on Formal Behavior

Perhaps the most compelling hypothesis that can be posited here is that the degree of a policeman's racial prejudice will have an effect on his tendency to arrest black citizens. Figure 6.7 reveals that a white officer's racial attitudes do indeed relate to the chances that he will take a black offender to the station. The more negative an officer's attitude toward blacks is, the higher the

Figure 6.7 Arrest of black offenders by white policemen, by attitude toward blacks.

probability that a black offender will be arrested. The exceedingly small number of white policemen with favorable attitudes toward blacks makes extremely tenuous any assertions about their behavior, but otherwise there is a fairly consistent pattern of slightly higher arrest rates as the attitudes of the officers shift from the neutral toward the negative.

In spite of the extremely small number of cases—a number so small that the neutral and positive categories of the independent variable must be combined—dispositions of black offenders in traffic cases show a similar pattern (Table 6.28). The favorably and neutrally disposed policemen ticket or arrest only about 39% of black traffic offenders, but the negatively disposed handle nearly 47% in these ways and the most negatively disposed sanction about 82%. Among

Table 6.28

Disposition of Black Offenders by White Policemen in
Police-Initiated Traffic Encounters, By
Attitude Toward Blacks of Policeman

	Attitude Toward Blacks			
Disposition	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral and Positive	Total
No Action	13.6%	20.0%	29.0%	21.7%
Warning	4.5	33.3	32.3	25.3
Ticket	54.5	36.7	25.8	37.3
Arrest	27.3	10.0	12.9	15.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	22	30	31	83
		Tau-b = -.242		

formal actions, only in the case of formal reports does the expected relationship between attitude and behavior fail to emerge. As Figure 6.8 shows, there is no consistent relationship between a policeman's racial attitude and his propensity to file reports of crimes in response to the complaints of black citizens.

Figure 6.8 Percentage of official reports written for black complainants by white policemen in felony and misdemeanor cases where suspect is absent, by attitude toward blacks.

Effects on Informal Behavior

If the findings of the relationships between policemen's atti-
tudes toward blacks and their formal decisions about them, as modest
as they are, come as something of a surprise, a more substantial
relationship might be expected to emerge between such attitudes and
the manner of the policeman, at least if Skolnick and Woodworth are
right in arguing that informal actions are more likely to reveal per-
sonal attitudes than formal ones (see Chapter II). At first glance,
however, this does not appear to be the case. As Table 6.29 makes
clear, there is no simple, straightforward relationship between racial

Table 6.29

Manner of White Policemen Toward Black Citizens,
by Policeman's Attitude Toward Blacks

Manner	Policeman's Attitude Toward Blacks				
	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total
Very Negative	1.2%	.7%	.3%	0.0%	.8%
Negative	11.7	8.9	7.6	13.1	9.5
Neutral	73.9	77.8	80.2	82.0	77.3
Positive	13.2	12.5	11.8	4.9	12.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1653	3959	890	122	6624

Tau-b = .015   Folded gamma = -.110

attitudes and informal treatment. That is, the prediction suggested
by simple attitudinal theory—that policemen who express favorable
attitudes toward black people will treat them positively and policemen

who express unfavorable attitudes toward black people will treat them negatively—is not supported. To be sure, more prejudiced policemen are slightly more inclined to treat blacks negatively, as the percentages in the first two rows of the table indicate. But even among the most prejudiced the percentage of negative behavior seems very low—only about 13%. Further, negative behaviors are just about as common among the most positively predisposed. And perhaps most puzzling, positive attitudes appear to be associated with a decline in positive treatment. The bottom row of Table 6.29 shows a decline from more than 13% positive behavior to less than 5% with increasingly favorable racial attitudes.

So, at least in this instance, the linkage between attitude and behavior is not the simple one expected. But to say that the linkage is not the simple one expected is not to say that there is no linkage. A closer look at the data presented in this table suggests that the two variables are indeed related, though in a more complicated fashion than anticipated.

Perhaps the most important feature of the relationship depicted in Table 6.29 is the slight, but nevertheless regular, tendency of policemen with more favorable attitudes toward blacks to treat blacks neutrally—the steady climb from 73.9% neutral treatment to 82.0% neutral treatment in the third row of the table. Though this is not the expected result, it does make sense in the context of police work. If police departments do indeed inculcate into their officers the idea that "good" or professional behavior is to treat citizens

in a neutral or bureaucratic fashion—if, in other words, they re-
define "good" behavior as impersonal behavior rather than friendly
behavior—then a policeman who was trying to treat a citizen well
would try to treat him in an impersonal fashion. Thus the trend
seen in the third row of the table may simply reflect the tendency
of favorably disposed policemen to pursue the conception of good
treatment they have acquired from the organization rather than their
own.[8] For purposes of comparison later, it will be useful to have
a single summary measure of this tendency toward increasing neutrality
in behavior with changes in the independent variable. Perhaps the
most appropriate simple measure is a gamma calculated on the table
after the dependent variable has been "folded" at the neutral cate-
gory. Treatment is, in other words, rescaled according to its devia-
tion from neutrality so that a neutral manner is scored "1," a posi-
tive or negative manner is scored "2," and a very negative manner is
scored "3." Because there is no expectation that behavior will
necessarily diverge from neutrality under conditions of less constraint,
but only that it may diverge, a one-way measure of association,
gamma, seems more appropriate than a two-way measure, such as Kendall's
tau-b or tau-c, for these ordinal variables.

If the "redefinition" explanation of the basic deviation from
expectations is taken as adequate, the sole remaining anomaly in
the table is the unexpectedly high rate of negative behavior toward
black citizens by policemen who hold favorable attitudes toward
black people. This may merely be a chance fluctuation. Because
very few white policemen with favorable attitudes toward blacks come

into contact with blacks, the number of cases in this category is extremely small—less than 2% of the total—and the resultant percentage may be quite unstable. Another possibility is, however, that white policemen who like and sympathize with black people might be particularly severe with those black citizens whom they see as threatening the stability and the integrity of the black community—that is, black offenders. If such were the case, the elevated proportion of unfavorable treatment by policemen with favorable racial attitudes should occur primarily with offenders and not with non-offenders.

Table 6.30 presents the attitude-behavior relationship within offender and non-offender groups. As predicted, the tendency of favorably disposed officers to treat blacks negatively does not emerge at all within the non-offender category. The percentage of black non-offenders treated negatively by the positively disposed officers is within a percentage point of that for the neutrally disposed officers and, overall, the table coincides neatly with the redefinition hypothesis just advanced. The folded gamma demonstrates neatly that the basic tendency observed in Table 6.29 persists and, indeed, grows here.

Also in keeping with the prediction made, the tendency of favorably disposed officers to treat blacks more severely does emerge vividly among offenders. Though the small number of cases again urges caution in drawing conclusions, the rate of negative actions is sharply higher among the most favorably disposed officers. In

Table 6.30

Manner of White Policemen Toward Black Citizens, By Policeman's Attitude Toward Blacks, By Citizen's Role

Manner	Policeman's Attitude Toward Blacks				
	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total
a) Non-Offender					
Very Negative	.4%	.6%	0.0%	0.0%	.5%
Negative	7.3	3.8	2.6	3.8	4.5
Neutral	78.6	83.5	87.2	91.0	82.9
Positive	13.7	12.1	10.2	5.1	12.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1084	2654	577	78	4393

Tau-b = .005   Folded gamma = -.181

Manner					
b) Offender					
Very Negative	2.6%	1.3%	1.3%	0.0%	1.6%
Negative	26.9	23.1	18.9	44.8	23.8
Neutral	58.7	60.6	61.3	55.2	60.1
Positive	11.9	14.9	18.5	0.0	14.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	387	891	238	29	1545

Tau-b = .054   Folded gamma = -.032

fact, nearly half—45%—of all black offenders who interact with policemen expressing positive sentiments toward black citizens are treated in a negative manner. This suggests that the rationale advanced above—that policemen who look favorably on blacks are particularly affronted by black offenders—is a sound one.

It is also interesting to note that, apart from the discrepant pattern observed among the least prejudiced patrolmen, the attitude-behavior relationship coincides exactly with the original expectation. As racial attitudes become progressively more favorable, negative behavior becomes less frequent and positive behavior becomes more frequent. The previously noted tendency for less prejudiced officers to adopt more frequently a neutral manner, the folded gamma shows, has all but disappeared. This suggests that the process of redefinition of good behavior as neutral behavior which seems to occur with respect to non-offenders does not occur with respect to offenders. Offenders may be, in the policeman's mind, set apart from other citizens and seen as "fair game," toward whom the expression of any personal feeling, whether positive or negative, is permissible. When a citizen crosses the divide between offender and non-offender, he may expose himself to a different set of police norms, both legal and interpersonal.

As was the case with the other individual difference variables, the relationships between policemen's racial attitudes and their formal and informal actions are by no means strong ones. Percentage differences and measures of association are often slight. However, what these relationships lack in strength they, in some measure, make up in consistency. The formal actions of arrest and ticketing both definitely are conditioned by the racial attitudes of the officer, with black offenders receiving harsher treatment at the hands of the more prejudiced officers. The same pattern carries over into the

manner of policemen toward black offenders. Highly prejudiced offi-
cers are more likely to treat suspects unfavorably and less likely
to treat them favorably than less prejudiced officers. Only the
actions of the most favorably disposed officers break from this
pattern and this, it has been argued, can easily be explained. Fin-
ally, racial attitudes do seem to condition the informal treatment
of non-offenders in a fashion which, although it is not the expected
one, nevertheless makes some sense. Judging from these results, it
would seem that, in the controversy between those who see racial atti-
tudes as crucial and those who see them as irrelevant to an under-
standing of police behavior, as is so often the case, the truth turns
out to lie somewhere in the middle. Racial attitudes do have an
impact on the behavior of policemen. However, the weakness of the
relationships makes it clear that they are by no means the only
determining factor. In many instances, officers act in ways that
would not be expected on the basis of their racial attitudes alone.

Multivariate Models of Individual Effects

In sum, the evidence presented in the preceding pages represents
a modest vindication of the "individual differences" model of police
behavior. Though the relationships observed are often weak, they
nevertheless emerge with a reassuring degree of consistency. Whether
the dependent variable is some aspect of formal action, informal
manner, or police effort, more experienced policemen do in general
behave differently from less experienced policemen. A policeman's

satisfaction with his job appears to have a slight effect on his formal decisions and on his level of effort. Black policemen enforce the law more aggressively, treat citizens in a more ministerial fashion, and work harder than white policemen. White policemen's racial attitudes do manifest themselves in formal and informal actions toward black citizens.

But even though this much has been established, two questions must be resolved before any firm conclusions about the importance of these individual differences can be drawn. One is whether, even taken together, these various factors constitute, in any absolute sense, an important source of variance in the behavior of policemen. This question is particularly important in light of the theoretical claim that, although a single attitude often will not predict well to a specific behavior—an assertion which is strongly supported by the results here—a larger number of attitudes will (see Chapter III).

Another is whether all the relationships observed in the preceding pages are real ones in their own right, or whether some of them are the spurious results of the others. The latter is a definite possibility because, as has already been noted, the various independent variables do relate to one another. For example, more experienced officers tend to be less satisfied with their work ($r = -.14$), blacks tend to be more satisfied with their work than whites ($r = .11$), and more satisfied officers tend to feel more favorably toward black people ($r = .10$).

A straightforward solution to both of these problems lies in the application to these data of multiple regression analysis. In the R^2 statistic is found a summary statement of the ability of all the independent variables taken together to account for variance in the dependent variable. In the partial regression coefficients are found statements of the impact of each of the independent variables when all the other independent variables are held constant.

One difficulty in applying this technique to these data is that the sorts of measures employed here fall short of the interval level of measurement assumed by the technique. However, the choice is really between violating the assumption regarding level of measure-ment—the net effect of which is in all likelihood to cause the effects of the variables on each other to be understated—and violat-ing the assumption that the explanatory model is properly specified—the net effect of which is to throw off all the results obtained from the model if the independent variables are related to each other (as they are here). Given that a monocausal model of a phenomenon as complicated as police behavior is certainly mis-specified, viola-tion of the level of measurement assumption by applying the multiple regression model to ordinal data seems the lesser of two evils. It seems, in other words, an acceptable risk in view of the important additional information which the technique can provide.

Another difficulty is that the multiple regression technique assesses the form and strength of linear relationships between vari-ables, while many of the relationships involved here are, as has

already been seen, non-linear. As a result, in some of the analyses
that follow, the multiple regression technique must be modified to
handle these more complicated patterns of relationship—typically,
through the addition of squared terms for some of the independent
variables. Finally, because of the complications which arise in the
construction of such models and the analysis of results from them,
results from only some of the possible analyses will be presented,
rather than results from analyses of all the dependent variables that
have been discussed up to this point. To be specific, analyses of
formal actions will focus on arrest and, to a lesser degree, report-
ing. Such a narrowing can be justified in terms of the parallels in
the results for the various formal actions observed thus far in the
analyses.

Arrest

Arrest stands as perhaps the most worthy candidate for further
analysis among the formal actions. Table 6.31 presents the results
of a multiple regression analysis of the arrest decision on three
of the individual characteristics examined in the previous discussion—
length of service, satisfaction with job, and policeman's race. Ra-
cial attitude is omitted here because it pertains only to the handl-
ing of black offenders, but will be included in a subsequent analysis.
Following the procedure suggested by Goldberger for situations in which
the dependent variable is dichotomous, the arrest variable has been
coded as a dummy variable, 0-1, and a generalized-least-squares-by-
transformation procedure implemented to correct for heteroscedasticity.[9]

Table 6.31

Regression of Arrest on Individual
Difference Measures

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)
Length of Service	.066	.047
(Length of Service)^2	-.020	.009
Job Satisfaction	.019	.011
Policeman's Race	.070	.028
Constant	.071	.074
R = .117	R^2 = .014	N = 2210

This approach yields coefficients that can be interpreted as the change in the probability of an offender being arrested associated with a one-unit shift in each of the independent variables while all other independent variables are held constant.

Because of the non-linear pattern observed with respect to length of service in Figure 6.2, a squared term in length of service has been added to capture curvilinearity. In contrast to the approach taken in the contingency table analysis, the race of the citizen is not included here. This is because the cross-tabulation reveals no interaction in the effect of the policeman's race on arrest with respect to this variable and because to include it would allow it—a situational variable—to inflate the explanatory power of the model when the real concern here is with the explanatory power of the individual characteristics of policemen alone.

The results presented in Table 6.31 reveal, most important of all, that even taken all together, the three individual differences

do not explain arrest effectively at all. R^2—which here must be interpreted as a goodness-of-fit measure rather than a proportion-of-variance-explained measure because of the special estimation technique used—attains a level of only .014, indicating an extremely limited ability to predict who will and who will not be arrested on the basis of the policeman's characteristics. So even the recognition of several different individual differences as determinants of arrest—at least these three individual differences—by no means solves the problem of weak relationships between individual characteristics and behavior.

However, even if the results are disappointing from the standpoint of predicting behavior, they do shed some light on the second question raised above.[10] Two of the three independent variables retain some slight impact on arrest, even when the others are held constant. The variable which proves not to have any consequential independent effect is job satisfaction. Though the coefficient describes a difference of about 6% between the least and the most satisfied (about half that observed in Figure 6.4), the magnitude of the standard error relative to that of the coefficient raises a serious question about its stability. On the other hand, the .07 coefficient for race of policeman (here also scaled as a 0-1 dummy variable, with mixed teams excluded from this analysis) indicates, in corroboration of what was observed in Table 6.20, that black officers arrest offenders about 7% more often than white officers and strengthens the inference by demonstrating that the relationship persists even when other relevant individual factors are controlled.

The coefficients for the length of service terms sustain the validity of the bivariate relationship observed earlier in Figure 6.2. Given the values assigned the different length-of-service categories (1 through 4), this combination of a larger positive coefficient on the first-degree term and a smaller negative coefficient on the second-degree term delineates a trend of a slight initial increase (about .01) in the probability of arrest from the "0-2 year" category to the "2-8 year" category, followed by a .11 drop from the "2-8 year" category to the "15 years or more" category.[11] This suggests that the initial climb in chances of arrest with increasing service observed in Figure 6.2 is largely the spurious artifact of differences in race and job satisfaction, but that the subsequent decline is a real one.

A similar analysis, directed at assessing the effect on arrest of racial attitudes when other individual differences are held constant, paints a similar picture of the overall impact of individual factors and of the separate effects of each of the individual differences. Table 6.32 presents the results of an analysis of the effects of length of service, job satisfaction, and attitudes toward black people for only those instances in which the last factor can be measured adequately and in which it is relevant to behavior—that is, interactions between white policemen and black offenders. Again, the predictive power of the individual factors taken simultaneously is weak—R^2 stands at only .014. But also again, two of the independent variables do have a unique, if slight, impact on the probability of

Table 6.32

Regression of Arrest on Individual Difference Measures -
White Policemen and Black Citizens Only

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)
Length of Service	-.042	.016
Job Satisfaction	-.001	.024
Attitude Toward Blacks	-.046	.018
Constant	.399	.106
R = .120	R^2 = .014	N = 868

arrest. The coefficients for length of service and racial attitude indicate declines of 12.6% and 13.8% in the chances of being arrested with shifts across the four-point scales ranging from the shortest to the longest period of service and from very negative to positive racial attitudes. As in the previous analysis, job satisfaction has the least impact of the variables—here, in fact, it appears definitely to have no impact at all.

Both of these analyses show the overall impact of these individual differences to be minor. However, it is clear that each of the individual differences, with the exception of satisfaction with the job, works its own subtle effect on the chances of arrest. The significance of these effects, minor though they may appear to be, should not be understated. They demonstrate the intrusion of the individual official into the rule of law. And, from the perspective of the offender, they represent real differences in the chances of being taken in—especially when it is remembered that overall those

chances are not very high (only about 18%). An offender who confronts

a less experienced officer runs a two-in-ten chance of being taken

in, while an offender who confronts an officer near the end of his

career runs only a one-in-ten chance. An offender who is detained

by a black policeman runs a .07 higher probability of being taken in

than one who confronts a white policeman. Given the .138 difference

in probabilities noted above, a black offender who confronts an

extremely prejudiced officer runs nearly twice the chance of being

arrested of one who confronts a racially favorable officer.[12] In

view of these differences, especially relative to the low base rate,

a feeling on the part of the offender that he is, to some extent, at

the mercy of the particular policeman that he happens to encounter

seems less than farfetched.

Informal Behavior

Multivariate analysis of the determinants of informal actions

is complicated by the unusual structure of the relationships between

some of the individual difference measures and the policeman's manner.

As observed earlier, no differences of any consequence in the

friendliness or harshness of treatment occur across categories of

the individual difference measures. However, the policeman's reli-

ance on personal, as opposed to impersonal, treatment does vary with

those factors. This changing variance in manner is not a difference

which is detected by analysis techniques relying on the linear model,

since they assess changes in the mean level of the dependent variable,

rather than changes in the variance about the mean level of the dependent variable. One solution is to use the "folded" version of the policeman's manner as the dependent variable, so that the coefficients describe the degree to which variations in the independent variable cause the policeman's manner to diverge from the impersonal.

Table 6.33 presents the results of two ordinary least squares analyses which use this folded version of manner as the dependent variable and divide the sample into offenders and non-offenders. The R^2's again demonstrate that the individual factors taken together explain relatively little of the variance in the dependent variable. The unstandardized coefficients reveal only slight changes along the arbitrary metric of the dependent variable, but the standardized coefficients show that again length of service and policeman's race are the more significant factors, regardless of whether the citizen is an offender or not. The slight tendencies of more experienced policemen and white policemen to deviate from a bureaucratic manner more often than less experienced policemen and black policemen, respectively, emerge as separate effects in these results.

The parallel analysis of the impact of racial attitudes, for those situations in which it can reasonably be accomplished, yields comparable results (Table 6.34), at least for non-offenders. R^2 for that group remains meager, but length of service retains its impact, job satisfaction again proves to have no effect, and racial attitudes are revealed to have a slight negative impact. For offenders, not surprisingly given the bivariate analysis, the results are utterly

Table 6.33

Regression of "Folded" Manner on Individual Difference Measures, By Role of Citizen

Independent Variable	(a) Non-Offenders			(b) Offenders		
	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)
Length of Service	.062	.006	.114	.055	.012	.080
Job Satisfaction	.008	.006	.015	.011	.014	.013
Policeman's Race	-.097	.012	-.085	-.112	.024	-.080
Constant	1.149	.029		1.409	.065	
	R = .141	R^2 = .020	N = 9254	R = .112	R^2 = .013	N = 3398

Table 6.34

Regression of "Folded" Manner on Individual Difference Measures, By Role of Citizen - White Policemen and Black Citizens Only

Independent Variable	(a) Non-Offenders			(b) Offenders		
	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)
Length of Service	.060	.009	.110	.015	.020	.020
Job Satis- faction	-.001	.009	-.002	-.030	.023	-.036
Attitude Toward Blacks	-.034	.009	-.059	-.001	.020	-.001
Constant	1.10	.043		1.486	.108	
	R = .128	R^2 = .016	N = 3886	R = .044	R^2 = .002	N = 1367

unimpressive. None of the factors has much of an impact at all, least of all racial attitude. This is primarily due to the fact that racial attitudes, as seen in Table 6.30, have little effect on the tendency for behavior toward offenders to deviate from a neutral manner. Rather, for this particular combination of policemen and citizens, racial attitude has a very weak effect of the sort expected across the negative side of the scale, countered by the strong tendency of favorably disposed white officers to treat black offenders harshly.

Effort

It is in the area of police effort that the three individual difference measures as a group exert their greatest impact. Table 6.35 presents the results of two ordinary least squares analyses employing length of service, job satisfaction, and policeman's race as explanatory variables and the average number of contacts initiated by an officer per tour of duty and the observer's rating of how the officer used his free time as dependent variables.

The power of these predictive models is notably higher than in the previous analyses, with R^2's indicating something over 5% of the variance explained in each case. This result, while not anticipated, makes some sense. With formal and informal actions toward citizens as the dependent variables, individual differences must compete with a complex array of situational factors, the configuration of which can shift from encounter to encounter. (The effects of these

Table 6.35

Regression of Initiation of Contacts and Aggressiveness of Patrolling on Individual Difference Measures

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable					
	Initiation of Contact			Aggressiveness of Patrolling		
	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)	Regression Coefficient (b)	Standard Error (S_b)	Standardized Regression Coefficient (β)
Length of Service	-.149	.047	-.148	-.275	.045	-.176
Job Satisfaction	-.006	.052	-.005	.158	.050	.091
Policeman's Race	.421	.106	.184	.281	.096	.083
Constant	.671	.256		2.787	.243	
	R = .234	R^2 = .055	N = 452	R = .230	R^2 = .053	N = 1186

factors are the topic of the next chapter.) But with these depen-
dent variables, because they are both general descriptions of be-
havior cumulated over a tour or a series of tours of duty, the effects
of particular situational factors have already been randomized out
and therefore individual differences can emerge more clearly in the
absence of the "noise." In other words, it is not surprising that
experiential and verbal traits correlate more highly with behavioral
traits than with specific behaviors.

As would be expected given the greater predictive power of
these models, the effects of each of the individual differences are
also stronger than in the preceding analyses—and again the modest
effects noted in the bivariate analyses stand up in the face of
controls for the other variables. Length of service retains its
impact, with the unstandardized coefficient in the contact model
indicating that the most experienced officers initiate contacts with
citizens about one-half time less often per tour of duty than the
least experienced officers. The standardized coefficients for length
of service show this factor to have a slightly greater effect on the
use of free time.

The greatest difference is observed in the comparison of rates
of contact across racial groups. Even after length of service, in
particular, is held constant, black officers still contact citizens
about .4 more times per tour of duty than white officers. They also
use their free time more aggressively, as shown by the .28 shift along
the patrolling continuum associated with the difference in race. The

failure of the standardized coefficients for race to achieve larger

values—though the .18 level attained here does stand out among the

other results observed—is attributable to the small number of black

officers observed. When only a few officers are black, it is im-

possible for the racial variable to exert any great impact on the

dependent variable.

Although the length of time an officer has served and his race

independently influence how hard he works, these results indicate,

his feelings of satisfaction with his job play a lesser role. Job

satisfaction appears to have no effect whatsoever on rates of con-

tact and only a slight influence on the use of free time. The latter

influence, it turns out, stems from the powerful impact which job

satisfaction has within a particular organizational context (as will

be seen in Chapter VIII). In general, however, these results are

consistent with the already substantial body of evidence that worker

morale has little or no influence on productivity.

The results of the multiple regression analyses, taken as a

whole, offer little cause to modify any of the conclusions derived

from the bivariate analyses. Rather, they simply buttress the

evidence seen there that individual characteristics have only slight

effects on all facets of police behavior with evidence that, even

taken all together, individual differences exert only subtle influ-

ences on the behavior of policemen and that the effects observed in

the bivariate analyses are separate ones.

Overall, then, it appears that the primary expectation with respect to individual differences developed in Chapter III has been borne out—characteristics of individuals and measures of psychological traits and attitudes show relatively little relationship to behavior. Even when several characteristics and attitudes are introduced simultaneously, the proportions of variance accounted for remain very low.

Advocates of individual difference explanations can find some hope in these results—the variables do occasionally have a modest impact and their failure to have a greater impact can, to some degree, be attributed to the weakness with which they are measured and the lack of variance in them. But advocates of alternative explanations can also justifiably contend that, given their limited explanatory potency, too much attention has been lavished on individual differences. That may indeed be the case. However, the work described in Chapter III suggests that the book on individual differences cannot be closed until their impact in differing organizational and situational contexts has been explored. That also being the case, a more definitive conclusion about their role must await the analyses of Chapters VIII and IX.

Footnotes for Chapter VI

1. Arthur Niederhoffer, <u>Behind the Shield</u> (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 239-240, 246.

2. Ibid., p. 10.

3. The data presented here, and all the other data describing the characteristics and attitudes of the police officers to be presented, were obtained from the on-the-job interviews conducted by the observers and then aggregated across interviews by assigning to each officer for each individual factor his mean score on that characteristic across all the rides on which he was interviewed and gave a response, in accordance with the general rationale described in Chapter IV.

   In practice, the application of this procedure presents a number of problems. The first is that the number of policemen from whom information was obtained is, for certain variables—not all of which will be used in this analysis—rather low. The following table includes the number of officers, out of 589, from whom information on each of these variables was obtained. The second problem is that the attempt to randomize out

Variable	Number of Officers With One or More Responses	Number of Officers With Two or More Responses	Eta-Square
Length of Service	581	333	.83
Political Position	203	64	.58
Attitude Toward Blacks	479	208	.51
Attitude Toward Superiors	457	197	.41
Satisfaction With Job	461	211	.38
Attitude Toward Courts	394	176	.33

extraneous influences on the expressions of opinion by averaging across interviews, as proposed in Chapter IV, runs afoul of the relatively small number of officers from whom information was obtained on more than one occasion. Only for the relatively easy question of how long the officer has served were multiple responses obtained from a majority of cases. For other items, multiple responses from about a third of the officers were a more typical result.

The remaining problems have to do with assessing the amount of stability in these expressions of attitudes and with the results of that assessment. When constructing an index which is to measure a concept, one seeks assurance that the separate pieces of information which enter into that index all do indeed reflect the same thing. In the case of cross-sectional data, for example, one correlates together the various items proposed to enter into the scale and hopes that they will correlate highly with one another, thereby suggesting an underlying communality. In the case of data obtained over time, one correlates responses to similar stimuli given at different times and expects a high correlation, on the grounds that that indicates a stable underlying structure. Here the attempt to assess stability runs into several difficulties. First, as already noted, relatively few officers give more than one response to each question. Thus, for most of the cases, there is nothing to correlate over time. Second, the usual procedure of assessing stability by correlating a t_1 response with a t_2 response confronts the problems that, for any individual policeman, there may be anywhere from zero to ten responses and that the time intervals between responses may vary greatly. For example, one policeman's two responses might be separated by hours while another's might be separated by weeks. These difficulties make the implementation and interpretation of a conventional test-retest check for reliability extremely difficult.

The strategy adopted here borrows a leaf from the book of the psychologists whose work is discussed in Chapter III. If persons were completely inconsistent in their responses, a one-way analysis of variance which treated the individual as the independent variable would find the within sum-of-squares to be equal to the total sum-of-squares and eta-square to be equal to zero. On the other hand, if individuals were perfectly consistent, the within sum-of-squares would be zero, the between sum-of-squares and the total sum-of-squares would be equal and eta-square would be equal to one. The table above reports eta-square for each of the variables, based, of course, on all cases for which two or more responses were obtained. As might be expected, length of service is the most stable of all the variables, but the rest fall far short of it in consistency.

These results do not instill much confidence in these measures as representations of stable underlying attitudes. Certainly they leave open the possibility that the tests of hypotheses relating these variables to behavior will fail because of faulty measurement in the former. But they do show at least some consistency and, considering the conditions under which they were obtained, that gives at least some cause for optimism.

4. The task of relating individual characteristics of policemen to their actions is, at this and successive points in the analysis, complicated by the fact that the original observation schedules do not call on the observer to attribute every action to a particular officer when he records the activity of a multiple-man patrol, but rather sometimes only ask what actions "the police" took. Among the actions treated in this way are arrests, ticketing, and the writing of reports.

One way of getting around this problem would be to examine these actions only for encounters in which just one policeman was involved—the actions taken there could be only his—and to generalize from them. The problems with this are that, as can be seen in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, tours of duty, encounters, and interactions involving only one policeman are far less common than those involving two or more and that, as will be seen in Chapter IX, what goes on in an encounter with two policemen may differ from what goes on in an encounter involving only one policeman. Generalization, in other words, would be from an atypical context and from one in which there is some reason to believe that relationships do differ.

Another alternative would be to regard the characteristics of each of the policemen as separate influences on their joint action. Then they could be entered into a multiple regression equation as independent variables simultaneously determining behavior. This approach runs afoul of the problem that the characteristics of policemen who serve together are often similar—for instance, they may have served on the force about the same length of time or they may have influenced each other to develop similar attitudes. Since the correlations between partners' characteristics are often just as strong as the correlations between the dependent variables and the independent variables, the resultant coefficients are quite unstable. The solution employed here is to take the averages of characteristics across partners and use these values as independent variables. Though this procedure may wash out some important variance in the independent variables, it does have the virtues of logic and simplicity in its favor.

5. Figure 6.2, it should be noted, includes all offenders. It might be thought that the relationship seen there is only the result of older policemen being more lenient with trivial offenses. Such is not the case. Even for the "real" crimes alone (felonies and misdemeanors), the relationship persists—as the following figure shows.

Percentage of Offenders Arrested in Felony and Misdemeanor Cases

50 —

44.7

40 —

40.2   36.8

30 —
                        24.2

20 —   Tau-b = -.083

0 —

| 0-2 Years | 2-8 Years | 8-15 Years | 15 + Years |

Length of Service

6. The origins of this segregation of black officers from white citizens are of some interest. One possibility is that it is a self-imposed one, with black officers reluctant to contact white citizens. But the evidence suggests instead that it is the result of departmental deployment practices. The following table shows the racial composition of the patrol contingent observed in each of the eight precincts. Black

City	Boston			Chicago		
Precinct	Dorchester (White)	Roxbury (Black)	Total	Fillmore (Black)	Town Hall (White)	Total
Race of Officers						
White	100.0%	93.6%	96.0%	71.5%	100.0%	83.6%
Black	0.0	6.4	4.0	28.5	0.0	16.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	56	94	150	124	91	215

City	Washington					Grand
Precinct	Prec. 6 (White)	Prec. 10 (Black)	Prec. 13 (Black)	Prec. 14 (Black)	Total	Total
Race of Officers						
White	89.1%	85.7%	66.7%	73.7%	79.2%	85.1%
Black	10.9	14.3	33.3	26.3	20.8	14.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	46	71	48	59	224	589

officers are evidently assigned just to black precincts. They thus seldom contact whites because they are assigned to areas with few whites in them. Whether this pattern of assignment emanates from a desire on the part of departments to concentrate their black officers in the areas where they think they will do the most good—the black areas—or from a desire to avoid the tensions that might result if white citizens were policed by black officers cannot be determined from these data.

This pattern of assignment and the resultant imbalance of the racial composition of the citizenry contacted by white and black officers prompt two other comments. First, a potentially fascinating interaction situation—white citizens, from the dominant racial group in a subordinate position to black policemen, from the subordinate racial group—cannot effectively be studied, simply because it occurs so infrequently. Second, as the above table shows, only a small proportion of all the black officers observed (6 out of 87, to be exact) were on the Boston force and more than half were on the Washington force. Therefore, general assertions about the effects of the race of the policeman necessarily reflect more the situations in Washington and, to a lesser extent, Chicago and scarcely at all that in Boston.

7. The distributions of racial opinions presented in Table 6.27 differ from those presented in Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss's, Jr., original analysis—"Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions," in U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas, Field Surveys III, Vol. II, Section 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 135—because of the differences in the ways in which scores for each individual on the variable were calculated. Black and Reiss do not describe how they combined different scores from each individual across rides into a single score. The figures shown here result from the averaging process described in Footnote 3.

8. A logical implication of this explanation—and therefore a test of its validity—is that such a tendency would be strongest in a department where this process of redefinition had been most successful. The expectation therefore would be that this tendency for positive racial attitudes to be translated into neutral behavior should be greatest in the most professional department and weakest in the least professional department—which, in the case of these data, translates into Chicago and Boston, respectively. This is, as will be seen in Chapter VIII, an expectation that is borne out.

9. See Arthur S. Goldberger, <u>Econometric Theory</u> (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 235-236, 248-251. I thank Lee Muhlenkort Luskin and Robert Luskin for their advice on the implementation of this procedure.

10. Because the coefficients express changes in a probability, they are necessarily numerically small. Further, the relatively weak relationships observed in some of the preceding bivariate tables also presage small values. The problem then is to distinguish between the small but meaningful and the inconsequential. Following a traditional statistical rule of thumb, coefficients will be regarded as sufficiently stable to warrant interpretation when their magnitude exceeds twice their standard error. One circumstance in which this criterion cannot be mechanically applied, though, is with coefficients on pairs of variables where one is the square of the other—the technique that has been used to capture curvilinear relationships. Here the resultant multicollinearity between the members of the pair has the effect of inflating the standard error for both of the variables in the pair. In these situations, additional information—for example, results from comparable regression equations in which the squared terms were omitted and evidence on the overall amount of change described by the pair of coefficients— has been used to arrive at a judgment of whether or not a variable has a noteworthy effect.

11. These assessments of shifts in the probability of being arrested and others like them later on in the analysis can most straightforwardly be derived with a simple substitution of the various possible values for the independent variable into the estimated equation. For example, where length of service is X_1 and arrest Y, the relationship between arrest and length of service (leaving aside the effects of other variables) is described by the function

$$Y = \ldots + .066X_1 - .020\, X_1^2 \ldots$$

Therefore, Y varies with X across the range of X_1 in the following way:

X_1	Y
1	.046
2	.052
3	.018
4	-.056

The intercept and other independent variables can be ignored here because the concern is not with the actual value of Y, but with how Y changes as X_1 changes. Thus, with successive

unit changes in X_1, Y increases by .006 and then falls by .034 and .074. More formally, the change in the dependent variable can be traced by taking the partial derivative of Y with respect to X_1 so that

$$\frac{\partial Y}{\partial X_1} = .066 - .04 \, X_1$$

and the exact slope of Y on X_1 can be calculated for any value of X_1.

12. A possible problem here is that relationships between individual factors and behavior might arise because of correlations of individual factors and behavior with characteristics of areas. That is, certain kinds of officers—younger officers, black officers, more prejudiced officers—might be assigned to higher crime areas and higher crime areas might also be expected to engender higher arrest rates. The obvious solution is to control for the character of the area. That, however, has already been accomplished by the decision of the original investigators to study primarily high crime areas. Thus differences in the character of the areas are not likely responsible for the relationships observed here.

Further, if these relationships are the results of differences in the kinds of places to which officers are assigned, given the racial segregation of the areas studied by Reiss, looking at treatment within racial groups tends to hold place constant. The persistence of the effects of length of service and attitude toward blacks in Table 6.32, where only the treatment of black citizens is involved, thus also suggests that the character of the place is not responsible for these relationships.

CHAPTER VII

THE IMPACT OF SITUATIONS

Situational explanations of police behavior tie police actions to the particular features of the circumstances in which policemen confront citizens. Because situations can differ from one another in a myriad of ways, it is necessary for analytic purposes to single out only a few of the dimensions along which they can vary. The divisions employed here are those identified in Chapter II as underlying much of the situational analysis of police behavior: the legal features of the situation; the observable characteristics of the persons the policeman confronts in the situation; the behavior of the persons confronted; and, finally, the simple physical and social setting within which police and citizens meet.

The specific legal features to be analyzed here are the seriousness of the offense alleged and the quality of the evidence that an offense has been committed. The citizen characteristics treated include, in addition to the race of the citizen (discussed in the previous chapter), the class, the sex, and the age of the citizen. Citizen behaviors examined are the citizen's emotional state, his manner toward the policeman, and, in the case of a complainant, his expression of a preference regarding the disposition of an offender or the writing of a report. Facets of the physical and social setting—henceforth referred to as structural factors—to be examined are the visibility of the interaction to the police organization,

to peers, and to the public, and, in some instances, the relation-
ship between the complainant and the offender.

This scheme of general categories and specific variables is
by no means an ideal one. Perhaps the most glaring shortcoming is
that so much of the nuance in what transpires between police and
citizen is missing. Potentially important factors such as those
mentioned in Chapter II—the expectations that policemen have about
a place, the social standards that the place evokes—and others that
have not yet been mentioned—the size and apparent strength of the
citizen, for example—are neglected entirely. Other factors, such
as the threat or danger a policeman perceives in a place can be
gotten at only indirectly, through some of the factors already cited—
for instance, the hostility of the citizen or the presence of a part-
ner. These omissions occur because this is a secondary analysis of
data gathered by investigators whose interests differed from mine
and because these factors are, in any case, difficult to measure.

Another question might be raised about the assignment of speci-
fic variables to general categories. The neat conceptual distinc-
tions made here undoubtedly blur in the eyes of the policeman on
the beat. His past experiences, personal and vicarious, may cause
him to regard citizen characteristics as legally relevant. If, for
example, he has come to believe that black complainants are less
likely to show up at court proceedings or less likely to give credi-
ble testimony, he may understandably, if not properly, adjust his
assessment of the quality of the evidence for the fact that it comes

from a black person. His past experiences may also lead him to anticipate certain kinds of behavior from certain kinds of people. This linkage has received the most attention in Skolnick's account of the "symbolic assailant."[1] Thus the distinction between who a person is and how the person acts—or can be expected to act—can be a fuzzy one.[2] However, though problems arise in categorizing specific variables according to this scheme, especially if an attempt is made to recreate the policeman's mental construction of the situation, the scheme does constitute a reasonably exclusive and exhaustive one at the conceptual level.

The final question involves the adequacy of the measures them-selves. All of them, of course, are based on the reports of the single observer present in each encounter. In virtually every case, the situational variables are simply the observer's characterization of the setting on continua or checklists in the observation schedule devised by the original investigators. For example, the observer could characterize the citizen's race as "1) White; 2) Negro; 3) Other" or his manner toward the police as "1) Very deferential; 2) Civil; 3) Antagonistic; 4) Don't know." The only exceptions to this are for the measures of the legal seriousness of the offense, the quality of the evidence, the preference of the complainant, and the relationship between the complainant and the offender, in which cases the coders were called upon to survey the observer's entire report and come to a simple characterization of what had happened, and for class, in which case a composite measure was constructed from the observer's estimates of the citizen's class, income, and speech.

Regardless of whether the situational factor is operational-
ized by the observer's direct report or the coder's reformulation
of it, the accuracy with which it is measured obviously depends
heavily on the skill of the observer. This constitutes an important
qualification because the observers were called upon to record a
considerable amount of information—each observation schedule filled
a fifty-page booklet—and to make a large number of difficult judg-
ments about what the characteristics of the situation actually were.
Determining what the offense was—or even who the offender was—
could often be difficult tasks. Ascertaining with any precision
the age or class or the demeanor of a citizen would also, in some
situations, not be easy. Add to all this the fact that the observers
were asked, in order to diminish the effects of their presence on
the officers, to hold out on writing down as much of their descrip-
tion as they could until after the tour of duty was completed.

These ambiguities and pressures open the door to the construc-
tion of consistency between situational factors and police behavior
by observers. Following the line of argument suggested by the
psychologists cited in Chapter III regarding the construction by
observers of consistencies between individual traits or attitudes
and behavior, it seems likely that observers may sometimes shift their
perceptions of a situation to bring them into line with the behavior
they see. For example, an observer may tend to regard the hostility
of an offender as somewhat more clear-cut if the offender is arrested
than if he is not. Given the possibilities for error in the

measurement of these situational factors—stemming, in brief, from the pressures to remember and record large amounts of information, from the difficulties in making judgments about situations from ambiguous evidence, and from the possibilities for constructed consistency between situations and behavior—the findings reported in the following pages must be accepted with some reserve.

Because of the complexities involved in assessing the impact of each of a large number of situational factors, the focus in this chapter will narrow to a somewhat more limited range of police behavior. The entire category of effort will be omitted here because the measures of this dimension of behavior are not defined at the level of specific situations.[3] Traffic offenses will also be ignored here, due to their small number and the lack of variation among them along the situational dimensions in question. That leaves as topics for analysis the impact of situational factors on the two other aspects of formal behavior—arrest and the writing of official reports—and the single measure of informal behavior—the manner of the policeman toward the citizen.

Effects on Formal Behavior

Legal Characteristics

The official actions of the police are, as authoritative decisions of the state, supposed to respond to the features of situations identified by the law as determinative of whether or not the

legal process should be invoked. The key elements identified by the law are the character of the offense which is alleged to have occurred—here treated in terms of the seriousness of the offense— and the credibility of the evidence that the alleged offense has occurred—here treated in terms of the source of the evidence. In general, it would be expected that the more serious the offense alleged and the more credible the evidence that it has occurred, the more likely it is that the legal process will be invoked.

As noted in Chapter II, Black has carefully examined these two hypotheses. In his analysis of the arrest decision, he finds that felony suspects are somewhat more likely to be arrested than misdemeanor suspects and that suspects implicated by police witnessing of an offense are more likely to be arrested than suspects implicated by the testimony of other citizens.[4] His analysis of report writing similarly shows that invocation of the legal process occurs more frequently in felony cases than in misdemeanor cases. No assessment of the impact of evidence on the reporting of crimes is made because observers were not called upon to describe the character of the evidence in situations in which no offender was present.[5]

A potential problem with Black's analysis is his restriction of it to a very limited range of situations. Justifiably concerned that extraneous factors will confound relationships between police actions and the independent variables in which he is interested, he confines his analyses to very small subsets of the data in order to control for as many of these factors as possible. For example, in

his study of arrest, he excludes all non-criminal encounters—
everything except felonies and misdemeanors—all encounters stemming
from citizen field and station mobilizations, all encounters in-
volving suspects of mixed race or mixed social class status, and all
encounters with suspects less than eighteen years old or of white
collar status. The end result is, as he acknowledges, an analysis
based on only about 5% out of 5713 incidents.[6] Though such a con-
cern with internal validity is admirable, such a severe restriction
leads to serious concern about the external validity of the results.
The representativeness of the remaining cases is, after such an
extensive winnowing, suspect.

A preferable strategy—one that would maintain internal validity
without exacting such a heavy toll on external validity—would be
to examine all the pertinent cases to see whether or not basic
relationships exist in the first place and then to impose controls
to see whether or not each persists when other factors are held
constant. In order to avoid the attrition in cases inevitable with
control by subsetting, statistical control of the sort performed by
the multiple regression technique would be most appropriate. That
is the strategy employed here.

Table 7.1 assesses the simple effect of the seriousness of the
offense—across all gradations of offense, both legal and non-
legal—on the arrest of offenders. In general, the more serious the
offense is, the more likely that the offender will be taken to the
station. It is important to note that the relationship is by no
means a perfect one. These data reiterate Black's point that

Table 7.1

Arrest by Type of Offense

			Type of Offense					
Disposition of Offender	Suspicious Person	Juvenile Trouble	Disputes & Disturbances	Traffic	Misdemeanor	Felony	Other	Total
Arrested	4.0%	6.8%	3.2%	13.0%	34.9%	56.9%	11.7%	17.9%
Released	96.0	93.2	96.8	87.0	65.1	43.1	88.3	82.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	109	542	468	470	602	195	214	2591

substantial numbers of people who "ought" to be arrested are not—note the relatively low proportion of suspected felons and misdemeanants taken in. They also reveal what his analysis does not—that noteworthy percentages of people who are not suspected of a felony or misdemeanor are also taken in. This, of course, suggests that some citizens are taken in for reasons that have more to do with other aspects of the situation than with its legal characteristics. A similar pattern emerges for the writing of reports (Table 7.2). Again, even the allegation of a fairly serious crime is no assurance that a report will be written.

In subsequent analyses, seriousness of offense will be recoded as a four-category dimension, in which all offenses that are not felonies, misdemeanors, or traffic violations are grouped into a single "non-criminal" category. This has been done to allow seriousness of offense to be treated as an ordinal variable and is premised on the assumption that, while it may be hard to say that "juvenile

Table 7.2

Official Reports Written for Complainants, by
Type of Offense

| | | | Type of Offense | | | | | |
Disposition	Suspicious Person	Juvenile Trouble	Disputes & Disturbances	Traffic	Misdemeanor	Felony	Other	Total
Report Written	3.3%	15.8%	4.8%	24.6%	48.7%	62.4%	35.0%	40.5%
Report Not Written	96.7	84.2	95.2	75.4	51.3	37.6	65.0	59.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n	61	158	147	69	340	510	329	1664

trouble" is less serious than a "suspicious person" incident, it
is nevertheless easier to argue that they are both alike in being
less serious than a felony, misdemeanor, or traffic offense.

The impact of the second legal factor bearing on formal dis-
position of a suspect—the character of the evidence that a crime
has been committed—can be considered only once the seriousness of
the offense has been taken into account. This is so because, under
the law, the strength of evidence required to support an arrest
differs depending on the seriousness of the alleged offense. An
officer can generally arrest a suspect when he has "reasonable
cause" to believe that a felony has been committed. The reasonable
cause standard is met when the officer himself witnesses the com-
mission of a felony, when a citizen reports to him the commission

of a felony, or when he encounters any other reasonable evidence that a felony has been committed. In the case of misdemeanors (which includes most traffic offenses), the standard for arrest is more stringent. Generally the officer himself must witness the act or obtain a properly sworn complaint from a citizen who witnessed the act if he is to make an arrest for it. Neither citizen testimony nor reasonable evidence of such an offense is sufficient.[7]

Table 7.3 presents arrest rates for offenders according to the type of evidence incriminating them by seriousness of offense. In general, the rates observed are congruent with what would be expected given the legal criteria. Arrest rates are lowest when there is no evidence of an offense and highest in the three felony categories in which the reasonable cause requirement is met. Arrests for misdemeanors are also noticeably more frequent when officers themselves observe the offense than when other evidence is available.

However, there is also much that is unexpected in these results. Reasonable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a felony by no means insures arrest. In fact, only about two-thirds of offenders in such situations are taken in—underenforcement of the law at its most extreme. The same can be said of misdemeanants whose acts are witnessed by the police—here only two in five go to the station. And it is surprising to see that, for the least serious categories of "offense," being observed in an offense by the police is less incriminating than citizen testimony. The other side of the coin is the significant proportion of those arrested in situations

Table 7.3

Percentage of Offenders Arrested, by Seriousness of Offense
and Type of Evidence

Type of Evidence	Seriousness of Offense				
	Non-Criminal	Traffic	Misdemeanor	Felony	Total
None	1.9	6.6	5.0	4.5	2.5
N	587	61	20	22	690
Citizen Testimony	14.5	16.7	23.5	57.7	27.1
N	145	6	132	78	361
Reasonable Evidence	9.1	20.0	25.0	82.9	29.1
N	77	15	52	35	179
Police Witness	4.8	13.8	41.4	72.3	22.4
N	357	384	384	47	1172
Total	4.8	13.1	34.7	59.9	17.9
N	1166	466	588	182	2402

where legal considerations would not seem to warrant it—the mis-demeanants and non-criminal offenders (including traffic offenses) not observed by the police in the commission of an offense. Though the underenforcement of the law has been a consistent theme in the police literature—a literature which has in general focused on criminal offenses—these data raise the possibility of a region of "overenforcement." Police discretion, it appears, can cut both ways.

This evidence that the police arrest, in some circumstances, less often than would be expected and, in others, more often than would be expected leaves open the question of what causes their decisions to deviate from legal guidelines. The preceding chapters

have already provided some answers. But the deviations observed here seem substantial enough that organizational and individual factors are unlikely to be able to account for them. Therefore, these results provide an additional justification for an exploration of the impact which the non-legal characteristics of situations have on formal outcomes.

Citizen Characteristics

Notions that the formal outcomes which accrue to citizens depend on their characteristics are, as discussed in Chapter II, commonplace in the literature on the police. The most commonplace of the commonplace, the hypothesis that the race of the citizen has an impact on the treatment the police give him has already been examined and provisionally accepted in Chapter VI. But other characteristics—class, sex, and age—merit attention both because they have been identified as potentially important factors in their own right and because at least one of them may possibly play a confounding role in the observed relationship between the citizen's race and the police's treatment of him.

The impact of the offender's class—which has been, as noted in Chapter II, a long-standing concern of students of the police—can be seen in Table 7.4a. Lower class citizens run nearly 2 1/2 times the risk of arrest that middle-class citizens do—a result consistent with criticism of the police running back to Engels. The unexpectedly high arrest rate for upper-class offenders is probably due to chance

Table 7.4

Arrest, by Characteristics of Offender

(a) <u>Class</u>

Disposition	Lower	Middle	Upper	Total
Arrested	23.0%	9.7%	18.2%	18.4%
Released	77.0	90.3	81.8	81.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1605	844	22	2471

Tau-b = -.158

(b) <u>Sex</u>

	Male	Female	Total
Arrested	19.4%	12.4%	18.2%
Released	80.6	87.6	81.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	2145	443	2588

Tau-b = .068

(c) <u>Age</u>

	0-10	10-18	18-25	25-45	45-60	60 or More	Total
Arrested	9.3%	12.5%	22.0%	20.2%	21.6%	32.6%	18.2%
Released	90.7	87.5	78.0	79.8	78.4	67.4	81.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	118	771	540	830	287	46	2592

Tau-b = -.093

fluctuation, since it rests on a base of only 22 cases. At least in the neighborhoods studied, the police very infrequently come into contact with upper-class offenders and fairly infrequently come into contact even with middle-class offenders.

As discussed in Chapter II, sex and age have received perhaps more attention than any other citizen characteristics save class and race. Rubinstein's description of police reluctance to arrest or even stop female offenders receives some support from Table 7.4b. The percentages reveal that female offenders are taken in slightly less often than male offenders. And the marginals of the independent variable indicate that police contact relatively few female offenders. Women, in fact, constitute only 17% of all offenders, whereas they constitute roughly one-half of the total population. This could be in part the result of the misgivings about dealing with women which Rubinstein describes. However, given that the police themselves did not initiate contact in the vast majority of encounters observed in the course of this study, the greater part of this differential can probably be attributed to lower levels of offense among women.

Age appears as well to condition the chances of arrest (Table 7.4c). The young and the very young are taken in less often than are adults. The high rate among the oldest may be attributable to the imprecision of a percentage based on such a small number of cases. The age relationship observed here is in general consistent with Wilson's assertion that juveniles are less often handled by formal invocation of the legal process than are adults.

Police decisions about whether or not to write official reports seem also to be affected by these citizen characteristics, although here, of course, it is the characteristics of the complainant, rather than those of the offender, to which the officer responds. (The analysis is again confined to felony and misdemeanor cases in which no offender is present, for the reasons described in Chapter V.) Race's effect was discussed in the previous chapter. Class shows a substantial relationship, coinciding with Wilson's suggestion that policemen view the complaints of the less well-off as less legitimate than the complaints of the better-off (Table 7.5a).[8] Officers respond with official reports less often for women than for men (Table 7.5b). And policemen do, in general, take formal action more frequently on the basis of complaints from older citizens than from younger citizens (Table 7.5c). Children ten and under appear to deviate from this pattern, but that may reflect the small number of very young complainants rather than any real difference.

Citizen Behavior

If formal actions seem to respond in good measure to the outward characteristics of the citizen, they appear to respond as well to the behavior of the citizen. Foremost among all facets of the citizen's behavior, occurring either before or after the arrival of the police, is the behavior which casts him into the situation—whether, for example, he is committing an offense or complaining about an offense or just walking by. This is what has been, in Black's and Reiss's analyses and in this analysis, described as the

Table 7.5

Reporting, by Characteristics of Complainant

(a) Class

Disposition	Lower	Middle	Upper	Total
Report Written	48.7%	62.4%	78.9%	56.3%
Report Not Written	51.3	37.6	21.1	43.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	415	447	19	881

Tau-b = -.149

(b) Sex

	Male	Female	Total
Report Written	60.0%	51.6%	56.4%
Report Not Written	40.0	48.4	43.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	517	382	899

Tau-b = .084

(c) Age

	0-10	10-18	18-25	25-45	45-60	60 or More	Total
Report Written	66.7%	51.5%	59.8%	58.7%	63.9%	65.4%	60.2%
Report Not Written	33.3	48.5	40.2	41.3	36.1	34.6	39.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	18	66	117	397	180	52	830

Tau-b = -.041

role of the citizen—a description which treats the action as a characteristic. The conceptual point to be made here is that role is better understood, not as a characteristic of the person, but as a description of his behavior. In the case of these data, however, it is difficult to capitalize on this distinction in examining arrest because specific data on whether or not an individual was taken to the station were recorded only if the individual was an offender. Thus this aspect of behavior cannot really be treated as an independent variable because information on the dependent variable is available only for those in one category of the independent variable.[9]

Aspects of behavior which can be addressed, however, include the citizen's emotional state—whether he was agitated, calm, or detached—and his general manner toward the policeman—whether he was deferential, civil, or antagonistic. Table 7.6a suggests that the emotional state of the offender has a considerable effect. Offenders who get excited are arrested about twice as often as offenders who remain calm. And it is also noteworthy that, for those few offenders (about 5%) who project an air of detachment from the proceedings, arrests exceed those for the calm. Police seem to respond unfavorably to deviations from the norm of any kind, be they ones of excessive emotion or excessive "cool." In view of the oft-cited desire of a policeman to "take charge" of a situation, it is not surprising that threats to his control, whether from a person who cannot be controlled because he is overly excited or a person who cannot

Table 7.6

Arrest, by Citizen Behavior

(a) Emotional State of Offender

Disposition	Agitated	Calm	Detached	Total
Arrested	27.6%	13.0%	20.4%	18.1%
Released	72.4	87.0	79.6	81.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	812	1597	142	2551

Tau-b = .144

(b) Manner of Offender

	Deferential	Civil	Antagonistic	Total
Arrested	17.2%	14.8%	33.3%	18.3%
Released	82.8	85.2	66.7	81.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	268	1764	433	2465

Tau-b = -.134

(c) Preference of Complainant

	No Arrest	Unclear	Arrest	Total
Arrested	2.8%	22.9%	52.4%	21.1%
Released	97.2	77.1	47.6	78.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	360	415	187	962

Tau-b = -.406

be controlled because he refuses to attach himself to the situation and the officer's authority in it, evoke legal sanctions.

The literature discussed in Chapter II identifies the offender's demeanor toward the police as a crucial factor in determining whether or not he will be arrested. The data in Table 7.6b bear this out with a vengeance. While less than a seventh of offenders responding in civil fashion to the police are taken into custody, a third of the antagonistic are. Hostility toward the implementers of the law begets the sanctions of the law. In addition, like the pattern for emotional state, deferential behavior by the offender provides no refuge from the invocation of sanctions—a slightly larger propor- tion of the deferential than of the civil are taken in. Discussing this, Black suggests that offenders may defer to the police in the hope that it will get them off the hook or as a means of subtly ridiculing the police.[10] In the first instance, perhaps unexpectedly, and in the second instance, not surprisingly, the strategy proves counter-productive.

Another aspect of citizen behavior which has been related to formal outcomes for the offender is the preference for action, if any, expressed by the complainant. As noted in Chapter II, LaFave and Wilson emphasize the role which this factor may play and Black provides evidence of the factor's impact. Table 7.6c re-emphasizes the considerable influence which the complainant's preference exerts. When complainants indicate to the police that they want matters handled informally, without an arrest, the police in virtually every

instance—97% of the time—comply. When complainants give no indication of what they want done with the offender and thus leave it up to the police, the offender is taken in more often, but still less than a quarter of the time. When complainants lobby with the police for an arrest (which, the marginals reveal, happens fairly infrequently), however, the police more often than not take the offender to the station.

The findings which Black reports for a narrower context, then, appear to hold up for a broader context as well and the remarks which he makes about the "radically democratic" character of police work and the attendant damage to "uniform standards of justice" grow in their import. At the same time, it must be recognized that this compliance with complainants' wishes is, at least in practical terms, not inappropriate. If a complainant prefers that an arrest not be made, there is little point in the officer going ahead, because a reluctant complainant is unlikely to press charges or show up and testify in court later on. In view of these considerations and the possibility that an arrest is viewed by a policeman more as work than as sanction, the proclivity of policemen to forego an arrest when the opportunity presents itself is not surprising.

The complainant's behavior might also be expected to play an important role in determining whether or not reports of crime are written up in the absence of an offender. The complainant's emotional state appears to have an impact, with the agitated and the very few who are detached less likely to have reports written than the calm (Table 7.7a). On the other hand, a deferential manner redounds

Table 7.7

Reporting, by Citizen Behavior

(a) Emotional State of Complainant

Disposition	Agitated	Calm	Detached	Total
Report Written	47.0%	62.5%	36.4%	56.4%
Report Not Written	53.0	37.5	63.6	43.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	334	549	11	894

Tau-b = -.136

(b) Manner of Complainant

	Deferential	Civil	Antagonistic	Total
Report Written	69.3%	54.1%	38.1%	56.3%
Report Not Written	30.7	45.9	61.9	43.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	153	710	21	884

Tau-b = .127

(c) Complainant's Preference

	Unofficial Action	Unclear	Official Action	Total
Report Written	13.3%	71.9%	66.0%	60.9%
Report Not Written	86.7	28.1	34.0	39.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	113	313	382	808

Tau-b = -.207

to the benefit of the complainant and an antagonistic one to his disadvantage, as Table 7.7b shows. Officers respond more favorably to deference from complainants than to deference from offenders, perhaps because deference is a behavior that they see as appropriate for the former and inappropriate for the latter. Just as was the case for arrest, the complainant's preference again exerts much sway over the writing of reports. Table 7.7c demonstrates that the police seldom—only 13.3% of the time—write a report when the complainant favors an informal disposition and more often than not—66% of the time—do when the complainant favors a formal one. The higher rate of reporting when the complainant's preference is unclear, however, poses a puzzle. That officers should lean in the direction of reporting out of a desire to cover themselves is understandable; that this should lead them to report more often than they do when a citizen favors official action must stand as an anomaly.

Structural Characteristics

A final set of factors to which police actions have been posited to respond includes the physical and social setting in which the interaction with citizens occurs. A potentially significant social factor is the relationship between the complainant and the offender. Black suggests that increasing social distance between the two should lead to higher arrest rates since, in proximate social relations, other non-legal mechanisms can operate as sanctions. He finds this relationship to hold for felonies, but not misdemeanors.[11] Taking

all offenses together, arrest rates are, as might be expected, highest when the participants are strangers, but the margin over situations in which participants are from the same family is inconsequential and the latter rate is well above that for situations in which participants are merely friends and acquaintances (Table 7.8a). Therefore, the social distance hypothesis appears to have little validity as an explanation for police behavior in general.

The discussion of the other aspects of the physical and social setting in Chapter II concluded with the assertion that a primary rationale for expecting that these other factors would have an impact on behavior was that they affected the visibility of the police officer's actions to potentially pertinent audiences. The conclusion of social psychologists—discussed in Chapter III—that the social situation or "the sentiments and the acts of others in the immediate situation" will have an effect on behavior similarly points to the need to consider who is watching the behvaior. Therefore, the strategy underlying the following analysis is to assess the effects of these structural factors primarily in terms of their consequences for the visibility of police actions to three distinct audiences—the public, the police organization, and the policeman's peers, specifically, his partner.

The inside-outside distinction raised in Chapter II, which conditions visibility to the public and, via the public, to the department, might be expected to have some impact on the severity of police action. Officers might deal more harshly with offenders in private

Table 7.8

Arrest, by Structural Characteristics

	(a) Relationship between Complainant & Offender			
Disposition	Family	Friends	Stranger	Total
Arrested	21.2%	13.9%	21.8%	19.8%
Released	78.9	86.1	78.2	80.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	570	380	794	1744

Tau-b = -.017

	(b) Publicity of Setting			
	Private	Mixed	Public	Total
Arrested	18.6%	18.1%	18.0%	18.1%
Released	81.4	81.9	82.0	81.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	457	476	1614	2547

Tau-b = .005

	(c) Number of Citizens Present					
	One	Two	3 to 4	5 to 10	11 or More	Total
Arrested	23.0%	18.5%	16.6%	13.7%	24.0%	18.3%
Released	77.0	81.5	83.4	86.3	76.0	81.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	287	367	715	706	513	2588

Tau-b = -.004

	(d) Type of Mobilization		
	Citizen-Invoked	Police-Invoked	Total
Arrested	17.7%	19.5%	18.2%
Released	82.3	80.5	81.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1905	723	2628

Tau-b = .020

	(e) Number of Officers		
	One	Two	Total
Arrested	12.5%	20.5%	18.2%
Released	87.5	79.5	81.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	752	1876	2628

Tau-b = -.094

settings, where their actions are hidden from the public's eyes than in public ones or, alternatively, they might act more harshly in public settings where the maintenance of their image is more at stake. Unfortunately, this simple distinction seems to bear no relationship to arrest whatsoever (Table 7.8b).

However, the failure of this hypothesis may rest more with the measure of the independent variable than with the hypothesis itself. Just because an action occurs in a public place does not mean that it is visible to the public—a street is a public place, for instance, but if it is a residential street at 2 a.m., what transpires there may be of relatively low visibility to the public. Therefore, a more direct way of getting at visibility to the public is to employ the number of people actually present. With this measure, Table 7.8c reveals, public visibility does influence the formal actions of the police. Offenders alone run a higher risk of being arrested. With increasing numbers of spectators, up to ten, arrests decline. But offenders encountered in the presence of an audience larger than ten are also quite likely to be arrested. This pattern may represent the strategic disadvantage of the lone offender initially being offset by the presence of others, but ultimately being renewed by the desire of the offender to appear "in charge" before the public, as Bittner's discussion, cited in Chapter II, suggests.

Though the visibility of an incident to the public is often determined essentially by chance, the visibility of an incident to the police organization or to peers is the result of departmental

policy. In the case of visibility to the police organization, departments can, as discussed earlier, determine through policy decisions the balance of less visible police-initiated contacts and more visible citizen-initiated contacts. Black and Reiss's consistent attention to this factor suggests that it may have considerable impact on formal actions. Yet, as Table 7.8d indicates, the distinction makes little difference for arrest rates, since offenders in police-initiated contacts are only marginally more likely to be taken to the station than those in citizen-initiated contacts.

Another departmental decision which may affect the structure of the situation is the choice the department makes between one-man and two-man patrols.[12] Implicit in the logic of advocates of both one-man and two-man patrols (discussed in Chapter II) is the idea that two-man patrols will be more aggressive in their enforcement of the law than one-man patrols. Thus two-man patrols might be expected to take offenders in more often than one-man patrols. This, in fact, turns out to be the case (Table 7.8e). While 21% of all offenders who confront two men are arrested, only 13% of all offenders who confront one man are. Whether this should be viewed as the result of reticence on the part of a single officer or over-aggressiveness on the part of officers working together is more a question of semantics than a question of evidence. What is clear, however, is that an offender who is confronted by a team runs a higher risk of being taken in than an offender who is confronted by a single officer.

These structural characteristics might also be expected to influence the writing of reports. Clearly—and unlike what is seen with arrest—the social distance between the complainant and the offender plays a role (Table 7.9a). The greater the social distance, the more likely a report is to issue from the incident. As might be expected, the major difference is between when the antagonist is known and unknown. When the offender is family or friend, reports result only about a quarter or a third of the time, respectively. When the offender is a stranger, on the other hand, officers are twice as likely to write a report. This again demonstrates how the police handle conflicts in public disputes and leave the resolution of private ones to familial and peer mechanisms. Visibility to peers—visibility to organization is an invariate factor here because all interactions which involve complainants are necessarily citizen-invoked—as measured by whether it is a one-man or a two-man patrol, also affects invocation via report (Table 7.9b). But here the difference is in the direction of a single officer being more likely to write up an incident than two officers working together—perhaps because, without a partner to talk to and generally being assigned to quieter precincts, the single officer has little else to do. Exposure of the interaction to the public, Tables 7.9c and d indicate, has no effect at all on report writing.

Table 7.9

Reporting, by Structural Characteristics

(a) Relationship between Complainant & Offender

Disposition	Family	Friends	Stranger	Total
Report Written	22.8%	34.7%	65.9%	56.8%
Report Not Written	77.2	65.3	34.1	43.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	57	118	499	674

Tau-b = -.307

(b) Number of Policemen

	One	Two	Total
Report Written	60.9%	54.5%	56.4%
Report Not Written	39.1	45.5	43.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	271	629	900

Tau-b = .059

(c) Publicity of Setting

	Private	Mixed	Public	Total
Report Written	53.7%	60.2%	56.7%	56.3%
Report Not Written	46.3	39.8	43.3	43.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	367	226	293	886

Tau-b = -.028

(d) Number of Citizens Present

	One	Two	3 to 4	5 to 10	10 or more	Total
Report Written	56.7%	55.1%	58.5%	55.3%	58.3%	56.7%
Report Not Written	43.3	44.9	41.5	44.7	41.7	43.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	268	243	195	103	84	893

Tau-b = -.007

Multivariate Models of Situational
Effects on Formal Behavior

The preceding pages have documented the simple relationships
between police decisions regarding the invocation of the legal pro-
cess and a broad range of situational factors. They represent an
advance beyond previous analyses of this sort—and the previous
analysis of this data—in the extent of the data base employed and
in the wide array of determinative factors examined. However, even
the methodologically unschooled will by this point have asked the
crucial question of whether all the relationships observed thus far
are each the independent effect of the particular situational factor
or whether perhaps at least some of them are the spurious results
of some of the other real effects. There remains to be implemented,
that is, a remedy for the problem posed by the interrelationships
between the various independent variables—interrelationships which,
as mentioned earlier, threaten the internal validity of all these
results.

The threat arises because it is theoretically plausible to
expect that there will be relationships between these independent
variables and because the empirical evidence substantiates these
expectations. A wide variety of factors might be expected to relate
to the seriousness of the offense and do, in reality, turn out to
be—for example, race ($r = .09$, with blacks more often involved in
serious offenses), class ($r = -.09$, with higher-class people less
often involved in serious offenses), and manner toward the policeman

(r = .12, with serious offenders more likely to be antagonistic to the police—the stakes are, after all, higher for them).[13] Female offenders are somewhat more likely to become excited than male offenders (r = -.09), and complainants are more likely to ask that they not be taken in (r = -.09). And, as might be expected, race correlates substantially with class (r = -.36).

Perhaps most surprising, the race of the offender bears a significant relationship (r = .38) to the number of officers on the contacting team. Police administrators' practice of assigning two-man patrols to high crime areas (see Footnote 12) has the effect, because high-crime areas tend to be black areas, of pitting the black offender against two patrolmen and the white offender against one patrolman. Similarly, the class of the offender is also related (r = -.25) to the number of patrolmen he meets, since middle-class people tend to contact the police in the lower-crime areas policed by lone officers.

Excited offenders tend to be more antagonistic than detached ones (r = -.19) and offenders tend to be more detached the greater the social distance between them and the complainant (r = .20). However, there is no relationship between the number of policemen and the antagonism of the offender. This suggests that neither those who favor two-man patrols because they may dissuade offenders from resistance nor those who oppose them because they may incite offenders to hostile reactions stand on firm empirical ground. Finally, as might be expected, the more serious the offense, the more likely the complainant is to ask the police to take the offender in (r = .30).

As discussed earlier, the strategy adopted to guard against unwarranted inferences about the impact of each of the situational factors is multiple regression analysis—an appropriate choice because each coefficient describes the effect of the associated variable on the dependent variable when all the other variables in the equation are held constant. The dichotomous character of the dependent variables and the resultant heteroscedasticity of the error term again necessitate the use of the generalized least squares technique described in the previous chapter. As was the case there, the coefficients for the independent variables are straightforwardly interpretable as the change in the probability of the legal process being invoked, via arrest or report, for a one-unit change in the independent variable, holding all other factors constant. The R^2 summarizes the predictive power of all the variables taken together.

Table 7.10 presents the results of a multiple regression analysis of the impact of situational factors on the chances that an offender will be arrested.[14] The results show that some of the factors which appear to have significant effects when viewed individually turn out, once other factors are taken into account, to be of little consequence. Some of the relationships observed up to this point are, in other words, either purely or partially spurious. In order to demonstrate the effects of the variables, particularly those for which the coefficients describe curvilinear relationships, the table also shows the changes in the probability of arrest associated with a shift from one category of each independent variable to the next.

Table 7.10

Regression of Arrest on Situational Factors

Variable	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error	Change in Percentage of Offenders Arrested with Shift from One Category to the Next	Total Shift Across Scale
Legal Characteristics			Non-Criminal Traffic Misdemeanor Felony	
Seriousness	.130	.010	+ 13% + 13% + 13%	39%
			None Citizen Reasonable Police	
Evidence	.006	.004	+ .6% + .6% +.6%	1.8%
Citizen Characteristics			White Black	
Race	.021	.011	+ 2.1%	2.1%
			Lower Middle Upper	
Class	-.027	.010	- 2.7%	-2.7%
			Male Female	
Sex			- 3.9%	-3.9%
			0-10 10-18 18-25 25-45 45-60 60+	
Age	-.010	.003	-.8% - .6% - .4% - .3% - .1%	-2.2%
(Age)²	.001	.003		
Citizen Behavior			Agitated Calm Detached	
Emotional State	-.031	.095	- 2.8% - 2.6%	-5.4%
(State)²	.001	.012		
			Deferential Civil Antagonistic	
Manner and	-.114	.052	- 2.1% + 4.1%	+2.0%
(Manner)²	.031	.013		
			No Arrest Unclear Arrest	
Comp. Pref.	.056	.011	+ 5.6% + 5.6%	+11.2%
Structural Factors			Private Mixed Public	
Publicity	-.009	.005	- .9% - .9%	-1.8%
			One Two 3 to 4 5 to 10 11+	
Number of			- 2.0% + 0.0% + 2.0% + 4.0%	+4.0%
Citizens &	-.050	.024		
(Citizens)²	.010	.004		
Mobilization			Citizen-Invoked Police-Invoked	
			+ 2.3%	+2.3%
			One Two	
Number of	-.036	.011	- 3.6%	-3.6%
Policemen				
Constant	.136	.098		

R = .502   R² = .252   N = 1917

*Too few cases to extrapolate

Seriousness of offense retains almost all of its impact on
the dependent variable, even after the imposition of controls for
a variety of potentially confounding factors. The .13 coefficient
for this factor—greater than that for any other—reveals it to be
the primary determinant of whether or not an offender is taken in.
This, if not surprising, is at least reassuring—the heavy concentra-
tion in much of the police literature on non-legal factors has per-
haps tended to obscure the important role which the law plays in
police arrest decisions. The overall impact of this factor is best
demonstrated by the shift in the percentage of arrests associated
with a shift from the least serious "offenses" (non-criminal ones)
to the most serious offenses (felonies)—nearly 40%, which is far
greater than that for any other variable. The other legal factor,
the character of the evidence, turns out to have no significant inde-
pendent impact on arrest rates at all.

The substantial inter-racial and inter-class differences observed
in Tables 6.13 and 7.4(a) prove to be primarily the results of other
factors. The 9% difference between whites and blacks and the 13%
difference between lower-class and middle-class people diminish
sharply with the imposition of controls for other factors. The long-
standing controversy over whether it is race or class that is the
more important factor is resolved by evidence that neither of them
makes much difference once other factors are held constant, though
class does appear to be slightly more important, given its marginally

larger and more stable coefficient. The -.039 coefficient for sex indicates, on the other hand, that the 7% difference in arrest rates observed in Table 7.4(b) stands up reasonably well. The set of coefficients for age reveals that, rather than any real increase over the life-span—such as appeared to be the case from Table 7.4(c)—arrest rates are essentially constant across age cohorts.

The strong influence exerted by the emotional state of the offender (seen in Table 7.6[a]) wanes in the face of controls. The set of coefficients for this factor reveals that the excited's chances of being arrested are only about 3% greater than those of the calm and that a slightly smaller gap separates the calm from the detached. Perhaps most significantly, the apparently heightened chances of arrest for the detached observed in Table 7.6(a) disappear completely, indicating that they stem from the influence of other factors.[15]

In one of the most obvious departures from what was observed in the bivariate tables, the impact of the offender's manner toward the policeman is diminished considerably by the imposition of controls. Though the 2% differential between the deferential and the civil observed in Table 7.6(b) holds up, the 19% differential between the civil and the antagonistic fades to about 4%. Much of the difference in the treatment of those who are civil to the police and those who are hostile, this suggests, is due to, not the manner of the offender, but the fact that offenders of certain kinds and in certain situations are both more likely to be hostile to the police and more likely to be arrested. Though the manner of the offender

has been a major focus in the study of the determinants of arrest, these results suggest that it may be more a reflection of the other features of the situation than a determinant of the outcome.

The preference of the complainant endures as a factor of consequence. The 11% shift in the probability of arrest from one end of the scale to the other is greater than that for any other variable except the seriousness of the offense. And, in fact, this figure is somewhat attenuated because it represents the impact of the complainant's preference averaged across all incidents, even those in which a complainant was not present.[16] When analysis is confined to only those cases in which a complainant was actually present, this coefficient rises considerably—in one model roughly comparable to this one, to more than .15. In that narrower subset of cases, in fact, its influence is of about the same magnitude as the seriousness of the offense.

Among structural factors, the distinction between private and public places proves to have no effect on arrest, as might be expected on the basis of the bivariate table (Table 7.8[b]). The non-linear effect of the number of citizens seen in Table 7.8(c) persists, even if in somewhat muted form. An offender confronting the police alone is slightly more likely to be arrested than one in the presence of a few others, but the presence of more observers boosts the chances of arrest, even after other situational factors have been partialled out. A modicum of visibility to the public appears to exert some restraint on the officer, but wider exposure—as some authorities on

the police have argued—increases the chances that he will invoke his authority.

Mobilization, which in the bivariate tables showed remarkably little relationship to arrest, profits not at all from the imposition of controls. Though it might be thought that a control for seriousness would cause this relationship to blossom—because, for example, offenses in police-invoked encounters might be less serious on average than offenses in citizen-invoked encounters—no such phenomenon occurs. The chances of arrest in the two types of mobilization situations remain virtually identical.

The effect of the presence of a partner, on the other hand, changes noticeably once controls are imposed. Table 7.8(e) showed the arrest rate for offenders confronting two-man patrols to exceed that for offenders confronting a single officer by about 8%. But the relationship reverses once the other variables are controlled for. Two-man patrols are less likely, by about 4%, to arrest an offender than an officer working alone. This suggests that the apparently higher rate of arrest by two-man patrols is the spurious result of differences in the kinds of people and situations that two-man patrols confront. In view of the commonly stated belief that officers working in teams can more easily, and thus are more willing to, make arrests, it is interesting to note that, ceteris paribus, officers on their own arrest more often. This raises serious questions about the cost-effectiveness of two-man patrols, for it suggests that, under a plan of single-officer deployment, not only could more patrol units be deployed, but also each unit might produce more arrests.

An important criterion in the evaluation of a model such as this one is its overall predictive power. The R^2 obtained here, .25, indicates a moderate predictive capability. However, it must be remembered that this level of strength is achieved with twelve independent variables. With that in mind, it must be regarded as relatively unimpressive. Although it substantially exceeds the explanatory power of the comparable individual difference model described in the previous chapter, it demonstrates that attention to situational factors—at least those measured in this study—does not provide any panacea for the inability to account for large amounts of the variation in police behavior.[17]

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the results of a parallel analysis of the writing of reports in felony and misdemeanor situations where the offender is not available for arrest (Table 7.11). Here as well the overall predictive power of the set of situational factors yields an R^2 of only slightly more than 25%. The effects of individual situational characteristics do, however, differ from those observed for arrest. Seriousness of offense, which Table 7.2 indicated to have a considerable effect (with felonies reported at a rate 14% higher than that for misdemeanors), loses its potency in the face of controls. Felonies do not prove to be reported at a rate significantly higher than that for misdemeanors.

Among citizen characteristics, race and class retain their effect. Even after confounding factors are partialled out, reports are written about 8% less often for black complainants than for white complainants and about 9% less often for lower-class people than for middle-class

Table 7.11

Regression of Reporting on Situational Factors - Felonies
and Misdemeanors with Offenders Absent Only

Variable	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error	Change in Percentage of Reports Written with Shift from One Category to the Next			Total Shift Across Scale
Legal Characteristics						
Seriousness	.053	.033	Misdemeanor Felony + 5.3%			+5.3%
Citizen Characteristics						
Race	-.078	.032	White Black - 7.8%			-7.8%
Class	.087	.034	Lower Middle Upper + 8.7% *			+8.7%
Sex	-.004	.036	Male Female - .4%			- .4%
Age	-.014	.017	0-10 10-18 18-25 25-45 45-60 60+ - 1.4% - 1.4% -1.4% - 1.4% - 1.4%			-7.0%
Citizen Behavior						
Emotional State	.058	.036	Agitated Calm Detached + 5.8% *			+5.8%
Manner	-.141	.036	Deferential Civil Antagonistic - 14.1% - 14.1%			-28.2%
Comp. Pref.	1:050	.164	Unofficial Unclear Official + 42% + 0%			+42%
& (Comp. Pref.)²	-.210	.039				
Structural Characteristics						
Relationship	.096	.028	Family Friends Stranger + 9.6% + 9.6%			+19.2%
Publicity	-.060	.020	Private Mixed Public - 6.0% - 6.0%			-12.0%
Number of Citizens	.016	.013	One Two 3 to 4 5 to 10 11 or more + 1.6% + 1.6% + 1.6% + 1.6%			+6.4%
Number of Police	-.042	.036	One Two - 4.2%			-4.2%
Constant	-.676	.229				

$R = .512$ $R^2 = .262$ $N = 558$

*Too few cases to extrapolate

people. These results convincingly support the contention of some
critics that the police take the complaints of black and lower-class
people less seriously than those of white and upper-class people.
Neither the citizen's sex nor age retains any noteworthy impact.

The behavior of the complainant definitely conditions the pro-
bability that a report will be written. Though the citizen's emo-
tional state does not have an independent impact of any consequence,
controls do nothing to diminish the influe..:e of the complainant's
manner toward the policeman. Just as in the bivariate table, antagon-
ism, as opposed to deference, reduces the chances that a report will
be written by nearly 30%. Further, the strong impact seen for the
complainant's expressed preference persists in very much the same form.
There is no difference between when the complainant is unclear about
what he wants and when he asks for official action. But a request
that the matter be handled informally lowers the percentage of reports
written by more than 40%. This demonstrates that the complainant
really does, for all practical purposes, wield a veto over the intro-
duction of cases into the legal process via the reporting mechanism.

Among structural differences, the substantial impact of social
distance diminishes somewhat, but it nevertheless remains a signifi-
cant influence. The private-public dimension exerts a far greater
effect than was apparent from the bivariate table, with reports quite
a bit more likely to issue from private settings than from public ones.
That this stems more from the character of the place than from actual
visibility to the public is indicated by the failure of the actual

number of citizens present to exert any noteworthy effect. The coefficient for the number of officers is only slightly smaller than what would be expected on the basis of Table 7.9(b), but the relatively large size of the standard error raises a serious question about its stability. Thus any firm conclusion that reporting rates (like arresting rates) are lower for two-officer teams cannot be supported by these data.

These multiple regression analyses describe, probably more effectively than any other available technique, the true impact of a wide variety of situational factors on police decisions to invoke the legal process. The principal points of convergence are the major role which the complainant's preference plays—when the complainant is present, of course—and the more modest effects of the citizen's class and manner. The persistent effects of the complainant's preference, both for arrest and reporting, serve to underscore the questions about "democratic" law enforcement that Black raised on the basis of his examination of a narrower body of evidence. The lesser effects observed for class tend to confirm the long-standing hypothesis that police actions favor both upper-class offenders and upper-class complainants. The consistent effects observed for manner support the very plausible hypothesis that the formal actions of the police respond in some measure to the way in which people treat them.

The principal points of divergence are the greater effect which the seriousness of the offense has on invocation via arrest, compared

with invocation via reporting, and the generally larger effects
which such non-legal factors as race, class, manner, and complain-
ant's preference have on reporting. Indeed, it is this inverse
relationship in the importance of legal and non-legal factors between
the two types of decisions that produces R^2s that are about equal.
One reason for the smaller impact of seriousness on reporting is
undoubtedly the restriction of that analysis to felony and misdemeanor
cases only. This has the effect of reducing variance in the indepen-
dent variable and thereby reducing the influence it can have on the
dependent variable. But the greater absolute impact of the non-legal
factors on reporting suggests that the difference is not just a
methodological artifact. Rather, the pattern may reflect differences
in the visibility and the importance of the two types of decision.
An arrest is a more visible and important kind of act because it
presses an obligation on the legal process—to handle in some fashion
the person brought in—and because it unquestionably disrupts the
routine of the individual brought in. A report, on the other hand,
is less visible and less important, because it typically simply enters
the bureaucratic paper flow and frequently has no direct effect on
anyone. The reduced visibility and importance of the report, relative
to arrest, therefore may provide the officer with a wider range of
discretion, and this he may use by paying less heed to legal factors
and more attention to the characteristics and behavior of the citizens
involved.

Effects on Informal Behavior

Since the formal actions of the police—arresting and report-
ing—gain their significance primarily because they constitute the
actions by which values are authoritatively allocated, the analysis
of the impact of situational factors on formal actions rightly
focused on those groups for whom values were being allocated—offen-
ders and complainants. The informal actions of the police acquire
their significance both because of the way in which they allocate
values—even if more subtle ones—and because they may redound on
the support which citizens give to their government. Since any citi-
zen who comes into contact with the police may be affected in either
of these ways, the analysis of the impact of situational factors on
informal actions must be broadened to encompass, not just the cen-
tral figures of complainant and offender, but all the kinds of
citizens who come into contact with the police.

However, although this broader focus is justifiable—and, indeed,
essential—on theoretical grounds, it nevertheless spawns an element
of complication in the analysis. On theoretical grounds, it would
seem desirable simply to examine the relationships, for all citizens,
between each of the situational factors previously identified and
the informal treatment of the citizen. But the practical problem
is that to do so would be to ignore the possibility and, in some
instances, the very plausible expectation that the relationship be-
tween the factor and the treatment will differ depending on the role
the citizen plays in the situation. For example, while it might make

sense to posit that more convincing evidence of an offense would
cause the police to treat an offender more negatively, it would
make little sense to posit that the relationship would hold as well
for the victim of a crime—indeed, the opposite relationship might
be expected.

These considerations point in the direction of hypothesizing
different types of relationships between each of the situational
factors and informal treatment for each of the citizen roles. Yet
that would lead to an almost impossibly complicated summary model.
An approach that is simpler, yet admits some possibility of such
interactions, is to employ instead the simple role distinction drawn
previously—between offenders and non-offenders. That is the path
taken here.

This approach has the additional advantage of alleviating the
problems caused the analysis by the considerable difference in the
amount of variance in the policeman's manner toward offenders and
non-offenders—a phenomenon noted at the beginning of Chapter V.
Without a division into offenders and non-offenders, it would be
impossible to determine whether the greater variance in the treatment
of offenders stems from a greater sensitivity to situational factors
and necessary to make the complicated methodological adjustments
appropriate to a situation of heteroscedasticity.

Legal Characteristics

The impact of seriousness of offense provides an immediate
example in which it is important to distinguish between offenders

and non-offenders. For offenders, it would seem reasonable to anticipate that, under a "punishment" rationale, the police might be inclined to treat more harshly those who have committed more serious offenses. On the other hand, under an "importance" rationale, it might make sense that the police would deal more cautiously and neutrally with more serious offenders. Under either hypothesis, friendly treatment ought to decline with increasingly serious offenses. For non-offenders, it would again seem plausible that the police would be more inclined to "play it straight" in situations that involved more serious offenses.

Table 7.12.1a suggests that both of the posited mechanisms are at work for offenders. Friendly treatment does indeed decline steadily—from 18% to 8%—with increases in the seriousness of offense. Setting aside traffic offenses, the proportion of neutral and negative behaviors also climbs slightly with increases in the seriousness of offense. Thus it seems plausible to conclude that officers feel some impetus to treat offenders with greater care, but express some of their disapproval toward more serious offenders as well.

The disjuncture in the pattern caused by traffic offenses is, on reflection, not hard to understand. They are, more than any other police function, pro forma bureaucratic encounters in which the policeman may adopt a ministerial manner in order to deflect the citizen's resentment at having been caught. Wilson, in fact, specifically notes the "ministerial quality" of traffic law

Table 7.12

Manner of Policeman toward Citizen by Legal Characteristics —by Citizen's Role and Total

(1) Seriousness

Manner	(a) Offender					(b) Non-Offender					(c) Total				
	Non-Cr.	Traffic	Misdem.	Felony	Total	Non-Cr.	Traffic	Misdem.	Felony	Total	Non-Cr.	Traffic	Misdem.	Felony	Total
Very Negative	2.5%	2.0%	3.6%	1.9%	2.7%	.7%	0.0%	.5%	.1%	.5%	1.1%	1.5%	1.6%	.3%	1.1%
Negative	25.4	12.0	28.6	31.4	24.5	5.2	1.1	6.2	3.7	4.9	10.5	6.3	13.6	7.4	10.3
Neutral	54.4	72.3	55.8	58.4	58.2	75.9	82.6	80.9	85.1	79.3	70.3	78.3	73.0	81.9	73.6
Positive	17.6	13.7	11.9	8.4	14.6	18.2	16.3	12.4	11.1	15.4	18.1	13.9	11.8	10.4	15.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1782	656	1014	322	3774	5572	559	2199	2234	10564	8031	1481	3590	2644	15746
	Tau-b = -.061					Tau-b = -.055					Tau-b = -.051				

(2) Quality of Evidence

Manner	(a) Offender					(b) Non-Offender					(c) Total				
	None	Citizen	Reason-able	Police	Total	None	Citizen	Reason-able	Police	Total	None	Citizen	Reason-able	Police	Total
Very Negative	2.4%	2.0%	3.8%	3.2%	2.8%	.5%	.5%	.8%	.3%	.5%	.8%	1.1%	1.8%	2.2%	1.2%
Negative	16.1	26.5	28.4	28.7	24.3	4.5	6.7	7.0	5.0	4.8	6.1	14.3	16.7	19.5	10.1
Neutral	60.8	57.8	59.9	55.1	57.7	78.1	84.2	84.7	82.8	79.2	75.4	74.9	73.5	65.9	73.4
Positive	20.7	13.7	7.9	13.1	15.2	16.9	8.6	7.5	11.9	15.5	17.7	9.7	8.0	12.3	15.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1242	593	292	1745	3872	8452	915	359	909	10635	10492	1719	773	3264	16248
	Tau-b = -.121					Tau-b = -.072					Tau-b = -.164				

enforcement, writing that "in traffic work the idealized concep-
tion and the courtroom conception of law enforcement operates:
the law is impersonally applied to easily ascertained infractions
under circumstances such that the norms of individual culpability
and equality can be observed."[18] For non-offenders (Table 7.12.1b)
the hypothesized pattern of increasing impersonality is also borne
out, with traffic offenses again deviating from the pattern—and
probably for the same reasons as in the case of offenders.

The character of evidence might be expected to influence the
treatment of offenders, with the police dealing more harshly with
those more clearly implicated in wrong-doing. Such a pattern does
emerge, with offenders against whom no evidence is available treated
negatively about 19% of the time and offenders against whom evidence
is available treated negatively about 30% of the time. There is no
reason to expect that this factor should exert any effect on the
treatment of non-offenders and, as the percentages in Table 7.12.2b
show, it does not.

Citizen Characteristics

Race has already been shown to exert primarily a constraining
effect on the behavior of policemen, with black citizens handled
in a more impersonal fashion than white citizens (Tables 6.17 and
6.18). In the case of class, two competing hypotheses can be advanced.
One, following along the Marxist line that "a worker who falls into
the hands of the police is immediately treated in a nasty and bru-
tal fashion" (cited in Chapter I), would suggest that lower-class

people will be treated with a more negative manner than higher-class people. The other, following Banton's suggestion of an impersonal manner with the socially superior and a familiar one with the socially inferior, would suggest increasingly neutral behavior, the higher the class of the citizen. Table 7.13.1 shows that, taking all citizens together, the general trend is for higher-class people to be treated more positively—supporting the first of the two hypotheses. This is a pattern, the partial tables show, which holds regardless of the role the citizen plays.

Rubinstein implies that policemen will be more cautious with women, especially women offenders. Evidence from the observations provides some weak support for this (Table 7.13.2). Overall, women are treated somewhat more neutrally and slightly more positively than men. And, just as Rubinstein's discussion would lead one to expect, the difference is due to female offenders. While male and female non-offenders are treated almost identically, female offenders are treated negatively less often than men and neutrally and positively more often than men. Policemen, then, do not just avoid potentially provocative negative actions toward female offenders. Rather, they seem to bend over backwards in their treatment of them— to the extent that a female offender is treated positively at least as often as a female non-offender.

Popular stereotypes portray policemen as having a special affinity for small children and a special antipathy for adolescents. Wilson reports that policemen often employ informal sanctions instead of

Table 7.13

Manner of Policeman toward Citizen by Citizen Characteristics
— by Citizen's Role and Total

(1) Class

Manner	(a) Offender				(b) Non-Offender				(c) Total			
	Low	Middle	High	Total	Low	Middle	High	Total	Low	Middle	High	Total
Very Negative	2.9%	2.5%	0.0%	2.7%	.6%	.4%	0.0%	.5%	1.2%	.9%	1.1%	1.1%
Negative	25.7	19.5	21.9	23.8	5.3	4.6	2.1	5.0	11.3	8.3	5.3	10.2
Neutral	57.2	61.1	65.6	58.5	81.1	76.4	71.0	79.2	74.2	72.4	70.9	73.5
Positive	14.2	16.9	12.5	15.0	13.1	18.7	26.9	15.3	13.3	18.3	22.8	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	2635	1181	32	3848	6509	3870	145	10524	10205	5441	189	15835

Tau-b = .064   Tau-b = .076   Tau-b = .078

(2) Sex

Manner	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Very Negative	3.1%	1.0%	2.8%	.5%	.6%	.5%	1.4%	.7%	1.2%
Negative	25.2	18.4	24.1	4.9	4.8	4.9	12.6	6.5	10.3
Neutral	57.4	61.9	58.2	79.8	18.4	79.2	71.4	76.4	73.3
Positive	14.3	18.6	15.0	14.8	16.2	15.5	14.5	16.4	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	3300	678	3978	5695	5034	10729	9959	6260	16219

Tau-b = .077   Tau-b = .015   Tau-b = .077

Table 7.13 (Continued)

Manner of Policeman toward Citizen by Citizen Characteristics
— by Citizen's Role and Total

(3) Age

(a) Offenders

Manner	0-10	10-18	18-25	25-45	45-60	60 or More	Total
Very Negative	5.3%	2.9%	3.3%	2.0%	2.6%	3.0%	2.8%
Negative	8.3	37.3	21.4	17.7	22.7	19.7	24.2
Neutral	57.4	44.6	60.6	67.3	61.6	48.5	58.1
Positive	29.0	15.3	14.7	13.0	13.2	28.8	14.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	169	1121	842	1319	463	66	3980

Tau-b = .058

(b) Non-Offenders

Manner	0-10	10-18	18-25	25-45	45-60	60 or More	Total
Very Negative	.3%	1.0%	.2%	.4%	.6%	.7%	.5%
Negative	3.1	6.3	3.7	4.6	5.9	6.2	4.8
Neutral	66.9	78.2	81.3	82.2	78.7	75.5	79.3
Positive	29.6	14.5	14.8	12.8	14.8	17.6	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	958	1190	1060	4438	2013	580	10785

Tau-b = -.053

(c) Total

Manner	0-10	10-18	18-25	25-45	45-60	60 or More	Total
Very Negative	1.0%	2.0%	1.6%	.8%	.9%	.9%	1.2%
Negative	3.8	22.2	10.1	7.2	9.1	7.4	10.3
Neutral	66.5	60.9	73.9	79.2	75.1	73.2	73.4
Positive	28.7	14.9	14.3	12.8	14.8	18.5	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1250	2676	2821	6245	2635	660	16287

Tau-b = .016

formal ones in dealing with juvenile offenders.[19] Thus the relation-
ship between age and policeman's manner might be expected to look
something like this: overall, favorable treatment for the youngest
citizens (due primarily to friendliness with the youngest non-
offenders) followed by negative treatment for teenagers (due to
police hostility toward adolescent offenders) followed by a modera-
tion into neutral treatment toward older cohorts. The aggregated
table, for both offenders and non-offenders, follows this pattern
reasonably well, the primary divergence being an unexpected renais-
sance of favorable treatment toward the very oldest citizens
(Table 7.13.3).

However, the division of the citizenry by role produces some
unanticipated results. While non-offending children are indeed the
most favorably treated of any group, they are treated no better than
offending children. Apparently age overrides behavior among the
smallest children—and policemen do not, as Wilson intimates, "chew
out" the youngest offenders. The high rate of negative behavior
overall toward adolescents is due primarily to the high rate toward
adolescent offenders although, even among non-offenders, the adoles-
cent group is most likely to be treated negatively. This suggests
that police antipathy toward adolescents extends beyond offenders.
Finally, the higher rate of favorable treatment toward old people
occurs for both offenders and non-offenders, but is particularly
marked for old offenders. Whether this is due to the small number
of aged offenders or to a "soft spot" in the "police personality" is

hard to say, but it does suggest that growing old has some advantages—at least if you are growing old on the other side of the law!

It would be dangerous to infer too much from data gathered in such a limited setting, but it is nevertheless instructive to compare these trends in police treatment across age cohorts with trends in public evaluations of the police across age cohorts, which have been best documented by Easton and Dennis.[20] Such a comparison shows that positive treatment by the police and favorable attitudes toward the police are most common among the very youngest. Negative treatment and negative attitudes emerge during the adolescent years, but level off and then recede during adulthood.

This congruence suggests that attitudes toward authority may not be so much a reflection of a general orientation toward authority, as Easton and Dennis argue, as they are a response to experiences with the police. Neither may they be the result of the amount of contact with the police, as Easton and Dennis also suggest. Rather, differences in the actual character of police behavior toward different age groups—experience directly by some and vicariously by others in the cohort—might account for different attitudes. Small children and older people may evaluate the police favorably, not because they generally like authority, but because the police treat them well. Adolescents may dislike the police, not because they are hostile to authority in general, but because the police are hostile to them and their peers. These results, in other words, can be interpreted as an additional piece of evidence favoring an experientially based,

as opposed to a psychologically based, explanation for evaluations
of government.

Citizen Behavior

That the informal behavior of policemen responds to the behavior
citizens direct toward them is, as noted in Chapter II, a common
theme in the literature on the police. Overall, there appears to
be little relationship between the emotional state of the citizen
and how the policeman treats him, but the division by role reveals
two distinct patterns (Table 7.14.1). For non-offenders, excitement
is likely to elicit a negative response, while calmness and detach-
ment incline the officer toward more friendly or neutral responses.
For offenders, results resemble those for arrest: excitement in-
creases the likelihood of a negative response, but a detached manner
increases it even more—to a rate of nearly 42%. This again implies
that policemen are extremely sensitive to the failure of an offender
to acknowledge the dominance of the police officer in a situation.
In combination with the evidence on arrest, these data show that
policemen use both formal and informal means to maintain control over
a situation.

Antagonism toward the police understandably provokes antagonism
from the police (Table 7.14.2). Both overall and within each role
group, citizens who are antagonistic toward the police are treated
less well than citizens who are civil toward the police. Regardless
of the role the citizen plays, the less friendly he is in his dealings

Table 7.14

Manner of Policeman toward Citizen by Citizen's Behavior
— by Citizen's Role and Total

(1) Emotional State

Manner	(a) Offender				(b) Non-Offender				(c) Total			
	Agitated	Calm	Detached	Total	Agitated	Calm	Detached	Total	Agitated	Calm	Detached	Total
Very Negative	3.4%	2.3%	3.8%	2.7%	.7%	.4%	0.0%	.5%	1.5%	1.0%	1.3%	1.1%
Negative	27.2	21.1	35.1	24.1	9.3	2.9	3.8	4.9	14.8	8.1	10.9	10.3
Neutral	59.1	58.8	45.7	58.2	76.5	79.8	83.3	79.1	71.6	73.9	75.2	73.3
Positive	10.4	17.7	12.4	15.0	13.4	16.8	12.9	15.5	12.2	17.1	12.5	15.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1311	2412	210	3933	3255	6724	743	10722	4891	10177	1078	16146

$Tau\text{-}b = .058$ $Tau\text{-}b = .076$ $Tau\text{-}b = .077$

(2) Citizen's Manner

Manner	Deferential	Civil	Antagonistic	Total	Deferential	Civil	Antagonistic	Total	Deferential	Civil	Antagonistic	Total
Very Negative	3.6%	1.5%	6.3%	2.6%	0.0%	.5%	2.3%	.5%	.8%	.8%	4.9%	1.1%
Negative	20.7	20.8	38.9	24.1	4.5	4.3	25.1	5.0	8.9	8.1	36.0	10.4
Neutral	54.9	61.6	48.9	58.3	66.7	81.0	63.9	78.7	63.3	76.4	52.6	72.9
Positive	20.9	16.5	5.8	15.0	28.8	14.2	8.7	15.8	27.1	14.7	6.5	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	421	2708	709	3838	1254	8720	346	10320	1815	12523	1235	15573

$Tau\text{-}b = -.170$ $Tau\text{-}b = -.149$ $Tau\text{-}b = -.190$

with the police, the less friendly the police will be toward him—
witness the 27% incidence of negative behavior toward antagonistic
non-offenders (relative to 6% overall) and the 45% incidence toward
offenders (relative to 27% overall). And there is a hint that
deference on the part of the offender is not productive—while the
civil offender is treated negatively 22% of the time, the deferen-
tial one is treated negatively a little more often, 24% of the time.

These relationships with emotional state and manner both point up
again what was seen in the case of arrest—a departure from what is
regarded as appropriate behavior in a situation, even if it is not
in the direction of hostility, can evoke a hostile response. They
also demonstrate the need to take the role the citizen plays into
account in understanding the effects which other situational vari-
ables have on police behavior. An act of deference which, coming
from a non-offender, is likely to increase the chances of a positive
response can, when coming from an offender, increase the chances of
a negative one.

Structural Characteristics

While citizen behavior has fairly substantial effects on police
behavior, the effects of the setting itself are less vivid. One key
dimension here is the visibility of the interaction to the public.
As discussed in Chapter II, Skolnick, Westley, and Bittner all con-
tend that policemen tend to act more harshly when their actions are
open to public view. Table 7.15.1 reveals this sort of difference

Table 7.15

Manner of Policeman toward Citizen by Structural Characteristics – by Citizen's Role and Total

(1) Publicity of Setting

Manner	(a) Offender				(b) Non-Offender				(c) Total			
	Private	Mixed	Public	Total	Private	Mixed	Public	Total	Private	Mixed	Public	Total
Very Negative	1.9%	2.5%	2.9%	2.6%	.8%	.3%	.4%	.5%	1.1%	.7%	1.3%	1.1%
Negative	19.8	24.0	26.1	24.5	4.6	4.1	5.8	4.9	7.1	8.5	13.4	10.3
Neutral	63.8	57.7	57.0	58.4	81.7	76.1	78.9	79.2	78.5	72.7	70.6	73.5
Positive	14.5	15.8	14.1	14.5	12.8	19.5	14.9	15.4	13.3	18.1	14.7	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	746	751	2379	3876	3873	2792	1951	10616	4934	3972	7317	16223

Tau-b = -.046   Tau-b = .013   Tau-b = -.045

(2) Number of Citizens

Manner	One	Two	3 to 4	5 to 10	10 or More	Total	One	Two	3 to 4	5 to 10	10 or More	Total	One	Two	3 to 4	5 to 10	10 or More	Total
Very Negative	4.3%	2.5%	1.9%	1.3%	4.5%	2.6%	.3%	.5%	.5%	.5%	.5%	.5%	1.5%	1.0%	1.0%	.8%	1.6%	1.1%
Negative	14.4	19.5	20.6	29.3	31.1	24.3	5.8	4.6	4.7	4.6	5.3	4.9	8.5	8.3	8.9	12.2	11.7	10.3
Neutral	62.4	63.4	64.4	52.6	50.8	58.2	77.5	79.2	78.8	79.7	79.6	79.2	72.7	75.4	75.3	71.3	72.5	73.4
Positive	18.9	14.6	13.1	16.7	13.6	15.0	16.4	15.7	16.0	15.1	14.6	15.5	17.3	15.4	14.9	15.7	14.2	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	417	563	1129	1053	800	3962	927	1611	3167	2557	2534	10796	1364	2309	4720	4109	3808	16310

Tau-b = -.087   Tau-b = -.013   Tau-b = -.035

Table 7.15 (Continued)

Manner of Policeman toward Citizen by Structural Characteristics – by Citizen's Role and Total

(3) Type of Mobilization

	(a) Offender			(b) Non-Offender			(c) Total		
Manner	Citizen-Invoked	Police-Invoked	Total	Citizen-Invoked	Police-Invoked	Total	Citizen-Invoked	Police-Invoked	Total
Very Negative	2.4%	3.7%	2.7%	.5%	.4%	.5%	.9%	2.8%	1.1%
Negative	22.9	28.0	24.3	4.9	3.7	4.9	9.0	19.2	10.2
Neutral	58.5	56.7	58.0	79.3	78.5	79.2	74.4	65.8	73.4
Positive	16.2	11.6	15.0	15.3	17.4	15.4	15.7	12.2	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	2950	1061	4011	10374	512	10886	14700	1980	16680
	Tau-b = -.073			Tau-b = .016			Tau-b = -.093		

(4) Number of Policemen

	One	Two	Total	One	Two	Total	One	Two	Total
Very Negative	1.9%	2.9%	2.7%	.6%	.5%	.5%	.9%	1.2%	1.1%
Negative	27.7	23.5	24.3	4.3	5.0	4.9	11.5	10.0	10.2
Neutral	48.6	60.1	58.0	70.8	81.0	79.2	64.4	75.3	73.4
Positive	21.8	13.4	15.0	24.2	13.6	15.4	23.1	13.6	15.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	740	3271	4011	1875	9011	10886	2914	13766	16680
	Tau-b = -.027			Tau-b = -.095			Tau-b = -.061		

between police behavior in public and private places and suggests
that it is stronger for offenders than for non-offenders.

However, just as in the case of arrest the number of citizens
proved to be a more discriminating measure of visibility to the pub-
lic, so also does it here (Table 7.15.2). While the relationship for
all citizens taken together is a weak one, this turns out to be the
product of a lack of any relationship at all for non-offenders and
a substantial one for offenders. The percentage of negative actions
toward offenders—19% when only the offender is present—increases
steadily and substantially as the size of the audience grows, reach-
ing a level roughly double the original percentage when ten or more
people are present. So policemen do indeed assert their authority
more forcefully when they have an audience, as the authors cited pre-
viously have argued. Maintaining one's image in the eyes of the
public appears often to override impulses toward professional, neu-
tral behavior. Note, however, the comparatively high rate at which
lone offenders are treated very negatively. The police do, in some
instances of low visibility to the public, seem to capitalize on the
opportunity to administer harsh treatment.

The effect of visibility to the police department, as operation-
alized by the way in which the police come to the situation, would
be adjudged considerable on the basis of the aggregated table (Table
7.15.3). Positive and neutral behaviors are somewhat less common
and negative and very negative behaviors more than twice as common
in the less visible police-invoked encounters as in the more visible

citizen-invoked encounters. An obvious explanation for this, how-
ever, is that the police are much more likely to encounter offenders—
whom they are inclined to treat negatively—in interactions they
initiate than in interactions initiated by citizens. A look at the
relationship for offenders and non-offenders separately shows this
to be the major reason for the relationship. For non-offenders,
behavior does not vary across invocation type. But the relationship
is not a purely spurious one because, for offenders, behavior in
police-invoked encounters is slightly more negative than in citizen-
invoked encounters. This may be because the lower visibility of the
police-invoked encounter allows the policeman greater latitude to
sanction the offender informally. An alternative explanation is that
the police must work harder to exert their authority over offenders
in situations where the offender sees that the policemen are pre-
sent out of their own volition, not because someone else has asked
them to be there.

The remaining structural characteristic is the presence or
absence of a partner, which determines both visibility to another
member of the police organization and the threat which an officer
may feel in a situation. In terms of visibility, it might be expect-
ed that an officer with a partner would conduct himself more properly,
out of a desire to retain the respect of his colleague and out of a
concern that his colleague might report back to other officers or the
police administration misconduct on his part—though the "blue code"
of silence generally makes the latter very unlikely. In terms of

threat, regardless of one's position in the one-man versus two-man patrol controversy, there seems to be a consensus that an officer alone has to rely more on his interpersonal skills than officers working in teams, who can rely more on threats and exertion of force. Table 7.15.4 shows that, both overall and within offender and non-offender categories, policemen in teams do tend to treat citizens more impersonally than officers working alone. This tends to sub-stantiate the "visibility" hypothesis. It is also clear, however, that officers working alone are more apt to adopt a friendly manner than officers working in pairs—something which might be expected under the threat hypothesis. At the same time, it is also the case that officers working in teams are not more likely to treat citizens harshly than officers working alone—evidence which runs counter to the arguments of opponents of two-man patrols.

These results suggest that, at least as far as informal treat-ment is concerned, there is little difference in the amount of nega-tive treatment between one- and two-man patrols. The choice, there-fore, may depend on what one's ideal of police behavior is. If one opts for a more friendly, support-engendering police department, then single-man patrols are a logical choice. If, on the other hand, one prefers a professional department—one which projects an image of ministerial, bureaucratic behavior—then two-man patrol units seem more likely to achieve that end.

Multivariate Models of Situational
Effects on Informal Behavior

The informal actions of the police, the last several pages have established, are related to a number of different situational characteristics. However, just as for formal actions, it is again necessary to determine whether all these relationships are real or whether some of them might be the spurious artifacts of inter-relationships between manner and other situational characteristics.

The technique used to accomplish this objective of simultaneous control, as well as to provide an indicator of the overall explana-tory power of the set of situational factors, is again multiple regression analysis. Because of the difference in the variances of treatment for offenders and non-offenders, because of the differ-ences in relationships between treatment and situational factors for offenders and non-offenders, and because of an interest in assessing the explanatory power of the situational factors for offenders and non-offenders separately, two parallel multiple regression analyses were performed—one for each group (Table 7.16).[21] Squared terms were included for citizen's age, emotional state, and manner toward the police in order to capture the non-linear effects with respect to these variables observed in the tables.[22]

Because the assignment of numeric values to the categories of the dependent variable, apart from ordering, is essentially arbi-trary—ranging from 1 (very negative) to 4 (positive), perhaps the most useful gauges of the effects of the various situational factors are the standardized regression coefficients.[23] Their interpretation

Table 7.16

Regression of Manner on Situational Characteristics, by Citizen Role

	Non-Offender			Offender		
Variable	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Regression Coefficient	Regression Coefficient	Standard Error	Standardized Regression Coefficient
Legal Characteristics						
Seriousness	-.013	.004	-.035	-.019	.013	-.029
Evidence	-.020	.006	-.038	-.035	.011	-.067
Citizen Characteristics						
Class	.040	.011	.044	.078	.027	.055
Race	-.040	.012	-.041	.064	.027	.046
Sex	.026	.011	.027	.159	.032	.085
Age	-.096	.018	-.259	.027	.056	.046
Age^2	.011	.003	.203	.001	.008	.010
Citizen Behavior						
State	.231	.048	.271	.500	.115	.406
State^2	-.050	.014	-.209	-.143	.032	-.409
Manner	.060	.062	.049	.395	.113	.313
Manner^2	-.071	.017	-.207	-.146	.027	-.491
Structural Characteristics						
Publicity	.009	.007	.016	.020	.017	.023
No. of Citizens	-.001	.004	-.003	-.046	.010	-.083
Mobilization	.054	.028	.023	-.121	.032	-.079
No. of Police	-.080	.015	-.064	-.122	.033	-.067
Constant	3.307	.089		2.440	.205	
R	.238			.317		
R^2	.057			.100		
N	7821 (Sampled)			3129		

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is complicated, however, by the squared terms which have been included to tap non-linear effects. The standardized coefficients are not particularly useful in interpreting the exact shape of the non-linear trend—the unstandardized coefficients delineate that most vividly—but the standardized coefficients for the first and second degree terms for each variable can be combined here to provide a useful indication of the overall impact of the variable. To be specific, the overall standardized impact of an independent variable in a multiple regression analysis which has been entered in both first and second degree terms can, in this instance, be approximated by taking the sum of the two standardized coefficients.[24]

Perhaps the most striking thing to be noted about the standardized coefficients for the legal characteristics for both offenders and non-offenders is their small size. Even though the percentage differences in Table 7.12 are not great, the weakness of the impact of these factors after other factors are controlled for comes as something of a surprise. Clearly, the legal features of a situation have little influence on the informal actions of the policeman—a striking contrast to the considerable influence which they exert over arrest, for example. (The difference in the impact of these legal factors, along with complainant's preference, and perhaps a smaller amount of measurement error in the more easily observed, and hence more accurate, dichotomous formal decision variables are probably the primary reasons for the greater explanatory power of the formal behavior models, as compared to the informal behavior models.) The

only relationship which deviates to any degree from this pattern is
that between the character of the evidence and the treatment of
offenders. The beta of -.067 indicates that the tendency of the
police to treat more harshly offenders against whom they have
stronger evidence holds up to some degree.

The differences in treatment according to citizen characteris-
tics noted in the discussion of Table 7.13 also appear to persist,
although the standardized coefficients are only marginally larger
than those observed for the legal characteristics. Higher-class
citizens, regardless of their role, enjoy slightly more favorable
treatment than lower-class citizens. But even so, the most salient
feature of these coefficients is their small size.

With respect to race, once other factors are taken into account,
an interesting pattern emerges. Among non-offenders, blacks are
treated slightly less well than whites, while, among offenders,
blacks are treated slightly better than whites. This reflects the
persistence of the relationships observed in Table 6.18—behavior
toward non-offenders tends toward the favorable, but behavior toward
black non-offenders, being more constrained, tends to be less favor-
able than that toward whites. Behavior toward offenders tends toward
the unfavorable, but behavior toward blacks, again being more con-
strained, tends to be less unfavorable than that toward whites. As
in the case of arrest and report-writing, the effects of class and
race are of about the same magnitude.

The sex differences observed in Table 7.12.2 also stand. Though
female non-offenders are treated only slightly better than male non-
offenders, female offenders are treated substantially better than

male ones—showing that the differences observed are real ones and not, as might have been expected, the results of differences in the behavior of male and female offenders.

The unstandardized coefficients for age and its square in the non-offender model describe behavior which becomes more and more negative as the citizen grows older, except that there is a slight amelioration for the oldest group of citizens—a result which is consistent with the bivariate relationship observed in Table 7.13. For offenders, on the other hand, the unstandardized coefficients describe a trend of increasingly positive treatment across age cohorts. (This is another instance in which multicollinearity between the first- and second-degree terms inflates standard errors to the extent that reliance on them to assess the stability of the relationship is deceptive. When age is included only as a first-degree term, the standard error is less than half the size of the coefficient, indicating that it does have a non-zero, even if not substantial, effect.) The absence of any noteworthy curvilinear effect—observe the near-zero coefficient on the squared age term—indicates that the high level of negative behavior toward adolescents observed in Table 7.13.3 is not a real effect of age, but rather the spurious result of other variables which disappears when they are partialled out. On the basis of the "sum of standardized coefficients" rule of thumb proposed earlier, for neither offenders nor non-offenders does age have a major impact—the impact of the variable, as measured by the sum of the coefficients, does not exceed .06 in either case.

These results all suggest that, once other factors are taken into account, police are not prone to be particularly harsh with adolescents. Rather, it would appear that young people are particularly likely to be involved in situations and act in ways that evoke negative police responses. In light of this, the experiential theory of people's attitudes toward the police advanced earlier requires an addendum. Though young people's attitudes toward the police may indeed be a response to unfavorable police treatment of them, this does not necessarily mean that they are the innocent victims of police discrimination against their age cohort. Instead, they may bring this treatment on themselves by their own involvements and actions. These results may, in other words, attest to the existence of a cycle of antagonism between the police and young people: young people dislike the police and therefore act in ways that evoke harsh police responses. These, in turn, lead to negative attitudes toward the police and so on.

More than any other type of factor, the bivariate tables (Table 7.14) showed, citizen behavior influences informal police behavior. The regression analyses reveal that, of the citizen's emotional state and the citizen's manner, it is the latter which has the greater impact when all other influences are partialled out. The net effects for manner—a negative .158 (.049 + [-.207]) for non-offenders and a negative .178 (.313 + [-.491]) for offenders—are by far the largest observed in these regressions. Certainly, independent of what a person has done or who he is, his manner toward the police is an important factor in determining the policeman's manner toward him.

The unstandardized coefficients for these factors reveal that the basic trends in treatment observed in the bivariate tables hold up even after the imposition of controls. That is, the positive coefficients for the first-degree terms and the negative coefficients for the second-degree terms in state describe more positive treatment as the citizen's emotional state shifts from "agitated" to "calm" and more negative treatment as the citizen's state shifts from "calm" to "detached." The greater magnitude of the second-degree term for offenders, compared to that for non-offenders, indicates a more precipitous decline for the former. The unstandardized coefficients for manner describe a slight shift toward more negative treatment as citizens shift from deference to civility and a much sharper shift toward negative treatment as citizens shift from civility to antagonism.

The standardized coefficients for structural characteristics reaffirm that informal police behavior does not differ in tone from public to private places. And, in the case of non-offenders, the number of citizens present has no effect whatsoever. However, for offenders, the presence of an audience has one of the most substantial impacts observed, indicating that the tendency of policemen to treat offenders more harshly when more people are watching, observed in Table 7.15.2, is not an artifact of other relationships. Visibility to the department, a comparison of the coefficients for mobilization reveals, bears only on the treatment of offenders, with them faring less well when visibility is lower.

Finally, the presence or absence of a partner retains a significant effect even in the face of multivariate controls—an effect which is about the same whether the person is an offender or not. The legitimate concern that the difference between one-man and two-man patrols observed in the bivariate tables might be due to differences in the situations into which one- and two-man units enter— differences in seriousness of crime, behavior of the citizens, and so forth—proves to be unfounded, because even after all such factors are partialled out, officers in two-man patrols tend to be less positive in their manner than officers on their own.

So, all in all, some of the factors which, in the bivariate tables, seemed to have an impact on the policeman's manner have been shown to retain some impact even after adjustments have been made for potentially confounding factors—most notably, the manner of the citizen, the number of policemen, and, in the case of offenders, the sex of the citizen, the number of attending citizens, and the type of mobilization.

But the most significant aspect of these analyses has yet to be considered, although the magnitudes of the standardized regression coefficients have certainly presaged it. It is the weakness of the impact that these variables, both singly—as shown by the individual betas—and as a group—as shown by the R^2's—have on the policeman's treatment of the citizen. The latter, at best, do not exceed 10% of the variance explained—and that with a battery of 12 explanatory variables!

The overall inability of situational factors to explain most of the variation in police behavior—true to some degree even in the case of formal actions, but most pronounced in the case of the policeman's informal manner—is significant because it runs counter to the expectations raised by the situationalists discussed in Chapter III. Recall, for example, Mischel's assertion of "the enormous variance due to situationally specific variables" compared to the "trivial portion of the variance" accounted for by individual difference measures.[25] It is true that, in this analysis, situational differences have accounted for a greater share of the variance in behavior than individual differences. But more situational factors were employed—and probably were measured with greater precision—than individual factors. And more important, the share of variance explained by situational factors is far from "enormous." R^2's of 5%, 10%, or even 25% reflect weak to modest shares of variance, given this number of predictors, but no more.

The question clearly raised by these results is whether situational explanations of behavior are all that their proponents have touted them to be. Before deciding one way or the other, it will be useful to consider the possible reasons, beyond the inadequacy of the general hypothesis, for the failure of situational factors to account more impressively for differences in behavior.

Certainly one reason is that the effects of some of the situational factors are not of the linear or curvilinear sorts captured

by the ordinary regression model or the model with modifications, such as squared terms. Some factors affect not the central tendency of behavior so much as the amount of variation in behavior. The most striking example of this is the relationship between race and manner. The differences in the means of treatment for whites and blacks after other factors are held constant are, as the unstandardized coefficients for race in Table 7.16 show, slight—about -.04 for non-offenders and about .06 for offenders. In contrast, differences in the variation in treatment are more substantial. Overall, the standard deviations in policeman's manner for whites and blacks are .63 and .49, respectively. For non-offenders, they are .53 and .41 and, for offenders, .77 and .64. This sort of effect is not easily examined with conventional statistical techniques, which either ignore such differences (as in ordinary least squares regression and analysis of variance, which simply assume a constant variance across levels of the independent variable) or treat them as an anomaly for which adjustments should be made (as in weighted least squares, which simply reduces the impact which the more divergent cases have on the final estimates).

An alternative is to treat the manner of the policeman, not as a negative-to-positive scale, but as one which ranges from neutral to divergent behavior by folding it at the neutral category. When this approach is employed, certain variables—seriousness, race, and age for non-offenders and race, age, and class for offenders—do prove to have more effect, as measured by standardized regression

coefficients. However, overall, the set of situational factors accounts for even less of the variation in the policeman's manner than before. Thus the unusual form of some of the relationships does not appear to be a major reason for the limited power of the model.

Another possible explanation for the impotence of the situational factors is, of course, that not all the important factors have been included in the explanatory equation. This may very well be part of the problem but it must be admitted that the independent variables included here represent a fairly complete sampling of those raised in the literature. To be sure, others might have been included— the physical sizes of the citizens relative to the police, for example—but it seems unlikely that differences more subtle than those already included would boost substantially the explanatory power of the model.

More likely, the problem is not one of what has been left out, but rather of how well what has been included has been measured. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the circumstances under which and the procedures by which assessments of both the independent and dependent variables of this analysis were made were not particularly conducive to great precision. It is likely, in other words, that all these measures are contaminated by a fair amount of measurement error. Under the plausible assumption that much of this error is essentially random, the expected outcome is that relationships will be attenuated.[26]

A piece of evidence that suggests that random measurement error is responsible for the low explanatory power of these factors is the difference between the R^2's for the informal treatment of offenders and non-offenders—roughly 10% of variance explained for the former, but only 6% for the latter. That this is not due to any major difference in the structure of effects for the two groups is evident from a comparison of the standardized regression coefficients in Table 7.16—rather, the coefficients for the non-offenders are just generally lower than those for offenders.

One possible alternative explanation is that the observers, because offenders tend to be the focus of attention in an encounter, may have followed their behavior more closely than the behavior of others and hence have characterized it more accurately. This difference in the amount of random measurement error for the two groups would lead to a difference in the degree of attenuation in relationships and to a difference in the R^2's like that observed. One way to test this further would be to see whether explanation of behavior is in general better for the more central and thus more accurately characterized figures in encounters—complainants and offenders—than for the more peripheral and thus less accurately characterized ones—members of groups that side with one party or the other, bystanders, and so on. No such pattern emerges. In fact, in some earlier analyses using a predictor set similar to, but not identical with, that employed here, explanation was overall a bit better for the more peripheral figures than for the more central ones. This

raises the disturbing possibility, as discussed earlier in this chapter, that observers, not having paid close attention to these people, may have constructed consistent "packages" of characteristics, behavior, and police treatment for them.

In the final analysis, although measurement error is undoubtedly partly to blame for the overall weakness of explanation, the most plausible explanation for the difference in explanatory power between offenders and non-offenders may be that the police are simply freer to respond to the characteristics and behavior of offenders. An offender is, compared to a non-offender, very vulnerable to the police. He is less worthy of respectful treatment in the eyes of the police because he has, after all, done something wrong. In the case of police abuse, he represents less of a threat to the police because, in the face of a complaint to the department, the policeman can usually justify whatever he has done to the person by reference to his offender role. Constraints are loosened in dealing with offenders—as the greater variance in manner toward them shows—and thus the policeman's responses to them can flow more freely than with a citizen who does not play this more vulnerable role.

Finally, the limited explanatory power of these situational models can probably be attributed to the limited amount of variation in some of what appear to be, on the basis of unstandardized coefficients and percentages, relatively potent determinants of police behavior. That is, the explanatory power of the independent variables, as measured individually by the standardized regression coefficients and in the aggregate by the R^2s—which are, after all, simply

a function of the individual standardized regression coefficients[27]—
is a function, as Blalock has so effectively argued, of two distinct
properties of the relationship: "(1) the causal law connecting
two (or more) variables and (2) the relative amounts of variation
that happen to exist in any particular population." To illustrate,
the standardized regression coefficient in the bivariate case is
defined as

$$b_{yx} = b_{yx} \left(\frac{s_x}{s_y}\right) ,$$

which means that the value of the standardized coefficient depends
on both the slope of y on x (b_{yx}) and on the actual amounts of
variation in x and y (s_x and s_y).[28] In Tables 7.10, 7.11, and 7.16,
the unstandardized coefficients show that variations in some of the
situational factors do trace out fairly sharp differences in police
actions—legal seriousness, complainant's preference, and number of
participants for arrest; complainant's preference and manner for
reports; age, manner, and number of policemen for informal treatment
of non-offenders; and sex, manner, number of citizens, mobilization,
and number of policemen for informal treatment of offenders. But an
examination of marginals in the bivariate tables shows that the
amount of variation in most of these factors is limited. For
example, misdemeanor and felony suspects are much more likely to be
taken in than other kinds of offenders, but only a quarter of offen-
ders are suspected of a misdemeanor and fewer than a tenth, of a
felony. Female offenders are arrested less often and treated more

favorably than male offenders, but the difference cannot account for much variance because only about a sixth of all offenders are female. Antagonistic offenders get treated much less well than civil ones, but only about a sixth of all offenders are so foolish as to be antagonistic toward the police. This lack of variance is even more acute for non-offenders. Even displays of antagonism by a non-offender evoke a harsh response. Yet, as might be expected, only about 3% of all non-offenders are hostile to the police. The number of policemen also sways the treatment of the non-offender, but the vast majority of police-citizen interactions occur between citizens and pairs of officers.

These are situations in which, figuratively speaking, the "spirit" or underlying trend of the relationship is willing, but the "flesh" or actual impact is weak. Differences in situational factors do, when they occur, lead to differences in police action, but the differences do not occur often enough that much of the variation in police behavior can be accounted for. Were there fewer constraints and greater variation in the kinds and the behavior of the people who came into contact with the police during the course of this study, relationships between these situational factors and the police reaction to them would perhaps be stronger.

So the answer to the question of whether the results obtained here call into serious question the viability of situational explanations of police behavior would have to be a negative one. There are sufficient reasons to account for the less than "enormous"

explanatory power of these factors without calling into question
their real potency. All in all, in fact, given the sorts of diffi-
culties recognized in the last few pages, the explanatory power of
the model, particularly for formal actions, can be regarded as en-
couraging. Further, situational factors do account for police behavior
considerably more effectively than do the individual factors examined
in the previous chapter (even though it must be admitted that the
individual differences model labors under similar difficulties of
measurement error and a lack of variance in explanatory factors). This,
it will be recalled, is exactly what would be expected on the basis
of a comparison of the relative homogeneity of individuals and situa-
tions in the police milieu, as suggested in Chapter IV. To be sure,
variation in neither situations or individuals is great, but overall
variation in situations is greater than variation in individuals
and, as a result, situational factors tend to be more important movers
of police behavior than individual ones.

A recognition of situational factors, then, does make an appre-
ciable contribution to our understanding of why policemen act the
way they do. On the other hand, situational factors do not consti-
tute any kind of Rosetta stone. Whether due to measurement error
or some other factor, substantially more than half the variance in
the dependent variables remains unaccounted for. And situational
models have the definite disadvantage of being unparsimonious. It
is evident that, before the claims of both the situationalist students
of police behavior and the situationalist students of human behavior

can be accepted more wholeheartedly, situational explanations will have to be further refined and tested. The next chapters will take a few simple and short steps in that direction by examining more closely the interplay between situational differences and individual and organizational differences.

Footnotes for Chapter VII

1. Jerome H. Skolnick, <u>Justice Without Trial</u> (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 45-48.

2. James Q. Wilson makes the same point in a somewhat different context. <u>Varieties of Police Behavior</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 27.

3. Because effort has been defined at the level of the tour of duty and not at the level of the individual encounter, it is not possible, nor would it make much sense, to relate it to most of the situational variables employed here. One exception is the number of policemen in the patrol unit. One might expect that peer pressures could lead to either higher or lower levels of effort or that two men working together would tend to spend time talking to each other that they should spend concentrating on patrolling. The following table shows that the more

Aggressiveness of Patrolling	Number of Policemen			
	One	Two	Three or More	Total
Little Preventive Patrolling	25.1%	17.6%	7.5%	17.9%
Some Preventive Patrolling	53.5	61.0	76.9	61.4
Aggressive Preventive Patrolling	21.5	21.3	15.6	20.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	275	965	160	1400
		Tau-b = .046		

officers there are in the patrol unit, the less time is spent "goofing off." Peer pressure, it appears does encourage slightly greater effort by officers in their patrolling except that three-man teams patrol less aggressively than smaller units.

4. Donald J. Black, "The Social Organization of Arrest," <u>Stanford Law Review</u> 23 (June 1971): 1094. In juvenile cases, however, he finds that suspects implicated by police witnessing are less likely to be arrested than those implicated by citizen testimony. "Police Control of Juveniles," <u>American Sociological Review</u> 35 (February 1970): 73.

5. Donald J. Black, "Production of Crime Rates," *American Sociological Review* 35 (August 1970): 733-48.

6. Black, "Social Organization," p. 1089.

7. This is a general characterization of the legal relationship between seriousness of offense and evidentiary requirements. See Black, "Social Organization," p. 1093. The relationship does, however, differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—and some differences do exist across the jurisdictions involved in this study. See Wayne R. LaFave, *Arrest* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 18-21, 231-264; and Wilson, *Varieties*, pp. 22-23.

8. Wilson, *Varieties*, p. 27.

9. It might be asked what difference this makes, since nobody except offenders gets taken to the station anyway. This is demonstrably not the case. Observers were asked to record the number of non-offenders who were "taken or directed" to the station. According to these tallies, more than 150 were. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of these were "taken or directed" for purposes that did not involve the invocation of the legal process against them. But because the Reiss schedule does not distinguish between those taken in for arrest and those taken in for purposes other than arrest and because it does not call for an identification of those non-offenders taken in, the transportation of non-offenders to the station is a phenomenon which these data cannot be used to examine.

10. Black, "Social Organization," p. 1099; and "Police Control of Juveniles," p. 75.

11. Black, "Social Organization," p. 1098.

12. This is a decision which, at least in theory, is made primarily on the basis of a concern for the safety of the officer. One-man patrols are used more often on the safer day shifts than on the more dangerous night shifts and in lower-crime "quiet" areas than in higher-crime areas. The deployment of officers in the precincts studied demonstrates this. In the following table, it can be seen that, of the 840 rides on which observers went, nearly half of the day shift rides had only one officer, while only about a third of the night and "last out" shifts did.

  At the time of the study, the Washington department used one-man patrols most sparingly, while the Chicago department used them most often, as the following table shows. But these cross-city differences pale in comparison to the impact of the level of crime in the precinct. The following table arrays precincts in order of increasing crime rate (from left to right) within each city. This reveals that multiple-man units

Table 1, Footnote 12

	Time of Shift			
Number of Officers in Patrol Unit	Day (8 am-4 pm)	Night (4 pm-12 pm)	"Last Out" (12 pm-8 am)	Total
One Man	49.3%	31.4%	32.4%	34.6%
Two Men	37.3	62.7	66.2	59.0
Three or More	13.4	5.9	1.4	6.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	142	542	148	832

Table 2, Footnote 12

City	Boston			Chicago		
Precinct	Dorchester	Roxbury	Total	Town Hall	Fillmore	Total
Number of Officers in Patrol Unit						
One Man	70.0%	10.9%	38.5%	72.9%	38.4%	54.9%
Two Men	26.7	89.1	60.0	27.1	60.1	44.4
Three or More	3.4	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.4	.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	120	137	260	129	138	267

City	Washington					
Precinct	Precinct 6	Precinct 14	Precinct 10	Precinct 13	Total	Grand Total
Number of Officers in Patrol Unit						
One Man	14.1%	43.1%	2.2%	0.0%	13.7%	34.4%
Two Men	77.5	57.2	81.7	74.4	71.0	59.2
Three or More	8.4	9.7	16.2	25.7	15.2	6.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	71	72	93	78	314	840

are consistently employed more often in higher-crime areas. An important result of this is that, because higher-crime areas tend also to be black areas, blacks contact two-man patrols much more often than one-man patrols. The implications of this will become apparent shortly.

13. The measures of relationship cited in this and the succeeding two paragraphs are Pearson product-moment correlations.

14. Squared terms have been included here to capture the non-linearity with respect to age, emotional state, manner, and number of citizens noted in the bivariate tables. They have been included with the aim of minimizing any understatement of the effects of these variables, but it must be acknowledged that their contribution to the overall predictive power of the model is infinitesimal—the R^2 for the model which omits these terms is only about .3% less than the R^2 for the model shown here. Relational distance has been excluded from the arrest model because of its slight impact and the large number of cases with missing data, since complainants are often not present. Complainant's preference presents a similar problem, but because of its greater impact, it seemed important to retain it in the model. The missing data problem has been resolved by equating cases in which no complainant was present with cases in which the complainant was present, but expressed no preference regarding the disposition of the offender.

15. This is one of the situations in which the presence of the squared term inflates the standard errors of the coefficients and makes them a misleading baseline against which to evaluate the stability of the coefficients. Perhaps the best demonstration of this is that a similar model, not including the squared term, shows emotional state to have a significant effect.

16. This is the practical result of the procedure, described in footnote 14, of coding all those cases in which a complainant was present as equivalent to cases in which a complainant expressed no preference. The inclusion of a large number of cases for which complainant's preference can have no effect has the inevitable effect of reducing the size of this coefficient.

17. Given the limited impact which some of the variables prove to have once the effects of other factors have been partialled out, it might seem advisable to repeat the analysis omitting them. Here and in later analyses, however, they have been retained. There are two reasons for this. First, even though each variable may not have a great independent impact of its own, nevertheless it is desirable that the collection of variables be held constant in order to give a more accurate picture of the impact which

each variable has. Second, a basic assumption of this analysis is that variables which do not have an effect overall may prove to have an effect under certain circumstances. Leaving all the theoretically interesting variables in at this point facilitates comparison with the conditional models to be examined later on.

18. Wilson, _Varieties_, pp. 54-55.

19. Ibid., p. 145.

20. David Easton and Jack Dennis, _Children in the Political System_ (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 292-305.

21. An alternative here would be to use a single interactive model with dummy and multiplicative terms to capture differences between offenders and non-offenders. It would also be necessary to employ a weighted least squares technique, in view of the substantial differences in variance between the offender and non-offender group. Such an approach would have the advantage of incorporating the citizen role distinction directly into the model and of providing an overall indicator of goodness of fit. It would have the disadvantages of being considerably more complicated and thus more difficult to interpret, of not providing separate indicators of goodness of fit within each of the role groups, and of requiring computer memory considerably in excess of that available—what with more than 30 independent variables and over 15,000 cases.

22. A squared term might also have been included for class, given the non-linearity of the relationship observed in Table 7.13.1, but the small number of cases involved—only 32—would render the contribution negligible.

23. John W. Tukey, "Causation, Regression, and Path Analysis," in _Statistics and Mathematics in Biology_, ed. Oscar Kempthorne et al. (Ames, Iowa: 1954), pp. 38-40.

24. Consider the case of a two independent variable multiple regression. The standardized coefficients, which indicate the relative impact of each of the variables, can be calculated from the bivariate product-moment correlations between the variables:

$$b_{yx_1 \cdot x_2} = \frac{r_{yx_1} - r_{yx_2} r_{x_1 x_2}}{1 - r_{x_1 x_2}^2} \qquad b_{yx_2 \cdot x_1} = \frac{r_{yx_2} - r_{yx_1} r_{x_1 x_2}}{1 - r_{x_1 x_2}^2}$$

From: Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., <u>Social Statistics</u>, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 453. Since the denominators are the same, the sum of these partial standardized measures can be expressed quite simply as a function of the bivariate correlations:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\beta_{yx_1 \cdot x_2} + \beta_{yx_2 \cdot x_1} &= \frac{r_{yx_1} - r_{yx_2} r_{x_1 x_2}}{1 - r_{x_1 x_2}^2} + \frac{r_{yx_2} - r_{yx_1} r_{x_1 x_2}}{1 - r_{x_1 x_2}^2} \\[2mm]
&= \frac{r_{yx_1} - r_{yx_2} r_{x_1 x_2} + r_{yx_2} - r_{yx_1} r_{x_1 x_2}}{1 - r_{x_1 x_2}^2} \\[2mm]
&= \frac{r_{yx_1} + r_{yx_2} - r_{x_1 x_2}(r_{yx_1} + r_{yx_2})}{1 - r_{x_1 x_2}^2} \\[2mm]
&= \frac{(r_{yx_1} + r_{yx_2})(1 - r_{x_1 x_2})}{(1 + r_{x_1 x_2})(1 - r_{x_1 x_2})}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\beta_{yx_1 \cdot x_2} + \beta_{yx_2 \cdot x_1} = \frac{r_{yx_1} + r_{yx_2}}{1 + r_{x_1 x_2}}
$$

Since the bivariate r's equal the bivariate β's, the latter can be substituted:

$$
\beta_{yx_1 \cdot x_2} + \beta_{yx_2 \cdot x_1} = \frac{\beta_{yx_1} + \beta_{yx_2}}{1 + r_{x_1 x_2}}
$$

The relationship between the sum of the partial standardized coefficients and the zero-order standardized coefficients thus depends on the correlation between x_1 and x_2. Where x_1 and x_2 are uncorrelated, their sums are equal (because, where $r_{x_1 x_2} = 0$, $\beta_{yx_1 \cdot x_2} = \beta_{yx_1}$ and $\beta_{yx_2 \cdot x_1} = \beta_{yx_2}$). As x_1 and x_2 become increasingly correlated, the sum of the two standardized coefficients approaches the average of the two zero-order coefficients. At the extreme of $r_{x_1 x_2} = 1$, the sum of the partial measures equals the average of the two bivariate coefficients.

Now, when x_2 is the standardized version of the square of the original variable and x_1 is the standardized version of the original variable, as long as x_1 takes on only small positive values, the correlation between x_1 and x_2 will be very high and the zero-order coefficients will be very close in value—i.e., when $\beta_{yx_1} = \beta_{yx_2}$ and $r_{x_1 x_2} = 1$

then

$$\sigma_{yx_1 \cdot x_2} + \sigma_{yx_2 \cdot x_1} = \frac{\sigma_{yx_1} + \sigma_{yx_1}}{1 + 1} = \frac{2\,\sigma_{yx_1}}{2} = \sigma_{yx_1}$$

The sum of the standardized coefficients on the original variable and the squared variable will, under these conditions, approximate the standardized coefficient on the original variable.

25. Walter Mischel, _Personality and Assessment_ (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 82-83.

26. Mordecai Ezekiel and Karl A. Fox, _Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis_ (New York: Wiley, 1966).

27. John H. Mueller, Karl F. Schuessler, and Herbert L. Costner, _Statistical Research in Sociology_, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 302.

28. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," _American Political Science Review_ 61 (March 1967): 133.

CHAPTER VIII

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIATION IN THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL AND SITUATIONAL DIFFERENCES

The analyses of the preceding three chapters have, for the most part, borne out the expectations derived from the literature reviewed in Chapters II and III and applied to the specific concern of police behavior in Chapter IV. Police behavior, in all its dimensions, does differ from organization to organization in a fashion generally consistent with what has previously been learned about the relationship between organizational setting and police action, but there is nevertheless substantial intra-organizational variation in behavior. Consistent with what some students of the police have long argued, individual differences do have some effect on police behavior, but inconsistent with what these students of the police have suggested and consistent with what certain "situational" social psychologists have argued, the magnitude of these effects, even when a number of individual characteristics are employed simultaneously, is very small. As might be expected given the relative homogeneity of individuals and situations in the police milieu and in keeping with the arguments of the situationalist psychologists, the effects of situational factors are greater than those of individual factors. However, contrary to the situationalists' expectations, reliance on situational factors alone leaves a substantial share of the variation in behavior unexplained. In short, none of the three basic models raised in this dissertation can alone account for

variation in police behavior sufficient that we feel that we can really understand police behavior by reference to it alone.

The literature reviewed earlier suggests as a reason for the limited explanatory power of these models the possibility that the relationships between organizational factors, individual factors, situational factors, and behavior may be, not merely simple ones, but rather contingent ones, and suggests as a possible solution to the problem of weak relationships an examination of the relationships between each of these factors and behavior under particular sets of circumstances defined by the other classes of factors. (Another alternative here would, of course, be simply to introduce all three kinds of factors into a single explanatory model. Why that has not been done will be discussed in the final chapter.) Whereas the basic hypotheses of the preceding three chapters were that organization, individual, and situation each affect behavior directly, the basic hypotheses of the next two chapters are that organization, individual, and situation can also each affect behavior indirectly by modifying the way in which the other factors affect behavior. These chapters examine, in other words, the possibility of what statisticians call "interaction" or the effects of what some psychologists call "moderating variables."

The first possible interaction advanced in Chapter IV was that organization may impinge on the relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes, on the one hand, and police behavior on the other, and a second that it may impinge on the relationship

between situational characteristics and police behavior. These two possibilities will be considered in this chapter. A third is that individual differences may affect relationships between situational factors and police behavior. A fourth is that situational differences—especially differences in the audience that observes police behavior—may have an effect on the relationship between individual characteristics, attitudes, and behavior. These two possibilities will be taken up in Chapter IX.

The Effects of Organization on the Impact of Individual Characteristics

A basic objective of any organization is getting the subordinates at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy to carry out the policies established by their superiors at the top of the organization.[1] A basic problem for the organization is that subordinates sometimes want to pursue ends other than those of the organization. To use the terminology employed here previously, individual behavior is sometimes inclined to follow the characteristics and attitudes of the individual actor rather than the dictates of the organization. In order to offset these individual inclinations and insure that organizational goals are achieved, organizations employ a variety of means. They may try to recruit subordinates whom they think are prone to compliance. They may try to teach individuals the importance of going along with organizational policies. They may try to observe the performance of subordinates, and reward those who act as they ought and sanction or even dismiss those who do not.

Organizations differ in the lengths to which they go and thus perhaps the success which they achieve in offsetting individual tendencies and in instilling organizational tendencies in their subordinates. That, in fact, is one of the important elements in the set of distinctions that Wilson draws between departmental styles. In watchman-style departments,

> Patrolmen are locally recruited, paid low salaries, expected to have second jobs, given the very minimum in initial training and almost no in-service training, and not rewarded for having or getting a higher education. ...How the patrolman behaves at all depends very much on who, if anyone, is supervising him...There is little incentive to work hard.[2]

It is hard to imagine a situation in which there would be less reason for an officer to go along with departmental directives instead of his own inclinations. A legalistic department, on the other hand,

> seeks to centralize control, formalize authority, and require written accounts of everything that transpires... The chief hopes that the problems of citizen complaints will be eased if he can recruit "good men." A "good man" is one who finds it possible to play the police role impersonally— to distinguish between what a policeman must do and his feelings about doing it—and to play it both zealously and courteously. The administrations of legalistic police departments believe such men are more likely to be recruited in middle-class than in working-class neighborhoods and among the college-educated than the high-school-educated. The modernization of a police department—new buildings, shiny equipment, IBM punch cards, elaborate training programs, higher salaries, rewards for taking college courses in one's spare time, and the waived residence requirement freeing men to live in the suburbs—might all be viewed as an effort to attract middle-class men who both make and value a "good appearance" and who work hard.[3]   (emphasis added)

In a legalistic department, in other words, everything is directed toward putting into the field officers who will go by the department's rules and not by their own inclinations (if those differ from the

rules). The end result of these differences in departmental prac-
tices should therefore be that relationships between individual
characteristics and attitudes, on the one hand, and police behavior,
on the other, should be stronger in watchman-like departments and
weaker in legalistic departments.

In the context of this particular study, given both the prior
information about the departments and the behavioral differences
observed in Chapter V, this means that relationships between individ-
ual characteristics and attitudes and behavior should be stronger in
the watchman-like Boston department and weaker in the more legalistic
Chicago and Washington departments. And given that the preponderance
of the police-citizen encounters observed in this study took place in
departments that lean more toward the legalistic style than the
watchman style, it seems not overly optimistic to hope that the weak-
ness of the relationships for the entire set of encounters observed in
Chapter VI will prove to be the result of very weak relationships in
two departments—Chicago and Washington—outweighing more substantial
relationships in the third—Boston.

The procedure required to test this hypothesis—examining the
relationships between individual characteristics and behavior within
each department—serves another purpose as well. Chapter V demon-
strated that police behavior differed from one department to another.
Chapter VI presented evidence, not only that individual characteristics
and attitudes showed some relationship to behavior, but also that
these characteristics and attitudes were related to department. With

this triangle of relationships, it is possible that the relation-
ships observed between individual factors and behavior are the spur-
ious result of city differences. Because of this possibility, a
control for city is doubly advisable. Thus the data presented in
this section will be analyzed not only from the standpoint of whether
or not there are inter-city differences of a sort that validate the
line of hypothesizing advanced in the preceding several pages, but
also from the standpoint of whether or not the relationships between
individual factors and behavior observed in Chapter VI possess internal
validity.

Organizational Differences in the Impact
of Length of Service

In Chapter VI, the length of time a policeman had served on the
force was identified as a possible surrogate for police cynicism and
shown to have a modest impact on several dimensions of performance.
If organization does moderate the effect which individual character-
istics have on behavior, these effects should be stronger in Boston
than in Chicago or Washington.

Figure 8.1 reveals that, although Boston has the most unequi-
vocally downward trend, the percentage differences across the years
for the three departments are roughly the same. Further, the initial
effect of increasing experience can be accepted with less certainty
in Boston because the department there employed comparatively few
young officers. In fact, the initial 16.7% is based on only 18
meetings between offenders and policemen. The differing pattern in

Figure 8.1. Percentage of offenders arrested by length of
service, by city.

Boston, however, were it to be taken at face value, is an interest-

ing one because it could be explained in terms of differing sociali-

zation to departmental norms. In the other departments, officers

may be socialized into norms of professionalism and then fall away

from them, while in Boston, they may be initially socialized into

norms of low performance. In any case, on the basis of percentages

and measures of association, the relationship does not appear to

differ much from city to city. A closer look at the magnitude of

the relationship will await the imposition of controls for other

possibly confounding individual differences. But for now, two things

are evident: (1) there are not dramatic differences in the tenure-

arrest relationship across departments; and (2) the bivariate

relationship observed in Figure 6.2 is not a spurious product of
city differences because it persists within each city. In other
words, as a policeman's experience increases, he initially is more
likely to arrest, but subsequently becomes less likely to arrest.
Also, departmental measures do not seem to be effective in offsetting
this trend.

Length of service was found to affect the informal treatment of
citizens as well. More experienced officers tended to be less
bureaucratic in their behavior toward citizens and this greater
expressiveness was found to work primarily to the advantage of non-
offenders and the disadvantage of offenders. Table 8.1 demonstrates—
and the measures of association are perhaps more useful here than
the percentages—that these relationships exist in some departments,
but not in others. In fact, for offenders, results coincide nicely
with the hypothesis—relationships are almost nonexistent for Chicago
and Washington, only the sign indicating the residues of their exist-
ence, while, for Boston, the propensity for more experienced police-
men to treat offenders negatively comes across more vividly.

However, for non-offenders, the picture is less clear. Percent-
ages and tau-b's suggest that, though the trend toward more expressive
behavior with increasing service exists in all three cities, the
tendency in the aggregate for it to run toward the positive side occurs
principally in Washington—something that would not be expected under
the hypothesis advanced. Such a pattern is, in fact, difficult to
explain. It could occur simply by chance. It might reflect a tendency
in Washington for all officers, under the pressures of departmental
reform, to avoid a negative manner and for the newest recruits to the

Table 8.1

Manner of Policeman, by Length of Service,
by Role of Citizen, by City

	City														
	Boston					Chicago					Washington				
Manner	Length of Service														
a) Non-Offender	0-2	2-8	8-15	15+	Total	0-2	2-8	8-15	15+	Total	0-2	2-8	8-15	15+	Total
Very Negative	1.0%	.1%	.4%	.7%	.4%	1.0%	0.0%	.5%	.5%	.4%	.2%	.7%	.1%	0.0%	.6%
Negative	2.5	4.6	5.5	7.0	5.4	5.4	6.2	8.2	9.4	6.8	1.2	2.4	3.2	1.3	2.8
Neutral	72.6	75.1	73.4	67.9	72.5	74.1	73.6	66.3	70.9	71.6	94.5	88.8	83.0	85.7	88.4
Positive	23.9	20.2	20.7	24.4	21.7	19.5	20.1	25.0	19.2	21.2	4.0	7.5	13.6	13.0	8.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	201	788	1225	676	2890	498	1385	733	213	2829	420	3405	755	77	4657
Tau-b	.000					.009					.069				
b) Offender															
Very Negative	0.0%	2.8%	5.4%	5.9%	4.4%	.9%	1.6%	2.1%	8.2%	2.2%	4.6%	1.8%	1.2%	0.0%	1.9%
Negative	13.2	35.4	33.7	37.1	33.3	24.8	25.0	16.1	31.1	23.6	14.6	19.3	23.7	7.9	19.3
Neutral	65.8	42.3	43.4	43.0	44.8	53.0	53.5	59.9	48.4	54.3	67.7	69.8	66.5	84.2	69.5
Positive	21.1	19.5	17.5	14.0	17.5	21.3	19.9	21.9	12.3	19.9	13.1	9.1	8.6	7.9	9.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	76	246	389	221	932	230	739	292	122	1383	130	1100	245	38	1513
Tau-b	-.096					-.020					-.023				

force to be most susceptible to injunctions about professionalism and impersonality. Setting aside chance (given the large number of cases involved), the likely explanation is that the organizational setting does have some effect on the tenure-manner relationship, though the effect is not the simple one hypothesized. In addition, it is apparent that the relationship is not simply the spurious effect of department because it does persist within some organizational settings.

Police effort, it was observed in Chapter VI, declines with increasing length of service, though initiation of contacts does show an initial increase. Figure 8.2 and Table 8.2 both demonstrate that the relationships observed earlier hold up reasonably well, which rules out an important possible source of spuriousness. But they also reveal a substantial difference in the strength of the pattern. For both contacting and patrolling during free time, the relation-ship is weakest in Washington's department, consistent with its image as a legalistic department. Also, as might be expected under the hypothesis, length of service has the greatest effect on use of free time in Boston. The one anomaly is that the legalistic Chicago department shows a stronger relationship between tenure and con-tacting than the watchman-like Boston department. This may be because the relationship for Boston is attenuated more by the initial non-linearity than the one for Chicago.

All in all, the evidence on the effects of length of service paints a somewhat clouded picture. The emergence of relationships as strongest in Boston in three of the five comparisons made (looking

Figure 8.2. Average number of police-initiated contacts per policeman per tour of duty, by length of service, by city.

Table 8.2

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, by Length
of Service, by City

	City																
	Boston					Chicago					Washington						
	Length of Service																
Aggressiveness of Patrolling	0-2	2-8	8-15	15+	Total	0-2	2-8	8-15	15+	Total	0-2	2-8	8-15	15+	Total
Little Prev. Patrolling	9.7%	31.7%	34.1%	46.6%	34.8%	9.4%	16.4%	26.1%	13.8%	17.6%	1.6%	8.5%	3.1%	22.3%	7.3%
Some Prev. Patrolling	48.4	51.9	47.3	44.7	47.9	60.4	64.5	56.5	72.4	62.5	68.3	70.3	69.1	55.6	69.4
Aggressive Prev. Patrolling	41.9	16.3	18.6	8.7	17.2	30.2	19.1	17.4	13.8	19.9	30.2	21.2	27.8	22.2	23.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	31	104	167	103	405	53	183	92	29	357	63	424	97	18	602
Tau-b		-.174					-.116					-.010			

simply at the measures of association) offers weak support for the
hypothesis that effects would be greatest in this watchman-style
department, though a higher degree of consistency would, of course,
be more convincing. At the least, the substantially stronger rela-
tionships in some cities than in others provide a modicum of support
for the hypothesis that organization—or at least city—moderates
relationships between individual characteristics and behavior. Most
unequivocally, the persistence of the relationships even after the
imposition of a control for city supports the conclusion that the
relationships between experience and police behavior observed in
Chapter VI are not merely the spurious product of departmental
differences.

Organizational Differences in the Impact of Job Satisfaction

Figure 6.4, it may be recalled, indicated a faint relationship
between job satisfaction and arrest. Figure 8.3 dispels immediately
any suspicion that that relationship is the spurious result of city
differences, for the relationship stands up clearly in Washington
and Chicago. However, these stronger positive relationships and
the weaker negative relationship in Boston are not consistent with
what would be expected under the hypothesis in question here. One
possible explanation is that the definition of "doing a good job"
differs across departments. In a watchman-like department, an offi-
cer's understanding is that he is supposed to manage his beat without

Figure 8.3. Percentage of offenders arrested, by satisfaction with job, by city.

necessarily making arrests.[4] In a legalistic department, it is

that he is supposed to produce arrests.[5] If the basic hypothesis

is that higher morale will lead to the officer doing a better job,

then it makes sense that higher morale leads to more arrests in a

legalistic department but not in a watchman-like one.

The results for arrest hold out the hope that a relationship

between job satisfaction and informal treatment will emerge in at

least some organizational settings. However, the evidence indicates

otherwise. The summary measures in Table 8.3 reveal that nowhere

does job satisfaction exert any noteworthy effect on policemen's

informal treatment of citizens, though whatever relationships there

are overall seem to emanate primarily from Chicago.

Table 8.3

Correlations (Tau-b's) between Manner and Satisfaction
with Job, by Citizen's Role and City

	City		
Citizen's Role	Boston	Chicago	Washington
Non-Offender	.036	.030	.006
N	2474	2536	4285
Offender	-.001	-.055	.008
N	797	1246	1392
Total	.025	.004	.006
N	3682	4275	6311

The effects of morale on effort, as measured by the initiation of contacts, are similar across all three cities in their curvilinear pattern—and, for the most part, similarly small (Figure 8.4). Again, however, the factor seems to count for the most in Chicago, since the mean number of contacts varies the most in that department. The greater influence on effort of morale in Chicago is seen as well in patrolling during non-mobilized time (Table 8.4). The relationship between morale and patrol practice is much stronger in Chicago than it is in either Boston or Washington. And, of course, its persistence within a single organizational context indicates that it is not simply the spurious result of departmental differences.

These results regarding the effects of morale suggest some amendments to the general conclusion about the effects of morale drawn in Chapter VI and to the hypotheses under consideration here.

Figure 8.4. Average number of police-initiated contacts per policeman per tour of duty, by satisfaction with job, by city.

Table 8.4

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, by Satisfaction with Job, by City

Aggressiveness of Patrolling	Boston					Chicago					Washington				
	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total	Dislikes	Neutral	Likes	Likes Very Much	Total
Little Prev. Patrolling	63.3%	35.7%	32.3%	43.8%	34.4%	34.6%	32.5%	14.6%	5.0%	17.4%	2.9%	9.3%	7.8%	8.5%	7.8%
Some Prev. Patrolling	44.8	46.4	49.1	43.8	47.8	61.5	55.0	64.4	55.0	61.7	91.2	65.7	67.0	74.5	69.0
Aggressive Prev. Patrolling	6.9	17.9	18.7	12.5	17.2	3.8	12.5	21.0	40.0	20.9	5.9	25.0	25.2	17.0	23.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
n	29	84	214	16	343	26	40	205	40	311	34	108	349	47	538
Tau-b			.051					.256					.033		

First, greater job satisfaction leads to improved performance only in some organizational contexts, not in all. Second, it is not necessarily the case that individual characteristics will simply have more impact in a loosely controlled watchman-like department than in a more tightly controlled legalistic department. In four of the five comparisons made, satisfaction has the greatest effect in Chicago, a presumably legalistic department, and not in the watchman-like Boston department. Even though the differences are, in a couple of instances, very slight, this degree of consistency suggests that satisfaction may indeed play a special role in this department. Rather than individual characteristics simply being less potent in legalistic than in watchman-like departments, it may be that different individual characteristics are important in different kinds of departments.

Under this view, the greater impact of satisfaction in Chicago might be accounted for in several different ways. One possibility is, as suggested before, that by providing unambiguous instruction as to what an officer ought to be doing, the department supplies a uniform objective toward which officers will exert themselves, depending on their level of motivation. Another possibility has to do with individual differences in susceptibility to departmental instruction. The Chicago department, in its period of reform prior to the time of the observational study, emphasized greater police efficiency and productivity and tried to instill higher morale through its departmental educational program.[6]   The strong relationship

between morale and performance in that department may simply reflect the fact that the "best students" learned both high morale and high productivity, while the "worst students" learned neither. Finally, it may simply be that a professionalized departmental ethos encourages internal sources of motivation, while a traditional department ethos relies on external ones.

Organizational Differences in the Impact of the Policeman's Race

Assessing the effect of organization on the impact of differences in the race of the patrolman is complicated by the fact that, in the department where the style of organization would presumably let individual differences have the greatest impact—Boston—there are hardly any black patrolmen. Of the 149 officers observed in Boston, to be specific, only 6 were blacks. Because of this paucity of black officers in Boston, the intra-city analysis of racial differences will necessarily focus on Chicago and Washington and all evidence from Boston displayed should be interpreted with the small number of cases uppermost in the reader's mind.

The tendency of black officers to arrest about 4% more often, overall, than white officers (observed in Table 6.5) proves to result from a relationship which holds in the Chicago department and nowhere else (Table 8.5). Note that this table is confined to black offenders only, since although a control for the race of the citizen is desirable in light of the pattern observed in Table 6.20, there are too few encounters between black policemen and white offenders to

Table 8.5

Arrest of Black Offenders, by Race of Policeman, by City

Disposition of Offender	City								
	Boston			Chicago			Washington		
	Racial Composition of Patrol Unit								
	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black	White	Mixed	Black
Arrested	12.5%	(33.3%)	(0.0%)	19.6%	22.9%	27.7%	25.5%	22.7%	25.1%
Released	87.5	(66.7)	(100.0)	80.4	77.1	72.3	74.5	77.3	74.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	216	3	4	199	144	65	502	66	167

draw any meaningful conclusion about the effect of the race of the officer within city for white citizens.

This pattern of differences in the behavior of policemen depending on their race in the Chicago department but not in the Washington department extends to the informal dimensions of treatment as well (Table 8.6). The tendency of black officers to treat citizens more bureaucratically than white officers is evident in the Chicago department but virtually non-existent in the Washington department—in fact, among non-offenders there, it is completely non-existent. So, overall, it must be concluded that the differences in behavior toward citizens by officers of differing races observed in Chapter VI flow primarily from the Chicago department. There black officers tend in general to act more professionally (i.e., higher arrest rates and a more impersonal manner) than white officers, while in Washington, the performance of officers varies hardly at all by race.

Table 8.6

Manner toward Black Citizens, by Race of Policeman,
by City, by Role of Citizen

	City					
	Boston		Chicago		Washington	
			Race of Policeman			
Manner	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
a) Non-Offender						
Very Negative	.2%	0.0%	.1%	.3%	.8%	.6%
Negative	5.4	0.0	6.2	3.7	3.2	1.4
Neutral	73.7	81.6	76.9	84.9	90.0	89.9
Positive	20.7	18.4	16.8	11.2	6.0	8.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1257	49	839	383	2656	845
b) Offender						
Very Negative	.3%	0.0%	1.9%	1.3%	2.4%	1.1%
Negative	26.9	11.1	24.3	24.7	21.0	18.4
Neutral	50.9	88.9	55.0	61.7	67.6	70.7
Positive	22.0	0.0	18.8	12.3	9.0	9.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	350	9	420	235	921	348

It is in the area of effort that the officers' race proves to have a broader effect. Chapter VI demonstrated a tendency for black officers to work harder than white officers. By one indicator of effort—the number of encounters initiated (Table 8.7)—that is a tendency which exists within all three departments (though the Boston

Table 8.7

Average Number of Police-Initiated Contacts per Policeman per Tour of Duty, by Race

City	Race of Patrolman		
	White	Black	Total
Boston	.45	(.58)	.46
N	140	6	146
Chicago	1.11	1.42	1.16
N	175	34	209
Washington	.49	.87	.57
N	169	44	213
Total	.70	1.07	.76
N	484	84	568

results, of course, are suspect because of the small number of cases involved). This clearly demonstrates that the relationship observed earlier is not simply the artifact of the more professionalized departments both recruiting more blacks and encouraging higher rates of contact. Rather, black officers are more likely than white officers to enter into interactions with citizens, regardless of city. In contrast to what was observed for arrest and treatment, racial differences in contact appear to be greater in Washington than in Chicago.

A clue as to why these racial differences occur may be found in the relationship, within cities, between the officer's race and the other indicator of effort, the aggressiveness with which he patrols. Table 8.8 reveals that the tendency of black officers to

Table 8.8

Aggressiveness of Patrolling, by Race
of Patrolman, by City

	City								
	Boston			Chicago			Washington		
	Race of Patrolman								
Aggressiveness of Patrolling	White	Black	Total	White	Black	Total	White	Black	Total
Little Prev. Patrolling	34.8%	30.0%	34.7%	17.7%	17.1%	17.6%	8.4%	3.1%	7.3%
Some Prev. Patrolling	47.5	60.0	47.8	62.5	62.9	62.6	70.0	68.8	69.7
Aggressive Preventive Patrolling	17.7	10.0	17.5	19.8	20.0	19.8	21.6	28.1	22.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	396	10	406	288	70	358	473	128	601
Tau-b	-.003			.005			.086		

patrol more aggressively (observed in Table 6.25) emanates solely from Washington—in Chicago, in fact, the distributions for white officers and for black officers are virtually identical. If the higher rates of contact for blacks in Table 8.7 were due solely to higher motivation among blacks, the latter would probably manifest itself in patrolling practices as well. In Chicago, it definitely

does not. (Also, the impact of race on contact would have been attenuated when a control for job satisfaction was imposed, which the multiple regression analysis of Table 6.35 shows does not happen.) Therefore, perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the higher rates of contact result from black officers being assigned to areas in which more events warranting the initiation of a contact are observed—a hypothesis which cannot be tested with the data available from the observation study—and that the differences in patrol practice reflect some other unknown circumstance in the Washington department.

The attempt to test the validity of the central hypothesis of this section—that individual differences will be manifested more openly in the more loosely structured watchman-like department than in the more tightly controlled legalistic department—with respect to the race of the policeman runs afoul of the paucity of black policemen in the theoretically more interesting organizational setting. Nevertheless, based on evidence from just the two more professional departments, a number of conclusions seem warranted. The general persistence of racial differences makes two points. First, the racial differences observed in Chapter VI are not simply the spurious result of city differences (though, of course, other factors which cannot adequately be measured here may be responsible). Second, a more professionalized style does not appear to prevent racial differences from emerging in behavior. The uniformity in behavior across individuals within this style of department which Wilson's discussion anticipates does not materialize.

At the same time, this does not prove that organization is unimportant as a moderating variable. A consistent pattern of relationships does emerge here. Racial differences in behavior toward citizens are greater in Chicago than in Washington, while racial differences in effort are greater in Washington than in Chicago. One response is, of course, to regard this as being a chance occurrence, but two factors argue against that. First is the substantial number of cases involved in most of the relationships. Second is the consistency with which these patterns emerge. For each of the three comparisons involving treatment of citizens (arrest and manner toward offenders and non-offenders), policeman's race has more effect in Chicago than in Washington. For both of the comparisons involving effort—and these two measures get at the concept in very different ways—policeman's race has more effect in Washington than in Chicago. This suggests two things. First, there may be—and undoubtedly there are!—differences between the two cities that Wilson's style typology does not pick up. These should ultimately be identified, operationalized, and incorporated into this type of analysis. Second, the effect of a moderating variable may depend, not just on the independent variable (as the results for length of service and satisfaction suggest), but also on the dependent variable.

Organizational Differences in the
Impact of Racial Attitudes

Of all the individual differences for which organization might be thought to moderate relationships with behavior, probably none is

more salient or significant than the racial attitudes of the police-man. After all, as the assertion by Bayley and Mendelsohn cited in Chapter II implies, it is exactly for the purpose of preventing personal prejudices from carrying over into the implementation of the law and the treatment of citizens that organizations institute their supervisory and disciplinary regimens. In view of the long-standing tension between minorities and the police and the frequent calls for police organizations to do something to end the discrim-inatory treatment of minorities, it is crucial to ascertain whether organizations can indeed take steps that will successfully break the connection between prejudiced attitudes and actions toward citizens.

The overall relationship between the racial attitude of a white policeman and whether or not he will arrest a black offender is, it will be recalled, a fairly weak one. By the hypothesis under consideration here, this should be the result of a relatively strong relationship in the watchman-style Boston department and relatively weaker relationships in the Chicago and Washington departments. Figure 8.5 depicts a reality fully consistent with these expectations. In Boston, as both percentages and the summary measures make clear, arrest varies sharply and monotonically with the racial attitudes of the officer involved. (The percentage line for Boston spans only three points on the scale because none of the white officers observed interacting with black offenders in Boston expressed favorable atti-tudes toward them. Lest it be thought that Boston is atypical in this respect—and lest much credence be given the percentages for

*None of the white policemen observed interacting with
black offenders in Boston expressed positive racial
attitudes. The percentages for this category in Chicago
and Washington are extremely tenuous, being based on
N's of three and four, respectively.

Figure 8.5. Percentage of black offenders arrested by white
policemen, by attitude toward blacks, by city.

the "positive" category for Chicago and Washington—it should be
added that the N's for those two cities in that category are three
and four, respectively.) The pattern for Chicago is less regular
in form, with the most prejudiced arresting less often than the
merely prejudiced, but overall consistent with expectations. In
Washington, the-very-negatively-inclined arrest at a rate higher
than the rest, but otherwise there are no differences.

The relationship between this important individual attitude and
behavior is strongest in the department that exerts the least
amount of control over its officers in the field (Boston) and weakest

in the department which, at least judging from most earlier results, most tightly constrains subordinate behavior (Washington). This is one instance—and an important instance it is—in which the hypothesized interactions between organization, attitudes, and action do emerge. Ties between individual attitudes and politically significant behavior are contingent upon organization. These results call into question the evenhandedness of law enforcement in loosely supervised watchman-style departments, such as the one in Boston, but augur well for the ability of more professional deparments, such as those in Chicago and Washington, to block the translation of attitudes into action. Further, they dispel any suspicion that the relationship observed is the spurious result of departmental differences.

Joining in the simplest fashion what was learned about the overall relationship between racial attitudes and informal treatment in Chapter VI with the basic hypothesis under consideration here would lead us to anticipate that the relationships observed there—increasingly neutral behavior toward non-offenders with more favorable attitudes and increasingly positive behavior toward offenders with more favorable attitudes—would be more pronounced in Boston than in Chicago or Washington. However, if the overall pattern for non-offenders does indeed reflect a redefinition of "good" behavior as impersonal rather than friendly behavior, the tendency toward impersonal behavior with increasingly favorable attitudes ought to be strongest in the departments where the redefinition process has been the most effective. These would most likely be the

more legalistic departments, where greater effort is made to inculcate impersonality of treatment as an ideal. For the three cities under consideration here, that would mean stronger tendencies toward impersonal treatment with increasingly favorable attitudes in Chicago and Washington than in Boston.

Table 8.9a reveals that it is the subtler second hypothesis, rather than the simpler, first one that is borne out. Both the ascending percentages in the third row of each partial table and the appropriate measures of association—a gamma calculated on the table after the dependent variable has been folded at the neutral category, as described in Chapter VI—show that the tendency of less prejudiced policemen to treat non-offenders more impersonally is more pronounced in the legalistic Chicago and Washington departments and less pronounced in the watchman-like Boston department. These results agree precisely with what would be expected under the redefinition hypothesis and run counter to what would be expected under the competing hypothesis. Therefore, their emergence must be taken as a basis for preferring the former over the latter.

Chapter VI inferred from the emergence of a relationship between attitude and behavior for offenders which ran more to expected form—excepting, of course, the sharply higher rates of negative treatment toward black offenders among favorably disposed officers—that this process of redefinition of norms did not operate with respect to offenders and that offenders thus exposed themselves to the prejudice of the officer. Even if this is the case, according to the broad hypothesis under examination here, there should be

Table 8.9

Manner of White Policemen toward Black Citizens, by Policeman's Attitude toward Blacks, by City and by Citizen's Role

	City														
	Boston					Chicago					Washington				
	Attitude toward Blacks														
Manner	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total
a) Non-Offenders															
Very Negative	.3%	.2%	0.0%	0.0%	.2%	.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	.1%	.3%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	.7%
Negative	7.5	4.9	4.9	0.0	5.6	13.6	6.5	1.8	0.0	6.5	5.6	2.5	2.4	4.9	3.4
Neutral	73.6	72.0	80.4	0.0	73.1	64.8	78.8	83.8	82.4	77.4	84.5	91.2	92.9	93.4	89.7
Positive	18.6	22.9	14.7	0.0	21.2	21.0	14.6	14.4	17.6	16.0	9.6	5.3	4.7	1.6	6.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	295	824	102	0	1221	162	372	222	17	773	627	1458	253	61	2399
Tau-b		.024					.041					-.027			
Folded Gamma		-.039					-.292					-.278			
b) Offenders															
Very Negative	0.0%	.4%	0.0%	0.0%	.3%	4.3%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1.8%	2.7%	1.7%	2.6%	0.0%	2.1%
Negative	20.6	27.2	40.0	0.0	26.8	25.8	24.0	17.3	54.5	23.6	29.2	20.6	15.7	38.9	22.7
Neutral	60.3	49.2	36.0	0.0	50.4	51.6	58.7	55.1	45.5	55.6	61.1	67.5	72.2	61.1	66.3
Positive	19.1	23.2	24.0	0.0	22.4	18.3	15.6	27.6	0.0	18.9	7.1	10.2	9.6	0.0	9.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	68	250	25	0	343	93	179	98	11	381	226	462	115	18	821
Tau-b		-.039					.073					.076			
Folded Gamma		.249					-.039					-.124			

less relationship between racial prejudice and manner toward black
offenders in a legalistic department than in watchman-like depart-
ments. Unfortunately, Table 8.9b reveals nothing as simple. The
relationship observed in Table 6.30b, with increasingly favorable
attitudes leading toward increasingly favorable treatment (except
among the most favorably disposed officers, who treat black offen-
ders the most negatively of all), persists in the legalistic depart-
ments, Chicago and Washington. This indicates, at the least, that
the overall relationship is not spurious. However, the relationship
completely dissolves in Boston and is replaced by one in which,
quite definitely, the most prejudiced officers are the most likely
to treat offenders impersonally—a point emphasized neatly by the
sign and magnitude of the folded gamma. This runs counter to any
expectation and is hard to interpret as anything other than an
anomaly.

In more vivid fashion than was the case for any of the other
individual differences examined here, the relationships between racial
attitudes and police behavior reiterate two important points—that
relationships between individual attitudes and behavior are not merely
the spurious artifacts of inter-departmental differences and that
organization does indeed affect these relationships. In two of the
three comparisons made, findings are consistent with expectations.
Relationships between racial prejudice and arrest are indeed stronger
in the more traditional department than in the more modern depart-
ments. Consistent with the redefinition hypothesis advanced in

Chapter VI, more favorable racial attitudes are associated with
a more impersonal manner toward non-offenders only in the more
modern departments. Only in the case of manner toward offenders do
results not fit with expectations. Obviously, all this does not
offer much support for the simple hypothesis derived from Wilson,
but it does again suggest that organization may be an important
moderating variable and that its effects may vary from one dimension
of behavior to another.

Multivariate Models of Organizational Differences in the Impact of Individual Characteristics

Though the preceding analysis has demonstrated that the relation-
ships between individual factors and behavior are not the spurious
results of inter-departmental differences, one remaining concern
is whether the relationships between each of the individual charac-
teristics and behavior within each of the cities are real ones or,
rather, the spurious products of other individual characteristics.
As in Chapter VI, the tool employed to assess the internal validity
of these relationships is multiple regression analysis. An innova-
tion here is the use of dummy variables and multiplicative dummy
terms to discern simultaneously the relationships within each of the
three cities.

Table 8.10 presents the results of such an analysis for arrest.
It parallels the one described in Table 6.31 in the use of a weighting
technique that adjusts for the dichotomous character of the dependent

Table 8.10

Regression of Arrest on Individual Difference Measures,
by City—Unstandardized Regression Coefficients

Independent Variable	City		
	Boston	Chicago	Washington
Adjusted Constant	.131	.136	.187
Length of Service	-.020	.122	.157
(Length of Service)^2	-.0004	-.025	-.043
Job Satisfaction	-.015	.029	.042
Race	-.110	.097	.027
Actual Constant	.238	-.091	-.037
	R = .184	R^2 = .034	N = 2210

variable. Nothing is found here to weaken the validity of the con-
clusions derived from the bivariate partial tables. In Boston,
increasing experience is consistently associated with lower arrest
rates, higher levels of satisfaction depress arrest rates very
slightly, and blacks arrest much less often than whites—though
that, it must be recalled, reflects the performance of an exceeding-
ly small number of black officers. In the more legalistic depart-
ments of Chicago and Washington, initial increases in arrest with
increasing experience are offset by later declines (with the coeffi-
cients delineating a sharper initial increase in Chicago and a
sharper subsequent decline in Washington). Satisfaction exerts
equally meager effects in both cities and the race of the policeman
exerts much stronger effects in Chicago than in Washington.

The adjusted constant figure represents the "average" arrest rate in each city once these individual differences have been taken into account—i.e., as if all the forces were equal in experience, morale, and racial composition.[7] As can be seen, they vary less than the percentages in Table 5.5. This indicates that the differences observed there are to some extent due to differences in the composition of the forces along these dimensions. The fact that the differences persist at all indicates that compositional differences are not the only cause of differences in arrest rates across the cities, but the fact that they are diminished suggests that it is partially through decisions about recruitment and retention which affect the composition of the force that departments—intentionally or inadvertently—affect the character of law enforcement. A particularly interesting feature of these adjusted intercepts is the near-convergence of the Boston and Chicago arrest rates. Once differences in the character of the force are washed out, there may be hardly any difference, it would appear, between a watchman-like department and a legalistic department—at least this watchman-like department and this legalistic department. The higher figure for Washington, even in the face of the partialling out of the individual factors, indicates the independent effectiveness of other organizational devices in increasing subordinate compliance with organizational policies. Finally, to return to a familiar theme, in spite of the insight into relationships which these results give us, they emphasize the overall weakness of effects. Even with inter-city and individual differences taken into account, the R^2 remains exceedingly low—only about 3%.

A parallel analysis of informal treatment is complicated by the necessary division into offenders and non-offenders, the initial weakness of the effects (as seen in Tables 6.34 and 6.35), the fact that some of the relationships involve changes in the tendency of informal treatment to deviate from neutrality, and a need to focus on black citizens alone in some cases and all citizens in others. As a result, presentation of this analysis in a form that does justice to all its complexities would be a very drawn-out exercise (twenty-four separate regression equations in all) with little emerging from it that has not already been seen in the bi-variate tables. Since the objective of this enterprise is simply to insure the internal validity of the results already presented, it will suffice to say that nothing emerges in those analyses to indicate that any of the effects observed are the spurious artifacts of other individual characteristics.

The relatively powerful effects—and cross-city differences in them—observed for measures of effort prove to hold up as well (Table 8.11). The magnitude of the R^2s attest to the former. The particular significance of increasing experience in Boston, the powerful effect which job satisfaction, in Chicago, and the race of the officer, in Washington, have on patrolling—all these are attested to by the individual coefficients, thus ensuring the validity of the conclusions drawn earlier. Here the strength of relationships is more encouraging—22% and 9% of variation explained. Further, the adjusted constants, by describing what the level of effort would be if all forces were at the average in terms of

Table 8.11

Regressions of Measures of Effort on Individual Differences Measures, by City—Unstandardized Regression Coefficients

	Dependent Variable					
	Average Number of Police-Initiated Contacts			Aggressiveness of Patrolling		
Independent Variable City	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Boston	Chicago	Washington
Adjusted Constant	.56	1.25	.54	2.64	2.59	3.26
Length of Service	-.16	-.15	-.11	-.30	-.12	-.04
Satisfaction with Job	-.02	-.01	-.05	.15	.43	.02
Race	.20	.36	.49	-.12	.00	.28
Constant	.76	1.21	.37	3.08	1.70	2.98
R		.472			.299	
R^2		.222			.089	
N		452			1186	

experience, morale, and racial balance, offer some insight into how organization works its effects. For initiation of contacts, once individual differences are taken into account, Boston and Washington (in contrast to their relative positions in Table 5.15) show equal rates of contact, while Chicago differs even more sharply than before. Compositional differences thus may produce the overall differences between Boston and Washington, while other factors account for the higher rate of contact in Chicago—probably departmental pressure to produce traffic citations.

Composition of the force appears to account for some of the difference in patrolling as well. The patrolling variable in Table 5.16 can be treated as a 1-3-5 scale and a mean then calculated for each city to reflect the average level of intensity of patrolling there. These means—Boston, 2.66; Chicago, 3.05; and Washington, 3.32—reflect, as do the percentages of the table, increasingly more aggressive patrolling as one moves from Boston to Chicago to Washington. The adjusted constants in Table 8.11 reflect the values of these same means once differences in the composition of the forces have been equalized at the mean for the sample as a whole. The pattern which emerges resembles that for arrest. Once compositional differences are partialled out, performance in Chicago is about the same as in Boston, while Washington stands apart at a higher level. This again suggests that the differences observed between Boston and Chicago are due to the kinds of personnel employed by the departments, while other factors—organizational training and directives, such as might be thought to be common in a reforming department—may account for the higher level of effort in Washington.

So the answer to the basic question raised at the outset of this section—whether or not the organizational setting can indeed influence the relationship between individual factors and arrest—must be an affirmative one. Most of the relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes and police behavior vary, depending on the organizational setting. Perhaps the primary exception to this rule is the inverse relationship between experience and arrest, which shows a fair amount of constancy across departments.

But the findings relating to a second expectation—that the strongest relationships would emerge in watchman-like departments and the weakest in legalistic departments—are considerably more mixed. In some instances, that is exactly what happens. For example, the impact of experience on the treatment of offenders and on effort and the impact of racial prejudice on the arrest decision are greater in the watchman-like department than in the legalistic departments. However, in many instances, though differences in relationships do emerge between departments, they are not consistent with the second expectation. Some of these variations in relationship—the differences across cities in the relationships between job satisfaction and arrest, between racial prejudice and interpersonal manner, for example—might be explained by positing a difference in the definition of norms across departments. In a legalistic department, to illustrate, the ideal interpersonal manner is an impersonal tone, rather than a friendly one. In a watchman-like department, avoiding arrests might be preferred to making arrests and an impersonal manner might be seen as a more negative response than an expressive—positively or negatively—one.

Still other differences, such as those in the relationships between experience and manner for non-offenders and all those involving race, can be accounted for only on ad hoc bases. These instances, in particular, point up the complexities of police behavior and the need for a fuller understanding of the specific circumstances prevailing in each police organization before inferences can be drawn

about the relationship between any particular individual charac-
teristics and behavior there.

Beyond addressing the basic hypotheses under consideration,
these results illuminate more fully some of the earlier observations.
As has been noted at several points, the persistence of most of the
relationships between individual factors and behavior within cities
demonstrates that those relationships are not the spurious products
of departmental differences. The comparisons of adjusted constants
with the city means presented in Chapter V shed some light on why
inter-city differences exist by showing that some of the differences
can be attributed to differences in the composition of police forces
and that some must be attributed to other factors.

Overall, organization proves to be a moderately successful
moderating variable. It does, to borrow Bem's phrase, seem "to
divide up the world into useful equivalence classes." By no means
is it a panacea for weaknesses in relationships between individual
factors and behavior. Indeed, it is startling to see how little
relationship there can be between an attitude and behavior in what
would seem to be the most conducive of circumstances—consider, for
example, the relationship between racial prejudice and the treatment
of black non-offenders in Boston shown in Table 8.9b. Nevertheless,
relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes, on
one side, and behavior, on the other, do appear to be contingent on
organization. The challenge lies in understanding why these differ-
ences emerge. The pursuit of that question seems destined to lead

to distinctions between organizations much finer than the coarse "watchman-legalistic" dimension employed here.

The Effects of Organization on the Impact
of Situational Characteristics

The preceding section approached, as is more commonly the case, the basic problem of the police organization from an individual-difference perspective. The basic problem of an organization was seen as keeping individual characteristics and attitudes from being translated into behavior. The evidence presented showed that the relationships between individual factors and behavior varied from organization to organization.

It is also possible to approach this problem from a situational perspective. The basic problem facing a police organization can be seen as keeping police behavior from varying across "irrelevant"—i.e., non-legal—situational characteristics. Relevant evidence here would be that showing relationships between situational charac-teristics and behavior to vary from organization to organization.

As suggested in Chapter III, the two perspectives differ both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, the former looks to internal sources of behavior, while the latter looks to external sources. Methodologically, the former relies on comparisons of behavior across individuals, holding situation constant, while the latter relies on comparisons of behavior across situations, holding individual constant. Nevertheless, they merge in that, although findings of cross-situational variation in behavior are obviously

consistent with the situationalist hypothesis, they can also be interpreted as evidence bearing indirectly on individual hypotheses. If actors are posited to have favorable attitudes toward stimulus A and unfavorable ones toward stimulus B, then a finding that their behavior toward stimulus A is more positive than their behavior toward stimulus B can be interpreted as supporting the importance of attitudes in influencing behavior. (Situationalists would, of course, here deny the need for the excess "mentalist" baggage.) They also merge in the practical sense that a police department which aspires to the ideal of uniform justice is, in either case, interested in seeing that behavior does not vary at all, whether it be from officer to officer or from situation to situation, except in accord with legally defined criteria.

So, either as a direct test of the organization's ability to control subordinates' response patterns or as an indirect test of the sort of individual difference hypotheses explored in the previous section, inter-organizational differences in relationships between situational factors and behavior merit attention.

Organizational Differences in Situational Effects on Arrest

Wilson's discussion of departmental styles again suggests the kinds of differences that might be expected to emerge with respect to arrest. Most fundamentally, in a legalistic department, the officer should ideally "act as if his duty were merely to compare observed behavior with a legal standard and make an arrest if that

standard has been violated . . . [arrests] are made as much as possible on the basis of a fixed, not a variable, standard of behavior."[9] In a watchman-like department, on the other hand, the officer judges

> the seriousness of infractions less by what the law says about them than by their immediate and personal conse- quences, which will differ in importance depending on the standards of the relevant group—teenagers, Negroes, pro- stitutes, motorists, families, and so forth. In all cases, circumstances of person and condition are taken seriously into account—community notables are excused because they have influence and, perhaps, because their conduct is self- regulating; Negroes are either ignored or arrested, depend- ing on the seriousness of the offense, because they have no influence and their conduct, except within broad limits, is not thought to be self-regulating.[9]

The expectation here, put in terms of the broad categories delineated at the beginning of Chapter VII, is that legal factors will be relatively important in legalistic departments and unimportant in watchman-like departments, while citizen characteristics will be important in watchman-like departments and unimportant in legalistic departments.

Wilson goes on to identify the degree to which a department relies on a standard of distributive justice as an important differ- ence between legalistic and watchman-like departments. Distributive justice to Wilson means "to give each person what he deserves and to judge what he deserves by how he acts and talks . . . A 'wise guy' deserves less than a 'good guy,' a man who does not accept police authority, and thus legal authority, deserves less than a man who does."[10] He argues that the watchman style "makes distributive

justice the standard for handling disorderly situations." This

contrasts with the legalistic style, in which policemen are

encouraged

> to take as their standard of justice one which assumes
> that the function of government is to punish, on the
> basis of individual culpability, those who depart from
> the behavior required by the law. Justice consists gen-
> erally of equals being treated equally, but in the legal-
> istic style equality does not depend on attributes of
> person but only on attributes of behavior. "All men are
> equal before the law" means that the only just distinc-
> tions that may be made among them are on the basis of
> their behavior in areas defined by the law. This cri-
> terion is, of course, rather different from the standard
> of distributive justice . . .[11]

The expectation here, then, is that the officer in a legalistic

department will be more sensitive to "behavior in areas defined by

the law"—the commission of actual offenses—while an officer in

a watchman-like department will be more sensitive to how a person

"acts and talks"—whether he is a "wise guy" or a "good guy,"

whether he accepts or rejects police authority. Wilson seems to

extend the same kind of rationale to another dimension of citizen

behavior treated earlier—the complainant's preference. Contrast-

ing policemen in the two types of departments, he notes that "the

police in following the legalistic style do not try to privatize

the handling of disputes and minor offenses" and cites instances in

which legalistic departments press a case even when the complainant

is willing to drop it.[12] This suggests that the complainant's

preference may be less influential in a legalistic department than

in a watchman-like department. So, to put it in the terms employed

in Chapter VII, in every respect, citizen behavior (outside the areas defined by the law) should affect outcomes more in a watchman-like department than in a legalistic department.

Wilson does not directly address the question of how the impact of structural factors should differ from one style of department to another. The most straightforward inference would be that such factors, being legally irrelevant, should have less effect in a legalistic department than in a watchman-like department.

To sum up, Wilson's discussion of departmental styles suggests that legal factors should show more relationship to police behavior in legalistic departments than in watchman-like departments, while citizen characteristics, citizen behavior, and perhaps structural factors should show more of a relationship to police behavior in watchman-like than in legalistic departments.

One way of testing these hypotheses would be to examine the regression coefficients of arrest on all these different situational factors, not for the sample as a whole (as in Table 7.10), but for each of the three cities separately. Based on what is known about the organizational structure and style of the departments in each of the three cities and what has been observed about the behavior in the three cities up to this point, it seems most appropriate to anticipate that Boston would manifest a watchman-like pattern of relationships and Chicago and Washington, a legalistic one.

Table 8.12 presents the results of an analysis designed to assess the validity of these expectations—unstandardized regression coefficients from three parallel regression analyses, each identical

Table 8.12

Regressions of Arrest on Situational Factors, by City

Independent Variable	Boston Regression Coefficient	Boston Standard Error	Chicago Regression Coefficient	Chicago Standard Error	Washington Regression Coefficient	Washington Standard Error
Adjusted Constant	.112		.169		.234	
Legal Characteristics						
Seriousness	.073	.018 W w*	.074	.015 S w	.202	.013 S s*
Evidence	-.006	.007 W w*	.020	.007 S s*	.006	.008 S w
Citizen Characteristics						
Class	-.015	.018 S w	-.009	.017 W w*	-.057	.014 W s
Race	-.001	.020 S w	.060	.020 W s	-.013	.019 W w*
Age	.080	.039 S s*	-.073	.042 W s	-.039	.033 W w*
(Age)²	-.009	.006	.006	.006	.006	.005
Sex	-.027	.021 S w	-.053	.020 W s	-.052	.015 W s
Citizen Behavior						
State	-.217	.083 S s*	-.022	.083 W w*	.100	.068 W s
(State)²	.059	.022	.000	.023	-.040	.020
Manner	.013	.090 S w	-.136	.092 W s	-.117	.064 W w*
(Manner)²	.003	.021	.049	.023	.034	.016
Comp. Preference	.068	.021 S s*	.020	.018 W w*	.075	.013 W s
Structural Characteristics						
Publicity	.007	.008 S w	-.031	.008 W s	.005	.006 W w*
Number of Citizens	-.009	.042 S w	-.047	.041 W w*	.003	.035 W w*
(Number of Citizens)²	.002	.006	.006	.006	.001	.005
Mobilization	-.055	.023 S s*	.002	.026 W w*	.004	.029 W w*
Number of Policemen	-.059	.020 S s*	-.026	.017 W w*	.049	.028 W w*
Constant	.059	.172	.374	.175	-.177	.152
R	.449		.397		.615	
R²	.202		.158		.378	
N	473		761		683	

Note:

W denotes weak predicted relationship

w denotes weak actual relationship

S denotes strong predicted relationship

s denotes strong actual relationship

* denotes agreement between predicted and actual relationship

to that from which the results presented in Table 7.10 were drawn, except that it is confined to interactions between offenders and officers of a single department.[13] Coefficients, because of the 0-1 scaling of the dichotomous dependent variable and the weighting procedure employed to adjust for heteroscedasticity, can again be interpreted as the change in the probability of being arrested associated with a one-unit change in the particular independent variable when all other independent variables are held constant.

In order to facilitate comparison of the empirical results with expectations, additional symbols accompany each coefficient. The capital letters "W" and "S" denote whether the relationship would, on the basis of the previous discussion, be expected to be a weak one or a strong one. The small letters "w" and "s" denote the actual magnitude of the relationship. Following the criterion stated earlier, any relationship for which the coefficient does not exceed twice its standard error is designated as a weak one. (One exception is for factors treated with squared terms. Here the same procedure described earlier, in footnote 10 of Chapter VI, is adopted.) Relationships which are not weak and are substantially stronger than the same relationships in at least one other city are designated strong ones. An asterisk denotes those instances in which the observation coincides with the expectation.

An inspection of the table reveals that the Wilson-based expectations are not, in general, borne out. Of the 39 predictions made, only 22 prove to be accurate. Given the binary choice of "weak" or "strong," this is only slightly better than what would be expected

if predictions were made randomly.[14] There are several possible explanations. One is, of course, that Wilson's theory is deficient—that the organizational style of a department does not determine the kinds of situational factors that are or are not important influences on the arrest decision. A second is that the empirical expectations have not been properly derived from Wilson's discussion. A third is that the characterization of departmental styles is inaccurate—that Boston is really not watchman-like or Chicago or Washington is not really legalistic. A fourth is that measurement error in the independent and dependent variables renders this data useless for detecting the subtle differences in relationships that may actually exist.

The second explanation gains credence from the fact that expectations regarding the effects of some of the factors—particularly, the structural ones—were inferred from Wilson's discussion rather than drawn directly from it. The best corrective for this is to focus only on those factors that Wilson himself explicitly designates as important. In the terms used here, these are seriousness, class, race, sex, emotional state, manner, and complainant's preference. Focusing on the 24 relevant predictions alone, only 11 prove accurate—an even smaller proportion than initially. So the relationships imputed to Wilson are not responsible for the lack of fit between expectations and observations. Thus it does not seem that improper derivations from Wilson's discussion are a reason for the inaccuracy in prediction.

The third explanation gains credence from the fact that the style of the Washington department is uncertain—being in transition, it is neither clearly watchman-like nor legalistic. A remedy for this problem is to focus only on Boston and Chicago, departments which Reiss and Wilson himself (as mentioned in Chapter IV) have characterized as "traditional" and "professionalized," respectively. Considering again only the eight situational factors on which Wilson has advanced clear expectations, relationships should be stronger in Chicago for one—seriousness—and stronger in Boston for the rest. This narrowest of tests fares even more badly than the broader ones for, in all but two instances—the citizen's emotional state and the complainant's preference—expectations are not borne out. There is no general pattern, in other words, of legal factors playing a more important role in Chicago than in Boston or of citizen characteristics and behavior playing a more important role in Boston than in Chicago.

Another possibility, following the suggestion in Chapter V, is that Washington, as a department under reform, might actually be more legalistic than Chicago. If so, perhaps the better comparison would be between Boston and Washington. But here again, in only two of the eight key comparisons—seriousness and age—do the coefficients fall into the expected pattern. So again the expectations derived from Wilson are not realized.

One remaining possibility is that none of the departments studied—neither Boston, Chicago, nor Washington—is a pure enough

representative of its style for the expected differences to emerge clearly. The only definitive solution to this problem is to find departments that are pure representatives of the types and examine the factors that determine behavior in them. That would resolve the theoretical question of whether the determinants of behavior do in fact differ from one organizational style to another. However, even so, the failure of differences to emerge in departments that are, on the face of things, as different as Reiss and Wilson say Boston and Chicago are calls into question the utility of the style typology as a practical device for understanding differences in behavior across most police departments.

The fourth and final explanation is perhaps the most difficult to rule out. Both what has been said about the methodology of the study and what has been seen in the results of tne study thus far suggest that measurement error is great in these data. And it may be that measurement error is such that it completely obscures subtle differences in relationships across the three cities. A definitive resolution of this problem awaits a replication of the basic design with improved methods of assessing both independent and dependent variables. For now, though, at least three things can be said.

First, random measurement error attenuates relationships. Given the equivalence of observer selection, training, and supervision in each of the three cities, there is no reason to think that random measurement error is any greater in one city than another. Therefore,

relationships should be attenuated about equally in all the cities. Thus the relative magnitudes of coefficients should not be disturbed. Even in the face of random measurement error, then, patterns would be expected to hold up. That they do not suggests that the basic problem more likely lies with the theory than with the measurement.

Second, there is not what could be called a fatal lack of relationship in these data. R^2s are not strong, but neither are they inconsequential, particularly considering the origins of the data. Further, Wilson's discussion suggests that fifteen of these relationships should be "strong." By the criteria adopted, the number of relationships that are strong is sixteen. The problem is not so much that coefficients are not strong as it is that the strong coefficients are not the right ones.

Third, it seems likely that the amount of measurement error differs from variable to variable. The dependent variable here—whether or not a person is taken to the station—is probably relatively free of error because it describes an easily observable and salient event. The same can also be said of some of the independent variables. Though seriousness of offense or citizen's emotional state may be fairly difficult to judge, such basic physical characteristics as a person's race and sex and perhaps even age can probably be recorded quite accurately. If Wilson's theory were right, but measurement error was obscuring results, expectations for these more easily measured factors would be borne out more often than expectations for the more difficult-to-measure factors. That such is

not the case is apparent for the coefficients for race and age and sex. Of the nine predictions there, only three prove accurate. And out of the six predictions for the two most easily observed variables, race and sex, only one proves accurate. This suggests quite strongly that the problem is more with the hypothesis than with the measurement.

Insofar as can be determined from these data, then, the relationship which Wilson hypothesizes to exist between organizational style and the weight which various situational factors have on the arrest decision does not appear to exist. The relationship does not emerge and alternative explanations for its failure to emerge have, to the extent possible, been ruled out.

The question then arises whether, even if expectations based on Wilson's discussion are not borne out, there is any support for some other variant of the broad hypothesis under examination here— that the impact of situational factors on arrest varies systematically from city to city. Unfortunately, the coefficients in Table 8.12 manifest no overall patterns suggestive of any alternative hypothesis. No particular category of factors in one city appears to be more important than another category in the same city or the same category in another city. In no city does the pattern of relationships seem to parallel that in another city.

This is not, of course, to say that there are not differences across the cities. The most striking is the much stronger relationship between seriousness and arrest in Washington—a difference which is

the primary reason for the greater explanatory power of the model
in Washington than elsewhere. Also interesting are the differences
across cities in the relationship between age and arrest. In
Boston, the age coefficients delineate a positive relationship, with
the younger less likely to be arrested than the older. In Chicago,
the relationship is just the opposite (again the standard errors
are misleadingly inflated here) with the younger more likely to be
taken in, once other factors are taken into account. In Washington,
the same is true, though the coefficients are not stable enough to
place much confidence in them. This suggests that one of Wilson's
specific projections is at least partly right—juveniles in a more
watchman-like department are less likely to be taken in than adults.
However, in a more legalistic department, they run, not the same
chances of arrest as adults, but even higher chances.

Finally, differences in the relationship of arrest to struc-
tural factors raise some interesting questions. If mobilization
is, as has been argued, a good measure of visibility to the organi-
zation, then it is not surprising that diminished visibility to the
organization reduces the arrest rates in a traditional department
while not affecting it in the more modern departments—at least if
legalistic departments are staffed by officers motivated by a sense
of professionalism rather than a fear of being caught and disciplined.

Differences in professionalism might also account for the
differences observed in the relationship between the number of police-
men and arrest. The negative coefficient for Boston suggests that,

in a non-professional department, the presence of a partner may provide the opportunity—and perhaps the social support—for "taking it easy." In a more professional department, on the other hand, where motivation is more likely to be based internally, the presence of a partner should make less difference, as appears to be the case in Chicago and Washington.

But these, it must be emphasized, are only hints of structure in what overall appears to be a decidedly unstructured set of results. (Indeed, their occurrence is not so frequent that the possibility that they occur by chance can be ruled out. This possibility, and an alternative, will be discussed at the end of this chapter.) It is safe to say that these data provide no support for any broad hypothesis asserting that the effects of legal factors, citizen characteristics, citizen behavior, or structural characteristics on arrest vary systematically across police departments.

Though these multiple regression results do not support the basic hypothesis under consideration, they do nevertheless allow the examination of one important and still unanswered question raised earlier in these pages. In Chapter V, it was found that arrest rates differed from city to city. The provisional conclusion drawn there was that these differences reflected differences in departmental style, but the possibility that they might stem from, among other things, differences in the characteristics of situations across the three cities was also noted. As a means of buttressing that earlier conclusion, it is desirable to adjust the rates presented earlier (in Table 5.5) for differences in situations across cities. The

multiple regression equations of Table 8.12 provide a mechanism for doing that. By entering into the equations the overall means for each of the independent variables, a predicted score can be calculated for each city that describes what the arrest rate in each city would be if situations in all three cities were the same—that is, if there were no differences between cities in the seriousness of crime, racial composition of the population, or the deference of offenders to the police, for example. These predicted scores appear as the adjusted constants in Table 8.12. For Boston and Chicago, they are virtually identical to the unadjusted rates. For Washington, the adjusted rate is slightly lower than the unadjusted rate, but it remains substantially above that for the other two cities. This indicates that the higher arrest rate in Washington can, in some small measure, be attributed to differences in the characteristics of situations there, but that overall the differences in arrest rates across cities cannot be laid to situational differences. Instead, they must flow from other factors, among them differences in the composition of the forces (as demonstrated earlier in this chapter) and perhaps differences in organizational policies and procedures.

Organizational Differences in Situational
Effects on Manner

The discouraging results for arrest, for which expectations were fairly clear, bode ill for the examination of the relationships between situational factors and informal treatment, where expectations are considerably less clear. The lack of clear expectations results,

it can again be said, primarily from the failure of students of the police to devote much attention to the informal side of police behavior, politically important as it may be. Wilson does, however, suggest that organizational style will impinge on the relationships between situational factors and the informal aspects of behavior as well as the formal aspects of behavior, writing that officers

> can distinguish among classes and personalities and they recognize that <u>language</u> appropriate to one class or personality type may not be appropriate to another. Indeed, the watchman style encourages officers to take personal differences into account both in enforcing the law and in <u>addressing the citizen</u>. Thus, citizens are viewed as "deserving" various forms of address (emphasis added).[15]

This contrasts with the legalistic department's emphasis on uniform, impersonal behavior. There

> the officers are instructed to do their duty impersonally and with minimum involvement, especially with suspects.[16]

Wilson explicitly posits, then, that there will be more relationship between the characteristics and behavior (or "personalities") of citizens and the policeman's manner toward them in watchman-like than in legalistic departments. Given the alleged emphasis on distributive justice—giving people what they "deserve"—in watchman-like departments, it also seems reasonable to expect stronger relationships between legal factors and the policeman's manner in watchman-like than in legalistic departments, at least for offenders. A patrolman in a legalistic department would strive, ideally, to treat every offender impersonally, no matter how serious the offense or how clearly the offender was implicated. A "watchman," on the other hand, might be inclined to treat more harshly those he knew

to have committed a more serious offense or against whom he had
more compelling evidence—especially if he thought the offender
might be let off easily later on. Expectations with regard to
structural factors are again less certain, though it makes the most
sense to posit that these differences in visibility would probably
have more effect on the unprofessional (and externally motivated)
officers of a watchman-like department than on the professional
(and internally motivated) officers of a legalistic department. All
in all, then, these situational factors, individually and collec-
tively, should have more impact in the watchman-like Boston depart-
ment than in the more legalistic Chicago and Washington departments.

An examination of R^2s for six regression equations, one each
for offenders and non-offenders in each city (Table 8.13) reveals
that the expectations about collective effects are not borne out
very convincingly. It is true that, for offenders, situational
factors explain somewhat more of the variance in Boston than in
Chicago and in Chicago than in Washington. But differences are not
great and, more important, the pattern does not hold up for non-
offenders. There the combined effect of situational factors is
equal in Boston and Washington and slightly lower in Chicago. Given
the relatively small differences and the inconsistency of results for
offenders and non-offenders, this part of the analysis must be
regarded as inconclusive.

More conclusive evidence against the hypothesis comes from the
individual regression coefficients. Relationships do not appear,

Table 8.13

Regression of Manner on Situational Characteristics, by Citizen's Role and by City— Standardized Regression Coefficients

	Citizen's Role					
Independent Variable	Non-Offenders			Offenders		
	Boston	Chicago	Washington	Boston	Chicago	Washington
Legal Characteristics						
Seriousness	-.063 (.021)Ss°	-.071 (.021)Hs	.017 (.016)Hw°	-.076 (.046)Sw	-.043 (.031)Hw°	.018 (.031)Hw°
Evidence	-.116 (.022)Ss°	-.003 (.023)Hw°	-.023 (.016)Hw°	-.073 (.044)Sw	-.078 (.033)Hs	-.099 (.036)Hs
Citizen Characteristics						
Class	-.013 (.022)Sw	.047 (.023)Hw°	.118 (.017)Ws	.071 (.041)Sw	.083 (.031)Hs	.009 (.029)Hw°
Race	.027 (.022)Sw	-.004 (.023)Ww°	-.038 (.017)Ww°	.149 (.040)Ss°	.000 (.031)Hw°	-.042 (.030)Hw°
Sex	.030 (.022)Sw	.027 (.021)Ww°	.022 (.016)Ww°	.061 (.037)Sw	.096 (.028)Ws	.057 (.027)Ww°
Age	-.335 (.091)Sw	-.041 (.093)Ww°	-.257 (.067)Ww°	-.189 (.201)Sw	.223 (.166)Ww°	-.111 (.139)Ww°
$(Age)^2$	.316 (.090)	-.011 (.093)	.194 (.067)	.296 (.200)	-.170 (.165)	.101 (.138)
Citizen Behavior						
State	.210 (.110)Ss°	.415 (.105)Ww°	.276 (.077)Ww°	-.243 (.194)Sw	.687 (.152)Hw°	.394 (.149)Ww°
$(State)^2$	-.131 (.110)	-.359 (.105)	-.213 (.077)	.169 (.192)	-.615 (.150)	-.433 (.147)
Manner	.079 (.089)Ss°	.283 (.087)Hs	.169 (.077)Hs	.261 (.209)Ss°	-.113 (.153)Ws	.568 (.138)Hs
$(Manner)^2$	-.105 (.089)	-.399 (.087)	-.005 (.077)	-.434 (.214)	-.107 (.154)	-.712 (.140)
Structural Characteristics						
Publicity	.027 (.021)Sw	-.021 (.021)Ww°	.020 (.017)Ww°	.045 (.040)Sw	.032 (.033)Hw°	.019 (.031)Ww°
Number of Citizens	.030 (.021)Sw	-.039 (.021)Ww°	.023 (.016)Ww°	-.027 (.038)Sw	.004 (.032)Ww°	-.169 (.030)Ws
Mobilization	.078 (.022)Ss°	.015 (.023)Ww°	-.017 (.016)Ww°	-.223 (.039)Ss°	.013 (.036)Ww°	-.130 (.034)Hs
Number of Policeman	-.070 (.022)Ss°	-.058 (.021)Ws	-.028 (.015)Ww°	-.053 (.042)Sw	-.078 (.029)Hs	-.015 (.027)Hw°
R	.276	.225	.275	.414	.368	.326
R^2	.076	.051	.076	.172	.136	.106
N	2329	2365	4013	693	1168	1268

Notes: 1) Entries in parentheses are standard error of betas

2) Symbols used here have the same meaning as in Table 8.12

in general, to be stronger in Boston than in Washington or Chicago. Adopting the same strategy employed in the analysis of arrest and projecting here that strong relationships should emerge in Boston and weak ones in Chicago and Washington, only 43 of 72 expectations are realized—again, only slightly better than would be expected by chance.

That it is the hypothesis that is at fault and not the procedures used to test it is suggested by analyses parallel to those conducted for arrest. The possibility that unwarranted inferences from Wilson's discussion are responsible is addressed by focusing only on the characteristics and behavior of citizens. Even in that select group, only 21 of 36 predictions—about the same percentage as before—are borne out. The possibility that the inclusion of Washington is confounding the test is diminished by focusing only on Boston and Chicago. A head-to-head comparison of these two cities on only the more crucial "characteristics and behavior" factors shows that in only 2 of 12 comparisons does Boston actually show a greater relationship than Chicago. Finally, the possibility that measurement error is responsible is diminished by the failure of the expected patterns to emerge more clearly for the most easily measured variables—race, sex, and age. Not surprisingly, then, in view of the results for arrest and the weaker set of expectations here, Wilson's hypothesis does not appear to be supported for manner either.

Also not surprisingly, in view of the results for arrest, no other consistent patterns of relationship emerge in the coefficients

of Table 8.13. Thus there is really no basis here for positing
any alternative explanation of differences across organizations in
the impact of situational factors. As with arrest, some striking
differences do emerge. Note, for example, among non-offenders, the
substantially greater impact of evidence in Boston and class in
Washington. For offenders, race seems to have a particularly great
effect in Boston, number of citizens in Washington, and mobilization
in both Boston and Washington. Unfortunately, it is hard to account
for these theoretically on anything other than a blatantly ad hoc
basis.

The attempts to discern organizational differences in the
impact of situational factors on arrest and manner have followed
parallel courses. In neither instance was any evidence found to
support Wilson's contention that the impact of legal and non-legal
factors would vary according to the organizational style of the
police department. In neither instance have any broad patterns
suggestive of an alternative explanation emerged. In both instances,
however, particular factors have appeared to be of particular impor-
tance in particular cities.

Two explanations might be advanced for this lack of structure
in both sets of results. One is that the differences which do emerge
are simply the result of chance. Though the magnitude and the
stability of some of the coefficients observed argue for the reality
of the relationships, given the problems with measurement error, this

is a possibility that must be seriously entertained—at least until a study of this sort is replicated with improved measurement techniques.

Another possibility is that these differences reflect differences in specific policies, practices, and circumstances across the three cities and departments. For example, it may be that officers in the different departments are explicitly or implicitly encouraged to handle certain kinds of citizens and situations in certain kinds of ways. This possibility points in the direction of a thorough examination of the specific policies and circumstances within each of these departments and cities at the time of the study (something that was adjudged beyond the scope of this study—indeed, for a single department, it would be a dissertation in itself). Such an effort might, first of all, provide a better basis for understanding some of the idiosyncratic patterns which emerge in the tables of this chapter. Beyond that, and more important, it might provide the basis for a new set of conceptual distinctions, on the order of Wilson's typology, that would allow accurate projections of which individual and situational characteristics are likely to be important determinants of behavior in particular kinds of police departments.

Footnotes for Chapter VIII

1. Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), pp. 219-223. See also James Q. Wilson, "The Bureaucracy Problem," The Public Interest, No. 6 (Winter, 1967): 3-9; and also his Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 1-3, 173.

2. Wilson, Varieties, pp. 151-155.

3. Ibid., pp. 183-187.

4. Ibid., p. 144.

5. Ibid., p. 180.

6. James Q. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect: The Chicago Case," in The Police, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 157.

7. The adjusted constant represents the level of the dependent variable in each city if the composition of the force in that city were identical to the composition of the entire officer sample. It is obtained by calculating a predicted score from the set of regression coefficients in each city using the sample means for each of the independent variables as the value for each of the independent variables.

8. Wilson, Varieties, p. 172, p. 179.

9. Ibid., p. 141.

10. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

11. Ibid., pp. 157, 188-189.

12. Ibid., pp. 173-174, 176-177.

13. Parallel analyses were performed here instead of a single analysis with interaction terms because of a desire to compare the overall explanatory power of situational factors across the three cities and because, with the large number of situational factors and the two additional multiplicative terms necessary for each, the number of independent variables would become unwieldy.

14. One other question, not flowing from Wilson's discussion, merits attention here. Chapter VII noted that, as a general rule, officers can arrest on "reasonable cause" in felony cases, but must actually witness the act to arrest in a misdemeanor case. But it was also noted that the exact criteria differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the case of the jurisdictions studied here, through the usual rule holds in Boston, the Illinois statute in force in Chicago permits misdemeanor arrests on "probable cause" as well. The law in Washington permits such arrests in some circumstances.

The question arises whether the effects of these variations in legal standards can be discerned in these data. Because the coefficients in Table 8.12 state the effect of evidence for all offenses, not just misdemeanors, they cannot resolve the question. However, multivariate tables identical in form to Table 7.3—one for each city—allow an answer. They reveal the difference in arrest rates for "police witness" misdemeanor and for "citizen witness" and "other reasonable evidence" misdemeanors to be no less in Chicago (in proportional terms) than in Washington or Boston. The difference in legal requirements, then, seems to make little difference at the behavioral level.

15. Ibid., p. 157

16. Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect," p. 160.

CHAPTER IX

THE INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND SITUATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Recent literature in psychology and social psychology, Chapter III demonstrated, emphasizes the need to take into account the qualities of both the actor and the situation in which he acts in order to understand the action which takes place. Though some scholars, particularly psychologists, have concluded that such a synthesis can take place only at the idiographic level—with behavior seen as organized at the particular-person-within-a-particular-situation level—the evidence to date has not ruled out the possibility that behavior may be organized on a higher level. To be specific, there remains the possibility that individuals and situations can be arranged along fairly general dimensions of difference and that these dimensions of difference may manifest themselves in behavior in some, if not all, circumstances.

In practical terms, what this means is that, even though—as the results of Chapters VI and VII have demonstrated—individual and situational characteristics may not generally have powerful influences on behavior, there is nevertheless good reason to think that they will under some conditions. Chapters III and IV suggest as perhaps most promising the possibilities that situational factors may bear stronger relationships to behavior for some kinds of individuals than for others and that individual factors may exert more of an influence on behavior in some kinds of situations than in others.

The Effects of Individual Differences on the Impact
of Situational Characteristics

An attempt to test the hypothesis that individuals will vary in

their sensitivity to situational factors runs, in this instance,

into some immediate obstacles. First, as noted earlier, dramatic

variations in characteristics are simply not found among these police-

men, they being a fairly homogenous group of white, working class

males. (Thus the kinds of differences between males and females and

between "normal" and disturbed people which Endler and Hunt, Moos,

and others report cannot be examined here.) Second, the kinds of

individual differences which might be particularly pertinent to police

work—authoritarianism and professionalism are two dimensions which

come immediately to mind—were not assessed by the original investi-

gators. A possible exception to this—a variable that was measured

and that might theoretically be expected to condition responses to

situational variations—is the amount of time an officer has served

on the force. Though crudely measured along a four-point ordinal

scale, it nevertheless is of considerable theoretical promise because,

as reported in Chapter III, a common finding of the psychologists has

been that the longer a person is in an environment and the more

familiar one becomes with it, the more impact situational factors

have on the behavior of the person. This general notion of increas-

ing sensitivity to environmental variation with increasing experience

in the environment dovetails nicely with the popular stereotype of

the older policeman as an experienced professional who has, as a result

of his interaction with his environment, developed a keen and unerring sense of people and place. This implies, in short, an increase in the responsiveness of the policeman to situational factors over the course of his police career. But a common counter-theme holds that this increasing responsiveness to situation focuses on the non-legal rather than the legal aspects of the situation. Typically, rookie policemen are seen as initially being excessively prone to follow the letter of the law. As they gain more experience, they learn how to "handle the situation." This implies a decrease in the influence which legal factors exert on decisions over the course of the police career.

Individual Differences in Situational Effects on Arrest

Table 9.1 presents results addressing this question—coefficients from four regression analyses of arrest on situational factors identical to the analysis described in Table 7.10, except that here a separate analysis has been done for each of the four experience cohorts. R^2's demonstrate that, contrary to the broad expectations set forth above, situational factors do not account for more variance among the more experienced officers. In fact, the arrest decisions of the least experienced officers are definitely best accounted for by situational factors and there is little difference across the other cohorts. The reason for this, it turns out, may be directly related to the second hypothesis advanced above—that young officers will be more influenced by legal factors than older officers.

Table 9.1

Regressions of Arrest on Situational Characteristics, by Length of Service of Policemen—Unstandardized Regression Coefficients

Independent Variable	0 - 2 Years	2 - 8 Years	8 - 15 Years	15 or More Years
Legal Characteristics				
Seriousness	.148 (.020*)	.126 (.016)	.115 (.017)	.077 (.023)
Evidence	-.005 (.011)	.014 (.008)	.010 (.008)	-.002 (.011)
Citizen Characteristics				
Class	-.072 (.023)	-.066 (.018)	.011 (.016)	-.013 (.028)
Race	.017 (.022)	.036 (.020)	.012 (.018)	.019 (.043)
Sex	-.036 (.026)	-.036 (.021)	-.044 (.018)	-.016 (.029)
Age	-.034 (.050)	-.078 (.047)	-.063 (.045)	.083 (.049)
(Age)^2	.002 (.008)	.012 (.007)	.007 (.007)	-.009 (.007)
Citizen Behavior				
Emotional State	-.252 (.097)	.073 (.080)	.053 (.084)	.004 (.123)
(Emotional State)^2	.069 (.027)	-.022 (.022)	-.035 (.024)	-.003 (.032)
Manner	.187 (.111)	-.163 (.089)	-.162 (.090)	-.046 (.131)
(Manner)^2	-.039 (.025)	.041 (.022)	.043 (.023)	.019 (.033)
Complainant's Prof.	.077 (.023)	.074 (.020)	.050 (.017)	.083 (.031)
Structural Characteristics				
Publicity	-.020 (.012)	-.030 (.008)	.006 (.008)	.016 (.013)
Number of Citizens	-.019 (.046)	-.082 (.040)	-.143 (.047)	.069 (.056)
(Number of Citizens)^2	.004 (.007)	.018 (.006)	.019 (.007)	-.009 (.008)
Mobilization	.033 (.035)	.082 (.027)	-.052 (.024)	-.099 (.038)
Number of Policemen	.053 (.024)	-.086 (.024)	-.004 (.018)	-.067 (.027)
Constant	-.118 (.233)	.260 (.176)	.419 (.170)	-.260 (.263)
R	.597	.470	.499	.463
R^2	.357	.220	.249	.214
N	262	833	604	190

*Entry in parentheses is the standard error of the regression coefficient.

500

But before proceeding further, the precautionary "may be" deserves some elaboration. Division of the sample by the amount of experience that the officer has leads, because of the uneven distribution along that variable, to two of the regressions being based on fairly small numbers of cases. These small numbers, combined with data in which measurement error is undoubtedly rife and the small size of the coefficients for the sample as a whole, lead to coefficients that are quite unstable. Indeed, a look across some rows of this table (for example, mobilization or number of policemen) is cause for great discouragement because the coefficients for some of the factors appear to vary randomly, with no evidence of a consistent trend, much less a consistent trend that makes theoretical sense. Because of the obvious danger of over-interpreting the results, it is necessary to be extremely conservative in drawing conclusions from them.

Even operating under that standard, however, one pattern does emerge convincingly from these results. That is the steady decline in the coefficient for the seriousness of the offense. In simple terms, the longer an officer has served on the force, the less his decision to arrest is conditioned on the seriousness of the offense. Consistent with the second hypothesis advanced above, the least experienced officers' arrest decisions are strongly influenced by the seriousness of the crime; for more experienced officers, this is a much less decisive factor. The image of the young officer who has to learn not to just go "by the book" receives substantial support

in these data.[1] In fact, the differences in the impact of serious-
ness across experience cohorts are alone sufficient to account for
much of the drop-off in the explanatory power of the models.

The only other reliable differences across cohorts are a
decline in the impact of class—for which no theoretical explana-
tion suggests itself—and evidence from the coefficients for emo-
tional state that the tendency of officers to respond negatively to
offenders who are detached in their manner exists only among the
youngest officers. This may be because the least experienced offi-
cers are least skilled in handling aloof offenders and therefore
are most often driven to employ their formal authority to "take
charge" of a situation.

Individual Differences in Situational Effects on Manner

Though the overpowering effects of the decline in the impor-
tance of seriousness of offense invalidate the hypothesis under
consideration here in the case of arrest, the hypothesis appears to
fare somewhat better in the case of the manner of the policeman.
As Table 9.2 shows, for both offenders and non-offenders, situa-
tional factors do have the greatest impact for the most experienced
officers and less of an impact for the less experienced. This in-
crease is particularly vivid in the treatment of offenders, where
the percentage of variation explained in informal treatment—about
22%—rises to a level higher than that observed in any other sub-
division of the data.

Table 9.2

Regression of Manner on Situational Characteristics, by Citizen's Role, by Length of Service of Policeman—Standardized Regression Coefficients

Independent Variable Role:	Non-Offenders				Offenders			
	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15+ Years	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15+ Year
Legal Characteristics								
Seriousness	-.074	-.034	-.057	.011	-.066	-.042	.019	.003
Evidence	-.007	-.023	-.062	-.150	.083	-.081	-.065	-.097
Citizen Characteristics								
Class	-.065	.089	.025	.021	.045	.019	.075	.086
Race	-.045	-.068	-.009	-.002	.045	.004	.003	.062
Sex	.028	.017	.079	.042	.097	.094	.058	.123
Age	.043	-.337	-.175	-.326	-.138	.076	-.015	-.058
(Age)^2	-.002	.270	.111	.259	.067	-.053	.056	.250
Citizen Behavior								
Emotional State	.289	.391	.329	-.145	.593	.664	.255	-.435
(Emotional State)^2	-.251	-.344	-.270	.251	-.632	-.623	-.318	.355
Manner	-.364	.123	-.107	.224	-.139	.245	.924	-.532
(Manner)^2	.177	-.256	-.082	-.366	.024	-.426	-1.090	.265
Structural Characteristics								
Publicity	.011	.002	.031	.044	-.163	.027	.094	.061
Number of Citizens	-.032	.015	.011	-.006	-.154	-.069	-.119	-.022
Mobilization	-.038	.008	.035	.063	-.177	-.073	-.148	-.151
Number of Police	.079	-.107	.001	-.111	-.174	-.049	.001	-.139
R	.253	.280	.257	.300	.368	.337	.356	.474
R^2	.064	.078	.066	.090	.136	.113	.127	.225
N	864	4506	2209	739	338	1647	718	292

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These results are, on their face, consistent with the hypo-
thesis that situational factors will account for a greater share
of the variance in behavior for those more experienced in a milieu
than for those less experienced. However, a closer look engenders
a greater sense of caution about these results. First, and most
evident, the differences across the first three cohorts are rela-
tively slight and do not indicate any consistent upward trend
during this period. Only for the last cohort is the impact of
situation substantially greater. If increasing exposure to an
environment increased sensitivity to variations in it, one would
expect instead that change would be greatest early in the period,
as one became familiar with the major features of the setting, and
then would slow down as less and less which is novel was encountered.

Second, and most important, the movement of many of the coeffi-
cients across cohorts is so inconsistent as to raise a serious ques-
tion of whether or not any systematic process underlies the eleva-
tion of the R^2's among the oldest officers. Clearly, the seriousness
of the offense is not involved; that, as was the case for arrest,
declines in importance across cohorts, indicating that more experi-
enced policemen are less inclined to be particularly harsh in more
serious cases. A close look at the coefficients (including the un-
standardized coefficients not shown here) suggests several possi-
bilities as promising reasons for the increase. For offenders, the
role of class increases after an initial decline. The manner of the
citizen also is noticeably more potent for the most experienced

officers. For non-offenders, the character of the evidence and the mobilization type become progressively more important. However, it is hard to understand why the general hypothesis should manifest itself most clearly with respect to these particular variables.

In fact, in only one instance is a pattern observed that offers any new insight into how an officer's response to a situational characteristic might vary with his experience. This is in the case of the age of the citizen—a connection which makes intuitive sense because the amount of experience an officer has is strongly related to his own age—a correlation of about .93, in fact[2]—and it seems plausible that age differentials between officer and citizen might influence behavior. An inspection of the age coefficients in Table 9.2—and an application of the summing rule for interpretation suggested in Chapter VII—reveals that, for the treatment of offenders, there is a negative relationship (about -.071) for the least experienced cohort and then successively more positive relationships (.023, .041, and .192) for successively more experienced cohorts. For the treatment of non-offenders, the pattern is reversed. Among the least experienced officers, the relationship between citizen's age and the policeman's manner is positive (.041) and, among the more experienced officers, it is negative (-.067, -.064, and -.067).

Calculation of the changes in the mean level of treatment across age of the citizen for each of the four experience cohorts (using, of course, the unstandardized coefficients) illuminates more clearly what is going on here. Table 9.3 shows overall differences (after the effects of all other measured variables have been removed) between

Table 9.3

Difference of Policeman's Manner Toward Oldest Citizens and
Policeman's Manner Toward Youngest Citizens, by Citizen's
Role, by Policeman's Length of Service

Citizen's Role	Length of Service			15 or More Years
	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	
Offenders	-.201	+.062	+.129	+.642
Non-Offenders	+.075	-.111	-.121	-.144

the manner of policemen toward the oldest citizens and the manner of

the policemen toward the youngest citizens for policemen with diff-

erent amounts of experience. The least experienced, youngest offi-

cers treat older offenders in a less positive fashion than younger

offenders. But older policemen treat older offenders in a more

positive fashion than younger offenders and the difference in treat-

ment grows quite dramatically, so that the oldest officers treat

the oldest offenders .64 points better (on a treatment scale that has

only 4 points) than the youngest offenders. For non-offenders the

pattern is reversed—and differences, it should be noted, are less

sharp. Young officers treat older non-offenders better than younger

non-offenders. Older officers are progressively more inclined to

treat younger non-offenders better than older non-offenders, with

the differences widening to -.144 among the oldest officers.

So the experience of the officer clearly has an impact on how

he reacts to the age of the citizen. For offenders, the pattern is

quite easily understood as a sort of generation-gap phenomenon. A

young policeman treats more positively those offenders who are close

to his own age than those who are older than he is. An older
policeman treats more positively those who are close to his own
age than those who are younger than he is. The puzzle is why the
pattern reverses among non-offenders, with younger officers treating
older citizens more positively than younger citizens and older
officers treating younger citizens more positively than older citizens.
This anomaly results from the basic difference in the treatment of
offenders and non-offenders—as Table 5.4 shows, offenders tend to
be treated negatively and non-offenders, positively. Therefore,
the tendency of young officers to treat young offenders more posi-
tively than older offenders and of older officers to treat older
offenders more positively than younger ones both represent shifts
toward more neutral treatment. Conversely, the tendencies of
younger officers to treat younger non-offenders less positively and
of older officers to treat older non-offenders less positively both
represent trends toward more neutral behavior as well. What this
complicated pattern of coefficients conveys, then, is the operation
of a relatively simple principle—regardless of the role the citizen
plays, the closer he or she is in age to the officer, the more im-
personal will be the officer's manner. This can perhaps best be
understood as manifesting a desire on the part of the policeman to
project a professional image to people of his own age.

In spite of much that does not run true to expected form in
Tables 9.1 and 9.2, then, there is, in a few instances, substantial
evidence of structured individual difference in responsiveness to
situational variation. Officers who have served as policemen for

longer periods of time do respond differently to some situational variations than officers who have served for shorter periods of time. Their decisions to arrest are considerably less likely to depend on the seriousness of the offense involved. The manner of the most experienced officers is considerably more contingent on situational factors than the manner of the less experienced officers. On the other hand, the manner of less experienced officers depends more on the legal aspects of the situation. And, as has just been demonstrated, how an officer responds to the age of the citizen depends upon his own age. Certainly, the many instances in which relationships do not change systematically across experience cohorts dictate extreme caution in making generalizations, but these results do make two important points. The more specific is that the psychologists cited do appear to be on the right track in arguing that how long a person has been in an environment will affect how he responds to it. The more general is that individual differences— and, it must be emphasized, individual differences that can be characterized along general dimensions, not just discretely, as some psychologists have argued—do condition behavioral responses to situational variation. One of the major hypotheses advanced in Chapter III - the possibility that "the impact of situation may vary across individuals" has, even if only in a few instances, been borne out.

The Effects of Situational Differences on the Impact of Individual Characteristics

The final question to be addressed in this dissertation is whether, just as relationships between situational character-istics and behavior are stronger for some kinds of individuals than for other kinds, relationships between individual characteristics and behavior are stronger in some kinds of situations than in others. A number of characteristics that weaken relationships between indi-vidual characteristics or attitudes and behavior—or, to put it in the terms favored by situationalist psychologists, that militate against behavioral consistency—were identified in Chapter III: variation in the behavioral alternatives available, the expected or actual consequences of behavior, the similarity of evoking situa-tions, and so forth. Unfortunately, these approaches are all diffi-cult to operationalize under any circumstances, much less in a secondary analysis.

However, the data available do permit an examination of the sort of hypothesis that has attracted a good deal of attention from social psychologists—the basic notion that much of the weakness in the relationship between individual characteristics and attitudes, on one side, and behavior, on the other, can be traced to social pressures emanating from the situation in which the action takes place. Implicit in this idea are two hypotheses, one vague and one more specific. The vague hypothesis asserts that, in situations where social pressures are stronger, the relationships between indi-vidual characteristics and behavior will be weaker than in situations

where social pressures are weaker. This is because, regardless of the direction of social pressure, as long as some individuals are originally inclined to act in one way and other individuals in another, the flow of social pressures will tend to cause some individuals to deviate from the action they would have taken. Therefore, the link between individual characteristics and behavior will tend to be attenuated in the face of greater social pressures.

Here the assumption is that social pressures will be weaker in situations of low visibility to various audiences than in situations of high visibility. Therefore relationships between individual characteristics and behavior should be generally weaker in high visibility situations than in low visibility situations. In simple terms, people operating in a vacuum will feel free to follow their own inclinations, while people operating in view of others may feel the need to temper their actions. The approach follows closely the "social constraint" idea advanced by Warner and De Fleur:

> We may use the probability of exposing one's acts to significant others as an index of the degree of social constraint which is present in a situation . . . A situation of high social constraint is one in which the individual's behavior takes place under conditions where it is likely that his reference groups (or others significant to him) will become aware of it. A situation of low social constraint would be one of relative anonymity, in which the individual's actions would be unlikely to be subjected to such potential surveillance . . . The factor of social constraint should have a substantial influence on attitude-action consistency.[3]

In the case of the policeman, there are three significant audiences before which the policeman may feel the need to temper his actions—the public, the department, and his partner. All these

are audiences of concern to the policeman because they bear on his self-respect and because they hold power over his job, either directly (in the case of the department) or indirectly (in the case of the public and the partner, either of whom may report any misdeeds of the officer to the department). So, in general, relationships between individual characteristics or attitudes and behavior should be stronger in situations of low visibility to public, department, and partner than in situations of high visibility. These factors will be measured by dichotomies, into low and high visibility, of factors previously examined—the first by a dichotomy between interactions witnessed by four members of the public or fewer and interactions witnessed by five or more, the second by a dichotomy between police-invoked and citizen-invoked interactions, and the third by a dichotomy between interactions involving one officer and interactions involving two.

The first hypothesis takes social pressures as forces which are simply present or absent and is deficient in its neglect of the direction in which these pressures flow. The reason for this is a purely practical one imposed by the secondary nature of the analysis. There are just no practical ways of operationalizing the direction of public or departmental pressure with the data available. However, given that data are available regarding the characteristics of the partner with whom an officer worked, a test of a hypothesis which addresses the direction of the social pressure is possible with respect to that audience. The basic hypothesis here is that an officer

is more likely to follow his own dispositions when he is in the presence of a partner who is similarly disposed than when he is not.

Situational Differences in Individual Effects on Arrest

In Chapter VI, four individual characteristics—the length of time an officer had served, his satisfaction with his job, his race, and his racial attitudes—were demonstrated to affect weakly the frequency with which he arrested offenders. Under the broad hypothesis advanced above, these relationships should be stronger in situations of low visibility to the policeman's significant others and weaker in situations of high visibility. Table 9.4 presents correlations between each of the individual difference measures and arrest for differing gradations of visibility to public, department, and partner.

Situational Differences in Visibility to the Public

Differences in visibility to the public have, as far as direction is concerned, the anticipated effect on the relationships involving experience and job satisfaction—individual predispositions are manifested more in encounters less visible to the public than in encounters more visible to the public. Policemen do apparently rein in slightly on their own inclinations when more people are watching. However, the differences observed here are very small and any expectations that the meager correlations observed earlier would blossom out into strong ones once the constraints of public visibility were relaxed prove to be overly optimistic. The ordering of the

Table 9.4

Correlations (Tau-b) between Arrest of Offenders and
Individual Difference Measures, Overall and by
Visibility to Public, Department, and Partner

Visibility	Individual Differences Measure			
	Length of Service	Satisfaction With Job	Policeman's Race	Attitude Toward Blacks*
Overall	-.069	.064	.06⁻	-.090
N	2601	2486	2593	900
To Public				
Low	-.097	.060	.030	-.070
N	1350	1269	1348	460
High	-.047	.056	.099	-.108
N	1211	1181	1209	434
To Department				
Low	-.061	.059	.067	-.125
N	712	683	707	187
High	-.069	.066	.054	-.081
N	1889	1803	1886	713
To Partner				
Low	-.036	.000	-.014	-.134
N	740	694	742	129
High	-.070	.075	.061	-.079
N	1861	1792	1851	771

*Calculated for white policemen and black offenders only.

coefficients for length of service, in particular, suggests that
visibility to the public does affect relationships, but the magni-
tudes of the coefficients suggest that the effects are of little
consequence.

The two items involving race show the opposite pattern, with stronger relationships in situations more visible to the public. The coefficients for the race of the policeman indicate that the tendency of black officers to arrest at a higher rate than white officers—first observed in Table 6.20—emanates almost entirely from situations in which five or more people are present. In fact, an examination of percentages shows that black officers arrest at a rate about 2% higher than white officers in low visibility situations, but at a rate almost 15% higher in high visibility situations. (The numbers of cases involved is large enough that chance fluctuations seem an unlikely cause.) Since Alex's research suggests that the ambiguous social status of black policemen—they are at once the oppressor and the oppressed—leads them to be uncertain about their authority, it may be that they feel the need to invoke their authority more frequently in the face of crowds—which, given the neighborhoods to which they are assigned, are usually black—where it is under greater threat.[4]

The relationship between racial attitudes and arrest is also a little stronger in situations that are more visible to the public than in situations that are less visible. One possibility is that the presence of a crowd, which, if the offender is black, is also likely to be black, stimulates the salience of the racial attitude to the officer and thereby leads to a stronger relationship between attitude and behavior.

Situational Differences in Visibility to the Department

Visibility to the department appears to have little effect. Differences are, with one possible exception, clearly too slight to be of any significance at all. The exception is the relationship between a policeman's racial attitudes and whether or not he arrests blacks. Attitude bears a stronger relationship in the low visibility setting than in the high visibility setting. Policemen do, in other words, tend to act less in accord with their racial attitudes when their actions are more visible to the police department than when they are not—a good demonstration of the social constraint mechanism at work.

One question is, of course, why visibility to the department has a discernible impact on the translation of racial attitudes, and not the other individual differences, into actions. One explanation is that departments may be more concerned with negating some attitudes than others. Administrators may be willing to abide poorer performance by older officers—indeed, sometimes they may facilitate it by assigning them to quieter areas—or by disgruntled officers. However, they may not be willing, especially when the discriminatory treatment of blacks creates problems for the department (as was the case at the time of this study), to abide the expression of prejudiced attitudes in the actions of their officers. Thus, they put pressure on patrolmen to "watch their step" with blacks and these pressures are most salient to officers in situations which are most visible to the organization.

Situational Differences in Visibility to Partner

An assessment of the impact of the presence of a partner is complicated by two methodological issues. First, as Table 7.8 showed, single officers make arrests much less often than officers in teams. The marginals in a table limited to the former are therefore more sharply skewed than the marginals in a table limited to the latter and this can depress the magnitude of a measure of association.[5] Therefore, the value for one-man encounters may be depressed relative to that for two-man encounters. Examination of the tables on which the statistics to be cited in the next few paragraphs are based, however, indicates that this is not a serious problem. Second, because the individual difference measures employed here are the single officer's characteristics in encounters involving only one policeman and the average of the two policemen's characteristics in encounters involving two policemen, as described in Footnote 4 of Chapter VI, the attitudinal measure for encounters involving two policemen may contain some error due to the averaging process, while the measures for encounters with one policeman are relatively error free. Since random measurement error attenuates relationships, this could cause relationships for two-man encounters to be understated.

The possibility that these coefficients have been attenuated, however, becomes a moot point with the finding, in Table 9.4, that attenuated or not, they are nevertheless greater, in three instances, than the coefficients for encounters involving a single officer.

That is, relationships between individual characteristics and behavior are stronger in the presence of a partner than when the officer works alone. This is a surprising reversal of what might be expected until one important fact is recalled. As mentioned in Chapter VI, officers are frequently assigned to serve with officers who are similar to them. A possible explanation is that officers who work in teams are more likely to act in accord with their own attitudes than officers who work alone because they work with a partner who either gives them greater latitude—it being easier for two men to make an arrest than one—or who, being like them, offers social support for their actions. For methodological reasons— because the dependent variable measures the behavior of the team, not the individual—this hypothesis cannot be examined here. However, the hypothesis will be examined in a similar context shortly, where methodological problems do not interfere.

One remaining puzzle is why the presence of a partner does not lead to a stronger relationship between racial attitudes and the treatment of black citizens. The number of cases in the low visibility group is small enough, relative to the number in the high visibility group, that this might be attributed to chance fluctuation. Another possibility is that, on an issue of salience to the department (as racial prejudice was), the partner becomes a surrogate for the department, at least as far as the officer is concerned, and variation in visibility to a partner also causes variation in the officer's perception of his visibility to the department.

Situational Differences in Individual Effects on Manner

Overall, then, it does appear that variations in situational visibility do affect the relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes and the important police behavior of arrest. However, before attempting to draw any conclusions, it will be useful to look at the same sorts of effects on informal behavior, both because it may serve to extend the generality of the results and because the availability of separate behavioral measures for each officer alleviates the methodological problems confronted in the analysis of arrest.

The major drawback of such an analysis is that it is complicated by the necessary distinctions between offenders and non-offenders and by the fact that some of the individual factors affect the dispersion rather than the central tendency of the dependent variable. That is, the baselines against which the effects of visibility must be judged differ from group to group and from individual characteristic to individual characteristic. A quick recapitulation of what was found earlier will therefore facilitate what follows. The principal effect of increasing experience on the manner of the policeman was to lead to a more expressive, as opposed to an impersonal, manner (Table 6.3). There were, however, tendencies for this behavior to become increasingly favorable toward non-offenders and increasingly unfavorable toward offenders (Table 6.4). Improvements in job satisfaction had virtually no effect on the policeman's manner (Table 6.10)—in fact, for this reason, further results

regarding this factor will not be presented—though, in sum, it can
be said that variations in visibility do not have any effect.

The major differences observed in the manner of the officers
of different races was the tendency of black officers to treat
citizens—offenders and non-offenders—more impersonally than do
white officers (Table 6.23). Racial prejudice's effects differ for
non-offenders and offenders. In their handling of non-offenders,
officers with more favorable attitudes towards blacks tend to treat
them more impersonally—better, it was suggested, in the sense of
more professionally (Table 6.30). In handling offenders, more
favorable attitudes lead to more positive treatment and less favorable
ones lead to more negative treatment, except that the handful of
officers who are favorably inclined toward black people tend to
treat black offenders quite negatively.

Situational Differences in Visibility to the Public

What then are the effects of the social situation on these
relationships? Consider first the effects of visibility to the
public. As Table 9.5 shows, the tendencies (as measured by "folded"
gammas, for the reasons described earlier) of less experienced
officers, black officers, and officers with more favorable attitudes
toward blacks to treat non-offenders (blacks only in the last case)
more neutrally all are stronger—not weaker, as might be expected—
in encounters more visible to the public than in those less visible.
The tendency is most striking in the case of racial attitudes, where
it appears that racial attitude bears almost no relationship to

Table 9.5

Correlation (Folded Gammas) between Manner toward Non-Offenders
and Individual Difference Measures, by
Visibility to Public

Visibility to Public	Individual Difference Measures		
	Length of Service	Policeman's Race	Attitude Toward Blacks*
Low	.187	-.294	-.040
N	5462	5553	2370
High	.236	-.348	-.351
N	4824	4892	2000
*Calculated for white policemen and black non-offenders only.			

behavior in low visibility situations and a substantial relationship
in high visibility ones.

Table 9.6 presents the cross-tabulation on which the summary
statistics for racial attitudes are based. When the number of
citizens in attendance is small, how a policeman treats black non-
offenders bears virtually no relationship to how he feels about
blacks, but when the number is large, policemen with more favorable
attitudes definitely tend to treat citizens more impersonally. In
Chapter VI, it was speculated that the basic trend observed in
Table 6.30 might reflect the fact that good behavior was redefined
in the minds of patrolmen as impersonal, professional behavior and
that the relationship which emerged there was the result of
favorably disposed officers treating citizens in a way that was to
them better. This explanation was supported by the finding, in
Chapter VIII (Table 8.9), that the relationship was stronger in the

Table 9.6

Manner of White Policemen toward Black Non-Offenders,
by Attitude toward Blacks, by Visibility to Public

	Attitude toward Blacks				
Manner	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Total
a) Low Visibility to Public					
Very Negative	.6%	.4%	0.0%	0.0%	.4%
Negative	5.6	4.2	3.1	5.9	4.5
Neutral	82.1	82.3	84.7	82.4	82.6
Positive	11.6	13.1	12.1	11.8	12.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	621	1394	321	34	2370
	Folded Gamma = -.040				
b) High Visibility to Public					
Very Negative	0.0%	.8%	0.0%	0.0%	.5%
Negative	9.5	3.4	2.0	2.5	4.6
Neutral	73.8	84.7	90.2	97.5	83.1
Positive	16.7	11.1	7.8	0.0	11.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	461	1243	256	40	2000
	Folded Gamma = -.351				

departments where this redefinition process was likely to be more
effective—the more professional departments of Chicago and
Washington. These results suggest a motivating power behind the
redefinition process—a desire to look good in the eyes of the public.

The public, in other words, evokes a norm of professionalism for which the department may have defined behavioral standards and the officer who is characteristically or attitudinally inclined to behave well will act in accord with it. And, it should be noted, this norm of neutrality evoked by the public can account for the enhanced relationships between manner and experience and race as well. If neutral behavior is indeed a more salient norm in high visibility settings than in low visibility settings then it also makes sense that the experience and race should affect behavior more in high visibility situations than in low visibility situations. Table 9.5 shows that they do.

Chapter VI presented evidence that the effects on the policeman's manner toward offenders of the policeman's experience, race, and racial attitudes were somewhat simpler. More experienced officers tended to treat offenders more negatively (Table 6.4b), black officers tended to treat offenders more impersonally (Table 6.24b), and more prejudiced officers tended to treat black offenders more negatively. Table 9.7 shows that, with the exception of race (which an examination of percentages indicates is due solely to gamma's sensitivity to marginal distributions, the percentage differences in the tables being almost exactly the same), the individual differences have more effect in the more visible situations. This again runs counter to the broad hypothesis. One explanation is that these are chance fluctuations, though N's are quite large. Another possibility is that public hostility toward offenders creates a context in which more hostile actions by the officers are socially supported.

Table 9.7

Correlations between Manner of Policemen toward Offenders and
Individual Difference Measures by Visibility to Public

	Individual Difference Measure					
Visibility to Public	Length of Service		Policeman's Race		Attitude Toward Blacks*	
	Tau-b	N	Folded Gamma	N	Tau-b	N
Low	-.036	2020	-.227	2049	.040	785
High	-.086	1760	-.166	1776	.074	748

*Calculated for interactions between white policemen and
black citizens only.

So, overall, the broad hypothesis that relationships between
individual characteristics and behavior will be diminished by public
exposure is not borne out. The consistency with which public
exposure enhances these relationships suggests that the presence of
the public evokes norms—favoring impersonal treatment for non-
offenders and negative treatment for offenders—with which officers
may comply, depending on their own characteristics and attitudes.

Situational Differences in Visibility to the Department

The simplest expectation regarding the effects of visibility to
the department would again be for the relationships observed in
Chapter VI to be stronger in low visibility situations and weaker in
high visibility situations. However, given that the basic form of
those relationships seems, under the redefinition hypothesis, to be
determined by organizational pressures—specifically, the tendencies

toward more impersonal or less impersonal behavior rather than toward more positive or less positive behavior—it seems unlikely that these tendencies would be greater in situations of less visibility to the organization. Rather, it might be expected that relationships in low visibility situations would run along the usual lines of "better" inclinations being manifested in more positive treatment, while those in high visibility situations would run along the redefinition hypothesis's lines of better inclinations being manifested in more neutral and impersonal treatment.

Consider first the case of experience. For non-offenders, the overall tendency (as observed in Table 6.4a) was essentially a shift away from impersonal behavior—as indicated by a folded gamma for that table of .209—and a slight shift toward positive behavior—as indicated by a tau-b of .051—with increasing experience. Table 9.8 reveals that the shift away from impersonal behavior in both directions occurs primarily in high visibility situations—as would be expected if more experienced officers paid less heed than younger officers to organizational norms—while a more conventional relationship of more experienced officers being more likely to act positively and (what is crucial here) less likely to act negatively occurs in low visibility situations—as would be expected if organizational norms were simply not operating here. So, true to the broader hypothesis, the relationship is weaker in the more visible situations and stronger in the less visible situations—and the character of the relationships in the two tables is consistent with

Table 9.8

Manner of Policeman by Length of Service, by Citizen
Role and Visibility to Department

| Visibility to Department | Length of Service | | | | | | | | | |
| | Low | | | | | High | | | | |
Manner	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15+ Years	Total	0-2 Years	2-8 Years	8-15 Years	15+ Years	Total
a) Non-Offender										
Very Negative	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.4%	.4%	.7%	.5%	.4%	.4%	.5%
Negative	8.9	4.0	2.6	0.0	3.8	3.1	4.0	5.7	7.2	4.6
Neutral	82.2	81.9	70.3	77.8	78.1	81.5	83.2	74.4	69.8	79.4
Positive	8.9	14.1	27.1	14.8	17.7	14.7	12.4	19.5	22.6	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	45	276	155	27	503	1074	5302	2558	939	9873
Tau-b		.134					.047			
Folded Gamma		.228					.208			
b) Offender										
Very Negative	3.3	2.2	5.6	11.4	3.7	1.3	1.7	2.5	4.8	2.2
Negative	16.7	28.2	32.1	37.1	28.3	20.9	21.1	23.5	31.2	22.8
Neutral	65.0	57.0	51.2	51.4	56.3	57.6	62.4	55.8	48.2	58.6
Positive	15.0	12.6	11.2	0.0	11.7	20.3	14.8	18.1	15.8	16.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	120	625	215	70	1030	316	1460	711	311	2798
Tau-b		-.134					-.052			
Folded Gamma		.154					.119			

the salience of an organizational norm of impersonal behavior in the high visibility situation and the absence of such a norm in the low visibility situation.

The decided shift toward a negative manner toward offenders with increasing experience, along with the marginal distribution (compared to that for non-offenders), indicates that norms of impersonality are less salient to officers in the treatment of offenders (Table 6.4b). It appears, quite simply, that the more experience the officer gains, the more negatively he treats offenders. If it is as simple as this, and if visibility to the organization does operate to reduce the manifestation of individual characteristics in behavior, this relationship should simply be stronger in the less visible situations than in more visible situations. Table 9.8b reveals that it is, thereby increasing confidence in the explanation.

The results for race lead in a different direction. For offenders and non-offenders, it was found in Chapter VI, the primary difference in the behavior of black and white officers was that black officers treated citizens more impersonally (the folded gammas, not reported there, are -.326 and -.199, respectively). Table 9.9 reveals that this is a tendency which manifests itself more strongly in less visible situations. This is consistent with the original broad hypothesis, but inconsistent with the expectation that individuals disposed to go along with departmental norms—here neutral behavior—should do so more distinctly in situations that are more visible to the department. Inspection of the percentage tables

Table 9.9

Manner by Race of Policeman, by Citizen Role and
by Visibility to Department

Visibility to Department	Policeman's Race					
	Low			High		
Manner	White	Black	Total	White	Black	Total
a) Non-Offenders						
Very Negative	.5%	0.0%	.4%	.5%	.5%	.5%
Negative	3.4	4.9	3.7	5.1	2.0	4.6
Neutral	75.4	90.3	78.4	78.1	87.4	79.5
Positive	20.6	4.9	17.5	16.3	10.2	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	407	103	510	8519	1504	10,023
Folded Gamma		-.504			-.315	
b) Offenders						
Very Negative	4.7	1.1	3.8	2.4	1.2	2.2
Negative	28.8	25.5	27.9	23.3	18.2	22.6
Neutral	53.6	65.5	56.7	57.5	66.2	58.8
Positive	12.8	8.0	11.6	16.8	14.4	16.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	763	275	1038	2415	417	2832
Folded Gamma		-.255			-.184	

reveals that the reason for the reversal is that blacks, under any
conditions, adhere closely to the norm of impersonal treatment while
white officers tend to deviate more from neutrality in less visible
situations. Although the number of black officers is small enough,
in at least one instance, to be cause for caution, it appears that
adherence to the norm of impersonal behavior is founded differently

in white and black officers—the former being at least slightly
dependent on visibility to organization and the latter, hardly at
all.

The relationship between racial attitudes and treatment offers
perhaps the most convincing evidence of all for the importance of
visibility to the organization as a moderating factor and, parti-
cularly, for the hypothesis that police organizations modify patrol-
men's definitions of good behavior. Once again, the expectation
for non-offenders is that the relationship observed in situations of
high visibility to the organization will be like that observed in
Table 6.30a, with more favorable attitudes leading to more neutral
treatment, while the relationship in low visibility situations will
be of the conventional form. Table 9.10 displays the relationship
between white policemen's racial attitudes and how they treat black
citizens. Panel a reveals that these expectations are borne out
convincingly. In low visibility situations, the relationship for
non-offenders is definitely of the conventional form (the low per-
centage of positive treatment by the least favorably inclined being
the crucial element), while in high visibility situations, the
relationship is definitely of the sort compatible with the redefini-
tion hypothesis.

For offenders, given the lesser salience of the norm of imper-
sonality, what should emerge is a conventional attitude-behavior
relationship that is stronger in situations of low visibility and
weaker in situations of high visibility. Table 9.10b clearly shows

Table 9.10

Manner of White Policemen toward Black Citizens by Attitude toward Blacks, by Citizen Role and Visibility to Department

Attitude toward Blacks

Visibility to Department	Low					High				
Manner	Very Negative	Nega-tive	Neutral	Positive	Total	Very Negative	Nega-tive	Neutral	Positive	Total
a) Non-Offenders										
Very Negative	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	.4%	.6%	0.0%	0.0%	.5%
Negative	18.2	2.6	0.0	0.0	5.9	6.7	3.9	2.8	4.1	4.4
Neutral	78.2	75.9	90.9	50.0	79.0	78.6	83.8	86.9	93.2	83.1
Positive	3.6	21.6	9.1	50.0	15.1	14.3	11.7	10.3	2.7	12.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	55	116	44	4	219	1029	2538	533	74	4174
Tau-b		.202					-.008			
Folded Gamma		-.140					-.185			
b) Offenders										
Very Negative	5.1	1.8	3.0	0.0	2.8	1.9	1.2	.6	0.0	1.3
Negative	31.6	29.9	16.7	11.1	27.1	25.6	21.5	19.8	60.0	23.0
Neutral	59.5	52.1	54.5	88.9	55.5	58.4	62.6	64.0	40.0	61.4
Positive	3.8	16.2	25.8	0.0	14.6	14.0	14.6	15.7	0.0	14.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	79	167	66	9	321	308	724	172	20	1224
Tau-b		.169					.020			
Folded Gamma		-.013					-.048			

this to be the case—and a comparison of the tau-b's—.169 to .020—reveals neatly the extent of the difference.

The relationships between the policeman's manner and experience and between the policeman's manner toward blacks and racial prejudice closely parallel one another. Divisions of the sample into non-offender and offender groups reveal that changes in the independent variable affect, for the former, adherence to or deviation from impersonal behavior and, for the latter, the balance of positive or negative treatment. Relationships for non-offenders assume the first of the two forms in highly visible situations and the latter form in low visibility situations. Relationships for offenders assume the latter form regardless of visibility, but are stronger in low visibility situations than in high visibility situations. These parallels demonstrate that visibility to the organization does have an effect on the way in which individual differences are manifested in behavior and suggest how those effects work. A police organization inculcates norms of impersonal behavior which, intentionally or unintentionally, are related primarily to the behavior of non-offenders—hence the differences in relationships between offenders and non-offenders. Officers adhere more closely to these norms in situations visible to the organization, but otherwise follow their own inclinations—hence the differences in the form of the relationships for non-offenders across levels of visibility. Even in the absence of a norm, officers tend to rein in their behavior

in situations that are more visible to the organization—hence the differences in the relationship for offenders across levels of visibility.

Situational Differences in Visibility to a Partner

The logic of the proposition that a policeman by himself will be freer to treat citizens according to his own inclinations than a policeman working with a partner retains an intuitive appeal—one that is buttressed by the fact that the manner of officers working alone exhibits greater variance than the manner of officers working in teams. However, the effects of increased visibility, thus far, augur ill for the hypothesis—particularly those seen in the earlier analysis of arrest, where it was observed that the presence of a partner tended to increase relationships, either because an officer with a partner may feel safer in doing as he pleases or because the partner, often being like-minded, offers social support for the behavior.

Table 9.11 shows that, in terms of the conventional relationships measured by tau-b's, there is no tendency for relationships to be weaker in higher visibility situations in any instance save one—racial attitudes. There, the conventional sort of relationship between attitude and behavior emerges in the low visibility situations and disappears in the high visibility situations—completely for non-offenders and very nearly so for offenders. In the case of non-offenders, the folded gammas show that it is supplanted in the high

Table 9.11

Correlations between Manner and Individual Difference
Measures by Citizen Role and by Visibility
to Partner

	Individual Difference Measures								
	Length of Service			Policeman's Race			Attitude toward Blacks		
Visibility to Partner	Tau-b	Folded Gamma	N	Tau-b	Folded Gamma	N	Tau-b	Folded Gamma	N
a) Non-Offenders									
Low	.017	.026	1835	.004	-.179	1870	.083	.030	391
High	.044	.236	8541	-.033	-.333	8663	-.008	-.226	4002
b) Offenders									
Low	-.087	-.022	729	-.005	-.134	730	.137	-.009	127
High	-.064	.144	3099	.021	-.184	3140	.034	-.054	1418

visibility situation by the "impersonality" kind of relationship.
This bears, of course, a striking relationship to what was observed
in the case of visibility to the department—so much so that it seems
not unreasonable to suggest (as was suggested in the case of arrest)
that the partner may, on a particularly salient issue such as racial
attitudes, stand as a sort of surrogate for the department. When the
"heat" is on, in other words, officers may set aside their racial
prejudices in the presence of someone who might conceivably report—
or be forced to report—their misdeeds. This would, of course, con-
stitute a lapse in the notorious "blue code," but it is hard to imagine
how else to account for these results.

Though visibility does not have much effect on any other of the relationships—viewing relationships in conventional terms—the folded gammas reveal that not to be the case when relationships are viewed in "impersonality" terms. Here, in every instance, relationships are stronger in situations where a partner is present. In other words, all the characteristics which predispose the policeman to deviate, positively or negatively, from an impersonal manner—more experience, being white, being prejudiced against blacks—have a greater tendency to do so when a partner is present than when a partner is not present. This again parallels what was seen in the relationships of experience and race with arrest. As was suggested there, at least two possibilities arise. One is that an officer working with a partner simply feels more free to do as he pleases. The greater variance in the manner of officers working alone argues against this, however. The other is that, since officers who work together often have similar characteristics, the presence of a partner frequently provides a socially supportive atmosphere for behavior deviating from the norm of impersonality. As was not the case for arrest, here the raw materials needed to explain the hypothesis—separate measures of characteristics, attitudes, and behavior for each officer—are available. In fact, this situation offers perhaps the best opportunity of all to test the social constraint hypothesis, because here the character of the social pressure is known rather than inferred, as was necessarily the case in the analysis of the effects of visibility to the public and visibility to the department.

Situational Differences in Partner Similarity

If the presence of a like-minded colleague is what causes relationships generally to be stronger in interactions involving two officers, then relationships between individual factors and behavior should be stronger in those interactions in which the officers resemble one another in their characteristics and attitudes than in those in which they differ. Table 9.12 presents the evidence bearing on this hypothesis for each of the dimensions of individual difference. It shows the relationship between the individual officer's characteristic or attitude and his manner toward non-offenders and offenders for those situations in which the partner is similar to him—that is, is classified identically to him—along the dimension in question and for those in which the partner differs.

In the treatment of non-offenders, the dominant tendency for two-man patrols is, as seen in Table 9.11, for more experienced officers to treat citizens more personally than less experienced officers. A lesser tendency is for this divergent behavior to be manifested primarily, though not exclusively, in more favorable treatment. The folded gammas and tau-b's, respectively, of Table 9.12 reveal these effects to be considerably enhanced when the partner has a similar amount of experience and attenuated when he differs. That is, individual differences in experience exert their impact on behavior more dramatically when the environment, as defined by the partner's characteristic, is socially supportive than when the environment is socially divergent.

Table 9.12

Correlations between Manner and Individual Difference
Measures by Similarity to Partner and
by Citizen Role

| Similarity to Partner | Individual Difference Measure | | | | | | | | |
| | Length of Service | | | Policeman's Race | | | Attitude toward Blacks* | | |
	Tau-b	Folded Gamma	N	Tau-b	Folded Gamma	N	Tau-b	Folded Gamma	N
a) Non-Offender									
Similar	.113	.381	4062	-.029	-.381	7385	.003	-.326	1976
Different	.002	.159	4063	-.032	-.020	1003	-.003	-.123	1608
b) Offender									
Similar	-.054	.210	1515	.021	-.230	2592	.073	-.314	642
Different	-.090	.115	1420	.001	.075	441	-.016	.113	625

*Calculated for interactions between white policemen and
black citizens only.

In the treatment of offenders, there is, as noted earlier, a
similar tendency toward increasingly personal treatment, but here
the divergent behavior is primarily, though again not exclusively,
negative in character. Table 9.12 shows the former tendency to be
enhanced considerably and the latter tendency to be diminished
slightly in the presence of an equally experienced partner. The
folded gammas reveal the pattern of increasing experience leading to
more personal behavior to be stronger when partners are similar and

weaker when they are different. The tau-b's, on the other hand, indicate that the shift toward negative action is a bit more pronounced when partners diverge. An examination of percentages, however, suggests that this deviation from expectations results more from diminished dispersion in the independent variable in the "similar" category, relative to the "different" category, than from changes in experience actually being associated with greater changes in behavior in the "different" category. Therefore, the social support hypothesis can be said to hold up reasonably well here, too.

The outcome for the effects of race is fully consistent with expectations. As Table 9.12 shows, the consistent tendency of black policemen to diverge less than white policemen in their treatment of both offenders and non-offenders from neutrality and impersonality is definitely dependent on the race of the partner. The behavior of black officers working with black partners is decidedly more impersonal than the behavior of white officers working with white partners, as indicated by the folded gammas of -.381 and -.230. However, when working with partners of the opposite race, the behavior of whites and blacks differs much less. For non-offenders, the gamma of -.020 indicates that blacks who work with white partners are only slightly more impersonal than whites who work with black partners. There is a considerable tendency, that is, for officers of one race to moderate their behavior when working with partners of the opposite race. Interestingly enough, percentages reveal that it is white officers who do most of the moderating. To illustrate,

white officers working with white partners manifest a neutral manner with non-offenders 79.7% of the time and blacks with blacks, 89.9%. The percentage of neutral behavior from blacks when they work with whites falls toward the white norm by only about 2%—to 87.7%. The percentage of neutral behavior from whites working with blacks, in contrast, rises toward the black norm by more than 7%—to 87.2%. For offenders, the gamma of .075 reveals that this process of moderation leads to an actual reversal of the pattern. When white policemen work with black partners, they treat offenders neutrally more frequently than black policemen who work with white partners—by a ratio, the percentages show, of 66.5% to 63.2%.

Results for attitude toward blacks also support the overall hypothesis. The tendency for less prejudiced white officers to treat black non-offenders more impersonally, as measured by the folded gamma, proves to be considerably stronger when the officer and his partner agree in their racial attitudes than when they disagree. The weak conventional relationship between the white policeman's attitude toward blacks and his manner toward black offenders is also conditioned by the character of the peer environment. When partners agree, the original tau-b of .034 climbs to .073 while, when partners disagree, it drops slightly below zero.

What emerges here, then, is at once an explanation for why the relationships between individual characteristics and attitudes and individual behavior tend to be stronger in the presence of a partner and, more generally, a demonstration of the effect that the

behavioral context can have on the relationship between individual characteristics and attitudes and individual behavior. Generally, when the behavioral environment is a supportive one, relationships between individual factors and behavior can become fairly strong—as seen by the folded gammas that consistently exceed .30. On the other hand, when the social environment is not supportive, measures of relationship drop dramatically—often to zero and always by at least half. So there is contingency in the relationships between individual difference measures and behavior. It does appear that those who have focused on the social supportiveness or constraint of the behavioral context as a key moderating variable are correct. These results provide additional evidence in support of the conclusion which Deutscher has drawn.

> . . . a considerable proportion of the variance in human behavior can be explained by efforts (conscious or unconscious) on the part of people to bring their sentiments and acts into line, not with each other, but with what they perceive to be the sentiments and the acts of others in the immediate situation.[6]

Specifically, the stronger relationships for officers working with partners than for officers working alone are a result of this general tendency for supportive environments to increase the impact of individual differences and the relatively large proportion of situations in which police officers are assigned to work with like-minded colleagues.

So situational factors—specifically, the visibility of the policeman's actions to "significant others" in the police milieu—do appear to have a substantial impact on the relationships between the characteristics and attitudes of the policeman and his formal and informal actions. Results are perhaps most puzzling in the case of visibility to the public. The general expectation that individual factors would have the least effect in the more public situations is borne out in only a couple of instances and, even there, differences are exceedingly slight. More often, individual factors make more of a difference in more public settings, the most striking examples being the tendency of black officers to be more inclined to arrest, relative to whites, in high-visibility situations than in low-visibility situations and the tendency of white officers favorable to blacks to express this in neutral behavior more often in high-visibility situations than in low-visibility situations. Perhaps the best overall explanation, ad hoc as it is, is that the presence of crowds raises concerns in the policeman that transcend whether or not his actions are reported back to the police organization—in particular, a concern with making sure the public respects his authority and a concern that he project an impersonal image.

Visibility to the department appears to be of greater significance. Its effects on relationships with arrest are virtually non-existent, except in the case of attitudes toward blacks, where it has the anticipated effect of suppressing the linkage between attitude and action slightly. But its effects on relationships with

manner are more substantial. In situations of low visibility to the department, relationships between individual factors and manner are, without exception, stronger than relationships in situations of high visibility, as would be expected under the social constraint hypothesis. Further, in situations of high visibility to the department, individual factors relate to behavior in a way that suggests that policemen redefine good behavior in the department's terms— as impersonal rather than friendly behavior. This clearly occurs in the relationships between the policeman's manner toward non-offenders and the policeman's length of service and attitude toward blacks.

The efficacy of this factor is not hard to understand. The department is, to the policeman, a highly salient institution. It controls much of his life—both on and off the job—and he is dependent on it for his livelihood. It is therefore not surprising that the policeman should pay it great heed and suppress or modify his inclinations when he knows that it is "watching."

The results for the effects of visibility to a partner make the specific point of the importance of the inclinations of the partner to the way in which a policeman acts and the more general point of the importance of the direction in which social pressures flow to relationships between individual factors and behavior. Contrary to expectations, policemen who work with partners will often manifest stronger relationships between individual factors and behavior than policemen who work alone. This occurs, it appears, because

partners tend to have similar characteristics and attitudes. There-fore, the peer environment in which a policeman works is generally conducive to his own inclinations being expressed in behavior. That such is the case is suggested by the fairly substantial relation-ships in cases where the officer and his partner share characteris-tics and attitudes and the considerably weaker relationships in cases where the actor and his partner differ.

Overall, then, the results presented here are often consistent with theoretical expectations or at least can be explained in ways that are theoretically plausible. But it is important to recognize that reality does not always readily conform to theoretical expec-tations. The generally (and sometimes dramatically) higher correla-tions in public than in private situations, the failure of visibility to the department to condition linkages between individual differ-ence measures and arrest—these and other results already noted remain phenomena for which convincing explanations are disturbingly elusive.

But perhaps the most significant feature of these results is the magnitude of the relationships. The conditional hypothesis advanced by social psychologists—and the underlying hypothesis of these last several pages—is that, under certain conditions, the individual's characteristics and attitudes will have powerful effects on his behavior. The tables of the last two chapters have shown that individual factors do have a much greater impact under some conditions than under others, but only rarely, if at all, can their impact be described as strong. Nowhere do tau-bs exceed the .3 level that

Wicker specifies as the approximate upper limit of attitude-behavior correlations and only rarely do gammas—a surprising result, given the notorious generosity of this measure.[7] Even under the best of conditions, as demarcated by the situational factors that can reasonably be operationalized with these data, individual differences cannot be said to exert powerful effects on behavior. The hope that the introduction of situational contingencies into the attitude-behavior relationship would prove to be the salvation of the individual differences paradigm is simply not borne out. Incorporation of this element does point up some of the factors that tend to increase or decrease the impact of individual differences, but it also reveals that the introduction of simple situational distinctions alone is not sufficient to protect the individual differences model from challenges to its explanatory power.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that it may not be the model itself that is exclusively at fault. Footnote 3 in Chapter VI provides compelling evidence of the weakness of the individual difference measures employed here. This undoubtedly partially accounts for the weakness of relationships observed here. Though problems of validity and reliability are virtually inherent in the trait-state sort of model—and therefore constitute a compelling argument against the usefulness of the model—it is nevertheless not at all unreasonable to assume that the relationships observed here would prove to be stronger were individual differences measured via conventional assessment techniques—carefully structured questions

asked in a controlled setting, for example—rather than via the shaky methods employed in this study.

Further, in the face of all the evidence that visibility to the public, the department, and the partner affects relationships, it would be foolish to neglect the fact that there is yet another audience to be considered here—one whose effects cannot be measured because visibility to it is always at a constant high, but one which undoubtedly also influences relationships. This audience is, of course, the observer recording the incident. The unexpected effects of visibility to the public and visibility to the partner urge caution in speculating about the effects that the presence of an observer has on the relationships under study here. However, since policemen undoubtedly realized that the observers were there with departmental approval, a reasonable assumption is that the policemen may have responded to the observers as they did to increased exposure to the department and that relationships would be stronger in the absence of an observer than in the presence of one. Another reason, in other words, for the absence of stronger relationships, either in particular circumstances or in general, may be that the the presence of the observer tended to suppress them relative to what they are normally—in situations in which an outside observer is not present.

It is easy to explain, then, why these relationships never rise above moderate levels. But we see also in these results another possible explanation for why it is that relationships between individual difference measures and behavior are, in general, so weak.

Although in certain situations relationships are substantial, it
is clear that, in police work as presently constituted, these situa-
tions are not generally the most common ones. Increased visibility
to the public does enhance relationships, but the increases are
often slight and visibility to the public is more often low than
high. The presence of a partner, which is the usual situation
given the widespread reliance on two-man units, also enhances rela-
tionships relative to what they are when the officer works alone,
but even so, except with respect to race, there are almost as many
situations in which officers differ in their characteristics and
attitudes as there are situations in which they agree. This keeps
attitude-behavior relationships weaker than they otherwise might
be. Finally (and perhaps most important in view of the strong
effects which visibility to the department often exert), because of
the reactive character of contemporary law enforcement, the over-
whelming majority of police-citizen interactions are relatively
visible to the department. Given that the relatively visible citi-
zen-initiated encounters outnumber the relatively invisible police-
initiated encounters by better than seven-to-one, it is not sur-
prising that many of the relationships between individual factors
and behavior are, overall, relatively weak. Individual character-
istics and attitudes can have a substantial impact on behavior, but
the circumstances in which they do so arise relatively infrequently.

Apart from accounting, in some measure, for the overall weak-
ness of relationships, these results also pose a subtle irony. As

organizations directed to the uniform treatment of citizens under the law, police departments seek to prevent the individual characteristics and attitudes of policemen from being manifested in their behavior. Now, the police department's ability to manipulate the visibility of police actions varies with the audience. Visibility to partner and the character of the partner, it can control. Visibility to the public and, what is significant here, visibility to the department, lie essentially outside its control. Given that visibility to the department depends on the type of mobilization, it stems ultimately, as Black and Reiss have argued, from

> . . . the nature of violative behavior itself. Most crimes occur in private rather than public places . . . Given the barriers to legal penetration of the private place, the police must rely on the citizen to mobilize them for crimes occurring in private settings.[8]

Given the presumed goal of the police organization, these results pose something of an irony. In the type of visibility that the department can control (through its policies regarding one-man versus two-man teams and regarding the kinds of men it assigns to work together), the net effect of current practice is to enhance the expression of individual differences in behavior—a result counter to organizational objectives. In the type of visibility that lies outside the department's control, visibility to the department, the net effect of the nature of violative behavior is to reduce the expression of individual differences in behavior—a result consistent with organizational objectives.

Footnotes for Chapter IX

1. An alternative explanation for this pattern is that it might result from the concentration of older officers in the more watchman-like department, where seriousness has a weaker effect on arrest, and of younger officers in the more legalistic departments, where seriousness has (at least in one instance) a stronger effect on arrest. An analysis of differences in the strength of the seriousness—arrest relationship across experience cohorts within each department is complicated by the very small number of cases in some cohorts within each city. Nevertheless, the basic trend does seem to hold up—at least in Boston and Washington. This suggests that the pattern is not the spurious result of departmental differences.

2. This is the correlation between age in years and number of years of service obtained from a separate sample of 204 officers interviewed in the same eight precincts by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. These interviews were conducted at about the same time as the observational study and were another part of the broad research effort undertaken in these precincts under Professor Reiss's direction. The principal report on this part of the project is Reiss's "Career Orientations, Job Satisfaction, and the Assessment of Law Enforcement Problems by Police Officers," in President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas, Field Surveys III, Vol. 2, Sec. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

3. Lyle G. Warner and Melvin L. DeFleur, "Attitude as an Interactional Concept: Social Constraint and Social Distance as Intervening Variables between Attitudes and Action," in The Consistency Controversy, ed. Allen E. Liska (New York: Halstead Press, 1975), pp. 182, 188.

4. Nicholas Alex, Black in Blue (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 13-22.

5. Jere Bruner, "What's the Question to that Answer? Measures and Marginals in Crosstabulations," American Journal of Political Science 20 (November 1976): 781-804.

6. Irwin Deutscher, What We Say/What We Do (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), p. 240.

7. A. H. Wicker, "Attitudes Versus Actions," Journal of Social
    Issues 25 (1969): 65. Wicker sets the .30 level for the
    product-moment correlation coefficient, while the statistic
    used here is Kendall's tau-b. However, the generally close
    correspondence between the two measures suggests that the
    .30 level is a criterion comparable to that for the r.

8. Donald J. Black and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Patterns of
    Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions," in U.S. Presi-
    dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
    Justice, Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metro-
    politan Areas, Field Surveys III, Vol. II, Section 1
    (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967),
    p. 3.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

This study addresses two broad questions. First, is the behavior of policemen a phenomenon of any political significance? The answer to that question, it has been argued here, is yes. The actions—both formal and informal—of the police are important politically because they affect the way in which values are allocated for a society and because they affect the ability of a political system to persist. Police actions, first of all, are aimed at implementing the distributive principles expressed in a society's laws. Second, the way in which the police carry on their work may affect the willingness of citizens to comply with a society's laws and the support which they render to various objects in the political system.

The second question, which gains its political significance from the affirmative answer to the first, is that of why policemen act as they do. In this study, police actions have been operationalized in terms of formal decisions to invoke the legal process, the informal manner of the policeman toward the citizen, and the effort which the policeman exerts. Evidence has been presented to show that these actions are influenced by three broad classes of factors: organizational factors, individual factors, and situational factors.

The importance of organization has been demonstrated by evidence that police behavior—along all three dimensions examined

here—differs from police department to police department, even
after the imposition of controls for a number of potentially con-
founding factors. The differences in behavior observed between
departments, while modest, are, in many respects, compatible with
the typology of departmental styles advanced by James Q. Wilson.
Police behavior in the traditional, decentralized, "watchman-like"
department is relatively unprofessional in its character. The legal
process is invoked infrequently. Policemen are informal in their
manner toward citizens. They display little initiative in their
work, patrolling lackadaisically and seldom entering into contacts
with citizens on their own volition. More modern, centralized,
"legalistic" departments obtain a different sort of performance from
their officers. The legal process is invoked more frequently. There
is some tendency for citizens to be treated more bureaucratically.
Effort is greater. So departmental style does seem to influence
behavior at the operative level of the department. That style is
not the only factor is suggested by some unanticipated differences
in behavior between Chicago, presumably a good example of Wilson's
legalistic style, and Washington, a department in the process of
modernization, but organizational structure and ethos do appear to
have some impact on behavior.

The characteristics of individual officers exert consistent,
if sometimes unanticipated and never potent, effects on their actions.
More experienced officers, compared with less experienced officers,
invoke the legal process less often, treat citizens more personally,

and do not work as hard. In contrast to what is often asserted by
students of the police (but in keeping with what students of organi-
zational behavior have often found), the policeman's satisfaction
with his job has little effect. It bears no relationship to his
manner toward citizens and only a slight relationship to the effort
he expends. It does. however, appear to have more of an effect on
his decisions to invoke the legal process, with more satisfied offi-
cers slightly more likely to arrest offenders and write reports than
less satisfied officers.

Race has a significant impact on the behavior of policemen.
Black policemen invoke the legal process more often and treat citizens
impersonally more often than white policemen. They are also more
aggressive in patrolling and initiating encounters. The racial
attitudes of white policemen influence their behavior toward black
citizens. Policemen with less favorable attitudes toward blacks
are more likely to arrest blacks and to sanction blacks in traffic
incidents, though they are not less likely to write reports for
black complainants. The manifestation of racial attitudes in the
white policeman's manner toward black citizens is unexpectedly com-
plex. For offenders, the relationship runs along expected lines,
with more prejudiced officers treating black offenders less favorably
and less prejudiced officers treating them more favorably, except
that officers who actually feel positively toward blacks treat
black offenders quite negatively. For non-offenders, the relationship
takes on a different form. Increasingly favorable attitudes lead to

increasingly impersonal treatment, while increasingly negative attitudes lead to more expressive treatment, of either a positive or a negative character.

Among the three classes of determinants examined in this study, situational factors have, overall, the greatest effect. For arrest, two of the situational factors emphasized by Black in his analysis of these data— seriousness of offense and the complainant's preference—retain their pre-eminence, even in the face of controls for possibly confounding factors. For reporting, the complainant's preference and manner toward the policeman appear to be most decisive. For the policeman's manner toward the citizen, as might be expected, the manner of the citizen toward the policeman exerts the dominant influence.

However, other situational factors exert significant effects as well—for example, the class and race of the citizen (especially in the case of report writing), and the sex of the citizen (especially for the formal and informal treatment of offenders). Police actions also vary with the structural characteristics of the setting. The presence of a larger number of citizens increases the chances that an offender will be arrested and that the policeman will adopt a negative manner toward him. Ceteris paribus, two-man units are less likely than one-man units to invoke the legal process, but more likely to treat citizens bureaucratically. Offenders in police-invoked encounters are arrested at about the same rate as offenders in citizen-invoked encounters, but are somewhat more likely to be treated negatively.

In theory, organizations should mediate the effects of individual and situational characteristics on behavior. Generally, following Wilson's argument, non-legal factors should exert more influence in watchman-style departments than in legalistic departments. The data offer some evidence for this. For example, among individual characteristics, the impact of racial prejudice on the arrest of offenders is greatest in Boston, the watchman-like department, and least in Washington, one of the more professional departments. In other instances, relationships vary from city to city, but not in accord with expectations. To illustrate, job satisfaction consistently has more effect in the more professionalized departments, particularly Chicago, than in the more traditional department. And racial attitudes have, not less of an effect, but a different kind of effect in the legalistic departments, compared to the watchman-like department. Instead of favorable attitudes leading to a more positive manner toward non-offenders, in the more professional departments, they lead to a more impersonal manner. This pattern does not emerge in the watchman-like department, which suggests that professional departments redefine good behavior in the minds of their patrolmen as impersonal behavior, while traditional departments do not.

The data offer no support for the hypothesis—derived from Wilson's discussion of departmental style—that the legal aspects of a situation will be more important, and citizen characteristics and behavior less important, in a legalistic department than in a watchman-like department.

Hypotheses suggested by the psychological and social-psychological literature on individual and situational sources of variation in behavior fare somewhat better. Individuals do differ in their responsiveness to situational factors. Less experienced policemen put greater weight on the legal seriousness of the offense than do more experienced policemen in coming to decisions about arrest. Also, the policeman's age and the citizen's age interact in a fashion that leads to a higher frequency of neutral treatment for citizens who are closer in age to the officer than for those who are more distant.

Situational factors—specifically, differences in visibility to various "significant others" in the police milieu—mediate relationships between individual factors and behavior. Higher visibility to the public enhances the magnitude of most relationships between individual factors and arrest and manner. Greater visibility to the department, though it generally has little effect on relationships between arrest and individual factors, attenuates conventional relationships between manner and individual characteristics and modifies the form of relationships between these factors and manner toward non-offenders. The presence of a partner frequently enhances relationships—the sole exception being the relationships between attitudes toward blacks and formal and informal actions. The primary reason for this seems to be that partners often share the same characteristics and that a like-minded colleague provides an atmosphere which is conducive to the translation of individual predispositions into actions.

The temptation to generalize extravagantly from these findings is strong. Unlike earlier studies, which have typically focused on only a single aspect of police behavior—usually arrest—these results span a range of theoretically significant dimensions of police behavior: three different types of decisions to invoke the legal process, the manner of the policeman, and effort. In contrast to earlier studies, which have generally looked to only one explanatory model to account for police behavior, the analyses reported on here encompass three different models of behavior implicit in the extant literature on the police. Unlike other studies, which have typically examined police performance in a single department, the study described here draws on data gathered in three different departments—but gathered according to a uniform methodology. This facilitates meaningful comparisons across departments. In contrast to many other studies, which have relied upon the verbal reports of citizens or police or on statistics generated internally by the police department, this study relies on observations, by disinterested observers, of the actual behavior of police officers going about their jobs. Finally, in contrast to almost all other studies, which have shown a glaring insensitivity to questions of internal validity, this study has devoted much attention—indeed, by this point some readers might protest, too much attention—to controlling relationships in order to insure that the effects of one factor are not erroneously attributed to another factor.

However, although the internal and external validity of these
findings is strong when compared with that of other studies of the
police, it nevertheless leaves much room for improvement. Several
of the reasons for caution in generalizing from these findings have
already been noted and will not be belabored here. They include the
effect which the presence of the observer may have on the behavior
of the policeman, the bias which the observer may introduce into his
characterizations of individual and situational factors and police
behavior, the uncontrolled setting in which interviewing was done,
and the lack of systematically gathered information on a number of
theoretically interesting factors—organizational, individual, and
situational. All these problems open the door to errors in infer-
ence—both Type I and Type II. About all that can be said is to
hope that future research efforts will improve upon what Reiss did
in even half the measure that he improved upon the work of those who
went before him.

One reason for caution that has been touched upon before is,
however, of sufficient importance that it deserves special attention
here. This is the obvious weakness of many of the relationships
observed in this study. In fact, a number of the conclusions drawn
here—conclusions that, for example, the class of the citizen and
the amount of time an officer has served have an effect on the
officer's behavior—are based on relationships that are, by ordinary
statistical criteria, weak. (Care has been taken, though, it should
be emphasized, to avoid attributing any substantive significance to

relationships that are likely to be merely chance occurrences.)
Substantive interpretation of these weak relationships is justifiable
on a number of grounds. First, the relationships generally involve
substantial numbers of cases, which makes it less likely that they
are chance occurrences. Second, though sometimes weak, the effects
of many of the factors do emerge with a reassuring degree of con-
sistency. Finally, given that the way in which many of the variables
were operationalized was conducive to the introduction of substan-
tial error into the measurement process and given that the effect
of such error—assuming it is random—is to weaken relationships,
it is not surprising that relationships involving these variables
turn out to be weak.

In view of all these considerations, then, the conclusion that
the relationships exist, but are weak, is sounder than the conclu-
sion that they simply do not exist. Of course, there is the chance
that some of the relationships observed here are not real ones or
that they are so slight as to be truly inconsequential. Therefore,
caution seems the best short-run strategy. At the same time, though,
it must be said that caution can stand only as a short-run strategy.
In the long run, the only real solution is to develop more valid
measures of individual, situational, and organizational character-
istics and of behavior itself.

Another reason for caution in generalization is evident from
a description of the circumstances in which the data employed in
this analysis were gathered—it was a study of the behavior of police
patrolmen in eight relatively high-crime precincts in three large

cities during the summer of 1966. Though the universe of events from which the events sampled here were drawn is large and diverse compared to those of other police studies, it is nevertheless a limited one. It includes only the behavior of patrolmen, while police officers serve in a variety of other roles. The data were gathered in a narrowly defined context in only three cities during a time of considerable tension in police-citizen relations. The interactions studied here cannot, in other words, be taken as a simple cross-section of current police behavior in the United States. It is particularly important, in fact, to recognize the dangers of over-generalization in a study that has emphasized the variable effects which context can have on the relationship between individual and situational factors and behavior. As Chapters VIII and IX have vividly demonstrated, just because a particular factor relates to behavior in a certain way in one city or circumstance does not mean that it will do so in another city or circumstance. The only solutions to this problem are, in the present instance, to recognize the limitations of the findings presented here and, in the future, to conduct studies that cast the sampling net more widely and uniformly.

A final concern relating to the validity of the findings has to do with the failure of this analysis to proceed on to what might be viewed as the logical culmination of all that has gone before—a single model (for each dimension of police behavior) into which are entered as predictors organization, individual characteristics, and situational characteristics. Such an enterprise was, in fact, at

the time this project was conceived, seen as the final step in the analysis. It is a step, however, that will not be taken, for reasons that have to do as much with the utility of such an undertaking as with the technical difficulties.

The methodological problems should, by this point, be apparent. Even after leaving out the least effectual of the factors, there remain perhaps ten or more individual and situational factors that exert simple effects of some consequence on the dependent variables. Dummy terms must also be included to capture inter-city differences and multiplicative terms to capture the primary inter-city, inter-individual, and inter-situational interactions. And these provisions do not even begin to address the necessary distinctions between offenders and non-offenders, the fact that certain factors pertain only to behavior toward certain kinds of citizens—for example, attitudes toward blacks can properly only be related to behavior toward blacks—and the differences in the basic character of relationships across situations—whether, for example, the manner of the policeman shifts from negative to positive or from negative or positive to neutral.

If all these complications argue against a single over-arching model, it must also be asked what such a model would reveal about police behavior that has not been learned from the analyses already presented. The primary appeals of a single, all-encompassing model are that it would reveal the effects of each family of factors while the effects of all the other factors are held constant and that it would provide a summary statement of the predictive power of

organizational, individual, and situational factors taken together. With respect to the first point, Chapters VIII and IX have already assessed the possibilities that many of the relationships are spurious by looking at the effects of individual and situational factors while holding organization constant, the effects of situational factors while holding a theoretically important individual difference constant, and the effects of individual factors while holding a number of theoretically important situational differences constant. If organization is taken as exogenous with respect to individual and situational differences, as makes some sense here, all the important combinations have been covered.

What these simpler analyses show is that each of the families of factors does exert its own influence on police behavior, even after other factors have been controlled for. Further, these analyses reveal, situational factors continue to exert the greatest effects after controls are imposed, while individual and organizational factors exert lesser effects, but effects that are nevertheless worthy of attention, particularly in certain contexts.

With respect to the second point—the availability of an overarching summary measure of all these effects—the R^2s observed for situational factors seem to set the general range for the effects of all factors taken together and it is unlikely that the addition of individual and organizational factors would boost that range much. The reason for this is that the effects of these factors are small, with generally not more than one or two percent contributed

to goodness-of-fit, even before controls for other factors are imposed. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a summary model would raise the overall R^2 much above that observed for the situational factors alone. So the R^2s observed for the situational models—at best, not much more than about 25%—provide a sort of "ballpark" figure for the goodness-of-fit obtained from the three classes of factors taken together. In sum, then, in view of the complications that would ensue, construction of summary models would seem to do little to enhance our understanding of the roots of police behavior or to increase our confidence in the conclusions already drawn. Therefore, such an effort will not be undertaken here.

All these considerations temper our willingness to generalize from these findings. Nevertheless, since these findings do possess considerable internal and external validity, especially compared to the findings of other studies of police behavior, it is appropriate to conclude by considering some of the implications they raise. Implications for three areas will be discussed here—for law enforcement policy, for political science, and for the social sciences in general.

If it is true that understanding why a person acts as he does is necessary in order to control his actions, then these results may be of some utility to police administrators. Perhaps more than anything else, these findings may be reassuring to them. In the differences in behavior which emerge across departments varying in their style lies evidence that decisions made at the top of an

organization do, to some degree, percolate down to influence per-
formance at the bottom of an organization. The behavior of patrol-
men on the streets of Boston does reflect the old-fashioned, decen-
tralized organizational structure. Modernization, on the other
hand, can lead to rapid and dramatic behavioral change (as evidenced
by Washington) and to lasting, if not always so dramatic, behavioral
change (as evidenced by Chicago). The decisions of organizational
superiors regarding what the style and the ethos of the police
department should be do influence the actions of organizational sub-
ordinates.

More specifically, these results point to certain problems and
possibilities for police officials as they attempt to control the
behavioral output of their organization. Perhaps most apparent is
the generally less desirable performance observed among more experi-
enced officers, compared to less experienced officers. The lower
arrest and reporting rates, the more expressive manner, and the lower
levels of effort observed in the more experienced cohorts all pose
problems for the police department which aspires to "professional"
performance. What should be done—and, indeed, whether or not any-
thing can or should be done—depends on what exactly are the causes
of the differences. For example, if the patterns result from a
growing sense of cynicism, as was suggested in Chapter VI, then mid-
career training and counseling programs and changes in promotion
and retention policies may be appropriate correctives. If, on the
other hand, the relationships reflect generational shifts in the
character of recruits to the police force, there may be little that

can be done about them, other than to try to recruit more selectively in the future. The inherent weaknesses of the cross-sectional design used here prevent any precise specification of the source of, or a possible solution for, the problem, but the results obtained are at least useful as a means of establishing that a problem exists. Definitive solutions must await further research, employing a longitudinal component, that can pinpoint more precisely the roots of the patterns observed.

As has been the finding in other organizational contexts, these results suggest that satisfaction with job has received more than its due attention. Efforts to improve morale, it appears, might better be justified on the humanistic ground that it is good for workers to be happy in their jobs than on the pragmatic ground that efficiency and productivity will be enhanced. Caution is essential here, however, because the factor does appear to have more of an effect in some organizational contexts (Chicago, for example) than others.

The differences in the behavior of white and black officers suggest that more intensive recruiting of blacks will improve the overall level of police performance. The effects which racial prejudice has on police treatment of citizens argue for departmental efforts—through recruitment and training—to reduce the level of racial antagonism among patrolmen.

Of course, although departments can, through their recruitment, training, and promotional policies, control to some degree the

characteristics of the patrol force, these characteristics are, in some measure, exogenously determined and outside the manipulative range of the department. Fortunately, the foregoing analyses do suggest a number of ways in which the department can mitigate the impact of these individual factors. For one, the relationships between manner toward non-offenders and experience and attitude toward blacks suggest that departments can get officers to change their notions of "good" and "bad" performance. More significant, the differences observed between relationships in low and high visibility situations suggest that departments can reduce the effects of "undesirable" individual differences by keeping visibility to the department high. Therefore, whatever the department can do to make subordinates conscious of its oversight—be it through reliance on citizen-invoked rather than police-invoked initiation of encounters or through the requiring of careful log-keeping and comprehensive written reports—is likely to cut down on the impact of these individual factors.

Similarly, given the results observed for variations in visibility to peers, a department should be able to minimize the impact of "undesirable" individual differences by relying on one-man rather than two-man patrols and, if two-man patrols must be used, by assigning to work together officers who differ from each other, rather than resemble each other, in their characteristics. Perhaps the best way to offset the predispositions of more experienced officers, white officers, and racially prejudiced officers, in other words, is to

assign them to work with less experienced officers, black officers, and racially unprejudiced officers, respectively. Other factors which must also enter into the balance here, though, are the direct effects which visibility to department and to partner exert on behavior. The consistently lower rates at which the legal process is invoked by two-man teams argue for greater reliance on one-man patrols—an argument which is buttressed by cost considerations—while, with respect to manner, the choice hinges on whether an impersonal or a friendly manner is taken as the ideal. Increased visibility to the department, on the other hand, appears primarily likely to ameliorate slightly the formal and informal treatment of offenders.

If the task of the political scientist is to understand the process of authoritative allocation and the process whereby support is generated for the political system, these findings also contribute to our understanding of the basic political processes of our society. It is, perhaps above all else, reassuring to see that legal considerations play as large a role in determining formal outcomes as they do. This is an important corrective to accounts which look to everything except the law in order to explain formal police actions. At the same time, it is also important to recognize that a multitude of other, essentially extraneous factors—organizational, individual, and situational—do seem to impinge between "the law" and "the law in effect." People who confront certain kinds of officers, certain kinds of people, people who act in certain kinds of ways, and people

who meet the police in certain kinds of situations will fare differently than will others. "Equal treatment under the law" thus stands more as an ideal than as an accurate description of the way in which the policemen actually implement the law.

In addition, these results make it easier to understand why levels of support and compliance differ across the various strata of society. Simply put, the police, in their formal and informal actions, treat some citizens more favorably than others. Some citizens get arrested less often, receive a more sympathetic response to their complaints of victimization, are treated in a more friendly or a more professional way, and have their neighborhoods patrolled more aggressively. All these things have, as Gourley says, a "constantly-accumulating effect" on public evaluations of the police and ultimately, the assumption is, on the support which citizens cede to political institutions and those who man them. It is likely that, in the less favorable treatment given to lower-class and black complainants and offenders (compared to their higher-class and white counterparts), the slower responses to calls from black neighborhoods, and the less friendly manner toward black citizens and young people lie at least some of the roots of disenchantment with police authority and public authority—roots that may continue to bear bitter fruit for some time to come.

Finally, these results make a small but unique contribution to our understanding of the interplay of individual and situational factors in the determination of behavior—a contribution which has implications, not just for political scientists, but for behavioral scientists of all kinds. The contribution is a unique one because,

unlike so many of the studies which have pursued this problem, this one is based on data gathered in a natural setting, not a contrived experimental one. At the same time, the number and types of factors measured were sufficient that it is possible to impose a modicum of control. Thus, while internal validity suffers in comparison with experimental results, the external validity of these results is considerably stronger than that of the results of most studies addressing these questions.

Perhaps the finding of greatest significance to the individual differences-situational differences controversy is the relative strength of situational factors and the relative weakness of individual factors as determinants of behavior. In general, the acts of the policemen observed in this study appear to be far more dependent on the characteristics of the situation in which the person acts than on the characteristics of the person who acts. It is, of course, important to recognize that this is a conclusion which is, strictly speaking, relevant only to the particular context in which the study was carried out, with its particular blend of individual and situational heterogeneity, and that the number and the quality of the individual difference measures leave much to be desired. However, these results, in combination with the multitude of other research results discussed in Chapter III, urge political scientists and social scientists in general to pay greater heed than they previously have to the circumstances in which behavior occurs, as opposed to focusing narrowly on the characteristics of actors alone. They confirm the dangers inherent in the simple

inference from the fact that a person has a certain characteristic to the conclusion that he will act in a certain way. Inferences of these kinds must be far more qualified, in terms of both the magnitude of the impact the characteristics have and the circumstances in which they will exert whatever effects they do have. Conversely, these results redirect attention toward the details of the complex stimulus to which an actor in the "real world" responds and especially to the expectations of the significant others to whom the behavior is actually or potentially visible.

However, if these results do support the essential thrust of the situationalists' argument, they also supply a corrective for some of their other themes. While situational factors do account for the greater share of variance in behavior in this police context, individual factors play a role too. It is easy to denigrate the weak correlations between individual factors and behavior but, all things considered, the actor is by no means irrelevant to his act, particularly under certain conditions.

The results here also call into question the need to resort to idiographic, as opposed to nomothetic, explanations of behavior, as some situationalists have argued. While it may be true that, as Mischel writes, "we may predict best if we know what each situation means to the individual", it is also true that we can do reasonably well in predicting by grouping individuals and situations into relatively broad, theoretically justifiable classes—particularly if we follow the "contingent relationship" strategy employed here. And

we can do so without having to acquire the detailed information about the individual's prior experience in the same or a similar (however those nettlesome terms are to be operationalized) situation that the idiographic approach requires. True, our ability to understand specific acts will be impaired, but our ability to generalize will remain intact. All this suggests that researchers who approach individual differences—or situational differences, for that matter—from a nomothetic perspective have not, as some critics have implied, been pursuing a blind alley. Rather, they have employed an approach which, like a variety of approaches, has its virtues and its deficiencies. Instead of scrapping it, social scientists would be better advised to pay greater attention to what both its strengths and its limitations are.

So the direction in which these results point is one of greater attention to the conditions in which behavior is evoked and continuing attention to the characteristics of actors. Obviously this is a more complicated view of reality than that inherent in the classical "trait-state" explanation of behavior or even a strict situational explanation. It calls for simultaneous attention to a wide range of individual and situational factors and to their interactions. The resultant lack of parsimony is undoubtedly distressing to those who aspire to explain all of political behavior or even human behavior in terms of a few simple principles—that potential was, in fact, probably the greatest appeal of the classical "individual difference" model. But perhaps it is time that social

scientists, including political scientists, explicitly recognize
that human behavior is by far the most complicated of all the
natural phenomena and begin to develop both theories and method-
ologies which reflect that complexity.

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